OFAC amends DPRK sanctions regulations

June 21st, 2011

Here is the statement from the US Treasury Department:

​On June 20, 2011, the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“OFAC”) amended the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 510 (the “NKSR”), to implement Executive Order 13570 of April 18, 2011.  OFAC also removed from 31 C.F.R. chapter V the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 500 (the “FACR”), and the Regulations Prohibiting Transactions Involving the Shipment of Certain Merchandise between Foreign Countries (Transaction Control Regulations), 31 C.F.R. part 505 (the “TCR”).  The final rule containing the NKSR amendments was published at 76 FR 35740 (June 20, 2011); the final rule removing the FACR and TCR was published at 76 FR 35739 (June 20, 2011).

Here and here are the links to the final rules (PDF).

Here is a link to the Treasury Department’s DPRK information resource page.

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North Korea pushes forward with the modernization of Rajin Port

June 21st, 2011

Pictured above (Google Earth): Rason’s three ports: Rajin, Sonbong, Ungsang

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2011-6-21

North Korea and China hosted a groundbreaking ceremony on June 8 for the launch of the joint development project in Hwanggumpyong Island near the DPRK-China border. On the next day, the launching ceremony for the Rason Economic and Trade Zone took place.

The KCNA reported on April 27 that the modernization projects for the Rajin, Sonbong, and Ungsang Ports are to take place. According to the report, “These three ports in Rason City have the geographical advantage for maritime transportation. . . . Rajin Port, surrounded by Daecho and Socho Islands, is an ideal harbor that provides security and excellent marine conditions for docking ships.”

Currently at the Rajin Port, a number of equipment, fishery products, and processed foods are handled. An official from the Rason City People’s Committee stated, “There are plans of advancing Rajin, Sonbong, and Ungsang Ports even further to double the capacity and cargo.”

Recently, news on the Rason Economic and Trade Zone by the KCNA can be heard more frequently as North Korea is making an effort to advertise the development of this area. Recent reports covered news on the preferential tariff system, development program, and light industry zone.

The preferential tariff system of the Rason Economic and Trade Zone was adopted as means to lure more foreign investment into the area and improve the North Korea’s image as being more cooperative and supportive toward foreign businesses. Preferential treatment is being granted to foreign investors in order to turn the area into a major entrepot, export producer, and financial and tourist hub of Northeast Asia. One North Korean official stated, “Rason Economic and Trade Zone has favorable conditions to grow as a major trade zone. There are plans of constructing state-of-the-art equipment, facilities, and light industry factories to develop the area as a major export base.”

China and Russia are said to be paying special attention to the Rason Port development. China is already known to have invested in Pier 1 at Rajin Port and Russia in Pier 3.

North Korea has taken various legal measures to develop the area since Kim Jong Il’s field guidance visit to Rason City in December 2009. Rason City was designated as a “special city” in January 4, 2010 and the Rason Economic and Trade Zone Law was passed on January 27, 2010.

Additional Information:
1. A Swiss firm is alleged to have rented Rajin’s Pier No. 2, but it has not.

2. Here and here is some background information on the new Hwanggumphyon SEZ.  Here is some more information on the Rason ground-breaking and Chinese investment tour.

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Meth as medicine

June 21st, 2011

From a recent Newsweek article about meth use in the DPRK:

First synthesized in 1893, meth is now one of the world’s most widely abused drugs, imbuing the user with intense feelings of euphoria, concentration, and grandiosity. Smoked, injected or snorted, the drug also suppresses the need for food and sleep for an extended period of time; coming down can bring fatigue, anxiety, and occasionally suicidal ideation.

Inside North Korea, observers say, many use meth in place of expensive and hard-to-obtain medicine. “People with chronic disease take it until they’re addicted,” says one worker for a South Korea-based NGO, who requested anonymity in order to avoid jeopardizing his work with defectors. “They take it for things like cancer. This drug is their sole form of medication,” says the NGO worker, who has interviewed hundreds of defectors in the past three years. A former bicycle smuggler who defected in 2009 told NEWSWEEK of seeing a doctor administering meth to a friend’s sick father. “He took it and could speak well and move his hand again five minutes later. Because of this kind of effect, elderly people really took to this medicine.”

