Archive for the ‘Uncategorized’ Category

Hacking…

Thursday, March 28th, 2013

Today I discovered someone trying to hack into this web page.

So everyone out there, keep a close eye on your systems and be safe.

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Pueblo moved to war museum

Thursday, March 14th, 2013

UPDATE 9 (2013-4-11): Here is a satellite image of the Pueblo in its new location:

Pueblo-2013-Google Earth

UPDATE 8 (2013-4-11): Naenara provides basic information on how the Pueblo was moved:

Pueblo-moved-bu-truck-naenara

UPDATE 7 (2013-3-18): Koryo Tours has posted a photo of the ship on Instagram. The ship is not part of tourist itineraries just yet, but it is visible from the Mansu Bridge.

UPDATE 6 (2013-3-14): North Korean television has showed the pueblo for the first time since it was moved from its position on the Taedong River. It appears to have been painted Orange. You can see the ship in this video clip:

Here is a Google Earth satellite image showing the approximate location of the USS Pueblo as of 2013-3-14:

Pueblo-location-2013-3-14

UPDATE 5 (2012-12-4): Koryo Tours has also posted video to their Facebook Page of the spot where the Pueblo used to be. You can see the video here.

UPDATE 4 (2012-12-4): Koryo Tours has posted images of the empty dock where the Pueblo Used to be. Here is one:

You can see the other two photos here.

UPDATE 3 (2012-12-4): Thanks to the Wall Street Journal!

UPDATE 2 (2012-12-2): I was wrong.  It looks like the Pueblo is being moved to the Fatherland Liberation War Museum/Memorial Hall.

This weekend North Korean television ran footage of a new building being constructed next to the Fatherland Liberation War Memorial. Here is a Google Earth satellite image of the the building construction:

Here is the footage from North Korean television:

A much appreciated reader  informs me that at the 1:59 mark in the film an officer says USS Pueblo will be docked here (next to the new building).

UPDATE 1 (2012-11-29): NK News offers more info on the history of the ship.

ORIGINAL POST (2012-11-29): Koryo Tours, who this year published the first interior images of the Ryugyong Hotel, reports another scoop from Pyongyang: The Pueblo has been moved from its dock on the Taedong River in Central Pyongyang. The observation was made sometime between November 19 – 24.

The image below (from the Koryo Tours Facebook Page) is photo-shopped, but it gives an idea of what the space looks like now:

The most recent Google Earth imagery of the site (2012-10-13) shows the Pueblo safely docked in Pyongyang, so the ship was moved sometime after this date.

As the Koryo Tours photo suggests, the ship could have been moved into the Fatherland Liberation War Museum. It is currently under renovation:

The above satellite image (Google Earth) was taken 2012-10-13. You can read about the renovations in KCNA here.

However, I consider the likelihood that the Pueblo has been moved into the museum to be very small for a number of reasons.  We will see over the next few months whether the DPRK has new plans for the ship or whether it has just been temporarily moved for maintenance reasons.

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UNSC Resolution 2094: Response to DPRK’s third nuclear test

Thursday, March 7th, 2013

UPDATE 6 (2013-3-11): Here is the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs response to the UNSC Resolution 2094. As you can imagine, they do not approve.

UPDATE 5 (2013-3-8): The full official resolution can be read here.  Here is the DPRK response to 2094. Here is some information on the Chinese response. Here is some more analysis/commentary from Scott Snyder in The Diplomat. Choson Ilbo reports that large North Korean bank accounts exempt from sanctions.

UPDATE 4 (2013-3-7): The resolution has passed 15-0.  Read more at the BBC, Washington Post, New York Times. Marcus Noland commentary here and here. Victor Cha hereNK Leadership Watch has more on the events in Pyongyang

UPDATE 3 (2013-3-7): Once made public, the resolution will be posted here. Steve Herman (via Adam Cathcart) tweeted a link to the draft resolution which has been uploaded to Scribed. It is dated yesterday (2013-3-6).

UPDATE 2 (2012-3-7): Here is a Press Release from the US mission to the UNSC that went out this morning on the new sanctions (Resolution 2094). Thanks to Aidan Foster-Carter.

For reasons of brevity, I have put the entire document into this PDF for download.

UPDATE 1 (2013-3-7): Yonhap offers details on the unpublished sanctions proposal put forth by the US and China:

The three North Korean arms dealers are: Yon Chong-nam, the chief representative for the Korea Mining Developing Trading Corp (KOMID); Ko Chol-chae, the deputy chief representative for the KOMID; and Mun Chong-chol, an official at Tanchon Central Bank, the resolution showed.

