DPRK Media plays up environmental bona fides

June 5th, 2007

World Environment Day Observed
KCNA

6/5/2007

Papers here Tuesday dedicate articles to the World Environment Day.

Rodong Sinmun says in a signed article that diverse activities and functions are now under way in the DPRK according to the theme for this year designated by the United Nations Environment Programme.

It goes on:

The DPRK has long paid great attention to the environmental protection helpful to promoting the people’s health, increasing the scenic beauty of cities and providing better living conditions and environment. Thanks to the correct environmental protection policy of the DPRK government, the DPRK is recognized by the world community as a country with good environment.

The issue of environmental protection is now presenting itself as a very important and urgent one worldwide. Ecological environment is being seriously contaminated in various parts of the world for various reasons.

No country can be an exception in the work to protect the environment on the earth. Good results can be expected in this work only when all countries make positive efforts, aware of the urgency and importance of the work.

The DPRK will conduct positive work for environmental protection, maintaining close touch with international organizations in the future, too.

Minju Joson in a signed article notes that global warming is the most serious worldwide problem at present, adding that the melting of ice in the polar areas is the most vivid example of it. In order to cope with the situation the DPRK is taking steps to increase and firmly protect fresh water resources, stop soil from being washed away and prevent damage by strong winds and floods.
DPRK Strives to Prevent Global Warming
KCNA

6/5/2007

The abnormal climate phenomena caused by global warming has been raised today as a hard problem in the world.

The UN Environment Programme set “Global Warming” as the theme for this year on the occasion of the World Environment Day (June 5), since it threatens the life and security of humankind.

Organized on the occasion of the day in the country were colorful events including a scientific symposium and a national seminar on reducing the emission of atmospheric green-house gases and preventing global warming, and film shows for arousing profound social interest in the issue.

Jong Hyong Il, a department director in the Ministry of Land and Environment Preservation, told KCNA that the DPRK which has been suffering from the upward temperature in recent years is conducting varied activities in accordance with the world trend for preventing such phenomena. He went on:

It deepens the scientific researches into elevation of energy efficiency and utilization of regenerated energy and directs efforts to the work for applying the results.

The construction of large and minor hydro-power stations is being pushed ahead through an all-people movement and application of wind power positively encouraged.

An effort to improve the efficiency of solar batteries is being made, too.

Meanwhile, a brisk tree-planting campaign is being launched to increase the adsorption of carbon.

The DPRK, a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol and the Montreal Protocol on Substances Destroying Ozone Layer, is doing its best to restrict and reduce the emission of atmospheric green-house gases as much as possible.

World Environment Day Marked
KCNA

6/5/2007

An event took place at Changdok School on June 5 to observe World Environment Day.

Present there were officials in the field of environmental protection and teachers, employees and students of the school.

Also present on invitation were the associate director of the “Environmental Education Media Project” whose office is located in China and environment experts of different countries.

The guests laid bouquets before the statue of President Kim Il Sung at the school and paid a tribute to him.

After going round the historic building where the President studied, they were briefed on the history of the school.

The function heard speeches on the importance of the environment protection.

The participants watched a recorded material on global warming and pictures on the theme of it before appreciating a performance given by an art group of the school.

The guests appreciated the schoolchildren’s activities of the care-for-the-homeland team.

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How To Beat an Audit

June 4th, 2007

Wall Street Journal
6/4/2007

North Korea will not extend “cooperation” to any U.N. review.

The case of U.N. hard currency for Kim Jong Il took its latest turn Friday with the release of the much-awaited audit on United Nations operations in North Korea. The investigation confirms and elaborates on irregularities in United Nations Development Program’s activities in North Korea, first reported on these pages in January. It fails, however, to examine the central question of this scandal: Whether U.S. cash in North Korea was diverted from its intended recipients and instead used to prop up Kim’s totalitarian regime?

Let us stipulate that any investigation having to do with North Korea is bound to have its share of, shall we say, frustrations. Just ask the U.S. State Department, which, nearly two months after the first nuclear-disarmament deadline, still can’t get Pyongyang to live up to the initial round of its commitments no matter how many times it sweetens the deal.

The first thing to know about the U.N. probe is that it was an internal affair–conducted by the organization’s own Board of Auditors, a monitoring group that in U.N. doublespeak is said to conduct “external” inquiries. The second salient point is that it was conducted entirely in New York City. The longest journey the auditors undertook was to cross First Avenue from the U.N. Secretariat to the offices of the UNDP. To their credit, they tried to go to North Korea but were rebuffed.

