Lankov on Kim Jon-un’s rise to power

November 8th, 2011

Lankov writes in the Asia Times:

In October last year, media worldwide reported that Kim Jong-eun, Kim Jong-il’s third son, had been made a four-star general and promoted to the position of vice chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party’s Central Military Commission.

It was taken as evidence that at long last, the Dear Leader had decided on his successor. At the time, it was often overlooked that Kim Jong-eun had not yet been officially described as “successor”. Officially, he is merely a top dignitary, even though few would cast doubt on the actual meaning of the promotion of a 28-year-old to a top circle of decisions makers whose average age is well above 70.

Over the following year though, the media – at least, the English-language media – have not paid much attention to the succession process underway in the North. This lack of attention is easy toexplain. The media usually report unusual developments while the North Korean dynastic succession has so far progressed without many surprises.

It seems that North Korea’s decision makers do not want to be too creative. So far, they have generally followed the script which was developed 40 years ago, in the 1970s, when Kim Jong-il was promoted to succeed his father, Kim Il-sung.

From late 2010, Kim Jong-eun began to appear in the pages of the North Korean press and in news broadcasts on North Korean television. He is shown mimicking the public activities of his father (and earlier activities of his grandfather). Kim Jong-eun goes to factories where he explains to the managers how they should run their enterprises and extols workers to labor with even greater enthusiasm.

He is shown touring newly built apartments and inspecting military units, providing artists with moral guidance and mixing with exemplary soldiers.

At least in one case, such a visit was commemorated in stone. In 2009, Kim Jong-eun, then still unknown to most, accompanied his father on a visit to Wonsan Agricultural College. Soon afterwards, a commemorative stone feature was erected to celebrate this great historical event.

One should not be too surprised about this, the present author, when walking through Pyongyang, once came across a wooden bench that was fenced off and had a large commemorative stone placed next to it. The bench’s claim to fame was that in the 1950s, Kim Il-sung, founder of the dynasty, had once placed his buttocks on its wooden planks. Until this year though, such commemorative stones could only mark the activities of the two elder Kims. Now it seems that the successor has joined the top league.

Kim Jong-eun has been introduced to foreign embassies in Pyongyang and now frequently meets with visiting foreign officials and delegations. Recently, during a meeting with a Chinese dignitary, he was pictured sitting on the right hand side of the guest while his father, Marshal Kim Jong-il, sat on the left.

Jong-eun’s attire is worth noting. He wears a navy blue Mao Zedong suit. This dress is rather anachronistic, but it clearly has been chosen for its symbolism: his grandfather wore exactly the same daily uniform in the 1950s and 1960s. Kim Jong-eun resembles his grandfather indeed, and the likeness is further emphasized by his choice of haircut. This exercise in political image-making delivers a clear message: Kim Jong-eun is the next incarnation of his grandfather, the legitimate heir to the Kim dynasty.

Kim Jong-eun’s connection with his still-ruling father is also emphasized in clothing selection. In winter, he appears clad in a grey parka that is an exact copy of Kim Jong-il’s winter dress. In other words, the successor is made to look like a young clone of his two predecessors.

One should probably not overstate the significance of these facts too much, but nonetheless, this does not encourage the idea that Kim Jong-eun will break with the current line and become a radical reformer.

Every ruler of the Kim family has had his own, clearly defined, set of titles. Nowadays Kim Il-sung is usually referred to as the “Leader” (suryong in Korean) and Kim Jong-il is usually referred to as the “General” (changun). Kim Jong-eun, unremarkably, has also acquired a title: he supposed to be referred to as the “Four-star General” (taejang) – in Korean, this is a technical term for a military rank, different from the generic “General”, which is Kim Jong-il’s title.

Recently, North Koreans saw the emergence of a new type of personality cult-related object: three plaques or stones, identical in size and shape, each containing a short three character inscription. Such triple plaques or stones are increasingly common in public places in North Korea.

One plaque says “The blessing [of having] the leader”, the next says “The blessing [of having] the general”, while the last one says “The blessing [of having] the four-star general.” As we remember, “Leader” means Kim Il-sung, “General” stands for Kim Jong-il, and the “four-star General” is Jong-eun’s new sobriquet.

This is a way to remind North Koreans how incredibly lucky they are to be blessed by destiny, which has provided them with three geniuses of leadership, the three best leaders the world has ever seen.

As one should expect, the arts have been put to good political use as well. For the past few years, North Koreans have been encouraged to sing a song entitled Footsteps. It extols the manifold virtues of Jong-eun and especially his desire to be among the common people and take care of their needs.

Ko Yong-hui, Jong-eun’s late mother, has also begun to get her fair share of attention. Back in the 1970s, Kim Jong-il’s rise to power gave birth to personality cult for his mother, Kim Jong-suk. Jong-eun’s mother was a beautiful folk dancer who died in 2004. Nowadays she is supposed to be referred to as “Pyongyang’s mother”. Predictably, there is at least one song dedicated to her virtues and glory.

The city of Wonsan seemingly has started somewhat special standing in North Korea. Jong-eun’s mother was actually born in Japan, but she moved to North Korea with a large number of pro-Pyongyang ethnic Koreans. The major port of arrival for these people was Wonsan and it has been stated that Jong-eun described this city as “his second home town”.

According to some rumors, he was actually born in one of the Kim Jong-il’s residences in Wonsan or close by, but it is not currently clear whether these rumors should be taken seriously. Nonetheless, Wonsan is clearly a rising star of North Korea’s political geography.

What does this all mean? So far it seems that North Korea’s agitprop department is following the pattern that was developed in the 1970s. Then, they spent a few years on promoting the personality cult of the newly appointed successor whose virtues and devotion to the people were continuously extolled.

