North Korean Economy Watch

According to the Donga Ilbo:

More than half of North Korean defectors living in South Korea say they earn under 500,000 won (440 U.S. dollars) per month and suffer hiring discrimination, the results of a survey released Thursday said.

A combined 222 defectors nationwide were surveyed Sept. 15-30 and the study’s results were given to ruling Grand National Party lawmaker Kim Young-woo.

Of the respondents, 76 percent were women in their 20s to 40s. The gender and age ratios were similar to those of the estimated 20,000 defectors in the country, including those expected to enter South Korea by year’s end.

The study said 118 (56 percent) of 211 respondents said they earn under 500,000 won a month, or less than the minimum cost of living (504,344 won) per capita set by the Health and Welfare Ministry. Those who earned more than 500,000 won but under one million won (880 dollars) accounted for 21 percent (44), between one million and 1.5 million won (1,320 dollars) 16 percent (34), and between 1.5 million and two million won (1,760 dollars) five percent (10).

On discrimination in hiring, 93 of 216 respondents (43 percent) said they felt “slight” discrimination and 41 (20 percent) “strong” discrimination. Among 213 respondents, 115 (54 percent) said they earn less than a South Korean for the same work, and 58 (27 percent) out of 206 respondents said they felt ostracized due to their identity.

On their living conditions, 105 (48 percent) of 219 respondents said they are “poor” and 39 (18 percent) “very poor,” while 64 (29 percent) said they lead “moderate” lives, five (two percent) “affluent,” and six (three percent) “very affluent.”

A 40-something North Korean female defector urged South Koreans to show consideration for defectors on the questionnaire.

“We are a family of five. My husband is in bed due to hip surgery. Those unable to work due to illness have a very hard time making a living. I do my best to earn a good living but realize that this is impossible for those who have no power. We are heartened by your words of encouragement. We’d be very happy and grateful if you understand our difficulties and take care of us,” she said.

Read the full story here:
NK Defectors Complain of `Cold Lifestyle` in S. Korea 
Donga Ilbo
10/1/2010

According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s economic dependence on its strongest ally China is growing as its economy slips further into deeper isolation from the international community for its nuclear ambition, a report said Friday.

According to the report compiled by the Samsung Economic Research Institute, bilateral trade with China accounted for 52.6 percent of the North’s cross-border trade last year.

“North Korea’s so-called self-reliant economy is collapsing, and China is emerging as the communist state’s key supplier of economic goods,” the report said.

The report said China’s investment in North Korea surged to US$41 million in 2008 from a meager $1.1 million in 2003. China is also planning to spend $2.37 billion on construction of a transportation network that links the two countries, it said.

But the report said it is hard to characterize the countries’ economic ties as “subordinate,” as the North is also involved in trade with South Korea and other countries.

As with most Yonhap stories, they do not provide a link to the report, or even its name, so I cannot say much about the numbers. 

Here is the English webpage of the Samsung Economic Research Institute.  I have been unable to locate this partuclar study, but maybe you will have better luck.

Yonhap also tells us that the Chinese are working to create a trade zone along the North Korean border.  According to the article:

China is seeking to build an economic zone in the northeastern region bordering North Korea, aiming to promote trade with the world’s most reclusive country, officials said Friday.

Thirteen cities in the Dongbei region, commonly known as Manchuria, issued a joint proposal Thursday to build the “Yalu River Economic Zone” and to boost trade with North Korea. The Yalu River or the Amnok River in Korean is a river on the border between China and North Korea.

The participating cities include Dandong, Dalian, Tonghua and Mudanjiang, all of which are located either in the Liaoning province, the Jilin province or the Heilongjiang province. The three provinces make up the Dongbei region.

North Korea has long been reported as planning to build a free economic zone near the bordering river. A number of ports already exist on the river, used for border trade between the two countries.

Dandong in Liaoning Province, which borders the North Korean city of Sinuiju, has become the largest logistics hub for North Korean trade, handling 70 percent of bilateral trade.