In refusing to let the auditors into North Korea, Kim Jong Il displayed his disrespect for Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon. The Board of Auditors had asked Mr. Ban’s office to intercede on its behalf with help on travel arrangements. “In an email dated 11 April 2007,” the audit report reads, “the Board was informed that on 20 March 2007, the Deputy Permanent Representative of DPRK [North Korea] advised [Mr. Ban’s chief of staff] that his government was not going to extend any cooperation to UNDP’s audit.”

Even given the limited scope of their investigations, however, the auditors were able to confirm the massive irregularities in the UNDP’s operations in North Korea. The auditors also found violations at three other agencies–Unicef, the U.N. Population Fund and the U.N. Office for Project Services. The infractions covered three areas:

Staffing: In violation of U.N. rules, local staffers were hand-picked by the North Korean government and allowed to work in “general service” jobs that, for example, allowed them access to the UNDP checkbook and other sensitive documents. Salaries were paid in euros directly to the government, and the auditors could not confirm whether the staffers actually received their pay.

Foreign-currency transactions: Also in violation of regulations, U.N. agencies in North Korea made large-scale disbursements in foreign currency, including payments for salaries, allowances and rent. The auditors could not verify controls over the disbursements. UNDP, Unicef and the U.N. Population Fund spent a total of $72.5 million on programs between 2002 and 2006, though the auditors caution that “the information supplied was not verified and no source documents were examined.”

Program oversight: Visits to U.N. projects, while permitted, were controlled by the North Korean government. Authorization took a week, and government officials accompanied the U.N. inspectors. Most revealing of all, it’s unclear whether the inspectors were international officials or the North Korean government officials on loan to the U.N. organizations whose first loyalty, it’s safe to say, would have been to Pyongyang.

UNDP says it provided evidence to the auditors of 38 field visits during 2002-2006. According to the auditors’ report, UNDP had a total of 172 projects over that five-year period. Do the arithmetic and it seems that only one in five UNDP projects was visited annually. Some “oversight”–especially if the inspectors were government factotums.

The auditors say that this is a “preliminary review.” That’s an understatement. Most glaringly, they failed to investigate the broader role UNDP is said to have had as a kind of money manager for other U.N. programs and, possibly, for countries sending aid to the North. UNDP is trumpeting the auditors’ finding that it spent only an average of $2.6 million a year during 2002-2006. But if it was making disbursements on behalf of other entities, the actual sums under its control–which presumably were subject to the same shoddy financial controls criticized by the auditors–could be far higher.

The UNDP suspended operations in North Korea in March when Pyongyang refused to abide by conditions laid down by the UNDP executive board after the irregularities came to light (but years after the UNDP itself knew but ignored them). To the extent that it sheds light on the corruption, the just-released audit is a useful exercise. But there’s a long way to go before we get to the bottom of the Cash for Kim scandal.

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Lessons on North Korean “Kremlinology”

June 4th, 2007

Secretive Kingdom
MSNBC
Christian Caryl
6/4/2007

If you’re confused by the reports coming out of North Korea, you’re probably not alone. Take the recent slew of conflicting reports about the health of the nation’s Dear Leader. U.S. Calls Kim Jong Il’s Health a ‘Concern,’ ran one headline. The body of the story, quoting a senior U.S. official who was himself referring to reports from other unnamed officials in Seoul, alluded to a “monthlong disappearance” by Kim and noted that the North Korean dictator suffers “from advanced diabetes and heart disease as well as high blood pressure.” Around the same time, another analysis claimed that Kim had recovered from these “chronic diseases.” The report, which based its account on the usual anonymous senior officials in Seoul and obscure North Korea wonks, also asserted confidently, that “intelligence” in the hands of the South Korean government indicates that Kim will choose his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, as his successor.

So what are we to think? Does that mean that everything we read about North Korea is garbage pretending to be authoritative truth? This sort of conundrum is par for the course for anyone who has spent time studying the goings-on at the top of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as the North prefers to call itself. The ironic fact of the matter is that we know far more about North Korea than ever before. China and South Korea have both deepened their ties with the Hermit Kingdom in recent years, and that means that much more information is flowing out as well as in. A steady stream of defectors has provided us with often-elaborate detail about the country in general. And there’s even a small—exceedingly small—population of foreigners who deal with the North on a regular basis. All of this helps us to build up our picture of what’s going on in the country.