KOMID is described by the resolution as North Korea’s “primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons,” while the North Korean bank is the “main DPRK (North Korea) financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacturing of such weapons.”

The two North Korean entities are the Second Academy of Natural Sciences, which is responsible for research and development of the North’s advanced weapons systems, including “missiles and probably nuclear weapons,” and the Korea Complex Equipment Import Corp. linked to the North’s “military-related sales,” according to the draft.

The Security Council is set to vote on the draft resolution on Thursday in New York.

The new sanctions will also focus on the DPRKs shipping, air, and “financial” industries:

The Security Council “decides that all states shall inspect all cargo within or transiting through their territory that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK,” the draft said.

It also “calls upon states to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items” banned by previous U.N. resolutions, the document said.

It also makes it difficult for North Korea to move in and out “bulk cash,” in an effort to squeeze the North Korean elite’s access to hard currency.

The Security Council also calls on all states to “exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel so as to prevent such individuals from contributing to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs,” it said.

The U.N.’s powerful body “expresses its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test,” the draft warned.

The DPRK’s Uranium enrichment program also gets a mention:

Apparently mindful of the North’s uranium concerns, the draft resolution includes Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment program for the first time, condemning “all the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear activities, including its “uranium enrichment.”

The North claims its uranium enrichment program is for peaceful energy development, but outside experts believe that it would give the country a new source of fission material to make atomic bombs, in addition to its widely known plutonium-based nuclear weapons program.

The DPRK, has of course, issued a response

In response to the proposed U.N. sanctions and ongoing Seoul-Washington joint military drills, the North’s military threatened to scrap the Korean War cease-fire.

Kim Yong-chol, a hard-line North Korean general suspected of involvement in a series of provocations against the South, read the statement on state TV, saying the North “will completely declare invalid” the Armistice Agreement that ended the 1950-53 Korean War.

The North also said it will cut off a military phone line at the truce village of Panmunjom.

South Korea’s military responded to the North’s bellicose threats with a verbal salvo, warning it would strike back at the North and destroy its “command leadership,” if provoked by Pyongyang.

ORIGINAL POST (2013-3-5): According to the New York Times:

The United Nations Security Council moved closer on Tuesday to expanding sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear and ballistic missile activities. The United States and China introduced a resolution that would target North Korean bankers and overseas cash couriers, tighten inspections of suspect ship and air cargo, and subject the country’s diplomats to invasive scrutiny and increased risk of expulsion.

Passage of the measure, drafted in response to the third North Korean underground nuclear test three weeks ago, seemed all but assured, in part because China — North Korea’s major benefactor — participated in drafting the language. It would be the fourth Security Council sanctions resolution on North Korea, which has defied the previous measures with increasing belligerence. A vote was expected on Thursday.

Infuriated, North Korea vowed to scrap the 1953 armistice that halted the Korean War and threatened to attack the United States with what the North Korean government news agency called an arsenal of diverse “lighter and smaller nukes.”

American officials played down the North Korean warning, which echoed bombastic admonitions that have become part of the standard fare from the North. Still, the threat of a North Korean nuclear attack seemed all the more provocative, coming two days after North Korea conveyed a message of friendship to a visiting American group that included Dennis Rodman, the former basketball star.

Susan E. Rice, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, who introduced the resolution in a closed session of the 15-member Security Council, told reporters afterward that it “builds upon, strengthens and significantly expands the scope of the strong U.N. sanctions already in place.”

For the first time, she said, the resolution would target “the illicit activities of North Korean diplomatic personnel, North Korean banking relationships, illicit transfers of bulk cash and new travel restrictions.” In the past, North Korea has been accused of running extensive counterfeiting and illegal drug enterprises, to raise much-needed hard currency.

Ms. Rice declined to predict whether the North would respond with another nuclear test or other retaliation. “All I can tell you is that the international community is united and very firm in its opposition to North Korea’s illicit nuclear and missile programs,” she said. “And the more provocations that occur, the more isolated and impoverished, sadly, North Korea will become.”

The Americans did not publicly release the resolution text. But a Security Council diplomat familiar with the measure, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the language may still be subject to revision, said it broke new ground with restrictions and prohibitions on North Korean banking transactions, new travel restrictions and increased monitoring of North Korean ship and air cargo.