Read the full Yonhap stories here:
N. Korean economic reliance on China further growing: report
Yonhap
10/1/2010

China eyes economic zone for trade with N. Korea
Yonhap
Kim Young-gyo
10/1/2010

According to Arirang News:

South Korea’s Unification Ministry on Wednesday finally endorsed the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund worth 8 billion won, or roughly 7 million US dollars in an effort to help North Korea recover from the aftermath of summer floods.

The total cost of aid to be sent is about 12.2 million dollars with about 7 million donated by the Council for the Promotion of Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation, chaired by Unification Minister Hyun In-taek and the rest coming from Seoul’s agriculture ministry.

The money will buy 5-thousand tons of rice to be shipped on October 25th from Gunsan Port to the North Korean city of Sinuiju.

Other aid includes 10-thousand tons of cement, three million cases of cup noodles and medicine.

Read the full story here:
S. Korea Endorses US$7 Mil. Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund
Arirang News
9/30/2010

According to Yonhap:

Trade between South and North Korea surged in the first half of the year despite high tensions over the communist nation’s alleged sinking of a South Korean warship in March, a trade organization said Wednesday.

South Korea’s exports to the North soared 63 percent on-year to US$430 million in the January-June period with North Korea’s exports to the South jumping 43 percent to $550 million, according to the Korea International Trade Association (KITA).

Read the full story here:
Inter-Korean trade jumps in H1 despite soured relations
Yonhap
9/29/2010

According to Fox News:

In an eerie replay of a scandal that enveloped the United Nations Development Program, an internal audit by the U.N.’s World Food Program shows significant “lapses,” “anomalies,” and unexplained variations last year in the way the relief agency reported its financial and commodity management in North Korea.

The holes in WFP’s humanitarian reporting raise questions of whether a U.N. agency has allowed money and supplies intended for starving North Koreans to end up in the hands of the country’s brutal communist rulers, who are under international sanctions aimed at halting their aggressive atomic weapons program.

According to WFP itself, in response to questions from Fox News, the confidential audit “highlighted a small number of inconsistencies in commodity accounting that have subsequently been addressed.” All the issues involved have since been “closed,” the agency added.

However, Fox News obtained a copy of a summary of projects undertaken by WFP’s internal watchdog Office of Internal Audit between July and September of last year, which lists the North Korean lapses first among its audit highlights. Among other things, it notes:

–“inconsistent data and unreliable information systems used for reporting [WFP] commodity movements, stock balances and food utilization” in North Korea;

–“lapses…in financial and commodity management processes.”

—“numerous anomalies…in information systems used for reporting commodity movements and food utilization in the CO [WFP local country office].”

See summary document here (PDF).

The full extent of the management lapses and their consequences cannot be determined without the unexpurgated audit report—and the WFP is not willing to make that public. The agency flatly turned down a request by Fox News for the document.

In fact, WFP has not even supplied a copy of the audit report to nations, including the U.S., that supervise its operations through a 36-member executive board. (The U.S. government gave about $1.76 billion to WFP in 2009, and has so far contributed $959 million this year.)

A Fox News query to the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in Geneva got confirmation that the U.S. government did not have the report, and that “WFP does not currently share its internal audit reports with the WFP Executive Board members.”

By now, however, it was supposed to. A policy that allowed the WFP’s executive director, Josette Sheeran, to give such audit reports to executive board members on demand was up for approval by the board at its last meeting in June. However, it was withdrawn from the board’s agenda; it is now up for consideration at the next Board meeting in November.

Even then, however, the wording of a draft version of the decision underlines that the sunlight provisions “will not be applied retroactively.”

The audit references to lapses in relief aid reporting practices are not the first indicator that the regime of ailing dictator Kim Jong Il might have the opportunity to exploit WFP resources in North Korea.

In June 2009, Fox News got an admission from the relief agency that its food supplies were carried from China to North Korea on vessels owned by the Kim regime. The potential transportation costs for those relief supplies appeared to be enormously high to outside shipping experts asked by Fox News to analyze the agency’s relief program documents. No mention of the regime’s role in transporting WFP goods appeared in the documents or on the agency’s website.

Click here to read an earlier Fox News article on this topic.

