Archive for February, 2018

International sanctions to reported to hit DPRK economy harder

Wednesday, February 28th, 2018

According to Yonhap:

A series of international sanctions will likely plunge the North Korean economy into a deeper slump this year and sharply worsen the living conditions of its citizens, a report said Wednesday.

The United States, the United Nations and other nations imposed tough economic sanctions on the reclusive country in retaliation for its nuclear and missile tests last year.

Lee Suk, a senior researcher at the state-run Korea Development Institute (KDI) and one of the report’s authors, said the international sanctions clearly dented North Korea’s trade last year, stalling or contracting its industrial activity and agricultural output.

“The impact of the sanctions doesn’t appear to have spilled over into the market yet, but there is a possibility that North Korea may suffer further setbacks in production, trade and consumption, sharply aggravating the welfare of economic actors.”

Kim Young-hoon of the Korea Rural Economic Institute estimated North Korea’s grain output for 2017 at 4.71 million tons, down 2 percent from the previous year.

“Pyongyang’s farm production didn’t increase last year, despite a series of agricultural reform measures since 2012,” Kim said. “It is difficult to paint a positive picture of North Korea’s food supply and demand this year.”

Lee Jong-kyu, a KDI researcher, said North Korea’s coal exports to China, its chief ally and economic benefactor, tumbled 78.5 percent on-year in 2017, with their dollar value sinking 66 percent.

The plunge contributed nearly 80 percent to the decrease in the value of North Korean trade with China last year, Lee said, predicting tougher international sanctions will give Pyongyang less leeway in its policy options this year.

Lee Suk-ki, a researcher at the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade, estimated that North Korea’s mining, agricultural and construction sectors stalled or contracted in 2017, compared with the previous year.

The sectors’ slack or weaker activity probably resulted from a severe drought, a decline in trade stemming from international economic sanctions and a correction following the previous year’s push to ramp up production, the economist said.

This article is derived from the  February 2018 issue of the monthly KDI Review of the North Korean Economy. See page 45 of this PDF (in Korean).

Read the full Yonhap story here
Int’l sanctions to hit N.K economy harder: report
Yonhap
2018-2-28

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What happened to the Camp 15 (Yodok) Prisoners?

Tuesday, February 27th, 2018

I have already published this in Radio Free Asia, so here is the English-language version.

I have previously written about the apparent decommissioning/downsizing of Camp No. 15 (Yodok) here. There has been some speculation in the media and in the human rights community about what has happened to the prisoners, but I am unaware of a final, conclusive evaluation.

Based on observations in satellite imagery, particularly from patterns of activity related to the decommissioned and recommissioned area that is known as Camp 18 (I don’t know the current name of the new camp since it was reopened), I suspect some of the prisoners have been moved from Camp 15 (Yodok) to the Kowon Mine area of Sudong District, South Phyongan Province.

Pictured Above (Google Earth): The geographic relationship between Camp 15 and the Kowon Mine in Sudong District.

In Camp 15, the first housing to be raised  was in the Revolutionizing Zone in 2014. Shortly after that, housing in other parts of the camp slowly began falling into obvious states of disuse. However, the period where the most housing was razed or deteriorated took place after 2016-6-2.

No significant new housing was built in the town of Yodok, the closest town to the entrance of the prison camp, since the decommission/downsizing process began.

However, an unusual level of new housing was constructed at the remote Kowon Mine and in the nearby town of Sudong. Pictured below is an overview of new housing that was constructed between 2014 and 2017.

Here are some close-ups of these sites:

Site 1: 39.383254°, 126.891885°

In the picture above (Top: 2014-5-5) we can see ten apartment blocks that are in different states of completion. This is the earliest available Google Earth image of this site, so I cannot say for sure when construction started. In the lower picture above (2017-4-18) we can see that all of the buildings have been completed, at least on the outside.

Site 2:  39.363201°, 126.921470°

In the picture above (2017-4-18), we can see 22 apartment blocks under construction. It is not possible to say when construction work started or finished using Google Earth imagery.

Site 3:  39.371160°, 126.973542°

In the picture above (2017-4-18), we can see four apartment blocks under construction.

Site 4:  39.374005°, 127.005262°

In the top image (2014-5-5), we can see the area before construction began. In the bottom image (2017-4-18), we can see nine apartment buildings under construction.