Jiro Ishimaru, founder and editor of Rimjin-gang, a magazine about North Korea and reported by people inside the country but published in Japan, says he has seen several North Koreans take meth to relieve stress and fatigue, including his former North Korean business partner. “He didn’t start taking it as a drug but as a medicine,” Ishimaru says.

The drug also offers an escape that might not otherwise be possible. As Shin puts it: “There’s so little hope in North Korea—that’s why ice is becoming popular. People have given up.”

Read the full story here:
North Korea’s Meth Export
Newsweek
Isaac Stone Fish
2011-6-19

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Lankov on the DPRK’s new SEZs

June 21st, 2011

Lankov writes in the Korea Times about the DPRK’s various Special Economic Zones:

In early June, the governments of China and North Korea declared that they would work to develop two new special economic zones (SEZs). One zone is to be situated in the small port city of Raseon, on the eastern coast of South Korea, just 20 kilometers from the nearest crossing to China. Another zone will be developed on the unremarkable sandy island of Hwanggumpyong, in the vicinity of Sinuiju, the largest city on the border (some three quarters of trade between the two countries pass through this city).

One cannot be surprised by this initiative as talk of new SEZs “soon to be established” has been around for over a decade. There is little doubt that the North Korean government is very interested in the idea of SEZs. Unfortunately, this interest does not necessary mean that the North Korean authorities are willing to make the concessions that would allow the SEZs to operate efficiently.

The history of North Korean SEZs is essentially the history of frequent failures and occasional partial successes. The first attempt to create a SEZ took place in 1991, when the North Korean government established a SEZ in the remote northwestern corner of the country. The Raseon SEZ, as it has now become known, is located where the borders of China, Russia and North Korea meet.

Read the remainder of the story below:
Read the rest of this entry »

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Politics comes before economy for DPRK

June 20th, 2011

The Global Times (PR of China) has posted a very interesting and blunt assessment of the DPRK’s newly announced Special Economic Zone by Zhang Liangui (张连瑰), a specialist in Korean issues and professor at the International Strategic Research Bureau at the Party School of the Central Committee of CPC.  The article is posted below:

After drawing up a 10-Year Economic Development Plan at the beginning of this year, North Korea has announced several measures to readjust its ties with China from an aid-dependent relationship to an economic partnership. Will North Korea switch from its militaristic focus to economic development? What are the implications of the recently announced Hwanggumpyong island project in the middle of the Yalu River? Nanfang People Weekly magazine talked to Zhang Liangui (Zhang), a specialist in Korean issues and professor at the International Strategic Research Bureau at the Party School of the Central Committee of CPC, on these issues.

Q: What is the rationale behind North Korea’s efforts to facilitate the joint development of Hwanggumpyong with China?

Zhang: There are several reasons. The most straightforward motive is obviously to ameliorate the shortage of foreign money, since North Korea is suffering from international sanctions as a result of its nuclear weapon development.

Beyond that, North Korea wants to strengthen its economic ties with China, avoiding a hopeless isolation from the international community. Third, this move also reflects North Korea’s territorial concerns.

Q: Why do you think the cooperation has something to do with territorial issues?

Zhang: Because of the border on the Yalu River. Usually rivers on the border between two sovereign nations are demarcated on a half-to-half basis, which means there’s a middle line of control accepted by both sides.

However, the Yalu River is jointly held by both China and North Korea, while the latter has exclusive possession of Hwanggumpyong island.

For years due to alluvial deposition, the island has continued to expand. It now has abutted on the Chinese side, and local government has to build a fence along the border.

Under this circumstance, North Korea has de facto control over the part of Yalu River to the east of Hwanggumpyong island.

Thus the development on Hwanggumpyong island may help North Korea secure its territorial and river possession.

