North Korean Economy Watch

According to KCNA:

10th Pyongyang Autumn Int’l Trade Fair Opens

Pyongyang, September 22, 2014 (KCNA) — The 10th Pyongyang Autumn International Trade Fair opened with due ceremony at the Three-Revolution Exhibition House on Monday.

Present at the opening ceremony were Vice-Premier Ro Tu Chol who doubles as chairman of the State Planning Commission, Ri Ryong Nam, minister of External Economic Relations, Kim Song Dok, vice-chairman of the Pyongyang City People’s Committee, Ri Hak Gwon, head of the DPRK Chamber of Commerce, officials in the field of foreign trade, delegations of different countries and regions, foreign diplomatic envoys and staff members of their embassies here.

Pak Ung Sik, director of the Korean International Exhibition Corporation, made an opening address which was followed by a congratulatory speech by Ri Myong San, vice-minister of External Economic Relations.

The speakers said the fair would offer a good opportunity to promote friendship and cooperation among countries and boost the wide-ranging economic and trade transactions and scientific and technological exchange.

They expressed the will to boost bilateral and multilateral cooperation with various countries and regions of the world in the fields of the economy and foreign trade on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in the days ahead.

The participants looked round products presented by companies of various countries and regions including the DPRK, Germany, Russia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Singapore, China, Cuba, Italy and Taipei of China.

The fair will run through Thursday.

According to the JoongAng Ilbo:

North Korea held a rare investors relations event over the weekend and its more capitalistic and entrepreneurial manner hinted at a new openness to foreign investors and economic reform in general.

“The door is wide open. Come on in any time,” said Oh Eung-gil, president of North Korea’s Wonsan District Development General Corporation.

Oh was inviting South Koreans to invest in the North as he addressed a group of businessmen at an investors relations session at the Shangri-La Hotel in Dalian, China, on Saturday.

“We prepared all the conditions to develop Mount Kumgang and waited for the South to change its attitude,” said Oh. “But we can no longer wait, so we are trying to attract foreign investors. We have no intention to exclude the South.”

The investors relations event was arranged by the Dalian chapter of the World Federation of Overseas Korea Traders Association. About 200 Korean businessmen from around the world including Australia, China and the United States attended.

From North Korea, five delegates including Oh joined the event.

The North started its event with a presentation by Oh on the country’s laws governing foreign investments and the business environment.

“We have already simplified the investment application procedures and created regulations that meet international standards,” Oh said.

He spent a considerable amount of time to assuring businessmen that their investments, if made, will not vanish overnight.

“With Article 19 of the Foreign Investment Act, we promise that the assets of foreign investors and their companies won’t be nationalized,” he said. “If they are nationalized for an unavoidable reason, then we will make compensation for all costs.”

He also stressed that the North has abundant mineral and fisheries resources. With its 2 million educated workforce, who graduated from 300 universities, Oh said North Korea is the best place to make investments in Asia.

He said foreign companies that invest in special economic zones will only have to pay 14 percent corporate income tax and that the tax is even lower for some advanced technology industries. Making investments in the North’s infrastructure will also be tax-free, he said.

The North also held an unprecedented question and answer session. At similar events in the past, the North only made presentations without answering investors’ questions.

A businessman said he was afraid that the North Korean government could confiscate his investments, and Oh assured him that the government guarantees all legal investments by laws.

Oh even used humor to answer one businessman’s question.

“I would like to invest in hospitals,” the businessman said.

“Our [Democratic People’s] Republic of Korea offers free medical services, so it will be hard for you to make money,” Oh joked. “Please reconsider.”

Following Oh’s presentation, Ri Sing-ryol, vice president of the Wonsan District Development General Corporation, unveiled a development plan for the Wonsan-Mount Kumgang international tourism zone. He said the zone has 142 historic sites, 11 white-sand coasts and nine lakes, as well as 676 tourist venues.

The North’s Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly announced in June an ambitious plan to develop the area as an international tourism zone.

