North Korea gearing up for hard times

July 10th, 2020

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

An editorial in today’s Rodong Sinmun emphasizes that fighting the “global pandemic” is more important than economic construction. For Korean-speaking readers, the message comes near the end of the editorial on Friday July 10th, and reads:

그것은 인민들의 생명과 건강을 보호하고 증진시키는것을 최급선무로, 가장 영예로운 혁명사업으로 간주하고있기때문이다.그 어떤 경제건설성과보다 대류행전염병의 침습을 막는것을 더 중요하게 여기고 이 사업에 최선을 기울여야 한다는것이 우리 당의 요구이다.

(Source: 김병진, “인민의 생명안전을 굳건히 지키는것은 우리 당의 제일중대사,” Rodong Sinmun, July 10th, 2020.)

This is not a new message, and it’s been re-stated in various forms in North Korean state media over the past few months. As I write in this article at 38 North, the recent emphasis on the chemical industry carries the same message: don’t expect any major changes in the external economic environment anytime soon, whether it be in conditions relating to sanctions or Covid-19.

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More anti-smuggling measures by the North Korean government

July 1st, 2020

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein 

The North Korean government is reportedly clamping down even further on smuggling across the Chinese border. As Daily NK notes, it’s a measure partially directed against corruption, which will most likely just increase bribery amounts. It’s also part of a broader state drive to assert its power over economic activity. Daily NK:

North Korean authorities recently ordered that ships travelling near the Sino-North Korean border must have a security official on board as part of efforts to crack down on smuggling, Daily NK has learned.

“The order concerns ships travelling along the Yalu River and states that they must have a Ministry of State Security [MSS] agent on board,” a source in China told Daily NK on June 25. “The order applies to all ships, regardless of whether they are container ships or fishing boats, and irrespective of their affiliation or purpose.”

Earlier this month, the MSS announced that anyone caught engaging in criminal activity near the border, including smuggling and attempting to defect, will be subject to strong punishments rather than rehabilitative measures, such as time at a forced labor camp.

The announcement of several measures pertaining to illegal activity near the border in the space of a month demonstrates how sensitive North Korean authorities are to smuggling and information leaks in the area.

BREAKING CORRUPTION

The order is also aimed at preventing corruption between local security officials and smugglers, according to the source.

Since it is common for smugglers to bribe local security officials, the MSS will reportedly send agents from the central government rather than local officers to work on the ships.

Smugglers say that the new order will only lead to more expensive bribes.

“You can earn up to RMB 10,000 [around USD 1,412] a day taking goods across the Yalu River,” the source said. “Because there’s so much money to be made, the measures won’t stop the smuggling. Smugglers will just have to pay higher bribes to the security officials.”

(Source: Jang Seul Gi, “N. Korea focuses on ending ship-based smuggling on border,” Daily NK, June 29, 2020.)

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North Korea strengthens camera surveillance along the Chinese border

June 30th, 2020

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

This is part of a very interesting trend, of surveillance in North Korea going more high-tech. Border security under Kim Jong-un has been a high priority, resulting in a significant drop in the number of defectors reaching South Korea. Recall, as the article does, that this is but one of several purchase rounds of surveillance equipment from China in recent years. It’s also part of a government drive to strengthen control overall – of economic and social trends and activities:

“The equipment was purchased from China in mid-May and cost approximately RMB 20 million [around USD 2,825,497],” a source based in China told Daily NK on Wednesday.

“The camera system will be set up in areas where smuggling activities are common – not across the entire border,” he continued, adding, “The installation of the system will begin in late June.”

Given that the cameras will only cover a limited area on the border, the high price tag suggests two possibilities: 1) the new system will film in higher definition than existing camera systems; or, 2) the system is so advanced that it can detect even the slightest of movements.

There is the possibility that the installation of the new system is part of preparations to resume trade between China and North Korea, namely by further cracking down on smuggling activities by individuals.

“The purchase of the new system shows that North Korea wants to stamp out these smuggling activities to ensure only [official] Sino-North Korean trade is allowed across the border,” the source speculated.

The source noted that North Korean officials believe that smuggling activities conducted by individuals are a key way information and illicit goods enter and exit the country.

(Source: Mun Dong Hui, “N. Korea to install new surveillance cameras on Sino-NK border,” Daily NK, 26 June, 2020.)