Yet when it comes to the most important part of the story—the motives and intentions of North Korea’s government—it’s always best to be skeptical. Andrei Lankov, a Seoul-based Russian academic who has studied the North for decades, says that he refuses to comment when asked by journalists about government reshuffles or coup rumors in Pyongyang. Such reports occasionally do end up getting confirmed by events, he concedes, but estimates that they are successful less than 20 percent of the time. (In other words, you’d usually be much better off judging the account’s veracity by flipping a coin.) Lankov notes that the Kim regime won’t even publish the precise number of members in the ruling communist party, much less basic stats on the economy. He describes it as by far the world’s most secretive state—far more so than even the old U.S.S.R., where it was common for intellectuals to discuss political topics when they knew they were in like-minded company. In North Korea, by contrast, “People are terrified to death to discuss anything political.” And that, he says, is because everything political ultimately comes down to the Kim family, which holds the power of instant life or death over every North Korean—and isn’t afraid to use it, as countless tales of the regime’s brutality attest. For that reason, Lankov argues, “The most explosive topic, the one that is never discussed, is the topic of succession.”

The result is a level of mystery that seems almost calculated to drive journalists into a frenzy. Confronted with such opacity, it’s hard to resist the temptation to show off even the slightest scrap of seemingly revelatory information garnered from some super-secret privileged source. In November 2004, the Russian news agency Tass reported that official portraits of Kim Jong Il were being taken down in North Korean diplomatic representations and official buildings. Could it be that Kim was on the way out? Respected news outlets jumped on the story, in some cases adding details culled from Chinese or Korean newspapers suggesting that the Dear Leader’s days were numbered. It hardly needs adding that he— and his portraits—remain firmly in place today.

Applying a bit more common sense might not be a bad thing. But the fact is that that’s far easier said than done. In April 2004, for example, a tremendous explosion took place in the train station in the North Korean city of Ryongchon, killing hundreds of people and rendering thousands more homeless. It happened just hours after Kim’s personal train had passed through the same station, spawning fervid speculation about a possible assassination attempt. According to one version the blast was triggered by a mobile phone—a detail that gained credibility a few months later, when the North Korean authorities pulled the plug on the country’s 18-month-old cell phone program. Service has never been restored.

Sounds convincing. Yet consider for a moment the important questions left unanswered by this version of events. If the explosion was being triggered remotely, why did the presumed conspirators wait for hours after Kim’s passage to send the signal? And why did they decide to kill hundreds of innocents in the process? In retrospect, virtually everything about this incident is still up for grabs. The fact that the North Korean government released casualty figures was actually hailed by some commentators as evidence of North Korea-style glasnost. Suffice it to say that we are still waiting for CNN to open its first Pyongyang bureau. (Skeptics note that the city’s proximity to the Chinese border meant that news of the explosion was bound to get out anyway.) In the wake of the disaster one British journalist confidently asserted that North Korea was becoming “more open to international help”—not that that stopped Pyongyang from announcing that it was about to start expelling international aid organizations a year later. And so it goes.

Western intelligence agencies also have a strikingly poor record when it comes to the country. No one in Washington or London predicted the North’s invasion of the South in 1950. The Clinton administration signed an agreement that would have supposedly rid the North of its plutonium-based nuclear-weapons program back in 1994—and then delayed fulfilling its own part of the deal because the CIA was assuring it of the North’s imminent collapse. (The experts are still sparring over whether the resulting failure of the Agreed Framework led inexorably to the North’s first nuclear test last autumn.) In 2002 the Bush administration announced that North Korea had suddenly admitted, in negotiations, its pursuit of a hitherto secret parallel nuclear weapons program based on highly enriched uranium—leading Washington to break off talks in indignation. In recent months, though, administration officials—their reputation already severely tarnished by the Iraq WMD intelligence scandal—have been forced to acknowledge that they can’t tell for sure whether the North Koreans still have such a program under way.