With the erection of buildings and infrastructure, North Korea expects Chinese developers to build the ground base, cement the foundations and free the island from the threat of alluvial erosion. If there’re many buildings, North Korea will have safe and unchallenged control over the island.

After acquiring Hwanggumpyong, North Korea asked farmers to plant trees and develop farmland. This caused the island to expand as well as causing disputes between the two sides. China should be fully aware of these concerns if it is looking for long-term cooperation over Hwanggumpyong.

Q: Why China is willing to cooperate and provide 80 percent of the funds?

Zhang: Many Chinese believe the US will try to contain China, especially at a time of tension among Northeastern Asian countries. The security concerns may give China and North Korea impetus for cooperation.

China also perceives North Korea’s instability, both economically and politically. China’s aid to North Korea is understandable and necessary in pursuing its goal of regional stability.

But China should be clear that its aid doesn’t serve the purpose of saving a specific government. The survival of any particular government is up to North Korea’s domestic will. And China doesn’t need to intervene in everything.

Q: Why did North Korea grant the opportunity to a Hong Kong enterprise? Will Hwanggumpyong become another Hong Kong, as North Korea wishes?

Zhang: It seems that North Korea is particularly enthusiastic about cooperating with Hong Kong firms. The precedent is the casino in Rason. A casino managed by Hong Kong executives can better woo Chinese tourists, as well as corrupt officials and outlaws.

However, Hong Kong’s prosperity is based on its transparent government, advanced legal system, high credibility, well-established infrastructure and financial markets, and in particular, stability.

It remains a difficult mission for today’s North Korea to build another Hong Kong.

Q: Will the Hwanggumpyong project attract more Chinese business people in the future?

Zhang: North Korea has reason to expect more investors to come. But I think there are several reasons preventing a great number of investors from going to Hwanggumpyong. According to my experience in dealing with Chinese business people, many of them complain of a lack of lawful regulations and the capricious North Korean economic policies.

Besides, many countries including China don’t accept credit cards issued by North Korea. Understandably, much of China’s national investment in North Korea comes out of political reasons rather than economic motivations. Unless North Korea has a stable and predictable government as well as international credibility, the prospect of foreign investment in North Korea is bleak。

Q: What do you think of the 10-Year Economic Development Plan, announced recently by the North Korean government?

Zhang: It seems 10 years is a bit long for North Korea’s management habits. So far, North Korea hasn’t been able to follow through on many of its long-term economic projects.

For example, the Kaesong Industrial Park was once planned to be a lucrative business produced by North-South Korean cooperation.

In May 2009, North Korea unilaterally announced a demand for wage and rent rises and scrapped the agreement they had signed up to. In 2010, the sinking of the Cheonan warship further hampered industrial activities in the region. Thus I think the 10-Year Economic Development Plan remains provisional and is intended more or less for propaganda purpose.

Q: Why does North Korea stress that its 10-Year Economic Development Plan “isn’t a reform and opening-up policy?”

Zhang: This is obviously aimed at China. Many Chinese media are under the delusion that North Korea is emulating China’s example to get rid of poverty and develop its country. In fact, North Korea is very unhappy about this claim.

North Korea is still against the idea of “reform and opening-up,” albeit now inexplicitly. It once equated “reform and opening-up policy” with revisionism and imperialists’ supposed conspiracy to topple socialist regimes.

During Kim Jong-il’s visit on June 5, while the Chinese media speculated about North Korea going through “reform and opening-up policy,” the North Korean media never used this phrase.

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Hong Kong company likely to be tapped as developer Hwanggumphyong

June 20th, 2011

According to Yonhap:

A Hong Kong conglomerate is likely to be tapped as a developer of a China-North Korea joint industrial complex on a North Korean island, a Chinese-language weekly said Monday, a move seen as deepening the North’s economic reliance on its neighboring country.

Earlier this month, China and North Korea broke ground to develop Hwanggumphyong Island, which sits at the estuary of the Yalu River between two border cities, Dandong on the Chinese side and Sinuiju on the North’s side.