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The North Korean economy is doing badly, but keep some perspective

June 23rd, 2020

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Sanctions and Covid-19 have fused together to put the North Korean economy in what can only reasonably be described as an awful situation. Trade first plummeted through sanctions, and then even further because of North Korea’s and China’s anti-Covid19 measures. And the fall continues, as these figures in Hankyoreh show:

Figures from the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) and Chinese customs authorities reviewed on June 18 show a major drop in the value of North Korean goods being exported to the Chinese market: US$10.7 million in January and February (-71.7% year on year), US$600,000 in March (-96.2%), and US$2.2 million in April (-90%). The value of North Korean exports to China, which stood at US$2.63 billion in 2016, has fallen since economic sanctions were toughened, decreasing to US$1.65 billion (-37.3%) in 2017 and US$195 million in 2018 (-88.2%). Exports rebounded in 2019, to US$285 million, but that was still less than a tenth of the value of exports in 2016.

But how bad are things?

Bloomberg ran an article yesterday with the angle that the North Korean economy is the “worst” in two decades, and that this is why the country is lashing out against South Korea with renewed vigor. To support the former claim, it cites figures claiming that the country’s economy will contract by a total of 6 percent this year due to the combination of sanctions and Covid-19.

But how reasonable is this take?

There is no doubting that things are bad, but some context is badly needed. One of course cannot equate an economic contraction with the overall situation. (Never mind that any number on this will be qualified guesswork at best.) A contraction is only the economy shrinking, and it means nothing if we don’t know what the starting point is. In 1997, North Korea was perhaps at the height of a devastating famine, after the economy crumbled following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and China vastly scaling back support.

Today, North Korea may be in an economic crisis of sorts. But it entered it on the back of several years of steadily increasing exports to China. These exports, in fact, grew by more than a factor of ten between 1998 and the record year of 2013. So the situation is so different that a comparison is hardly meaningful.

This is also true for the food situation. According to numbers from the World Food Program and the Food and Agriculture Organization, whose data is questionable but highly valuable, food production stood at 3.3 million tonnes in 2008, not an unusually low figure for the time. Contrast this with the projection that this year’s harvest will be 4.6 million tonnes. Not great, lower than it should be, lower than a few years ago, yes. But still not nearly the level of the disaster years.

Also, it is crucial to remember that even in ordinary times, a not insignificant proportion of trade with China occurs off the books. Throw an increasingly lower Chinese sense of caring what the US thinks about its sanctions implementation into the mix and you’ve got, well, likely a lot more trade happening under the radar. This is what news reports from inside North Korea have been saying for quite a while.

Not that things aren’t bad, or that North Korea’s recent actions have to do with sanctions (they almost certainly do). But don’t forget about context or proportions.

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Defectors matter for the North Korean economy

June 22nd, 2020

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Over the past few days, the North Korean government has staged protests against the defector leaflets that have caused so much rumble lately. Or, perhaps more accurately, have been used as a convenient excuse for the North Korean government to ratchet things up. In any case. It need hardly be mentioned that these so-called protests are not necessarily reflective of any broader sentiments among the general public.

But this Radio Free Asia article highlights an interesting point, namely that for many North Koreans, remittances from family members abroad constitutes a significant source of income. It’s not really just a matter of individual families, either. Sums are high enough that they likely make a not insignificant contribution to the national economy as a whole. Remittances play a significant role for the economy in several impoverished countries, and channeled the right way, they could for economic development in North Korea too.

Some in the North in fact envy families with members in the South because they send cash remittances back home, sources in the country said.

“Even though the party is organizing a series of mass rallies to denounce the defectors, the people are envious of the defectors’ families,” a resident of North Hamgyong province, who requested anonymity for security reasons, told RFA’s Korean Service recently.

“Residents are being made to shout out slogans to condemn the defectors, but after the rally is over it sure is hard to find anyone saying bad things about defectors on their own,” the source said.

“This is because the families around us [with a member who] defected are living well despite the difficulties of the national economy,” the source added.

Most of those who send balloons to the North are called “defectors” in both Koreas, who remain in a formal state of war long after the Cold War ended elsewhere.

But rights groups draw a distinction between defectors, who fled the North as government or military officials, and refugees — ordinary citizens who escaped poverty or hunger in the region’s poorest country.

North Korea’s belligerent turn this month is seen by Pyongyang watchers as calculated to extract diplomatic or economic concessions from Seoul and Washington in a well-established pattern of crisis escalation.

Smuggling cash through China

However the international reaction plays out, inside the country, the government’s break with a longstanding policy of ignoring or playing down discussion of exiles in the South is making more ordinary North Koreans think about them.

“The more the party strengthens class-consciousness education against defectors and denounces them, the more that residents show the exact opposite reaction,” another source, a resident of Ryanggang province who requested anonymity to speak freely, told RFA.

“They continue to hold rallies against defectors, so there is a growing interest in the freedom enjoyed by the defectors who have settled in South Korea,” the second source said.

