Archive for the ‘Political economy’ Category

DPRK real estate advice: Know your chairman

Thursday, August 28th, 2008

According to the Daily NK, the chairpersons of the DPRK’s “People’s Units” (the smallest administrative population unit) are elected by the local membership through a show of hands.  Since the chairperson is in a position of some power, the political and economic dynamics that take place are pretty interesting.  The Daily NK notes how a chairperson’s skill at protecting his constituents from inspections by other departments is now factored into local (unofficial) real estate prices:

Quoting from the article:

“When the inspection group comes, the chairpersons of the People’s Units contact each other in advance, so inspections can be avoided. Nowadays, how a People’s Unit chairperson acts affects the price of housing.”

“People who buy homes now cannot distinguish between good and bad homes, but pay great attention to the People’s Unit in the neighborhood. If the People’s Unit chairperson is not so sophisticated, then the neighborhood cannot come together, so people tend to avoid such neighborhoods and the price of housing tends to fall as well.”

“If an inspection unit comes suddenly, the People’s Unit chairperson tends to alert every household through the children in the village, which has been described as ‘the pastime of the People’s Unit.’ The more a People’s Unit chairperson excels at this, the less damage to the people of the unit.”

“Officials or big-time merchants pay careful attention to their relationship with the chairpersons. No matter what the type of inspection is, the citizens’ attitude can be assumed via the words of the chairperson of the People’s Unit, so the fate of a household depends on the words of the chairperson.”

And if the chairperson is not good at his job?

“Depending on the extent of the damage to the People’s Unit during the inspections, people distinguish whether or not the People’s Unit chairperson is smart and experienced or not. If the chairperson is judged to be not smart, then he or she has to relinquish his or her position.”

It is interesting that the chairpersons take such an interest in protecting their constituents from outside authorities, however, it is naïve to think that local elections are responsible for this behavior.  The reality is that these chairpersons probably know a good deal of information about their residents and collect some form of direct payment, or “taxes”, for their services.  The quote above, “big-time merchants pay careful attention to their relationship with the chairpersons,” is just a more polite way of saying this.  If the chairperson position was not profitable in some way, why would anyone want it?

Read the full Daily NK story here:
Who Is the Chairperson of the People’s Unit?
Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
8/18/2008

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The DPRK’s “tallest flagpole in the world”

Monday, August 18th, 2008

dprk-flagpole.jpgVisitors to either side of Korea’s DMZ will be familiar with the DPRK’s 160 meter (525 ft) flagpole in Kijong-dong. Wikipedia, citing a CNN report, claims the flag pole is the tallest in the world.  I was pretty sure of this fact as well, but according to Guinness, I was wrong.

The top 4 “unsupported” flag poles are: 1. Turkmenistan: 436 feet 2. Aqaba, Jordan: 431 feet 3. Amman, Jordan: 416 feet (126 meters) 4. United Arab Emirates: 404 feet (123.1 meters). The DPRK’s omission from this list is due to the fact that its flag pole technically sits on top of a tower, making it a “supported” structure—the equivalent of building a small flagpole on a tall building.

The DPRK might scoff at this subtlety, but even if one was to give them the benefit of the doubt, the victory would be short-lived.  According to a recent story in the Wall Street Journal, David Chambers of Trident Support Corporation is erecting a 532 foot flag pole, a full 7 feet taller than the DPRK’s, in Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku.

(Hat tip to Daniel Rothschild)

To learn more, read the very interesting and humorous article below:
Flagpole Builder Hits New Heights In Central Asia
Wall Street Journal, Page A1
Chip Cummins
8/16/2008

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(UPDATED) How Big is the North Korea Deal?

Monday, August 11th, 2008

UPDATE:  (Reuters) Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Japan that Washington would not remove North Korea from a US list of state sponsors of terrorism on the initial deadline of Monday, Japan’s foreign minister said.

ORGINAL POST: Marcus Noland comments in a Newsweek International op-ed how recent US policy changes towards North Korea (delisting the DPRK as a state sponsor of terror and exempting sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act) amount to very little:

Lifting the trade restrictions will have a minimal impact. North Korea will remain one of a few countries that does not have normal trade relations with the United States, meaning its exports will continue to be subjected to punitive tariffs of up to 90 percent.

Removing North Korea from the terrorism list means that Washington can now legally support it for membership in international financial organizations such as the World Bank. But the White House is under no obligation to actually do so. North Korea also remains excluded from US government programs that encourage trade and investment.

