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Fair Game?

Sunday, June 3rd, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
6/3/2007

Kim Il Sung’s North Korea has always been a tough customer, and nobody knows who was more irritated by its constant antics: its foes or its friends. It has been a tough ally, ready to cheat and manipulate its sponsors. Since the 1950s most of its patrons have had to put up with its style _ largely because of their grand strategy, of course.

In the long run, it was probably the Soviets who were subject to Pyongyang’s diplomatic frolics most frequently, but China has the dubious honor of being the first country to enjoy such an experience in the early 1950s. Somewhat surprisingly, this happened during the Korean War when only a massive Chinese intervention saved Kim Il Sung’s regime from a sorry end.

Recent document-based research by Chinese scholars, especially by the formidable Shen Zhihua, has provided us with new insights into the early history of relations between the two supposedly “fraternal” countries. Now it is clear that the picture was anything but rosy.

When the North Korean troops invaded the South, it was implied that the Chinese forces would step in if the situation took a dangerous turn. Nonetheless, until late September, Pyongyang ignored Chinese advice and kept Beijing in the dark about the frontline situation. This drove the Chinese military attache and ambassador mad, but they could not do much about it.

The situation changed in October when Kim Il Sung had lost the war: by late October 1950, there was hardly one battle-ready battalion in the North Korean armed forces. The Chinese rushed in a large expeditionary force, but soon a question arose: who was to be in charge of the united armed forces?

Kim Il Sung clearly assumed that he would stay in command, and would have operational control over the Chinese units. This was unacceptable to the Chinese. To an extent, this was a clash of two nationalisms (and nationalisms of East Asia are notorious for being particularly virulent). However, there were real considerations involved as well.

First of all, the Chinese force far outnumbered the North Korean army. Second, the Chinese generals did not have much trust in the military competence of their North Korean colleagues. Peng Dehuai, whose task was to save the North, did not hide his outrage about Pyongyang’s style of operations. He was especially angry about the meaningless defense of a doomed Seoul, where about 30,000 North Korean soldiers were killed in late September. In late 1950, he sent a telegram to Beijing in which he labeled the North Korean style “childish”.

However, Kim Il Sung and other North Korean leaders avoided the issue, so the two armies (or, to be more precise, the Chinese army and the remains of the North Korean army) for a while acted independently–often, with sorry results. On November 4, for instance, the lack of coordination even led to a battle in which the North Korean tanks mistakenly attacked Chinese infantry, and thus unwittingly helped a semi-circled American unit escape.

At the same time, the Chinese attempts to incorporate the North Korean units into their own forces were met with resistance on the part of Kim Il Sung. He needed an army of his own, and was not ready for concessions.

It took more than a month to solve the question of joint command. Perhaps, the problems would have last longer, had Stalin not sent a cable demanding an immediate rectification of the situation. Stalin’s advice had to be taken seriously, and his intervention put an end to delays. The Joint Command was headed by Peng Dehuai, with two Chinese-speaking Korean generals acting as his deputies (incidentally, both generals were purged by Kim Il Sung a few years after the war).

However, new tensions arose in December 1950 when the railways came to be discussed. The Chinese forces could be supplied only by rail, and those lines were subjected to intense bombing. The railways had to be managed carefully, but the Chinese commanders discovered that Korean administration gave preference to cargo related to the economic needs of Korean reconstruction, rather than to military supplies. As a result, the Chinese and Koreans ran two different railway administrations, operating on the same railway network. It’s easy to imagine how this influenced the efficiency of the transportation system.

After a few months of discussion the North Koreans agreed to have a joint railroad command, but on the conditions that they would exercise overall control. By that time, most of the rolling stock had been provided by China, and the Chinese soldiers were also doing most of the maintenance work, hence the Chinese generals assumed that they should have the upper hand. But the Koreans did not agree. For them, this was an issue of their territorial rights, sovereignty, and other important symbols. For the Chinese, this was a question of their soldiers’ lives.

Once again, direct Soviet involvement was necessary to put an end to the squabbling. Stalin had no patience for the petty ambitions of his not very efficient satellite, and he was still in position to control the North. Hence, Stalin himself cabled Pyongyang demanding they agree to the Chinese conditions. In May 1951, after his august intervention, Pyongyang gave in.