The diplomat also said that the resolution added a special lubricant and valve, needed for uranium enrichment, to items that North Korea cannot import.

The resolution would also place greater scrutiny on North Korean diplomatic personnel who are suspected of carrying proscribed goods and cash under the guise of official business, exposing them to possible deportation. “We know there are diplomats out there cooking up deals and moving funds around,” the Security Council diplomat said.

Among the other provisions, the diplomat said the resolution also included new language aimed at enforcement that had been absent from the earlier resolutions. It requires, for example, that if a North Korean cargo vessel crew refuses a host country’s request for inspection, the host is under a legal obligation to deny the vessel port access.

If a cargo plane is suspected of carrying prohibited goods to or from North Korea, the resolution would urge, but not require, that it be denied permission to fly over any other country — a new provision that could affect China, which routinely permits North Korean flights over its territory.

Previous rounds of sanctions have blacklisted trading and financial firms believed to be directly involved with nuclear and missile work. The sanctions have also restricted the importation of luxury goods, an effort directed at the country’s ruling elite.

American officials said privately that the latest resolution did not go as far as they would have liked, reflecting China’s insistence that the punitive measures remain focused on discouraging North Korea’s nuclear and missile behavior and avoid actions that could destabilize the country and lead to an economic collapse.

But the text was stronger than what some North Korean experts had anticipated, particularly the measures that could slow or frustrate the country’s banking activities and extensive dependence on cash payments in its trade with other countries.

“Going after the banking system in a broad brush way is arguably the strongest thing on this list,” said Evans J. R. Revere, a former State Department specialist in East Asian and Pacific affairs, and now senior director at the Albright Stonebridge Group, a Washington-based consulting company. “It does begin to eat into the ability of North Korea to finance many things.”

Mr. Revere attributed North Korea’s reaction on Tuesday to an accumulation of perceived affronts: China’s cooperation in drafting the sanctions, the annual military exercises under way between the United States and South Korea, and a hardened attitude by the South’s newly elected president, Park Geun-hye.

“This is North Korea’s way of saying, ‘We know you guys are doing several things, and here is our response,’ ” Mr. Revere said.

Here is coverage in The Guardian.

Here is coverage in the Washington Post.

Here is coverage of the DPRK’s response in CNN.

Here is my archive post on the DPRK’s third nuclear test.

Here is a statement (in Korean) by the North Korean military.

Read the full story here:
U.N. Resolution to Aim at North Korean Banks and Diplomats
New York Times
Rick Gladstone
2013-3-5

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My Twitter impersonator…

Tuesday, March 5th, 2013

It would be understandable if you thought I (Curtis Melvin) was the person behind the @NKeconWatch account on Twitter, but you would be mistaken. It appears that someone is impersonating me on Twitter.

twitter-screencenter

To the person who set the account up: I have made multiple attempts to contact you, but you have not replied to any of my messages. That is not very professional for the following reasons:

1. All the people following you think they are following me.

2. All of the people you are following think I am following them.

3. All of the people contacting you think they are contacting me.

Please leave a comment in this post (or contact me on twitter/facebook/email) so we can start talking.  Otherwise I am going to have Twitter shut the account down–and I don’t want to do that.  But I do want to know who you are and how to reach you so we can make all of this a little more transparent.

Sincerely,

Curtis (aka @CurtisMelvin)

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A random Monday post

Monday, March 4th, 2013

I must have offended Dennis Rodman.  When he arrived in Pyongyang, he tweeted coverage in NKeconWatch:

Dennis-rodman-tweet-2013-2-26-box

I have outlined the tweet above in yellow.  If you check the URL (ow.ly/i4Vxi), it still links to this post.

Despite my relative popularity with a nerdy and obscure corner of the blog-o-sphere, however, within a day or two the tweet was deleted and replaced:

Rodman-tweet-2013-2-28-box

I have no idea what I did to offend Mr. Rodman, but I find it interesting that he wants to distance himself from me.  I don’t even have any piercings (they are terribly impractical for Brazilian Jiu Jitsu).

_________________

Comrade Kim Goes Flying will make its US debut this week (March 8 and 9) at the Miami Film Festival.

Learn more here.

Also, for those people who think they have been everywhere….Koryo Tours has launched a new tour to TOFALARIA in Siberia!  Check out the information here.

