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Working as a Lawyer in Pyongyang

Sunday, July 27th, 2008

Brendan Carr over at Korea Law Blog dug up some information on law firms operating in the DPRK. All the information he posts is worth reading, but here are some highlights:

[T]he prospect of working as a foreign lawyer in Pyongyang has been on my list since I’ve been a lawyer.

Michael Hay, a foreign legal consultant in Seoul since 1990, actually did this—striking out from “Big Four” firm Bae, Kim, & Lee in 2001 [domain lapsed] to focus on being a full-time North Korea consultant. He established KoreaStrategic Inc. as a consultancy (its domain lapsed in June 2006, though), then with a splash announced the formation of Hay, Kalb & Associates as the first foreign/North Korean joint venture law firm in Pyongyang. The Hay, Kalb website, too, disappeared sometime in 2005, and I lost touch with Mike Hay around the same time. I remain curious to know about his adventure up North; I’m sure it’s been fascinating. However, he was always extremely tight-lipped about what he was doing there. Other than that he was focusing on North Korea “full-time, all the time” it was hard to get any specifics out of him.

There are two other law firms advertising their services and office presence in North Korea: Italy’s Birindelli e Associati (now Chiomenti after being acquired) and Singapore’s Kelvin Chia Partnership.

But today I found that the International Financial Law Review’s IFLR Legalwire, to which I hadn’t previously subscribed, recently (May 2008) reported on Birindelli partner Sara Marchetta’s experiences in Pyongyang. It’s fascinating stuff, published in two parts—go read Part 1 and Part 2. The article gave the impression that Hay, Kalb was still trading, which is promising, but Marchetta says that Birindelli kept no expatriate lawyer there year-round, because there were only four or five clients a year needing legal services, mostly in resource-extraction and processing ventures.

From Marchetta’s interview, I thought the following observations were worth noting:

Obtaining copies of laws:

The first issue is looking for legal resources – the law- as it is extremely complicated to get them. Even if you are a law firm and have people who are well-connected, its still a very long process to get a copy of a law. Even if the law has already been enacted and should be public, you still need special permission. If the law has not yet officially been translated into English, then you need to obtain special permission to get it and translate it.

The second thing is that the intended implementation of the law in a western sense does not exist. Especially when you go out of Pyongyang and Kaesong [North Korea’s special economic zone], everything is pretty much left up to political decision: whether you can stay here or there, what you do and cannot do…

Just to give you an example: in terms of a corporate tax, you go to a place, make an investment and you pay a corporate tax even if you don’t profit. It’s sort of a tax for being there. Corporate tax ends up being interpreted as a presence tax , which is paid independently of whether you make profits or not. In a few cases, we did find this type of interpretation, which is obviously extremely bizarre. So it is really a matter of general legal culture – which is totally lacking – and education of the administrative middle to low levels.

Does [this environment] hinder getting things done? Yes and no. Yes in the sense that getting a deal done takes more time because you do not have all of the information available at the beginning. No in the sense that once there is the intention of getting the deal done, there is a lot of facilitation from the bureaucratic and governmental point of view. If they say yes, its basically yes and it will happen.

How big is your office in Pyongyang:

It is currently staffed with two people. We have no expatriates. It is a joint venture as we are there in cooperation with a DPRK government entity called the Korean Justice Committee [KJC]. It is equivalent to the Chinese Ministry of Justice.

Are your lawyers at the office North Koreans?

Yes, they are North Korean lawyers. One of them is a pure lawyer, the other one is more someone who is well-connected in the government and has also PR and English capabilities. One side has the legal knowledge, and on the other side, fluent in English that they use to work with foreigners.

Does your JV status with the KJC give you an advantage over foreign firms?

As a matter of fact, from an operational point of view: yes. From the client’s point of view, I don’t know. I have no idea. I don’t think this is something that is hindering the expansion of our client base in Pyongyang, but I am not sure if it enhancing it.

What types of clients do you serve?