These early squabbles were a sign of things to come. Over the years, North Korea has developed a peculiar diplomatic style, harsh and unbending but remarkably successful. It used to be applied to Moscow and Beijing. Nowadays the same tricks work wonders in dealing with the current sponsors of the regime, Beijing and Seoul as well as with Washington. But that is another story…

Posted in China, Military, Political economy, Russia | Comments Closed

Washington Ready for Normal Relations with North Korea

Wednesday, May 30th, 2007

Korea Times
Lee Jin-Woo
5/30/2007

U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Alexander Vershbow said on Wednesday Washington is prepared to move forward toward the establishment of normal relations with North Korea.

“We are ready to begin the process of removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and from the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act,” Vershbow said at a symposium in Seoul.

But progress on all these tracks depends on achieving the complete elimination of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs, he said.

“We’re not ready to settle for a partial solution. It is only with complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization that we can contemplate the full normalization of relations,’’ he said.

Under the Feb. 13 accord in the six-party talks, the United States agreed to begin talks with the communist North over normalizing diplomatic relations. The two countries have had no diplomatic relations since the 1950-53 Korean War, which divided the Korean Peninsula into the two Koreas. The conflict ended in a cease-fire, but no peace treaty was signed.

The ambassador also hinted that the United States might urge the Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a bank in Macau where the North funds have been frozen, to replace its management, who they hold responsible for helping the North with counterfeiting and money laundering.

Meanwhile, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said in Beijing North Korea is appeared ready to follow through on the February agreement.

“Once they have their funds from the bank, they are prepared to do their part of the bargain, which is to shut down the Yongbyon plant,’’ Hill was quoted as saying by the Associated Press. The U.S. envoy was referring to the BDA issue.

Hill rejected suggestions that the six-party disarmament negotiations, which have been stalled since February, were dead.

Hill exchanged ideas with his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei on ways to resolve the stalled nuclear issue but did not give specific details, the AP reported.

Posted in Political economy, USA | Comments Closed

Kim’s sons vie for N.K. leadership

Monday, May 28th, 2007

Korea Herald
Jin Dae-woong
5/28/2007

North Korea appears to have embarked on preparations to pick a successor to leader Kim Jong-il from among his sons, as the communist leader’s health has declined recently, South Korean intelligence sources said yesterday.

According to the sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, Kim Jong-il has been frequently accompanied by his two sons, Kim Jong-chul (26) and Kim Jong-woon (23) in his recent official activities, such as inspections of military bases and the so-called “on-site guidance” tours.

“Kim has yet to decide whom will be his successor, but he appears to have it in mind to select one of his two sons,” one source said. “He is now looking at who would be better for the position while they accompany him on military inspections.”

The open appearance of Kim’s second and third sons at the official events resumed with Kim’s worsening health, stemming from chronic diabetes and heart disease, the sources said. Due to health concerns, Kim, 65, halved official public activities between January and May this year, compared to the activities made in the same period last year, they said.

Jong-chul and Jong-woon, both born to deceased Ko Young-hee, the reclusive leader’s purported third wife, had frequently accompanied Kim on such activities, but halted their attendance after the death of Ko in 2004, they added.

The reemergence of Kim’s two sons indicates that North Korea is gearing up for a third generation of hereditary power succession, another source said.

In late 2005, Kim Jong-il banned any debate on a succession nomination in fear of a rapid erosion of his power in the Stalinist country.

Kim Jong-il took over from his father, Kim Il-sung in 1994. It was the North’s first hereditary power transfer.

The two “princes” have recently completed special military studies courses at Kim Il-sung Military University, one of North Korea’s top schools, named after the North Korean founder, he said. Jong-chul and Jong-woon respectively began the secret courses in 2001 and 2002, specializing in leadership and military theories based on Kim Jong-il’s military first policy, he said.

The special education was made in response to calls from Ko that the two sons should succeed the leadership of their father, he added.

Sources said that the moves are expected to reignite a fierce power struggle between Kim’s sons and their advocates over who would take over the helm of the communist country.

Before Kim issued a ban on any discussion in 2005 concerning his successor, it had been reported that Kim’s three sons, including the oldest, Kim Jong-nam, and their advocates had been engaged in a fierce power struggle in recent years.

