North Korean Economy Watch

I thought I would post a few satellite images to correct the Yonahp account of Kim Jong-il’s funeral procession (it is a tad incorrect).

First, here is the map that Yonhap published:

Click the image above to see a larger version

Here is the actual funeral procession route which I mapped out on Google Earth while watching this two-hour documentary on the event (it is amazing what you will watch when jet lagged!):

Here is some clarification on specific parts of the route:

1. It started and ended at Kumsusan Memorial Palace.

2. The motorcade turned at Jonsung Square across the street from the Fatherland Liberation War Museum:

3. The procession passed by the Monument to the Party Founding:

4. The procession entered Kim Il-sung square from the North, circled it, then continued south for appx four more blocks before turning around and again passing Kim Il-sung square on its way to the Arch of Triumph:

Have a good weekend!

Google Earth is offering some new imagery of the DPRK so I wanted to point out a few of the new locations we can identify.  The Pyongyang imagery is dated 2011-3-15. The east-coast imagery is dated 2011-5-14.

1. Solar Equipment Center (태양열설비쎈)

(Google Earth Coordinates: 39.014504°, 125.662840° , Google Maps, Wikimapia)

Kim Jong-il visited this facility on October 9, 2011.  It produces solar water heaters (KCNA).

2. Kumkop (gold cup) Combined Foodstuff Factory (금컵체육인종합식료공장)

(Google Earth Coordinates: 39.009592°, 125.671213°, Google Maps, Wikimapia)

According to KCNA:

The factory produces rice cake, bread, confectionary, processed meat and drinks. It also has welfare facilities for its employees.

The drinks, including carbonated water and nutritious water, are made with natural medicinal materials good for recovery from fatigue and promotion of health.

3. New Taekwando Center construction:

(Google Earth Coordinates:  39.016453°, 125.681939°, Google Maps, Wikimapia)

This facility is due to be completed in July.  I am not sure what it offers that the other Taekwando Center located right next door doesn’t have.

4. Something new at the old baseball stadium:

(Google Earth Coordinates:  39.008113°, 125.679196°, Google Maps, Wikimapia)

5. Wonsan – Hamhung Road (Partial map):

(Google Earth Coordinates:  39.421286°, 127.272296°, Google Maps, Wikimapia)

Read more about this road here.

6. And not really new, but Kim Jong-il recently visited the wind power farm of KPA Air Force Unit 1016–so I thought I would post it:

This facility is located in Kwail County (과일군) at  38.442086°, 124.939944°.  I have also marked it on Wikimapia and Google Maps.  According to KCNA:

[Kim Jong-il] toured a wind power plant built by the unit. After being briefed on the plant, he went round its inside and outside to learn about its construction and output of electricity.

Very pleased to hear that servicepersons of the unit successfully completed the plant with high output capacity in cooperation with Kim Chaek University of Technology and scientific institutions, he gave a high appreciation of their merit.

I am relaxed to hear that pilots and servicepersons rejoice at the plant as they can freely use enough electricity for combat preparations while cooking and heating with it, he said.

Being told that the plant freed the unit from the shortage of electricity and some of excessive power is supplied even to a bathing resort in the unit’s stationary area, he said with high appreciation that the People’s Army has done good things for the people.

After his inspection, Kim Jong Il gave the accompanying commanding officials and staff members of the KPA Supreme Command precious teachings needed to further strengthen the KPA into an invincible revolutionary army of Mt. Paektu and thus defend the socialist motherland as firm as a rock.

Just east of this facility is an air force base, so it is reasonable to assume that this is the home of KPA Air Force Unit 1016:

This wind power farm is not the KPA Air Force’s only or even largest experiment with wind power. Below is a Google Earth image of a facility in Ongjin County:

This facility is located in Google Earth here: 37.941508°, 125.409778°. I have also tagged it on Wikimpaia and Google Maps. It contains four wind turbines on two different sites (as of 2010-7-4).

I have uploaded a short clip to You Tube that is taken from North Korean television.  It shows a romanticized account of the installation of these specific wind power turbines.  You can see the clip here.

Here is the relevant satellite imagery from Google Earth which shows the construction of the facility (which began in late 2005):

Image Dates: (L) 2005-8-5, (R) 2005-10-5

Image Dates: (L) 2006-11-11, (R) 2009-4-16

Image Dates: (L) 2010-3-28, (R) 2010-10-6

You can see the facility in Google Maps here.

Here is the story according to KCNA:

Pyongyang, November 9 (KCNA) — The Ryongsong Water-purifying Station has been built on a modern basis.

Latticing, detritus chamber, settling basin and others were successfully built to ensure the flow of clean water into the River Pothong and provide the people in the capital city with better living conditions and circumstances.

A ceremony for its completion took place on Wednesday.

Present there were Vice-premier Jon Ha Chol, officials concerned, scientists, builders and workers.

Hwang Hak Won, minister of Urban Management, addressing the ceremony, noted that the station was perfectly completed in a short span of time.

He stressed the need to strictly abide by the requirements of the technical regulations in managing and operating the station, further perfect the processes and make green-belt in its surrounding area.

Additional information:

1. Some Pyongyang water sanitation projects  have been funded by Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.

2. Here is a previous post on waste management in the DPRK.

Pictured above: (L) Kim Il-Sung and Muammar Gaddafi attend a Mass Games performance in Kim Il-Sung Stadium, (R) Muammar Gaddafi gives an award to Kim Il-Sung

Pictured above (Google Earth): DPRK-Libya Friendship Farm at Jangchon-dong (장천동: 38.987331°, 125.842014°).  More background here.

UPDATE 26 (2011-10-26): Yonhap offers more details on the North Koreans who remain in Libya:

North Korea has banned its citizens in Libya from returning home in an apparent attempt to prevent the popular uprisings in the Arab world from reaching the isolated regime, a source said Wednesday.

…

About 200 North Koreans have been left in limbo in the war-torn country as Pyongyang ordered them not to return home, the source familiar with the issue said.

The North Korean doctors, nurses and construction workers were sent to the African nation to earn hard currency for their impoverished communist country.

North Korea has also taken similar steps for its officials in Libya, Egypt and other countries, said the source.

UPDATE 5 (2011-8-30): According to the Korea Times:

North Korea has not yet officially recognized the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) in Libya as the North African nation’s legitimate governing authority, said an official at the North Korean Embassy in Tripoli, Monday.

Asked whether Pyongyang has granted recognition to Libya’s NTC, the official was quoted as saying by Yonhap News Agency, “Not yet … (we’ll have to) wait and see.” The official, who wished to remain unidentified, was speaking to reporters at the North Korean Embassy in Tripoli.

The official also confirmed reports that some 200 North Koreans are currently working in Libya as doctors, nurses and construction workers. With regard to their safety, the official said some have returned home, although others have not been able to leave due to difficulties in transit.

“We will deal with them depending on the circumstances,” the official was quoted as saying.

The North Korean Embassy building has not been looted or damaged in the six-month-long conflict, the official added. In the past week, the South Korean Embassy building and ambassador’s residence in Tripoli were attacked by armed robbers, although no one was hurt in either incident.

Pyongyang has yet to send a new ambassador to Tripoli, after the previous envoy returned to North Korea upon completing his term, the official said.

Between the two Koreas, Pyongyang was the first to establish diplomatic relations with Tripoli in 1974.

“We hope for peace and stability (in Libya),” the official said, adding that future relations between the nations will depend on the North African nation’s stability.

Some 50 to 60 countries, including South Korea, have recognized the NTC since its formation by rebel forces against the regime of Moammar Gadhafi in February.

