Archive for the ‘International Aid’ Category

(Updated) North Korea’s 2022 flooding season

Friday, July 1st, 2022

North Korea’s flooding season has begun. AP:

North Korea’s weather authorities predicted this year’s rainy season would start in late June and issued alerts for torrential downpours in most of its regions from Monday through Wednesday.

The official Korean Central News Agency said Tuesday that authorities in the North’s central and southwestern regions “have concentrated all forces and means on the work to cope with possible flood and typhoon damage.”

Officials and workers were working to protect crops, equipment at metal and chemical industrial establishments, power plant facilities and fishing boats from heavy rains, KCNA reported. It said the country’s anti-disaster agency was reviewing the readiness of emergency workers and medical staff.

KCNA said North Korean officials are urging residents and laborers to abide by pandemic-related restrictions during the country’s monsoon season. It said medical workers were ready to deal with any potential major health issues and officials were working to ensure epidemic control measures at shelters for people evacuated from flood-damaged areas.

As flooding spreads, the work to contain the damage ramps up. As state media reported on June 30th:

Officials and working people across the country are striving to minimize the damage by disastrous abnormal weather to the crops.

As soon as a warning on downpour was issued, the North Hwanghae Provincial Party Committee sent its officials to reservoirs, emptying gates and drainage pumping stations and ensured that officials in cities and counties went to the medium and small rivers and co-op farms in their areas to take measures for flood damage prevention. The province also pays attention to the threshing and keeping of wheat and barley.

South Hwanghae Province takes the best possible steps to send powerful forces and means to stricken areas in an emergency. Hundreds of excavators, lorries, tractors, etc. are ready to go to the afflicted areas.

(Source: “Proactive Efforts Made in DPRK to Minimize Damage by Flood to Crops,” Korean Central News Agency, June 30th, 2022.)

How well prepared can we presume North Korea to be to meet this year’s floods? Over the past few years, the regime has directed increasing attention and effort to disaster risk mitigation. It is obviously not a coincidence that Premier Kim Tok Hun inspected the State Hydro-meteorological Administration and the State Emergency Disaster Committee this week:

Learning in detail about the weather observation of the State Hydro-meteorological Administration, he said that it is very important to ensure the exactness and promptness of weather forecast in guaranteeing the successful implementation of the state policy tasks for the latter half of the year, including the grain production plan for this year, set forth at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth WPK Central Committee.

He stressed the need to minimize the damage from such disastrous weather phenomena as typhoon and downpour by enhancing the level of scientific forecast and analysis of the ever-changing weather conditions and their effect.
Visiting the State Emergency Disaster Committee, the premier called on all the sectors and units out in the campaign for preventing damage in rainy season to swiftly cope with any emergency and meticulously organize the work for protecting the state assets and ensuring the normal economic activity, regarding it as a core issue to protect the safety of the people.

He also called for establishing a proper work system and order to control in a stable way any crisis under the state’s unified direction and push ahead with the work for securing enough means and materials needed to tide over the crisis.

(Source: “Premier Inspects Hydro-meteorological Administration and Emergency Disaster Committee,” Korean Central News Agency, 29/6/22.)

I will continue to post updates on the events here as they are reported.

Update 10/7/22: The raining continues. From Reuters:

North Korean towns along the border with China were flooded this week after heavy rain, threatening to exacerbate an already critical food and economic situation in the country.

North Korea state broadcasters said the city of Sinuiju had reported its heaviest rainfall of the year on Thursday, with at least 132.5 mm (5.2 inches) of rain by 4 p.m.

To the east, in North Hamgyong Province, officials were working to ensure water supplies remained sanitary by supervising sewage disposal and ensuring that residents boiled water before drinking, state news agency KCNA reported.

North Korea has reported an epidemic of an unspecified intestinal disease – suspected by South Korean officials to be cholera or typhoid – and has blamed foreign objects from the border with South Korea for sparking a COVID-19 outbreak.

(Source: “North Korean streets flooded as heavy rains exacerbate economic crisis,” Reuters, July 8th, 2022.)

Meanwhile, more state publications that focus on disaster management and planning. Rodong Sinmun: 

Scientists and officials of the State Hydro-meteorological Administration and the Academy of Agricultural Science in the DPRK have jointly conducted the crop growth forecast to cope with the unfavorable weather conditions.

A command group consisting of guidance and research forces from the two units publishes a bulletin on the crop growth forecast at 10-day intervals.