Site 5:  39.407088°, 126.859356°

Imaged dates (Google Earth): Top: 2014-5-5-, Bottom: 2017-4-18

Site 6:  39.377282°, 126.850181°

Imaged dates (Google Earth): Top: 2014-5-5-, Bottom: 2017-4-30

Summary
The evidence I have presented here is not conclusive, but it is worthy of further investigation by those with budgets to do so. In the images above, I have shown an uncharacteristic increase in local housing construction that takes place at the same time as housing in nearby prison camp 15 is being razed. There is not a similar build-up of housing at any of the other mines or towns near Camp 15, particularly Munchon and Chonnae Coal Mines, as far as I am aware. Additionally this pattern of resettlement to a nearby mine is the same that we saw with the closure and reopening of Camp 18.

It would not be too hard to estimate the number of apartments and families that are moving into these buildings, so if any readers want to do so and send me the findings, I will post them here.

 

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US prepares maritime interdiction to stop North Korean sanctions evasion

Friday, February 23rd, 2018

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

As the Winter Olympics with all its inter-Korean contacts wind down, the US is preparing to place Coast Guard forces to stop and search vessels in Asia-Pacific waters, to prevent North Korean sanctions circumvention. Reuters:

Washington has been talking to regional partners, including Japan, South Korea, Australia and Singapore, about coordinating a stepped-up crackdown that would go further than ever before in an attempt to squeeze Pyongyang’s use of seagoing trade to feed its nuclear missile program, several officials told Reuters.

While suspect ships have been intercepted before, the emerging strategy would expand the scope of such operations but stop short of imposing a naval blockade on North Korea. Pyongyang has warned it would consider a blockade an act of war.

The strategy calls for closer tracking and possible seizure of ships suspected of carrying banned weapons components and other prohibited cargo to or from North Korea, according to the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity. Depending on the scale of the campaign, the United States could consider beefing up the naval and air power of its Pacific Command, they said.

The U.S.-led initiative, which has not been previously reported, shows Washington’s increasing urgency to force North Korea into negotiations over the abandonment of its weapons programs, the officials said.

North Korea may be only a few months away from completing development of a nuclear-tipped missile capable of hitting the U.S. mainland, despite existing international sanctions that, at times, have been sidestepped by smuggling and ship-to-ship transfers at sea of banned goods, according to officials.

“There is no doubt we all have to do more, short of direct military action, to show (North Korean leader) Kim Jong Un we mean business,” said a senior administration official.

The White House declined official comment.

The effort could target vessels on the high seas or in the territorial waters of countries that choose to cooperate. It was unclear, however, to what extent the campaign might extend beyond Asia.

Washington on Friday slapped sanctions on dozens more companies and vessels linked to North Korean shipping trade and urged the United Nations to blacklist a list of entities, a move it said was aimed at shutting down North Korea’s illicit maritime smuggling activities to obtain oil and sell coal.

Tighter sanctions plus a more assertive approach at sea could dial up tensions at a time when fragile diplomacy between North and South Korea has gained momentum. It would also stretch U.S. military resources needed elsewhere, possibly incur massive new costs and fuel misgivings among some countries in the region.

The initiative, which is being developed, would be fraught with challenges that could risk triggering North Korean retaliation and dividing the international community.

China and Russia, which have blocked U.S. efforts at the United Nations to win approval for use of force in North Korea interdiction operations, are likely to oppose new actions if they see the United States as overstepping. A Chinese official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said such steps should only be taken under United Nations auspices.

China’s Foreign Ministry, in a statement to Reuters, said they did not know anything about the plan, but that in principle China believes U.N. resolutions on North Korea should be fully and thoroughly implemented.

“At the same time, we hope relevant countries act in accordance with Security Council resolutions and international law,” it added, without elaborating.

Full article:
Exclusive: U.S. prepares high-seas crackdown on North Korea sanctions evaders – source
Phil Stewart, David Brunnstrom
Reuters
2018-02-23

I won’t go into the strategic and political implications, but when it comes to sanctions circumvention, a plan like this, thoroughly executed, would likely raise the costs of North Korean sanctions circumvention. Even with what sanctioned trade still goes on, there’s likely a substantial premium charged by traders that deal with North Korea because of the risks involved. As those risks go up, so should the premium. No measures can make circumvention fully impossible, but it can get a whole lot more expensive.