WFP has delivered more than $1 billion worth of food aid to North Korea since 2000, but the amount of donated money available for that effort has dwindled sharply as the Kim regime has exploded two nuclear bombs, threatened neighboring Japan and South Korea with war, and even sunk a South Korean warship on the high seas, according to the best forensic evidence available.

Its current plans call for spending about $91 million for food for about 2.2 million North Koreans this year.

The WFP audit reference to lapsed internal controls in North Korea, and the agency’s pooh-poohing of them, also bears a disturbing resemblance to the early stages of a battle over the role of the United Nations Development Program in North Korea, which led to the closure of UNDP’s North Korea office for two years, from 2007 to 2009. The WFP was later named as the U.N.’s lead agency in the country.

In 2006, a whistleblower named Artjon Shkurtaj revealed that UNDP procedures in North Korea had funneled millions of dollars in hard currency to the Kim regime, allowed North Korean government nominees to occupy sensitive UNDP positions in the local country office, kept thousands of U.S. dollars counterfeited by North Korea without informing U.S. authorities, and other transgressions.

All were flatly denied by the U.N. agency, though many of the accusations were later revealed to have been mentioned in internal audit reports — which UNDP refused to make public, on the same grounds currently used by WFP, that they were internal management tools. The existence of the audit criticisms were only made known through an external board of auditors’ investigation in 2007.

A further outside investigation revealed that UNDP’s transgressions were even worse than the auditors had suggested. Not only had UNDP routinely continued to hand over millions in hard currency to the Kim regime, use government nominated officials in sensitive positions, and transfer sensitive equipment with potential for terrorist use or for use in creating weapons of mass destruction, it had done so in violation of U.N. Security Council sanctions in force at the time, and also contravened its own basic financial rules and regulations.

Click here to read an earlier Fox News article on this topic.

In the midst of the furor over its North Korean activities, UNDP finally agreed to make future internal audit reports public—at least to governments on its executive board, and as long as they applied in writing. Since then, it has also amended its internal procedures and is now relaunching itself in North Korea. (To date, the U.N. has not paid recompense to Shkurtaj that was mandated by its own ethics officer in the wake of the UNDP scandal.)

Is the World Food Program following the unsettling trail blazed by UNDP in North Korea, before it mended its ways?

Without the full internal audits, it is hard to tell—but the stonewalling of those audits looks very familiar.

Read the full story here:
U.N. Audit Finds ‘Lapses’ in Managing Food Program Aid to N. Korea
Fox News
George Russell
9/28/2010

According to Kathimerini:

Authorities in Piraeus today were to continue their inspection of a German-flagged French-owned vessel that had been en route to Syria from North Korea with a cargo believed to comprise banned weapons.

Following a tip-off from another country, which was not identified, Greek authorities intercepted the vessel and ordered its mooring at the port of Piraeus so checks could be carried out. Coast guard officers, military experts and members of the National Intelligence Service (EYP) participated in the inspection, which did not result in the discovery of any weapons but did turn up a large quantity of what a government source yesterday described as “nonmilitary material that could have a dual use.” This material reportedly included pieces of metal and pipes that could be used in the construction of missile launchers.

The United Nations Security Council agreed in June last year to ban the export of all weapons from North Korea.

According to Reuters:

The expanded sanctions were aimed at cutting off its arms sales, a vital export estimated to earn it more than $1 billion a year.

North Korea’s biggest weapons sales come from ballistic missiles, with Iran and other Middle Eastern states as customers, according to U.S. government officials.

Read the full stories here:
Ship checked for weapons
Kathimerini
9/29/2010

Greece searches ship for North Korean arms – source
Reuters
9/28/2010

According to Yonhap:

Britain has named a female career diplomat as its next ambassador to North Korea, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office said Tuesday.

The office said Karen Wolstenholme has been appointed as its envoy to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which is the official name of the communist country. She is to succeed London’s current ambassador to Pyongyang Peter Hughes in September 2011.

Wolstenholme joined the foreign office in 1980 and was previously posted to Moscow, Brussels and Wellington.

She headed various regional teams from 2003 before being named First Secretary, Deputy UK Permanent Representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons based in the Hague in 2007.