The State Hydro-meteorological Administration strengthens the grasp and analysis of the mean temperature, precipitation, sunshine rate and current agricultural climate conditions in liaison with the meteorological observatories across the country. And it provides the Academy of Agricultural Science with the basic information on the predicted agricultural weather conditions.

The Academy of Agricultural Science informs, through the forecast bulletin, of detailed agricultural technological measures according to cereal, vegetable, industrial crops, fruit and other sectors. It also presents to each issue of the bulletin excellent experiences on farming, agricultural sci-tech common knowledge, advanced farming technological data and answers to the questions conducive to the farming works in corresponding period.

(Source: “DPRK Pays Efforts to Crop Growth Forecast,” Rodong Sinmun, July 7th, 2022.)

 

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North Korea’s problematic Covid-19 numbers

Wednesday, May 18th, 2022

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

North Korea’s admission of a Covid-19 outbreak has understandably drawn global attention. It’s one of two countries – the other one being Eritrea – that have not yet started administering Covid-19 vaccines. North Korea also claimed, until just a few days ago, to have had zero cases of infections.

Naturally, the government’s data is highly interesting in this situation, and you can follow the officially reported numbers here at 38 North‘s tracker. Due to the lack of testing kits, North Korean authorities report cases of “fever” as a proxy for Covid-19.

These numbers perhaps tell us more about how the government perceives the situation, than how many North Koreans have actually been infected with Covid-19. That North Korean authorities are now signalling a greater level of pragmatism in tackling the virus does not mean their claims until a few days ago about zero cases were true. The zero cases claim defies common sense and logic, not least since North Korea borders Chinese provinces where we know there have been significant outbreaks. Outlets such as Daily NK, Rimjingang, Radio Free Asia and others with sources inside North Korea have reported since the start of the pandemic about large numbers of people coming down with Covid-19 symptoms.

Already in March 2020, shortly after the pandemic began, sources in North Korea told Daily NK that over 20 North Koreans had died from the virus. By November last year, Daily NK reported that more than 100,000 people with symptoms were housed in government quarantine facilities. These are only two examples out of a large number of such reports. There is of course no way to confirm any of the information about Covid outbreaks in North Korea. Most  reports, however, have used roughly the same metric as the government uses right now to count cases — fever symptoms.

North Korean state media reports of the number of people in treatment per province also raises a lot of questions. Consider the map below, from the 38 North tracker:

It is possible that Pyongyang and its surroundings, Kaesong, and Rason, all have significantly higher numbers of cases than, say, North Hamgyong province. After all, Pyongyang is a relatively crowded city by North Korean standards, making infections spread more easily. But these are also sensitive areas and it may well be that the government is simply paying more attention by testing (for fever) more and monitoring numbers more closely. All three, in fact, are so-called “administrative special cities” (특별시/t’ŭkpyŏlssi), placing them under more direct central government administration than other cities. Pyongyang, moreover, is politically sensitive as the country’s power center, and Kaesong sits on the tense border with South Korea. Rason holds a special economic zone and is close to North Korea’s borders with Russia and China. Perhaps the government pays greater attention to these cities because of this common denominator.

The question is still why the North Korean government chose to acknowledge the presence of Covid-19 in the country this month. Since the announcement, the state has strengthened quarantine measures, some of which were already in place, and imposed a nationwide lockdown, though there’s been some questions raised about how sternly it is implemented. It is still possible, as I noted in a previous post, that the government is changing to a more pragmatic Covid-19 policy overall, starting with recognizing the virus.

As of now few data points point in this direction, although it is still much too early to tell. It may also be that the government made the announcement to set the stage for accepting vaccines and other assistance from abroad. Even with such assistance, it remains unclear how the rollout would work in practice given North Korea’s lacking equipment for, for example, storing vaccines and keeping them cold while transported around the country.

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North Korea finally admits a case of Covid-19. Is there a trade connection?

Thursday, May 12th, 2022

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Finally, after over two years of denial, North Korean state media has acknowledged a case of Covid-19 in the country:

Next, the Political Bureau discussed the issue of coping with the epidemic prevention crisis state prevailing in the country.

It recognized as follows:

A most serious emergency case of the state occurred: A break was made on our emergency epidemic prevention front where has firmly defended for two years and three months from February, 2020.

