North Korean Economy Watch

Kim Jong il sets sights on increasing processed food rationing in order to improve the daily lives of the people
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-8-10-1
8/10/2009

North Korean authorities, recognizing that rationing of processed foods is directly linked to the daily lives of the residents of North Korea, are concentrating on a policy of increasing distribution as part of the campaign to build a ‘Strong and Prosperous Nation’ by 2012. The policy calls for the construction of regional food processing facilities throughout the country and using domestic ingredients for all processed foods. In addition, the government plans to undertake diversification of small-scale factories in order to produce soybean paste, soy sauce, cooking oil and other staples, as well as noodles, rice-cake and other foods, all kinds of side dishes, and alcoholic beverages.

This movement was announced in concurrence with Kim Jong Il’s visit to the Samilpo Special Products Factory and Store, both run by the military, on April 7, just two days after the North’s launch of a long-range rocket. This factory, on the bank of the Daedong River, produces over 350 kinds of edibles, including noodles, rice-cakes, oil, sweets, alcoholic drinks, processed meats and fish products. During his visit, Kim Jong Il is said to have stated, “Today, I am happier than during the launch of the Kwangmyeongseong 2,” emphasizing his interest in boosting food production.

On July 15, (North) Korean Central Broadcasting announced the formation of construction offices in Jagang, North Pyongan and other provinces to oversee the building of food production complexes, and the dispatch of “shock troops” to bolster construction efforts.

Recently, the construction of large-scale factories to produce foodstuffs out of each region’s local stock has been pursued in every province in the country. Even at the Cabinet level, a ’Production Workers’ Conference’ was held, bringing together responsible authorities and local production experts to discuss a course for quickly improving services provided to the general population.

In order to effectively implement the North’s policy of increasing rations of foodstuffs, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly issued an order to establish a Ministry of Foodstuff and Daily Necessities Industry.

As North Korea tries to implement this type of measure to boost production and rationing, failure to improve food shortage conditions and economic hardships while at the same time mobilizing the population in a drive to establish a Strong and Prosperous Nation has led to growing outcries among residents. North Korean authorities appear to be introducing these measures in order to placate these complaints.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-7-22-1
7/22/2009

According to a report released by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), mineral products again topped the list of DPRK exports, accounting for 41.3 percent of goods sent out of the country last year. The KOTRA report, “2008 DPRK Trade Trends,” states that the North’s 2008 exports, totaling 1,130,213,000 dollars, increased by 23 percent over the 918.77 million USD-worth of goods exported in 2007.

With the exception of plastic and wooden goods, North Korean exports grew in all areas. Mineral products accounted for 41.3 percent; non-ferrous minerals made up 16.8 percent, textiles accounted for 10.6 percent; chemical plastics made up 7.6 percent; electrical and electronic machinery made up 7 percent; and animal products accounted for 3.6 percent.

Mineral goods were up 33.5 percent over last year, recording sales of 465.44 million USD. This sector has shown continuous growth over the last five years. In 2004, trade in these goods brought in 152.28 million USD; in 2005, 243.66 million USD; in 2006, 244.43 million USD; and in 2007, 349.58 million USD.

Since 2003, North Korea has concentrated on invigorating the light-industrial sector, and has emphasized the export of manufactured goods. However, last year, exports of mineral products and non-ferrous minerals combined to make up a total of 58.1 percent of all exports; the North has been unable to restructure its export sector or satisfactorily boost light-industrial manufacturing.

North Korea’s imports grew as well, to more than twice that of exports. Bringing in goods worth 2,685,478,000 USD, imports grew by 32 percent over the 2.023 billion in imports during 2007. In 2008, mineral products accounted for 25.9 percent of imports; fibers accounted for 11.9 percent; electrical and electronic machinery, 11.5 percent; processed food items, 8.8 percent; chemical and heavy industrial goods, 7.5 percent; and non-ferrous minerals, 6.6 percent. Import of fibers, processed food, and mineral products grew, while the import of animal products, vegetable products and automobiles fell.

Crude petroleum, the North’s largest import item, was imported exclusively from China, and was up 46.9 percent (414.31 million USD) over 2007 (281.97 million USD). However, due to the loss of other sources of fuel, overall imports of crude grew by a mere 1 percent.

Import of grains fell in 2008, recording only 86.24 million USD – a fall of 25.6 percent from the 115.86 million USD in grain imports during 2007. KOTRA explains that due to instability in the grain market, imports from China of rice and barley were halted in April, while corn imports were halted in August.

(Note: Here is the KOTRA web page.  It is not a user-friendly site and I was unable to find the report in English.)