Kim Jong-nam, 36, may stage a challenge against Jong-chul and Jong-woon in the pursuit of leadership, noting that oldest sons are generally favored in North Korea, where Confucian traditions that honor seniority are still dominant, they said.

Jong-nam is believed to have fallen out of his father’s favor when he was caught trying to enter Japan in 2001 on a forged passport. He was born to Kim’s first purported wife Sung Hae-rim, a former North Korean movie star, who died in 2002. The eldest son escaped an assassination attempt in Austria in 2004, which was suspected of being conducted by advocates of Jong-chul and Jung-woon.

Kim Jong-chol was widely favored to be first in line to succeed Kim Jong-il, but he has been said to suffer from a chronic overproduction of female hormones.

In addition, the emergence of Kim Jong-il’s purported new wife, Kim Ok, is also expected to add a new twist to the power struggle between the princes, sources said.

The 43-year-old former secretary of Kim Jong-il has frequently accompanied the reclusive leader Kim on his visits to army bases and industrial complexes, and sat with him when he met visiting foreign dignitaries.

Sources think that the young lady could be behind the leader’s ban on any succession debate because Kim’s early appointment of a successor may destabilize her status as first lady. She is building up her own political force with close affiliates in crucial posts within the regime, they said.

Posted in Political economy | Comments Closed

Where is the nearest North Korean Embassy?

Wednesday, May 23rd, 2007

The Internet knows…

http://kp.embassyinformation.com/?einfo

Posted in Political economy | Comments Closed

Diplomatic Ease

Tuesday, May 22nd, 2007

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
5/20/2007

It’s tough to serve in a foreign mission in Pyongyang. One has to survive difficult conditions, the boredom of long official gatherings, the near absence of a social life. And police surveillance, of course!

The major assumptions on which the North Korean authorities act in their dealings with diplomats and foreign officials is simple: all diplomats are spies, sent to Pyongyang to inflict harm (to a slightly lesser extent, this is applicable to all foreigners). Thus, they should be isolated from any interaction with locals, constantly monitored and fed only with the (dis)information their hosts find suitable.

Such an approach began to develop a long time ago: as early as the mid-1950s the embassies of the supposedly friendly Communist countries complained about restrictions and harassment. Initially, the victims were the likes of Hungarians and Poles, but from the late 1950s, even the Chinese and Soviet Embassies, representatives of Pyongyang’s powerful sponsors, found themselves under constant surveillance.

Every veteran of diplomatic Pyongyang is able to produce his share of anecdotes and stories _ and I think about collecting them one day. For example, Erik Cornel, a Swedish ambassador to the North, related how some diplomats discovered that the newly built embassy buildings were equipped with a network of underground tunnels which would allow the North Korean operatives to get into any compound unnoticed and unopposed. A wife of the Indonesian ambassador noted how she discovered a face staring at her from a hatch in their residence. Obviously, somebody on a covert patrol in the tunnel network lost his way…

This is a rather typical North Korean approach: to compensate for the shortage of expensive high technology with some low-tech ingenuity and resourcefulness!

Indeed, technology is often in short supply. Another story by Erik Cornel is probably worth quoting in full: “The cleaner [of the Swedish embassy] was a youngish, reserved but agreeable lady, who was treated with great respect by others. The gardener once came with a dirty lamp globe which needed cleaning. When he realized that it was she _ and not one of the foreign women _ that he had to ask for help, he crouched down and respectfully lifted up the globe towards her. She also served tables when we gave formal dinner parties and wore the traditional, wide Korean dress of beautiful silk cloth. On one of the first occasions, as ill-luck would have it, a sudden cracking noise emanated from under her skirts as she served dinner _ it sounded like someone was trying to tune into a station on an old-fashioned radio. She abruptly stopped serving and rushed back into the kitchen _ evidently, the tape recorder was malfunctioning.’’

The diplomats had to hire all their own maids, drivers, secretaries, and other local personnel via a special government agency whose main task was to plant as many police agents as possible in these not-so-numerous nests of foreign subversion. Major embassies, like those of Russia and China, avoided the problems by avoiding the local personnel altogether: every single person in the embassy, from the gardener or janitor up, was an ex-pat. This makes sense, especially because the major embassies are probably the only ones that really have secrets to keep (it’s hard to imagine what sort of apocryphal secrets might be kept in the missions of, say, Romania or Austria).

