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Kim Jong Nam meets the press

Thursday, January 29th, 2009

Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong il’s eldest son (and a “nice” guy I am told), has recently been fairly amenable to speaking to foreign journalists—in English—about developments in the DPRK. He has largely avoided giving much away except that he is not interested in succeeding his father—who is healthy.

Here is a video interview of KJN at Beijing Capital Airport where he boarded another plane to Macau. (Is Air Koryo flying into Beijing’s new terminal?)

Bradley Martin, author of Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, reports on KJN’s activities in Bloomberg:

Kim Jong Nam, who was wearing large sunglasses and a knit cap, said he was in Macau, Asia’s largest casino destination, for a “holiday trip.” “I never gamble out here,” he said before climbing into a taxi, with no sign of accompanying bodyguards.

At Beijing’s airport earlier in the day, Kim Jong Nam told Asahi Television that he had “no information” on whether Megumi Yokota, a Japanese national abducted by North Korean agents in 1977, might still be alive.

When asked whether he was interested in succeeding his father as North Korea’s leader, Kim said “I am not interested by the issue, sorry.”

Kim Jong Nam went to boarding school in Switzerland (as did his younger brother Kim Jong Chol). Aside from English, Korean, and French, I would bet he also speaks some German, Mandarin, and Cantonese. He was also rumored to be the target of an assassination plot in Austria in 2004. Since my source with Austrian intelligence has gone dormant, I cannot confirm this.

Read the full article here:
Kim Jong Il Seems Healthy, Eldest Son Tells Fuji News in Macau
Bloomberg
Bradley Martin and Taku Kato
1/27/2009

Posted in Aviation, Political economy | 3 Comments »

CFR: US must prepare for potential instability in DPRK

Wednesday, January 28th, 2009

Council on Foreign Relations
1/28/2009

Download report here (PDF)

Continuing uncertainties about the health of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il and possible succession arrangements “warrant heightened attention and preparation” by U.S. policymakers, says a new Council on Foreign Relations report. “The risks are too great and the stakes too high” for U.S. policymakers “to rely on last-minute improvisation for a peaceful and stable outcome” in nuclear-armed North Korea, says the report sponsored by CFR’s Center for Preventive Action (CPA).

In preparing for sudden change, the report recommends that the United States “continue to promote behavioral change within the current regime rather than actively seek to overthrow it unless extreme circumstances dictate otherwise.” But it cautions that: “The United States should not support efforts to prop up the current regime beyond the point at which it has clearly ceased to govern effectively.”

The report also warns against “high-handed U.S. action,” advocating that the United States “defer to South Korean wishes and leadership in the management of change in North Korea,” except if “overriding national interests compel unilateral action.” The report was coauthored by CPA Director Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit of the Weatherhead East Asia Institute at Columbia University.

The report also stresses that the potential political, economic, security, and humanitarian challenges presented by instability in the Korean Peninsula as a result of sudden change demand U.S. cooperation with the region’s principal powers. “Failure to accommodate [these powers’] national interests… could have profoundly negative consequences for the evolution of Korea, the stability of northeast Asia, and U.S. relations with major allies and other countries in the region,” says the report.

The report, titled Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea, examines three potential succession scenarios, each of which poses its own set of challenges to U.S. policymakers:

1) Managed succession: the current regime, which has ruled North Korea since 1948, maintains power but under new leadership.

2) Contested succession: different factions vie for power in Pyongyang, resulting in regime change and a new policy direction. “How a power struggle would play out and who the eventual winner or winners might be is obviously impossible to predict, but a prolonged, divisive, and potentially even violent succession struggle is not out of the question,” says the report.

3) Failed succession: changes in North Korean leadership produce no clear and effective national leader, fatally weakening the state’s ability to function and leading to its eventual demise. In this scenario, North Korea’s “rapid absorption by South Korea is widely viewed as the inevitable next step.”

Regardless of how succession transpires, the report offers specific policy recommendations on how the United States can improve its ability to manage sudden change in the peninsula. These include:

1. Enhancing U.S. readiness: “The United States should upgrade its ability to discern and comprehend domestic political, economic, and other developments in North Korea.” For example, the report recommends enhancing U.S. intelligence to take advantage of a variety of new sources of information; establishing broader contacts with Pyongyang during ongoing denuclearization negotiations; and reestablishing the working relationship between the U.S. and North Korean militaries to recover the remains of American soldiers missing or killed in action during the Korean War.

2. Promoting allied coordination and preparedness: “The United States should work closely with South Korea and Japan to improve allied coordination and preparedness for contingencies in North Korea… The current joint military planning between the United States and South Korea needs to be augmented with a coordinated political, diplomatic, economic, and legal strategy to tackle the core issues likely to arise.”

3. Fostering regional transparency and capacity-building: “To reduce the risk of misunderstanding and friction in a crisis involving North Korea, the United States should pursue a quiet dialogue with the People’s Republic of China to discuss issues of mutual concern… The aim of such talks would be not only to raise potential concerns and discuss possible responses but also to minimize misunderstandings that might arise and seriously exacerbate a crisis.” The United States also should open discussions with South Korea and Japan, UN agencies, European counterparts, and nongovernmental organizations.

4. The report concludes: “Improving contingency planning, sharing the results of this planning, improving consultation on the future of the Korean peninsula, and taking concrete steps to build up generic, potentially useful capabilities—though certainly not sufficient in and of themselves to cope with these challenges—will establish a much firmer foundation for the future.”