From YouTube:

(Click on image to see video)

According to the video description:

This was PyongSu’s introduction to donor organisations and individuals that have been purchasing pharmaceuticals abroad and shipped them to North Korea. PyongSu’s promotional presentation explained to them why they should place their orders with PyongSu rather than with pharmaceutical companies abroad.

As PyongSu had no budget to mandate a professional advertising company with the task its managing director Felix Abt made the concept, the script and produced it in-house towards the end of 2005, with the help of North Korean IT and designing students and their Canadian trainer Ian Lee as well as teacher Michael P. Spavor, then giving language courses in Pyongyang, who was the “voice” in this clip. Thus, this unique advertising clip was made in its entirety in Pyongyang (and by people who are not advertising professionals). Check it out and add your comment!

Longer videos on investments in the DPRK can be found here.

Click on image to see advert

The BBC offers what is hailed as the first Taedonggang Beer commercial. According to the article:

In a rare nod to commercial motives in the resolutely communist nation, the TV advert features a thirsty worker holding a mug of frothy beer.

Young women in traditional Korean dress are shown serving trays of beer to men in Western suits.

Billed as the “Pride of Pyongyang”, the advert promises drinkers that the beer will help ease stress.

“It represents the new look of Pyongyang,” the two-and-a-half minute advert says. “It will be a familiar part of our lives.”

Taedonggang Beer Factory has been making the brew since buying a British brewery and shipping it lock, stock and barrel from the UK in 2002.

The beer has been occasionally available in South Korea and is said to be of high quality.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, said to have a fondness for fine wines and brandy, has taken a personal interest in the brewery.

“Watching good quality beer coming out in an uninterrupted flow for a long while, he noted with great pleasure that it has now become possible to supply more fresh beer to people in all seasons,” North Korea’s state news agency, KCNA, said after he visited the brewery in 2002.

The DPRK did allow a ten minute “infomercial” to be made about Taedonggang Beer (probably by the Chongryun).  You can see it here:

Click on image to see video

Here is a previous post on the beer.

Here is the location of the Taedongggang Brewery.

The full article can be found here:
North Korea launches beer advert
BBC
4/3/2009

North Korea doesn’t release official economic data.  Since 1991, the South Korean central bank has released its own estimates of the North Korean economy to fill the void.  Its figures are derived from information provided by the ROK’s National Intelligence Service and other sources.  The 2008 statistics can be downloaded here.

According to coverage by the Associated Press:

The North’s gross domestic product for last year was estimated at $24.7 billion, a 3.7% increase from 2007, Seoul’s Bank of Korea said in a news release. The impoverished North’s economy shrank 2.3% in 2007 and 1.1% in 2006.

The central bank said the North’s economic growth was mainly because of “temporary factors” such as favorable weather conditions that resulted in an increase in agricultural production, and the arrival of oil shipments under an international disarmament deal on its nuclear program.

The size of North Korea’s economy, however, was still about 2.6% of South Korea’s, the bank said, adding it was “difficult” to determine whether last year’s growth means the country’s internal economic conditions have improved.

The bank said the North’s agricultural production increased 10.9% last year compared with 2007. The production of coal, iron ore and other minerals expanded 2.3% and the manufacturing industry 2.5%.

…and BBC coverage:

Agricultural production rose nearly 11% in 2008 compared with 2007. And coal, iron ore and other mineral production grew 2.3% for the year.

UPDATE from Business Week:

The surprise underscores the tiny size of the North Korean economy, which could be easily swayed by such factors as weather and outside assistance. Just over two-thirds of the 3.7% growth came from the agricultural sector, and that is heavily dictated by weather. North Korea’s agricultural output increased by 10.9% in 2008 after falling by 12.1% in the previous year as it managed to escape from major floods and drought. Its 2008 manufacturing production also grew by 2.5%, compared with a gain of a mere 0.8% in 2007, thanks to heavy oil supplies by the U.S. and its allies as a result of Pyongyang’s agreement last year to begin dismantling its nuclear facilities.

Even as hope builds in South Korea about a recovery, with the U.S. and China showing signs of revival, prospects for North Korea’s economy are looking grimmer. North Korea’s nuclear test in May and the regime’s missile tests this year have led to an end to outside help and economic sanctions by the U.N. This heralds a poor performance in the manufacturing sector, which will almost certainly face an acute shortage of oil and electricity this year.

Pyongyang can’t count on the agricultural industry for any major contribution to economic growth in 2009, either. Even if North Korea manages to maintain the 2008 grain output of 4.3 million tons, which will be difficult to achieve unless last year’s exceptionally good weather is repeated, it won’t help the economy grow as it starts from a high base.