“Now that the Kim Jong-un regime is settled, the North’s top priority is resolving economic hardships and strong economic reform is being pushed forward,” said Jin Jiang, chairman of the Dalian Chapter of the World Federation of Overseas Korea Traders Association.

According to the Donga-Ilbo, the patchy subject of Hyundai Asan’s assets came up:

North Korea requested South Korea to make additional investment in Mount Kumgang and Wonsan areas, claiming that “it never confiscated the South’s property,” which it had forfeited and frozen in April 2010. Oh Eung Kil, general president of Wonsan district development company under the North’s external economy ministry, told South Korean reporters at an informational session on investment in the North in Dalian, Liaoning Province, China on Saturday.

“We did not confiscate Hyundai (Asan)’s asset. We will not confiscate and will wait (going forward). We have waited for long (thus far),” Oh said. “The South’s asset is just in our territory because it is real estate, and the property is registered in Hyundai’s name.”

Notably, citing the North’s foreign investment act providing that Pyongyang does not nationalize foreigners’ asset, Oh said, “Because we cannot afford to continue waiting, blindly trusting the South, we will form ties with investors from various countries. Still, we are not excluding the South. The door is open.”

In April 2010, the North implemented a slew of measures, including forfeiture of the South Korean government’s assets such as a separated family reunion house, freezing of private sector assets including duty-free shops, and deportation of management staff. In 2011, the North enacted the “Mount Kumgang international tourism district act,” and deprived Hyundai Asan of the exclusive right to tourism projects. Hotels and other assets that were owned by Hyundai are currently operated by the North Korean authority. Experts say, “The North’s move is aimed at denying its forfeiture of Hyundai Asan’s assets, which was negatively regarded by foreigners, and displaying situation of improved investment environment.”

Meanwhile, Oh said, “Foreign shipment of unprocessed natural resources has been designated as an additional item subject to restriction of investment into North Korea.” While banning shipment of coals and others without processing in North Korea by foreign investors, the North intends to allow processing of such resources within the Stalinist country. Since the North Korean authority singled out “sale of valuable natural resources at bargain prices as a unpatriotic act” as one of the crimes allegedly committed by Jang Song Thaek who was executed late last year, Pyongyang is believed to have strictly restricted foreign shipment of natural resources.

Here is additional coverage in the Choson Ilbo.

Other posts on the Wonsan-Mt. Kumgang International Tourist Zone here. See the category tab on the right for more.

Read the full stories here:
Pyongyang woos foreign investors
JoongAng Ilbo
Choi Hyung-Kyu
2014-9-22

N.K.: ‘We never confiscated facilities from Hyundai Asan’
Donga-Ilbo
2014-9-22

According to KCNA (2014-9-21):

Achievements Made in Sepho Tableland for Two Years

Pyongyang, September 21, 2014 14:24 KST (KCNA) — It is two years since the new history of change started in Sepho area.

Service personnel and people of the DPRK turned out as one under the grandiose plan of Marshal Kim Jong Un who initiated the reclamation of the tableland as the first grand nature-remaking project in the new century of Juche on September 22, Juche 101(2012). As a result, the barren land is now undergoing change beyond recognition thanks to their heroic struggle.

For the past two years the members of Construction Shock Brigade 922 made eye-opening achievements, going through manifold difficulties.

They finished reclaiming more than 50 000 hectares of tableland covering Sepho, Phyonggang and Ichon counties and created man-made pasture amounting to 98 percent of the project and nature-made pasture equivalent to 77 percent of the project.

They also created more than 600 hectares of windbreak and more than 12 700 hectares of pasture protection forest and pushed forward the construction of reservoirs, dwelling houses, hotels, stockbreeding research institute, epizootic prevention center, domestic animal sties and roads extending more than one thousand of kilometers, thus opening a bright prospect for building a large-scale stockbreeding base.

From the Pyongyang Times (2014-9-20) No. 38 (2813), p4:

The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly issued a decree establishing Jindo export processing area in Nampho on July 23.