We serve companies looking at setting up a presence in the DPRK. These are large companies that deal with natural resources, like mining or consumer goods, and most of them have already a presence in China.

What are teh key sectors of Work?

Well we deal with mining projects. This means that yo go there, you test the product and if it’s okay then you give the technology to be extracted in a proper way. You do part of the processing of the mineral and export it. This is one deal. On the other side, before advising on an investment we advise our clients on precessing contracts. Obviously this can be done not just for mining, but for shoes, clothes, and any other product that can be exported. The deal structure is basically these two.

Looking forward, is there enough going on to fairly classify the DPRK as an “emerging market”?

Not in terms of a domestic market. I don’t think that the domestic market is going to develop very much, but the DPRK is a good place for processing contracts. I mean, you send raw materials and they send back the finished product. There is also a strong market for natural resources and low-to-medium technology projects. There, you can produce basic chemicals, basic pharmaceutical products and some consumer goods. The Chinese are doing clothing here, doing shoes, and a lot of other things.

Do you predict enough work growth to expand?

Not for the time being for a number of reasons. One, we do not see an increase in DPRK-related work. We have two, three, four, maximum five clients a year and that’s basically it. So this is the main reason. Then you have always the political issue. It’s always there. The political wind is really swinging a lot and it changes by the season and is very much affected by the situation of the six-party talks. So for the time being, we are looking at what is happening and we are doing what we can do, but we do not have plans to enlarge our presence in the DPRK for the time being.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Chiomenti, DPRK Policies, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International trade, Joint Ventures, Kelvin Chia Partnership, Korean Justice Committee, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Mining/Minerals, Statutes | Comments Closed

Rajin SEZ electrified perimeter on Google Earth

Friday, July 25th, 2008

According to Lankov and Kim’s “North Korean Market Vendors: The Rise of Grassroots Capitalists in a Post-Stalinist Society” there is an electrified perimeter fence surrounding North Korea’s first “special economic zone,” Rajin Songbon.

I have spent a lot of time looking at this area on Google Earth, but never seen the electrified fence. Last night, however, I found it. Before reading Lankov’s article, I thought it was a highway, or highway construction, on account of its approximate 35 mile/56 km length (as calculated using the Google Earth ruler). The image of the perimeter (shown below) will be added, along with a few other new locations, to the next version of North Korea Uncovered (due in early August).

Click on image for larger version

And in case you missed it, Lankov’s article mentions North Korea’s largest market in Pyongsong. Satellite imagery of this location is below.

Click on image for larger view

Posted in Automobiles, Electricity, Energy, Google Earth, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Transportation | 3 Comments »

Russia-DPRK economic relations

Thursday, July 24th, 2008

From Dr. Leonid Petrov in the Asia Times:

Russia cooperation with North Korea
Since the early 2000s, overall relations between Russia and the DPRK have been improving. The DPRK’s importation of refined oil from Russia saw its first increase in 2002-2003 (from $20 million to $96 million) and was caused by the beginning of the US-DPRK nuclear confrontation and the subsequent demise of the international Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization project that was to construct a light water reactor nuclear power plant in North Korea.

During 2004-2005, petroleum trade between Russia and North Korea grew from $105 million to $172.3 million. Until the six-party talks produced their first results, in the list of Russia’s exports to the DPRK, oil products dominated at 63%. Rampant corruption in both countries also let a trickle of Russian oil to be smuggled to North Korea unaccounted for.

In 2006, Russia was the DPRK’s third-largest trading partner after China and South Korea and absorbed 9% of the total $3.18 billion spent by the North on imports (approximately $286 million). The Kremlin’s approval of international sanctions against the former communist ally was accompanied by the curtailment of trade with the North. At the time of North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, Russia’s trade statistics showed that exports of petroleum had dropped 91.1% compared to the same period of the previous year.