Those factors make North Korea’s economic growth last year an anomaly. “There’s no indication that North Korea’s growth engine has improved in any fundamental way,” says Bank of Korea economist Shin Seung Cheol. Even with last year’s extraordinary growth, North Korea’s gross domestic product was 1/38 of South Korea’s $935 billion and its trade volume was 1/224 of the South’s $857.3 billion in 2008. As long as North Korea’s reclusive leader Kim Jong Il refuses to open up his country, the gap is bound to keep expanding.

I have collected the most commonly referenced North Korean economic statistics here.

Read more here:
South Korea’s Central Bank Says North’s Economy Grew in 2008
Associated Press
6/28/2009

North Korea’s GDP Growth Better Than South Korea’s
Business Week
Moon Ihlwan
6/30/2009

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Evan Ramstad offers some information on China’s investments in North Korea:

The diplomatic minuet is taking place after China increased trade with North Korea over the past four years. Last year, trade between China and North Korea jumped 41% to $2.79 billion, with most of that coming from increased exports by China.

 On Tuesday, truck traffic between the two countries resumed after a break Monday for a Chinese holiday. Dozens of trucks made the crossing in Dandong, a major city along the North Korean border.

China has been North Korea’s chief political and economic sponsor since the Soviet Union collapsed nearly 20 years ago. For much of that time, it served as donor of last resort, making up the difference when energy, food and donations to North Korea dropped off from other countries. That often amounted to $100 million to $200 million in aid.

China broke from that pattern in 2005 by boosting its exports and widening its trade surplus with North Korea. Outside experts view China’s trade surplus as the chief measure of its economic aid to North Korea because North Korea has no measurable debt instrument and little ability to narrow the trade gap.

Chinese companies, sometimes with help from the Chinese government, are investing heavily in North Korea’s mining industry, construction and light manufacturing such as textiles. Chinese consumer goods line store shelves and market stalls in North Korea.

Many executives of Chinese companies in North Korea say it’s a difficult place to operate. Among the challenges: getting money out of the country. China helped Panda Electronics Group, based in Nanjing, start a computer assembly factory with Taedong River Computer Corp. in North Korea five years ago.

North Korea’s currency, the won, can’t be converted. To move money out of the country, Panda must buy commodities in North Korea and sell them in China for cash, an executive said.

The increased business activity in North Korea reflects China’s desire to treat North Korea more as a “normal country” rather than a socialist brother entitled to unlimited assistance, scholars and analysts in China say. They say China also hopes its companies in North Korea will encourage the North’s government to open its economy as China began to do in the 1980s.

Wang Kai, a manager of Liaoning Fuxin Tianxin Technology and Development Co., says the company decided to build a pipe-making factory in North Korea because the country’s economy has few places to go but up.

“North Korea’s situation and economic status are pretty similar to China’s before the start of the opening up and reform policy,” Mr. Wang said in an interview before the rocket launch.

Others note China’s desire is to prevent North Korea’s collapse, which might pour refugees into China’s northeast.

The increased business is yielding a payoff in political influence for China in Pyongyang that’s become more important since North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il was incapacitated by illness in August. One signal that Mr. Kim was back in control came when he met in late January with a delegation of visiting diplomats from Beijing.

Read the full story here:
Economic interests shape Beijing’s Pyongyang Policy
Wall Street Journal Online
Evan Romstad
4/8/2009

North Korea Uncovered v.16
Download it here

The most recent version of North Korea Uncovered (North Korea Google Earth) has been published.  Since being launched, this project has been continuously expanded and to date has been downloaded over 32,000 times.

Pictured to the left is a statue of Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo.  This statue, as well as many others identified in this version of the project, was built by the North Koreans. According to a visitor:

From the neck down, the Kabila monument looks strangely like Kim Jong Il: baggy uniform, creased pants, the raised arm, a little book in his left hand. From the neck up, the statue is the thick, grim bald mug of Laurent Kabila (his son Joseph is the current president). “The body was made in North Korea,” explains my driver Felix. In other words, the body is Kim Jong Il’s, but with a fat, scowling Kabila head simply welded on.

This is particularly interesting because there are no known pictures of a Kim Jong il statue.  The only KJI statue that is reported to exist is in front of the National Security Agency in Pyongyang.  If a Kim Jong il statue does in fact exist, it might look something like this.

Thanks again to the anonymous contributors, readers, and fans of this project for your helpful advice and location information. This project would not be successful without your contributions.