Grounds for despair? No, just for a measure of humility. Journalists—and governments—need to do a better job of admitting to the public that any information about North Korea’s leadership is to be regarded with profound skepticism. To be sure, a few privileged insiders—former Kim employees, a kidnapped film director—have come forth to tell their stories. That’s how we know, for example, details of the Dear Leader’s luxury-loving ways. Yet there have been almost no defectors from the upper ranks of the leadership who have been willing to reveal significant details about what makes the regime tick—presumably for fear of retribution against them or their families. Perhaps it’s just hard for many of us, wallowing in an age of instant messaging and tell-all blogs, to believe that there are limits to what we can know about other human beings. Consider, for example, this revealing incident involving a North Korean worker (who thus almost certainly doubles as an employee of the North Korean security service) at a European embassy in Pyongyang. The worker was shocked when her brother showed up one day to apply for a visa, because she had no idea that her brother had the right to travel abroad. He, by contrast, had no idea that his sister worked in a foreign embassy. In that respect, perhaps, North  Korea can serve as a useful cautionary tale. Is it hard to know what’s going on at the top? “It’s not just hard,” says Andrei Lankov. “It’s impossible.”

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N. Koreans growing familiar with digital devices

June 3rd, 2007

Yonhap 
6/3/2007

NKeconWatch: Joshua at One Free Korea is skeptical about the article below, read here.  As a side note, see how much lower health care prices can be if consumers are permitted to pay for it themselves. 

High-tech portal devices such as music players and cameras are almost ubiquitous in South Korea, but many may believe they are nowhere to be found in poverty-stricken North Korea.

Unlike the conventional wisdom, however, a growing number of North Koreans, though still confined to some privileged classes, listen to music with MP3 players and take pictures with digital cameras in their daily life, a North Korean souvenir shop clerk told Yonhap News Agency.

A group of South Korean reporters visited North Korea last week to cover a delegation from South Korea’s Gyeonggi Province which has been promoting agricultural exchanges with the communist government. The reporters were allowed to visit a department store and other attractions in the North’s capital, Pyongyang.

When asked what he was listening to with an earphone, the North Korean clerk answered plainly, “MP3 music files,” adding that he downloaded songs from the Internet.

When asked if he has a digital camera, the clerk replied, “I am using the same model Canon that you are carrying now.”

In terms of IT development, the reclusive North has been regarded as lagging far behind South Korea where almost all younger people take it for granted to use digital devices.

The clerk’s response does not provide any insight into the North’s IT sector, including how many of them use such digital devices, but experts say that they offer a glimpse into changes taking place in North Korea, though slowly.

Meanwhile, a North Korean restaurant worker said that many beauty-conscious North Korean women receive plastic surgeries to look prettier. “You can easily see a woman on the street who had a double eyelid operation,” he said.

Such eyelid plastic surgery costs around 0.7 euro in the North, slightly less than the average monthly salary in the country, he said.

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Fair Game?

June 3rd, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
6/3/2007

Kim Il Sung’s North Korea has always been a tough customer, and nobody knows who was more irritated by its constant antics: its foes or its friends. It has been a tough ally, ready to cheat and manipulate its sponsors. Since the 1950s most of its patrons have had to put up with its style _ largely because of their grand strategy, of course.

In the long run, it was probably the Soviets who were subject to Pyongyang’s diplomatic frolics most frequently, but China has the dubious honor of being the first country to enjoy such an experience in the early 1950s. Somewhat surprisingly, this happened during the Korean War when only a massive Chinese intervention saved Kim Il Sung’s regime from a sorry end.

Recent document-based research by Chinese scholars, especially by the formidable Shen Zhihua, has provided us with new insights into the early history of relations between the two supposedly “fraternal” countries. Now it is clear that the picture was anything but rosy.

When the North Korean troops invaded the South, it was implied that the Chinese forces would step in if the situation took a dangerous turn. Nonetheless, until late September, Pyongyang ignored Chinese advice and kept Beijing in the dark about the frontline situation. This drove the Chinese military attache and ambassador mad, but they could not do much about it.

The situation changed in October when Kim Il Sung had lost the war: by late October 1950, there was hardly one battle-ready battalion in the North Korean armed forces. The Chinese rushed in a large expeditionary force, but soon a question arose: who was to be in charge of the united armed forces?

Kim Il Sung clearly assumed that he would stay in command, and would have operational control over the Chinese units. This was unacceptable to the Chinese. To an extent, this was a clash of two nationalisms (and nationalisms of East Asia are notorious for being particularly virulent). However, there were real considerations involved as well.

First of all, the Chinese force far outnumbered the North Korean army. Second, the Chinese generals did not have much trust in the military competence of their North Korean colleagues. Peng Dehuai, whose task was to save the North, did not hide his outrage about Pyongyang’s style of operations. He was especially angry about the meaningless defense of a doomed Seoul, where about 30,000 North Korean soldiers were killed in late September. In late 1950, he sent a telegram to Beijing in which he labeled the North Korean style “childish”.