Read the full story here:
North Korea yet to recognize Libya’s rebel NTC
Korea Times
Philip Iglauer
2011-8-30

UPDATE 4 (2011-5-16): According to the Daily NK, NATO denies hitting the embassy:

“It has been alleged that NATO attacked the embassy; this is simply not true,” NATO said in a statement released on Friday, “While we are aware of media reports that there was damage to the North Korean embassy, we have no knowledge of possible collateral damage.”

The statement came following one released Thursday by the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating North Korean claims that it had incurred damage as a result of a “barbaric, indiscriminate air raid” by NATO.

It described how a bomb exploded in the vicinity of the embassy during the night of May 9th, releasing shrapnel that penetrated the ceiling of the building and broke car windows.

While NATO conceded that it was targeting a bunker in central Tripoli that night, it said that “the embassy was located some 500 meters from the target we struck.”

“Our strikes are precise and while the possibility of collateral damage will always exist, we go to great lengths to reduce such possibilities,” it went on.

Earlier, Libya national television also reported that the North Korean embassy in Tripoli had been damaged during an air raid.

UPDATE 3 (2011-5-12): Libya and China’s Xinhua are reporting that NATO damaged the DPRK embassy in Tripoli. KCNA has not said anything as of now.  According to Xinhua:

Libya’s state television said on Thursday a NATO air strike damaged the DPRK embassy in the capital Tripoli without giving more details.

Earlier reports indicated that the staff of the embassy has been unable to return home during the uprising.

Here is video footage of the embassy.

UPDATE 2 (2011-5-8): North Korea exported nuclear materials to Libya (Korea Herald and VOA):

The nuclear materials found in Libya in 2004 were highly likely to have been produced by North Korea, U.S.-funded broadcaster Voice of America said Saturday, citing an interview with a former senior official of the U.N. nuclear watchdog.

In the interview, Olli Heinonen, the former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said uranium hexafluoride, or UF6 ― used in uranium enrichment in Libya ― was very likely to have been made by the communist state.

Heinonen made the allegations based on North Korea’s purchase of parts to develop nuclear capabilities, information provided by Pakistan and other pieces of evidence.

To the question of whether there is any connection between the North and Syria with regard to nuclear technology developments, he said that that should be further investigated. He added that a nuclear reactor in Syria, which Israel destroyed, was very similar to North Korean reactors, indicating the possible connection between the two states.

The former deputy director general also said there was a good chance that North Korea has uranium enrichment facilities in areas other than the Yongbyon nuclear complex, stressing that IAEA inspectors should visit those facilities, provided they are allowed to do so.

Touching on the possibility of the North abandoning its nuclear programs, Heinonen said that the North could renounce them if the abandonment would lead to its economic development and security assurance.

The six-party talks aimed at denuclearizing the North have been suspended since 2008. China, the host of the multilateral talks, has been seeking to establish a mood for the dialogue while the South is apparently reluctant to see the resumption of the talks immediately as inter-Korean issues, including two deadly attacks last year, have yet to be addressed.

UPDATE 1 (2011-4-10): The DPRK has apparently ordered many of its citizens to remain in Libya and other Arab nations.  According to Yonhap:

North Korea has ordered its people in Libya not to return home, apparently out of fear that they will spread news of the anti-government uprisings in the African nation, a source said Sunday.

In a letter sent to the North Korean embassy in Libya, Pyongyang ordered its people to “follow the measures of the Libyan government” and not return home, said the source familiar with North Korea affairs.

The move sharply contrasts with other countries’ efforts to evacuate their people from strife-torn Libya and demonstrates the Pyongyang regime’s fear of possible revolts triggered by the African nation’s pro-democracy protests of the past few months, according to the source.

More than 200 North Koreans are believed to be living in Libya to earn foreign cash while working as doctors, nurses and construction workers.

Between the two Koreas, Pyongyang was first to establish diplomatic relations with Tripoli in 1974, followed by a cooperation pact signed by Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi during his visit to the North in 1982.

North Koreans in Middle Eastern nations such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates also appear unlikely to be able to return home while anti-government protests continue in the region.

Sources say the North Korean government in recent months has tightened control over the flow of information by strictly monitoring the use of computers, mobile phones, USB memory sticks and other IT equipment.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-3-29): Andrei Lankov writes in the Korea Times about the effects NATO military intervention in Libya might have on the DPRK’s medium-term international relations strategies. According to his article:

Kim Jong-il right now may feel very happy about his wisdom which he demonstrated by stubbornly rejecting denuclearization proposals. Colonel Gadhafi in 2003 did exactly what Kim said he would never do ― Gadhafi agreed to swap his nuclear weapons program for better relations with the West and economic rewards. As we see, it did not help the eccentric strongman. Once his subjects rose in rebellion, the West intervened and chose its military might to assist the rebels.

In private conversations, North Korean officials often say: “Had Sadam had nukes he would still be in his palace right now.” From now on, they probably will add: “And had Gadhafi not surrendered his nukes, nobody would have intervened when he was exterminating the rebels.”

But what is the likely overall impact of such thinking on the North Korean actions? If anything, it increases the already high probability of another nuclear test and/or missile launch. The preparations for such undertakings have been underway for some time. Now, North Korean leaders might believe that this is a good time to show off their steadily growing nuclear and missile capabilities. This is a way to send a message to the Obama administration, and the message will read like this: “Mr. President, we are dangerous and its better not to get involved with us even if we do something which is not to your or anybody’s liking”.

At the same time, it’s now less likely that North Korea will attempt a major provocation aimed at South Korea. Until recently, one could be almost certain that in the near future (in April or May, perhaps), the North would repeat what they did with frigate Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island. Now they will probably think twice before making another attack.

While the attacks on Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island are usually described as “provocations” this is essentially a misnomer. “Provocation” describes an act whose goal is to elicit an irrational and/or excessive reaction from the target of the incident. It was clearly not the case with the Cheonan or Yeonpyeong attack. The North attacked under the assumption that the South would not react in a meaningful way and would be incapable of inflicting any serious damage on assets valuable to the North Korean leadership (the lives of rank-and-file soldiers do not belong to this category).

North Koreans are aware that currently the South Korean public and government are in an unusually bellicose mood. They therefore expect a massive retaliation to follow in the event of another attack. Until recently the North Korean leadership probably anticipated that the South Korean retaliation would be limited, since neither the South nor its major ally, the United States, would do anything which might lead to an escalation of an exchange of fire on the border to a full scale war.

Therefore from Pyongyang’s point of view, another military operation made perfect sense. It would be a good way to demonstrate that North Korea is not going to be quiet when ignored. They wanted to show that for Seoul and Washington, it’s essentially cheaper to pay some protection money to Pyongyang (in the shape of aid and concessions) than to deal with the ever-present possibility of a North Korean attack and related sense of tensions and instability.

However, the recent developments in Libya might have changed the equation ― for a while, at least. Libya shows that under certain circumstances the U.S. and its major allies may indeed choose to launch a large-scale military operation. The assumption that Seoul and Washington will avoid escalation seems still to be true, but Pyongyang may have started to have grave doubts about this.

So it is quite possible that the coming spring will be quieter than the present author (and many of his colleagues) have until recently expected. This does not mean that North Korea has turned into a pacifist state, but from the vantage point of Pyongyang it makes sense to postpone their operations against the South and wait for the dust to settle. And of course, by being quiet for a while they can save resources which will be needed to better prepare the next missile launch and next nuclear test.

Though Lankov refers to North Korean officials in “private conversations,” the North Korean foreign ministry made essentially the same claim in a public statement on March 22 (KCNA):

The present Libyan crisis teaches the international community a serious lesson.

It was fully exposed before the world that “Libya’s nuclear dismantlement” much touted by the U.S. in the past turned out to be a mode of aggression whereby the latter coaxed the former with such sweet words as “guarantee of security” and “improvement of relations” to disarm itself and then swallowed it up by force.