The state emergency epidemic prevention command and relevant units made deliberation of the result of strict gene arrangement analysis on the specimen from persons with fever of an organization in the capital city on May 8, and concluded that it coincided with Omicron BA.2 variant which is recently spreading worldwide rapidly.

Informed at the meeting was the spread state in the whole country. Urgent measures were presented and deliberated to take the strategic initiative in the epidemic prevention campaign for the future.

The Political Bureau censured the epidemic prevention sectors for their carelessness, relaxation, irresponsibility and inefficiency as they did not sensitively cope with the public health state which infectors of all kinds of variants are increasing worldwide including surrounding regions of our country.

The Political Bureau recognized that it is necessary to switch over from the state epidemic prevention system to the maximum emergency epidemic prevention system to cope with the present circumstance.

All measures were taken for the Party, administrative and economic organs at all levels, sectors of public and state security and national defence and all organs and sectors of the country to establish the proper work system to make the state work be done smoothly in line with the maximum emergency epidemic prevention system coming into force.

Adopted at the meeting was a resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK on switch over from the state emergency epidemic prevention work to the maximum emergency epidemic prevention system to cope with the prevailing epidemic prevention crisis.

Concluding the meeting, Kim Jong Un raised principles to be maintained thoroughly in the emergency epidemic prevention work and tasks to do so.

He outlined and analyzed the current epidemic prevention crisis of the country and noted that the maximum emergency epidemic prevention system is mainly aimed to stably contain and control the spread of COVID-19 that made inroads into the country and to quickly cure the infections in order to eradicate the source of the virus spread at an early date.

Pointing out that more dangerous enemy of us than the malicious virus are unscientific fear, lack of faith and weak will, he affirmed that we will surely overcome the current sudden situation and win victory in the emergency epidemic prevention work as we have strong organizing ability with which the Party, government and people are united as one and there are high political awareness and self-consciousness of all the people that have been fostered and cemented during the prolonged emergency epidemic prevention campaign.

He called on all the cities and counties of the whole country to thoroughly lock down their areas and organize work and production after closing each working unit, production unit and living unit from each other so as to flawlessly and perfectly block the spread vacuum of the malicious virus.

Stressing the necessity of quickly organizing scientific and intensive examination and treatment campaign, he said that the Party and the government decided to take a measure to mobilize reserve medical supplies that have been stored up for the emergency until now.

He underscored the need for the public health sector and the emergency epidemic prevention sectors to strictly conduct intensive examination of all the people, take proactive measures for medical observation and treatment, intensify disinfection of all areas ranging from workplaces to living space and thus block and terminate the source of the malicious epidemics spread.

Though the epidemic prevention situation is harsh at present, it cannot block our advance toward the overall development of socialist construction, and there should be nothing missed in the planned economic work, the General Secretary said, stressing that the Cabinet and other state economic guidance organs and relevant units should conduct fuller organization, guidance and command over the economic work in conformity with switching over from state epidemic prevention system to the maximum emergency epidemic prevention system so as to speed up the immediate farming work and the production at major industrial sectors and industrial establishments to the maximum and flawlessly compete within the appointed date the cherished works of our Party for the people such as the construction of 10 000 flats in the Hwasong area and the Ryonpho Greenhouse Farm.

The Party and power organs should minimize inconveniences and agonies the people would suffer under the strong blockade situation, stabilize their lives and take thoroughgoing measures so that slightest negative phenomena are not be revealed, he noted.

Stressing the need to more firmly cement the outposts of the state defence and guarantee the victory of the great epidemic prevention campaign with arms, he specially emphasized that guard duty should be further strengthened on the fronts, borders, seas and air and the best measures be taken to make security vacuum not be revealed in the national defence.

The people-first politics by our Party and state that have displayed the great vitality, overcoming all troubles of history, and the strength of our people who are united single-mindedly are the most powerful guarantee to win victory in the current great epidemic prevention campaign, he said, adding that all the Party organizations and power organs should prove in practice their loyalty to the Party and revolution, devotion to the people and responsibility for their duty at the present great epidemic prevention campaign to defend the lives and security of the people.

He warmly appealed to all the people and officers and men of the People’s Army to triumphantly conclude the great epidemic prevention campaign with firm confidence and great redoubled efforts and thus defend to the end our precious lives and future with our faith, will and unity.

The Political Bureau of the C.C., WPK examined and approved the written emergency instructions of the Central Military Commission of the Party and the Cabinet and made sure that they are issued.