The exiles send money to their relatives in the North through intermediaries in China, who take a cut for arranging the smuggling of cash, usually Chinese yuan or U.S. dollars, across the porous Sino-North Korean border.

North Korean refugees in South Korea face social discrimination and many struggle economically as they are less competitive in South Korea’s cutthroat job market. But 62 percent of them sent money to friends and relatives in the North in 2018, according to a survey by a rights group.

The Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, which interviewed 414 North Koreans in the South, found most forwarded $500-2,000 a year – significant sums where an official salary is worth about $5 a month.

According to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, 32,000 North Koreans have settled in South Korea since 1998, including 1,047 last year.

The North Hamgyong source said that residents are complaining about having to attend rallies denouncing defectors.

“The people gripe about fatigue and they are discontent with the authorities’ ongoing rallies.

“They are critical of the authorities for focusing only on promoting the greatness of the Highest Dignity and creating a crisis against South Korea without solving the food problem that has befallen many residents at this difficult time,” the source said.  The Highest Dignity is an honorific term for Kim Jong Un.

(Source: Jieun Kim, Leejin Jun, Eugene Whong, “Official North Korean Fury at Defectors Belies Popular Envy of Remittances From Exiles,” Radio Free Asia, June 19th, 2020.)

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North Korean coal market routines changing

June 14th, 2020

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

That’s essentially the story told by Daily NK here, and it appears like some mines may be successfully cutting out a middleman:

“Coal mined from state-run coal mines is supposed to go to an agency in charge of distribution, but [these days] not all of the coal is being supplied to the appropriate agency,” the source said. “Coal mines have to make a profit to feed the large number of workers they have, so they decided to start doing business directly with the procurement and sales departments at companies.”

Some companies that received coal from this distribution system now have to buy the coal directly from coal mines, the source said, adding, “In these cases, coal mines sell the coal at a cheaper price than the usual market price.”

Some trading companies have reportedly begun working with railway authorities to transport large amounts of coal by train rather than by truck.

“They are making efforts to reduce distribution costs by going to coal-scarce areas and selling coal there while buying and then reselling that region’s specialty goods,” the source said.

“Of course there is still wholesale selling of coal taking place among merchants located near the mines. Since coal is a commodity that is always in demand, buyers are flocking to the markets,” the source added.

Generally, coal in North Korea used to be sold at around KPW 300,000 per ton, but by the end of 2017, after the implementation of more severe international sanctions, the price had plummeted to around KPW 200,000. Yet, due to smuggling and other factors, coal prices crept back up to KPW 290,000 per ton last year, according to the source.

(Source: Kang Mi Jin, “State-owned coal mines are finding new ways to make money,” Daily NK, June 11th, 2020.)

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Trends in the time of Corona: North Koreans increasingly gifting each other cell phone minutes

June 11th, 2020

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Daily NK reports on an interesting trend:

North Koreans in Pyongyang are increasingly sending mobile phone minutes to others as gifts instead of attending birthdays or weddings as the country continues to restrict face-to-face meetings due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

“With restrictions on movement, events and meetings due to the coronavirus, it is becoming commonplace for people to send others ‘mobile money’ as a celebratory gift,” a source in Pyongyang told Daily NK on June 8.

“Mobile money” refers to a service where users can exchange minutes with other mobile phones users, essentially allowing people to “top-up” others who do not have enough minutes for voice calls.

“Students in Pyongyang who come from areas outside Pyongyang can’t return home due to the coronavirus and are unable to see their friends,” the source told Daily NK. “While confined in their dormitories, students began sending mobile money instead of gifts for various celebrations at home or their friends’ birthdays, and this practice is spreading to other areas of the country.”

AS SIMPLE AS CAN BE

Sending mobile money is relatively simple. Anyone with a mobile money card, which is akin to a checking card for mobile phone charges, can send minutes to others by entering the phone company’s three-digit ID number, the amount to be sent, the phone number of the recipient, and the six-digit password on the card.

For example, a subscriber of Koryolink, the most popular telecommunications provider in Pyongyang, can transmit mobile money to another individual by entering *999* followed by the amount of funds to be transferred, the phone number of the recipient, the six-digit phone money card password and then “#.” Kang Song NET customers would enter *929* instead of *999*.

(Source: Jang Seul Gi, “‘Mobile money’: an increasingly popular way of gifting to others,” Daily NK, June 11th, 2020.)