Version 16 contains the following additions: Rakwon Machine Complex, Sinuiju Cosmetics Factory, Manpo Restaurant, Worker’s Party No. 3 Building (including Central Committee and Guidance Dept.), Pukchang Aluminum Factory, Pusan-ri Aluminum Factory, Pukchung Machine Complex, Mirim Block Factory, Pyongyang General Textile Factory, Chonnae Cement Factory, Pyongsu Rx Joint Venture, Tongbong Cooperative Farm, Chusang Cooperative Farm, Hoeryong Essential Foodstuff Factory, Kim Ki-song Hoeryong First Middle School , Mirim War University, electricity grid expansion, Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground (TSLG)” is also known as the “Musudan-ri Launching Station,” rebuilt electricity grid, Kumchang-ri suspected underground nuclear site, Wangjaesan Grand Monument, Phothae Revolutionary Site, Naedong Revolutionary Site, Kunja Revolutionary Site, Junggang Revolutionary Site, Phophyong Revolutionary Site, Samdung Revolutionary Site, Phyongsan Granite Mine, Songjin Iron and Steel Complex (Kimchaek), Swedish, German and British embassy building, Taehongdan Potato Processing Factory, Pyongyang Muyseum of Film and Theatrical Arts, Overseas Monuments built by DPRK: Rice Museum (Muzium Padi) in Malaysia, Statue de Patrice Lumumba (Kinshasa, DR Congo), National Heroes Acre (Windhoek, Namibia), Derg Monument (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), National Heroes Acre (Harare, Zimbabwe), New State House (Windhoek, Namibia), Three Dikgosi (Chiefs) Monument (Gaborone, Botswana), 1st of May Square Statue of Agostinho Neto (Luanda, Angola), Momunment Heroinas Angolas (Luanda, Angola), Monument to the Martyrs of Kifangondo Battle (Luanda, Angola), Place de l’étoile rouge, (Porto Novo, Benin), Statue of King Béhanzin (Abomey, Benin), Monument to the African Renaissance (Dakar, Senegal), Monument to Laurent Kabila [pictured above] (Kinshasa, DR Congo).

The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) published an interesting paper (with the above title) on legal reform in the DPRK.  Below are some highlights.  Links to the entire paper at the bottom.

As citizens have been left without state provisions for subsistence since the state did not have the material resources to supply the people through its central rationing system, the vast majority of individuals and organizations had to support themselves. Legitimizing commercial and market activity and expanding the scope of private ownership were a part of this effort. One of the most important laws reflecting this transformation is the Damage Compensation Law (sonhae bosang-beop), which is the North Korean version of a general torts law. This law holds an individual or any legal entity liable for its tort when damage is inflicted. Monetary compensation is the rule, while restoration is allowed when possible.

Under the socialist system, where the state is responsible for the provision of a citizen’s livelihood, tort law was of little use. Even in the case of death, one’s family would not suffer economically since the state provided sustenance rations. However, with the collapse of the public distribution system, the North Korean authorities could no longer maintain their socialist system. Since an individual now has to rely on his or her own devices, the loss of the employment, for example, directly inflicts a financial burden on the individual or family. Therefore, damage to property or person should be compensated for by the responsible party. Therefore, the new damage compensation law acts as a new mechanism for the protection of private property, and strengthens individual responsibility for negligent acts that inflict damage on others.

and…

Relaxation of law and order, along with the laxity of organizational control due to economic difficulties, changed individual attitudes toward government authorities and organizations in which these individuals were members. Individuals became more independent from the state and its organizations, since both the state and more directly engaged organizations lost important means of control over individuals in society due to the lack of resources and the inability to provide basic necessities to the people.

Under these circumstances, individual victims had no appropriate method to seek compensation for damage through an official dispute resolution process. This has led to an environment in which self-remedy has become the rule, rather than the exception. Although new criminal law punishes those who have used force in asserting their rights, there is no effective means of dispute resolution outside of taking advantage of officials willing to look the other way in exchange for favors, or hiring thugs to more directly resolve disagreements. Citizens can buy justice through bribes, and law enforcement officials are especially helpful in these endeavors when their palms are greased. This is much more economical as well as effective than bringing a case to the relevant official agency, which is generally incapable of resolving problems and instead further exploits the situation.

On courts and lawyers…

For example, the most prominent role of the court in North Korea, where other types of lawsuit are very unusual, was to handle divorce settlements, since divorce through simple agreement of the two parties was not allowed. Ordinary citizens went so far as to perceive settlement of divorce to be the most important role of the court. Criminal cases were also unusual. Political crime is handled through a non-judicial process, while many deviances are resolved through unofficial processes within more local organizations. The role of the court in resolving disputes was negligible, aside from divorce. Since the role of law enforcement agencies is to protect the state and secure the socialist system, the most important qualification for them is not legal expertise, but rather, loyalty and devotion to the North Korean ideology and system.

On the other hand, the Lawyer’s Act of 1993 prescribes the required qualifications of a lawyer. Those who are eligible to work as lawyers are those who are certified legal professionals, those who have working experience of no less than 5 years in legal affairs, or those who have a professional license in a certain area and have passed the bar examination after a short-term course in legal education. This qualification for working as a lawyer signifies that the state wants to equip the judicial system with legal professionals. Although there is no explicit professional qualification for a judge or prosecutor, we may assume that legal professionals have been elected or recruited in practice. This trend is likely to be reinforced as these social changes continue to unfold.