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North Korea in Transition

Friday, February 15th, 2013

NK-in-transition-book

North Korea in Transition
Editors: Kyung-Ae Park, Scott Snyder
Order at Amazon.com: Book formatKindle format

Read a review in the Wall Street Journal.

More quality North Korean books  and videos can be found here.

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Friday Fun: The DPRK’s AK-47 and new calendar

Friday, February 8th, 2013

I thought I had posted this before, but apparently not….

A friend of mine in the law enforcement community down in South Florida went to a shooting range where he had the chance to fire a North Korean AK-47.

DPRK-ak-47-2

DPRK-ak-47-1

The gun was seized in a operation somewhere. I don’t know where, how, or when, but I sure would like to.

Also, Koryo Tours has posted the picture of a new DPRK 2013 calendar to their Facebook Page:

Koryo-tpurs-2013-calendar

The birthdays of President Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are highlighted, but nothing for Kim Jong-un’s birthday.

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38 North’s DPRK Digital Atlas

Monday, January 28th, 2013

I have worked with 38 North to publish the DPRK Digital Atlas. This is the most comprehensive and authoritative source of administrative boundaries in the DPRK that is publicly available:

Here is some information on the project:

The DPRK Digital Atlas is a resource developed by 38 North, working with Curtis Melvin (North Korean Economy Watch) and a talented team of programmers. It is part of 38 North’s on-going effort to provide various information and analysis resources to help policymakers, researchers, and the general public better understand the DPRK. The data for this project has been culled and vetted through a number of sources to provide users with the most accurate geographic information available at this time.

The atlas was created in Google Earth and then converted to a browser-based application to allow users to search the map either by name (English and Korean), coordinates, or simply by browsing through the drop down menus. Because it is built on the Google Earth platform, users can see the latest publicly available satellite imagery of any specific point or area as they are searching.

In this first iteration of the atlas, users can browse through the provinces, cities, counties, districts, towns and villages throughout the DPRK. Although it is the most comprehensive satellite mapping project of the DPRK, this remains an on-going GIS project, and future iterations will provide even greater detail and a wider variety of localities and features.

We are in debt to the following people and organizations for their contribution of key resources for the completion of this project: Jonathan Ung, Tam Nguyen, “Hank,” Stephen Mercado, Michael Rank, PSCORE, and the George Washington University Gelman Library’s Asia Reading Room.

The web page is fairly intuitive, but there is a separate page containing instructions. Data sources are listed on the atlas “About” page.

An older version of my infrastructure mapping project, North Korea Uncovered, can be found here. Although it was published in 2009, I have been working on it for nearly every day since. I am not someone who tends to exaggeration, but it is the most authoritative map of the DPRK’s infrastructure that will be made publicly available. I hope to publish it soon…

In closing, there is no golf course on Yanggak Island. And this is interesting.

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Speculation time: A new kwan-li-so or expansion of Camp 14?

Friday, January 18th, 2013

UPDATE 3 (2017-2-10): According to the White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2013 (2013-05-16), this new prison camp was formed from the remnants of the closed Camp 18 in Pukchang County:

2012년에 확인된 또 다른 변화로는 평남 북창군 신흥리 및 삼포동 일대에 위치하던 북창 18호 관리소가 대폭 축소되어 평남 개천 동림리 지역으로 이전하였다는 사실이다.

Another change confirmed in 2012 is that Camp 18, located in the vicinity of Pukchang, Pyongnam, got downsized by a large degree and moved to 동림리, 개천, Pyongnam.

18호 관리소가 관할하던 지역은 단 계적 해제 과정을 거쳐 일반시설로 환원되었고, 여전히 해제되지 않은 수용자들은 2006~2007년경 개천 지역으로 이전한 것으로 파악된다.

The area controlled by Camp 18 got gradually disassembled and changed into a general facility [Pongchang Coal Mine], and remaining inmates were sent to 개천 area in around 2006 and 2007.

현재 18호 관리소의 수용인원은 2009년 정부 추정치인 1만 9천 명보다 훨씬 축소된 2천~5천 명 규모로 추정된다.

The current estimate of the number of inmates in Camp 18 ranges from 2,000 to 5,000, much down from the 2009 government estimate of 19,000.

However, as of 2013 the former Camp 18 location has been reopened as a new prison camp. Its name and administrative classification are still unknown.

UPDATE 2 (2016-3-17): Joseph Bermudez has written about this site for HRNK, in which he calls it “Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area“.