North Korea’s declaration will trigger a reconvening of the Six-Party Talks, which includes China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The inadequate nature of the declaration guarantees there will be yet another round of negotiations in which North Korea will reveal a bit more in return for further concessions. It is no accident that up to 50,000 metric tons of US food aid is expected to arrive in North Korea early this month. 

Writing in 2004 (yet relevant today), Marcus Noland wrote about these issues in depth.  Below are excerpts from his op-ed on US tariffs:

US importers of DPRK products are required to obtain prior approval from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets, certifying that the products were not produced by North Korean entities designated as having engaged in missile proliferation. Subject to this condition, approval is routine. US government officials report that they receive only a handful of such requests each year. Their impression is that business conditions in the DPRK pose a greater impediment to bilateral trade than the regulatory regime.

So, at present, with the exception of military-related products, there are few specific legal restrictions on the ability of Americans to export to or invest in the DPRK. Imports are subject to a prior approval process, but this is based on a transparent and narrowly delineated certification requirement.

Yet there is little trade between the United States and the DPRK. North Korea is among the few countries that the United States does not grant normal trade relations (NTR) status to, and North Korean exports are subject to the so-called column 2 tariff rates established by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. These tariffs tend to be the highest on labor-intensive products such as garments, in which North Korea is conceivably competitive. Though their incidence is an accident of history, and not an intentional slap, the column 2 tariffs represent a serious potential impediment to trade. Some countries, notably China, have successfully exported to the United States despite being subject to the higher column 2 tariffs (though even China eventually gained NTR status on a year-to-year basis). Most countries that have recently obtained permanent NTR, such as China, have done so through the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession process. The DPRK has shown no interest in joining the WTO.

This disinterest is unfortunate. The United States does not grant the DPRK quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), a worldwide network of bilateral trade quotas on textiles and apparel (due to expire in 2005), and WTO accession could aid the DPRK in this regard. In the case of the similarly diplomatically problematic Burmese government, the US government found it politically easier to accept an increase in Burmese exports to the United States than to negotiate publicly a textile agreement under WTO auspices with the repressive regime. WTO membership has its privileges. In any event, the DPRK is one of the rare countries that chronically do not fill their MFA quotas in Europe, where there are no sanctions, suggesting that the problem lies in DPRK’s inability to compete, not in trade barriers.

However, should the DPRK obtain NTR status, the United States would likely classify it as a nonmarket economy (NME) and subject it to onerous antidumping rules on the Chinese template. The point is that improved diplomatic relations is no panacea—the United States can be protectionist on purely economic grounds, regardless of politics.

Conversely, the United States trades with some low-income countries preferentially, unilaterally granting them limited tariff-free access through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), subject to standards concerning workers’ rights, intellectual property protection, and drug trafficking. Given North Korea’s disregard for internationally accepted labor standards, it is inconceivable that the United States would grant North Korea GSP privileges under current practices, even if diplomatic relations were normalized. Yet China, which has never received GSP privileges, vividly demonstrates that it is quite possible to prosper without such advantages.

Today, internal conditions and practices in North Korea, not legal restrictions, greatly impede bilateral trade. However, with sufficient reform and improvement in competitiveness, a broad range of policy issues would become increasingly relevant. In this regard, DPRK accession to the WTO would be advantageous. In the meantime, rather than complaining about US policy, North Korean officials would be better served by redoubling their reform efforts.

For more information, read the full articles below:
Partially True Confessions: How Big is the North Korea Deal?
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute
Newsweek (Link via the Peterson Institute)
7/7/2008

The Legal Framework of US–North Korea Trade Relations
Op-ed in JoongAng Ilbo, via the Peterson Institute web site.
Marcus Noland
4/27/2004

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Kim Jong il asserts control of border regions

Thursday, July 31st, 2008

As reported earlier this year by the Daily NK, Kim Jong il’s brother in law, Jang Song Taek, was leading an anti-corruption campaign in North Korea’s northern provinces along the Chinese border. Aside from controlling financial leakages, these efforts could be interpreted as attempts by Kim to gain control over military-owned trade companies.

According to a past report:

The inspection group withdrew all trade certificates with exception of those certificates belonging to the families of anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters, and those certificates issued by the Ministry of Finance or the Shinuiju Municipal Administrative Committee.  Therefore, presently at Shinuiju Customs, all import items without trade certificates issued by the above mentioned three groups have to be sent back to China.

