North Korean Economy Watch

Yonhap
7/30/2007

North Korea has elected 27,390 deputies to the government councils of provinces, cities and counties, the North’s state-run media reported Monday.

“All registered voters, except those who are staying abroad or those who are working at sea far away from the land, took part in the election as of 18:00 Sunday,” the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, citing data from the Central Election Guidance Committee.

The KCNA reported that those who were not able to go to the polls because of old age and illness cast ballots into “mobile ballot boxes,” saying all voters across the country took part in the election with ardent revolutionary enthusiasm.

Voter turnout was 99.82 percent, and all the voters cast yes votes for candidates in all constituencies, according to the KCNA.

The number of deputies is up 740 from the last election in August in 2003, the KCNA reported. In 1999, North Korea elected a total of 29,442 deputies to local assemblies.

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
7/29/2007

On September 30, 1950, at 11:30 p.m., the Eighth Department of the Soviet General Staff received a coded message from Pyongyang. It took about an hour to decipher it, and then a courier was dispatched to deliver it to Stalin’s residence on the outskirts of Moscow. It was 2:30 a.m., but the Soviet dictator liked to work at night. At any rate, the message was so important that perhaps they would wake him anyway. Kim Il-sung had reported that the North Korean army had ceased to exist, and that the only way to save the North Korean state would be through an urgent dispatch of troops from the USSR.

Stalin was hardly surprised. He was never an enthusiast for Kim Il-sung’s invasion plans, and when in January 1950 he finally granted permission to invade the South, he did so on the assumption that the U.S. would have no time, and perhaps, no will, to interfere. Hence, when Stalin learned of the Incheon landing, he was quick to appreciate what had happened.

Thanks to the recent efforts of historians, especially Alexander Mansourov and Pak Myong-rim whose research I use for this article, we know what was happening in Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang during the fateful two weeks which followed MacArthur’s amphibious operation in Incheon.

The landing did not come as a complete surprise: the Soviet _ and, obviously, Chinese _ intelligence expected something like it, and the Chinese even warned the North Koreans about the danger.

When Stalin learned about the large-scale landing, he realized that a disaster was looming. As early as Sept. 18, he cabled his instructions to Pyongyang. He requested a stop of the push toward Busan, and demanded the withdrawal of troops from the South to reinforce Seoul’s defenses. This was a reasonable suggestion, but Stalin did not appreciate the degree of U.S. military superiority. It is doubtful whether such a withdrawal would have accomplished much.

But Stalin’s representatives in Korea, including Gen. Shtykov, the first Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, were even less appreciative of the new dangers. While the U.S. and South Korean forces were fighting their way to Seoul, soon to cut the North Korean troops off from their supply bases, both Shtykov and Kim Il-sung still hoped that the landing force could be contained. The documents confirm that even when the U.N. forces took over the Gimpo airfield and entered the outskirts of Seoul, the North Korean command still hoped to take Busan in the following few days.

The North Korean press remained silent about the landing. By Sept. 18, the sounds of battle were well heard in Seoul, but the official propaganda and communist activists assured everybody that nothing special was taking place. Kim Song-chil, a historian and author of a famous diary, described how his Communist interlocutors insisted that the sounds of distant artillery were merely produced by the field exercises of the North Korean troops.

On Sept. 20, Stalin repeated his demand, and required the withdrawal of forces from the southern part of the country to Seoul, in order to “establish strong frontline positions to the north and east of Seoul.” It indicated that Seoul should be surrendered to the U.N. forces. But Kim Il-sung, with his trademark stubbornness, kept pressing on toward Busan.

Only on the evening of Sept. 25, did Kim Il-sung admit that there was no chance of pushing the South Korean forces into the sea near Busan. He ordered a withdrawal, but it was too late. The next day, heavy battles unrolled into the streets in downtown Seoul where the North Korean forces tried to resist. They did what they could. Kim Song-chil wrote about their bravery with great admiration, and the historian was no fan of the communists.

Over the two days of Sept. 27-28, the North Korean command system disintegrated. Kim Il-sung could not even contact his own Defense Minister Choe Yong-gon, who was in Seoul doing his best to keep the city. An emergency meeting in Pyongyang created a new command structure, presided over by Kim Il-sung, himself. But he was a general without an army; after the battle of Seoul, the North Korean forces ceased to exist.

For a while, there was some hope that the U.N. troops would not cross the 38th parallel. But by Oct. 1, it became clear that such a turn of events was very unlikely. Thus, Kim Il-sung and Pak Hon-yong, his foreign minister and future victim of the purges, wrote a cable in which they desperately asked for help. They admitted “if the enemy were to take advantage of the situation and step up its offensive in North Korea, then we would be unable to stop the enemy by our own forces.” Accordingly they asked for Soviet troops.