A significant part of this propaganda appeared in confidential publications that were not supposed to be seen by outsiders and often not even by common North Koreans as well. This allowed them to claim that the North Korean public suddenly experienced a burst of spontaneous love for young Kim Jong-il. His official confirmation as his father’s successor was presented as merely the corollary of this universal love and admiration.

In the case of Kim Jong-il, these preparations took eight years. Kim Jong-il was selected as successor and promoted to top positions in the government in 1972, but his standing as heir-designate remained unofficial until 1980. In 1980, the sixth congress of the Korean Workers’ Party officially declared Kim Jong-il to be the official successor of Kim Il-sung.

Recent events, especially the speedy emergence of Jong-eun’s personality cult, leaves little doubt that the decision pertaining to his future has been made and is unlikely to be changed. However, he is yet to be declared a successor, officially and unequivocally. Technically speaking, he is merely one of a dozen top military commanders, albeit very young and enjoying unparalleled admiration among the common people.

If the experiences of the 1970s are a guide as to what is likely to happen, we should expect that in due time Jong-eun’s standing will be made official. Judging by the hype North Korean propaganda makes about 2012 (meant to be a year of great events and achievements), one cannot rule out that the final promotion will happen as soon as next year – perhaps, but not necessarily, at a party congress which will be convened for this purposes.

There is one noticeable difference between Kim Jong-il’s promotion in the 1970s and Kim Jong-eun’s promotion of late. In the case of Jong-eun, North Korean agitprop has moved much faster, so it may be possible that the entire preparatory phase be compressed into two or three years.

They have a good reason to be in a hurry. Kim Il-sung was 60 when he made a decision about his son, Kim Jong-il made the same decision at the age of 68, whilst being in far worse physical shape. So nobody knows how much time North Korea has to complete the tricky dynastic succession.

At any rate, things appear to be moving smoothly right now. The succession process has yet to run into any noticeable obstacles. So the chances are that the world’s youngest four-star general will succeed Marshal Kim Jong-il, becoming the third Kim to rule the world’s only communist absolute monarchy.

Read the full story here:
The rise of Kim Il-sung’s mini-me
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
2011-11-8

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Choson Exchange October trip findings

November 7th, 2011

From the Choson Exchange web page (November 5):

In October 2011, John Kim, a board director of the Choson Exchange, visited the Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Zone. The following is a summary of some of his findings based on site visits and talks with senior officials in the SEZ. An longer account of his travels and impressions will be available soon. This information helps elaborate on our report from August.

Rajin Port
The Rajin Port employs 1400 workers. The Chinese have conducted feasibility tests regarding two new piers, but currently the port houses three piers with 9-9.5 meters draft. A 30,000 metric ton coal storage warehouse was built at Pier 1 by the Chinese, who moved 80,000 metric tons through the facility in five shipments from January to September. Pier two, largely dedicated to container shipment, is currently dormant and a Swiss company is currently using Pier 3 to ship manganese and talc out of the region. The Russians also have a 49 year lease agreement signed in 2008.

Oongsang [Ungsang] Port
Oongsang Port exported Russian lumber until 1985, but remains largely quiet now except for the occasional fishing boat. The present draft of 7 meters constricts any major future activity, so the North Koreans hope to bring in over $100M to widen the draft to 9 meters. After Rajin Port activity surpasses capacity there, Oongsang Port will become the next regional hub for drybulk activity.

Sonbong Port
Originally opened in the early 70’s, the draft within the port is 7 meters, but a fully laden Very Large Crude Carrier containing 270,000 metric tons of oil can offload at an offshore facility further out at sea. Two pipes, 63 cm in diameter, run for 9km underground before reaching the storage facility at “Victory Petrochemical”, a simple refinery that was designed to refine crude and send oil products (gasoline, naphtha, jet fuel, diesel and fuel oil) back to the port for export. In addition to this two way flow, fuel oil also arrived sporadically at the port as part of aid packages from 1994 to 2008.

Sonbong Power
This power plant was originally designed to take fuel oil from Victory Petrochemical as feedstock and generate power to feed back to Victory. Since the refinery has been offline, Sonbong Power has at times provided electricity to the region, but with fuel oil prices close to $700/metric ton and current electricity prices at 6.5 eurocents/kwh, the economics of running the plant do not work leaving the 800 workers employed here largely idle.

Victory [Sungri] Oil Refinery
Literally translated as “Victory Chemical Plant”, this refinery was completed in 1973 with a 40,000bbl/day crude distillation unit that typically yields 40~50% residual fuel oil for an average crude feed. Investment into upgrading capacity in the international market has led to an eroding of margins for simple refineries like Victory. Currently the refinery is idle and would need over $500M in investment to become competitive.

Hye Song Trading Company
Mr Kim visited a Sewing Factory owned by Hye Song, which runs 8 such factories employing 2000 workers. Output is recorded for the entire year on a bulletin board at the front entrance of the company. All employees except the handyman were women.

Cell Phone use more prevalent
The number of cell phone users in the DPRK crossed 1 million earlier this year and one official commented that the overwhelming majority of urban households have at least one cell phone. This particular official had 4 phones for a household of 3. Foreigners are allowed to use cell phones on a different network, and users of the domestic and foreign network can not call each other. All usage is prepaid.