The pragmatic mood in bilateral relations prevails, and these days Russia delivers oil and food to North Korea only in accordance with its obligations associated with progress at the six-party talks. This year, Russia has already delivered 100,000 tonnes of fuel oil to the DPRK in two batches and, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin, a top Russian envoy to the six-party talks, will deliver another 100,000 tonnes by October 2008. In June, the Russian government announced it would provide 2,860 tonnes of flour to the DPRK. According to an official KCNA news agency report, this food aid arrived at the border city of Sinuiju in the DPRK’s northern Pyongan province in early July.

Recently, for the first time in the post-Soviet era, North Korea saw a major Russian investment. In the city of Pyeongseong, the Russian auto plant KamAZ opened its first assembly line, specializing in the production of medium-size trucks named “Taebaeksan-96”. Although less than 50 trucks were assembled in 2007, this cooperation became an important milestone in the development of bilateral relations. While the project doesn’t violate United Nations sanctions on North Korea, it shows Moscow’s drive to expand its influence in the country. Ironically, the more trucks assembled the heavier North Korea’s dependence on imported fuel, engine oils and other petrochemical products.

The importance of the DPRK’s Rajin-Seonbong special economic zone to Russia’s national interests continues to grow. The state-run monopoly OAO Russian Railways is currently upgrading its railway connections with North Korea in Khasan-Tumangang, investing at least 1.75 billion roubles (US$72 million) into this project, and plans to participate in an ambitious plan to rebuild a trans-Korean railway. By connecting Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian railroad, Russia hopes to benefit form the transit of South Korean and Japanese cargo which could be sent via its territory to Central Asian and European markets. Pyongyang seems to endorse these plans and other Russian initiatives, but does not commit any financial resources.

Eighty percent of overall bilateral economic trade between Russia and North Korea consists of cooperation, barter and investment-in-kind between the regional areas. The most active Russian regions trading with the DPRK are Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Maritime province (Primorsky Krai) itself exports to North Korea more than $4 million worth of refined oil per year. There are no oil fields in Maritime province and oil has to be borrowed through a chain of federal bureaucratic structures from the oil-rich areas of Eastern Siberia. Instead of money, the local governments agree to receive the labor of North Korean workers.

North Korean laborers in Siberia and the Far East were common under the Soviet system and they are still visibly present. In 2004, the Russian Federal Immigration Service issued 14,000 visas for foreign laborers, of whom North Koreans numbered 3,320 in 2005 and 5,000 in 2006. Since the DPRK has no other way to pay in goods or services, its government started paying for oil imported from Russia by dispatching thousands of laborers at zero cost. Following strong demand from local companies, just in 2006 regional authorities of Primorsky Krai agreed to issue an extra 5,000 working visas to North Koreans. This openness is contrary to local government policy that normally restricts the entry of labor from China.

DPRK citizens are sent to Russia to work as woodcutters and builders but some have also managed to find work in the agricultural and marine industry. Through the presence of these laborers, Russia has enjoyed a partial repayment of the DPRK’s post-Soviet debt through North Korean workers being contracted to work in mines and lumber mills in Russia’s Far East.

The wages they are able to make in Russia are far greater than what they would make at home. However, the foreign worker quota is set not by provincial governments but by Moscow, which often tries to put a stop to these programs due to the complexity of the matter. Part of this opposition stems from the fact that the North Korean workers in Russia still fall under DPRK laws and, therefore, are subject to intrusive supervision.

Among the most difficult but negotiable issues in the way of Russia-North Korea cooperation remains the problem of external debt. During the Soviet era, the DPRK incurred a debt of approximately $8 billion, which Pyongyang still owes to Moscow but cannot repay. This debt remains a stumbling block in most negotiations on new aid and development programs. However, this debt can potentially make trilateral Russian-Korean relations closer and stronger.