The report is coauthored by Paul B. Stares, the General John W. Vessey Senior Fellow for Conflict Prevention and Director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Joel S. Wit, Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at the Weatherhead East Asia Institute, Columbia University, and a Visiting Fellow at the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University.

Download report here (PDF)

UPDATE: Information from the Korea Times:

South Korea and the United States should maintain about 460,000 troops to deal with any unusual situation on the Korean Peninsula that results from internal instability in North Korea, says a new report published by a private U.S. foreign policy organization Wednesday.

The figure represents a three-fold increase in the number of U.S. troops currently deployed to Iraq.

The authors believe Pyongyang possesses six to eight nuclear weapons as well as several ballistic missiles and 4,000 tons of chemical weapons. China might also try to secure the North’s WMDs in the case of an emergency, they forecast.

The South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command drew up a conceptual action plan to respond to sudden changes in North Korea, codenamed CONPLAN 5029, in 1999.

The plan includes outlines for joint military responses by South Korean and U.S. troops to various levels of internal turmoil in North Korea, according to sources.

Contingencies include a mass inflow of North Korean refugees, a civil war provoked by a revolt or coup, South Korean hostages being held in the North, and natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods.

The plan also includes measures to prevent Pyongyang’s weapons of mass destruction from being smuggled out of the country, if the regime was involved in a domestic crisis or suddenly collapses.

In 2005, the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which pursued a policy of greater independence from the United States, rejected a U.S. proposal to develop the conceptual plan to an operational plan involving more specific scenarios.

Read the full article here:
‘460,000 Troops Needed to Stabilize NK Collapse’
Korea Times
Jung Sung-ki
1/28/2009

Posted in Political economy, USA | Comments Closed

The evolving clandestine leaflet market

Wednesday, January 28th, 2009

UPDATE 3: February 26, 2009. According to Yonhap:

Prosecutors on Thursday questioned two activists who brought in North Korean bills for their leaflet campaign criticizing North Korea, allegedly in violation of South Korean law.

The South Korean government has not restricted the controversial leaflet campaign, which criticizes North Korean leader Kim Jong-il as “the most vicious dictator and murderer,” saying there was no law to stop it.

But the Unification Ministry requested a probe for the first time last week, after the activists attached North Korean banknotes to their flyers to encourage North Korean citizens to pick them up.

Bringing North Korean money into South Korea is permitted only for trade purposes or for personal possession. Violations can result in up to three years in jail or 10 million won (US$6,562) in fines, according to the law on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.

A North Korean defector, Park Sang-hak, and Choi Sung-yong whose fisherman father is allegedly being held in North Korea, flew scores of North Korean banknotes attached to some 20,000 propaganda leaflets toward North Korea via gas-filled balloons on Feb. 16, Kim’s birthday. Most of the flyers never reached the North, however, because of unfavorable winds.

Prosecutors said they questioned the activists about how the North Korean money was brought in. Other details were not available.

“They asked us how we acquired the North Korean bills and how much we have,” Park said.

UPDATE 2: February 16, 2009. Kim Jong Il’s official birthday. The activists called Seoul’s bluff and sent the flyers across the DMZ with DPRK won in tow. Nothing has happened. Pyongyang has not yet complained in the press (as of 2/24).

UPDATE: South Korean government declares the use of DPRK won by groups is illegal:

“It is against the law for civic groups to bring in North Korean currency [into the ROK] without Unification Minister authorization and enclose it in leaflets,” ministry spokesman Kim Ho-nyeon said at a news briefing.

“It is the related ministries’ position that such a request for authorization, if it comes, is likely to harm the order of South-North cooperation and thus will not be granted.”

In other words: “You need permission to do this and we will not give it to you.” But according to Yonhap:

Defying the announcement, organizations of North Korean defectors and families of abducted South Koreans vowed to go ahead with a plan to fly a fresh batch of propaganda leaflets across the heavily fortified border in February. They said the new leaflets will be flown with North Korean bills attached to encourage people to pick them up.

If they go through with this plan, the stage will be set for what I assume will be a well-publicized showdown between the police and North Korean defector groups.

ORIGINAL POST:
South Korea-based human rights groups garnered headlines last year by sending hundreds of thousands of leaflets about Kim Jong il’s lifestyle into the DPRK attached to balloons. (A copy of the leaflet and a rough English explication can be found here). Not only did these leaflets promt repeated public complaints from Pyongyang, but they were also blamed for the North’s unilateral “renegotiation” of inter-Korean cooperation projects in Kaesong—which reduced cross border civilian traffic to 880—about 20% of the 4,200 licensed to enter the Kaesong Complex. Of course closing down these projects was also a goal of the human rights groups, so in the end Pyongyang delivered its most vocal critics a double victory: South Korean subsidies to the North via Kaesong have been drastically curtailed and the balloons, which were temporarily suspended, have resumed.

As an aside, there is evidence that the Kaesong projects were curtailed for other reasons, most notably internal political concerns and/or the politics of North-South relations. No matter the true cause(s), Pyongyang publicly blamed the leaflets.

Although Pyongyang has discovered it had little political leverage over the supply side of the leaflet market, it retains significant leverage over the demand side. Quoting from Yonhap:

North Korea is arresting citizens who possess U.S. one dollar bills as a way to crack down on packages of anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets sent by South Korean activists that include the currency, an activist here said Wednesday.