It proved once again the truth of history that peace can be preserved only when one builds up one’s own strength as long as high-handed and arbitrary practices go on in the world.

The DPRK was quite just when it took the path of Songun and the military capacity for self-defence built up in this course serves as a very valuable deterrent for averting a war and defending peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Since then, they have published 16 stories about Libya: Demonstration Staged in Russia against US Military Operation against Libya, US Involvement in Libya Protested, AU Chairperson Rejects Military Intervention in Libya, Indiscriminate Use of Arms against Libya Assailed, Algeria Opposes Military Intervention in Libya, Military Operation in Libya Condemned in Russia , Venezuelan President Censures West’s Attack on Libya, Iranian Foreign Ministry Assails West’s Military Operation against Libya, Ugandan President Blasts West for Double Standards,  India Regrets Air Strikes on Libya, AU Demands Stop to Attack on Libya , Russian PM Brands Military Operation against Libya as Invasion, Russia Assails Military Attack on Libya , China Concerned about Libyan Crisis, Russia Opposes Military Attack on Libya , Foreign Forces’ Armed Intervention in Libya Assailed in Cuba.

In fact, there are hundreds of KCNA stories about Libya.  Check them out here (STALIN Search Engine).

The Daily NK, however, reminds us of one the the most important aspects of the DPRK-Libya relationship:

Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi has been using weapons purchased from North Korea in his faltering attempt to suppress anti-government protests.

As revealed by South Korean television broadcaster SBS on the 28th, boxes containing rockets and clearly bearing the name North Korea were found in Ras Lanuf following the retreat of pro-Qadhafi forces under NATO air strikes.

The boxes were disguised as parts for bulldozers.

Elsewhere, “64 Machine gun” was found written in Korean on an anti-aircraft heavy machine gun. A similar model of machine gun has been seen many times in images released by the North Korean authorities.

Check out the article for pictures.

UPDATE: Writing at the Wall Street Journal Blog, Evan Ramstad gets a quote from Bruce Bechtol:

“It just goes to show how deeply involved in the arms market (in the Middle East and Africa) North Korea is,” said Bruce Bechtol, a former intelligence officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency in the U.S. who is now a professor at San Angelo State University.

“Their WMD [weapons of mass destruction] proliferation gets lots of attention, but folks often forget that they also engage in a plethora of conventional arms sales,” he said.

Would it be a stretch to assume that The DPRK and Libya have been trading oil for weapons?

Previous posts about the DPRK and Libya here.

This was picked up by RFA.

UPDATE 6 (2011-10-4): According to the Daily NK:

Progress on the project to build 100,000 homes in Pyongyang is moving forward rapidly in at least one location: central Changjeon Street. According to a source from the city who spoke with The Daily NK yesterday, “There are around 30,000 homes being constructed along Changjeon Street, and the shells have almost all gone up.”

Changjeon Street is in the heart of Pyongyang, near well-known spots such as Mansudae Assembly Hall and the giant bronze statue of Kim Il Sung. The authorities are known to be focusing the state’s limited power on construction in this area, with the intention of completing at least the most visible part of planned projects ordered for the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth in April, 2012.

North Korea is understood to have invited a number of foreign dignitaries to witness several big events it has planned for next April, including the Spring Friendship Art Festival and the April 15th ‘Day of the Sun’ birthday celebrations. In that context, completing construction along Changjeon Street is a natural priority.

Changjeon Street was apparently given a further boost following the visit of Kim Jong Il to China in May. Kim was reportedly struck by the inadequacy of Pyongyang when held up against major cities in China, and called for improvement.

The authorities thereafter ordered that the skeletons of homes on Changjeon Street be completed by the anniversary of the Party foundation, which falls on October 10th. According to the source, “The pace of construction has picked up since the authorities ordered that the building frames be completed by October 10th.”

“They started work on a 40-storey building at the end of May, and now are up to the 35th storey. They are using a waterproofing agent that causes the cement to dry quickly, which means they sometimes get through three floors a day,” he continued.

Rodong Shinmun, the Party mouthpiece publication, described the renewed pace of operations on Changjeon Street last Thursday, stating proudly, “The blinding pace of the audacious construction offensive, paying no heed to night or day, has allowed for the construction of the framework of a 40-floor high-rise residential building in no time at all.”

Similar progress is being seen on road extensions and beautification projects nearby. The source said, “Road extension projects have been completed, including that of the road in front of the Botong River and Pyongyang Gymnasium. They’ve put flower beds by the side of the road and the whole area is now in a very good state.”

However, the fixation with construction on Changjeon Street is leading to accidents there, the source added, noting, “Because they only pressure us to speed up and don’t say anything about safety, there have been frequent incidents of workers falling.”

It is also causing other projects in the city to lag far behind. According to the source, “The authorities are doing renovations on houses along the main roads, but only painting and sprucing up the areas which can be seen. The buildings along Tongil, Hyungsaesan and Yongseon Streets were all demolished in 2009, but as yet there is no sign of progress from the company which has been tasked with the construction work.”

UPDATE 5 (2011-6-8): According to the Daily NK:

Finally, yesterday’s Rodong Shinmun, citing a statement from Kim Jong Il himself, went on to remind the people, “Construction in Pyongyang is not simply an issue of operational economics regarding the formation of roads and construction of homes, it is an important political issue related to the prestige of Socialist Chosun and dignity of the Kim Il Sung Motherland.”

This kind of propaganda push is aimed at ensuring the people are cogent of fact that modern buildings are being constructed by the authorities; an attempt to bring to life ongoing propaganda about the strong and prosperous state, which inside sources suggest is viewed with considerable public cynicism.

According to the Chosun Shinbo piece dated June 23rd, the construction at Mansudae is set to include a complex of 14 new apartment buildings, including North Korea’s tallest at 45 floors, a school, nursery and other public buildings. Elsewhere, there is a plan to pull down older construction in Mansu-dong and replace it with a park, and another to put up a modern cylindrical and square apartment building in the vicinity of Pyongyang Students’ and Children’s Palace.

Meanwhile, all the talk of modernity fits well with efforts to promote the youthful vigor of successor Kim Jong Eun, especially as it surrounds the statue of Kim Il Sung on Mansudae Hill, which is itself said to be undergoing a facelift.

In yesterday’s piece, Rodong Shinmun went on, “According to the Party’s grand capital construction plan, a fire of new Pyongyang creation is blazing violently in the ongoing Mansudae area construction,” adding, “According to this warlike strategy, in a short time, less than a month after it began, the groups taking part in the construction had achieved innovative results, digging the vast foundations of the new homes and laying the concrete.”

However, rumor has it that the reality does not meet the heights of this official propaganda, with the authorities having only managed to construct some 500 new residences in the period to the end of 2010.

UPDATE 4 (2011-6-8): KCTV has braodcast new footage of the construction zone and explained what a few of the new buildings will be.  I have uploaded the particular video clip to YouTube, and you can watch it here.

Below are screen shots.  In the picture on the left, we can see that many of the older buildings in the area have already been removed and holes have been dug for the new foundations.  In the picture on the right we can see another conceptual shot of the area from the other side of the Taedong River.

UPDATE 3 (2011-6-8): According to the Pyongyang Times:

A huge construction project has been undertaken to renew the looks of the Mansudae area of Pyongyang on the occasion of the 100th birthday of President Kim Il Sung (April 2012) as part of the grand capital construction plan of the Workers’ Party of Korea.

The project includes the construction of modern dwelling houses and a monumental structure in the area in central Pyongyang where the statue of President Kim Il Sung stands and the development of parks in the surroundings to meet the requirements of the new century. It will be a big stride forward to building Pyongyang magnificently as the world-level city.