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North Korean state attempting to curtail ideological contamination of citizens abroad with TV box

June 10th, 2020

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

North Koreans living abroad are increasingly pressured to buy the Manbang IPTV boxes, to ensure that they can keep watching domestic TV and follow the riveting reports of Kim Jong-un’s guidance visits and other activities while abroad, Daily NK reports:

North Korean authorities are pressuring overseas residents of China to purchase a domestically-made IPTV set-top box as part of efforts to strengthen ideological education, Daily NK has learned.

“The North Korean embassy to China is selling IPTV set-top boxes to embassy staff and trade representatives at RMB 2,000 [around USD 282] per box. There is a lot of pressure to buy the boxes, which places a substantial burden on those who have recently been struggling to make ends meet,” a China-based source told Daily NK on June 8.

North Korea has been developing and selling a set-top box called “Manbang” since 2016. Manbang is capable of playing TV broadcasts in real-time along with videos-on-demand (VODs).

The state-run outlet DPRK Today described Manbang as an “IT platform” that allows businesses or households subscribed to North Korea’s intranet network to view various broadcasts real-time, as well as re-watch programs that have already aired.

The source pointed out that forcing North Korean citizens abroad to purchase the set-top box has more to do with strengthening ideological education than making money.

“The set-top box allows North Korean authorities to provide educational programs to North Koreans living in China, including embassy staff and traders,” the source told Daily NK. “[The reason the authorities are pressuring people to buy the devices] is because they think that there are declining levels of loyalty and ideological fervor among those living in China.”

The recent push to sell the devices may also be part of efforts by North Korean authorities to provide overseas residents with devices capable of broadcasting only North Korean programs. Many North Koreans living abroad reportedly watch foreign TV in secret.

North Korean authorities are also checking to see whether people living in China are watching the various ideological education programs provided by the state, according to the source.

“The leadership has instructed that criticism sessions should include discussions on whether people are using the set-top boxes,” the source told Daily NK, adding, “North Korean officials will even go as far as calling up individuals to ask about the broadcasts and make sure they are being watched.”

Manbang features reports on North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s activities, as well as dramatized versions of Kim Il Sung’s memoirs. Videos relating to Kim family history are also available in the device’s VOD platform.

(Source: Mun Dong Hui, “N. Korean citizens in China pressured to buy IPTV set-top boxes,” Daily NK, June 10th, 2020.)

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Autarky, self-reliance and urban privilege in Kim Jong-un’s June politburo remarks

June 8th, 2020

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

On Monday June 8th, the Korean Worker’s Party politburo held a meeting. Kim Jong-un made several interesting remarks about the overall state of the economy, as Reuters reported here. The full Rodong Sinmun recounting of Kim’s statements is interesting and worth reading in its entirety. More and more state rhetoric seems to presume autarky as the default approach for economic development which is somewhat worrying, but perhaps just a reflection of where the country’s economic conditions stand as of now.

It’s also interesting to note Kim’s mention of the situation specifically in Pyongyang. Perhaps he means to signal to the political elites that he is looking out for their interests and quality of life, and that things will improve. What that means for the rest of the country is less clear. Pyongyang is symbolically important, but the growing disparity between the capital city and the rest of the country should concern the government.

Rodong’s rendition below, in both the original Korean and an English translation.

Political Bureau of C.C., WPK Meets under Guidance of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un

The 13th Political Bureau meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was held on June 6 and 7 at a time when the entire Party, the whole country and all the people have vigorously turned out in the general offensive for glorifying the 75th founding anniversary of the WPK as the great festival of victors true to the great idea and strategy of the Party for making a breakthrough head-on and its action program.

Kim Jong Un, chairman of the WPK, chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, was present in the meeting.

Attending the meeting were members and alternate members of the Political Bureau of the C.C., WPK.

Vice-premiers of the Cabinet, some chairpersons of provincial party committees and leading officials of committees and ministries were there as observers.

Upon authorization of the Political Bureau of the C.C., WPK, Supreme Leader of the Party, state and armed forces Kim Jong Un presided over the meeting.

The meeting discussed in depth some crucial issues arising in further developing the self-sufficient economy of the country and improving the standard of people’s living.

Discussed as the first agenda items were some urgent problems arising in developing the chemical industry of the country in a well-defined framework.

He indicated orientation and way to reconstruct the chemical industry as required by Juche and modernity and put it on a track of sustainable development.

Repeatedly stressing that the chemical industry is the foundation of industry and a major thrust front of the national economy, he recollected that the Party, regarding the chemical and metallurgical industries as twin pillars of the self-supporting economy, set forth the policy of founding the C1 chemical industry to suit to the specific conditions of the country and to meet the world’s trend at its Seventh Congress and has since pushed forward with the work.