The second SEZ in Nampho after the Waudo export processing area which was set up last year, the Jindo export processing area will be the first bonded processing trade hub among the 24 special economic zones built in the country.

Part of Ryongnam-ri in Waudo-District sitting on both sides of the road leading to the West Sea Barrage from the lower reaches of the Taedong River in southwest Nampho, it covers an area of 1.8 sq kilometers and has very favorable conditions of infrastructure.

It is also near Nampho Port, trade port directly leading to China and southeast Asia, and Pyongyang and Nampho cities boasting machine-building , electronic and light industries. It will provide the region with every potential for industrial growth and enough manpower.

The area is aimed at bringing in raw materials duty free and producing light industrial and chemical goods for export.

To this end, it plans to build a bonded processing trade area that encourages processing export by allowing businesses to be built on the principle of environmental protection and energy saving and promoting technology transfer and introducing new products and industrial sectors from other countries.

According to the first-stage development plan, the area will cover 180 hectares, which will be divided into 10 sections of electric and electronic appliances , leather, shoes and other light industrial goods, machine and metal products, chemical, rubber and plastic goods, fibre and clothes-making, bonded warehouses and and exhibitions, management and service, power station and reserve area.

Premiums and privileges will be offered to investors in the area according to the law on economic development zones and its enforcement rules and regulations.

The master plan of the processing area is now under examination and investors are making field surveys.

By Cha Chol

According to the Daily NK:

Independently owned taxi services have emerged in South Pyongan Province, Daily NK has learned. This is the only other confirmed location of such a service in North Korea, outside of Pyongyang and Rasun.

A source in South Pyongan Province reported to Daily NK on September 11th, “Taxis have appeared in Pyungsung [Phyongsong] and Suncheon [Sunchon] Cities and are quickly gaining popularity,” adding that, “Privately owned taxis are emerging as a new way to make money and the donju [new affluent classes] are quick to invest in the opportunity.”

Taxis managed by the Daedong River Passenger Transport Service Company in Pyongyang are widespread in the capital city as well as Rasun [Rason], but the cabs operating in Pyungsung and Suncheon only require registration with the Transport Service Company, after which they and are free to operate independently.

Originally, Daedong River Passenger Transport Service Company had plans to expand its operations to other regions, but budget shortages stymied these efforts, and the source surmised this as cause for the organization to begin issuing operating licenses, for a fee, to individually owned taxis instead.

As these privately owned taxis become more prevalent in Pyongnam [South Phyongan Province], Pyongsung, and Suncheon, vehicle sales, automobile parts, and recruitment and hiring of drivers continues to rise. The source estimated approximately 18 privately owned taxis in Pyungsung currently, with at least 8-10 operating in Suncheon.

A report by the pro-North publication Choson Sinbo [run by The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan] proclaimed last year that there were 400 taxis operating in Pyongyang. A taxi dispatching service [known as “call taxis” in South Korea] were among the other purported features offered to customers by the Transport Company in the capital city.

“These independently-owned cabs are not part of a state-run enterprise; they are personal businesses,” he explained. “After being granted an operating license, the donju are keen to purchase vehicles to employ as taxis. Cars imported for use as taxis through official trading licenses are taxed at high rates, so most use smuggled cars instead.”

In Sinuiju City, the Kangsung Port sees high volumes of exports serving to procure foreign currency that funnels back into the Chosun Workers’ Party, in addition to highly active smuggling operations. Members of the donju usually request a vehicle to utilize as a cab through the appropriate trading company and receive it through the Kangsung Port.

New vehicles to service as taxis sold at Suncheon Market cost approximately $12,000, while used cars are priced in the region of $6,000-7,000 USD, with additional payments of $500 sellers who have the connections to throw in an accompanying license plate.

Even those who receive the license plate in the market must go through the proper channels to start offering their services. “Taxis purchased by individuals must be registered with the Daedong River Passenger Transport Company in Pyongyang,” he said, nothing it to be a fairly simple procedure, “After being issued an operating license and license plate, they pass through the “No. 10 Checkpoint and they are immediately able to begin business operations.”