Jang’s efforts, though seemingly effective at reasserting financial control of the region, had apparently taken their toll on local commerce:

In Hyesan, Yangkang Province, markets have been significantly reduced in size and scope recently, due to the anti-socialist group’s inspections[.]

[T]he merchants were at unease when under inspection by the National Security Agency (NSA) and other governmental organizations which govern the jangmadang [markets].

For example, transportation of goods by traders has withered away since last year, as the authority of the People’s Safety Agency (PSA) [controlled by Jang] rose and [it] launched [] a strict crackdown on traders’ belongings.

The source explained the situation in Hyesan, that “Hyesan had become the city where Chinese goods were traded for the cheapest value because Chinese goods [enter the country] at Hyesan[.] [During] the (PSA) inspection period [goods] could not be transported inland due to the inspection of trains and cars. Lives of the common people became even tougher than before, since goods could not be circulated through the jangmadang in spite of their low prices.”

“The more stringent the regulation became, the more bribes cadres received and worsened were the lives of people,” the source added.

(NKeconWatch: I have “cleaned up” some of the grammar here to make it more readable.  If you want to see the original version, click here.)

And in Sinuiju:

The intensive inspection of Shinuiju, in which over 70% of Chinese-North Korean commercial traffic occurs, caused several aftereffects inside North Korea: commercial traffic passing through Shinuiju and Dandong decreased by half compared to the past, and the aftermath of the inspections in Shinuiju added fuel to the fire of price rises in jangmadang goods across the country.

For instance, sugar, which is a raw material for doughnuts or candies that are consumed the most by average civilians in the jangmadang, carried a price of around 1,500 won per kilogram before the inspections, but in mid-May, it rose to 2,100 won and vegetable oil hiked from 5,500 to 7,500 won per kilogram. Such an increase in prices also caused a significant threat to the survival of citizens who made a living off the jangmadang trade.

But the final result of the evaluation of the Shinuiju inspection, which caused quite a stir externally, has purportedly been negligible.

The source said, “The volume of trade has decreased over several months and the number of visitors to China has also been reduced by half. The results of the inspection have not produced too much difference, except for the execution of 14 corrupt officials.”

The source further noted, “The only change which has been visible to the eye is the rise in the cost of bribes offered to North Korean customs from 40 to 80 dollars per hundred kilograms of goods. There was a rumor that the loading volume carried into the North would be fixed at 120kg, from 360kg, but this has not been done yet.”(Daily NK)

The Daily NK now reports that in the wake of these developments, Kim Jong il’s National Defense Commission (NDC) has moved in and directly taken over the inspections—and economic conditions have improved:

[Markets] have become lively again in the past few days as inspections by the National Defense Commission (NDC) have gotten underway.

A source in North Korea reported to Daily NK on Friday that “Merchants in Hyesan these days are fish in water. They say that they would not mind at all going through such inspections for an entire the year!”

Part of the reason for the turn around has been a change in focus.  Whereas Jang’s work hit many “ordinary” North Koreans (particularly those working for the wrong trading companies), NDC inspections are focused on controlling the mid- to upper-level cadres.  It is entirely speculatory to ask whether Kim’s strategy was to unleash Jang to get control of the region and afterwards assert direct control himself, or whether complaints from locals forced the NDC to end Jang’s campaign.

Of course this is all unverified information from inside North Korea, so who knows how much of it is correct!

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Russia-DPRK economic relations

Thursday, July 24th, 2008

From Dr. Leonid Petrov in the Asia Times:

Russia cooperation with North Korea
Since the early 2000s, overall relations between Russia and the DPRK have been improving. The DPRK’s importation of refined oil from Russia saw its first increase in 2002-2003 (from $20 million to $96 million) and was caused by the beginning of the US-DPRK nuclear confrontation and the subsequent demise of the international Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization project that was to construct a light water reactor nuclear power plant in North Korea.

During 2004-2005, petroleum trade between Russia and North Korea grew from $105 million to $172.3 million. Until the six-party talks produced their first results, in the list of Russia’s exports to the DPRK, oil products dominated at 63%. Rampant corruption in both countries also let a trickle of Russian oil to be smuggled to North Korea unaccounted for.