New provisions were also introduced to reinforce the judicial system. For example, interference with a law enforcement official’s performance of duties is now a punishable offence ; Threatening a witness or exacting revenge has been criminalized ; Non-execution of judgment will now be punished. Although the introduction of these provisions was an expression of the government’s effort to bring in a more effective judicial system, it would not be an easy task under the vague status of transformation. The state is very cautious and reluctant to undertake bold or fundamental changes due to concerns about political instability. Therefore, it takes time for various coherent mechanisms to fully support a market system.

You can download the entire paper in PDF format here.

You can read it on the IFES web page here.

UPDATE 2/20/2009): According to the Daily NK:

“Special holiday provisions,” which have long been provided to all the people of North Korea on the three major holidays, Lunar New Year’s Day, Kim Il Sung’s and Kim Jong Il’s birthdays, and provided a rare moment of modest luxury in the year, are becoming scarce and discriminatory in their application by the authorities.

A source from Yangkang Province reported in a telephone interview with Daily NK on the 17th, “There were no holiday provisions in Hyesan provided to the citizens.”

The source explained some of the causes, “In the past, the authorities prepared holiday provisions and handed them over in one lump to each city, county and province. But now, factories, working places or collective farms prepare provisions for associated workers and farmers by themselves. In this situation, cadres cast their obligation to prepare and distribute provisions onto lower managers and take their own portions first. Accordingly, many other citizens cannot have been given any provisions.”

The source from Yangkang Province continued that, “The holiday provisions had continued, even though they were nominal, until now. It was unimaginable that there could be no holiday provisions because even on October 10, 2005, the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Party, and on September 9 last year, on the 60th anniversary of the nation’s’ founding, there were special provisions of some sort.”

Historically, there have generally been three kinds of special provisions on national holidays. The first one is holiday gifts for children consisting of candies, cookies or school supplies; the second is more substantial foodstuffs like pork or liquor for everybody; and lastly the General’s special gifts for cadres and some workers or farmers who achieve impressive results.

“Get holiday provisions for yourselves!”

Until right before Kim Il Sung’s death, on the three holidays, these gifts and provisions could be taken for granted.

However, as the economic situation turned ugly, the special provisions from Pyongyang were all suspended. Since 1998, the holiday provisions have been given only to citizens of Pyongyang, aside from one kilogram of candies and cookies supplied to elementary school students.

Since 2000, the authorities have ordered other work places, factories and collective farms to provide holiday provisions by themselves from their own funds.

The order created side effects. Factories and other work places started mobilizing workers and residents to collect beans, medical herbs and bracken under the pretext of making foreign currency. They allotted certain duties to the People’s Units, factories and farms. For cadres, it appeared to be a significant business.

Regarding the Lunar New Year’s Holiday provisions for 2009, the North Korean authorities issued an instruction on December 20th entitled, “With respect to preparations for 2009 Lunar New Year’s Holiday provisions distinctively under the responsibility of the committee of each level of the Party.” It came from the Guidance Department of the Central Committee of the Party.

The source criticized that, “The cadres have used this occasion to generate benefits for themselves. Households where holiday provisions were given on Lunar New Year’s Day were just those of the “marvelous” cadres’ of the National Security Agency, the People’s Safety Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Party.”

“On the 16th, local cadres of the Party were taken rice, pork, liquor, bean oil, and cigarettes as holiday provisions. Besides gifts to the Party in the provinces by each department, cadres of the Guidance Department under the Party in local provinces were given socks and cosmetic products produced in China,” the source reported.

He released rumors of this custom circulating among the people, “Some say that the Party in Poongseo, Yangkang Province exported 300 square meters of timber in early January [nominally in order to prepare for holiday provisions]. And, others say that deer and wild boar were offered to officials of local committees of the Party, the NSA and the PSA of the provinces.”

“When holidays come, only the people without power suffer to make foreign currency to guarantee cadres’ special provisions. Otherwise, they have to offer bribes in order to avoid doing such activities.”

Kim Jong Il’s special gifts flow into seats of power

A source from North Hamkyung Province revealed on the 17th, “For the February 16 holiday, the state supplied the authorities of Pyongyang, Hoiryeong, Samjiyeon and Kaesong Special District with provisions. In Hoiryeong, they received a bottle of bean oil, 500 grams of candies and cookies, soap, toothbrush and toothpaste.”

He additionally reported that, “In some regions of South Hwanghwa and North Pyongan Province, two or three-days of food were provided around February 16.”