Handset Type: Local
Purchase Cost: 1570-2200 RMB
Usage Cost: 250 minutes and 20 text messages, while each additional minute is charged at 60 NKW (about .1 RMB/min)

Handset Type: Foreigner
Purchase Cost: 1800-2400 RMB
Usage Cost: Does not include any free minutes and are charged at 2RMB/min

Banking System has room for growth
There are two banks in Rason, the Central Bank, which is focused on domestic transactions, and the Golden Triangle Bank, which is focused on foreign currency transactions. Transactions for goods and services are conducted almost entirely in cash, usually in RMB or NKW. Mechanisms for savings are credit have room for development. As banks take a fee to deposit and withdraw cash, merchants prefer to hold money in cash (usually RMB). Credit is also available almost exclusively through friends or family.

Bottlenecks
A number of issues require solving if Rason is serious about attracting large scale foreign investment. Among these are reliable access to travel visas, reasonable communications costs with the outside world, a more mature banking system with savings and credit mechanisms and favorable tax treatment with a consistent legal framework. The mere fact that Rason is experimenting with market reform is encouraging, and Mr Kim is optimistic about economic development in the region and the nation as a whole.

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Ideology classes being extended for KPA

November 7th, 2011

According to the Daily NK:

A source within North Korea has revealed to Daily NK that political education classes for the Chosun People’s Army have been extended from 12 to 19 hours a week in what the source sees as an effort to increase unity within the military.

The order to extend ideological instruction apparently came from the General Political Bureau of the Ministry of Peoples’ Armed Forces in early September. Following as it did the late Colonel Muammar Qadhafi’s escape from the Libyan capital Tripoli in the middle of August, this points to the possibility that the beginning of the Libyan leader’s end had a part to play in the nervy North Korean regime’s decision.

The source claims that all military units were handed new schedules for political education at that time, stating, “Every week commissioned officers get extra materials to conduct classes and enlisted soldiers have had their basic hours extended from 12 to 19.”

In reality this means that the classes, which used to be for two hours every day from Monday to Saturday, have now been extended to three hours, with the 30 minutes each morning previously allotted for reading and interpreting party policy and the works of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il extended to 40 minutes.

Commanding officers have had their own classes covering the correct method of instructing subordinates bumped up from three or four times a month to twice a week. These classes are to help them become acquainted with the guidance materials sent down from Pyongyang.

So-called ‘political commissars’ attached to companies follow the guidelines of the General Political Bureau in carrying out political education. Given their license to assess the ‘appropriateness’ of company commanders, in many ways they occupy a role more influential than that of commanders themselves.

The source claims that Special Forces were the guinea pigs for the new policy, with Marine Corps, specialist security forces and guidance department troops getting the first taste of the new orders.

The ideological training of ordinary soldiers is said to involve interpretation of Rodong Shinmun editorials, which serve as the main de facto public mouthpiece for official opinion, along with ideological ‘debate’ sessions.

“At the end of October we began studying a piece from the Rodong Shinmun called ‘We are all Descendants of Kim Il Sung’, and have been had debate sessions regarding another article which was about how to make our lives even better than they already are,” the source explained.

“A stationed officer from the Political Bureau sits in on the debate sessions and plays the role of a facilitator, making sure everything goes smoothly. They are drumming up excitement within these sessions by giving a day’s holiday to the best participants,” said the source.

Interestingly, meanwhile, the source added that the state is still choosing not to report on the death of Gaddafi or other Libya news, while “Most soldiers think the ramping up of political studies is some sort of preparation for winter training.”

Every year North Korea holds winter training from December 1 until June. On top of ideological education, training also involves marching, shooting, martial arts, war strategy and other drills.

Read the full story here:
More Ideology for the Troops!
Daily NK
Lee Seok Young
2011-11-07

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DPRK highlights friendship with China through new stamps

November 7th, 2011

KCNA posted some new commemorative stamps today highlighting the friendship felt between fraternal socialist leaders (click images to see larger versions):

Kim Il-sung with Mao Zedong (L) and Deng Xiaopeng (R)

 

Kim Jong-il with Jiang Zemen (L) and Hu Jintao (R)

 

Chairman Mao as a youth

According to KCNA:

Pyongyang, November 7 (KCNA) — The DPRK State Stamp Bureau has published four sheetlets and an individual stamp to mark the anniversaries of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and China and the entry of the Chinese People’s Volunteers into the Korea front.

Printed in the sheetlets are Korean and Chinese letters “DPRK-China Friendship” and “DPRK-China Friendship Is Everlasting”, as well as flags of two countries.

Seen in the sheetlets are portraits of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il and photos of Chinese leaders Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

The stamps also carry pictures of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il meeting with Chinese leaders.

The individual stamp contains an oil painting portraying Chairman Mao Zedong.

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Apple iPads spotted in Pyongyang

November 7th, 2011

Pictured above (Google Earth): Changwang street runs north from the Pyongyang Central Train Station to the Potonggang Gate–straight through the Workers’ Party Leadership Compound (AKA the “Forbidden City”)

According to the Daily NK:

As the use of multimedia devices continues to spread among wealthy kids from the Pyongyang elite keen to ride the ‘Korean Wave’ of South Korean cultural influences, it appears that ownership of an Apple i-Pad tablet computer has now also become one symbol of ‘cool.’

The most common and popular multimedia devices used by younger generations in Pyongyang are still MP4 players and DVD playback devices with USB compatibility, of course; however, on Changgwang St. in the very heart of Pyongyang a few people have recently been witnessed wielding the popular Apple machines.

“Notebook computers are pretty common in Pyongyang,” one Chinese businessman who visits Pyongyang 2 to 3 times a year told Daily NK on the 6th, “But i-Pads are now a symbol of wealth; someone in Pyongyang requested one from me for their child.”

“I also witnessed a person using an i-Pad on Changgwang Street and PSM officers did not stop this, while the user did not seem to care about getting in trouble,” the source went on, adding, “There are many foreigners in that area so they are probably trying to adopt a sophisticated image.”