The Economic Observer, one of the leading economy-focused newspapers in China, said it has exclusively obtained a document showing that Sunbase International Holdings Ltd., an investment conglomerate based in Hong Kong, will win exclusive rights to develop the border island.

The group, which reportedly has direct control over total assets of over HK$60 billion (US$9.3 billion), is recognized as one of the largest property management companies in Hong Kong and mainland China.

Gunter Gao, chairman of the board of Sunbase International, visited North Korea twice last year and had high-level meetings with North Korean government officials on the economic development of the island, the report said.

The newspaper earlier reported that the 56-year-old Hong Kong tycoon met Kim Yong-nam, president of the Presidium of the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly, before the groundbreaking ceremony of the joint economic zone. Gao is widely considered to have strong ties with politicians in mainland China.

Gao has long served as one of the Hong Kong members of the National Committee for Chinese People’s Political Consultative, a political advisory body in mainland China.

Citing unnamed sources, the weekly said the North Korean authorities preferred Hong Kong entities rather than mainland Chinese firms as developers of the joint economic zone because Hong Kong companies are more open and international.

The economic cooperation between China and North Korea comes on the heels of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s weeklong trip to China in May when he studied the neighboring country’s economic development. It was his third trip to China in just over a year.

Beijing has been trying to lure its impoverished ally to embrace the reform that lifted millions of Chinese out of poverty and helped China’s rise to become the world’s second-largest economy.

North Korea has been facing worsening food shortages and massive inflation, which has increased public anger in the country.

Read the full story hre:
Hong Kong conglomerate likely to be tapped as developer of N. Korean island: report
Yonhap
Kim Young-gyo
2011-6-20

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Recent DPRK publications

June 19th, 2011

Imports from North Korea: Existing Rules,Implications of the KORUS FTA, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex
Mark E. Manyin, Coordinator, Jeanne J. Grimmett, Vivian C. Jones, Dick K. Nanto, Michaela D. Platzer, Dianne E. Rennack
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
June 2, 2011

Download the PDF here.  This publication has been added to the list of previous CRS reports on the DPRK here.

________

Trade with China 1995-2009
Nathaniel Aden
Nautilus Institute
June 7, 2011

View the paper here.  A link to this paper has been added to the DPRK Economic Statistics Page. The Nautilus Insitute has also posted links to some very interesting presentations from the 2010 DPRK Energy and Minerals Working Group.

________

[Book] The Contemporary North Korean Politics: History, Ideology, and Power System (현대 북한의 정치: 역사, 이념, 권력체계)
Jong Song-Jang (정성장)
More information TBA, but see here and here (Korean).

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[Book] Architekturführer Pjöngjang (German: Pyongyang Architecture Guide)
Philipp Meuser
Order here at Amazon. More here and here.

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Comparison of NK and USSR

June 19th, 2011

Andrei Lankov writes in the Korea Times:

The present author was born in the former Soviet Union and is frequently asked which period of Soviet history the current North Korea is reminiscent of?

I usually say that this question has no straightforward answer. The problem is that depending on what area you look, the associations are remarkably different. The developments in North Korea are not that different from those of the USSR, but in different areas the time seems to flow with a different speed.

North Korea’s official ideology and propaganda continues to be uncannily similar to late Stalinist Soviet culture, to the period of the late 1940s. The North Koreans are still served the same fare of ossified Leninism and strong nationalism, heavily spliced with eulogies to the leaders’ wisdom and benevolence.

It appears as if North Korean propaganda, as well as its official ideology, has been frozen in time since the late 1960s. One can take an article from Rodong Shinmun of, say, 1972 and then compare it with an article published yesterday only to find no major differences in language, style and reasoning.

At the same time, the general mood among educated urban North Koreans is quite similar to the mood which prevailed among the same social milieu in Moscow and Leningrad of the 1960s. People are still afraid to talk politics and most of them do not entertain serious doubts about the fundamentals of the system. They tend to believe that their economic problems have been created by a combination of natural disasters, collapse of the ‘socialist markets’ and, of course, an economic blockade maintained by the greedy U.S. imperialists and their shameless lackeys.