The North’s spy agency, the State Security Agency, issued the directive in early November to stop citizens from collecting the leaflets that criticize leader Kim Jong-il and his communist regime, said Park Sang-hak, a North Korean defector and leader of Fighters For Free North Korea in Seoul.

So now we move to round three. How will the human rights groups respond?

South Korean activist groups will attach N. Korean currency to anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent into North Korea, replacing US$1 bills, following rumors that citizens found with the notes are punished, an activist said Thursday.

Seoul’s National Intelligence Service confirmed that North Korean authorities arrest and interrogate those who possess U.S. dollars that allegedly came with the leaflets from South Korea. But the spy agency declined to comment on what kind of punishment they face.

To prevent further arrests, Park Sang-hak, a North Korean defector and head of Fighters for Free North Korea in Seoul, said his organization and another activist group will send 5,000 won North Korean notes — the highest denomination in the country — when they fly a fresh batch of balloons into North Korea next month.

The amount is just enough to purchase about 2kg of rice, officials and aid workers say, and is a little more than the average monthly salary for urban workers. A North Korean household needs at least 20,000 won a month to survive, they added.

This is an interesting move as it increases the demand for leaflets in the DPRK in two important ways. The first, is that low-level workers and cadres will find it much easier to possess and spend DPRK won (compared to $US), particularly in the southern provinces. Secondly, the DPRK-US$ exchange rate is about W3,000/$1, so the switch represents a 66% increase in purchasing power per collected note!

Of course this raises the question of where they will get the DPRK won:

Park refused to elaborate on how he acquired the North Korean bills, except to say that they passed through China’s border region with North Korea.

South Koreans can bring North Korean money into the country only for trade purposes and must first receive government approval to do so. Failure to abide by these restrictions can result in three years in jail or a 20 million won (US$15,198) fine. The ministry is reviewing whether the activists’ possession of North Korean bills was legitimate.

But other than creating routine problems for North Korean state security, I am not sure what specific results human rights groups seek from these activities. North Korea’s information blockade cracked over a decade ago—even in the southern provinces where the balloons drift. Although people in these areas might possess little positive information about the outside world, they probably have a general sense that the state of global affairs is not as their leaders portray. So, breaking the information blockade is a necessary but not sufficient condition for social change in the DPRK.

Unfortunately, the information on the leaflets is predominately non-actionable. Rather than condemning Kim Jong il’s lifestyle, the leaflets should provide instructions on accessing foreign radio and television broadcasts, tactics for clandestine organization, case studies in successful defection, business and smuggling opportunities, local prices, and even mundane news like sports scores, movie reviews, etc. This would likely be much more valuable to the North Koreans than political propaganda.

This is an interesting tactic, however, and I look forward to seeing what the next moves will be from players in both the North and South.

Read the full articles here:
N. Korea arresting carriers of $1 bills to stop anti-Pyongyang leaflets: activist
Yonhap
Kim Hyun
1/7/2009

Activists to send N. Korean currency with anti-Pyongyang leaflets
Yonhap
Kim Hyun
1/8/2009

North Korea cash sent with leaflets illegal: Seoul
Reuters
Jack Kim
1/27/2009

Seoul bars activists from bringing in N. Korean currency
Yonhap
1/28/2009

Posted in Political economy, South Korea | 6 Comments »

DPRK ministerial shakeup and SPA elections announced

Monday, January 5th, 2009

UPDATE 3: According to numerous media sources, Choe Sung Chol has been shot (h/t Marmot). Read more here: Bloomberg, Reuters, Korea Times.

UPDATE 2: According to the Joong Ang Daily:

North Korea’s point man on South Korea, who was earlier said to have been sacked for misjudgment, is said to be undergoing what sources called “severe” communist training at a chicken farm, sources here said yesterday.

Choe Sung-chol, once a vice chairman of the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee, the North’s state organization handling inter-Korean affairs, was reported to have been dismissed in early 2008 for what sources called his lack of foresight on South Korea’s new conservative administration under President Lee Myung-bak.

Political dissidents in North Korea are said to often undergo training on the communist revolution. This includes hard labor in harsh environments, such as mines or in labor camps.

Choe, 52, became better known to South Korean officials and the public in 2007, when he escorted then-President Roh Moo-hyun throughout his visit to Pyongyang for a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

He is also known to have played a key role in arranging the summit.

Officials in Seoul have acknowledged the dismissal of Choe, but could not confirm his whereabouts or why he was sacked.

“He has been undergoing training for about a year now, so it really is hard to tell whether he will be reinstated or not,” another source said, also speaking on condition of anonymity.

(UPDATE 1) Shortly after the DPRK’s ministerial and leadership changes were dscovered, the DPRK announced the Supreme People’s Assembly will be recomposed in March. According to Reuters:

The reclusive North’s official media said in a two-sentence dispatch the election for deputies to its Supreme People’s Assembly would be held on March 8, without offering details.

North Korea wants to promote economic elite to the assembly to help lay the groundwork for the next generation of its leadership, a think tank affiliated with the South’s intelligence service said in a report in December, Yonhap news agency said.

However, analysts cautioned against reading too much into the leadership changes, saying Kim Jong-il and his inner circle hold the real power while ministers and other government officials have almost no influence in forming policy.

The assembly session that typically meets in April each year is a highly choreographed affair focused on budget matters where legislation is traditionally passed with unanimous approval.

North Koreans can vote only for the candidates selected by supreme leaders who allocate assembly seats to promote rank-and-file officials and purge those no longer in favor.