I wish Mr. Hughes all the best in the future.

Read the full story here:
Britain taps woman as next ambassador to N. Korea
Yonhap
9/28/2010

There is an interesting article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists:

Article Highlights
1. The idea that North Korea and Myanmar are collaborating on a nuclear weapons programs represents only one possible scenario among several that deserve closer examination.

2. Myanmar’s goal might be to improve its missile program or trade in illicit technology rather than build nuclear weapons.

3. Myanmar’s receipt of illegally-exported or questionable dual-use items should cause the international community to reexamine export controls and policies specific to trade with the Southeast Asian country.

Article Text:

Is Myanmar developing nuclear weapons, perhaps with the help of North Korea? That worrisome possibility, prompted by Myanmar’s receipt of dual-use technology via an illegal North Korean procurement network, has garnered considerable speculation. Compelling evidence amassed in reports published this year by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), Jane’s Intelligence Review, and Al Jazeera indicates that, as the ISIS report put it, “There remain sound reasons to suspect that the military regime in Burma [Myanmar] might be pursuing a long-term strategy to make nuclear weapons.”1

The possible existence of such a program cannot and should not be discounted, but it is far from the only explanation that can account for Myanmar’s unusual imports. The dual-use technology sent to Myanmar — including a cylindrical grinder and magnetometer — are considerably beyond the country’s current technical capabilities, according to the DVB report. Such sophisticated devices, which could be used to produce nuclear- or missile-related parts, may point to a well-planned, long-term nuclear weapons program, perhaps assisted by North Korea.

However, alternate explanations also warrant consideration to better understand the nature of DPRK-Myanmar trade in such technologies. Plausible alternative scenarios include the use of Myanmar as a transshipment hub for items ultimately destined for North Korea, an evolving conventional missile program, procurement errors or other planning missteps, or some combination of these possibilities.

Myanmar as a transshipment hub. In late 2009, the Yokohama District Court in Japan found the president of Toko Boeki (a small Tokyo-based trading company) guilty of coordinating illegal WMD-related exports to Myanmar.2 Investigators determined that Toko Boeki had acquired cylindrical grinders and a magnetometer at the behest of New East International Company, a North Korean front company based in Hong Kong.3 Although New East International directed Toko Boeki to deliver the equipment to Myanmar, it is possible that the devices were not intended to remain there; Myanmar may have been a transfer point before the goods were shipped to another location — perhaps even North Korea.

Indeed, Myanmar has distinct advantages to North Korean procurement networks that want to circumvent sanctions and illegally divert dual-use equipment to Pyongyang. (See Editor’s Note.) Although it is also subject to sanctions, Myanmar is not as isolated as North Korea, and legitimate shipments originating from Japan, for example, can provide suitable cover for WMD-related deliveries.

In addition, Myanmar’s flourishing illegal trade networks — including drug and human trafficking — represent a familiarity with the kind of knowledge required to covertly transship deliveries to countries with more advanced WMD programs (such as North Korea). The rampant corruption associated with the military regime further enables illicit trade.

The revival of diplomatic and military relationships between Myanmar’s ruling junta and Pyongyang is another reason to consider whether North Korea, and not Myanmar, may have been the final destination for the dual-use equipment.4 Chartered or diplomatic air transport, necessary to ferry officials between capitals, is less susceptible to interdiction, offering an ideal conduit for the transfer of some types of dual-use equipment from Myanmar to North Korea. A UN panel of experts on Resolution 1874 (which strengthened sanctions on North Korea after its second nuclear test) highlighted such a scenario in a May 2010 report PDF, suggesting that Pyongyang may turn to illicit air cargo shipments as a preferred mode of transport for its illegal trade.

A conventional missile program. Myanmar may be an ideal transshipment hub, but reports from ISIS and DVB indicate that dual-use machine tools from Japan and Europe are not simply being stored in Myanmar, but also used there. This could indicate that the devices may actually be intended for use in Myanmar’s indigenous missile program.