However, very few educated North Koreans nowadays buy the official propaganda message wholesale. They know that the official media lies, and sometimes lies quite shamelessly. While being more or less loyal subjects of their state, they entertain significant (and growing) skepticism about its institutions and the official pronouncements of its leaders.

It seems that social fear, once powerful and omnipresent, is diminishing. The North Korean state remains highly repressive, but the level of repressiveness is in steady decline. Nowadays North Koreans can do many things which would almost definitely have landed them in prison some 20 years ago ― in some cases, even mildly critical statements about the system are now tolerated.

Of course, open dissent is still unthinkable, but genuine enthusiasm is almost impossible to find. This is a picture, clearly reminiscent of the USSR of, say, year 1965 (albeit the North Korean state remains far more repressive than the Soviet Union used to be during Brezhnev’s rule).

The economic situation is different again. In economic terms, present day North Korea is similar to Russia in the early 1990s, the turbulent days that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. At that time a large number of the Soviet people discovered that their official salaries would not suffice if they wanted to stay alive, so they began to look for additional sources of income. Ex-Soviet officials busily stole state property, whilst less lucky commoners relied on an assorted variety of small businesses, household workshops and subsistence farming.

This is very similar to present-day North Korea, even though the collapse of the socialist economy in North Korea led to far more damaging consequences than was the case in Russia –after all North Korea experienced a disastrous famine, while few if any Russians starved to death in the early post-Soviet period.

In North Korea, the collapse of the state-run economy and rationing system plunged a majority of the population into the world of the grass-roots market economy. No reliable statistics are available, but researchers tend to agree that roughly three-quarters of average household income in North Korea is now derived from private economic activities of different kinds.

Like their early post-Soviet peers, North Korean officials are always on the lookout for a nice bribe. They also don’t mind quietly transforming state property into their own personal property– many North Korean enterprises ostensibly still owned by the government are actually private nowadays. Meanwhile other North Koreans sell, buy, smuggle, farm unofficial plots, run individual workshops or find employment with such workshops.

So, we have a curious picture. Ideology still pretends that almost nothing has changed in the last 50 years (it’s telling that the official media has never mentioned the market economy, as if it doesn’t exist). The political consciousness is less dominated by the state, but still remains under its control.

However, the North Korean state has almost completely lost control of the economic life of its people. This picture has no parallels in the history of the Soviet Union or, for that matter, in the histories of other ex-communist countries, even though all its elements (if taken separately) would appear familiar to the people with Soviet-era experience.

Read the full story here:
Comparison of NK and USSR
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
2011-6-19

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Executive Order 13466

June 19th, 2011

UPDATE 2 (2011-6-19): According to Yonhap, a researcher at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) asserts the goal of Executive Order 13466 is to essentially facilitate ratification of the KORUS FTA by preventing the importation of goods made in the Kaesong Industrial Zone into the United States:

A recent executive order issued by U.S. President Barack Obama is partly aimed at banning the imports of products made at an inter-Korean industrial park in Kaesong, a North Korean border town, ahead of the ratification of a free trade pact with South Korea, a Congress-affiliated researcher said Wednesday.

Dick Nanto, a specialist in industry, trade and foreign affairs with the Congressional Research Service (CRS), noted that the April executive order prohibits the direct and indirect entry of North Korean goods.

“The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets and Control said goods, services and technologies from North Korea may not be imported into the United States directly or indirectly without license,” he said at a forum hosted by Korea Economic Institute.

He said the wording “indirect” was inserted in consideration of Congress’s objection to the inclusion of Kaesong products in the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement, or KORUS FTA.

“That includes any country — China, South Korea — any country that uses a product of North Korea in the process or as part of the process,” Nanto said.