“Even if we know that someone was replaced, everything related to it is pure speculation because we have no clue as to the individual inclinations of these people,” said Andrei Lankov, an expert on the North at the South’s Kookmin University. (Reuters)

The Joong Ang Ilbo provides some additional facts:

The election is also a mere formality in the North because the candidates are hand-picked by the Workers’ Party and then approved by North leader Kim Jong-il.

The five-year terms of the 687 representatives, selected in 2003, were supposed to end last September. North Korea watchers have speculated that Kim’s health was linked to the election delay. According to intelligence sources in Seoul, Kim suffered a stroke in August.

North Korea watchers said Kim’s appearance at a polling station will put an end to speculation about his health. Kim had cast ballots in the 1998 and 2003 elections, according to past North Korean media reports.

With the upcoming election, Kim’s regime will enter its third term. The newly formed legislature will, on paper, form a cabinet, devise a national budget plan and conduct foreign policy.

Following former leader Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, the Supreme People’s Assembly did not meet for four years. At that meeting, it elected the younger Kim as the National Defense Commission chairman and officially launched his regime. At the time, the legislature also amended the Constitution and undertook a dramatic cabinet shakeup.

ORIGINAL POST
According to the Joong Ang Daily:

Yu Yong-sun, a 68-year-old Buddhist leader, has become North Korea’s senior South Korea policy maker, a top Seoul official told the JoongAng Ilbo yesterday.

Choe Sung-chol, deputy director of the United Front Department of the North Korean Workers’ Party, was in charge of Pyongyang’s South Korean affairs until early last year. After he lost the job, Yu, head of the Korean Buddhists Federation, was appointed to the post, the source said.

“Yu succeeded Choe in March last year,” the source said. “Choe was once deeply trusted by [North Korean] leader Kim Jong-il, but he stepped down because he had failed to accurately assess the outcome of the 2007 presidential election in the South, the Lee Myung-bak administration’s North Korea policy and the outlook for inter-Korean relations.”

The source also said corruption scandals involving the overseas North Korean assistance committee under the United Front Department played a role in Choe’s sacking.

Choe played a crucial role in arranging the second inter-Korean summit between the president of South Korea at the time, Roh Moo-hyun, and Kim in 2007.

Yu, the successor, is not an entirely new face in inter-Korean affairs. Since 2000, he represented the North in several rounds of inter-Korean ministerial talks. He has led the Buddhist group since May 2006.

“We’ve also obtained intelligence that Kwon Ho-ung, who used to be the chief negotiator for the inter-Korean ministerial talks, stepped down from the post and has been put under house arrest,” the source said.

The North reshuffled its cabinet recently, according to the South’s Unification Ministry. Ho Thaek, vice minister of the electric power industry, was promoted to minister. Other minister-level promotions also took place at the Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Forestry and Ministry of Foreign Trade. (Jeong Yong-soo, JoongAng Ilbo)

The Choson Ilbo reports on some more ministerial changes:

North Korea has reshuffled two cabinet ministers and appointed a new man to a key post in the Workers’ Party. North Korean state media reported that Kim Tae-bong was appointed new metal industry minister and Hur Tack new power industry minister. They replace Kim Sung-hyun and Pak Nam-chil. Kim Kyong-ok as newly-named first deputy director of the ruling party’s Organization Guidance Department that controls the party, Army and administration and is headed by leader Kim Jong-il.

It is rare for reshuffles to be announced separately. The new economic appointments may be related to the emphasis on “economic recovery” in a New Year’s statement released in the state media last week that is the closest the North has to an annual message from Kim Jong-il, a government official here speculated. The statement described the metal industry as the “pillar of the independent economy of socialism” and said the electricity, coal and railroad sectors “should take the lead in the people’s economic development through reforms.” Hence replacement of the metal and power industry ministers, according to the official. He admitted little is known about the newly appointed ministers.

The Organization and Guidance Department’s new first deputy director Kim Kyong-ok is reportedly in charge of regional party organizations.

“If the power succession is to move smoothly, the economy must be revived and control of the party organization is essential,” an intelligence officer here said. He predicted noticeable changes in the North’s power structure this year. A researcher at the Korea Institute of National Unification said North Korea “is going to take various steps in a bid to prevent Kim Jong-il’s authority from weakening due to ill health.”

And from Yonhap:

North Korea promoted industrial veterans to top posts in its latest Cabinet reshuffle, signaling Pyongyang’s stepped-up drive to rebuild the country’s frail economy, Seoul officials and analysts said Tuesday.

A reshuffle in the communist state is usually inferred when new faces appear in its media, as the country does not publicize such moves.

Five new names were mentioned as the North’s ministers of railways, forestry, electricity, agriculture and metal industry in the North’s New Year message and reports in October, Seoul’s Unification Ministry Spokesman Kim Ho-nyoun said.

“They are formerly vice ministers or those who climbed the ladder in each field. The reshuffle considered their on-spot experiences and expertise,” the spokesman said.

It was not clear when the reshuffle took place, he said.

North Korean media have been reporting a brisk campaign to rebuild the country’s ailing industrial infrastructure, following up on the New Year economic blueprint rolled out by leader Kim Jong-il. Kim called on citizens “to solve problems by our own efforts” and increase production in electricity, coal and daily equipment.

In the reshuffle, Jon Kil-su was named minister of railways; Kim Kwang-yong minister of forestry; Ho Taek minister of power industry; Kim Chang-sik minister of agriculture; Kim Tae-bong minister of metal industry.