However, Kim Il Sung and other North Korean leaders avoided the issue, so the two armies (or, to be more precise, the Chinese army and the remains of the North Korean army) for a while acted independently–often, with sorry results. On November 4, for instance, the lack of coordination even led to a battle in which the North Korean tanks mistakenly attacked Chinese infantry, and thus unwittingly helped a semi-circled American unit escape.

At the same time, the Chinese attempts to incorporate the North Korean units into their own forces were met with resistance on the part of Kim Il Sung. He needed an army of his own, and was not ready for concessions.

It took more than a month to solve the question of joint command. Perhaps, the problems would have last longer, had Stalin not sent a cable demanding an immediate rectification of the situation. Stalin’s advice had to be taken seriously, and his intervention put an end to delays. The Joint Command was headed by Peng Dehuai, with two Chinese-speaking Korean generals acting as his deputies (incidentally, both generals were purged by Kim Il Sung a few years after the war).

However, new tensions arose in December 1950 when the railways came to be discussed. The Chinese forces could be supplied only by rail, and those lines were subjected to intense bombing. The railways had to be managed carefully, but the Chinese commanders discovered that Korean administration gave preference to cargo related to the economic needs of Korean reconstruction, rather than to military supplies. As a result, the Chinese and Koreans ran two different railway administrations, operating on the same railway network. It’s easy to imagine how this influenced the efficiency of the transportation system.

After a few months of discussion the North Koreans agreed to have a joint railroad command, but on the conditions that they would exercise overall control. By that time, most of the rolling stock had been provided by China, and the Chinese soldiers were also doing most of the maintenance work, hence the Chinese generals assumed that they should have the upper hand. But the Koreans did not agree. For them, this was an issue of their territorial rights, sovereignty, and other important symbols. For the Chinese, this was a question of their soldiers’ lives.

Once again, direct Soviet involvement was necessary to put an end to the squabbling. Stalin had no patience for the petty ambitions of his not very efficient satellite, and he was still in position to control the North. Hence, Stalin himself cabled Pyongyang demanding they agree to the Chinese conditions. In May 1951, after his august intervention, Pyongyang gave in.

These early squabbles were a sign of things to come. Over the years, North Korea has developed a peculiar diplomatic style, harsh and unbending but remarkably successful. It used to be applied to Moscow and Beijing. Nowadays the same tricks work wonders in dealing with the current sponsors of the regime, Beijing and Seoul as well as with Washington. But that is another story…

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Russia Belatedly Joins in Sanctions against N.Korea

June 1st, 2007

Chosun Ilbo
6/1/2007

According to Russia’s Itar Tass news agency on Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree imposing sanctions on North Korea in compliance with a UN Security Council resolution in the wake of Pyongyang’s nuclear test last October.

The presidential decree applies a full weapons embargo against North Korea in pursuance of UN Security Council Resolution 1718. All Russian government agencies and enterprises will be banned from exporting to North Korea tanks, fighter jets, warships, heavy artillery pieces, missiles, and missile launchers, as well as materials that can be used for nuclear weapons development.

In addition, North Korean officials involved in development programs for weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons are banned from entering Russia. Shipments of luxury goods to North Korea are also banned.

The measure will likely have no tangible effects, however, given that the current annual trade volume between Russia and North Korea is only about $200 million.

The decree comes as North Korea continues to delay implementing the conditions of the Feb. 13 nuclear disarmament agreement. The decree may put pressure on North Korea to follow the agreement.

After the UN approved the sanctions against North Korea in October last year, Russian government agencies had consultations amongst themselves and coordinated with the Russian parliament. Putin finally signed the sanctions decree on Sunday.

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China’s grain exports to N. Korea remain flat in Jan.-April

June 1st, 2007

Kyodo (Hat Tip DPRK Studies)
6/1/2007

China, North Korea’s major food supplier, exported roughly the same amount of grain to the country in the first four months of the year as it did a year earlier, according to recently released Chinese customs figures.

China’s January-April exports of maize, rice and wheat flour to the country totaled 55,446 tons, up 0.6 percent from the same period in 2006, according to the figures.

When compared to 2005, exports were down 66.7 percent.

The World Food Program warned earlier this year that the food shortage in North Korea is worsening.

While North Korea has faced a chronic food shortage, the shortfall had been made up in the past by multilateral aid channeled through the WFP as well as bilateral shipments from countries such as China and South Korea.

But external food aid has gone down recently, leaving the North with a huge food deficit.