Recalling that the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea discussed the issues of establishing the C1 chemical industry and of building the fertilizer production capacity as core points in developing the chemical industry, the Supreme Leader clarified the plan and will of waging a bold struggle to put the overall chemical industry on a Juche and modern basis.

The premier of the Cabinet made a report on the review by the scientific group of the scientific and technical guarantee and economic efficiency of founding C1 chemical industry, and the present situation of the chemical industry.

The meeting heard suggestions on earlier completion of founding C1 chemical industry and had in-depth discussion of issues of opening a broad avenue to the development of chemical industry.

The chemical industrial field has to be activated first to propel and guarantee the economic development of the country, the Supreme Leader said, setting forth immediate tasks for propping up the chemical industry as a whole.

He stressed the need to give top priority to increasing the capacity for producing fertilizer, to begin with, in the chemical industrial field and push forward this work and put particular emphasis on promptly settling scientific and technological issues of founding potassic fertilizer industry based on our own raw materials.

Indicating orientation and immediate goal for energizing existent chemical factories, the Supreme Leader pointed out the need to conduct in a far-sighted way the work to explore chemical industrial field based on new raw materials.

He underlined the need to actively propel the work to perfect and update in a modern way the structure of sectors of the chemical industry.

He clarified that the new structure of sectors of Juche-based chemical industry should be multi-lateral production system, which is saving energy, labor and natural resources and which is technology-intensive and development-and-creation-oriented, that produces nonstop all kinds of chemical goods enough to meet demand thoroughly based on locally available raw and other materials.

He called for building reliable national level scientific research force, actively pushing forward the development of catalyst and laying a material foundation for developing catalyst technology, catalyst industry.

He stressed the importance to carry out substantial work to build talent force in chemical industrial field and to bring up a greater number of talents of practical type who are development-and-creation-oriented in the field of education.

As the second agenda item the meeting discussed immediate issues of ensuring living conditions for citizens in the capital city.

Pointing out in detail the issues that have to be urgently settled to ensure living conditions of citizens in the city, the Supreme Leader stressed to take strong state measures for ensuring the living conditions of people including the construction of dwelling houses.

Important issues for settling issues arising as regards the living conditions of Pyongyang citizens were discussed at the meeting.

A resolution on the first and second agenda items was adopted with full approval at the meeting.

As the third agenda item, the meeting examined before ratification the suggestion on modifying some rule-related matters arising in the present party work and reflecting them in a draft amendment to the party rules.

The fourth agenda item was an organizational matter.

There was a by-election of an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee. Kim Yong Hwan was by-elected as an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee.

Members and alternate members of the WPK Central Committee were recalled and elected to fill vacancies. Ko Kil Son, Kim Jong Nam, Song Yong Gon were by-elected as members from alternate members while Ri Jae Nam, Kwon Thae Yong and Kwon Yong Jin as members of the WPK Central Committee.

Rim Yong Chol, Kang Il Sop, Sin In Yong, Ri Kyong Chon, Kim Ju Sam, Kim Jong Chol, Choe Kwang Jun, Yang Myong Chol, Kim Yong Chol, Pak Man Ho were by-elected as alternate members of the WPK Central Committee.

The 13th Political Bureau meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK marked an important occasion in further consolidating the foundation and potential of the self-supporting national economy, giving top priority to the people’s dignity, rights and interests under the uplifted banner of people-first principle and opening up a broad avenue to improving the standard of people’s living to meet the requirements of the prevailing situation of the revolution.

(Source: Political News Team, “Political Bureau of C.C., WPK Meets under Guidance of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un,” Rodong Sinmun, June 8th, 2020.)

조선로동당 중앙위원회 제7기 제13차 정치국회의 진행

우리 당의 위대한 정면돌파사상과 전략, 실천강령을 높이 받들고 당창건 75돐을 승리자의 대축전으로 빛내이기 위한 전당적, 전국가적, 전인민적총진군의 불길이 세차게 타번지고있는 속에서 조선로동당 중앙위원회 제7기 제13차 정치국회의가 6월 7일에 진행되였다.

조선로동당 위원장이시며 조선민주주의인민공화국 국무위원회 위원장이시며 조선민주주의인민공화국무력 최고사령관이신 우리 당과 국가, 무력의 최고령도자 김정은동지께서 정치국회의에 참가하시였다.

정치국회의에는 조선로동당 중앙위원회 정치국 위원, 후보위원들이 참가하였다.

내각부총리들과 일부 도당위원장들, 위원회, 성 책임일군들이 방청으로 참가하였다.

당중앙위원회 정치국의 위임에 따라 김정은동지께서 회의를 사회하시였다.