All telephone conversations are intercepted. Pyongyang does not try to deny this _ officials sometimes cite records of intercepted phone talks while dealing with foreigners. Recently, most foreign missions have come with a separate network, which allows their staff to talk to other missions, but restricts their ability to make calls to the North Korean institutions, let alone to private citizens.

On their rare outings, diplomats are frequently followed by plain-clothes police. These guys’ job is not too difficult, since foreigners are highly visible in the Pyongyang crowd.

No diplomat has ever been allowed to meet North Koreans in private. All interactions take place at official receptions, where only a handful of trusted and screened Northerners are allowed to attend.

The attempts to get any meaningful statistics or other data are frustrated by the government, which has not published any hard statistics for four decades. One of my favourite responses explaining this phenomenon is the answer given to the wife of a Cuban ambassador. When she tried to inquire about North Korean burial customs, her counterpart answered: “You know, here, in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, people do not die that much!’’ In the late 1980s North Korean diplomats briefly acquired the habit of answering potentially troublesome questions by reading in full the relevant clippings from Nodong Sinmun. If one was unreasonable enough to ask about the expected harvest, he had to spend a long time listening to a reading of a Nodong Sinmun editorial on the flourishing of Korean agriculture under the wise leadership of the “Great Leader.’’

However, some old Pyongyang hands developed techniques which helped them make sense of very subtle hints to be found in the changes of their hosts’ behaviour, or in between the lines of the seemingly meaningless grumbling of the official press.

Posted in Civil society, Political economy | Comments Closed

Experts Differ Over N.Korea’s Economic Openness

Tuesday, May 22nd, 2007

Yonhap
5/22/2007

A lawmaker of the pro-government Uri Party has said the North Korean economy has taken a step toward economic openness.

But North Korea watchers still remained suspicious as to whether the Pyongyang regime has the genuine determination to carry out market-oriented economic reform.

“I got the strong impression that the North is striving toward economic reform during my visit to Pyongyang,” said Rep. Choi Sung of the Uri Party in a telephone interview with The Korea Times Monday.

Choi visited the North from May 14 to 18 with 130 South Korean business leaders to participate in fairs to attract external investment.

The Stalinist country is unlikely to follow in the footsteps the former Soviet Union took in the post-Cold War era, and therefore, its growth model will take a different form, Choi said.

“The North is seeking a tailored growth model by introducing an incentive-based system while maintaining its communist regime,” said the lawmaker who has visited the North 20 times.

He said the library of one of the elite universities in the North displayed a wide array of information technology related publications, and citizens were anxious to learn English.

“Clerks working at shops selling souvenirs looked very business-oriented and tried to sell as many products as possible to their customers,” he said.

Asked if he had a chance to talk to any North Korean officials if they share his view, Rep. Choi said he had not.

He said it was very evident the North was moving toward economic openness.

His view, however, is at odds with what most North Korea watchers have expressed through media reports.

The Yonhap News Agency reported on May 18 that former North Korean Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju was removed and made manager of a chemical complex because his capitalism-oriented stance fueled objections from senior North Korea officials.

Pak was named manger of the synthetic fiber complex in South Pyongan Province, the report said.

Citing unidentified sources, the report said the former premier had called on the North to introduce an incentive-based system into its economy.

The conservative Chosun Ilbo newspaper supported the observation in an article published on May 19, saying that key officials calling for introducing an incentive-based system in the North have been demoted since the 1990s.

Posted in Economic reform, Education, Labor conditions/wages, Library, Political economy | Comments Closed

N. Korean leader makes reshuffle of top military officials

Monday, May 21st, 2007

Yonhap
5/21/2007

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il recently made a reshuffle of his top military officials that may solidify his already firm grip on the country’s military, intelligence officials said Monday.

Ri Myong-su, former operations director of the North’s Korean People’s Army (KPA), has been named a resident member of the National Defense Commission (NDC), the highest decision-making body under the communist nation’s constitution that was revised in 1997 to reflect its military first, or “songun,” policy, an official said while speaking anonymously.

Ri was replaced by Kim Myong-guk, who had served in the post from 1994-1997, while Jong Thae-gun, an Army lieutenant general, has been named the propaganda director of the KPA’s General Political Bureau, according to the sources.