The ground-breaking ceremony took place on May 22.

It brought together Premier Choe Yong Rim, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces Kim Yong Chun, Vice-Premiers Jon Ha Chol and Ro Tu Chol, officials from ministries, national agencies and municipality and tens of thousands of builders.

Premier Choe Yong Rim made a keynote speech.

He noted that leader Kim Jong Il saw that monumental structures were built everywhere in the capital to glorify the President’s revolutionary exploits for all ages. He then referred to the facts that the leader initiated the construction of Changgwang and Kwangbok Streets and other large projects and led them in the van to bring about a radical turn in building the capital and improving the people’s livelihood.

He said that under his wise guidance modern houses including those in Mansudae Street and at the foot of Haebang Hill, cultural and public service facilities, parks and recreation grounds were built in recent years and gigantic housing development and city landscaping projects are now dynamically pushed forward in Pyongyang.

More recently the leader suggested the development of the Mansudae area and took drastic measures to push the project from design to mobilizing the builders and supply of materials, he noted, and added that all the officials and builders should be well aware of the importance and significance of this construction, strictly observe the instructions of the designs, building operations and construction methods and work hard to create a new building speed.

He stressed the need to finish the construction of houses in Ryongsong, Sopho and Ryokpho areas in time together with the construction in the Mansudae area.

He called on the whole Party, the entire nation and all the people to turn out to support the construction in the Mansudae area.

He was followed by other speakers.

UPDATE 2 (2011-6-3): KCNA has finally published a story about the new construction in the Central District:

There started the project to build on the best level the Mansudae area in Pyongyang where President Kim Il Sung’s statue stands in the run-up to the centenary of his birth.

A monumental edifice, high-rise apartment houses, skyscraping buildings, public buildings and cultural and service facilities will appear as required by the new century in the vast area covering dozens of hectares where its old appearance will be no longer to be seen.

A new street will make its appearance as required by the modern sense of beauty, completely free from the existing mode of urban construction.

It will be unique in the formative artistic representation of architecture and the whole area will turn into a huge park. This is a new idea in the lay-out of the street in the area.

A round-shape big people’s theater will spring up in the area of Mansu-dong.

Trees of good species and flowering plants will be planted in the more than ten hectare area around the theater facing the Mansudae Assembly Hall. Promenades and public service facilities will keep in good harmony.

The height of the high-rise apartment houses to be built in the area covering hundreds of thousands of square meters in Kyongsang-dong, Jongro-dong and Taedongmun-dong is expected to gradually increase and twin tower buildings will be concentrated in the area near the Changjon Intersection so that one can enjoy a bird-eye-view of rhythmic distribution of huge buildings on the street.

A catering street will rise to face Okryu Restaurant and public buildings and cultural and service facilities of unique styles will be distributed to the convenience of the residents. They will be decorated with peculiar street lamps and diverse lights.

What draws attention in the lay-out of the streets is the fashionable appearance of high-rise and skyscraping apartment houses of peculiar styles, a harmonious combination of circular, semi-circular and angle style architecture.

The houses will have de luxe flats which will meet the cultural need of Pyongyangites.

When the construction of the Mansudae area completed, it will best match the monumental edifices including the Chollima Statue, the Tower of the Juche Idea, the Monument to Party Founding, the Grand People’s Study House and the Moranbong Theater and structures in the era of the Workers’ Party including An Sang Thaek, An Sang Thaek Street, Munsu, Mansudae and Changwang streets. This will change the appearance of the capital city beyond recognition.

Conceptual images of the construction area can be seen below.

UPDATE 1 (2011-5-24): In the comments, a reader points out a photo by a recent visitor to Pyongyang.  See a LARGE version of the photo here. The photo (2011-4-24) shows that renovation of the Mansudae area began over a month ago.  As of April 24, area families and all of their belongings had already been relocated (to where?); shops had been closed and emptied; and building destruction had begun.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-5-23):

The May 22 episode of the DPRK’s evening news (via elufa.net) featured a ground-breaking ceremony for a re-development project in the Mansudae area of Pyongyang’s Central District (만수대지구, 중구 역). You can see a clip of the evening news broadcast (with English translation) here.

I used the project overview map in the evening news to map out the construction area on Google Earth:

In Jongro-dong (종로동) the Pyongyang School Children’s Palace (평양학생소년궁전) will be spared destruction, but the exclusive Kumsong Middle School No. 1 next door (굼성제1 중학교–not to be confused with the Kumsong School in Mangyongdae) looks like it will be torn down.

In Mansu-dong (만수동) we will see the destruction of the historical Changjon Primary School (평양창전소학교) and the DPRK’s central bank.  Maybe the central bank will get a home in the new facilities, but I have no idea.

In Kyongsang-dong (경상동) the Pyongyang Kyongsang Kindergarden (for musically gifted youngsters) as well as the Pyongyang Children’s Department Store will be torn down.  These too may receive  a new home in the reconstructed neighborhood facilities.

Additional information:
1. This project comes immediately after the first Mansudae Area redevelopment project near the Potong Gate (just to the west of this one).  Read about the first Mansudae Street renovation project here.

2. This residential construction project, though unlikely to be completed by April 2012, is probably part of the DPRK’s 2012 Kangsong Taeguk (강성대국) campaign.  As part of the campaign, Pyongyang is to receive 100,000 new housing units.  Read more about 2012 construction projects here, here, and here.

3. One report says that the KPA has been put in charge of the DPRK’s renovations.

4. Pyongyang just held an architecture exposé.  See some of the work here.

5. These projects appear to be priorities as well.

1. Korean War Historical Images (flickr): This first image is taken at what is now the Ryongsong Machine Complex in Haean-guyok, Hamhung (해안구역):

Click images for larger versions (See area today in Google Maps here)

This image likely comes from what is now Sunan Airport, though it could come from Pyongayng’s Taedonggang-guyok, where an airstrip was located before the Korean War:

And I am not sure where this facility was located, but below is an image of the former Chosen Oil Refinery in Wonsan:

2. NK News posted some rare photos of Chongjin taken by a recent visitor. See them here.

3. 38 North has published a couple of recent interesting reports: One by Andray Abrahamian and this two-part piece by Aidan Foster-Carter.

4. NK Leadership Watch has a roundup of recent DPRK-Russia engagement.

5. Choson Exchange also posted some recent pictures to their Facebook page.  See them here.

6. The DPRK Power Sector: Data and Interconnection Options

7. I am traveling a lot and unusually busy so please be patient for the next few weeks if I don’t get back to you.  Have a good weekend!

In the last decade we have seen the expansion of trade between the DPRK and the PRC.  You can see the data here (KEI) and here (Natuilus). You can also see this trend using satellite imagery:

Above image date: 2002-4-29

Pictured above (2002) is the former coal yard next to the Dandong train station in China.  Through this facility, China managed its DPRK coal trade.

Above image date: 2005-1-19

By January 2005, the coal field had given way to the construction of what was to become the Dandong Customs House, which manages rail and vehicle trade with the DPRK city of Sinuiju on the other side of the Amnok (Yalu) river. There are three things to notice in the picture above: New registration office (yellow box on the right), new main building (blue roof), preservation of nearby apartment blocks (yellow box on left).

Above image date: 2009-10-11

Above is the first photo of the completed facility which was taken in October 2009.  As is usually the case the parking lot is nearly entirely full.

Above image date: 2010-4-5

In the picture above we can see trucks moving in both directions through the registration office.  This facility is the first port of call for vehicles crossing the Friendship Bridge from Sinuiju, DPRK. Again we can see that the customs house is busy.

Above image dates: 2010-6-7, 2010-10-28

The above pictures (most recent on Google Earth) again reinforce the notion that the Dandong-Sinuiju trade route is bustling.