정치국회의에서는 나라의 자립경제를 더욱 발전시키며 인민들의 생활을 향상시키는데서 나서는 일련의 중대한 문제들이 심도있게 토의되였다.

첫째의정으로 나라의 화학공업을 전망성있게 발전시키는데서 나서는 당면한 몇가지 문제에 대하여 토의하였다.

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서는 화학공업의 구조를 주체화, 현대화의 요구에 맞게 개조하고 지속적인 발전궤도에 올려세우기 위한 방향과 방도를 밝혀주시였다.

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서는 화학공업은 공업의 기초이고 인민경제의 주타격전선이라고 거듭 강조하시면서 우리 당이 화학공업을 금속공업과 함께 자립경제의 쌍기둥으로 내세우고 당 제7차대회에서 우리 나라의 실정과 세계적추세에 맞게 탄소하나화학공업을 창설할데 대한 방침을 제시한 후 그 사업을 본격화하여온데 대하여 말씀하시였다.

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서는 당중앙위원회 제7기 제5차전원회의에서 화학공업발전의 핵심사항으로 탄소하나화학공업창설과 비료생산능력조성문제를 취급한데 대하여 언급하시면서 화학공업전반의 주체화, 현대화를 실현하기 위한 투쟁을 통이 크게 벌려나갈 구상과 의지를 표명하시였다.

회의에서는 내각총리가 탄소하나화학공업창설의 과학기술적담보와 경제적효과성을 재검토심의한 과학그루빠의 사업정형과 화학공업부문의 현 실태에 대한 보고를 하였다.

회의에서는 탄소하나화학공업창설을 다그쳐 끝내기 위한 의견들을 청취하고 화학공업발전의 새 활로를 열어놓기 위한 문제들을 진지하게 협의하였다.

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서는 나라의 경제발전을 추동하고 담보하기 위해서는 화학공업부문이 먼저 들고일어나야 한다고 하시면서 화학공업전반을 추켜세우기 위한 당면과업들을 제시하시였다.

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서는 화학공업부문에서 무엇보다도 비료생산능력을 늘이기 위한 사업을 최우선적인 문제로 보고 대하며 이 사업을 강하게 밀고나갈데 대하여서와 우리의 원료에 의거한 카리비료공업을 창설하는데서 나서는 과학기술적문제들을 시급히 해결할데 대하여 특별히 강조하시였다.

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서는 현존화학공장들을 활성화하기 위한 방향과 당면목표를 제시하시고 새로운 원료에 의거하는 화학공업분야를 개척하기 위한 사업도 전망성있게 벌려나갈데 대하여 지적하시였다.

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서는 화학공업의 부문구조를 완비하고 현대적으로 개건하기 위한 사업을 적극 추진할데 대하여 강조하시였다.

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서는 국내원료와 자재에 철저히 의거하여 각종 화학제품들을 수요대로 중단없이 생산해내는 에네르기절약형, 로력절약형, 자원절약형, 기술집약형, 개발창조형의 다방면적인 생산체계를 갖추는것이 주체화된 화학공업의 새 부문구조로 되여야 한다고 천명하시였다.

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서는 국가적인 과학연구력량을 튼튼히 꾸리고 탄소하나화학공업에 쓰이는 촉매개발을 적극 다그치면서 촉매기술, 촉매공업을 발전시키기 위한 물질적토대를 갖출데 대하여 지적하시였다.

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서는 화학공업부문의 인재력량을 꾸리기 위한 사업을 착실히 해나가며 교육부문에서 개발창조형의 인재, 실천형의 인재들을 더 많이 키워낼데 대하여 말씀하시였다.

정치국회의에서는 둘째의정으로 수도시민들의 생활보장에서 나서는 당면한 문제들이 토의되였다.

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서는 수도시민들의 생활보장에서 시급히 해결해야 할 문제들을 구체적으로 지적하시면서 살림집건설을 비롯한 인민생활보장과 관련한 국가적인 대책을 강하게 세울데 대하여 강조하시였다.

회의에서는 평양시민들의 생활에서 제기되는 문제들을 풀기 위한 중요문제들이 토의되였다.

정치국회의에서는 첫째의정과 둘째의정에 대한 결정서가 전원일치로 채택되였다.

정치국회의에서는 셋째의정으로 현행당사업에서 제기되는 일련의 규약상문제들을 일부 수정하고 당규약개정안에 반영할데 대한 의견을 심의비준하였다.

정치국회의에서는 넷째의정으로 조직문제를 토의하였다.

당중앙위원회 정치국 후보위원을 보선하였다.

김영환동지를 당중앙위원회 정치국 후보위원으로 보선하였다.