The reshuffle first appeared to be a routine rearrangement of personnel, but the sources said it may have been aimed at expanding the role and power of the already powerful NDC.

“The NDC seems to have become, at least externally, the North’s highest decision-making body as a number of top military officials have recently been appointed to (new) permanent posts of the defense commission,” a source said.

“We believe the NDC may become an actual organization in the near future with hundreds of resident staff like the other top decision-making bodies” such as the Workers’ Party, the official added.

Headed by the North’s reclusive leader, the defense commission has been the most powerful organization in the country where the military comes before everything.

But it has mostly been regarded as a faction of a group, namely the KPA, as most of its members concurrently served in other posts of the army, according to the sources.

Kim Yong-chun, the former Chief of General Staff of the KPA, was named the first deputy chairman of the NDC in April.

The sources said it is too early to determine why the commission’s permanent staff has been increased, but they said it may be linked to Pyongyang’s ruling system after Kim Jong-il.

The 65-year-old Kim has yet to name his successor, raising questions worldwide whether the reclusive leader is considering a collective ruling system after his death.

Kim was named as successor to his father, the founder of North Korea Kim Il-sung, at the age of 32 in 1974.

He has three sons from two marriages, but his oldest son, Jong-nam, 35, has apparently fallen out of favor following a 2001 incident in which the junior Kim was thrown out of Japan after trying to enter the country with a forged passport.

His two other sons, Jong-chul and Jong-un, both in their early 20s, have not held any official posts.

N. Korea enhances Kim’s defense commission
Korea Herald
Jin Dae-woong
5/21/2007

North Korea is beefing up the National Defense Commission, a top military decision-making body directly controlled by Kim Jong-il, Seoul intelligence sources said.

Pyongyang recently conducted a major reshuffle of its top military leadership, including the repositioning of Kim’s closest confidants to the committee, they said on condition of anonymity.

Chaired by Kim, the committee is an organization independent of the Cabinet and the ruling Korean Workers’ Party. It is next only to the communist country’s president, a post permanently held by the late founder and Kim’s father Kim Il-sung since his death in 1994.

The sources said that Gen. Ri Myong-su, former operation director of the Korean People’s Army, has been appointed as a standing member of the NDC. Gen. Kim Myong-kuk has been named to replace Ri as the top operations commander.

The reshuffle followed the appointment of Vice-Marshal Kim Yong-chun, former chief of the general staff of the Korean People’s Army, as vice chairman of the NDC during last month’s general session of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the nation’s parliament.

The personnel reconfiguration, which also affected key posts in the North Korean armed forces, is seen as part of Pyongyang’s move to further enhance the NDC, a powerful state body, under North Korea’s military-first policy.

The generals have been regarded as the most influential figures in the military as they frequently accompany Kim during his field unit inspections.

The commission has the power to direct all activities of the armed forces and national defense projects, establish and disband central defense institutions, appoint and dismiss senior military officers, confer military titles and grant titles for top commanders. It also can declare a state of war and issue mobilization orders in an emergency.

The National Defense Commission, presently chaired by Kim Jong-il, consists of the first deputy chairman, two deputy chairmen and six commission members. All members are selected for a five-year term.

The reshuffles are the latest known change to the commission. Gen. Hyon Chol-hae, former vice director of the KPA General Political Bureau, moved to the post of NDC vice director in 2003.

Experts noted that the figures are taking full-time posts in the NDC and relinquishing their posts in the People’s Army.

Other current members concurrently hold posts at both organizations, sources said.

Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok, the first vice-chairman of the NDC, also assumes the position of director of the KPA General Political Bureau. Vice Marshal Kim Il-chol concurrently serves as a member of the NDC and minister of the People’s Armed Forces.

“As high-ranking military officers have moved to the NDC as full-time members, the NDC may be preparing to take follow up measures to expand its role and function in the future,” the sources said.

The NDC has been known as a consultative body of top military leaders without extensive subordinate organizations comparable to the ruling party and the Cabinet.

The intelligence sources said the NDC may have more manpower and organization under its wing.

“The NDC began equipping itself with organizational apparatuses with the 2003 transfer of Hyon Chol-hae from the KPA position to the post of NDC,” another source said.