In January 1991, soon after the opening of diplomatic relations with South Korea, Moscow received $3 billion from Seoul in the form of a three-year loan. The collapse of the Soviet Union left this loan largely unpaid. The new Russian government in the 1990s provided South Korea with armaments worth $150 million to be counted as payment in kind for the remaining debt. In 2003, after bilateral negotiations on this issue were completed, part of this Russian debt was canceled and the remainder was rescheduled to be paid over the next 23 years.

Taking into account its own debts to the South, Russia could easily write off a significant portion of North Korean debt. To resolve this question, a certain agreement between all three parties is needed. To engage in a mutual and reciprocal round of debt cancelation, Russia might choose to see the North and the South as one country. Such an agreement would have unblocked the road for broader cooperation between Russia and the two Koreas, and simplified Russia’s energy cooperation with China and Japan.

The full article is worth reading here:
Russia is key to North Korea’s plight
Asia Times
Leonid Petrov
7/24/2008

Posted in Electricity, Energy, Foreign aid statistics, International trade, Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Natural Gas, Oil, Political economy, Railways, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Russia, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

Lankov and Kim on North Korean market vendors

Wednesday, July 23rd, 2008

“North Korean Market Vendors: The Rise of Grassroots Capitalists in a Post-Stalinist Society”
Andrei Lankov and Kim Seok-hyang
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 81 Iss.1
(subscription required)

Abstract:
The article deals with the social changes that have taken place in North Korea [from 1994-2002], when the collapse of the centrally planned economy led to the growth of private commercial activity. This activity remains technically illegal, but the relevant bans and restrictions have rarely been enforced due to endemic corruption and disorganization of the state bureaucracy. The article is largely based on in-depth interviews with North Korean black market operators [who have defected to South Korea]. It traces their origins, the type and scale of their business, and changes in their mode of operation.

The article demonstrates that the “second economy” came to dominate North Korean economic life by the late 1990s, since authorities’ attempts to limit its scale were largely ineffective. The growth of the “second economy” produced new grassroots capitalists who sometimes came from underpriveledged social groups, but more typically represented people with good official connections. It is also remarkable that foreign connections (usually with China) played a major role: to a large extent, merchandise sold at the North Korean markets either came from overseas or was exported overseas eventually, and in many cases the merchants’ initial capital was also provided by relatives residing overseas.

Some highlights:
1. Changsa is the North Korean word for “dealings in the marketplace.” Tonju is the word for money changers/lenders meaning “master of money”.
2. Public Distribution System (PDS) rations were cut for the first time in 1973.
3. The DPRK system restricted market activity primarily through three mechanisms: limited size of family farming plots, inminban surveillance system, and travel permits.
4. Before the arduous march, North Koreans were not inclined to resort to market trade. These transactions were seen as ethically suspect. Once the famine hit, people took up market trading remarkably quickly.
5. Before the arduous march, bribery was rare, even though patronage and indirect forms of corruption were rampant. Mid-level bureaucrats had to vie for preferred access to poor-quality consumer goods, better schools, and study trips abroad.
6. At the height of the arduous march (1997), production was at 46% of capacity.
7. North Korean traders seldom if ever have to deal with the protection racket. When asked directly, respondents did not mention threats from mobsters as one of their security concerns (I wonder if this is still the case).
8. Pyongsong market is reputed to be the largest in the country. It is just outside Pyongyang, making it accessible to citizens inside the capital as well as those who cannot get permits to enter the city (Pictured below with Google Earth coordinates).

Click on image for larger view

9. Financial services such as money-changers and private loan sharks offer loans at 5%-30%/month.
10. Most North Korean merchants know South Korea is a rich country. They also avoid surveillance since these activities are done at state-owned enterprises and study sessions.