(Source: “8th Political Bureau Meeting of 8th Central Committee of WPK Held,” Korean Central News Agency, May 12th, 2022.)

A few thoughts:

First, it’s very unlikely that this is actually North Korea’s first case. It defies common sense and logic, especially given the country’s proximity to China. There is a solid stream of anecdotal reports to strongly suggest that North Korea has already seen outbreaks in several parts of the country.

Second, recall that Chinese authorities, upon North Korea’s request, recently ceased railway traffic between the two countries again after it had been open for only four months. The following part of the KCNA statement, depending on how you read it, seems to suggest that the recently re-imposed “blockade” may last for quite a while, and won’t necessarily go away when case numbers in Chinese border provinces drop:

The Party and power organs should minimize inconveniences and agonies the people would suffer under the strong blockade situation, stabilize their lives and take thoroughgoing measures so that slightest negative phenomena are not be revealed, he noted.

It seems to me that Kim Jong-un’s message could be: buckle down, again, for the long-haul. The four months of somewhat restored railway links were the exception.

Third, however, it is also possible that the country’s admission of a case is part of a normalization of government policies related to the virus. Dropping the zero-cases claim would allow the government to manage the virus as a strategy, rather than seek to contain it entirely. In other words, if the government would recognize the virus as part of a new reality, it could move away from tight border lockdowns toward testing measures and, eventually, a mass vaccination campaign. Recognizing the spread of the virus and opting to manage it would expand policy options beyond closing the border every time infection numbers go up across the border in China.

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North Korea’s tense food situation

Tuesday, December 7th, 2021

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

As usual, it’s very difficult to get a read on the domestic availability and production of food in North Korea. Nonetheless, the overarching picture continues to be grim, and the fears over the Omicron-variant seems to be making it all worse. This is also what the South Korean government assesses:

The cost of groceries and daily necessities in North Korea is estimated to be rapidly increasing in the face of a prolonged border lockdown to stave off the COVID-19 pandemic, Seoul’s unification ministry said Monday.

The North has imposed a strict border control since last year, which is believed to have taken a toll on its economy already hit by crippling sanctions.

“North Korea is experiencing chronic food shortages with around 1 million tons of foods falling short every year,” ministry spokesperson Lee Jong-joo told a regular press briefing. “As the coronavirus-driven border lockdown has prolonged, it is likely to be having difficulties in securing necessary foods from abroad.”

The North was seen preparing to reopen its land border with China, with South Korea’s spy agency estimating its cross-border rail services could resume as early as in November. But the spread of the omicron variant is apparently delaying the reclusive regime’s planned border reopening.

“Though we do have limits in having access to accurate information, the government’s estimation … is that the volatility of foods and necessities prices is growing (in North Korea) and some items are witnessing a rapid price hike,” Lee said.

Yet, referring to experts’ assessments the North’s crop output could improve this year due to better weather conditions, she said the government will continue monitoring its situation in line with a review on the need for a humanitarian cooperation.

(Source: “Prices of food, daily necessities estimated to be rapidly soaring in N. Korea: gov’t,” Yonhap News, 6/12/21.)

The last paragraph here is a crucial caveat, as North Korea’s food production is highly volatile and dependent on weather conditions. Over the past few years, there have sometimes been reason to suspect that the state has exaggerated the direness of its food situation rather than the other way around.

Nonetheless, it’s clear that the prolonged border closure is hitting hard against the economy as a whole. There have been several reports over the past few months indicating that Pyongyang might soon unseal the border, but no major changes seem to have taken place. I’m not sure that means those reports were necessarily wrong. Rather, the government may well have planned to ease the border lockdown at several points only to back down in the face of a new development, be it Covid-19 spreading in China’s northeast, or the rise of the Omicron variant.

It’s difficult to see what could really change if the government continues to both refuse to let the outside world assist in a vaccination campaign, and at the same time responds to each new wave or variant of the virus by further tightening or extending the border lockdown. It’s not a sustainable strategy but given the regime’s fear of the havoc that a significant spread of the virus could wreak in society, given its very fragile health system, it might not change anytime soon.

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Some brief thoughts about North Korea’s food situation, late June 2021

Wednesday, June 23rd, 2021

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

By all accounts, the current food situation in North Korea appears difficult. It’s a crucially important topic that I unfortunately have not had much time to follow over the past few weeks. A few brief thoughts:

First, it’s important to keep in mind when hearing phrases such as “worst in a decade” that North Korea went through an actual famine in the 1990s and early 2000s. So that the food situation has gotten better over the last decade, while the country was arguably still rebounding from the famine, should not come as a surprise.