China does not explicitly reveal its food assistance to North Korea, and analysts rely on export figures to assess the amount of aid Beijing gives Pyongyang.

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North Korean Students in Beijing Called Back Home

May 31st, 2007

Choson Ilbo
5/31/2007

All North Korean students studying in Beijing have returned to their home country, and some have dropped out of their schools, sources said on Wednesday. According to Peking University, 19 North Korean students from that school left for home before the weeklong May Day holidays starting May 1. None had returned as of Wednesday.

One North Korean student who was majoring in economics at Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management has reportedly quit the school. Many other North Korean students have apparently submitted applications to drop out and have returned to their home country.

Currently there are very few North Koreans studying in Beijing. About 200 North Korean studied in the Chinese capital in the 1980s, but now only 50 or 60 are studying there on North Korean and Chinese scholarships.

An official with the South Korean Embassy in China said, “The North Korean government has recalled students studying abroad and children of overseas residents, including diplomats, for ideological education every summer vacation. However, it is difficult to understand why the North Korean government has recalled students in foreign countries during the school semester.”

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Search Every Nook and Cranny for Out-sources

May 31st, 2007

Daily NK
Kwon Jeong Hyun
5/31/2007

In order to block the outflow of information, North Korean authorities have been conducting investigations and enforcing control over people who lead lifestyles that are better off than the average person.

An inside source living in the bodrder city of North Hamkyung informed on the 30th, “Since the end of April, special inspection groups began investigation to block the flow of out-sources.”

The source said, “An order was made to search people who recently visited family in China or illegal defectors who affiliated with South Korean or U.S. intelligence services are selling North Korea’s national information to foreigners for money.”

It appears that this order was made as North Korean authorities believe that citizens living along the border regions are receiving economic aid from defectors in South Korea or foreign organizations in return for information.

At a lecture last November that targeted border garrison, North Korean authorities stated, “Selling information is an act indifferent to selling the nation.”

One educational material criticized, “Being engrossed in making money is rooting out the secrets of authorities, the nation and military” and commented, “Recently, the enemy have been going to use extreme ways and measures to purchase the secrets of our authorities, nation and military with dirty money.”

The source said, “These inspection groups have offices in the People’s committee of each city and are in the process of inspecting the whole household” and relayed, “Every household will be inspected. Families with luxury daily goods and living standards exceeding their monthly income are being targeted for investigation.”

“The groups are inspecting each home for information regarding their workplace, monthly income and living expenditure by help of chairpersons of each People’s unit” said the source and explained, “Suspicious persons are taken away to the secret groups for further cross-examination.”

As a result, families are running around moving their electrical appliances and household items to other homes temporarily. The source informed, “What’s worse, even law officers (including inspectors, National Security Agents, Safety Agents) are frantically hiding their electric rice cookers, gastops and color TV’s.”

“Since 2004 unto now, these groups have also been searching for missing persons, people without secure residences and the unemployed” added the source.

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In reclusive North, signs of economic liberalization

May 30th, 2007

Hankyoreh
Authored by Ryu Yi-geun and translated by Daniel Rakove

PYONYANG: “Next time, please come back and purchase something,” implored Mr. Hong to the customers leaving his store empty-handed.

“You’re saying you earn more if you sell more?”

“You bet.”

But this reporter was still suspicious. Four days later, I carefully asked our handler for confirmation.

“Of course it’s true,” he assured me. “Even in the same eight-hour workday, he who produces more results gets paid more.”

The concept of receiving compensation in proportion to the amount of sales is one that is now long familiar to North Koreans. Yet what is surprising is the gusto with which North Korean store staff will go to in encouraging South Korean tourists to buy their products, a phenomenon indicative of how great the materialistic impulse has become in the reclusive communist nation.

Constructed in Pyongyang’s central district in 1995, the 47-story Yanggak Hotel seems to float above the Daedong River like an island. Mr. Hong works at a store there on the second floor. There is even a spot next door to exchange money. Though the set prices are written on each product – in Euros – the South Korean customers managed to save a bit through bargaining. The owner was at first insistent that all products be only sold for the listed price, but he finally gave way after a long give and take with the customers. He decided it worthwhile to sell his products slightly cheaper, if only to make a profit. Though most transactions are conducted at the listed price, there were instances at the hotel store and other establishments of selling to tourists at a discounted rate after haggling over the price.