UPDATE 1 (2013-1-21): Thanks to the Daily NK and Wall Street Journal for helping to reach out to others who may know about this facility. Here is an interview I did for NPR.

ORIGINAL POST (2013-1-18): Today (Friday) Google Earth was updated with new satellite imagery (dated 2011-9-21) of the area around Camps 14 and 18 (Kwan-li-so 14). Camp 18 is said to have been closed for a few years and the area has even been featured on North Korean television (See Pongchang District Coal Mine, 봉창지구탄광, here and here).

While updating my Google Earth file to match the new satellite imagery, however, I noticed the addition of a new area that bears striking similarity to other known “kwan-li-so (관리소)” or prison camps. This area was built sometime between 2006-12-17 and 2011-9-21. It is surrounded by a very visible security perimeter. It is also placed right next to Camp 14– even sharing 3kms of border.

Camp14-logo

New-camp-logo

Pictured Above (Google Earth): The location of interest next to Camp 14 in Kaechon County

Let’s look at this new area more closely. The security perimeter is approximately 20km in circumference  There are two entrances on the northwestern edge of the fence:

new-camp-entrance-2006-12-17 new-camp-entrance-2011-9-21-logo

Pictured above is the northern most entrance. The picture on the left is dated 2006-12-17. The picture on the right is dated 2011-9-21.

new-camp-entrance-2-2006 new-camp-entrance-2-2011-logo

Pictured above is the southern entrance.  This appears to more of a staff or auxiliary entrance.

There appear to be six new buildings constructed around the perimeter that could serve as guard posts/facilities. Three of them are identical:

new-camp-guard-posts

There has been some new residential and administrative units added to the interior as well:

new-camp-interior-2006 new-camp-interiot-2011-logo

Pictured above (Google Earth): Residential and administrative construction within the perimeter fence. This village does not appear on any North Korean atlas that I have seen.

There is an old coal mine inside the perimeter fence, but it does not appear to be operational.  Comparisons of debris show that coal piles have become overgrown with trees since 2004. In addition, the electrical substation that was located here to power the mine (before the fence was built)  has been removed:

new-camp-substation-2004 GoogleEarth_Image

So I don’t want to jump to any conclusions here, but this facility certainly raises flags.  I look forward to hearing opinions and information/criticism from the wider North Korea-watching community.

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Kim Jong-un’s new year address (2013)

Friday, January 11th, 2013

Kim Jong-un ditched the new year “Joint Editorial” of the Kim Jong-il era and has personally taken on the role of reading a new year speech (appx .5 hrs)–as was done by his grandfather, Kim Il-sung. Here is a video of the speech (in Korean..no subtitles):

KCNA published the text of the full speech. Here is the English version. Here is the Korean version.

Having read it all, I can understand why Kim Jong-il did not want to give these speeches.  If I had absolute power I would not want to either.  Here is some analysis that others have provided:

The New York Times highlighted Kim jong-un’s softening tone towards South Korea:

“A key to ending the divide of the nation and achieving reunification is to end the situation of confrontation between the North and the South,” Mr. Kim said. “A basic precondition to improving North-South relations and advancing national reunification is to honor and implement North-South joint declarations.”

He was referring to two inter-Korean agreements, signed in 2000 and 2007, when two South Korean presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, were pursuing a “Sunshine Policy” of reconciliation and economic cooperation with North Korea and met Mr. Kim’s father in the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.

And on economics:

In his speech, Kim Jong-un, echoed themes of previous New Year’s messages, emphasizing that improving the living standards of North Koreans and rejuvenating the agricultural and light industries were among the country’s main priorities.

But he revealed no details of any planned economic policy changes. He mentioned only a need to “improve economic leadership and management” and “spread useful experiences created in various work units.”

The Daily NK issued this commentary:

According to the Ministry of Unification in Seoul, “Overall there was no new policy; they stuck to the existing line.”

In last year’s New Year’s Joint Editorial, the Kim Jong Il era equivalent of this morning’s address, a North Korean regime conscious of the risks of succession emphasized little more than the need to adhere closely to the last instructions of Kim Jong Il as a means of promoting social stability. Kim Jong Il’s name was mentioned a total of 34 times in that editorial.

This year, Kim Jong Eun focused on propagating the accomplishments of his first year, predominantly the December 12th rocket launch success, which he set up as an example for all sectors of the North Korean economy to promote growth. He even put forward a rocket-inspired slogan for 2013, calling for overall economic development based on the “spirit that conquered the universe.”