In 2006, Russia was the DPRK’s third-largest trading partner after China and South Korea and absorbed 9% of the total $3.18 billion spent by the North on imports (approximately $286 million). The Kremlin’s approval of international sanctions against the former communist ally was accompanied by the curtailment of trade with the North. At the time of North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, Russia’s trade statistics showed that exports of petroleum had dropped 91.1% compared to the same period of the previous year.

The pragmatic mood in bilateral relations prevails, and these days Russia delivers oil and food to North Korea only in accordance with its obligations associated with progress at the six-party talks. This year, Russia has already delivered 100,000 tonnes of fuel oil to the DPRK in two batches and, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin, a top Russian envoy to the six-party talks, will deliver another 100,000 tonnes by October 2008. In June, the Russian government announced it would provide 2,860 tonnes of flour to the DPRK. According to an official KCNA news agency report, this food aid arrived at the border city of Sinuiju in the DPRK’s northern Pyongan province in early July.

Recently, for the first time in the post-Soviet era, North Korea saw a major Russian investment. In the city of Pyeongseong, the Russian auto plant KamAZ opened its first assembly line, specializing in the production of medium-size trucks named “Taebaeksan-96”. Although less than 50 trucks were assembled in 2007, this cooperation became an important milestone in the development of bilateral relations. While the project doesn’t violate United Nations sanctions on North Korea, it shows Moscow’s drive to expand its influence in the country. Ironically, the more trucks assembled the heavier North Korea’s dependence on imported fuel, engine oils and other petrochemical products.

The importance of the DPRK’s Rajin-Seonbong special economic zone to Russia’s national interests continues to grow. The state-run monopoly OAO Russian Railways is currently upgrading its railway connections with North Korea in Khasan-Tumangang, investing at least 1.75 billion roubles (US$72 million) into this project, and plans to participate in an ambitious plan to rebuild a trans-Korean railway. By connecting Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian railroad, Russia hopes to benefit form the transit of South Korean and Japanese cargo which could be sent via its territory to Central Asian and European markets. Pyongyang seems to endorse these plans and other Russian initiatives, but does not commit any financial resources.

Eighty percent of overall bilateral economic trade between Russia and North Korea consists of cooperation, barter and investment-in-kind between the regional areas. The most active Russian regions trading with the DPRK are Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Maritime province (Primorsky Krai) itself exports to North Korea more than $4 million worth of refined oil per year. There are no oil fields in Maritime province and oil has to be borrowed through a chain of federal bureaucratic structures from the oil-rich areas of Eastern Siberia. Instead of money, the local governments agree to receive the labor of North Korean workers.

North Korean laborers in Siberia and the Far East were common under the Soviet system and they are still visibly present. In 2004, the Russian Federal Immigration Service issued 14,000 visas for foreign laborers, of whom North Koreans numbered 3,320 in 2005 and 5,000 in 2006. Since the DPRK has no other way to pay in goods or services, its government started paying for oil imported from Russia by dispatching thousands of laborers at zero cost. Following strong demand from local companies, just in 2006 regional authorities of Primorsky Krai agreed to issue an extra 5,000 working visas to North Koreans. This openness is contrary to local government policy that normally restricts the entry of labor from China.

DPRK citizens are sent to Russia to work as woodcutters and builders but some have also managed to find work in the agricultural and marine industry. Through the presence of these laborers, Russia has enjoyed a partial repayment of the DPRK’s post-Soviet debt through North Korean workers being contracted to work in mines and lumber mills in Russia’s Far East.

The wages they are able to make in Russia are far greater than what they would make at home. However, the foreign worker quota is set not by provincial governments but by Moscow, which often tries to put a stop to these programs due to the complexity of the matter. Part of this opposition stems from the fact that the North Korean workers in Russia still fall under DPRK laws and, therefore, are subject to intrusive supervision.

Among the most difficult but negotiable issues in the way of Russia-North Korea cooperation remains the problem of external debt. During the Soviet era, the DPRK incurred a debt of approximately $8 billion, which Pyongyang still owes to Moscow but cannot repay. This debt remains a stumbling block in most negotiations on new aid and development programs. However, this debt can potentially make trilateral Russian-Korean relations closer and stronger.

In January 1991, soon after the opening of diplomatic relations with South Korea, Moscow received $3 billion from Seoul in the form of a three-year loan. The collapse of the Soviet Union left this loan largely unpaid. The new Russian government in the 1990s provided South Korea with armaments worth $150 million to be counted as payment in kind for the remaining debt. In 2003, after bilateral negotiations on this issue were completed, part of this Russian debt was canceled and the remainder was rescheduled to be paid over the next 23 years.