Elements of capitalism are slowly making their way into North Korean life – wrapped in the euphemism of “utility.” After returning from his trip to North Korea from May 14-18, on which he led 130 economic delegates, Min Byeong-seok, Director of the Hankyoreh Foundation for Reunification and Culture proclaimed, “I could unmistakably feel here and there that North Korea is changing.”

It is of course difficult to confirm the presence of change in North Korea. This is in part because the changes are occurring at a low level. After all, there is always a difference in what we look for compared to what we are shown. This is what makes it difficult for someone to declare unreservedly, “North Korea is this,” or “North Korea is that.” There are also parts of North Korea that are difficult to understand due to the biases originating from the political system and values of the observer. Hankyoreh21 managed to get a spot in the group of Pyongyang-bound economic delegates, and recorded below is a compilation of the various things we witnessed.

“My life has gotten so much better since last year.” These words did not seem to be mere propaganda. Whether spoken by our North Korean guide or the various Pyongyang citizens with whom we came in contact, their words were by and large the same. One citizen told us, “My wages increased from 3,000 to 6,000 North Korean won,” and consumer prices “went up about 10-20 percent.” In other words, wages have increased much faster than has the rate of inflation. Yet that man cannot be taken to be the representative Pyongyang laborer, nor does he have the credibility of an economist.

Indeed, it is hard to grasp the level of inflation in North Korea: all one can do is take an educated guess. Lee Do-hyang of the Institute for National Security Strategy said, “These things are evidence that the financial situation is improving and the economy is enduring,” adding, “It seems that the quality of life for common people is taking a turn for the better.” Yet in North Korea, where it is said some US$30 a month is necessary to get by, a 3,000 North Korean won raise is not exactly a windfall: 6,000 North Korean won is about equivalent to $2, and on the black market, $1 sells for 3,000 North Korean won. Thus, the rationing and side jobs that bring in an additional $15-20 a month are an essential source of income.

Pyongyang’s major marketplaces have grown livelier. Stretching between 2,000 and 3,000 pyeong (1 pyeong is 3.3 sq. meters), one large-scale market has taken up a spot next to Kimchaek Industrial School on a once-empty spot along Otangangan Street. In the shape of a high school gym, the market’s two-story building is covered in a blue roof and the exterior is clean. Visible from the Yanggak Hotel, the market was bustling at 6 p.m. on May 16. The Bonghak Market next to the Pyongyang Cosmetics Factory was also busy once the sun set. At least one marketplace has taken shape in each of Pyongyang’s 18 districts. Each one is a symbol of capitalism’s penetration of the socialist, planned economy. The activities in each market are said to be hardly distinguishable from the capitalism found in other countries.

One citizen said, “The people go to the markets more, where the prices are a little bit cheaper than at the nationally operated stores. Even if one doesn’t buy anything, it is fun to look around, what with the variety of goods for sale and the haggling going on.” Most citizens are said to buy their daily necessities at such markets, having become an essential part of daily North Korean life.

Street food vendors started appearing quite a while ago, but their numbers are ever-increasing. The fairly tidy vendors can be seen here and there throughout Pyongyang, selling a variety of goods, including soft drinks, ice cream, bread, rice cakes, and so on. Each product runs between 100-300 North Korean won.

The local People’s Committee gives licenses for the operation of such stands to various companies or the descendants of revolutionaries. A portion of sales is taken by the state and the remainder of the profit goes to the managing company or individual.

Though the residents of Nampo, a port city 40 minutes by bus from Pyongyang, do not seem to be better off than their Pyongyang counterparts, the city is quite lively. On the journey from the major ship repair factory by the port, through the city center, and to the freeway entrance leading to Pyongyang, 50-60 separate street food vendors were spotted. The products they were selling as well as their method of sale were quite diverse. Some vendors – most likely new ones – simply laid out their goods on the ground for sale, showing even to the outsider that North Korea’s markets have hit a growth surge.

Five years have passed since the July 1, 2002 economic measures were instituted by the North Korean government, raising wages as well as the currency’s value. In addition, the price of rice and other necessities was increased, and a system of incentives and limited independent capital was expanded. Yet very few North Korean people have even heard of “the 7/1 measures.” Only after talking for a significant length of time will they mention the notion of “utility” that has been pursued over the last few years.