당중앙위원회 위원, 후보위원들을 소환 및 보선하였다.

고길선동지, 김정남동지, 송영건동지를 당중앙위원회 후보위원에서 위원으로, 리재남동지, 권태영동지, 권영진동지를 당중앙위원회 위원으로 보선하였다.

림영철동지, 강일섭동지, 신인영동지, 리경천동지, 김주삼동지, 김정철동지, 최광준동지, 양명철동지, 김영철동지, 박만호동지를 당중앙위원회 후보위원으로 보선하였다.

조선로동당 중앙위원회 제7기 제13차 정치국회의는 조성된 혁명정세의 요구에 맞게 자립경제의 토대와 잠재력을 더욱 튼튼히 다지며 인민대중제일주의의 기치높이 인민의 존엄과 권익을 최우선, 절대시하고 인민생활향상의 활로를 열어나가는데서 중요한 계기로 된다.

(Source: Ponsajŏngch’ibodoban, “Chosŏllodongdang Chungangwiwŏnhoe Che7ki che13ch’a Chŏngch’igukhoeŭi Chinhaeng,” Rodong Sinmun, June 8th, 2020.)

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Update on North Korea and Covid19: June 7th, 2020

June 7th, 2020

By: Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

A little over a week ago, I wrote an essay for Foreign Policy Research Institute about Covid-19 in North Korea. The long-term challenge of Covid-19, combined with sanctions, of course poses a major economic challenge for North Korea. However, as I attempt to lay out, there’s another issue. Much of Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy and policy focus has been tied up with economic construction and raising the people’s living standard. That looks like an increasingly distant prospect. With “just” sanctions, trade could have resumed and even expanded depending on the political moods in Beijing, and to a lesser extent, Moscow. Now with Covid-19, considerations are totally different:

Over the past few months, however, the tone of state rhetoric has changed. While before it breathed optimism, North Korean state propaganda now speaks much more—and more realistically—about problems and obstacles to economic development and about the old themes of autarky and economic self-reliance. For the time being, any plans to lift North Korea to a higher plane of economic development have largely been put on hold.

What does this mean politically for Kim Jong-un, who staked much of his credibility on delivering economic progress? The truth is that no one really knows. On the one hand, North Korea is perhaps the harshest dictatorship in the world, and the regime crushes even the slightest hint of dissent with an uncompromising iron fist. Over 100,000 people are estimated to be imprisoned in labor camps, many for crimes of political nature (or “speaking mistakes” as the Korean term goes), some for life. Kim Jong-un was in fact absent not just for one period of several weeks—the initial one that drew so much international attention—but for two different periods, and only appeared in North Korean media four times in all of April and May. Kim may be recovering from a medical procedure, but his absence may also be caused by caution against COVID-19. He may simply not want to conduct public visits or meeting sessions due to the risk of infection. In a system where so much power is centered around one single leader, his health is a top priority for national security in the eyes of the state, and will always be strongly guarded.

On the other hand, no dictatorship can truly function sustainably without any sense of at least tacit support from part of the population, such as the privileged, political core class. Kim has catered to this class in North Korea by overseeing their access to an essentially Western upper-middle class lifestyle in many respects, such as luxury department stores and a water park. The provinces have seen little of this development, and the massive and growing cleavage between the capital city and everywhere else is another long-term problem for the regime. Even so, life in the countryside has improved overall, albeit more marginally, thanks to the growth of the market system.

What happens when, over the course of a longer period of time, things not only cease to improve, but become markedly more difficult? The general public may heed the state’s call to get ready for some difficult times ahead for a while, but in the longer run, it may lead to widespread discontent. What that will mean for the North Korean regime, which has already survived challenges that seemed impossible, only time will tell.

(Full article here.)

In North Korea, it seems the regime is letting up on some of the strongest restrictions. For example, it will – and this says a great deal about the country’s complex economic system, where boundaries between illegal and legal trade are often unclear – “permit” smuggling to a greater extent:

North Korean authorities have decided to permit smuggling activities across some portions of the Sino-North Korean border from mid-June on the condition that smugglers pay foreign currency to purchase trade permits, Daily NK has learned.

According to a Daily NK source in North Korea on May 29, North Korea decided to allow traders in Sinuiju, Ryongchon, Uiju and Nampo Special City to conduct their activities from June 15. Traders who fall within the purview of the new measure include those working for trade companies affiliated with the military, Cabinet and other government agencies along with individual smugglers registered with companies.

WAKU BACK TO YOU

Traders must fulfill two conditions to restart their activities: 1) pay for their trade license (waku) in foreign currency; and, 2) in addition to their own imports, import items designated by the state and donate half of these imports to the government.