UPDATE 1 (2011-4-19): Haggard and Noland have a good discussion on the EO.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-4-19): First of all, here is the Executive Order:

Executive Order — Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to North Korea

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in view of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 of October 14, 2006, and UNSCR 1874 of June 12, 2009,

I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, in order to take additional steps to address the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466 of June 26, 2008, and expanded in Executive Order 13551 of August 30, 2010, that will ensure implementation of the import restrictions contained in UNSCRs 1718 and 1874 and complement the import restrictions provided for in the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751
et seq.), hereby order:

Section 1. Except to the extent provided in statutes or in licenses, regulations, orders, or directives that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of
this order, the importation into the United States, directly or indirectly, of any goods, services, or technology from North Korea is prohibited.

Sec. 2. (a) Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 3. The provisions of Executive Orders 13466 and 13551 remain in effect, and this order does not affect any action taken pursuant to those orders.

Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:

(a) the term “person” means an individual or entity;

(b) the term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization;

(c) the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States;

(d) the term “North Korea” includes the territory of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Government of North Korea; and

(e) the term “Government of North Korea” means the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities.

Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA and the UNPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.

Sec. 6. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

Sec. 7. This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 19, 2011.

Here is the text of the letter to Congress:

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

April 18, 2011

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), I hereby report that I have issued an Executive Order (the “order”) that takes additional steps to address the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466 of June 26, 2008, and expanded in Executive Order 13551 of August 30, 2010.

In 2008, upon terminating the exercise of certain authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) with respect to North Korea, the President issued Executive Order 13466 and declared a national emergency pursuant to IEEPA to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by the existence and risk of the proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula. Executive Order 13466 continued certain restrictions on North Korea and North Korean nationals that had been in place under TWEA.

In 2010, I determined that the Government of North Korea’s continued provocative actions destabilized the Korean Peninsula and imperiled U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and trading partners in the region, and warranted the imposition of additional sanctions, and I issued Executive Order 13551, expanding the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466. In Executive Order 13551, I ordered blocked the property and interests in property of three North Korean entities and one individual listed in the Annex to that order and provided criteria under which the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may designate additional persons whose property and interests in property shall be blocked.

The United Nations Security Council, in Resolutions 1718 and 1874, requires Member States to take certain measures to prevent, among other transactions, the importation of certain goods and services from North Korea. The sanctions contained in Executive Order 13551 strengthen the implementation of these Resolutions.

I have issued the order today to further address the national emergency with respect to North Korea and ensure implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874. The order also complements executive authorities under section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act to ensure that all imports from North Korea are consistent with the import restrictions described in that provision, even when relevant designations under that provision are not in effect. To accomplish these goals, the order prohibits the direct or indirect importation of goods, services, and technology from North Korea. Unless exempt, all imports into the United States from North Korea must be authorized.

The order leaves in place all existing sanctions imposed under Executive Orders 13466 and 13551.

I have delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA and the United Nations Participation Act as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the order. In particular, this delegated authority may be used to establish a process to consider licenses for imports from North Korea that are consistent with the purposes of the order.

The order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 19, 2011. All executive agencies of the United States Government are directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of the order.

I am enclosing a copy of the order I have issued.

Sincerely,
BARACK OBAMA

According to the Wall Street Journal:

Monday’s order further expands on an executive order imposed in August 2010 (pdf), and another in 2008. Both remain in effect under this order. In a letter to the House Speaker and the president of the Senate, Obama said the order prohibits the direct importation of goods, services or technology from North Korea.

“Unless exempt, all imports into the United States from North Korea must be authorized,” the letter says.

The goal of the latest executive order is to further implement two United Nations Security Council resolutions, 1718 and 1874, which tasked member states to prevent certain transactions and imports from North Korea. The latest issuance sends a signal that the prior orders weren’t enough, however.

Treasury is tasked with coming up with rules on how to enforce the sanctions and issue import licenses under the order. It went into effect at midnight Tuesday.

The US Treasury also blacklisted another North Korean bank. According to Reuters:

The U.S. Treasury on Tuesday imposed sanctions on North Korea’s Bank of East Land over transactions with a blacklisted North Korean arms maker that it said has exported torpedoes to Iran.