Second, it’s difficult to tell precisely how bad things are. Food production estimates, though only approximations, paint a picture of relative shortage compared to the past few years, but still not near disaster levels. North Korean authorities and international organs often sound the alarm bell over looming disasters, while little follow-up is done about what actually happened in the end. Anyone remember the famine warnings in early 2019, by the state and some foreign analysts alike? It’s impossible to tell how representative this report by Daily NK is, but if it’s true, the government is failing to stabilize prices because consumers choose not to buy rice in bulk for cheaper but lower quality from state-owned stores. If the country was approaching a genuine famine, this likely wouldn’t be the case.

Third, all this said, things do seem difficult. Bill Brown outlines in an excellent and thorough report here some of the alarming signs: relatively major fluctuations in both exchange rates and food prices. Although price levels aren’t at levels never seen before, fluctuations like this are relatively unusual. I suspect much of it is driven by future expectations of shortages based on information suggesting that the state will not open the border to China for trade within the foreseeable future.

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Kim Jong-un’s claim of the “worst-ever situation”

Sunday, April 18th, 2021

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Perhaps I am late to the game already (the long weekend here in Israel is to blame for that), but it has been puzzling to see the media reporting on Kim Jong-un’s claim that North Korea faces its “worst-ever” economic situation at the moment, under both international sanctions and a self-imposed border lockdown.

It seems that Kim’s words have been misinterpreted or lost in translation. Colleagues at 38 North have rightly and importantly pointed out that the original Korean-language statement is not nearly as drastic. This is often the case with KCNA articles and translated statements from North Korea:

In the vernacular report, however, this term read kuknanhan (극난한), which would be better translated as “very hard” or even “extremely difficult.”[2] North Korea’s English-language media sometimes omit passages or provide translations that are different from the vernacular text, and without analyzing years’ worth of data, it is impossible to conclude whether they do so deliberately, or if they are simply oversights.

It is clear, however, that Kim did not say “the worst-ever situation” at this event. Even if he had, the North Korean leader has made similar remarks in connection with the country’s current circumstances in recent months. For example, Kim’s opening address at the Eighth Party Congress in January referred to the past five years as a period of “unprecedented, worst-ever trials.”

None of this means that the situation is not bad. But “worst-ever” would be extremely drastic for a country where the failings of the economic system led to a famine in the 1990s and early 2000s that took the lives of between 600,000-1.5 million people. Today’s conditions simply aren’t grave enough to warrant such comparisons.

Precisely how difficult conditions are remains hard to tell. The Russian ambassador to North Korea recently gave an interview where he said that the country’s food situation is not at all catastrophic, and that there are no signs suggesting an ongoing famine. He is probably right, but at the same time, we should be careful not to extrapolate too much about the situation in the provinces, for example, based on an assessment of the store shelves in Pyongyang. The country’s society is highly stratified and its economy relatively fragmented. The situation in one locality may well be much more dire than in another.

At the same time, we should also be careful not to take Kim Jong-un at his word. What, except for Kim’s own statement, suggests that today’s situation is worse than the one in 1995, after both economic collapse and heavy flooding took a severe toll on the economy? Sure, things are incredibly messy right now, a view that both circumstances and data support. Kim’s own statement, not least, is another solid data point showing just how grim things appear to be. But famine, meaning large numbers of people dying from starvation or malnourishment, is simply a different dimensions. Let us hope that North Korea does not get there, neither now nor in the future.

There are reasons to believe that it will not. The market system, for its faults and flaws, is able to react to changes in supply and demand, unlike the state distribution system in the 1990s. Moreover, China would likely step in with serious quantities of food aid if the situation got truly disastrous. Many signs suggest that North Korea and China expect to resume and even expand trade in the short-term. Should a drastic need arise, China would likely increase humanitarian shipments as well, although it is far from certain.

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March 2021: North Korea’s skyrocketing corn prices

Tuesday, March 9th, 2021

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Given the self-imposed border lockdown North Korea is under at the moment, the recent rise in food prices should come as no surprise. The precise factors are difficult to pin down, but whatever they are, there is some serious cause for concern.