For the record, the North Koreans have expanded their customs facilities on the Sinuiju side of the border in relationship to the growing levels of trade:

Above image dates: 2002-4-29, 2010-10-28

But this is not all.  The North Koreans and Chinese are also building a second bridge and additional trade infrastructure in Ryongchon County, south-west of Sinuiju.  Learn more about that here.

UPDATE 4 (2011-7-27): According to the Choson Ilbo, the DPRK is laying railroad tracks to connect the Tongchang-ri launch facility to the railway system:

A South Korean government source said the North is laying the tracks at the Tonchang-ri site, which is believed to have been completed early this year. The site is five times the size of the existing Taepodong missile test site in Musudan-ri in North Hamgyong Province.

“We believe that the train tracks will be used to transport long-range missiles from a missile plant in Pyongyang to the missile assembly facility in Tongchang-ri and to carry materials to the site for various kinds of facilities,” the source added.

Using current Google Earth imagery (March 2010), I am unable to confirm that the railway system is being extended to include the Tongchang-ri facility.  The closest railway station to the launch facility is at Cholsan (철산) a little over 8 miles (appx 13 km) to the north:

UPDATE 3 (2011-7-25): Global Security Newswire reports that the DPRK test-fired a long-range rocket engine at this facility:

North Korea in 2010 carried out a test of a rocket engine that could be incorporated into an extended-range missile, Agence France-Presse reported on Sunday (see GSN, July 8).

The trial occurred last October at the North’s new missile launch installation at Dongchang-ri, an unidentified high-ranking South Korean official told the Yonhap News Agency.

“We believed that the test, carried out at an hour when the U.S. military satellite could detect it, was aimed at showcasing its missile threats,” the official said.

Satellite pictures from January demonstrated the isolated nation has finished a missile launchpad at Dongchang-ri, a military site along the North’s west coast that is believed to be more sophisticated than the country’s initial launch installation at Musudan-ri in the east.

North Korea conducted test flights of long-range missiles in 1998, 2006 and 2009. While the earlier trials experienced technical failures, the missile in the most recent test traveled 2,000 miles before splashing down into the Pacific.

The nearly finished Dongchang-ri launch site is viewed by experts as figuring heavily into Pyongyang’s goal of fielding an ICBM that could put the continental United States within targeting distance.

South Korean intelligence officers think North Korea’s Taepodong 2 long-range ballistic missile, which is designed to travel roughly 4,160 miles, could hit the U.S. West Coast some 20 minutes after firing from Dongchang-ri, according to Yonhap (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, July 24).

UPDATE 2 (2/16/2011): Voice of America is reporting that the launch tower of the DPRK’s Tongchang Launch facility (동창리, 철산군, 39.667342°, 124.706786°) is now completed.  According to the article:

Tim Brown, an image analyst who is a senior fellow at Global Security.org, says it has taken North Korea about a decade to finish the facility.

“Little by little, they’ve been getting closer and closer to having an operational site. We can now say, I think confidently, that the launch tower and the launch pad are basically finished,” said Brown. “And the question is do they have a launch vehicle that’s ready to be launched? And we just don’t know.”

Here is more at Globalsecurity.org

Here is more at the Washington Post.

Here is the initial 2008 report on the facility by Joseph Bermudez and Tim Brown (PDF).

UPDATE 1 (9/16/2008): Just as the new missle platform gains media attention, someone announces that it has already been used.  According to Bloomberg:

“Any ballistic missile activity of the kind reported would not be permitted” under Security Council resolution 1718, McCormack told reporters in Washington today. The measure barred the provision of nuclear technology, large-scale weapons and luxury goods to be sold to North Korea and permitted cargo inspections to carry out the prohibition.

The possible engine test might be a sign that North Korea is backtracking on a pledge to cooperate with five other nations seeking an end to the country’s nuclear-weapons effort. The North Korean regime has failed to deliver a plan to verify steps to shut down the program.

The engine test at the Dongchang-li base in North Pyongan Province, which is expected to be completed by 2009, also shows that North Korea is continuing to develop long-range missiles, the newspaper reported today, without saying where it obtained the information.

The ignition test earlier this year may have been carried out on a Taepodong-2 missile, which has a range of 6,700 kilometers (almost 4,200 miles).  (Bloomberg)

The New York Times has a run down of the sources of this story.

Original Post (9/11/2008):

Joseph Bermudez (Jane’s Information Group) and Tim Brown (talent-keyhole.com) have written an article about North Korea’s second long-range missle/rocket platform near Tongch’ang-dong.  The Jane’s press release and PDF of the article are below:

PDF of article images: nklaunchpad.pdf

Press release from Jane’s:

Jane’s Defence Weekly Uncovers North Korea’s New Missile Facility
LONDON (11 September 2008) -

Analysis of high-resolution commercially available satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe has allowed Jane’s Defence Weekly to verify the existence of North Korea’s new ballistic missile facility.

Located on the west coast of North Korea, several kilometres southwest of the village of Tongch’ang-dong, the new facility presents a challenge to US and foreign reconnaissance assets since it is obscured from direct airborne and seaborne observation by nearby hills. Difficulties with airborne reconnaissance are exacerbated by the facility’s location at the northern reaches of the Yellow Sea between North Korean and Chinese airspace.

The base has been under construction for the past eight years and will be capable of launching both the Taepodong 2 ballistic missile and the Taepodong 2 space launch vehicle. The facility also has a rocket engine test stand, which is capable of supporting test firings of all known North Korean rocket motors.

Joseph S Bermudez Jr, Analyst for Jane’s Defence Weekly, commented, ‘The installation is small by Western standards but large by North Korean standards. The launch facility consists of a moveable launch pad and a 10-storey-tall umbilical tower capable of supporting North Korea’s largest ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.’

‘About 1 km south of the launch pad there is a rocket engine test stand, which is very similar to the Shahid Hemmat test facility east of Tehran, Iran.’ Bermudez continued, ‘The North Korean and Iranian governments have been collaborating on ballistic missile programmes since the early 1980s. A recent example of this was Iran’s use of a Safir or Messenger) space launch vehicle to launch its Omid (Hope) satellite. The Safir is closely based on North Korea’s indigenous Nodong missile.’

The new missile and space launch facility is approximately one or two years away from final first-stage completion. The launch pad probably achieved an emergency launch capability in 2006, although no launches are known to have been conducted to date.

This facility shows that, despite continued economic, political and social hardships, North Korea continues to commit precious resources to the development of ballistic missile and space launch capabilities. While the US is continuing to force an end to North Korea’s nuclear programme, its ballistic missile and space launch programmes appear to be continuing without much public objection.

UPDATE 6 (2011-7-11): It looks like none of the DPRK power stations have been approved by the UNFCC for the CDM program.  A reader notes:

[I] just searched through the entire CDM database with the category numbers for these projects, and as far as I can see none of these has got beyond validation phase['s] comments phase, and judging by some of the comments – “It is evident from the PDD [Project Design Document] that the values are consistent and it is definitely forged and cooked up values to show a non CDM project as a CDM project” – being one of the more polite, that I’d be amazed if they make it beyond that. [It] looks like the DPRK hasn’t got its environmental and managerial audit systems quite up to date yet.

UPDATE 5 (2011-7-11): I just checked the UNFCC web page, and it appears that in addition to the hydro power plants mentioned below, the North Koreans also submitted the “Energy Efficiency Improvement Project in Pyongyang Textile Factory” [sic] for carbon offsets on May 23, 2011. According to the UNFCC web page, the project is in the portfolio of the Carbon-Trade Division, GBCIO, Ministry of Foreign Trade.