In addition, the NDC has continued recruiting personnel such as Kim Yang-gon, councilor of the NDC, from other government departments, to strengthen the NDC’s policy functions, sources said.

“It is in line with North Korea’s long-term move to concentrate the country’s decision-making power on Kim Jong-il and his close subordinates,” said Nam Sung-wook, North Korean studies professor at Korea University. “It is mainly aimed at preventing possible regime dissolution amid rising international pressures over its nuclear weapons program. Kim is also seen directly intervening in a resolution of the nuclear issue.”

Kim Yong-hyun, a professor at Dongguk Univsersity, also agreed that the enhancement of the NDC will lead to the centralization of power in North Korea, reducing the role of the Korea Workers’ Party.

“Through the organizational reform, the North’s regime seeks to further streamline decision-making procedures to more effectively tackle an array of issues,” Kim said.

The North Korean studies expert said it is an answer of North Korean leadership to continuing economic hardship. The leadership has given over a comparatively extensive amount of power to the Cabinet for dealing with economic stagnation.

Kim also said it could be interpreted as preparation for the post-Kim Jong-il system.

“After his death, a collective leadership led by core subordinates of Kim Jong-il is expected to emerge, so, the move could be one related to future changes,” he said.

Posted in Korean People's Army, KPA General Political Bureau, Military, National Defense Commission, Political economy, Songun | Comments Closed

N. Korean former premier relegated to company manager: sources

Friday, May 18th, 2007

Yonhap
5/18/2007

North Korea’s former Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju has been relegated to the chief administrative manager of the communist country’s largest chemical complex, informed sources said Friday.

In April, the North replaced Pak, who oversaw the country’s threadbare economy, with then Transport Minister Kim Yong-il. Pak is believed to have been in conflict with senior North Korean officials over the introduction of an incentive-based system.

Pak has since been working as the manager for the synthetic fiber complex in South Pyongan Province. The complex resumed operations in 2002. North Korea spent about US$10 billion to build the complex more than a decade ago, but it was hardly operated until recently.

“High-level North Korean economic officials staged a lobbying war not to be appointed prime minister as the premier has no real power and becomes the scapegoat for the North’s worsening economy,” a source said on condition of anonymity.

Saddled with a severe food shortage, North Korea said it will make all-out efforts to raise its people’s standard of living this year by concentrating on light industry and agriculture.

In a session of its parliament, North Korea said its major economic goal is “to improve the living standards of people on the basis of the existing foundations of agriculture and light industry.”

In a recent meeting with U.N. World Food Program officials, a North Korean vice agriculture minister acknowledged that the communist country has a shortfall of about 1 million tons of food and called for aid from the outside world.

Posted in Economic reform, Political economy | Comments Closed

Nicaragua embraces North Korea

Friday, May 18th, 2007

TvNZ
5/18/2007

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, once a Cold War enemy of the United States, has re-established diplomatic relations with former ally North Korea just four months after he bounced back to power.

Ortega says his country has a special relationship with North Korea because the communist country helped train his left-wing Sandinista guerrilla army in the years before a 1979 revolution that first carried him to power.

Weakened by a civil war against US-backed rebels, 0rtega was toppled by voters in 1990 and ties with North Korea were then broken off. But Ortega won a presidential election last November after 16 years in opposition and returned to office in January.

He has since moved Nicaragua closer to several leftist and anti-US governments such as Cuba, Iran and Venezuela and has now announced the resumption of diplomatic ties with North Korea.

“We’re going to strengthen relations,” Ortega said.

North Korea’s deputy foreign minister was to visit Nicaragua this week.

Ortega says he wants to stay on good terms with the US but the closer ties with North Korea are likely to worry Washington, which is trying to push North Korea to shut its nuclear facilities.

When Ortega led Nicaragua in the 1980s, his main international support came from communist Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Posted in Military, Nicaragua, Political economy | Comments Closed

North Korean Prime Minister Park Bong Joo’s Dismissal

Wednesday, May 16th, 2007

Daily NK
Yang Jung A
5/16/2007

“Kim Jong Il will not forgive even a scent of capitalism.”

The news concerning North Korea’s Park Bong Joo, the former prime minister who was dismissed last April after having received severe criticism from party members for insisting on implementation of an incentive-based system to encourage economic growth, has been generating interest.