Even companies or individuals that already possess a waku must buy new permits with foreign currency because the permitted import lists on their trade permits must be changed to accommodate the import needs of the state.

North Korean authorities have reportedly ordered smugglers to include rice, flour, oil (cooking oil), sugar, MSG and other foods on their list of imports. Even traders who previously specialized in electric appliances or clothes must now include food items in their imports to be allowed to begin trading again.

The inclusion of these food items is likely the result of a measure handed down by the country’s Central Committee and Cabinet on Apr. 17 that restricted all “unnecessary” imports until the end of the year.

Following the announcement of the import restrictions, the prices of MSG, soybean oil and flour skyrocketed; there now appears to be great discontent among North Koreans about the scarcity of certain food products and the generally higher prices of food items. Daily NK’s source said that the addition of these food items to import lists is a direct result of this discontent.

North Korean officials have also announced that smugglers who hand over 70% of the food products – more than just the minimum of 50% – they import to the state will be given so-called “patriotic donation certificates.”

All in the all, the latest measure to open up smuggling across the border is aimed at both acquiring foreign currency (through the sale of trade permits) and stabilizing market prices by importing food items in demand.

UNEQUAL FOOTING

The decision to open up smuggling in certain areas is likely due to difficulties in controlling smuggling activities in places like Ryanggang Province and North Hamgyong Province.

Smugglers in those regions are reportedly faced with the significant burden of having to move their operations to North Pyongan Province or Nampo.

Moreover, they have to submit a “letter of intent” to a North Korean agency saying they will be importing items from a particular Chinese trader and the existence of these traders in China must be confirmed by the North Korean embassy in China. These traders also have to compete with traders already based in North Pyongan Province and develop trading routes from scratch.

Ryanggang Province-based traders have mixed opinions on the move to open up smuggling across the border. Some believe that they need to take the opportunity to start trade again, while others think they should wait until the authorities officially permit smuggling across the border in the province.

(Source: Jang Seul Gi, “N. Korea to permit smuggling over parts of Sino-NK border,” Daily NK, 1/6/2020.)

Meanwhile, schools are now open, with video clips to show it:

Schools in North Korea were supposed to start new semesters in early April, but the vacation period was extended repeatedly due to the coronavirus pandemic, though some colleges and high schools were allowed to open in mid-April.

In the footage, students were seen wearing masks, as were parents and teachers. Masks stayed on inside classrooms.

The resumption of schools might suggest concerns over the coronavirus have recently eased in North Korea or it could be aimed at projecting Pyongyang’s the country’s ability to contain the virus.

(Source: “N. Korean schools reopen during pandemic,” Yonhap, 3/6/2020.)

Meanwhile, news continue to come out of the country about deaths from symptoms similar to Covid-19, though of course, everything remains unconfirmed:

Dozens of people in two South Pyongan Province hospitals recently died after suffering symptoms similar to those caused by COVID-19 infections, Daily NK has learned.“The dozens of people who died recently were all patients at a facility caring for tuberculosis patients and the hepatitis care center at the Pyongsong City Hospital,” a source in South Pyongan Province told Daily NK on June 4.

The Pyongsong City Tuberculosis Care Center and the Hepatitis Care Center at the Pyongsong City Hospital are both focused on treating patients with infectious diseases. Patients in these facilities are typically discharged only after receiving permission from their doctors.

The patients who died were all being hospitalized for preexisting conditions, but expired while receiving intensive care after they began showing signs of COVID-19 infections.

Both hospitals quickly blamed tuberculosis or hepatitis for the deaths and hospital workers were ordered to stay silent about the dead patients, the source said.

The sudden spike in deaths led some patients in the hospitals to run away from the facilities out of fear of COVID-19.

“Groups of patients left the hospitals out of fear that they could die if they stayed there any longer,” the source told Daily NK, adding, “Local authorities along with hospital managers were alarmed by this.”

Local and hospital authorities were reportedly concerned that the runaway patients might infect broader society with their diseases.

Local rumors about the runaway patients reportedly focused on the reaction of the authorities, which suggested that officials are still concerned about COVID-19.

Late last month, public health authorities in South Pyongan Province reportedly conducted a province-wide survey of people who showed symptoms similar to those caused by COVID-19 infections.

According to the source, the survey found that there are around 1,500 people quarantined either at home or at medical facilities in the province after complaining of high fevers, coughing, difficulty breathing, and other symptoms. Most of them are self-quarantining at home, while only a few with severe symptoms are in medical facilities.

(Source: Jang Seul Gi, “Source: Dozens recently died at two Pyongsong hospitals,” Daily NK, 5/6/2020.)

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