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Are DPRK hard-currency reserves expected to dry up by October?

Wednesday, February 21st, 2018

According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s hard currency reserves are expected to dry up around October if international sanctions on the communist nation hold, the chairman of the parliamentary intelligence committee said Wednesday.

Rep. Kang Seok-ho of the main opposition Liberty Korea Party said during a party meeting that the North’s recent peace overtures toward the South, including its invitation to President Moon Jae-in to visit Pyongyang, are aimed at overcoming such economic hardship.

“I received an analysis that, if international sanctions against the North continue like this, all of North Korea’s foreign currency earnings and overseas assets will be frozen, and its dollar (reserves) will dry up around October,” the lawmaker said.

Kang didn’t say where the analysis came from, including whether it’s from the National Intelligence Service.

He said it is an assessment he drew after discussions with intelligence authorities, concluding that as a result of international sanctions North Korea held out an olive branch, including its invitation to Moon to visit the North for what would be a third inter-Korean summit.

“At a time like this, our government should further strengthen cooperation with the international community on sanctions against the North,” Kang said.

He also said the government should send a special envoy to the North and work actively to help resume talks between the U.S. and the North.

A similar prediction was made in the Joong-Ang Ilbo a couple of weeks ago:

In 2017, the North’s exports to China — the only remaining market it officially trades with — plunged by 37 percent on-year. This year, they could plummet more than 90 percent if China fully complies with the sanctions.

Despite a sharp fall in exports, imports remained unchanged, suggesting a thinning of foreign exchange reserves.

Pyongyang is estimated to have about $3 billion in foreign exchange reserves. The unregistered sum could be higher when including foreign currency hoarded away by the elite. The coffers will fall further this year. By the second half, North Korea could be short on foreign exchange.

The Joong-Ang Ilbo article offers additional data and is well worth reading.

$3 billion seems low to me, but I can’t prove it. The black market value of the won has not moved much (since 2012!), and I have to suspect that the currency traders in the DPRK have a better idea of the country’s foreign exchange reserves than I do.

I suppose we will see in the later half of this year? It is interesting to think about think about the implications of North Korea running out of foreign exchange…

Read more here:
N. Korea’s hard currency reserves expected to dry up by October: lawmaker
Yonhap
2018-2-21

The effect of sanctions
Joong-Ang Ilbo
Kim Byung-yeon
2018-1-22

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Some Kwangmyong Intranet screen shots on KCTV

Monday, February 19th, 2018

According to KCTV evening news (2018-1-31) [via KCNA Watch], the North Korean intranet service, Kwangmyong,  is being managed by the Kwangmyong Information Technology Research Institute (광명정보기술연구원) under the Central Science and Technology Information Agency (중앙과학기술통보사). According to the broadcast, the network is being improved (faster and easier to use search engine and databases) to fulfill a growing need by North Korean youth and workers to have access to the latest technology.

The broadcast featured screenshots of some of the Intranet content. I am unsure if this content has been rolled out for use by the public, or if it remains under development.

Picture 1:

This screen shot is for a service called “Learning ‘Paduk'” (AKA “Go”).

Picture 2:

This screen shows various topical journals or books the institute publishes ranging from light industry to animal husbandry.

Picture 3:

This screen shows various sports that one can learn about through the search engine: Volleyball, table tennis, swimming, tennis, and badminton.

Picture 4:

The fourth screen is a ‘Women’s Health Handbook’.

Picture 5:

This fifth screen shows programs available such as Chinese-North Korean and English-North Korean translators.

Picture 6:

The sixth screen is an ad for North Korea’s Kindle

Picture 7:

This last screen shot is an extension of the sixth picture, showing the Kwangmyong Technical Encyclopedia, Biyak(multi-lingual dictionary), multi-lingual picture dictionary, and Kwangmyong Sports Encyclopedia

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Power and water supply in North Korea worsens in winter

Monday, February 19th, 2018

Institute for Far Easter Studies (IFES)

Reportedly, North Korea’s electricity and water supply have sharply deteriorated since mid-January this year.