Taking into account its own debts to the South, Russia could easily write off a significant portion of North Korean debt. To resolve this question, a certain agreement between all three parties is needed. To engage in a mutual and reciprocal round of debt cancelation, Russia might choose to see the North and the South as one country. Such an agreement would have unblocked the road for broader cooperation between Russia and the two Koreas, and simplified Russia’s energy cooperation with China and Japan.

The full article is worth reading here:
Russia is key to North Korea’s plight
Asia Times
Leonid Petrov
7/24/2008

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(UPDATE) China asks some North Koreans to leave ahead of Olympics

Monday, July 21st, 2008

UPDATE 2: According to the Associated Press:

[A South Korean] NIS official, who asked not be named, citing an internal policy, told The Associated Press that China had no plans to close all bridge links with North Korea “out of concerns of diplomatic friction with North Korea.”

The official also said China would not ask all North Koreans in China to leave, saying that Beijing plans to crackdown on North Koreans who illegally stay in China and Beijing plans to restrict renewing visas for North Koreans. 

UPDATE 1:  According to the Associated Press, China plans to close all the bridges to the DPRK during the Olympics, starting next month.  This will have a devastating impact on trade with Sinuiju, Manpo, Hyesan, Hoeryong, and many other trading hubs along the Chinese border.

ORIGINAL POST: According to an interesting article in Bloomberg (thanks to reader) China is acting to reduce the chances that North Korea issues will interfere with coverage of the Olympic games in Beijing this summer.

According to the article:

China asked some North Korean work units to leave the country or move their business operations during the Olympic Games, according to documentation from the North Korean embassy obtained by Bloomberg News.

Citing security issues, China asked North Koreans, except trade representatives and government-dispatched personnel, to leave by July 31 and not return until the end of September, the Korean-language statement said. The embassy in Beijing gave the order to North Koreans in a July 11 directive, according to a copy of the document obtained by Bloomberg News.

The order took effect from July 13 and those who delay departure would be fined or not allowed to reenter China, according to the document. Workers scheduled for dispatch to China from July 1 should delay their departure until Sept. 25, it said.

and…

It isn’t clear how authoritative the directive is. Five North Korean businessmen contacted by Bloomberg news provided different departure dates, or said they were not affected by the directive. The people refused to be identified in print, citing possible recriminations.

A press attaché at the Chinese embassy in Tokyo who declined to give his name said he wasn’t aware of the directive and that there would be no way to confirm its existence.

Read the articles here:
China asks some North Koreans to leave ahead of Olympics
Bloomberg
Hideko Takayama
7/15/2008

Report: China to shut down all bridges linked to NKorea during Olympics
Associated Press
7/21/2008

China to step up inspections at border with North Korea during Olympics to stop migrants
Associated Press
Kwang-Tae Kim
7/22/2008

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Lankov’s North Korea scenarios…

Wednesday, July 9th, 2008

As Marcus Noland has noted, one of the most difficult aspects of developing scenarios of North Korea’s future is that we do not know Kim Jong il’s vision for the DPRK after he has passed. Is he grooming members of his family to take his place or just to make sure they are wealthy and protected? Is Kim looking at China as a model? Some reports claim he is looking at Thailand’s royal family. What about a military dictatorship?

This week, Andrei Lankov weighs in with several scenarios he has outlined in four Daily NK stories:

Scenario 1:Kim Jong il follows the China/Vietnam model. Agriculture privatized along with a number of small- medium-sized firms. Workers Party remains in control. Lankov believes this scenario politically unobtainable since the inflow of knowledge of the outside world, particularly of the wealth in South Korea, will make incumbent political legitimacy almost impossible to maintain.

Scenario 2: The North Korean regime collapses because it does not have the power or resources to maintain its authority. If this happens, South Korean might not have any choice but to move to take over despite the high economic costs.

Scenario 3:If North Korea does collapse, South Korea does not have to be the only government to assert control in the territory. China has political and economic incentives to be heavily involved in North Korea’s re-composition, or to enter into a protective relationship with incumbent North Korean authorities. Market reforms would follow and opposition would be manageable.

Scenario 4: Weak political power gives various factions (including the military) space to revolt. Neither China nor South Korea want to get involved in an internal clash and North Korea descends into medium-term chaos.