Posted in Automobiles, Banking, Black markets, Economic reform, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Google Earth, Insurance, Joint Ventures, Price liberalization, Private property, Public Distribiution System (PDS), Railways, Transportation | 1 Comment »

(UPDATED) South Korean tourist fatally shot at Kumgang

Monday, July 21st, 2008

UPDATE 13-August 28: Yoon Man-jun stepped down as CEO of Hyundai Asan over the July 11 killing of the 53-year-old South Korean woman by a North Korean soldier at the North’s Diamond Mountain resort, the company said in a statement. The company quoted Yoon as saying that he wanted to take “moral responsibility” for the death. (ETN news)

UPDATE 12-August 8: Despite bringing a halt to tourism in Kumgangsan, South Korea sent arrears to the DPRK. From the Choson Ilbo:

Despite stalemate over the shooting death of a South Korean tourist at North Korea’s Mt. Kumgang, tour operator Hyundai Asan made its July payment for tours to North Korea.

Asan said Thursday it paid US$675,250 to North Korea to cover costs accrued by 10,380 South Korean tourists who visited the mountain resort on July 1-11, until the tours halted after a South Korean tourist was shot and killed by a North Korean soldier at Mt. Kumgang.

Update 11-August 8: DPRK to expel all remaining ROKs from Kumgnag starting August 10.

UPDATE 10-Auguts 4: KCNA issues statement.

UPATE 9-August 3: Though no date was given, North Korea intends to expell most remaining South Koreans from Kumgang (Yonhap):

North Korea’s official media said earlier in the day that Pyongyang will expel all “unnecessary” South Korean personnel from the Mount Geumgang resort, where a South Korean tourist was shot dead by a North Korean soldier last month.

More than 260 South Korean workers are stationed at the scenic resort, according to Hyundai Asan, the South Korean tour organizer.

UPDATE 8-July 26: North Korea succeeds in preventing shooting concerns from being mentioned in official summary of ASEAN meeting.

UPDATE 7- July 23: South Korean government prevents South Korean civic groups from visiting DPRK until the North’s government agrees to participate in shoting investigation. (Donga Ilbo)

As of Tuesday, six organizations had been offered invitations to visit the DPRK (Donga Ilbo):

One hundred members of the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers’ Union applied for permits to visit North Korea during August. In addition, 120 South Gyeongsang Province officials including Governor Kim Tae-ho are reportedly planning to visit the regime.

Humanitarian organizations such as Good Neighbors International, Nanum International and the Korean Sharing Movement will reportedly send 40-150 delegates to the North in August (for the former two) and September. In addition, North Korean officials invited around 120 members of Peace Three Thousand, and the representatives of the two will meet in Gaesong on Saturday to discuss the invitation.

These organizations [would] stay two to four days in North Korea and [] attend joint meetings with the North Korean Teachers’ Union, visit North Korean industrial facilities, tour Mount Baekdu, and attend an Arirang performance – a play propagandizing the regime.

UPDATE 6- July 21: Suspension of the Kumgang Tours will cost the DPRK $20 million per year. If South Korea suspends the Kaesong tours (to the city, not the industrial zone) it will cost the DPRK government $15 million. (Choson Ilbo)

Maybe these numbers are sinking in. According to the Donga Ilbo:

North Korean officials recently followed one after another in expressing their perplexity regarding the incident, and fell over themselves to invite a horde of South Korean civic groups in August. These recent moves by the North have led some to believe that the North Korean authorities have somehow changed its stance towards the South.

An American source who recently met with North Korean officials in China and a working-level official at a South Korean civic group also said, “North Korean authorities told us that the shooter was a ‘very young’ person.”

The source added, “North Korean authorities told us that the incident equally took them aback. They added that especially at a time when the South Korean authorities are anxious to give them 50,000 tons of corn, those who thought the incident was intentional simply do not know anything about their regime.”

Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Ho-nyun also confirmed the Dong-A Ilbo’s report that North Korea invited a large group of South Korean visitors to Mount Baekdu and Pyongyang.

The Choson Ilbo remains skeptical.

UPDATE 5 – July 17: The North’s story has changed. DPRK rejects South’s inspectors. Seventy percent of officials of the United Front Department who were in charge of foreign affairs with South Korea were expelled from their positions early this year. It seemed to be an initiative step for taming the Lee administration and controlling the South’s policy (Daily NK).