Kim Kwang-yong and Kim Chang-sik were vice ministers and Jon held a senior post in their respective ministry. Ho was formerly a power plant chief, while little was known about Kim Tae-bong, Seoul officials said.

The shakeup was rumored to have affected more posts, but the Seoul spokesman could not officially confirm it.

Koh Yu-hwan, a North Korea studies professor at Seoul’s Dongguk University, said the reshuffle is a sign that the North is shifting its focus to the economy from the military. In its New Year message, Pyongyang pledged to build a “prosperous and powerful nation” by 2012, the 100th anniversary of North Korean founder Kim Il-sung’s birth, he noted.

“The key word this year is the economy,” Koh said. “The reshuffle seems to suggest officials with technical expertise should take the initiative to develop the economy.”

Kim Young-yoon, a researcher with the Korea Institute for National Unification, said Pyongyang is turning to its natural resources amid suspension of South Korean aid. The Seoul government halted its customary aid of rice and fertilizer this past year as Pyongyang refused offers of dialogue.

“North Korea has no other way but turn to its own natural resources as long as inter-Korean relations and the nuclear issue are in limbo,” he said.

Read the full articles here:
Buddhist leader gets North’s South policy spot
JoongAng Daily
Jeong Yong-soo
1/5/2009

N.Korea Reshuffles Economic Posts
Choson Ilbo
1/5/2009

N. Korea promotes industry veterans in Cabinet reshuffle
Yonhap
Kim Hyun
1/6/2008

North Korea says to elect MPs in government shake-up
Reuters
1/6/2009

North to hold parliamentary election
Joong Ang Ilbo
Ser Myo-ja
1/8/2009

Top North official said to be getting re-educated
Joong Ang Daily
1/12/2009

Posted in Buddhist Alliance, Cabinet, Environmental protection, Forestry, Inter-Korean summit, Lumber, Manufacturing, Ministry of Electrical Industry, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Metal Industry, Ministry of Power and Coal, Ministry of Railways, Organization and Guidance Department, Political economy, Railways, Supreme Peoples Assembly, United Front Department | 6 Comments »

2009 Joint Editorial published

Monday, January 5th, 2009

North Korea’s “New Year’s Day Joint Editorial” lays out the government’s policy priorities for the year—similar to a US State of the Union address. In the editorial, which is quite long, the government committed to strengthening the military, ridding the peninsula of nuclear weapons, improving the economy (energy, agriculture, and transport) and improving the people’s quality of life. Although the editorial is quite long, KCNA published a summary (KCNA link here, PDF here).

Today the Korean Worker’s Party threw itself a rally in Kim il Sung Square in support of the 2009 Joint Editorial.

Here are some reactions in the press:
Jon Herskovitz in Reuters, Korea Times, AFP, Xinhua.

Posted in Domestic publication, Kim's New Year Address (Joint editorials), Political economy | 1 Comment »

North Korean Revolutionary Merit Competition

Tuesday, December 23rd, 2008

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
12/23/2008

North Korea, since December 3rd, has been holding a “Competition for Revolutionary Descendants” in each province, over two days. The competition is the third of its kind, following on from 1998 and 2002.

A source confirmed in a phone conversation with the Daily NK on the 21st, “In Hyesan, Yangkang Province, from December 3rd, there was a “Competition for Revolutionary Descendants.” This competition took place simultaneously in each province.”

Another source said, “There was a competition in Chongjin, North Hamkyung Province in early December and many gifts, including clothing, were given out to the participants.”

The competition was held to stabilize the volatile state of affairs, spurred by rumors of Kim Jong Il’s illness, issues of food shortages, and the distribution of flyers in North Korea, by intercepting in advance any possible unrest among the core class.

(* North Korea categorized the population into the “core class (3,915,000),” the “unstable class (3,150,000),” and the “hostile class (7,935,000)” in 1971)

The Yangkang-based source said, “The competition was held with participation from the Party Chief Secretary of the province, the key officials in the province, city and county and chairpersons of the Peoples’ Units, descendants of revolutionaries and war veterans were invited to the competition.”

He then said, “Rather than being a real competition, it was a gathering to provide meals and distribute gifts. On the morning of the third day, after a flower-basket presentation ceremony at the Kim Il Sung memorial at the Bocheonbo Combat Victory Monument, a meeting was held at the Kim Jong Suk Arts Theater.”

He further noted, “At the meeting, there was a political lecture given by the new Propaganda Secretary of the Party in the Province Kim Bong She, after the congratulatory address by the Chief Secretary of the Province. Kim closed the event with a speech urging emulation of the lofty example of the first generation of revolutionaries, who devoted everything to the General.”

According to the source, after the event wrapped up its main events on the afternoon of the 3rd, it continued until the evening on the 4th with a special performance by the Yangkang Provincial Performing Arts Troupe, a special banquet, a visit to the Yangkang Province Revolutionary Historical Site, and a ceremony for presenting gifts.

The source said, “The authorities put in a lot of preparation for the event. They even brought beer, luxury alcohol and cigarettes from Pyongyang for the competition participants. Also, there were special performances at the Yalu Restaurant, a famous restaurant in Hyesan, at the Hyesan Shopping Center restaurant, and at restaurants in various train stations.”

The source explained, “The officials went out of their way to shake hands with the competition participants and urged, ‘In such difficult times, we have to submit to the guidance of the General.”