The regions where the special provisions were supplied were all selected by the authorities; Hoiryeong, because it is the hometown of Kim Jong Il’s mother, Samjiyeon is the county where Kim Jong Il insists he was born, and Kaesong is a place opened to South Korea so it may have been for propaganda towards foreign visitors.

The source explained, “In 2006, in evaluation meetings for anti-socialism group inspections in Hoiryeong, chairpersons of the People’s Units brought to the attention of the inspectors the fact that many citizens had left their hometown, the Hometown of the Mother (Kim Jong Sook), for China due to the grim reality of their lives. After a petition was reported to the General, on every holiday special supplies have not failed there.”

However, he said, “Although technically I live within the Hoiryeong administrative district, those who live in rural districts, including me, were excluded from the special provisions.”

Meanwhile, Kim Jong Il’s gifts to the official class have not ceased.

“On the General’s birthday, Chief Sectaries of cities, counties and provinces of the Party and other high level cadres in local provinces receive the General’s gifts. Additionally, persons who provided distinguished service to the state or exemplary workers also got gifts, but in Hoiryeong merely seven workers and farmers received special gifts of any sort.”

He criticized, “In the past it was a pleasure that even liquor was provided equally to all the residents, but now it is in the past. Now, it is a happy day only for cadres.”

He expressed the atmosphere of the holiday, “Some singing performances were held to commemorate the birthday by the Union of Democratic Women and Socialist Working Youth League, but there were not many people in the audience. There were not many people on the streets. It was a depressing holiday.”

Regarding this mood, an NGO activist who works for defectors in China analyzed hopefully, “This trend does not imply systematic change in North Korean society. There is one significant point; that in national business regarding Kim’s birthday, centralized authoritarian rule and control are crumbling down.”

UPDATE (2/19/2009): According to the Daily NK:

In commemoration of Kim Jong Il’s birthday on February 16th, 15-days of rations were provided to the citizens of Hyangsan and Woonsan in North Pyongan Province.

According to a source, the ration consisted of 2 kilograms of rice, 2 kilograms of noodles and the rest in corn for households with more than four family members. For small households, a kilogram of rice and noodles were given and the rest in corn. Recently, on the farms, provisions have not been sufficient and stealing has grown difficult, so the expectation of our citizens regarding the special rations have been high.

The source explained, “Since last year, with the increase in the number of guards on farms and the strengthening of house searches, the stealing of food from farms has been absolutely impossible.” For the last several years, as rations failed even for farmers themselves, stealing from collective farms as a means of survival had become commonplace.

The source continued, “Inspections have also been taking place at the county and provincial levels every November and December. With the strengthening of the regulations governing grain, stealing has become more difficult. If one is caught, he or she is taken to a labor detention facility.”

All the citizens of North Korea usually receive some form of commemorative product in honor of Kim Jong Il’s birthday, though it is not always in the form of food.

ORIGINAL POST: Although the practice has become inconsistent since the “Arduous March” of the late 1990’s, each year the DPRK distributes gifts or special provisions in celebration the two leaders’ official birthdays (Kim il Sung: 4/15 & Kim Jong il: 2/16). 

The value of one’s gift, however, allegedly depends on one’s rank in society.  A common farmer might receive a new pair of socks.  A senior Worker’s Party official probably receives a good deal more.  The distribution of alcohol is popular.  One estimate put the value of these special gifts at USD$20m. 

This year, Yonhap informs us that children in Pyongyang will receive domestically manufactured peanut candies:

Choson Sinbo, a Korean language newspaper in Japan that usually echoes Pyongyang’s policy, said peanut candies will be added to the gift list for children this year, following the completion of a production line in Pyongyang Vegetable-Processing Factory.

The foodstuff factory that produces noodle, bread and sweets was newly equipped with a peanut candy production facility at the end of last year as “a governmental measure to enhance the people’s diet,” the report said.

It said all of the ingredients are provided by the government.

Lee Seung-yong, a coordinator of Good Friends, a Seoul-based aid group for North Korea, said the cash-strapped North often has to collect ingredients from its citizens to make the gifts for them.

Only 20 percent of North Korean factories are currently operating due to the lack of electricity and raw materials, according to the Korea Institute for National Unification, a state-run think tank in Seoul.

Though some gifts are manufactured domestically by the people,  others are donated by foreigners.  Expensive gifts are imported by the leadership. 

Last year (February 2008), the Daily NK reported that locals actually resented receiving the gifts to some degree because all of the items were available in the marketplaces. Rather than restricting market activity and providing limited goods via the Public Distribution System (PDS), the story reports that people would prefer the government to simply make it easier to conduct business in the markets.