One Orascom official also previously reported witnessing the use of an i-Pad in Pyongyang. However, it is not possible to use the product’s 3G cellular facility in the city as yet.

In an interview with Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 8th, an official with the Egyptian company stated, “We are planning to develop a SIM card so that I-pads can be used in North Korea by the end of this year,” explaining “There is a 3G network for cell phones in North Korea, so as long as you insert a SIM card you’ll be able to use it.”

Naturally, the internet is not available to domestic users of phones in North Korea either, while the i-Pad is renowned worldwide for its lack of USB ports, too, much less a DVD drive, so while the elite may be obtaining the devices one way or another, only those lucky enough to live abroad can really use them.

iPods have been popular in the DPRK for some time. More than once have tourists been propositioned to give up their portable music devices.

Read the full story here:
Even i-Pads Are in Pyongyang Now
Daily NK
Park Jun Hyeong
2011-11-07

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DPRK mineral exports to China increase

November 6th, 2011

UPDATE 1 (2014-1-21): See more recent data here and here.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-11-6): According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s mineral exports to China have tripled this year compared to a year ago, a study showed Sunday.

A joint study of Chinese data by Yonhap News Agency and Seoul-based IBK Economic Research Institute showed that China imported 8.42 million tons of minerals from North Korea from January to September this year, worth US$852 million.

Over the first nine months of last year, China brought in 3.04 million tons of minerals from the North for $245 million.

Most of the minerals were anthracite coals, the data showed. This year, of 8.42 million tons, 8.19 tons were anthracites.

China is the sole major ally and the biggest economic benefactor for North Korea, a reclusive regime under international economic sanctions following its nuclear and long-range missile tests.

Cho Bong-hyun, an analyst at the IBK institute, said North Korea may be trying to earn much-needed hard currency as it aims to become a powerful and prosperous country by 2012.

“Last year, North Korea ordered its institutions to meet their goals in foreign currency income by this year,” Cho said. “Since exporting minerals is a military business, we can see that the military is trying to meet its target. In addition, the steep mineral export growth was attributable to the lifting of the cap on the amount of mineral exports, as ordered by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.”

China appears to be trying to stockpile mineral resources at affordable prices, Cho added. North Korean anthracites were traded at an average of $101 per ton, whereas the international standard for quality anthracites is $200 per ton.

“Given that North Korean coals are of very good quality, trade with China must have been made at a fairly low price,” Cho said.

Meanwhile, sources said North Korean authorities last month entirely halted its coal exports, as the impoverished country fears a shortage of energy resources during the upcoming winter.

From January to September this year, China exported 732,000 tons of minerals to North Korea, most of them crude oil.

Here is the IBK web page.  If anyone can find a copy of this report and send it to me to post, I would appreciate it.

Additional information:
1. The economics lessons: A. The more isolated the DPRK’s economy from the global trade and financial system, the greater monopsony power Chinese firms can exert on their North Korean trading partners. B. The rents earned in the current DPRK-China trade regime are visible and have organized constituencies.  Unfortunately the much greater gains that could be reaped if the North Korean economy was more open, integrated, and dynamic remain unseen and their potential beneficiaries remain unknown and unorganized.

2. The Nautilus Institute published a very interesting paper by Nathaniel Aden on China DPRK trade back in June. See it here.

3.  Here is the most recent US Geological Survey report on the DPRK’s mineral sector.

Read the Yonhap story here:
N. Korea’s mineral exports to China tripled from last year: study
Yonhap
2011-11-6

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Interesting weekend fare: Cars, cola, Disney, history, and lift troubles

November 6th, 2011

Cars 

Uriminzokkiri posted this short video of rush-hour traffic in Pyongyang (YouTube):

I will leave it up to the reader to determine if the video was staged. What is more interesting to me is to see the variety of vehicles used in the shots.  I saw at least one American Dodge Van in the footage (similar to the one I saw parked next to the Pueblo in 2005).  If you know a lot about cars, feel free to try identifying other vehicles in the footage.

And continuing on the automotive front–a tourist to the DPRK took this picture in September 2010:

The picture above is of an American-made, petrol-guzzling “Hummer H2” (MSRP in 2008 – USD$53,286; 10 mpg-US; 24 L/100 km; 12 mpg-imp). The license plate on the vehicle is 평양 22-2722.

In September 2011, Eric Lafforgue took the picture below of what appears to be a second Hummer on the streets of the DPRK.

The license plate on this vehicle is “23-199”. I cannot read the city name on the plate.  According to the photographer:

During my stay in North Korea, i [sp] saw 2 Hummer cars. This is the fist time i [sp] hear north korean people making cristisms about something in their country! They all told me it was a shame to see such a car in North Korea, as it needs lot of fuel. Some people told me that the car number tells that it belongs to a local media (press or tv).

Cola

Mr. Lafforgue has also brought up another interesting topic through his pictures: North Korea’s cola wars!

 

On the left is a Picture of Cocoa “crabonated drink” [sp] taken by Eric Lafforgue in 2008.  On the right is a picture of  “코코아 탄산단물” (Translation: “Cocoa Carbonated Drink”) taken by Eric Lafforgue in September 2011.

I might have been inclined to believe they were the same product with different labels (and maybe they are?), however, they appear to be manufactured by different companies.  The cola on the left is manufactured by a company called “룡진” (Ryongjin), a company about which I cannot find any additional information, and the beverage on the right is manufactured by “모란봉” (Moranbong).  I presume that “Moranbong” is actually the Moranbong Carbonated Fruit Juice J.V. Company. According to Naenara:

Moranbong Carbonated Fruit Juice J.V. Company
Add: Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea
Fax: 850-2-381-4410

The company formed in 2004 produces a wide assortment of carbonated fruit juice and health drink.