According to the source, the majority of individuals purchasing taxis are female, while the drivers are procured from the Transport Company or personal connections. The taxi owners generally conduct personal interviews before hiring the drivers, who are mostly males in their 30s and 40s; it is fiercely competitive process–one must pass through a competition of 50:1 to secure the job.

Potential benefits of the position are enough to ensure no shortage of applicants. With the exception of those areas off limits without a special license, namely border regions and Pyongyang, it is within taxis’ rights to go to most areas. These taxis fetch approximately $100 USD [80,000 KPW] per day, excluding fuel expenses, and cab owners pay the driver roughly 50% of these profits [including gas] as a monthly salary.

The exact amount that individual taxi workers owe the transport company in Pyongyang cannot yet be verified, though the source reported that a monthly offering in the region of $500 USD, for “the sake of formality,” must be contributed to management officials there.

Taxi fees run about 15,000 KPW for a 4km ride; bus fees are approximately 2000 KPW to go the same distance. A Pyungsung-Suncheon trip costs the passenger in the region of 75,000 KPW–extremely expensive compared to the 10,000 KPW bus fee to make the same trip. However, for those doing a great deal of business and working against time, taxis are the easiest option, explaining the increase in those employing their services.

The source asserts that the North Korean authorities’ inability to expand taxi operations due to budget shortages will inevitably lead to the spread of these individually owned cab services through the North. The ease of and lack of restriction on running such an operation will also see them continue to spread, “Everyone doing business will start to use them,” he said. “There aren’t that many taxis at the moment, and the price is expensive, but as the number of those owning the vehicles increases, the price will drop, as will the cost of motorcycles and bicycles.”

Read the full story here:
Taxis Take Off in South Pyongan Province
Daily NK
Seol Song Ah
2014-9-12

Pictured above (Google Earth) the relative locations of Rason and Zarubino Ports

According to Port Technology International:

China and Russia are to join forces and morph Russia’s Zarubino Port into one of the biggest ports in northeast Asia, according to the Chinese People’s Daily.

Zarubino Port is at the far south-eastern tip of Russia and a stones throw from North Korea, and only 18km from China.

North-east China’s Jilin province and Russia’s Summa Group reportedly signed a joint-agreement concerning the rejuvenation of the port at the fourth Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Shanghai in May, 2014.

It is planned that the Zarubino Port will have the ability to handle 60 million tonnes of cargo once construction is completed.

ECNS, an English-language Chinese news source, reported a Summa deputy president as stating the planned port will be multifunctional, and is intended to “hugely benefit China and Russia”.

The port will be used to serve as a key port in ensuring the security of food provisions.

Read more at Voice of America.

Zarubina port is only 80km (directly) north-east of Rason. It will be interesting to see what kind of effect this project will have on development at Rason.

The Nautilus Institute has published an interesting paper on energy infrastructure in the DPRK’s initial four special economic zones: Rason, Hwanggumphyong, Kaesong, Kaesong, and Kumgang.

Here is the publication information and  a link:

“Supplying Energy Needs for the DPRK’s Special Economic Zones and Special Administrative Regions: Electricity Infrastructure Requirements”
Nautilus Institute
Roger Cavazos & David von Hippel
2014-8-19

Here is the introduction:

The Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) uses special economic zones as a mechanism for engaging in commercial activity with other nations without substantially converting its economy to a market model; earning hard currency while reducing some of the social and political risks associated with a broader opening of the DPRK economy. The DPRK recently announced its intent to increase the number of Special Designated Zones, including Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and Special Administrative Regions (SAR) in the country by fourteen.[1] In most cases, these Special Designated Zones (we will use “Special Zone”, or “SZ”,as the generic term in this Working Paper to apply to Special Designated Zones) will require energy supply (and demand) infrastructure that is now missing, or insufficient, at all existing and proposed Special Zone sites. Even though past is not prologue—and the mechanisms for supplying energy needs to new SZs may be different than those used in the past, this paper seeks to briefly describe already existing Special Zones in terms of their present energy requirements. Present requirements provide rough estimates of the energy requirements of the newly proposed zones. Specifically we examine: the Rason Special Economic Zone and Special Administrative Region, the Hwanggumphyong Special Economic Zone, the Wihwado Special Economic Zone, the Kumgang Mountain Tourist Area, and finally, the Kaesong Industrial Zone. These specially designated zones ideally contribute to economic development in North Korea as well as provide economic benefits to the Chinese and Russian provinces bordering North Korea. Chinese plans to resuscitate and/or invigorate the economies of their three Northeast provinces bordering North Korea would certainly be moved forward by trade with a richer North Korea and access to strategic North Korean ports just across the border. Although this paper does not cover Russian plans, the motivations for Russian investments in North Korean SZs are likely similar—the desire to boost the economies of the areas of the Russian Far East that adjoin the DPRK, and to improve access to markets in Asia.

There is a limited but growing amount of information available to understand how these Special Zones are defined by North Korean policy, how they are currently faring in terms of economic performance, and what future zones will likely require in terms of energy usage. There is also a growing body of rules and regulations by which North Korea and China plan to govern these zones. Except for the Kaesong industrial complex, it appears that all these zones are significantly short on the energy infrastructure necessary to supply their modest current demands, let alone any future projected demands. North Korea’s decision to declare several such zones in North Korea’s interior may possibly indicate a desire to stitch together North Korea’s electrical transmission and distribution networks which are currently more a patchwork of regional grids rather than a unified national grid. Previous Special Zones have always been on or near North Korea’s periphery. Because previous zones were located on the DPRK’s frontiers, they were largely able to “plug in” to already developed electricity transmission and distribution systems on the other side of the border (in China, Russia or South Korea). While we present no specific calculations here, the cost to renew the DPRK’s entire transmission and distribution (T&D) system will certainly cost billions to tens of billions of dollars which could consume on the order of 10 percent or more of North Korea’s GDP for 5 to 10 years, assuming, as estimated by Republic of Korea (ROK) sources, that North Korea’s GDP is in the neighborhood of 40 billion dollars. The costs of T&D renewal are thus well beyond anything North Korea is likely to be able to afford to do in the short-term on anything but a piecemeal basis.

Despite gaps in our knowledge of how Special Zones in the DPRK have formed and operate or will operate, there is a substantial amount of information available from English, Chinese and Korean-language sources describing the basic plans for investment and the businesses that North Korean, Chinese, and in some cases Russian partners hope to develop in some Special Economic Zones. What is missing from the plans for which information is available, however, are detailedplans for building the energy infrastructure required to support the amount of economic activity (in factories, ports, hotels, workers quarters, and other elements of the SZs) envisioned. The electricity infrastructure required to support the economic plans is modest by most industrial standards. The existing infrastructure in most of the SZs, however, is grossly inadequate, and thus will require significant international investment to allow the SZs to operate as planned.

Investing in SZ infrastructure is likely to be more complex than a typical industrial investment. Sources of investment funds for SZ infrastructure could include businesses from a number of nations, and/or government or multilateral funds. Each potential lender/investor will have its own criteria for deciding on whether a given investment is reasonable or too risky. In theory, involving a number of different actors from different nations in DPRK SZ infrastructure investments would help to diversify the risk borne by any given company or nation, and to create a broader constituency for working with North Koreans using business practices that comply with international law and standards. In part, a broader constituency of coordinated investors could also help to discourage the “rent-seeking” by officials that is often a part of projects in the DPRK (and in many other countries). Because the amount of infrastructure-building required is high, there is significant potential for illegal rent-seeking, that is, for example, for DPRK authorities to inflate the price of “surveys” or permits, or the cost of securing import rights for equipment needed for the SZs, in order to gain personally from the transaction.