Although Myanmar’s overall technological development appears limited in comparison with North Korea, the majority of the questionable dual-use items received by Myanmar may truly be for its own missile development effort. Acquisition of conventionally armed short- and medium-range ballistic missiles would provide the junta with a significant strategic advantage over regional and domestic rivals, and short-range missiles could be useful to fight insurgent groups that challenge the junta’s authority.5

Further, Myanmar’s defense industry already produces artillery and mobile rocket launchers, and the country reportedly has spent more than a decade improving its missile production capabilities.6 This practical experience could facilitate Myanmar’s eventual creation of larger missiles, such as Scarabs or early Scud derivatives. Myanmar cannot yet produce these missiles, but the equipment identified in the Toko Boeki case and in the DVB report could be used to help it develop more advanced missile designs.

Alternative scenarios. It is also possible that, after some of the questionable dual-use equipment had already been received, a North Korea-Myanmar proliferation relationship fell into disarray due to the enormous complexity that plagues all WMD programs. Payment disputes (similar to those PDF that held up Myanmar’s negotiations with Russia for a 10 megawatt research reactor) could be one cause.7 Myanmar’s acquisition of equipment beyond its technical capabilities could also be explained by a procurement error or an overestimation of indigenous know-how, as the DVB report acknowledges. In 2002, Myanmar expressed interest in buying a mini-submarine from Pyongyang, according to Jane’s, but abandoned the idea due in part to its lack of expertise.8

The transfer of such advanced equipment could also be an example of aggressive sales of unsuitable technology to a naïve junta, similar to Geoffrey Forden’s suggestion that North Korea has been selling subpar missile technology to states in the Middle East. It is also plausible that a core group of scientists has the ear of the junta — as well as its funding — and may have over-promised deliverables. These scientists might include U Thaung, the pro-nuclear energy minister of science and technology, and Ko Ko Oo, who is director general of the Department of Atomic Energy and former director of the Department of Technical and Vocational Education (DTVE). The two departments shared the same address, phone number, and fax number until Myanmar’s capital was moved to Naypidyaw, and the DTVE is an end-user of some of the questionable dual-use equipment that Myanmar has acquired, according to ISIS.9

Another possible scenario is that Myanmar could be “warehousing” devices for North Korea under a barter agreement that allows Myanmar to train personnel on the dual-use equipment (and thereby gain valuable hands-on experience with the devices) before it is ultimately moved to North Korea. It is possible that Myanmar may even be viewed as an offshore production hub for transfer of items to North Korea or other interested parties. Sanctions make it nearly impossible for Pyongyang to acquire controlled, technically advanced equipment that requires installation and maintenance by foreign technicians; North Korea and Myanmar may have therefore collaborated to purchase the equipment, install it in Myanmar, and use the machines to produce advanced missile or nuclear parts that could then be more easily routed via air cargo to North Korea (or elsewhere).

Conclusion. The possibility that Myanmar is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is just one of many potential explanations for its importation of technologically advanced dual-use items. The alarming prospect of a nuclear-armed Myanmar cannot be ignored, but neither should it prevent the assessment of other feasible scenarios. More research is needed to determine precisely why Myanmar received questionable dual-use items and to discover their final destination, if Myanmar is a transshipment point. Export control regimes should take note of the potential for diversion of dual-use items through Myanmar, and to protect regional stability, governments in Asia should reexamine their trade policies toward the Southeast Asian country.

Read the full article here:
North Korea and Myanmar: A match for nuclear proliferation?
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Catherine Boyle, Melissa Hanham, Robert Shaw
9/27/2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-09-20-1
9-20-2010

The South Korean Ministry of Unification announced on September 14 that the number of ROK workers allowed in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, previously limited to fewer than 600, would be increased by two to three hundred. In response to the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, the South Korean government limited inter-Korean economic cooperation through the May 24 Measure, sharply cutting the number of South Korean workers in the joint industrial complex from around 1,000 down to 500. However, after companies in the complex voiced complaints over production losses caused by the measure, the government slightly raised the number of workers allowed, to 600, in mid-July. With this latest decision, the number will return to almost as many as were working prior to the May 24 Measure. This is the first sanction among those passed on May 24 to be practically rescinded.