UPDATE 4 – July 15: South Korea ups the ante by threatening to suspend tours of Kaesong unless the DPRK participates in the Kumgang shooting investigation (Bloomberg).

NKeconWatch analysis: Suspending tours to Kumgang is relatively expensive for both North and South. Hyundai and the South Korean government spent a lot of money developing the facilities, and by this time, the North Koreans who were earning from the project have grown accustomed to the cash flow. The tours of Kaesong are different, however. The South invested relatively little capital in the Kaesong tours, so suspending them idles few of their resources but hits the pocketbooks of the North Koreans who sponsor the program. Could the Kaesong Industrial Zone be turned into a bargaining chip?

UPDATE 3 – July 14: South Korea officially casts doubt on North Korea’s portrayal of events leading up to the shooting based on CCTV video and an eyewitness account. (Choson Ilbo)

UPDATE 2: This story in the Korea Times (h/t ROK Drop) seems to indicate that there was a witness to the shooting and that there were no substantial barriers or warnings that vacationers could wander into a restricted military zone.

UPDATE 1: The North Koreans expressed regret for the shooting, but says the responsibility lies entirely with Seoul. They also refuse to cooperate with the South Korean government in an investigation of the incident citing that they have already sorted things out with Hyundai Asan. Although South Korea’s President Lee Myung-Bak ignored the situation in a parliamentary speech he gave shortly after the shooting, the Unification Ministry has now publicly stated that the shooting was “wrong by any measure, unimaginable, and should not have occurred at all.”

ORIGINAL POST:Tourism numbers at the Kumgnag resort were up this year, despite high political tensions.

From the AP:

A North Korean soldier fatally shot a South Korean tourist Friday at a mountain resort in the communist North, prompting the South to suspend the high-profile tour program just as South Korean’s new president sought to rekindle strained ties between the divided countries.

The news of the unprecedented shooting of a 53-year-old woman at Diamond Mountain resort emerged just hours after new President Lee Myung-bak delivered a nationwide address calling for restored contacts between the two Koreas, which have been on hold since he took office in February.

Kim said South Korea would suspend future Diamond Mountain tours until it completes an investigation. The other some 1,200 tourists already at the resort are to complete their tours as scheduled by as late as Sunday, said Hyundai Asan, the South Korean company that operates the resort.

Links to full stories below the fold:

(more…)

Posted in Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Tourism, United Front Department | 7 Comments »

N Korea worker killed in Kaesong

Thursday, July 17th, 2008

From the BBC:

A North Korean worker was killed and four others were injured in an accident in the Kaesong industrial complex in North Korea, Southern officials said.

It happened when a steel frame collapsed at a factory owned by a South Korean company, Pyeongan, on Wednesday.

An investigation into the cause of the accident is reportedly under way.

Two of the four injured are in critical condition, a spokesman for South Korea’s Unification Ministry said, according to Associated Press.

They are all being treated in a hospital in the zone.

Read the full story here:
N Korea worker killed in Kaesong
BBC
7/17/2008

Posted in Foreign direct investment, Health care, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Labor conditions/wages, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | Comments Closed

GPI Consultancy: Economic Mission to North-Korea

Wednesday, July 16th, 2008

Netherlands Centrum voor Handelsbevordering
27 September – 4 October 2008
View the information flyer with more information here: it-tour_dprk.pdf

For the past decades, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) also known as North-Korea has been one of the most isolated countries in the world. Until recently, foreign companies could hardly enter this country. Inspired by the economic successes of its neighbouring country China, North-Korea has since a few years opened its doors for foreign enterprises. The DPRK established several free trade zones to attract foreign investors. In 2002 North Korea started to experiment with the Kaesong Industrial Region, near the South-Korean border. Moreover, other areas were designated as Special Administrative Regions, such as Sinŭiju near the border with China.