At the end of Unification Road in the Nagnang district of southern Pyongyang, the Phoenix Clothing Factory is producing clothing on commission. The 1,000-pyeong factory is unceasingly filled with the whirr of sewing machines. U Beom-su, 53, introduced himself to the South Korean observers as the company’s “chief executive,” explaining, “The workers work eight hours a day, but when the fixed day for shipment draws near, we have no choice but to put them on overtime.” The payment system for workers is multi-tiered, with five levels, the salary increasing with rank. Every month, one laborer is chosen from each team of workers as being the most outstanding, and is given bonus compensation. The ‘chief executive’ explained that further incentive payments were rewarded based upon the factory’s production levels on the whole.

It is unclear as to how widespread this model of business is, but director of the Korea Institute for National Unification Lee Bong-jo said that “the seeds of competition are visible.” However, the workers at the Yuwon Shoe Factory and the Pyongyang Cosmetics Factory were flustered when asked about their salaries or the labor system and evaded giving an answer.

The will for liberalization was evident here and there. At the 10th annual Pyongyang Spring International Trade Fair on May 14, 200 companies from 12 countries participated, either to view the product lines or to display their own. The majority were Chinese companies, including its largest electronics firm, Haier, while there were several sections of the exhibition primarily interested in retailing to the foreign visitors themselves, the determination by North Korea to get its products out to foreign markets was apparent.

Many members from the South Korean team of economic representatives also participated. In particular, representatives from Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., Ltd, the world’s second largest shipbuilder, as well as the Korea Port Engineering Company, visited the Yeongnam Ship Repair Factory and the Nampo Port to explore the possibility of making investments in those places. In a gesture of consideration, the Northern handlers prepared a separate automobile for the potential investors to explore the grounds, and held a separate consultation session for them beyond the general one for the economic delegates. On multiple occasions, various North Korean officials expressed an interest in attracting South Korean capital. The self-confidence they showed hinted at a sense that they had to some extent resolved the immediate issues of day-to-day subsistence. It may sound strange, but the consensus of those who had also made the trip last year was that the electricity situation had improved. In other words, basic economic conditions seemed to be on the upswing. Perhaps the self-confidence North Koreans showed in displaying their possession of a nuclear weapon has now flowed into the economic sector, thus explaining their will for some liberalization.

Yet simply because there is a will for opening up does not mean liberalization will come easily. One Daewoo source explained, “[We told the North Koreans that] there must be assurances before we invest. They have to provide the same conditions that China does.” At this point, there is probably not a single person who could make such assurances on behalf of the North Koreans. The country is still unprepared to take advantage of the money available to it from the South through the economic cooperation program. The six-party talks also must also make some progress on the nuclear issue. Furthermore, if North Korean – U.S. relations do not improve, then free trade between North and South will remain uncertain indefinitely.

In the case that external matters are settled and the will for liberalization strengthens, then the vitalization of the North Korean economy could quickly pick up with the improvement of infrastructure, such as the electricity grid and logistics, which are pointed to as the largest stumbling blocks. The reporters who arrived first on May 12 witnessed, for instance, how the automatic doors and the elevator on the first floor of the Yanggak Hotel took 30 minutes to warm up. While the houses themselves gave off light after the sun set, the streets between them were completely dark. The mere 20-30 percent rate of operation at factories as estimated by experts is partially accountable to a lack of raw materials, but most of all to the deficiency of electricity.

The rigidity of the economic system only adds to North Korea’s list of woes. Though the director of Pyongyang Cosmetics has requested raw materials and modern machinery, he does not have the full authority to manage the company. Another company has imported the raw materials from China, and he confessed that he knew little of the specifics on the subject. The director of the Daeanchinseon Glass Factory made a similarly vague request for “raw materials.”

The problems go deeper. For one, there was no sign on the part of the North Korean factory managers to think of the visiting economic representatives as business counterparts in the world of capital and industry. For example, even photography by the group of South Korean trade representatives was forbidden within the factory grounds. Another chronic problem is the ease by which North Koreans that are not economic officials or specialists break promises. Furthermore, as often appears in planned economies, there is a single-minded focus on “production” without consideration of whether the product being made is for domestic use or for export. This sort of difficulty was evident at the cosmetics and shoe factories, as well.

Lee Bong-jo, director of the Korea Institute for National Unification, offered some advice to the South: “Knowledge of North Korea must precede any investments there.”

It seems that amongst difficulty, Pyongyang may be carefully seeking change. Though it remains stuck in the dilemma of pursuing liberalization while maintaining regime stability, it is increasingly sending strong signs to the outside world of a will for liberalization. As South Korean Former Minister of Unification Jeong Sye-hyeon said, “It is difficult for North Korea to go backwards.”

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