A spokesperson for the Ministry of Unification stated, “Companies in the KIC have been complaining about growing difficulties in maintaining quality and of worker fatigue due to the reduction of employees [allowed in the complex],” and announced that the ministry had decided to increase the number of workers since it sees no physical threat to them. This announcement came as inter-Korean relations, which took a sharp turn for the worse after the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, appear to be improving, with North Korea returning South Korean fishermen seized last month, the ROK Red Cross decision on September 13 to send disaster relief in response to flooding in the North, and working-level discussions on a reunion for separated families being held. However, the spokesperson also stated that although the number of workers allowed to travel to North Korea was being increased, no new or additional investments were being allowed in the KIC, as originally dictated by the May 24 Measure.

Even before the announcement to increase the number of workers in the KIC, the South Korean government had shown flexibility when it came to the May 24 Measure; contracts made before the measure were honored, and North Korean manufactured and agricultural goods have continued to be imported under agreements reached before the sanctions. The government was flexible on humanitarian aid, as well, continuing to provide assistance to the most destitute in North Korea despite the decision to suspend aid on principle. Medical aid, particularly to prevent the spread of Malaria, has also continued. Recently, the South Korean government decided to allow the ROK Red Cross to send 5,000 tons of rice and 10,000 tons of cement, worth approximately 100 million won, to North Korea in response to massive flooding. This is the first time since the Lee Myung-bak administration came to power that any rice aid has been sent to the North. It is very likely that it will be sent as private-sector aid.

Seoul continues to ban visits to North Korea, but private-sector organizations have been allowed to travel to the Kaesong region. Despite the May 24 Measure, exceptions have been made for South Koreans involved with economic cooperation in the KIC and the Mount Keumgang areas. Among the sanctions passed in May, the ban on North Korean ships operating in South Korean waters and the ban on new investment in the North are still being enforced, but the suspension of inter-Korean exchanges, travel to the North, and provision of humanitarian aid have all been eased.

Among the Ministry of National Defense measures, the only psychological warfare tactic employed has been through radio broadcasts, while the distribution of leaflets and the broadcasting over loudspeakers were canceled after North Korean protests. Joint U.S.-ROK anti-submarine warfare exercises in the West Sea were postponed, while the U.S. put on a show of force with the deployment of an aircraft carrier to the East Sea in late July. Maritime interdiction drills led by the ROK military are planned for mid-October. The South Korean government insists that the May 24 Measure continues to stand unchanged, yet the enforcement and execution of the details is less than uniform.

The government’s position is that the restriction on workers in the KIC was not a sanction aimed at North Korea, but rather, a measure to protect South Korean workers; therefore, easing this restriction cannot be seen as a lifting of the May 24 Measure. Ultimately, it appears that a slight improvement in inter-Korean relations has led to a small amount of flexibility in implementing the May 24 Measure, but that the government will continue to enforce the measure until North Korea takes responsibility for sinking the ROKS Cheonan.

Aiden Foster-Carter has written an long piece in the Asia Times on North Korea’s geopolitics.  It is a fairly long piece, so here is the punch line:

So there’s our winner. Its rivals’ missteps have helped, but Beijing has long played a skillful, patient game. Like Moscow, it irked the North by recognizing South Korea (in 1992), but unlike the abrupt Russians it worked hard to soothe sensitivities.

Eighteen years on, guess which power is the top trade partner of both Koreas? Now, there’s subtle hegemony for you. No prizes either for guessing who’s snapping up North Korea’s mines, and beginning the lengthy, costly process of modernizing its decrepit infrastructure.

Face it: who else has the motive, or the means? As all agree, China’s overriding worry about North Korea is not Kim’s nukes but fear of collapse, and the chaos this could cause on its own borders. Beijing’s consistent strategy is not to paint Kim into a corner, no matter what.

Knowing that, how did policymakers in Seoul or Washington delude themselves that China would hurry to join a chorus of condemnation over the Cheonan? No way. Beijing squirmed a bit, but the game was worth the candle. Let Washington and Seoul huff and puff. All that achieved was to push an ever-more isolated North Korea further into China’s orbit and influence.