The main reason is the rapid rise in the price of corn as of late. One Daily NK-source in North Korea attributes it to large-scale state purchases of corn for snacks manufacturing in honor of Kim Jong-il’s birthday on February 16th.

The article makes clear, however, that this is only a partial explanation. Indeed, looking at the price index, it’s clear that the rise started long before February. On November 15th last year, the average price for a kilo of corn was 1350 won. On February 23rd this year, the average price was 3137 won. That’s a rise of 135 percent in a relatively short period of time. Prices of corn have often risen in the beginning part of the year, but not by this much.

Average corn prices in Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan, from 2015 and onward. Graph by NKEconWatch, data source: Daily NK.

Looking at individual cities, the rise is even more staggering. In Hyesan, where food prices tend to be higher in general, corn prices rose from 1450 won/kilo on November 15th last year to 3620/kilo on February 23rd. That’s an increase of 150 percent in only a few months.

Corn prices in Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan, from 2015 and onward. Graph by NKEconWatch, data source: Daily NK.

Why is this a concerning development for corn prices specifically?

First, corn is, in the North Korean context, rice’s less desired sibling. Corn always makes up a significant part of the diet for a big proportion of the North Korean population. However, when food becomes more scarce, people switch over a larger portion of their diets to corn, since it gives more food for the same amount of money. So a rise in corn prices may be a signal of growing scarcity overall.

Second, even if a large proportion of the rise was indeed caused by increasing state purchases, this is also a troubling indicator for the state of the North Korean market for food. If state procurement for snacks manufacturing for one single day can impact prices so much, this suggests a market under considerable stress and volatility to begin with.

At the same time, rice prices have remained conspicuously low and stabile. Rice prices in the last observation in the price index are around their seasonal normal. I’d be careful to assume too much based on this, however. Rice prices are lower right now than around the same time last year. This may – and I want to stress how little we know for certain – indicate that they are in fact lower not because supply is stabile, but because demand is lower. More consumers switching over their consumption to cheaper foods such as corn would put downward pressure on rice prices.

Average rice prices in Pyongyang, Sinuiju and Hyesan, from 2015 and onward. Graph by NKEconWatch, data source: Daily NK.

The current situation will only be possible to fully evaluate in a few weeks when we have more data points available. Suffice to say for now that, with all the caveats about the trappings of data from North Korea, the situation looks concerning.

Update March 16th, 2021: DailyNK recently published more info about the corn price situation, reporting that prices have stabilized in much of the country. Still, 3,000 KWP/kg, reported in “other inland regions” (than Hyesan), is high. It’s more than double the average price reported in Daily NK’s price index around one year ago.

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North Korea, Blinken and aid

Sunday, January 24th, 2021

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

During his confirmation hearing earlier this week, incoming secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, mentioned that humanitarian aid could be part of the Biden administration’s North Korea policy, although it isn’t clear precisely in what shape or form. Past administrations have often seen aid as part of the negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear weapons, and much of what Blinken said is, as Joshua Pollack pointed out on twitter, all part of the same, oft-repeated talking points on North Korea policy that often changes names but practically remains the same.

The pandemic may have changed things, as North Korea’s economic situation has gone from very bad to worse. But humanitarian aid as a carrot, for today’s North Korea, seems like a non-starter. Today’s North Korea is not the North Korea of 1998. It has a leader with economic ambitions far beyond humanitarian grain deliveries from the US, UN and South Korea. The country’s food situation is dire and aid, not least in combatting the pandemic, would be highly useful. But it is difficult to imagine the North Korean government openly acknowledging that its stated economic ambitions are divorced from reality, and accepting humanitarian aid being part of any negotiations.

Time will tell, but putting aid into the mix seems based on a faulty reading of the regime’s current attitudes and priorities.

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Asahi Shimbun: China provided North Korea with substantial amounts of food and fertilizer this year

Wednesday, November 4th, 2020

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

In a piece of news that should surprise no one, Asahi Shimbun reports that South Korean government sources say China provided North Korea with 5-600,000 tons of food aid and fertilizer this year. Although it wouldn’t entirely make up for the estimated shortfall, it is still a highly significant contribution:

But several South Korean government sources said China has provided North Korea with between 500,000 and 600,000 tons of food along with the fertilizer this year.

It also sent about 600,000 tons of corn and other types of grain between June and August, according to Chinese sources with inside knowledge of ties with North Korea.