It is known that Park Bong Joo was dismissed for an economic policy failure and using $8,000,000 of fertilizer money to purchase oil.

According to the Japanese media, Park, at last January’s “Cabinet Meeting,” suggested the implementation of an hourly, daily, and weekly plan to domestic companies as a way to inspire labor power. However, he was criticized by a Party leader who participated in the meeting at the time. The criticism was that Park was scheming to introduce capitalism.

Former Prime Minister Park also suggested in 2005 that it would be good to hold on exports of coal to China due to the influence it will have on civilian’s energy situation.

However, after the nuclear experiment, the National Defense Committee unfolded an emphasis on the acquisition of foreign currency for strengthening military power as being indispensable to the nation and strongly demanded the reopening of exports. This effectively reversed cabinet’s decision to terminate coal exports.

Concerning these matters, it is the evaluation of former International Secretary of the Party Hwang Jang Yop that “Park Bong Joo is the kind of person who speaks out about such things (to speak for reform).”

Former secretary Hwang said however, “(In North Korea), the Party secretary’s right to speak is much more powerful than the Prime Minister and even if Kim Jong Il could accept the contract work system (a piece rate system), if one advocates to reform like China, such speech to imitate capitalism or foreign country absolutely cannot be forgiven because Kim Jong Il himself can lose his position.”

”Basic economic reforms are impossible because of the need to preserve the basis of the military-first policy.”

Former Secretary Hwang explained, “Dr. Lee Seung Gi’s (abducted scientist who created a synthetic fiber, named as “Vinallon”) grandson, Park Chul went around saying China increased its production through agricultural reforms, but Dr. Lee’s pupil, Kim Hwan who was a secretary of the Party, supported Park Chul’s speech and was severely treated, falling to the position of assistant minister. From this we can see, speech to open and reform like China or even a scent of democratic opening and reform will not be forgiven.”

Kim Jong Il is known to have promised to lend his strength to the cabinet for normalization of North Korea’s destroyed economy after he elevated then Minister of Chemical Industry Park Bong Joo to the position of Prime Minister. (Park had previously been an economic bureaucrat).

When former Prime Minister Park reported to Kim Jong Il in 2003 that the Party and administration were infringing on the national economy, Kim Jong Il took the ministry’s side saying, “If I gave authority to the ministry, you have to be able to use it.”

However, as can be seen from more recent developments, the shake up involving Park Bong Joo shows how the cabinet is powerless in the face of the military and Party. Furthermore, this example reflects well how the system ultimately chooses the side of the anti-reform minded military in tension between it and reform-centered practical powers.

If the basis of the military-first policy remains unchanged, even if a brilliant economic bureaucrat assumes the duties of Prime Minister, the resuscitation of North Korea’s economic is fundamentally difficult, experts say.

Also, it has been pointed out that Kim Jong Il has been indulging the Party and the Army by dumping the responsibility for economic failure on the public administrative staff.

On the other hand, some North Korea experts suggest the dismissal of former Minister Park could be a symbolic acknowledgement of fear over the enlargement of China’s influence on North Korea.

Former Minister Park visited China in March 2005 and held talks with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wan Jiabao and inspected Chinese industrial cities. In January 2006, he was part of Kim Jong Il’s China visit as well.

N. Korea’s premier sacked due to his capitalist move
Yonhap
5/13/2007

North Korea fired its prime minister last week holding him responsible for making a suggestion that the reclusive communist country introduce an incentive-based capitalistic wage system, a Japanese newspaper said Sunday.

North Korea replaced Premier Pak Pong-ju with Transport Minister Kim Yong-il in April in a sudden reshuffle. The North gave no reasons for the change.

Citing unidentified diplomatic sources, Japan’s Mainichi Shimbun newspaper reported that Pak came under attack from party officials in January after suggesting the introduction of an incentive-based wage system to spur labor productivity.

The row apparently discouraged Pak to stay in his job, the paper said.

Mainichi said Pak was already at odds with the military over the North’s coal export policy. Pak banned coal exports to China, citing the shortage of fuel for households, but the military wanted coal exports to resume in an apparent bid to earn hard currency to boost the country’s defense capability, it said.

Posted in Coal, Economic reform, Energy, Labor conditions/wages, Political economy, Songun | Comments Closed

North Korean Economy Watch