He said, “At the competition, the issue of the Party’s active support for the children of deceased revolutionaries and needing to look after their needs was raised more than once. In particular, the provision for and subsistence of the descendants, due to difficult economic conditions, had been neglected, but the promise was made that, from now on, the Party in Yangkang Province would take an interest in and resolve the issue.”

Posted in Political economy, Songbun, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Idolization Ever Increasing

Friday, December 5th, 2008

Daily NK
Park Hyun Min
12/5/2008

The North Korean authorities have been expanding the construction of facilities that laud and idolize Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il throughout North Korea, in order to unite the people in spite of the severe economic crisis.

Up until the end of the 1990s, North Korea had been focusing on creating “revolutionary memorial halls” or ‘historic sites,’ or erecting statues in order to idolize the Kim family.

The main structure of idolatry, above all, is the Kim Il Sung statue. Among all the statues, the one in front of the Museum of Korean Revolution on the top of Mansudae hill in Pyongyang, erected in April 1972 to celebrate Kim Il Sung’s 60th birthday, is best-known. It is 23 meters (75.5 feet) high, including a 3 meter pedestal. The statue was once covered with gold, but it was removed.

Similar, less grandiose statues are located in all 70 major cities of North Korea. In total, there are 140,000 structures designed to idolize the Kim regime.

Especially after the death of Kim Il Sung, and the succession of Kim Jong Il three years later, in 1997, many mosaic murals were created throughout North Korea with the father and the son as the theme, and many of the revolutionary monuments were erected.

Mosaic murals mainly feature Kim Il Sung, the father with Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Il’s mother, Kim Jung Sook, made with glass or tiles of natural rocks baked at 1,200.

According to reports from the North Korean state-run media since 2000, one mural was made in 2000, four in 2002, then the number increased to 19 in 2003, 49 in 2004, and a sharp increase to 70 in 2005. Then in 2006, 55 murals were made while 67 were made last year. 88 murals have been made this year alone.

Furthermore, the size of the mosaic murals is growing. On average, the length and height of a mural is 5–10 meters. However, bigger murals with dimensions of 30 meters by 20 meters have been under construction.

The most well-known murals are located on Tongil (Unification) Street in Raknang district and on Kwangbok Street in Mankyungdae district in Pyongyang. The one on Kwangbok Street was made to celebrate Kim Sung Il’s 95th birthday in April, 2008, and goes by the name of “My great country, my nation, live forever.” The height and length of the murals are respectively 42 meters and 25 meters.

The other mural that was completed on Tongil Street the day before that was 33.7 meters long and 22 meters high.

Chosun Sinbo reported with great fanfare, “These murals are the biggest mosaic murals in the nation.”

Revolutionary monuments or historic memorials at places where Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il are known to have been, are being made constantly.

North Korea put up 31 revolutionary memorial slabs last year in places such as Pyongyang Music School or Pyongyang Shoe Factory, and 37 so far this year, in places like Suncheon First Middle School and Kangkye Pig Factory. Last year, revolutionary monuments were erected in five places, including the public building of the People’s Safety Agency in North Hamkyung Province and so far four monuments have been erected in places like Pyongyang 3.26 cable factory.

Jane Portal, the author of “Art under Control in North Korea” visited North Korea twice and assessed this idolatry as the world’s most intense, saying that Stalin and Mao Zedong’s idolatry cannot be compared with Kim Il Sung’s hunger for praise.

Additionally, North Korea is focusing on boosting people’s loyalty and revolutionary consciousness through collective visits to these historic sites, and by excavating or renovating them.

Chosun (North Korea) Central Broadcasting (the state-controlled radio station) last month hinted at the strengthened idolization process, saying that “Plans to revive historic sites in North Hamkyung province and the efforts of party members and laborers working on these projects are processing well.”

Posted in Advertising, Juche, Political economy | Comments Closed

Pyongyang changes official narrative on South

Monday, December 1st, 2008

In a recent Korea Times article, Andrei Lankov (citing Brian Myers) highlights how the DPRK has changed the narrative of its raison d’être in response to the growing realization among its people that South Korea is not the poor, exploited US colony the propaganda portrays it to be.

Quoting from the article:

Until some time a decade ago, the North Korean populace was expected and required to believe in a very simple world picture.

The North, led by the glorious dynasty of omniscient and benevolent rulers, was the best society on the face of the Earth, much envied and glorified by the less fortunate peoples of other countries.

The rest of the world was inferior, though people in the socialist countries admittedly fared better than the helpless inhabitants of the capitalist hell.

But worst of all was South Korea, the colony of the U.S. imperialists who exploited it with unparalleled brutality.

However, around 2000 the North Korean watchers (well, actually a handful of them with the time and ability to read the official press systematically) began to notice a new image of the South emerge.

Brian Myers, the ever observant reader of North Korean press and fiction first noticed the signs of this quiet transformation when it was only beginning.

Soon it became clear that he was right. A new propaganda line was being born. Interestingly, this time the new line was introduced not through newspapers, but in a more subtle way, through works of fiction, which also have to be approved by the supreme ideological authorities.

The new South Korea which emerged in these writings wasn’t so poor. Actually, it was not poor at all. The characters in recent North Korean novels, which deal with the imaginary life of the South, enjoy a lifestyle far superior to that of the average North Korean. They drive cars, dine out easily and live in expensive houses.

As Myers pointed out, the North Korean authors have poor ideas of how expensive Seoul real estate has become, so they sometimes overestimate South Korean’s income levels. In one novel, a young South Korean journalist buys a house in a very expensive neighborhood after merely a few years of work.