It has an affiliated factory equipped with hi-tech facilities that conform to hygienic requirements of GMP, ranging from production of bottles and drinks to packing.

Its products include apple, grape, peach, orange, cocoa, lemon and strawberry carbonated juices.

A multifunctional super-antioxidant health drink “Pirobong” is a drawing card in the world market.

The company will steadily increase investment in the development of new brand of drinks and further promote exchange and collaboration with partners across the world.

So why does the DPRK produce competing colas? Wouln’t that be wasteful duplication of processes? No.  Monopolys are generally more wasteful than competitive firms. Though in the past there were few producers of carbonated drinks in the DPRK (Ryongsong Food Factory, Kyongryon Patriotic Soda Factory), the DPRK seems to have moved away from near-monopoly production to a more competitive industrial organization in the production of soda.

Kim Jong-il’s sister, Kim Kyong-hui (KKH), is director of the Light Industry Department in the Worker’s Party and as a result holds all colas in her job portfolio. Without having any special data on the DPRK’s cola market, I would speculate that KKH promotes competition between the different soda producers to increase efficiency and profits for the ultimate goal of improving the positions of her discretionary official and unofficial budgets.

As an aside, earlier this year Forbes ran a story about meetings held between the DPRK’s Taepung International Investment Group and Coca Cola. Taephing is directed by Jang Song-thaek, Kim Kyong-hui’s husband.

Disney

In the past I have pointed out the appearance of Disney characters on North Korean apparel (see here for example). Now they are showing up on mobile phones:

History 1

Here is a video of Lim Su-kyung in Pyongyang (1989). Here is a story about her in the Daily NK. I think I just found her Facebook profile!

 

History 2

Here is a map of Pyongyang produced int he 1800s.  Other maps of the region here. Hat tip to Kwang On Yoo.

 

Lift troubles

Here is a 30+ minute video shot in Pyongyang–nearly entirley in the dark. Hat tip to Leonid Petrov.

The video caption reads: “We were touring the 3 Revolutions Exhibition in Pyongyang in 2009, when our elevator lost all power and 11 of us were stuck in blackness, hanging by a North Korean thread.”

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Japan – DPRK football match 2011

November 6th, 2011

UPDATE 1 (2011-11-6): According to the Wall Street Journal:

Japanese football fans are scrambling to secure one of the few seats available on an organized spectator tour to watch the national football team’s World Cup qualifying match against North Korea in Pyongyang on Nov. 15.

It is the first time Japan will play against its enigmatic neighbor on the latter’s home soil in 22 years.

The absence of diplomatic ties between Japan and North Korea has turned coordinating plans into a logistical workout for the Japan Football Association. It has also put a high premium on the 150 tickets available to Japanese citizens, according to the limit imposed by North Korea. The JFA said it is still negotiating with North Korea to try to raise that number.

Just 65 tickets are available for the official tour package. Ticket sales opened Tuesday, sold via Tokyo-based Nishitetsu Travel Co. The travel agency was already taking down names for a waiting list by the following morning.

The three-day, two-night excursion is priced at about ¥288,000, or roughly $3,700. Because there are currently no direct flights to Pyongyang, a special charter was arranged.

Even then, the trip was almost called off. The Japanese government only gave its formal approval Tuesday in support of the team, JFA officials and fans visiting the country: Tokyo has strongly discouraged residents from visiting North Korea citing economic sanctions imposed by Tokyo after a missile launch in 2006. (North Koreans are banned from entering Japan)

Meanwhile, another 65 tickets that were available for the trip were sold. Seats for a choice of two packages to Pyongyang sold out last month, according to Serie Co., a Tokyo-based travel company that organizes football tours. While there was more interest in attending this game compared to past qualifying matches, company president Masashi Tokuda said, there was also more anxiety. Following numerous inquiries, Mr. Tokuda and other employees went to North Korea to inspect the destination spots that would be on the tour—Kim Il-Sung Stadium where the match will be held, restaurants, hotel and sightseeing areas. The company posted its findings on its website.

While Japan isn’t alone in its strained relations with North Korea, traces of the two countries’ unique history has materialized on the football field. North Korea’s national team draws a lot of its power from a clutch of players who are ethnically Korean, but were born and raised in Japan and identify themselves as North Korean. Now playing in Japan’s professional football league, they are third- or fourth-generation Koreans who migrated or were forcefully moved to Japan when the Japanese colonized the country from 1910-1945.

As for the match itself, Japan will be a heavy favorite, ranked No. 17 in FIFA’s world rankings to North Korea at No. 124.

And the Samurai Blue most recently defeated North Korea 1-0 in September in Saitama, Japan.

But, as sports fans know all too well, home-team advantage can be a game-changer. North Korea won 2-0 the last time the two countries faced off in Pyongyang in June 1989.

Win, lose or tie, Japan fans making the trip should bear one other thing in mind: Both tour companies said bringing noise makers and team banners to North Korea is prohibited.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-11-2): First of all, Japan is going to allow a delegation to visit the DPRK for a World Cup qulaifying match.  According to the Mainichi Daily News:

Japan will allow supporters of the national soccer team along with accompanying press to visit Pyongyang to watch a World Cup qualifier against North Korea later this month, top government spokesman Osamu Fujimura said Tuesday.

The decision is an exceptional measure to be taken by Japan, which has asked its nationals to refrain from visiting North Korea as part of sanctions imposed following North Korea’s missile launch in July 2006.