Taking a step back, I use Lankov’s examples to build a broader scenario map using his drivers (regime strength/weakness and foreign intervention/non-intervention):

lankovscenarios.JPG

(Click on image for larger view)

Along the vertical axis is the strength of the DPRK’s central government. It is strong in the top two quadrants and weak in the bottom two quadrants. Along the horizontal axis is intervention or non-intervention by China or South Korea.

Using this framework, we see that Lankov’s first scenario falls into quadrant 2 (upper right), and economic reforms lead to a weakening of the central government, pushing the country into quadrants 3 or 4. This transition is based on the notion that the North Korean central government, or whichever coalition holds it together, can’t survive an economic transition, mainly due to the visible success of South Korea. I think this is an interesting argument, but I am not entirely convinced by it. Hong Kong is not inspiring revolts in China for the same reasons that North Korea does not need to fall prey to political upheaval—mainly, keep people from organizing and dispersing information, and make sure that some fraction of the productive gains from economic reforms are strategically redistributed as political rents. Of course, it would be interesting to see if a communist government could survive in Hong Kong if China was the giant, capitalist neighbor.

Special shout out to Herman Khan here.

Comments welcome.

ReadLinks to Lankov’s articles below the fold:
(more…)

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Kim Jong il steps up economic activities

Wednesday, July 2nd, 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-7-29-1
7/29/2008

Of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s public appearances during the first half of the year, fully half of them were to military installations or other defense-related sites, making it the most frequented sector, but compared to previous years, the number of visits to sites related to the economy rose considerably.

According to North Korean media sources, from January through June, Kim Jong Il made a total of 49 public visits. Of these, 25 (51%) were to military facilities, while 15 (31%) were to factories, cooperative farms, and other sites related to the nation’s economy. 3 (6%) public appearances were meetings with foreign dignitaries, and 6 (12%) were to public performances and other events.

In January, Kim made five on-site visits to economically important areas, after which there was a lull until May, when Kim appeared at six sites, and then made another 4 economy-related visits in June. In July, Kim has already made three visits to Jangan and North Pyongan Provinces, showing up at production facilities in those areas.

Between January and July of 2007, Kim made only six visits to sites related to the economic sector, less than a third the number of visits this year. In fact, with only 19 site visits for all of 2007, Kim’s appearances in the first half of this year have almost surpassed last year’s total, which itself was an increase over the 16 visits made in 2006.

The first public appearance made by Kim Jong Il in 2008 was at the Yaesung River Power Plant construction site on January 6, and was followed up by an appearance on January 21 the ‘18th National Program Contest and Exhibition’, emphasizing the government’s drive to resolve economic difficulties.

In the same month, Kim Jong Il visited a poultry and pork processing plant, a mushroom plant, a food processing facility, a rabbit breeding farm, and a youth mine, directly inspecting sites related to the lives and livelihoods of the people, appearing to emphasize the slogan announced in this year’s New Year’s Joint Declaration, “Prioritization of the People’s Lives”. Kim’s ‘economic walk’ was seemingly put on hold by a flurry of negotiations between the United States and North Korea regarding the North’s declaration of its nuclear programs and the attempt by the new South Korean government’s revamped policy towards North Korea between February and April, but then regained traction in May, with a visit on the 4th to a mountain orchard in Kangwon Province.

This year, Kim Jong Il’s on-site instructions at facilities related to building the economy and improving the lives of the people appear to be focused on stressing the need to resolve food shortages and ensure that everyone is fed.

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Nuclear declaration and US Sanctions

Friday, June 27th, 2008

UPDATE 3:  Executive Order: Continuing Certain Restrictions with Respect to North Korea and North Korean Nationals

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, find that the current existence and risk of the proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, and I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat. I further find that, as we deal with that threat through multilateral diplomacy, it is necessary to continue certain restrictions with respect to North Korea that would otherwise be lifted pursuant to a forthcoming proclamation that will terminate the exercise of authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 1 et seq.) (TWEA) with respect to North Korea.

Accordingly, I hereby order:

Section 1. Except to the extent provided in statutes or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this order, the following are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:

all property and interests in property of North Korea or a North Korean national that, pursuant to the President’s authorities under the TWEA, the exercise of which has been continued in accordance with section 101(b) of Public Law 95-223 (91 Stat. 1625; 50 U.S.C. App. 5(b) note), were blocked as of June 16, 2000, and remained blocked immediately prior to the date of this order.