Does this mean that the new image of the South is positive? Of course not! South Korean society might be rich, the propaganda operators say, but it is still inferior to the North.

The South Koreans had to pay a terrible price for their success: they were deprived of their precious national identity.

The cultural uniqueness and racial purity of the great Korean nation has become endangered. Mixed marriages are mentioned frequently and in a way that makes readers believe they are between the same lusty Americans and young Korean women.

However, the propaganda insists, the South Koreans themselves are not happy about this situation. They dream about liberation and purification, and their hopes are pinned on Pyongyang and, above all, the Dear Leader himself. In recent years, North Korean propaganda has insisted that Kim Jong -il is worshipped in the South. Similar statements were made earlier as well.

According to this new logic, the North is a torchbearer, a proud protector of nationhood and racial purity. South Korean prosperity is tainted and hence should not be envied.

The North must fight for the ultimate salvation of the South, and such salvation can be achieved only through unification under the North Korean auspices, so all South Koreans will be able to enjoy the loving care of the Dear Leader. Only American troops and a handful of national traitors prevent this dream from coming true.

Lankov (and Myers) speculate that the North Korean government changed the narrative in response to unauthorized information permeating the country. In a related note, the overt propaganda in many North Korean films has also been reduced in recent decades.

Most importantly, Lankov reminds us that nationalism is not a viable long-term political strategy—even in North Korea. North Korean Juche was supposed to liberate the Korean people and deliver on material progress, but it has not succeeded. From top to bottom, many North Koreans already know this.

Posted in Advertising, Animation, Domestic publication, Film, Juche, Political economy, Television | 1 Comment »

Lankov on the DPRK’s information black hole

Wednesday, November 19th, 2008

Writing today in the Asia Times, Andrei Lankov offers a survey of the difficulties in collecting and analyzing information on the DPRK.

Quoting from his article:

The author is not privy to the great secrets of the assorted intelligence services that are trying to penetrate the mysteries of Pyongyang palaces. That said, one cannot completely rule out a possibility that the Dear Leader’s most trusted doctor is actually on the United States Central Intelligence Agency’s payroll, or that a couple of senior North Korean generals report to Seoul on the recent decisions of Kim Jong-il’s inner circle.

Such high-level penetration is not completely impossible – but it is very, very unlikely. It seems that even the most cunning and successful intelligence services are faring very badly when it comes to cracking North Korean secrets. Things might be going relatively well as long as signal intelligence is concerned: satellites do miracles these days. However, satellites and signal interception and other technological gadgetry is good only when it comes to detecting hardware. No satellite or drone can tell much about human plans and intentions, or about the state of society, and this is where the real problems begin.

To start with, the North Korean state is deliberately designed to be a mystery for outsiders. No state is welcoming to foreign spooks, but most states limit their counter-intelligence efforts. After all, perfect secrecy, if achievable, is too expensive because it makes information exchange impossible and hinders economic life. The North seems to be unrestrained by these concerns. Pyongyang believes that total secrecy is the pre-condition of the regime’s survival, and clearly doesn’t worry too much about the economic efficiency of its system.

The major source of information about any country is its media. However, since the early 1960s the North Korean press ceased publishing economic statistics of any kind. All information about economic performance is a closely guarded state secret. Therefore, our knowledge of the state of the North Korean economy is largely based on guesswork.

Still, certain things are known quite well. For example, foreign trade statistics are easily deduced from the trade reports of countries which deal with North Korea. On the other hand, when it comes to even the most basic macroeconomic indicators, estimates vary greatly. North Korean per capita gross domestic product is believed to be somewhere between US$400 and US$2,000. Also, there are some topics which cannot be mentioned in official press or elsewhere, such as the existence of rationing or the need to apply for a permit before travelling outside the county.

North Korean watchers spend plenty of time perusing the Nodong Sinmun and Minju Choson, the two official North Korean dailies which are available overseas. Although boring and repetitive to the extreme – and full of endless eulogies to the ruling family – these newspapers sometimes indicate subtle changes in official policies and ideologies. Still, these are merely hints, and often too vague to be interpreted correctly or expediently.

More direct intelligence has come with great difficulty. The number of foreigners residing in North Korea remains very small. In the mid-1980s, there were some 600-700, over 60% of whom were Russians and Chinese. Today, foreigners remain closely watched and isolated. A foreigner cannot visit the private home of a North Korean even briefly – only institutions which are authorized to deal with foreigners can be visited. A short conversation on the street is possible, but it should not be for too long.

North Koreans allowed to visit “foreigners’ places” are carefully selected and know what not to talk about. Foreigners – even those with Asian features – stand out in North Korea and are carefully watched by a population trained to remain on guard against intrusions of perfidious aliens. Trips outside Pyongyang and a few designated areas remain strictly prohibited; when such a trip is authorized, a foreigner is always accompanied by minders.

The only group of foreigners to enjoy some freedom of movement in North Korea are Chinese – and these are often ethnic Koreans. Chinese authorities probably have the best information about the state of affairs inside North Korea, but their knowledge remains unknown to the outside world.

Despite all the difficulties, the world does know – or believes it knows – something about Pyongyang politics. Until recently, the major source of news and information about North Korea was Japan. This was largely determined by Japan’s some 600,000-strong ethnic Korean community.