The chief Cabinet secretary said at a news conference that the exception will only apply for members of the national team, and accompanying reporters and supporters who register for official tours organized by the Japan Football Association to attend the Nov. 15 qualifier for the 2014 FIFA World Cup.

Fujimura said the government decided to make an exception for the match because there is “great national interest.” He also said the government believes it should avoid any negative feedback on Japan’s bid to host international competitions such as the Olympics by not having politics interfere in sports activities.

According to JFA vice president Kozo Tashima, North Korea plans to only allow up to 150 Japanese supporters to enter the country. The JFA will continue to negotiate with North Korea about increasing the number, Tashima said.

The JFA, after discussing the matter with the government, initially asked the North Korean soccer association to arrange for the entry of 200 to 300 people. But the request was rejected because of limited capacity at hotels and on chartered flights, according to Tashima.

The JFA said the official tour led by Nishitetsu Travel Co. will offer 65 places and its application process will last until Friday. About 10 JFA officials are expected to join the tour.

The government will ban travelers from carrying goods to or from North Korea and ask them to notify the government if they intend to take over 100,000 yen in cash.

In August, Japan allowed the North Korean national team to enter the country for a World Cup qualifying match, in a similar exception to the ban in principle on North Koreans coming to Japan that was imposed in protest at Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons testing in October 2006 among other bilateral issues.

Read the full story here:
Japan to allow supporters to visit N. Korea for World Cup qualifier
Mainichi Daily News
2011-11-2

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US State Department issues new DPRK travel warning

November 5th, 2011

According to the State Department web page (November 3):

Travel Warning
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Bureau of Consular Affairs
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of

November 03, 2011

The Department of State continues to warn U.S. citizens about travel to North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK). The North Korean government will detain, prosecute, and sentence those who enter the DPRK without first having received explicit, official permission and an entry visa from its government. Travel by U.S. citizens to North Korea is not routine, and U.S. citizens crossing into North Korea, even accidently, have been subject to arrest and long-term detention. Since January 2009, four U.S. citizens have been arrested for entering North Korea illegally. In 2010, a fifth U.S. citizen, who had a valid DPRK visa in his U.S. passport, was arrested inside North Korea on unspecified charges.

The Government of North Korea imposes heavy fines and long prison sentences with hard labor on persons who enter the country without a valid passport and a North Korean visa. If you travel unescorted inside North Korea without explicit official authorization, North Korean security personnel may view your actions as espionage.

Security personnel may view any unauthorized attempt you make to talk to a North Korean citizen as espionage. North Korean authorities may fine or arrest you for unauthorized currency transactions or for shopping at stores not designated for foreigners.

It is a criminal act in North Korea to show disrespect to the country’s current and former leaders, Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung. North Korean authorities have threatened foreign journalists who questioned the policies or public statements of the DPRK or the actions of the current leadership

North Korean government authorities may also view taking unauthorized pictures as espionage, confiscate cameras and film, and/or detain the photographer. DPRK border officials routinely confiscate visitors’ cell phones upon arrival, returning the phone only upon departure. Foreign visitors to North Korea may be arrested, detained, or expelled for activities that would not be considered criminal outside the DPRK, including involvement in unsanctioned religious and political activities, engaging in unauthorized travel, or interaction with the local population.

The United States and the DPRK do not have diplomatic and consular relations. Since the United States does not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with North Korea, the U.S. government cannot provide normal consular services to its citizens in North Korea. The Swedish Embassy, the U.S. Protecting Power in the DPRK capital of Pyongyang, provides limited consular services to U.S. citizens traveling in North Korea who are ill, injured, arrested, or who have died while there. However, the Protecting Power cannot get U.S. citizens out of jail or pay their criminal fines.

U.S. citizens who plan to travel to North Korea are strongly encouraged to contact the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China about their trip by enrolling in the State Department’s Smart Traveler Enrollment Program. If you have received official permission and are going to visit North Korea by transiting China, please take the time to tell the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China, about your trip. If you check in, we can keep you up to date with important safety and security announcements. You will also help your friends and family get in touch with you in an emergency. By enrolling, you make it easier for the U.S. Embassy or Consulate to contact you in case of an emergency. Here is the link to the State Department’s Smart Traveler Enrollment Program.

China residents can contact U.S. Embassy Beijing directly:

U. S. Embassy Beijing: The Embassy is located near the Ladies’ Street (Nuren Jie) and Laitai Flower Market, opposite the Kempinski Hotel and Lufthansa shopping Center.

U.S. Embassy Beijing
American Citizens Services Unit
No. 55 An Jia Lou Road
Chaoyang District

Beijing, China 100600
Telephone: (86-10) 8531-4000
Facsimile: (86-10) 8531-3300
Email: [email protected]
Emergency after-hours telephone: (86-10) 8531-4000

You may also wish to contact the Embassy of Sweden by telephone or email about your trip:

The Embassy of Sweden Pyongyang (U.S. Protecting Power) in North Korea.
Munsu-Dong District
Pyongyang, DPRK
Telephone: (850-2) 3817 485 (reception)
Telephone: (850-2) 3817 904, (850-2) 3817 907 (First Secretary)
Telephone: (850-2) 3817 908, (850-2) 3817 905 (Ambassador)
Facsimile: (850-2) 3817 663
Email: [email protected]

U.S. citizens should also consult the Department of State’s Country Specific Information for North Korea, and the current Worldwide Caution, which are located on the Department’s Internet travel website. U.S. citizens can obtain current information on safety and security conditions by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll-free in the United States and Canada or, from outside the United States and Canada, +1-202-501-4444. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).