Sec. 2. Except to the extent provided in statutes or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this order, United States persons may not register a vessel in North Korea, obtain authorization for a vessel to fly the North Korean flag, or own, lease, operate, or insure any vessel flagged by North Korea.

Sec. 3. (a) Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:

(a) the term “person” means an individual or entity;

(b) the term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization; and

(c) the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.

Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.

Sec. 6. The Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to submit the recurring and final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).

Sec. 7. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

GEORGE W. BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June 26, 2008.

UPDATE 2: How much plutonium does the DPRK have?

From the Daily Times (Pakistan):

But there may be problems ahead with the declaration. Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper reported an informed source as saying the North declared it produced around 30 kg (66 lbs) of plutonium, while US officials have said they think it is closer to 50 kg. Sung Kim, a State Department envoy who witnessed the cooling tower blast, told reporters in Seoul on Saturday that there might not be enough time to complete the North’s denuclearisation before President George W Bush leaves office in January 2009.

‘Emotionally attached’: Kim said North Koreans engineers appeared to have formed an “emotional attachment” to their atomic programme that has become apparent during international efforts to dismantle it. Kim told reporters that he saw emotion in Ri Yong-ho, head of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, and his colleagues when they all witnessed Friday’s demolition of the plant’s cooling tower. “I think I detected a sense of sadness when the tower came down but I thought he put it well when he was asked what this all meant for him and he said that he just hoped this would contribute to peace and stability,” said Ri.  

UPDATE 1:
“US Treasury says N.Korea sanctions remain in place”
Reuters via Guardian
David Lawder
6/26/2008

U.S. Treasury financial sanctions aimed at ending North Korean money laundering, illicit financing activities and weapons proliferation remain in effect despite the easing of other sanctions against Pyongyang, a Treasury spokesman said on Thursday.

The move by the Bush administration to lift some sanctions after North Korea delivered a long-delayed account of its nuclear activities will not restore the country’s access to the international banking system, Treasury spokesman John Rankin said.

North Korea was largely cut off from the international banking system in 2005 when the Treasury named Banco Delta Asia, a small bank in the Chinese gambling enclave of Macau, as a primary money laundering concern.

The Treasury accused the bank of circulating counterfeit U.S. currency produced by North Korea, and of knowingly handling transactions by North Korean entities involved in illicit activities, including the narcotics trade and sales of counterfeit cigarettes and other goods.

Both North Korea and Banco Delta Asia have denied the Treasury’s allegations.

Although about $25 million in frozen North Korean funds in Banco Delta Asia was released last year, the sanctions against the bank, which prohibit transactions with U.S. banks, remain in effect, Rankin said. International banks have largely shunned Banco Delta Asia as well.

As recently as April, Treasury officials said so called “supernotes” — high quality counterfeit $100 bills produced by North Korea, were still surfacing.

“The lifting of sanctions associated with the Trading with the Enemy Act, and removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism does not represent North Korea’s re-integration into the international financial system,” he said.

Sanctions that prohibit U.S. companies from owning, leasing, operating, insuring North Korean-flagged shipping vessels, as well as registering vessels in North Korea, remain in place. 

ORIGINAL POST: Today North Korean made the nuclear declaration required by the February 2007 six-party agreement.  This web site does not focus on the nuclear issue, but this turn of events represents a significant US policy shift with economic implications for the DPRK.  The coverage has been overwhelming, so below are media excerpts that cover most of the angles:

“Pyongyang Submits Nuclear Declaration”
Wall Street Journal
Evan Ramstad
6/26/2008

After keeping the U.S. and other countries waiting for 15 months, North Korea delivered a description of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons, setting up the next – and more difficult – stage in an international effort to disarm and reshape the isolated, authoritarian country.

North Korean diplomats gave a declaration of its nuclear-weapons program to Chinese counterparts in Beijing who have been coordinating the six-nation talks. In return, U.S. President George W. Bush announced the lifting of some trade sanctions and beginning of the process of removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terror. (Read the text of the White House statement here).

Under the February 2007 deal, North Korea also agreed to disable a nuclear plant that provided fuel for its nuclear weapons, a step that’s also nearly complete. On Friday, it plans to blow up the cooling tower at the nuclear plant and invited TV crews from several countries, including the U.S. and South Korea, to record the event.