Surprisingly, in the 1950s, most ethnic Koreans in Japan chose to side with Pyongyang and even technically became North Korean citizens. Their association, Chosen Soren, became a secretive state-within-the-state, a major source of money and intelligence for North Korean authorities. Leading members of Chosen Soren have always had privileged access to powerful figures in the Pyongyang hierarchy. Understandably, some information was leaked.

However, as a rule most Japanese reports on North Korean politics are well of the mark. In some cases “news” is planted by political interests, other times false reports are honest mistakes. It is even suspected that in some cases journalists have deliberately fabricated stories to increase sales of their papers.

One of the major changes in recent years is that the border between China and North Korea has become extremely porous. Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese border areas have been major windows into the North. There is also a large community of North Korean illegal migrants, whose numbers in the late 1990s probably reached 250,000. Now there are some 30,000-40,000.

Some of these migrants make good money smuggling; others are employed at Chinese construction sites and sweatshops. These migrants stay in touch with their families in the North and the spread of mobile phones has facilitated the instantaneous flow of information.

Such family ties are hardly akin to James Bond-style secrets, but they do transmit handy low-level information about regulations on market trade or rules concerning workers of local factories. Until some 10 years ago, even such basic information usually remained unknown to outsiders.

Some groups have made use of the situation to provide North Korean news to the world. Most prominent of these providers is the Buddhist charity group Good Friends whose staff is permanently stationed in the border cities, where they gather information from visiting North Koreans. The results are published in regular newsletters that are partially translated into English. These newsletters provide invaluable intelligence.

Among other groups using similar strategies, the DailyNK is an online newspaper specializing in North Korean news and has correspondents in the Chinese border cities of Dandong and Shenyang. Their reports are very useful in understanding North Korean society, but seldom deal with high-level politics.

Finally, there is a large and fast growing community of North Korean defectors in the South. In 2000, there were merely a thousand defectors, but today their numbers have reached 15,000. These emigrants are remarkably different from the defectors of Europe’s Cold War era. People who fled from the former Soviet bloc included intellectuals, journalists, scholars and writers. Most of the North Korean defectors were impoverished farmers in the northern provinces. Many fled their starving villages, spent a few years in China and then found their way to the prosperous South. Prominent defectors are few and far between.

Still, all defectors possess useful information concerning daily life in North Korean society. This understanding is the major improvement from one or two decades ago. Observers are aware of how North Koreans make money, what they eat and how much they pay for their groceries.

We should not forget, however, that our knowledge of North Korean politics remains limited. In some cases we know names, but those names are merely empty symbols, without much content. For example, there is much speculation about Kim’s successor. Will it be Chang Song-t’aek, Kim’s brother-in-law? Or will Kim Jong-il choose his firstborn son, Kim Jong-nam? Or perhaps his younger son, Kim Jong-chol? And what about the current ladyfriend of the Dear Leader, a certain Ms Kim Ok?

The fact is we know nothing about these people. We have no idea about their affiliations, their experiences, or their vision for North Korea’s future.

Read the full article here:
Riddles and enigmas from North Korea
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
11/19/2008

Posted in Political economy | 1 Comment »

Jang Song Taek rumored to be in control

Sunday, November 9th, 2008

This seems speculative to me, however, the Daily Telegraph (London) is reporting that Kim Jong il’s brother in law, Jang Song Taek, is operating as the de facto decision-maker in the DPRK:

“Chang Sung Taek is now in control and is leading North Korea,” said Choi Jin Wook, of the (South Korean] government-affiliated Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul. “Other important figures consulted him, even when Kim Jong Il was OK. He will keep Kim Jong Il’s policy line even if he dies.”

Apart from his family connection to Mr Kim, Mr Chang is a cosmopolitan among North Korean cadres whose career bounced back from the brink of disaster just two years ago.

According to South Korea’s ministry of unification, he was educated at an elite school in Pyongyang, and married Mr Kim’s younger sister, Kim Kyong Hui, after studying in Moscow for three years.

He rose through the hierarchy to become head of the most powerful bureau of the Korean Workers’ Party’s, the “organisation and guidance department”. His older brother was the army general responsible for the defence of the capital itself.

In 2002, two years after a historic summit meeting between North and South, he led a delegation of senior officials on an unprecedented tour of South Korean industrial sites.

The most senior North Korean defector to the South, the former chief ideologue, Hwang Jang Yop, spoke of him as a potential successor to Mr Kim after a coup, and said that he was especially close to Kim Jong Nam, the dictator’s eldest son.

Perhaps because of his growing influence, Mr Chang was abruptly purged in 2004, and sent into internal exile. He reappeared in 2006 and last year a new and powerful post was created for him: head of the Party’s “administrative department”, in charge of the courts, the prosecutors, and the police – including those responsible for internal spying.

And in related news, it appears that the French doctor contacted by Kim Jong Nam (Kim Jong il’s eldest acknowledged son) did in fact visit Pyongyang, although he denies seeing Kim Jong il:

Japanese television identified a French brain surgeon who had recently visited Pyongyang – although he denied having treated Mr Kim. The Government has angrily denied that anything is wrong with him, and has released several photographs of him attending public events, none of which have quelled the growing consensus that he is ill.

If all this is true, and that is a big “if”, then this would seem to indicate that Jang and the Workers Party are set to lead the country when Kim finally reaches a stage where he is unable to make decisions.

Read more here:
North Korea ‘is being run by Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law’
Daily Telegraph
Richard Lloyd Parry
11/8/2008

Posted in Administrative Department (KWP), Organization and Guidance Department, Political economy, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

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