According to a Seoul-Pyongyang News report on February 8, a Chinese resident in Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province, who is currently visiting China, told Radio Free Asia that the supply of electricity in North Korea began to deteriorate in January and that since the middle of the month the water supply was completely suspended due to the lack of power.

“Even if electricity is not supplied, lighting is possible with solar power, but the problem is that there is no supply of tap water,” the same source said. “People living in high-rise apartments are suffering more than those living in conventional houses,” he added.

People can draw ground water from the well. However, since elevators in high-rise apartments are not functioning due to the power shortage, those residents must carry water on their back while climbing several flights of the stairs.

Until last year, people could buy bottled water that North Korean truck drivers smuggled in from China. But this year even that has become difficult due to the international sanctions. It is said to be difficult to find such bottled water in North Korea ever since the Chinese customs authorities placed a complete ban on smuggling of all goods by truck drivers crossing the border.

In the meantime, even Pyongyang, which often has the best supply of electricity, is said to have faced a substantial cut in power supply in January.

A Chinese resident in Pyongyang who has recently visited China claimed that “except for the central districts in Pyongyang, power is supplied only for two or three hours a day, yet the worst problem is that water supply is suspended as well due to the deteriorating energy conditions.”

“Even if electricity is not supplied, people can cope with many problems using sunlight [solar power], but there is not much they can do to solve the shortage of water for drinking, toilets, and other daily uses. All family members have to focus on resolving the water shortage,” the source added.

Although there are some differences depending on the region, another North Korean source says that in recent months Pyongyang has suffered from more than ten power failures a day.

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North Korea’s largest overseas restaurant closed down

Friday, February 16th, 2018

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

The largest of North Korea’s overseas restaurants has closed, and its workers have gone home, reports Daily NK. Those formerly employed in North Korea’s overseas joint ventures abroad, and as overseas labor with other companies, have been returning home in stages since sanctions passed by the UNSC last September forbade joint ventures with North Korea.

These restaurants are (were?) an interesting phenomenon. I’ve visited them in Vietnam, Cambodia, and China, and the last time I went to one was in 2013. At the time, it was packed with tourists, mostly from South Korea, and some locals. This was generally my experience with these restaurants from the first time I visited one in 2008, but of course I can’t say for sure whether that impression was representative of a general picture.

The last time I went to one was in 2016, in Beijing. On a regular Saturday night, the place was virtually empty, save for a couple of middle-aged men donning Kim Il-sung badges, drinking beer and chain smoking. Our party got our own room, complete with karaoke, even though we didn’t ask for one, simply because the place was so empty. I got a hint about what the reasons might have been earlier in the day when I called to make a reservation: since I spoke to the staff in Korean, they felt obligated to inform me that customers from South Korea were no longer welcome. This business-killing restriction was likely imposed after the mass defection to South Korea, from one of the restaurants earlier that year. For what it’s worth, this particular one – in central Beijing – seemed like a dying endeavor over a year before the sanctions, though one can’t generalize from just one data point.

Here’s Daily NK’s story:

Ahead of the Lunar New Year holiday, Daily NK obtained photos of employees of a recently-closed North Korean restaurant called Pyongyang Koryo Pavilion in the Chinese border city of Dandong returning home to North Korea.

Pyongyang Koryo Pavilion was the largest of North Korea’s overseas restaurants, and originally employed 200 people. However, the restaurant shut down in November due to intensifying international sanctions targeting North Korea for its nuclear and missile development. Its employees have continued to return to North Korea in groups.

“Management started repatriating the workers in groups following the Pyongyang Koryo Pavilion’s closure, but some of them went to work at other restaurants,” a source in China close to North Korean affairs told Daily NK on February 14. “The 30 people returning ahead of the Lunar New Year holiday were part of the contingent that had been working at other establishments following the shutdown of Pyongyang Koryo Pavilion.”

In September 2017, China’s Commerce Ministry ordered the closure of North Korean companies operating inside the country within 120 days of UN Resolution 2375, which passed on September 11, 2017. The ministry also announced that Chinese joint ventures with North Koreans and North Korean companies would be closed.

Upon the realization that the Pyongyang Koryo Pavilion would likely not be resuming operations, the North Korean authorities began to exfiltrate the workers in stages.

“They’re heading back to their hometowns, where their families live, but they don’t look very happy about it because they’re losing the opportunity to earn money abroad.