Currently, China and South-Korea are the most important trade partners of North-Korea; their mutual trade is growing fast. Also for European companies there are many opportunities to trade with North-Korea. During the recent seminar: ‘Doing Business with North-Korea’ (The Hague, 30 May) the representative from North-Korea highlighted that there are business opportunities in several fields, including Textile Industry, Shipbuilding, Agro Business, Logistics and Information Technology.

DPRK finds itself at the beginning of a new era of openness. In North-Korea there is a need for many foreign products and investments. The Chamber of Commerce Amsterdam, GPI Consultancy and the Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion are organizing an economic mission to investigate the business opportunities for foreign companies in this country. This unique economic mission to North-Korea will take place from 27 September to 4 October 2008. Our partner in North-Korea is the Pyongyang Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Renze Hasper, Member of the Board of the Chamber of Commerce Amsterdam, will be the mission leader of this economic mission.

The program includes individual matchmaking, company visits, network receptions and dinners. Furthermore, a visit is being planned tot the Kaesong Industrial Region.

GPI Consultancy is responsable for the IT-program of the mission. As an example, the program for the IT-delegates has been attached; they will visit firms in Pyongyang in the field of software development, animation, cartoons, computer games and BPO (Business Process Outsourcing). Similar matchmaking visits will be arranged for delegates from other business sectors.

The mission is open for participants from other countries as well.
If you are interested in joining this trade mission, please contact:

Paul Tjia
GPI Consultancy
P.O. Box 26151,
3002 ED Rotterdam,
The Netherlands
E-mail: [email protected]
tel: +31-10-4254172
fax: +31-10-4254317
Website: www.gpic.nl

Posted in Animation, Cell phones, Communications, Computing/IT, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, GPI Consultancy, International trade, Joint Ventures | Comments Closed

What caused the DPRK’s spring ’08 food price increases?

Sunday, July 13th, 2008

North Korea’s agricultural and food markets suffer from a number of permanent constraints that prevent their efficient operation. Rail transport is slow and/or unreliable, internal travel restrictions for “ordinary” merchants, and poor road conditions limit the distance food can travel before it goes bad. Restrictions on communications and lack of a futures market makes it difficult to know how much food is available in each location, or what is expected to be available in each location. This leads to hoarding, volatile prices, and a mismatch between local supply and demand. Compounding these basic problems is a poor business environment characterized by collective farming practices, corruption, bribery, poor property rights protection, poor contract enforcement, and ex-post expropriation of profits. Given these constraints, it is amazing agricultural and food markets work at all.

In addition to these factors, the DPRK’s food markets suffered a number of adverse supply shocks this year from flooding, China’s restrictions on food exports, and a decrease in expected food aid from China, South Korea, and the US (See the effects on prices in this chart by Noland/Haggard/Weeks here). The arrival of food aid has since brought some of these prices down.

This week, the Daily NK reports on two other causes of price increases in the DPRK: Anti-corruption campaigns and restrictions on farming private plots.

Anti Corruption campaigns (more here and here)

He reported that “From March to late April, for almost 40 days, inspections were undertaken nationally. In Hwanghae Province, the inspection groups under the Central Court came down and confiscated food which the cadres in farms had embezzled. In some cases, they confiscated 500-1000kg of rice and grains from cadres’ households by searching with metal sticks in their backyard.”

The Director of the Ministry of Administration of the Chosun (North Korea) Workers’ Party Jang Sung Taek and his inspection group went to Shinuiju and inspected persons in charge of trading.

No. 112 Land System

The No. 112 land system operates whereby the authorities offer a certain width of fallow lands, which are different by grade of food distribution amount, to national public servants and clerical workers, given in order to make them solve their food problem by farming instead of relying on distribution. Ishimaru explained that “However, the new Kim Young Il cabinet abrogated this system and banned them from planting seeds on those fields.”

Read the full story here:
Intensive Inspections in March and April a Direct Reason for Rise in Food Prices
Daily NK
Kim So Yeol
7/4/2008

Posted in Agriculture, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization, Private property | Comments Closed

Pyongyang wants McDonald’s franchise?!?