Pyongyang requested more assistance in the aftermath of the summer typhoon damage and Beijing is considering sending an additional 200,000 tons of food, the sources said.

The South Korean sources focused on the volume of fertilizer shipped to North Korea as such assistance is considered highly unusual.

North Korean authorities equate one ton of fertilizer to 10 tons of food assistance, a former high-ranking North Korean government official said.

“Due to chronic shortages, fertilizer is highly prized in North Korea,” the official added. “The amount sent this year is equivalent to 5.5 million tons of food, which exceeds the yearly production of food. It was a very unusual level of assistance.”

Although North Korea is no longer in the grips of famine that raged in the late 1990s and claimed countless lives, the U.N. World Food Program has estimated that between 2018 and 2019 about 10 million North Koreans did not have enough to eat.

The situation is believed to be worse this year.

North Korea was plagued by flooding and other damage due to typhoons and torrential rain in summer after near-drought conditions in spring.

A source at a Chinese government-affiliated agency who is well-versed in issues involving North Korean agriculture said that the harvest estimate at planting time was between 3.5 million and 3.8 million tons for a shortfall of about 1.5 million tons.

Rice prices were kept stable through the release of grain stockpiled for emergencies, but the situation without China’s assistance was expected to be dire from next spring.

China’s decision to bail out its unpredictable neighbor may reflect a strategy to keep North Korea in its corner as Beijing’s confrontation with Washington worsens. In this regard, Beijing made a big fuss of its involvement in joining fighting in the Korean War on the 70th anniversary of China’s participation.

“China and North Korea have always shared interests in terms of their view of the United States, but that has strengthened recently,” said a North Korean source. “China is sending a message to the United States through its appeal of a honeymoon period with North Korea.”

With no signs of progress in denuclearization talks with the United States, the easing of economic sanctions against North Korea appears unlikely in the short term.

That suggests North Korea will continue to lean on China for support, analysts said.

“If North Korea receives support from abroad, it will no longer be able to say it is getting by with its own efforts,” said a South Korean expert on the North Korean economy. “But North Korea can continue to save face because China does not announce the assistance levels.”

(Article source: Takeshi Kamiya in Seoul and Yoshikazu Hirai in Shenyang, “China bailout to North Korea: massive food and fertilizer aid,” Asahi Shimbun, November 3rd, 2020.)

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North Korea’s disaster management: a comment about a comment

Wednesday, November 4th, 2020

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

It might seem a strange topic to post about on the day after the US elections, but perhaps some readers might like a break from the incessant commentary for something completely different.

If so, I highly recommend the article that former ambassador James Hoare published yesterday on 38 North, partially as a comment to my earlier article about North Korean disaster management. Ambassador Hoare gives a highly interesting historical perspective partially based on his own experiences in the country, noting that deforestation is a problem on the Korean peninsula much older than North Korea itself. He also notes that North Korea is far from the only country where homes constructed near riverbeds are regularly flooded, and argues that North Korea’s flooding problems are, after all, not so unusual in an international context.

I fully agree with all of these points, and the historical context is very valuable and crucial for understanding the current situation. If anything, there are perhaps two points of minor disagreement that I have with Hoare’s text.

First, the current North Korean situation is in large part a result of changes that could have been avoided. Deforestation was acutely exacerbated during the Arduous March, because people had few other alternatives than to cut down trees for firewood and to clear the ground for farming. Deforestation and flooding, therefore, are not phenomena entirely endemic or “natural” neither to the Korean peninsula nor to North Korea in particular, because things were not always this way. There is nothing natural or inherently necessary about North Korea’s economic system, as the many former communist states who have adopted programs of systemic overhaul have shown. Natural disasters may be natural, but each state has a choice in how to meet them.

Second, ambassador Hoare rightly points out that one should perhaps applaud the progress being made rather than to note that improvements have a long way to go. My article neither sought to decry nor applaud any improvements, but simply to show where things stand, based partially on conversations with several people who have themselves worked in natural disaster mitigation in the country.

And despite the improvements that have been made, there is a real and substantive risks that North Korea’s disaster management improvement plans and ambitions will stop at being just that. In this realm, there should be little doubt that the government’s ambitions are high and praiseworthy. The problem is that we have seen too many examples of ambitions without implementation to conclude that they will in fact be realized. Oftentimes, the policy process, opaque as it is, often appears to stall, and political interest and attention may wane. In this, too, North Korea is not alone in the world.

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