UPDATE 4 (2011-7-11): DPRK begins construction of Ryesonggang Power Stations 3 and 4

Pictured above (Google Earth): Ryesonggang Youth Power Stations 1, 2, and 6 (례성강청년발전소).

Back in March of this year, the DPRK registered eight potential power plants with the UNFCC which it intended to construct to obtain carbon offset credits.  These eight hydro-power plants are:

Hamhung Hydropower Plant No.1
Hamhung 20MW Hydropower Plant No. 2
Kumya Hydropower Plant
Paekdusan Songun Youth 14MW Hydropower Project No.2
Ryesonggang Hydropower Project No. 3
Ryesonggang Hydropower Project No. 4
Ryesonggang Hydropower Project No. 5
Wonsangunmin 20MW Hydropower Project No. 1

On June 25th the DPRK evening news featured footage of the construction of the Ryesonggang Youth Power Station No. 3 (례성강청년3호발전소).  I have uploaded the footage to YouTube and you can see it here.

On June 28th the DPRK evening news featured footage of the construction of the Ryesonggang Youth Power Station No. 4 (례성강청년4호발전소).  I have uploaded the footage to YouTube and you can see it here.

I have not had the time to pinpoint the exact locations of these power stations using Google Earth.  Since the imagery is older, it will take some time to match up the mountain contours.  However, we have a general idea where they are located: between the Ryesonggang Power Stations 2 and 6.  These are mapped out in the image at the top of this post.  The satellite imagery is of Thosan (토산군) and Kumchon (금천군) counties.

Since I have a job, am in graduate school, am a landlord, and running this web page, I have not had time to follow up with the UNFCC to see if they have approved these projects for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). If there is an enterprising journalist or reader who cares to find out the answer, please let me know.

UPDATE 3 (3/23/2011): According to the UNFCC web page (select Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the “Host Party” box), these are the eight power stations that have been submitted for consideration:

Hamhung Hydropower Plant No.1
Hamhung 20MW Hydropower Plant No. 2
Kumya Hydropower Plant
Paekdusan Songun Youth 14MW Hydropower Project No.2
Ryesonggang Hydropower Project No. 3
Ryesonggang Hydropower Project No. 4
Ryesonggang Hydropower Project No. 5
Wonsangunmin 20MW Hydropower Project No. 1

The UNFCC web page does not mention the locations, size, or power generation capacity for most of the dams, but I am sure that information will trickle out over time. With the exception of the Kumya Power Station (See satellite image below), none of these facilities are visible on Google Earth–but related facilities are: the Paektusan Power Station 1 (See satellite image below) and Ryesonggang Power Station 1, 2, 6 (See satellite image below).  The Hamhung Power Stations are probably in or near Hamhung, and the Wonsangumin project is probably near Wonsan.

And according to an email from the UNFCC:

This list contains all the projects which have already started and for which a notification of CDM prior consideration has been submitted. This notification is necessary to prove that the incentive of the CDM was a decisive factor for taking up the project when a project has started before a project design document (PDD) has been published for global stakeholder consultation or a new methodology in connection with the project has been submitted. However, kindly note that these projects have not yet entered the CDM project cycle as lined out in the CDM rules, requirements and procedures, and to submission for registration has yet been made.

Further details on the CDM project cycle are available here: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/diagram.html

More information will be added here as time passes.

UPDATE 2 (3/11/2011): The DPRK has apparently registered eight power plants with the UNFCC.  According to Reuters:

North Korea has registered eight hydroelectric plants with the United Nations, and if approved, could allow the world’s most reclusive state to sell carbon offsets to earn precious hard currency.

These hydropower projects were registered with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for prior consideration in getting carbon credits, some of which have a capacity of 20 megawatts, the UNFCCC website showed.

Prior consideration is the first step for accreditation toward the U.N.’s Clean Development Mechanism that allows developing countries to earn tradeable carbon credits for emissions from clean-energy projects.

Bernhard Seliger, a messenger for North Korean officials on these projects, said the United Nations uploaded the information on Thursday after he submitted related forms on behalf of the North Korean government’s carbon trade division in late February.

“I have no idea when the U.N. makes a decision… North Korea has to finish the power plants, which up to now are only half-finished dams,” Seliger, Hanns Seidel Foundation’s representative in South Korea, told Reuters via email.

Analysts questioned the demand for carbon credits from North Korea, concerned the money might be siphoned off to nuclear arms or other military projects.

The UNFCC web page is not stranger friendly.

UPDATE 1 (3/8/2011): According to the Guardian:

North Korea hopes to earn much-needed hard currency by selling UN-backed carbon offsets from a series of hydro-power projects, as the country faces sanctions over its nuclear weapons programme.

If approved and registered by the UN, these would be the first projects for North Korea under a scheme called the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This allows developing countries to earn tradeable carbon credits for emissions reductions from clean-energy projects.

Some analysts questioned the demand for carbon credits from North Korea, with fears the money might be siphoned off to nuclear arms or other military projects.

The government has asked the Hanns Seidel Foundation of Germany, which focuses on humanitarian issues, to act as a go-between by working with UN-approved verification agency TUV Nord.

According to Bernhard Seliger, the foundation’s representative in South Korea, North Korea is initially looking at trying to get approval for three hydro power plants of 7-8 megawatts (MW).

Seliger visited the three hydro-plant construction sites in the north-east corner of the country in January.

In a statement, TUV Nord confirmed the foundation had engaged their services.

“In this respect, TUV Nord intends to verify hydropower dams in North Korea once pre-registered with United Nations framework conventions on climate change [UNFCCC] via the Beijing branch of its Chinese subsidiary TUV Nord Guangzhou,” it said.

If registered, the plants could yield millions of euros over several years.

Beijing-based lawyer Tom Luckock, who specialises in projects that curb greenhouse gas emissions, estimated that an 8 MW hydro plant could yield about 23,000 UN offsets a year.

The offsets, called Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), are generated from registered CDM projects, such as wind farms, that are rewarded for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

The offsets currently trade at nearly €12 (£10) each and are bought by governments in rich nations that need to meet UN emissions reduction targets.

Europe is the biggest buyer, with large polluting firms allowed to buy the offsets to meet a portion of their emissions reduction targets under the EU’s emissions trading scheme.

“Finding ways to secure foreign currency is the priority for North Korea, which is linked to everything from food to raw material imports to boost reduced productivity,” said Cho Myung-chul, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.

…

Seliger said North Korea, which signed the UN’s Kyoto Protocol climate pact in 2005, was also interested in biomass power generation projects under the CDM.

The UN-approved national agency that assesses and approves CDM projects in North Korea was not available for comment.

Questions remained on demand for North Korean CERs.

“Even if they open up, who in the world wants to pay for North Korea that is blamed for its nuclear weapons programme?” said Choi Soo-young, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification.

Cho said the UN needed to prevent outside cash going into its nuclear development activities, while Luckock, of global law firm Norton Rose, said: “Their limited access to hard currency has to be a concern for buyers – the damages clauses will carry limited weight without some security there.”

Another challenge is that North Korea would have to make public its energy consumption and generation data and disclose information on the amount of energy linked to the hydro project.

“Annual inspection, constant measurement and energy flow posting on the [UNFCC] website – all these things are new for North Korea,” Seliger said.

According to the AFP:

“We are talking about eight power plants, with the smallest size about 7.5 megawatts. These are not big projects but small or medium-sized projects,” Bernhard Seliger told AFP.

None has yet been completed, he said.

“I saw some (construction) sites in South Hamkyong province but that’s not all. There are other plants in other regions,” Seliger said, adding that some of the projects are led by the UN Development Programme.

The Hanns Seidel Foundation has been working since 2003 to build the North’s development capacity, and in 2008 organised a seminar on carbon trading for Pyongyang officials at their request.