Working conditions in SZs will be another area of concern for investors and for foreign firms seeking to operate facilities in new or existing SZs. Anecdotal reports suggest that industrial facilities in general in the DPRK tend to operate with limited evident concern for worker safety. In the absence of pressure from investing companies, it is also likely that working conditions will remain poor and dangerous, as there does not appear to be a significant set of DPRK regulations related to industrial safety. Nor, for that matter, does there appear to be a well-established and well-funded government body dedicated to establishing, monitoring and enforcing industrial safety regulations.

This paper describes several of the Special Zones now operating in or in the advanced planning process in the DPRK, together with what is known about plans for their development. For each, it provides a description of the likely energy requirements, based on what can be determined regarding planned activities at each site, and examines adjoining energy infrastructure to identify probable degrees of energy shortfalls that foreign investors, working with DPRK counterparts, will need to overcome. Some of issues and policies that policymakers inside and outside of the DPRK will need to consider in order to arrange for the financing and construction of the requisite infrastructure to operate the SZs.

You can download the PDF here.

In July 2014 a US federal court found the DPRK guilty of proliferating weapons and providing training to Hezbollah.

Here is the ruling (PDF).

According to Itar-Tass (Russia):

North Korean authorities have banned foreign diplomatic missions and branches of international humanitarian organizations working in the country from using any kind of wireless communications without government approval, starting from Monday.

The state department regulating radio frequencies said controls extending to satellite and Wi-Fi were in the interests of national security.

Regulations demand that foreign missions immediately dismantle all equipment providing such means of communication or face penalties including a substantial fine, enforced suspension of those systems and their confiscation.

Officials said foreign representations would be allowed to use equipment only after authorization.

A recent report in The Diplomat claimed that the black market price of housing near the Munsu diplomatic compound had gone up as people sought residencies that could access the internet.

Housing prices have skyrocketed in a residential area of Pyongyang where the foreign embassies are located as North Koreans are scrambling to move to that area, expecting to use the embassies’ Wi-Fi, North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity (NKIS) — a Seoul-based think tank — reported on August 6. The world wide web has long been totally banned in North Korea.

NKIS said the phenomenon became apparent in June when North Korean authorities arrested a broker who enriched himself by facilitating the purchase of housing in that area.

A man with the surname Cho helped people living in Pyongyang’s rich districts such as Central District and Potonggang District sell their houses and move in near the foreign embassies, NKIS reported. It is illegal for people to make real estate deals among individuals.

NKIS added that the reason why North Korean people want to move to the area where the foreign embassies are located is that they are able to use the Wi-Fi coming from the embassies. Since some of embassies have very strong Wi-Fi signals and some don’t even have passwords, people living around the embassies are able to access the Internet using the embassies’ Wi-Fi.

NK News received a copy of the official order from the State Radio Regulatory Department:

All the Diplomatic Missions and International Organizations to

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

The State Radio Regulatory Department, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, presents its compliments to all the Diplomatic Missions and International Organizations to the DPRK and has the honour to inform that the signals of regional wireless network, installed and being used without licence, produce some effect upon our surroundings.

Therefore, it is kindly notified that the regional wireless network is abolished here according to Article 18, Chapter 3 of the Law on Radio Regulation, and that the Missions, who would like to use the regional wireless network in future, should seek a consultation with the State Radio Regulatory Department.

It would be appreciated if the Missions could positively co-operate in the current measures taken for the security of the DPRK.

The State Radio Regulatory Department, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, avails itself of this opportunity to renew to all the Diplomatic Missions and International Organizations to the DPRK the assurances of its highest consideration.

The State Radio
Regulatory
Department,

Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea

Pyongyang
August 13,
2014

Appendix

Article 18, Chapter 3 of the DPRK Law on Radio Regulation; The institution, enterprise, organization and citizen who would like to form or use the wireless communication network and satellite communication network here should seek the licence from the Radio Regulatory body.

Article 61, Chapter 4 of the enforcement regulations for the DPRK Law on Radio Regulation; In case of having violated this rules and regulations relative to the application of the Law on Radio Regulation, a fine amounting up to 1,500,000 Wons will be imposed , or such punishment as interrupting the operation or forfeiting the equipment will be inflicted according to the circumstances.