Wednesday, July 9th, 2008

Incredible!

Burger Chain ‘Rebuffed N.Korean Overtures’
Choson Ilbo
7/10/2008

Influential North Koreans tried to bring McDonalds into the country, but the fast-food chain declined citing lack of profitability, Radio Free Asia reported Wednesday. RFA quoted Nancy Mazeska at MacDonald’s International Franchise Division as saying the person who contacted the chain probably had “political connections” and a “history of success in North Korea.” But due to the poor infrastructure and distribution network and probable lack of demand, McDonalds decided to take a rain check.

McDonalds at one point thought about letting its franchise in South Korea handle North Korean operations, she said. She did not comment further on who the businessman was and when he contacted the company. According to North Korean press, mass-produced hamburgers were distributed in universities in Pyongyang in September 2000 at the orders of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

Many thoughts are running through my head:

1. Can you imagine? The “golden arches” right next to the Arch of Triumph in Pyongyang. Of course the North Koreans would make sure that their “golden arches” were the largest in the world—3 meters taller than the ones in America.

2. Rumor has it that no two countries with a McDonald’s in them have ever attacked each other…with one recent exception: the bombing of Serbia in the 1990s. Despite the fact that McDonald’s is frequently targeted by anti-American activists, the opening of a franchise in Pyongyang would in fact be a great symbol of hope.

I remember visiting the first McDonald’s in the Soviet Union just after it opened in Moscow. I stood in line for hours to eat food that tasted exactly like it did in America (of course I was living in England at the time and their food didn’t taste much better than the Soviets’). The reason I stood in line for so long is because so many Russians wanted to try it as well, and it was finally considered politically acceptable. The same would probably be true of Pyongyang residents, and the line out the door would be telling.

3. The hamburger is not entirely unknown to North Koreans. All outbound flights on Air Koryo serve a hamburger (or at least it is some kind of meat patty in a much larger bun with a piece of lettuce). In business class, you get it on a plate. I don’t think it is that great, but it is made in the DPRK. Here is a bad photo I took of the alleged burger.

UPDATE: 4. ROK Drop wonders if they would have used US beef!

Posted in Aviation, Foreign direct investment, Restaurants, Tourism, USA | 2 Comments »

labor constraints at Kaesong

Wednesday, July 9th, 2008

According to the Korea Times, the end of official North-South dialogues has put plans on hold to expand housing for workers in the Kaesong Industrial Zone.

From the article:

Officials at the complex expressed concerns that South Korean companies intending to set up operations there may be unable to do so as a lack of housing will likely see manpower shortages.

According to the Gaesong Industrial District Management Committee, the number of North Korean workers at 72 companies operating in the site totals 30,084 and the figure could reach 40,000 by late this year.

Besides, approximately 80,000 to 100,000 workers would be needed by 2010 when 450 companies are expected to settle in the industrial park.

However infrastructure projections show that less than 60,000 North Korean workers will likely be able to commute to the industrial site.

Currently, North Korean workers head for their workplaces by 88 commuter buses and bicycles and the authorities promised to provide an additional 100 buses until the year’s end.

South and North Korea agreed last December to build dormitories to accommodate 15,000 North Korean workers.

The two sides were to conduct a geological survey early this year and start construction work in the first half of the year following the agreement but the suspended talks have hindered the plan.

After conservative President Lee Myung-bak vowed a tougher line toward the North, the communist North kicked South Korean officials out of its territory in March and cut off official communication channels.

The Seoul government recognizes the lodging problem as urgent. Yet, it admitted it cannot find a solution at the moment since the North is rejecting any talks.

Read the full story here:
Gaeseong Complex Lacks in Lodgings for N. Korean Workers
Korea Times
Kim Sue-young
7/9/2008

Posted in Construction, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Labor conditions/wages, Manufacturing, South Korea, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | Comments Closed

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