The tradeable credits, called Certified Emissions Reductions, are awarded for approved clean-energy projects such as hydropower plants or wind farms.

Big polluters elsewhere in the world can buy them as part of their efforts to cut emissions.

Seliger said his foundation is helping the North to prepare for the auditing process required to join the UN carbon credit trading system known as the Clean Development Mechanism.

“One good thing about this project is that it is very transparent, involving monitoring and auditing on an annual basis… I think it is very good for North Korea to participate in such an international regime,” said Seliger.

An official at a South Korean state agency, the Korea Energy Management Corp, said registration would take at least a year or two and it was unclear how much the North would be able to earn if approved.

The official, who declined to be identified, said a typical eight-megawatt hydropower plant could yield about 19,500 carbon credits each year, each of which was currently traded at 12 euros in global markets.

This would amount to around $327,000 a year.

But some buyers may shun the communist state, given its history of nuclear and missile development which has led to international sanctions.

“Government buyers will certainly shy away from dealing with the North,” said Koo Jung-Han, a researcher at the Korea Institute of Finance.

“But private companies have few reasons not to buy credits from the North as long as it can offer a competitively low price. However, the big question is whether the North will be able to build the plants without outside financiers.”

Koo said that countries hoping to buy carbon credits from upcoming overseas projects often encourage investment in the ventures by their own finance companies.

“But what kind of financial companies will take a plunge in projects in such a volatile, politically risky country like North Korea?”

The North suffers persistent power shortages even in the showpiece capital Pyongyang.

Many rural areas receive power only during key agricultural seasons, and must rely for the rest of the year on alternative fuels, according to a recent policy paper published by the Nautilus Institute think-tank.

Here are the web pages for the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the UNFCCC Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Program.

I am not sure which hydro power stations the DPRK is planning to submit to the UN, but many have been been highlighted in North Korean “media” in recent years:

Kumya River Dam
A dam is being constructed in Kumya County, South Hamgyong Province, to provide electrical power. Kim Jong-il last visited in August 4, 2010. It is just one of several dams under currently under construction in the DPRK.

Here is a satellite image of the Kumya dam’s construction (Google Earth: 11/25/2008,  39.574232°, 127.104736°)

This new reservoir will flood the locations of three villages (리): Ryongnam-ri (룡남리), Ryongsang-ri (룡상리), and Ryongchon-ri (룡천리).

Estimates of the reservoir size are made by me, but it is fairly obvious where the North Korean engineers expect the reservoir to flood because they have already relocated the villages from their former locations in the flood zone.

Kumjingang River Power Stations
Beginning in 2000, the DPRK has constructed three power stations on the Kumjin River (금진강) in  South Hamgyong Province.  The first was the Kumjingang Power Station (금진강발전소).  The second was the  Kumjingang Hungbong Youth Power Station (금진강흥봉청년발전소).  The third was the Kumjingang Kuchang Youth Power Station (금진강구창청년발전소).  All three are pictured below on Google Earth:

It does not appear that these projects have resulted in dislocated villages.

Wonsan Youth Power Stations
Below is a satellite image of the Wonsan Youth Power Stations No’s. 1-4 (원산청년발전소).   These projects required the construction of both the Kuryong Reservoir (구룡저수지) and an appx 8.5 mile (13.69km) tunnel to link the hydro power stations with their power source.  The inaugural ceremony for these facilities was on January 10, 2009.

The construction of the Kuryong Reservoir resulted in the dislocation of three villages: Kuryong-ri (구룡리), Konja-ri (건자리), and Haerang-ri (해랑리).

Orangchon Power Station No. 1
Kim Jong-il offered guidance at the Orangchon Power Station (어랑천1호발전소) in February 2007.  This facility will probably not be submitted to the UN for scrutiny because it lies just outside the security perimeter of what human rights groups assert is Kwan-li-so No. 16.

Anbyon Youth Power Stations No’s 1 & 2
The Anbyon Power Stations (안변청년1-2호발전소, 38.954400°, 127.538912°) are powered by waters from the Imnam Reservoir (임남저수지) via an underground tunnel nearly 45km in length.  Much more here.

The Imnam Reservoir flooded Chondo County’s capital city as well as appx 14 villages. The South Korean government was so worried about the Imnam Reservoir being used as a weapon that they built a dam downstream to prevent flooding should the DPRK release a large volume of water (38.209539°, 127.848760°).

Ryesonggang Youth Power Stations 1-6
Some of the Ryesonggang Youth Power Stations (례성강청년1-6호발전소, 38.367696°, 126.781096°) appear to be under construction in North Hwanghae Province.  The North Korean “media” has only broadcast images of the Ryesonggang Power Stations 1, 2, and 6 (all completed), so I presume that power stations 3, 4, and 5 are too new to show up on available Google Earth Satellite imagery. Below I post images of the distance between power stations 1 and 6 as well as close-ups of both facilities.

Power Station No. 1 was completed in 2007 and most recently received media attention in South Korea in September 2009 when the DPRK released a massive amount of water from its dam (Hwanggang Dam), causing floods in South Korea that killed six people. An estimated 40,000,000 short tons (36,000,000 t) of water was dumped during the flood, causing the water level at the border of Gyeonggi-do to leap from 7.5 feet (2.3 m) to 15.1 feet (4.6 m).

Power Station No. 2 (38.324008°, 126.673366°) has been completed, but it is too new to appear on Google Earth satellite imagery.  I have drawn it on Google Earth below:

Construction of Power Station No. 2 resulted in the dislocation of approximately 27 houses, but I have not been able to determine if any other villages were relocated due to construction of the other facilities.

Paektusan Songun Youth Power Stations
The North Korean media has also done a lot of advertising for the Paektusan Songun Youth Power Stations (백두산선군청년발전소) in Paekam County, Ryanggang Province (41.716931°, 128.786163°).

These dams have resulted in the dislocation of  two small communities as well as the severing of the old railway lines that connected Unhung, Kilju and Paekam with Musan.  Maybe the railway lines have been moved to accommodate the new dams, but it is also unclear if these line were in use to begin with.

Pukchang Ryongsan Power Station
Up until recently I believed the Pukchang Ryongsan Power Station (북창룡산발전소, 39.596238°, 126.266478°) was a large-scale river-straightening project, but according to recent KCTV footage (which I posted to Youtube here) it is in fact a hydro power station.  Work on this project began sometime around the spring 2002 (as best I can tell).

Huichon Youth Power Stations
The Huichon Youth Power Stations No. 1 & 2 have received the most attention in the North Korean media.  I recently located them and will post something soon.

Since the DPRK will likely be subjecting several of these (or other) power plants to international scrutiny, I look forward to seeing that data published.  KCNA is short on details and the disclosed information would facilitate more accurate assessments of the DPRK’s domestic hydro-power generating capacities.

A reader writes in with the following comments:

I would like to share some comments on the potential CDM projects in north Korea as i have been working on this field for many years now.

Concerning existing hydropower plants:
To be eligible to a CDM project, one of the first criteria is the additionality of the project. You have to prove (the rules are very stricts) that the project would not have been launched without the consideration of the revenues from the reselling of the CERs.
So the Dams that have already been buit are not eligible.

Concerning hydropower plants that are being implemented:
The first step of a CDM project is to notify to the UNFCCC secretariat and to Designated National Authority (in this case the Secretariat of the National Coordinating Committee of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for Environment) that you are seeking to establish your project as a CDM project.
Up to now, no such notification has been received by UNFCCC so it would be quiet difficult for projects being implemented to ask for the CDM status (i mean nearly impossible).