The DPRK has been placing a lot of focus on building/repairing “foodstuff factories” recently.  Here is a link to KCNA stories about “foodstuff factories” via the very helpful Stalin Search Engine.

Read the more here:
N. Korean children to get peanut candies on leader’s birthday
Yonhap
2/3/2009

15-days of Food on the Leader’s Birthday
Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
2/19/2009

Un-Socialist Inequality
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
2/20/2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
ICNK Forum No. 09-2-2-1
2/2/2009

ASSESSMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY FOR 2008

In the 2008 North Korean New Year’s Joint Editorial, Pyongyang established the year 2012 as “The Year of the Perfect Strong and Prosperous Nation,” while labeling 2008, “The Year of Turnabout,” and, “The Year of the Betterment of the Livelihoods of the People.” As the year marked the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the regime projected a highly motivated façade, but there was no sign of new changes in the North’s economic policies.

Faced with the inability to produce any substantial results in the realm of international economic cooperation, North Korean authorities focused on how to put a positive spin on international conditions that were tied to the progress of 6-Party Talks. However, no visible measures appeared to emerge. Internally, North Korea’s chronic supply shortages drove further disparities between official and market pricing and monetary exchange rates as authorities were unable to stabilize the domestic economy. The growing global economic instability also caused economic policy makers to act more conservatively.

In 2008, North Korea’s food production in 2008 amounted to 4.31 million tons, recording a 7.5 percent increase over the previous year, while energy production is estimated to have grown by approximately 10 percent. Through joint development projects for North Korea’s underground resources, the North received raw materials for light industries (soap and shoes) amounting to 70 million USD in 2007, and 10 million last year. In addition, DPRK-PRC trade and inter-Korean economic cooperation both grew (DPRK-PRC trade increased significantly, while North-South cooperation grew only slightly), but it is difficult to measure the extent to which these increases impacted the North’s economy.

It appears that overall, North Korean trade and industry has improved since 2007, and the 2008 economic growth rate was positive. However, when estimating the North’s economic growth rate in light of the quickly rising exchange rate for South Korean won, DPRK economic growth for 2008 could be seen as a negative value.

While North Korea’s overall industrial production grew in 2008, when compared to previous years, and the primary reason for such was the refurbishment of equipment in most stable industries, development assistance and heavy oil aid as part of the 6-Party Talks, the provision of raw materials for light industries by South Korea, and the rise in prices on goods internationally.

Because of favorable weather conditions and increased production of fertilizer in the North, the agricultural sector showed a relative increase in production in 2008, despite the suspension of fertilizer aid from South Korea. Grain production was up 300 thousand tons, for an estimated total of 4.31 million tons last year. Boosted energy production was helped by improvements in hydroelectrical production and heavy oil tied to 6-Party Talks, and the provision of parts and materials for power plants, which considerably increased power production, at least in the first half of the year. This played an important role in the increase in industrial operations, as well. As electrical supply is the biggest obstacle to raising the operating rate of production facilities, more power resulted in overall production increases.

The construction sector has focused efforts on Pyongyang, and in particular on efforts to improve the lifestyles of its residents. Housing (averaging 20,000 family dwellings per year), restaurants, waterworks, roads, and other construction and repair projects have been aggressively undertaken.

North Korean authorities emphasized the science and technology sector in 2008, although it appears that the actual impact of this campaign topped out at the supply of some practical technology and the at production facilities, power plants, and other factories, and the promotion of modernization and normalization of industrial production.

At the mid-point of 2008, inter-Korean trade had grown by 1.2 percent compared to the same period the year prior, reaching 1.82 billion USD. The freeze on the annual supply of 400 thousand tons of rice and between 300~350 thousand tons of fertilizer from the South had a negative impact on the North’s food situation. On the other hand, DPRK-PRC trade from January-November 2008 jumped by 29.3 percent over the same period in 2007, considerably more than the 14.9 percent recorded in 2005, the 14.9 percent seen in 2006 and the 16.1 percent rise last year.

The increase natural resource development and improvements in core industries, the possibility of expansion of markets, and the advantage of low-cost labor give China, Russia, and other adjacent countries positive perceptions regarding investment in the North, and as Pyongyang continued to expand economic cooperation with these countries last year, it also improved economic relations with Europe as well as Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries.

PROSPECTS FOR THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY IN 2009

If one looks at North Korea’s domestic economic policies, one will see that basically, in the 2009 New Year’s Joint Editorial, North Korea’s domestic and international economic policies have not undergone any significant changes. However, in order to accomplish the goal of establishing a Strong and Prosperous Country by 2012, it is expected that all efforts will be poured into reviving the economy. Based on the Joint Editorial, this year, the North’s economic policy is not one of reform due to transformation of the outside environment, but rather a revival of pas, conservatively grounded economic policy. Regarding international economic relations, the 2008 Joint Editorial specifically stressed the building of an economically strong nation based on the principle of the development of external economic relations, but there was no particular reference to this in 2009.