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Daily NK reports Workers’ Party shakeup in North Pyongan

November 3rd, 2011

UPDATE 3 (2011-11-3): According to the Daily NK:

Following September’s mass censure of more than thirty Party cadres in North Pyongan Province and Shinuiju, sources have informed Daily NK of an additional investigation leading to at least five executions and one suicide in a fishing region of the province.

According to the sources, the investigation was concentrated Unjong Village on the island of Shinmi, part of Seoncheon County around 70km south east of Shinuiju City [See in Google Maps here].

According to one of the sources, “On the 28th of last month they gathered provincial Party cadres and trading organ workers at Seoncheon Hall [See in Google Maps here] to report the inspection results and strengthen solidarity.”

The source gave more detail, saying, “They said they shot the head of the unit, his vice (female; 39), the captain of a clam fishing vessel, the local Party secretary responsible for food distribution and the head of Unjong Village cooperative farm, firing sixty bullets into each person at the shooting range of Seoncheon County Chosun People’s Army Base.”

The head of the fishing unit was executed on suspicion of having embezzled $60,000 and shifted it to a bank in China, the source explained.

“Aside from the execution of those five people, the local chief prosecutor then committed suicide,” the source went on. “The head of the local NSA and ten cadres were also dismissed.” The source also noted that the incident led to the dismissal of at least one provincial Party secretary.

While the investigation was ongoing the adopted daughter of the head of Unjong Village cooperative farm apparently even tried to hide the head of the fishing team in their family home so as to conceal her own father’s misconduct, but ended up in detention herself as a result.

According to the sources, the investigation was conducted by agents sent not from Pyongyang but from North Hamkyung Province, and as the shockwave of the devastation in Seoncheon County spread up to the provincial Party level, this fact began to cause regionalism to flare.

One of the sources explained, “The inspection team from North Hamkyung Province had no love for that place and they punished everyone one-by-one, so the incident got bigger. I have no idea where they will destroy next.”

This was apparently done so that the work could be driven forward by that regionalism, but also so its planners in Pyongyang could avoid complaint. This is not uncommon on the Korean Peninsula; indeed, in South Korea under military dictatorship units were frequently dispatched to other parts of the country to quell disturbances.

Elsewhere during the Seoncheon Hall meeting, the fates of key people in the original purge of North Pyongan Province (as previously reported by Daily NK) were also reported;

Kim Yoon Ho, the provincial guidance department head, was exiled to Dongrim County on charges of illegally mobilizing farm workers. However, his case is now under review thanks to the intervention of the provincial Party Chief Secretary.

Kim Cheol Ho (son of candidate member of the Politburo and head of the Party Cadres Department Kim Pyeong Hae, and Shinuiju municipal guidance head) was exiled to Dongchang County.

Local People’s Committee Chairman Park Cheon Geun was demoted.

The secretary of Wonlim, a marine products enterprise, was sent to Changson County on charges of embezzling $2,000.

However, Kim Jae Hwa, a Supreme People’s Assembly delegate and Shinuiju city commercial director, only received a light punishment from the Party even though he stole 70 tons of beans from the state.

UPDATE 2 (2011-10-4): According to the Daily NK:

The Daily NK has learned that the recent mass purge of more than 30 cadres from the provincial and municipal arms of the Party in North Pyongan Province and Shinuiju City came about as part of efforts to help bed in the Kim Jong Eun era while aiding new provincial Party Chief Secretary Lee Man Geon in taking hold of provincial affairs.

3 of the top 10 figures in the North Pyongan Province Party hierarchy were among those swept away in the purge at the start of last month, including the provincial Party propaganda and guidance heads and figures from within the security apparatus.

Lee, who reportedly led the purge, rose to his current position as a result of the promotion of predecessor Kim Pyeong Hae to a central Party post at the Chosun Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference in September, 2010

However, it appears that, partly because Kim had been promoted rather than removed, Lee struggled for almost a year to seize control of the provincial levers of power. Accordingly, the current assessment from inside North Korea is that Lee, with the backing of Kim Jong Eun, launched a power struggle to liquidate the Kim Pyeong Hae faction.

One source explained more today, saying, “On July 6th, a ‘gruppa’ from the central Party accompanied the General on an onsite inspection in Shinuiju, and they did some extensive vetting of provincial and city cadres. At that time, Chief Secretary Lee Man Geon joined with the Kim Jong Eun faction and set about sorting them out on charges of corruption.”

“Lee Man Geon read Kim Jong Eun’s mind and, so as to implant the successor’s faction, actively pursued charges of corruption against the cadres then kicked them out,” the source went on.

Meanwhile, Kim Pyeong Hae, who had become a candidate member of the Politburo and the head of the Party Cadres Department, also appears to have stopped work for the time being.

According to the source, “Kim Pyeong Hae was stopped from working in the middle of September. His second son Kim Gyeong Ho (former guidance head for the Shinuiju municipal Party) also lost his job; this really surprised Shinuiju cadres.”

Kim Pyeong Hae has not been seen in public since September 12th, after appearing on name lists at public events every day from the 8th until that time. That does not mean that Kim has been removed permanently, it is too early to say that, but it does appear that he may have been taken out of the front line for the time being.

UPDATE 1 (2011-9-27): According to the Daily NK:

The removal of more than 30 cadres in North Pyongan Province represents an anticipated shift in the provincial power structure for the purpose of establishing the Kim Jong Eun leadership structure. Branding existing cadres as corrupt, removing them and transfusing in fresh blood are all part of the liquidation and reformation work of the Kim Jong Eun era.