Cho Bong Hyun, a researcher with IBK’s economic research arm, told Daily NK today, “The core characteristic of this year’s New Year’s Address was emphasizing the Unha-3 launch and linking it to the economy. Kim Jong Eun seems to be planning to use the success of the rocket launch as a tool with which to vitalize the economy.”

However, the list of major achievements mentioned in the address included the military parade that marked the 100th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth, the completion of Huichon Dam and its affiliated power plant, and the construction of athletic facilities around Pyongyang. It is hard not to regard such projects as indicators of North Korea’s fundamental economic weakness rather than strength.

Kim made references to reunification and improving relations with South Korea as well, but did not appear to offer a compromise position that could spur dialogue. Indeed, he appeared also to confirm that Kim Jong Il’s military-first political line is set to continue in 2013 and on into Kim Jong Eun’s rule.

Regarding the softer tone with South Korea, the Daily NK had this to say:

The message for South Korea in North Korea’s statement for the New Year was considerably more gracious than that of last year. Kim Jong Eun stated in his address, as per the subsequent official translation, “An important issue in putting an end to the division of the country and achieving its reunification is to remove confrontation between the north and the south.”

Despite the fact that the “unity of the Korean people” has been a constant theme of North Korean discourse over several decades now, the reaction to Kim’s words was abnormally enthusiastic. Some experts even believe that the speech revealed Kim Jong Eun’s ardent wish to restore inter-Korean relations, and say that North Korea is sure to put more weight on dialogue with South Korea going forward. The state-run Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) concluded that North Korea has returned to a gentler South Korea policy.

Yet the reality is that North Korea has been going back and forth between dialogue and provocation over many years. This was even true under the left wing Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations. Lest we should forget, at the launch of the Lee Myung Bak administration in 2008, the first conservative administration for ten years, North Korea expressed great anticipation that progress in inter-Korean relations was impending.

At that time, North Korea called for the creation of “a new history of peaceful prosperity” and the promotion of legal and institutional mechanisms to prepare for unification. However, as inter-Korean relations went astray and Kim Jong Eun moved closer to the driving seat, North Korea embarked on a set of extreme provocations. Mind you, even then North and South were still discussing the possibility of a summit behind the scenes.

North Korea has chosen to limit its attacks on the new administration for one major reason; to test it. This happened in the 2003 and 2008 addresses (then known as the New Year’s Joint Editorial); indeed, it happens each time a new administration is launched down in Seoul.

The Daily NK also reports that the new year speech’s treatment of economic issues is nothing new:

[…] Promoting the development of light industry has been a key feature of a number of recent New Year’s Joint Editorials, the keynote editorial carried across North Korea’s three main publications; Rodong Shinmun (for the Chosun Workers’ Party), Chosun People’s Army (for the military) and Minju Chosun (for the Cabinet).

Evan Ramstad at the Wall Street Journal highlights a similar theme.  In his article, “North Korea’s Message: New Style, Similar Script“, he very cleverly compares 2013, 2012, 2011 publications. They are very similar.

Stephan Haggard confesses to being worn down (as am I), but offers some thoughtful comments nonetheless:

The basic economic message seems to be “do everything,” which is really equivalent to not prioritizing anything at all. But it is possibly worse than that. The slogan for the year is “Let us bring about a radical turn in the building of an economic giant with the same spirit and mettle as were displayed in conquering space!” This approach suggests that the regime’s thinking is still locked into the idea of leapfrogging, “100 day battles,” and monumentalism; indeed, the first reference to economics in the speech is to “Juche-oriented and modern factories and enterprises and reconstructed major production bases in key industrial sectors on the basis of advanced science and technology…”

If there is any logic to the speech—a big assumption—it sounds like heavy industry comes first. (“By adopting decisive steps to shore up the vanguard sectors of the national economy and the sectors of basic industries, we should develop coal-mining, electric-power and metallurgical industries and rail transport on a preferential basis and provide a firm springboard for the building of an economic giant.”) This is disheartening to say the least, but who knows? In the next section, the speech says the country should concentrate on people’s livelihoods, agriculture and light industry “too,” and also with the increasing emphasis seen in recent speeches on “science and technology” as a panacea.