The contents of North Korea’s declaration weren’t immediately disclosed. In recent weeks, U.S. diplomats have said they didn’t expect it to include a key piece of data – how many nuclear weapons the country has built. The document also is believed to be limited to North Korea’s efforts to develop plutonium as a nuclear fuel, but doesn’t mention suspected research into highly-enriched uranium as a fuel nor its suspected proliferation efforts to Syria.

“North Korea removed from US ‘axis of evil'”
London Times
Jeremy Page and Richard Lloyd Parry
6/26/008

The US move, which will also see a lifting of long-running sanctions, would mark the most significant thaw in relations between Washington and Pyongyang since the 1950-53 Korean War. Mr Bush said that it was intended to reward and encourage North Korean co-operation and accelerate the tangled negotiations on the country’s nuclear disarmament.

In the first instance, America will exempt North Korea from sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act, a piece of First World War legislation that was employed during the Korean War, and which restricts trade with Pyongyang by US companies and citizens. The only other country subject to its provisions is Cuba.

It also gave notice that it would start the 45-day process of removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, where it stands alongside Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria. Sanctions against them include a ban on arms sales, economic assistance, and an obligation on the US Government to oppose loans to listed countries by such international institutions as the World Bank.

“Diplomacy Is Working on North Korea”
Wall Street Journal
Condoleeza Rice
6/26/2008; Page A15

In its declaration, North Korea will state how much plutonium it possesses. We will not accept that statement on faith. We will insist on verification. North Korea has already turned over nearly 19,000 pages of production records from its Yongbyon reactor and associated facilities. With additional information we expect to receive – access to other documents, relevant sites, key personnel and the reactor itself – these records will help to verify the accuracy and completeness of Pyongyang’s declaration. North Korea’s plutonium program has been by far its largest nuclear effort over many decades, and we believe our policy could verifiably get the regime out of the plutonium-making business.

Getting a handle on North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program is harder, because we simply do not know its full scale or what it yielded. And yet, because of our current policy, we now know more about North Korea’s uranium-enrichment efforts than before, and we are learning more still – much of it troubling. North Korea acknowledges our concerns about its uranium-enrichment program, and we will insist on getting to the bottom of this issue.

Similarly, we know that North Korea proliferated nuclear technology to Syria, but we do not know whether that is the end of the story. Rather than just trying to address this threat unilaterally, we will be more effective in learning about North Korean proliferation and preventing its continuation through a cooperative effort with Japan, South Korea, China and Russia.

And in return for these steps, what have we given thus far? No significant economic assistance. No trade or investment cooperation. No security guarantees or normalized relations. And our many sanctions on North Korea, both bilateral and multilateral, remain in place.

“‘Good start’ to UN’s Syria probe”
BBC
6/25/2008

The head of a UN team investigating allegations that Syria has been working on a secret nuclear weapons programme says their work is off to a good start.

The IAEA official, Olli Heinonen, said inspectors had taken samples at the al-Kibar site in the Syrian desert.

“It was a good start, but there’s still work that remains to be done,” he said.

“For this trip we did what we agreed to. We achieved what we wanted on this first trip. We took samples which we wanted to take. Now it’s time to analyse them.”

Mr Heinonen also said he was generally satisfied with the level of co-operation by Syria.

Additional information: 

To read a hawk perspective, see Josh’s post at One Free Korea.  Also, the Telegraph (UK) reports that Vice President Cheney tried to block the deal.

David Kang spoke to NPR’s Market Place.

US move reduces Japan’s negotiation leverage over DPRK.

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Inter-Korean trade up this year

Wednesday, June 25th, 2008

Although political tensions have risen between North and South Korea (list here), Yonhap reports trade between the two countries has increased this year!

According to Yonhap:

South Korea’s trade with North Korea in the first five months of this year surged 30 percent on-year thanks to brisk industrial exchanges that offset a sharp drop in humanitarian aid, the Unification Ministry said Tuesday.

Inter-Korean trade volume increased to US$734.25 million in the January-May period, up from US$562.92 million during the same period last year, according to ministry data. The increase was notable in the commercial sector, which posted US$685 million worth of trade over the months, up 52 percent year-on-year.

However, exchanges in non-commercial areas significantly contracted due to strained inter-Korean political ties. Non-commercial trade dropped by 56 percent to US$49.2 million.

I have been unable to locate this information on the MoU website.  Perhaps it is not listed in English.  If you find it, please send me the link. 

Read the Yonhap article, see below:
Inter-Korean trade rises despite political chills
Yonhap
6/25/2008

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