Nothing is certain, especially about North Korea where forecasts (this writer’s not least) have a habit of turning out wrong. I expected North Korea to collapse long ago: guilty as charged, m’lud. I understimated this tough regime’s staying power, or the horrors it would impose on its people – including famine – to cling to power while refusing to see sense.

But this can’t go on forever. The old game of militant mendicancy is finally up. Kim Jong-il’s frail health, a delicate succession, and an empty treasury – United Nations sanctions have hit arms exports, and crime doesn’t pay like it used to – make defying the entire world just too risky.

North Korea needs a sugar daddy. There is only one candidate left standing, and one who fits the bill perfectly. It may not be a marriage made in heaven, mind you. Pyongyang will keep squawking, and even try the old game of playing off its interlocutors – as in its latest thaw with Seoul.

But at the end of the day Beijing is making an offer no one else can match, and which North Korea can’t refuse. It goes roughly like this: Okay, we’ll bail you out, we’ll guarantee your security, we’ll even stomach your weird monarchical tendencies – unless the kid turns out to be a complete klutz, in which case you know what to do. Jang Song-taek (brother-in-law to Kim Jong-il) knows the score.

You can count on us too not to shame you by spelling all this out and giving the game away. But yes, we do need something in return. Two things. First: markets. For goodness sake just leave them alone, nay let ’em rip – as we’ve been telling you to, ever since Deng Xiaoping.

Look where we are now, and where you are. We’ll do the heavy lifting of investment, so you have functioning factories and railways again. But you have to let it happen. No going back.

Second: no more trouble. We know it may take time for you to give up your footling pesky nukes. But we need an absolute guarantee of no more tests, or else. No other provocations, either. Our People’s Liberation Army will teach your Korean People’s Army how to adapt and how to make money. The new North Korea will be a good global citizen, trading like we do. The returns are good. It beats mugging any day.

And guess what? You’ll love it, all of you. You’ll prosper. No more worries. Your people will eat; your elite will make money. What’s not to like? Just stop all that shouting and marching; what a relief, eh? The rest of the cult can stay, if you must. All hail the young general Kim Jong-eun, finally fulfilling grandpa’s dream of peace and prosperity for all! (With a bit of help from his friends, but we’re modest.) You’ll love him. You really will.

This seems to me a plausible scenario for North Korea’s future. In fact, I struggle to imagine any other. Korean reunification? Maybe in the very long run – but right now, who wants it?

Not the North, whose elite know the fate of their East German counterparts after unification. Can we really expect them to put their faith in the tender mercies of Lee Myung-bak? Even under Kim Dae-jung or Roh Moo-hyun it would have been tricky. What place would there be for most of them, frankly, in a reunified peninsula? Not a privileged one, that’s for sure.

Ordinary North Koreans, too, have learned, from the trickle who have made it to Seoul, that South Korea is no land of milk and honey. True, they’d like a life, and to eat. But China, or a North Korea open to and learning from China, might look a better bet on that score.

Nor is the South enthusiastic, despite all the rhetoric. It would be embarrassing and galling to see the North become a Chinese satellite – yet perhaps also a huge relief. Let Beijing bear the brunt, the burden, and the costs of transforming the madhouse they have long sustained.

Further down the line, blood could prove thicker. By 2040 or so, a by then semi-transformed North Korea may tire of great Han chauvinism, slough off the Chinese yoke, and embrace the cousins south of the demilitarized zone (which would long ago have become more permeable). They’d be easier to absorb, too, now smoothed by a few decades of Chinese-style modernity.

Speculative, to be sure. But what other scenarios are there? And though from one viewpoint China has edged out rival powers as argued above, presumably to their chagrin, might some of them in truth be quietly relieved to be spared the responsibility? Let China take it on and deliver a new-style North Korea, vibrant and fit for a new century. It could last a long time, and spare the region and world much headache and risk. Does anyone have an alternative?

Aidan Foster-Carter is honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University, and a freelance consultant, writer and broadcaster on Korean affairs. A regular visitor to the peninsula, he has followed North Korea for over 40 years.

You can read the full article here:
How North Korea was lost – to China
Asia Times
Aidan Foster-Carter
9/16/2010