Article source (with pictures):
More North Korean overseas workers return home
Seol Song Ah
Daily NK
2018-02-16

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FinCEN designates Latvian Bank for North Korea links

Wednesday, February 14th, 2018

UPDATE 1 (2018-2-19): According to the AFP:

The European Central Bank said Monday it has frozen payments by the third-largest bank in tiny Baltic state Latvia, as its finances have deteriorated in the wake of money laundering allegations from Washington.

“Temporarily, and until further notice, a prohibition of all payments by ABLV bank on its financial liabilities has been imposed, and is now in effect,” the ECB said in a statement.

It is the first time the ECB has used its power to impose a moratorium since taking on eurozone-wide banking supervision responsibilities in 2014.

The US Department of the Treasury last week named ABLV “an institution of primary money laundering concern” and accused it of connections to North Korea’s weapons development programme.

ABLV’s financial position, which had previously been stable, has rapidly deteriorated since as it found its access to the financial system cut off, even threatening the bank’s survival.

In late September 2017, the bank’s balance sheet stood at around 3.6 billion euros ($4.5 billion), with 1.0 billion euros of loans and 2.7 billion in deposits.

Just two days before the ECB’s moratorium, Latvian supervisor FCMC issued a statement saying the bank’s capital and liquidity ratios — key indicators of a bank’s financial health — were in good shape.

The ECB decision on Monday comes after Latvian central bank governor Ilmars Rimsevics, who sits on the ECB governing council, was arrested Saturday by the country’s Corruption Prevention Bureau (KNAB).

A source familiar with the case told AFP there was no connection between the ABLV case and the governor’s arrest.

ORIGINAL POST (2018-2-14): According to the FinCEN press release:

FinCEN Finds the Bank Orchestrates Money Laundering Schemes, Obstructs Regulatory Enforcement, and Has Conducted Activity Linked to North Korea

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) today issued a finding and notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, seeking to prohibit the opening or maintaining of a correspondent account in the United States for, or on behalf of, ABLV Bank. FinCEN is proposing this action based on its finding set out in the NPRM that ABLV is a foreign bank of primary money laundering concern.

“FinCEN will continue to take action against foreign banks that disregard anti-money laundering safeguards and become conduits for widespread illicit activity,” said Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury. “Deficient practices at banks foster a wide array of illicit conduct, including activity linked to North Korea’s weapons program and corruption connected to Russia and Ukraine. FinCEN is committed to protecting the U.S. financial system from these types of risks.”

As described in the finding, ABLV has institutionalized money laundering as a pillar of the bank’s business practices. ABLV’s management permits the bank and its employees to orchestrate money laundering schemes; solicits high-risk shell company activity that enables the bank and its customers to launder funds; maintains inadequate controls over high-risk shell company accounts; and seeks to obstruct enforcement of Latvian anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) rules in order to protect these business practices.

ABLV’s failure to implement, and disregard for, effective AML/CFT and sanctions policies and procedures have made the bank attractive to a range of illicit actors engaged in organized crime, weapons proliferation, corruption, and sanctions evasion. Illicit financial activity at the bank includes transactions for parties connected to UN-designated entities, some of which are involved in North Korea’s procurement or export of ballistic missiles. In addition, ABLV has facilitated transactions for corrupt politically exposed persons and has funneled billions of dollars in public corruption and asset stripping proceeds through shell company accounts. ABLV failed to mitigate the risk stemming from these accounts, which involved large-scale illicit activity connected to Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine.

Section 311 actions alert the U.S. financial sector to foreign institutions, such as ABLV, that are of primary concern and through the public rulemaking process, if necessary, cut them off from the U.S. financial sector.

Here is coverage in the Korea Herald:

Last year, an investigation by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and Treasury found that five other Latvian banks, which mainly serve nonresident clients, violated the United Nations Security Council’s sanctions against North Korea and rules on anti-money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

Latvia’s Financial and Capital Market Commission confirmed the banks’ illicit activity and assigned it financial penalties totaling 3.5 million euros ($4.3 million).

It is the third time the US government has imposed sanctions against a foreign bank for dealing with North Korea.

In 2005, Macau-based Banco Delta Asia had some $25 million in North Korean funds frozen under US sanctions, as 24 companies including Chinese banks stopped dealing with the North, putting Pyongyang under severe financial strain. The US also blacklisted China’s Bank of Dandong in June last year for laundering money for North Korea.