Haggard followed up with these comments:

We see three things in the speech, editorials and posters that are discouraging. The first is the ongoing confusion between ends (being a strong and prosperous nation) and the strategy of getting there (heavy industry first, technological leap-frogging, vague injunctions to focus on people’s livelihoods). Second, the emphasis on technology as a form of economic deliverance is everywhere (“Today’s era is an era of science and technology, and we should open up an epoch-making phase in building an economically powerful state with the power of science and technology. The key to crushing the sanctions and blockades by the imperialists and leaping forward into an economically powerful state lies in science and technology.”) A single-minded focus on technology can put a missile in space, and the launch has to be seen as an achievement. But a single-minded focus on technology can’t produce economic growth in the absence of policies that promote ongoing innovation and provide incentives to using technology in an efficient way.In our humble opinion, it is a greater–if more mundane–achievement to grow at 3-4 percent a year than to waste hundreds of millions of dollars on a non-functioning satellite and military posturing.

Which brings us to the final problem: what we call the exhortatory approach to economic growth. The endless exhortation in important speeches is not coincidental. In the absence of meaningful incentives, the only way to squeeze more juice out of the workforce is hope that they respond to nationalist appeals by increasing effort. But a country’s workforce can work very hard and remain poor if what it is doing destroys value, as forced-march economic campaigns typically do. As we know from past socialist collapses, a surprising share of the capital stock in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was essentially worthless when the final reckoning came. Effort cannot substitute for fundamentals, if anyone is even paying attention to these campaigns any more.

Evans Revere, writing for Brookings, made some interesting observations:

Kim Jong-un’s choice of venue for the New Year’s speech was important. He delivered his remarks at the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee building, a site selected to reinforce another theme of his year-old leadership: the primacy of the Party over other institutions and the role of the KWP as the main vehicle for his rule. It was no accident that the Party flag was displayed prominently next to Kim as he spoke.

Having sought to convey that he is a leader in his grandfather’s mold, and having reminded the nation (particularly the military) that the Party under his leadership is in the driver’s seat, Kim spent much of the speech holding forth on another central theme of his reign: economic growth. Looking through this section of the speech, one is hard pressed to find details about future economic plans or concrete new ideas aimed at boosting the DPRK’s anemic economy. In fact, its hortatory calls for making new “advances,” “building an economic giant,” and “breaking through the cutting edge” resemble the timeworn, empty exhortations of past New Year’s editorials. Thin gruel indeed.

Andray Abrahamian at Choson Exchange picks up on a similar theme:

For those of you with an interest in empirical measurements, Kim Jong Il’s “Songun” only got six mentions this year. Kim Il Sung’s “Juche” got 13. But as much as the content of Kim’s speech is important, the very fact that he made a speech at all demonstrates his continuing efforts to associate himself with the pre-Songun era of his grandfather. Implicit in Kim’s style is a return to the relative stability and prosperity that Kim Il Sung oversaw.

The Institute for Far Eastern Studies issued two reports on the new year speech:

Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Address Stresses Continuous Economic Management and Improvement
2013-1-4

In the New Year’s address delivered by Kim Jong Un, emphasis was placed on easing the hostile inter-Korean relations and implementation of the June 15 inter-Korean joint declaration.

An intriguing point of this year’s speech was its format, as Kim Jong Un’s delivery of the New Year’s Address was televised — a rare occurrence, considering the last one to be televised was that given by Kim Il Sung in 1994, some nineteen years ago. The Korean Central News Agency and Korean Central Television broadcasted this year’s speech.

The highlight of the speech was Kim Jong Un’s declaration, “To end the state of division of the country and achieve reunification, we must remove confrontations between North and South.” He added, “Respecting and thoroughly implementing the north-south joint declarations is a basic prerequisite to promoting the inter-Korean relations and hastening the country’s reunification.”

This can be interpreted as an effort by the North as a hopeful message to the newly elected South Korean president Park Geun-hye for improved relations and to urge her administration to depart from her predecessor’s North Korea policy and implement the June 15 and October 4 Joint Declarations.

In the 2008 New Year address, North Korea made a similar statement encouraging the then Lee Myong-bak administration to fulfill the joint declarations.

As for North Korea’s foreign relations, Kim stressed that it will expand and develop relations with those countries that are friendly and cooperative to North Korea and affirmed to “strive actively to realize independence in the world and safeguard peace and stability in the region.” However, there was no mention of North Korea’s position on the nuclear issue or US-DPRK relations.

As for the economy, Kim stressed that “the entire Party, the whole country and all the people should wage an all-out struggle this year to effect a turnaround in building an economic giant and improving the people’s standard of living.” The importance of economy and the improvement of the lives of its people were reiterated and agriculture and light industry was named as frontline industries.