Some facts concerning future hydropower projects:
From the day you send the notification that you are seeking the CDM status to the day you are actually given the status, it takes in average 2 to 3 years (they would have to build the plants during this period)
Then it can be at least another year before you receive the CERs.
The price of 12 euro for a CER is for secondary market. The price for primary CER (directly sold by the producer) would be much less than 8 euro.
The figure of 20 000 CERs/year is completely unpredictable for the moment, here is a simplification of the calculation:
One CER is equal to one tonne of CO2 equivalent that would be avoided by producing clean electricity. For example when you produce 1 MW electricity from coal, the process releases X tonnes of CO2 in the atmosphere but when you produce 1 MW from a hydropower plant, you do not release CO2.
In order to calculate what the CDM project would be able to claim, we would have to know the CO2 emission factor of the North Korean grid and then multiply it by the amount of MWh produced by the CDM project.
If most of the electricity produced these days in North Korea already comes from hydropower plants, then the national emission factor will be low and the CDM project will not avoid a lot of CO2 emission (and so not earn a lot of €)
Without the capacity of the future project and the national emission factor, it is impossible to estimate the amount of CERs the project could generate.

The CDM status seems quiet unrealistic to obtain for North Korean projects but other international agreements are discussed these days and their outcome may be more adapted.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-1-31): According to Radio Free Asia:

Nuclear-armed but cash-starved North Korea has expressed interest in joining the world carbon market in an apparent bid to earn precious hard currency and avoid international sanctions, an expert told RFA.

But the secretive Kim Jong Il regime has to disclose critical information, such as energy consumption data as well as methods by which it derives energy, to be eligible for funding under the United Nations’ Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), said the North Korea expert, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The CDM is aimed at encouraging companies or organizations in the developed world to invest in carbon dioxide emissions-saving projects in developing countries.

In return for funding and technology transfer, investors receive carbon credits, which can then either be traded on carbon markets or used to reduce their own emissions tally if they are subject to a domestic cap.

The Kyoto Protocol set emission caps for 38 countries through 2012, establishing the CDM as a worldwide carbon market. It is a cornerstone of the group’s efforts to tackle global warming.

The North Korea expert told RFA on Jan. 13 that Pyongyang intended to apply for funding via the CDM and that the regime might list its proposed hydro-electricity power projects under the U.N. mechanism.

UN refrains from comment

When contacted on the North Korea move, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), the secretariat charged with implementing the global environmental treaty to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations, said it would refrain from commenting on individual country projects.

The North Korea expert estimated that one ton of carbon dioxide would trade for about U.S. $26 dollars and if a hydro-electric power project was registered under the CDM, depending on the carbon credit bid price, about U.S. $1 million dollars could be earned annually.

A hydro project registered under the CDM would need to be evaluated by U.N. inspectors for it to qualify for carbon credits. Usually, it would be evaluated continuously for about 14 years.

Details, including the amount of energy linked to the hydro project and potential reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, would have to be submitted.

North Korea has been mostly reluctant to share information about its energy generation activities.

According to the expert, North Korea has recently displayed “great interest” in the possibility of operating hydro-electric power stations to alleviate its domestic energy shortages and to acquire “carbon credits” that it could, in turn, sell on the international carbon market.

Hard currency

As North Korea’s economic crisis worsens, Pyongyang is seeking ways to earn hard currency following a failed currency reform and due to sanctions imposed by the international community over its nuclear and missile developments and provocations targeting South Korea.

The interest in the CDM is likely to be part of this search.

The North Korea expert also said that earning hard currency through “carbon credits” would not be subject to sanctions imposed on Pyongyang under UN Security Council resolutions, and that any North Korea’s application for participation under the CDM “may stand a chance.”

“For North Korea, this could be an opportunity to earn hard currency without engaging in illegal armament sales, while operating an electric power station in transparent fashion, and accepting strict monitoring by the UN, and abiding by applicable international standards.”

The United States has been pressing China to use its influence to persuade North Korea regime to end recent provocations and return to disarmament talks involving the three countries and South Korea, Russia and Japan.

The six-party nuclear talks were last held in 2008. The impoverished North has been seeking a restart to the nuclear negotiations, which propose to reward its gradual nuclear disarmament with phased infusions of economic aid.

In a bid to renew dialogue and ease chances of conflict, South Korea recently proposed holding a preliminary meeting with North Korea on Feb. 11 to prepare for high-level defense talks. On Friday, the North suggested parliamentary talks between the two sides.

Read the full story here:
North Korea Eyes Carbon Market
Radio Free Asia
1/29/2011

UPDATE 3 (2011-6-25): Adam Cathcart took some pictures of the new bridge construction–so it is progressing!

UPDATE 2 (2011-2-2): For some time I have been trying to track down the location of the proposed new Yalu River bridge which will connect the DPRK and China.  Thanks to a story in the Daily NK, I was able to map it out on Google Earth:

Pictured above: Location of the proposed Yalu Bridge (Google Earth)

According to the Daily NK:

According to someone inside the construction company responsible for the bridge’s development, “The development of Xinchengqu has been on the drawing board for two years. This time, the construction of the New River Yalu Bridge was confirmed between China and North Korea. This is a very good chance for us, from now on Xinchengqu will become the center of China-North Korea trade.

According to Dandong’s urban development plan, the bridge will connect Busan-Seoul-Pyongyang-Dandong and Beijing in the future, implying that future trade and cooperation between a reunited Korea and China is being taken into account.

China is providing the construction costs for the New Yalu River Bridge; an estimated one billion Yuan (approximately $145 million).

This particular location is interesting because it completely bypasses the city and county of Sinuiju–where earlier reports (below) described its location.  The bridge actually crosses from China into Sopuk-ri, Ryongchon County (서북리, 룡천군)—in the middle of nowhere.  There is absolutely no infrastructure at this location for administering trade between the DPRK, China, and prospectively South Korea, so it will all need to be built from scratch or moved from Sinuiju. Either way, this is bad news for Sinuiju which today benefits financially as both the capital of North Pyongan Province and as the gateway for the majority of trade between the DPRK and China.  It looks like Ryongchon may be taking some of their business!

In addition, the North Koreans have been widening  the Sinuiju highway and “beautifying” all of the surrounding residential areas in anticipation of greater loads of traffic coming from China.  See more about this here.  This could all be for naught if the Chinese end up building a trade artery south of all this construction!

UPDATE 1 (2010-12-31): (KCNA h/t Aidan Foster-Carter) The ceremony did take place to mark the launch of the bridge’s construction:

Pyongyang, December 31 (KCNA) — A ground-breaking ceremony for a DPRK-China bridge across the River Amnok took place in Dandong City, China, on Friday.

Present there from the DPRK side were its government delegation headed by Kim Chang Ryong, minister of Land and Environmental Conservation, and from the Chinese side Li Shenglin, minister of Transport, Hu Zhengyue, assistant to Foreign Minister, and Chen Zhenggao, governor of the Liaoning Provincial People’s Government, and other officials concerned of the central and local governments of China.

Speeches were made by Kim Chang Ryong, Kim Song Gi, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, and Choe Jong Gon, chairman of the North Phyongan Provincial People’s Committee, from the DPRK side and Li Shenglin, Hu Zhengyue, and Chen Zhenggao from the Chinese side.

They said that two rounds of General Secretary Kim Jong Il’s visit to China this year marked historic events of epoch-making significance in developing the DPRK-China friendship on a fresh high stage.

They expressed belief that the bridge would make a contribution to demonstrating once again the great vitality and invincible might of the DPRK-China friendship steadily growing stronger.

The bridge will be successfully built as a symbol of the DPRK-China friendship and a structure of the two peoples, they added.

Then followed a ceremony of the ground-breaking for the project.

The Ministry of Transport, the Liaoning Provincial Committee of the Communist Party and the Liaoning Provincial People’s Government of China arranged a reception in connection with the ceremony.

Read older posts on the bridge below:
(more…)