In 2009, resolution of agricultural problems was again prioritized as the task most necessary for the realization of a Strong and Prosperous Nation by 2012. Along with this, the North’s economic policy for 2009 will prioritize the modernization and normalization of the economy’s ‘vanguard sector’, and it is expected to continue to strengthen efforts to revive the economy. As it continues to work toward creating an environment in which it can concentrate efforts on the building of an ‘Economically Strong Nation’, North Korean authorities are expected to issue new measures to strengthen the economic management system, including the planned industrial system, the distribution and circulation framework, and an effective market management system. The North is also expected to further emphasize efforts to modernize the People’s Economy, as it considers modern vanguard science and technology to be the answer to recovery from its current economic crisis.

There is a possibility North Korea’s foreign trade, including that with China, will shrink in the future, as its external economic activity is hit by the current international economic situation and the rising value of the U.S. dollar and Chinese Yuan. Just as was seen in 2008, with the shrinking growth of the Chinese economy, DPRK-PRC trade will be hit negatively. Progress on the rail link being promoted between Rajin and Hasan, as well as the redevelopment of the Rajin Harbor is also expected to face difficulties. This is likely to lead to further efforts by the North to expand economic cooperation with the EU and Middle Eastern countries.

Despite North Korea’s removal from the U.S. list of terrorism-sponsoring states, because sanctions against North Korea still remain, the North will need to make progress in non-proliferation, human rights improvement, and marketization in order to see real economic benefits from improved relations with the Obama administration. However, because of a lack of confidence regarding market reform, differing stances between the U.S. and DPRK on denuclearization, and deeply rooted mistrust, there is a more than a small chance that progress on the nuclear issue will be stretched out over the long term.

Looking at prospects for the main domestic economic sectors of North Korea, firstly, the amount of development in the energy and mining sectors could take a favorable turn if there is movement on the nuclear issue, and this would have an overall positive effect on the entire industrial sector. The drop-off of demand due to the international financial crisis could have a considerable impact on the North’s mining sector, making it difficult to see much growth past the levels seen in 2008.

In 2009, the supply-demand situation regarding North Korean grains is expected to improve over last year. North Korea requires 5.2 million tons of grain, and is expected to harvest 4.9~5 million tons, falling only 200~300 thousand tons short. This is an improvement over the 790 thousand ton shortfall the North suffered in 2008. However, the actual amount of grains distributed to the people may not increase, because some of the 2008 shortage was relieved through the release of emergency rice reserves, and so some portion of the 2009 harvest will need to be set aside to restock that emergency reserve.

In the manufacturing sector, the increase in electrical production and increase in large-scale equipment operations in metalworks, chemicals, construction materials, and other heavy industries, the supply of materials for light industries as well as fertilizer will be extended, but the reduction of inter-Korean economic cooperation and foreign capital will mean a reduction in the ability to import equipment and materials, making it difficult to meet 2008-level growth in industrial production numbers.

In the construction sector, housing construction in Pyongyang and other areas will not fall off suddenly, but with the anniversary of the founding of the Party Museum upcoming and the impact of the furious construction activity that has been underway, it is likely to slow down in 2009. With North Korean authorities restricting private-sector economic activity, controlling the size of markets, and other measures controlling commerce in the North are expected to strengthen, which will considerably restrict anti-socialist commercial activity. To what extent official commerce networks will absorb this activity will be pivotal.

Trade between North Korea and China is expected to shrink as the global economic crisis drives down the price of raw materials that the North exports to the PRC. Following the North Korean authorities’ enforcement of a measure reducing inter-Korean economic cooperation on December 1, 2008, without improvement in the North Korean nuclear issue, and in U.S.-DPRK relations cooperation between Seoul and Pyongyang will gradually shrivel. Trade with other countries is also expected to fall as a result of the current global economic situation. Therefore, reduction of inter-Korean economic cooperation, North Korea’s principle provider of foreign capital, and sluggish trade between Beijing and Pyongyang will weaken the North’s foreign reserves supply-and-demand situation.

As for the investment sector, if North Korea is to succeed in its push to build a Strong and Prosperous Nation by 2012, it must attract foreign investment through aggressive policies of opening its economy. In order to improve the investment environment, Pyongyang must work more aggressively to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, but despite the demands of the surrounding countries, it is likely North Korea will insist on recognition as a nuclear power, making it difficult to expect progress on this front. Therefore, foreign investors’ interest in North Korean markets, and North Korea’s assention into international financial institutions through improved relations with the United States, appears to be a long way off.