The Treasury said the action was taken under an August 2010 White House executive order that aims to thwart North Korea’s arms trade, luxury goods imports, narcotics trafficking and money laundering.

The move seeks to freeze any Bank of East Land assets that may be under U.S. jurisdiction and bans U.S. entities from transactions with the institution, also known as Dongbang Bank.

The Treasury has fought a long-running sanctions battle against illicit activities of the North Korean government, including its alleged manufacturing of high-quality counterfeit $100 bills known as “supernotes.”

“Bank of East Land is a major conduit for facilitating North Korea’s conventional arms trade,” David Cohen, the Treasury’s acting under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said in a statement.

“Today’s designation exposes North Korea’s efforts to circumvent sanctions to conduct illegal activities and degrades its ability to abuse the international financial system,” Cohen said.

The Treasury said Bank of East Land has facilitated transactions for Green Pine Associated Corp, a North Korean arms manufacturer and exporter that was previously placed on the U.S. sanctions list. It said Green Pine produces submarines, military boats and missile systems and has exported torpedoes and technical assistance to Iranian defense-related firms.

In 2007 and 2008, the bank also facilitated transactions involving Green Pine and two blacklisted Iranian financial institutions, Bank Melli and Bank Sepah, the Treasury said. The Iranian state banks previously were sanctioned under an executive order aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear and missile development efforts.

In 2005, the Treasury blacklisted a small bank in Macau, Banco Delta Asia, which cut off Pyongyang’s primary conduit to the international financial system at that time. The move was separate from sanctions aimed at curbing North Korea’s nuclear program but added pressure on the reclusive communist regime to bring it back to multilateral nuclear talks.

Here is the US Treasury Department’s North Korea sanctions page.

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Friday Grab bag: a little bit of everything

June 17th, 2011

1. Google has uploaded some beautiful new satellite imagery of Pyongyang. Some parts of it are easier to see than others, and I have not gone through it all, but here are some fun, quick discoveries:

1. There appears to be a new aircraft runway in Ryongsong-guyok (룡성구역, 39.127835°, 125.777533°).  Maybe not, but maybe.

2. The Ryugyong Hotel is looking more and more like a space ship:

3. We can see 2012 building construction all over the place.  Below are the new apartments Kim Jong-il recently visited (L) at the foot of Haebang Hill and (R) behind the Central District Market (for artists).

Here and here are the KCNA stories about Kim’s visits to the sites.

Here is a photo of the artist-housing under construction.

The Haebang Hill apartments are built on the former location of the “Monument to the Fallen Fighters of the Korean People’s Army”.  See a picture of this former monument here.

 

2. DPRK TKD in USA. As I mentioned a couple of days ago, a North Korean Taekwondo team toured the northeastern US this week.  I wish I could have seen one of the shows…but here are some clips from the New York show on Youtube: Part 1Part 2Part 3Part4.

They did a great job and are tremendous athletes.  I hope they are able to return soon–and make it a little further south.

 

3. DPRK sand animation. This week KCNA posted some very interesting video of a “sand art” demonstration.  Very skilled performance. A viewer was able to rip the video and post it to YouTube.

Pictured above is the “Ryugyong Hotel fireworks” part of the performance.  Part 1 of the piece is here.  Part 2 of the piece is here.  The whole performance is well worth watching. If I could ever be a tourist to the DPRK again, I would want to see one of these performances.

UPDATE: A special thanks to Prof. Stephan Haggard for offering a helpful explication of the piece.

In a similar vein, this piece remains my favorite of the genre (from Ukraine).

 

2. Kim’s Train (Retro). Last week I posted recent video footage taken from inside Kim Jong-il’s train.  This week I post some retro footage taken in the 1970s(?):

You can see the video here.  The room set up is essentially the same, though Kim’s tastes have obviously changed!

 

3. The CNC backpack.

Here is the source.  Learn more about CNC here.

 

4. A North Korean artist reproduced da Vinci’s Last Supper for an art show in Russia. See the Russian-language version of the BBC here (picture-8 ). (h/t L.P.)

 

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