Although unsurprising in itself, the ‘purge of North Pyongan’ has, however, exceeded expectations in terms of target and scale. Everyone knew that Kim Jong Eun, having guaranteed the loyalty of organs of state security, had begun to work on the Party apparatus, but that he would do so in such a lightning fast and apparently violent manner did come as a surprise.

More than 30 cadres have been dismissed, including the North Pyongan Province propaganda secretary and Guidance Department head. The two, in addition to the head of workers’ unions in the province, were among the ten most powerful Party figures in the whole region. In particular, the head of the Guidance Department could be called the yoke at the core of the egg of provincial Party operations.

But slicing off limbs in this way, only one year after the former North Pyongan Province Party secretary was himself replaced by Lee Man Geon, offers a warning; show absolute loyalty to Kim Jong Eun.

As the second-in-command in practice, Kim has been dealing out cadre changes at higher levels since 2009. This has included inflicting retirement on Kim Young Joo, Kim Il Cheol and more, while rapidly elevating people like Lee Young Ho.

The purging of the former deputy head of the National Security Agency, Ryu Kyung, was taken in much the same way when it came to light earlier this year; namely as a part of the establishment of the succession system.

It was thus to be expected that having changed much of the central structure via the Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference last year, Kim would begin to realize changes in the provincial structure. Kim is now doing so, exercising his oversight powers via the central Party guidance structure and purging corrupt cadres.

“He can take away from this the ‘effect of a domestic crackdown’, namely the atmosphere of loyalty it creates, and the ‘effect of change’, namely the ability to plant his own younger people by cutting people for being corrupt,” explained Cheong Seong Chang of the Sejong Institute to The Daily NK today.

Such processes are rather common in dictatorships, and this is far from being the first time such events have unfolded in North Korea, either. Various corruption incidents ‘came to light’ during the March of Tribulation in the 1990s, used by Kim Jong Il to quiet complaints about the leadership in Pyongyang.

“Kim Jong Il regularly dismissed people, to both turn people’s anger at the leadership onto the mid-level cadres and at the same time evade responsibility for anything by suggesting that it was mid-level bribery that was precluding the people’s economy from improving,” according to Cheong.

In 1999, for example, there was the simultaneous purging of a number of figures from Yangkang Province, including the provincial Party general secretary and NSA secretary, Unheung County secretary and the political commissar for the No. 376 Unit of the Chosun People’s Army.

The provincial general secretary was dismissed on the premise that he had failed to prevent the rapid influx of ‘capitalist culture’ across the Sino-North Korean border, the NSA man because he had embezzled Party funds, and the Unheung County secretary and political commissar because they had taken bribes. All were subsequently executed, as is also often the case.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-9-26): According to the Daily NK:

The punishment of more than thirty officials from Party organs in North Pyongan Province is sending shockwaves through the national Party apparatus.

A number of sources within North Korea have confirmed the news in conversation with The Daily NK in the last few days, saying that the situation began to unfold at the beginning of this month and that the individuals were nominally singled out due to corruption.

The recent purge reportedly includes:

▲ Dismissal and loss of all privileges for the head of the provincial Guidance Department
▲ Sacking for the provincial propaganda secretary, as well as the head of the workers’ union and department responsible for power supply
▲ Demotion for the head of the Shinuiju People’s Assembly
▲ Sacking for the head of the city’s security forces and more than ten other city cadres
▲ Internal punishment for more than ten other party officials

A source from Sinuiju said “The dismissal of the propaganda secretary and head of the Guidance Department, people who are effectively in charge of the provincial party, as well as the removal of the municipal People’s Assembly chairman, all within a few days of one another, has left Shinuiju cadres in shock.”

The dismissed propaganda secretary was effectively the third most powerful cadre in North Pyongan Province, a man whose principal responsibilities include overseeing the idolization of the Kim family and the political education of the people, while the head of the Guidance Department and the workers’ union were effectively the 4th and 10th most powerful. As the main figure in the provincial Party Assembly, the head of the Guidance Department also had oversight powers over the chief secretary and organizing secretary. The appointment of all the dismissed officials falls under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Party Guidance Department.

Thus, the majority of defectors believe it implausible that the Party would punish so many heavyweight figures for corruption at once, even with the storm trooper inspections of a month ago as a catalyst.

Vice-President of Radio Free Chosun, Jang Sung Moo agreed, telling The Daily NK today, “It is highly unlikely that the authorities would get rid of the third, fourth and tenth most powerful figures in North Pyongan Province just for corruption. There is a good chance that there will be further charges down the track regarding other matters; espionage for example. That’s the only way ordinary people will be able to grasp it.”

South Korean intelligence agencies are already aware of the high profile sackings.

The highly irregular events in North Pyongan Province have caused consternation in other regions as well, sources say. According to one, “The numerous sackings of important cadres has left other cadres worried. Many of them can’t understand why their colleagues are being replaced all of a sudden.”

Interestingly, one of the dismissed cadres, the now ex-head of Shinuiju’s Guidance Department, is former North Pyongan Province Chief Secretary Kim Pyeong Hye’s son. Kim is regarded as one of Kim Jong Il’s closest associates after being promoted to the head of the Party Cadres Department at last year’s Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference. Thus, many people find it unlikely, at best, that corruption would be enough to bring down the son of one of Kim Jong Il’s trusted associates.

Accordingly, the purge could be a part of plans to facilitate Kim Jong Eun’s seizure of control of the Party. It is generally accepted that his takeover of the security forces is mostly complete, and instilling a measure of fear in the provincial elite is one method Kim is now likely to employ to help cement his grip.

Read the full stories here:
North Pyongan Party Cut Down to Size
Daily NK
Lee Seok Young
2011-9-26

 

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