“We have made clear to countries and companies around the world that they can choose to trade with North Korea or the United States, but not both,” the US Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Sigal Mandelker said in an anti-money laundering and financial crimes conference in New York on Tuesday.

“We will target not only companies that actually know they are being exploited, but also those that should know. We are resolved that anyone who knowingly aids North Korea faces being cut off from the US financial system.”

Read the full story here:
Latvian bank faces US sanctions for dealing with NK
Kim So-hyun
Korea Herald
2018-2-14

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Jang Song-thaek photo-shopped out of guidance picture

Tuesday, February 13th, 2018

On February 2, KCTV broadcast from inside a home on Mirae Scientist Street. You can see the video here at 5:07:38 if you subscribe to NK News. Inside the apartment, they showed where the resident had been photographed with Kim Jong-un and Kim Jong-il. Here are the photos on the wall:

Here is a blow up of the lower-center picture:

Surprisingly, I recognized this picture. It is from Kim Jong-il’s and Kim Jong-un’s guidance trip to the Jagang Machine Plant on 2011-4-8. Here is the official photo as it appeared in the media at the time:

In this lower photo, the three individuals wearing grey coats are (from left to right) Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-un, and Kim Jong-il. In the photo above (hanging on the wall of the apartment on Mirae Street) there are only two people wearing grey coats: Kim Jong-il and KimJong-un. There is also one less person in the photo.

I thought this was interesting. I wonder how many photos have been altered to remove Jang Song-thaek? Also, I wonder how many apartments on Mirae Scientists Street are dedicated to the machine plant industry.

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Sanctioned Foreign Trade Bank can’t pay North Korea’s UN dues…

Tuesday, February 13th, 2018

Reuters reports that North Korea cannot pay its UN dues owing to sanctions on its official hard currency repository, the Foreign Trade Bank (FTB). According to the article:

North Korea’s U.N. Ambassador Ja Song Nam met with U.N. management chief Jan Beagle on Friday to ask the world body to help secure a bank transaction channel so Pyongyang could pay the nearly $184,000 it says it owes for 2018.

U.N. member states are required to pay assessed contributions to the world body’s regular and peacekeeping budgets, as well as a budget for international tribunals.

U.S. and U.N. sanctions on the Foreign Trade Bank, North Korea’s primary foreign exchange bank, were preventing the country ”from honoring its obligation as a U.N. member state by hindering even normal activities such as payment of the U.N. contribution,” the North Korean mission said in a statement late on Friday.

The United States sanctioned the Foreign Trade Bank in 2013, while the U.N. Security Council blacklisted the bank last August.

The 15-member U.N. Security Council has unanimously boosted sanctions on North Korea since 2006 in a bid to choke funding for Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

According to the U.N. Charter, countries in arrears in an amount that equals or exceeds the contributions due for two preceding years can lose their vote in the 193-member U.N. General Assembly. The General Assembly can grant an exception if a country can show that conditions beyond its control contributed to the inability to pay.

The U.N. website said that as of Jan. 28 there 12 countries in arrears of more than two years. Apart from its 2018 dues, North Korea said it is up to date with its payments.

I know that many in the diplomatic and NGO communities have been physically bringing in cash to fund their operations in Pyongyang since the FTB was sanctioned.

There was a Russian Bank, Bank Sputnik, that had maintained a financial link to the FTB to service the diplomatic community. However, this banking link was severed in September 2017 and apparently remains closed.

UPDATE (2018-2-21): A news site I was previously unaware of has some interesting information on the relationship between the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank and the Russian bank, Sputnik. According to Inner City News:

In the face of North Korea sanctions, the UN in December 2017 used the sanctioned Foreign Trade Bank and Russia’s Sputnik Bank to transfer EUR 3,974,920.62 into the country, documents obtained by Inner City Press show. A letter from Sputnik Bank states that “unauthorized person (I.V. Tonkih) led negotiations with Korean party on interbank correspondent relationship.” Photos here.

NK News did a better job reporting on the relationship between Sputnik and the FTB.

Read the full story here:
North Korea says unable to pay U.N. dues, blames sanctions
Reuters
2018-2-10

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