Similarly, last year’s New Year joint editorial called for revolution in light industry and agriculture. This year’s message stressed that economic guidance and management must be improved to reflect the realities of development. It also stressed that the North “hold fast to the socialist economic system of our own style, steadily improve and perfect the methods of economic management on the principle of encouraging the working masses to fulfill their responsibility and role befitting the masters of production, and generalize on an extensive scale the good experiences gained at several units.”

In 2012, North Korea announced its ‘June 28 policy’. There is speculation that changes are taking place in various parts of the country to pilot changes in its economic system.

The New Year address also emphasizes the military. “The military might of a country represents its national strength; only when it builds up its military might in every way can it develop into a thriving country and defend the security and happiness of its people.” Kim Jong Un also emphasized that “The sector of defense industry should develop in larger numbers sophisticated military hardware of our own style that can contribute to implementing the Party’s military strategy.”

South Korean government showed a lukewarm response to North Korea’s New Year address. While the format of the address was relatively novel in that it was televised, most North Korea watchers see the content and format of the joint editorial as similar to past addresses. Kim Jong Un placed heavy emphasis on the economic sector, but the method of improvement revealed no major changes from the current policy. Likewise, no concrete measures were suggested for the improvement of inter-Korean relations except for a general suggestion to open the doors for dialogue.

and…

North Korea’s National Science and Technology Council calls the New Year’s Address, “A Shortcut Measure to Become an Economic Powerhouse”
2013-1-11

In the 2013 New Year speech by Kim Jong Un, plans to strengthen the National Science and Technology Council can be noticed to serve as a driving force for the future economic construction of North Korea.

According to the Chosun Shinbo, a pro-North Korean newspaper in Japan, the National Science and Technology Council assessed the New Year speech to substantiate, “The teachings of our leader Kim Jong Un, to stipulate the power of science and technology in order to provide a shortcut in constructing a strong economic nation.”

The news evaluated 2012 as a year of revolutionary achievement for succeeding in the satellite launch as it was the last year of the “Third Five-Year Plan” of scientific and technological development.

According to the newspaper, the National Science and Technology Council was acclaimed as an esteemed mechanism in conducting scientific research contributing to the nation’s economic development and in creating a new foundation for various scientific research sectors to carry out its projects.

As a result, the news claimed noteworthy achievements were made in state-of-the-art scientific research, with over hundreds of studies conducted in reconstruction and modernization projects in factories and enterprises across the country.

The 2013 marks the first year of the “Fourth Five-Year Plan of Scientific and Technological Development” and the National Science and Technology Council outlined its major goals and tasks of this year: “Our scientists and technicians will carry out the tasks put forth by the New Year speech to realize the modernization of our economy and build a strong nation from advancement in science and technology.”

The Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly decided last month to award the Medal of Kim Jong Il to the Korean Committee of Space Technology (KCST) for the successful launch of the Kwangmyongsong 3-2 satellite and commended it as the “paramount event and celebration in our national history of 5,000 years and of our people.”

The successful launch of the long-range rocket was lauded as a major national achievement to North Koreans, with the opportunity to embark on the building of a new satellite named “Kim Jong Un.”

In addition, Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of Workers’ Party of Korea, declared that the era of President Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il should be known as the “100 Years of Juche,” while the newspaper referred to Kim Jong Un’s era as the “new 100 Years of Juche.”

For Kim Jong Un, it is critical that his regime improve the North Korean economy in order for him to fully consolidate his power and win the hearts of the North Korean people. Kim is likely to continue to push forward with economic development efforts in 2013, through promoting political stability.

In this year’s New Year’s message, the year 2012 was named as the “year of the people” while agriculture and light industry were said to be major fronts for economic construction of a kangsong taeguk, or strong and prosperous nation. Food shortage and livelihood of the people were also named as major challenges to be resolved to realize kangsong taeguk.

From this year, “June 28 Policy” is likely to continue and already, pilot measures were implemented in selected rural areas to improve economic management and expand autonomy of factories and work sites. Depending on the outcomes of the pilot measure, changes in economic policy is likely to occur this year.

Some new measures likely to take place are as follows: in the agricultural sector, the expansion of farmers’ right to dispose of grain yield; in the industrial sector, the increase of incentives via increasing the autonomy of each company.

Alexandre Mansourov wrote extensive comments on the DPRK’s 2012 in 38 North.

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