But Stalin did not want to launch a third World War. He hoped that the Chinese would take the military responsibilities on. After all, their stake in the situation was greater than his. He eventually succeeded, but it took much effort on his part.

Daily NK
Kim Young Jin
7/24/2007

The North Korean government, with the approaching Provincial People’s Assembly delegate elections on the 29th of this month, stepped-up one level the management of citizens and regulation of cell phones.

Kang Ki Ok (pseudonym), a civilian of Hyesan in Yangkang Provicne, said in a phone conversation with the reporter on the 20th, “Nowadays, I am afraid to turn on my cell phone. The People Safety agents and the National Security agents inspect us with fury in their eyes. People who use cell phones during the election season are punished, so there are people who bury their phones by putting them into jars.”

The North Korean government, when the People’s Assembly election season comes around every four or five years, concentrates on regulating the society by observing the movement of citizens and examining the registration cards.

The members of the elections preparations committee, composed of National Security agents, chairmen of People’s Units, and head officials of each provincial unit, are ordered to strictly investigate illegal acts occurring in their regions and to control them. Illegal acts are punished at the end of the elections.

According to Mr. Kang, the outflow of information has been secured at the border region with the upcoming delegate elections, so concentrated cell phone regulation were carried out. Further, the control of the border has been toughened recently, so the escape fee has skyrocked to the North Korean currency of 1 million won (approx. US$1,075).

Another source relayed, “Safeguarding Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il statues and research offices have been toughened by inspection units composed of each organ and enterprise farming laborers. Further, they are making sure that historic places and vestiges of battle are not destroyed.”

This source said, “Youth Leagues have also organized inspection units and are regulating unemployed persons and are strictly making sure that juveniles do not watch South Korean dramas and listen to illegal CDs and South Korean songs.”

On one hand, related to election preparation, each city, district, and county candidates were posted at the election site and citizens over 17 have gone into preparations such as conducting voter registrations through the election committee.

The source also relayed that the People’s Safety Agency have actively stepped up inspections by summoning civilians who have gone out to foreign sites to catch clam and mine gold for survival.

When the movement of the North Korean authorities to strengthen the solidarity of the regime was presented through this election, the citizens, in fear of being punished as trial cases, have produced a cautious atmosphere.”

At the time of the Supreme People’s Assembly elections in 2003, when thefts or acts of violence occurred, perpetrators were stringently punished regardless of whether or not they were members of the Workers’ Party. Further, in the case that teenagers got into fist fights, the parents were disciplined and jointly held responsible.

Mr. Kim, who defected in 2006, said, “At the time of the 1991 provincial elections, in the province where we were living, teenagers got into a fist fight. One of the gangs who started the fight accused the opponent of “stirring a political event destroying elections” and went to the parents and got compensation for damages by threatening them.”

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
7/22/2007

When the North Korean leaders began their rather limited and controversial economic reforms in 2002, one aspect of the reform package did not attract particular attention overseas. It was declared that the CEO of a state-run factory would henceforth manage its activity directly. To Western ears, this sounded rather unremarkable, but North Koreans instantly understood that this meant the abolition of the Daean system. For decades this system was lauded as a unique invention of Kim Il-sung’s managerial genius _ and now it was over.

The system was introduced in the early 1960s, after some earlier experiments. The Daean Heavy Equipment Factory, not far from Pyongyang, served as the major testing ground, and it was the place where, in December 1961, Kim Il-sung gave his August approval to the system.

The Daean system was unusual indeed. The management of a factory was to be conducted in a collegial manner by the “factory management committee”. This committee was presided over, however, not by the company CEO, but by its party secretary. Taking into consideration that most North Korean committees are hardly anything but advisory bodies for their chairpersons, this meant that the daily management of a factory was to be done by its party secretary.

This was a break with the then established communist tradition. In fellow communist countries, the situation was different: while at the national level the party’s primacy was undisputed, it seldom bothered itself with micro-management of daily production. Typically for a communist country, a party secretary at factory level was a sort of priest-like figure, dealing with political education and moral guidance of the personnel rather than with the management of production.

Why did the North Koreans make such a break with tradition? First of all, we must not exaggerate the significance of this break: after all, it did not really matter whether a particular CEO was officially considered a “director” or a “party secretary”. Their background would be roughly the same nonetheless.

However, the introduction of the Daean system had some symbolic meaning. Since the ruling Party was meant to symbolize the “politics,” such that the promotion of its local representative was supposed to drive home the primacy of “politics” over everything else.

Indeed, the North Korean drive to industrialize in the 1950s and 1960s was achieved with a remarkable disregard for the economic incentives, and even rudimentary use of the market economy. In this regard, North Korea once again “out-Stalined” Stalin himself. In the USSR, large premiums and other material benefits were reserved for the most efficient workers. In Kim’s North Korea _ like Mao’s China _ the workers were supposed to work hard largely because of their ideological devotion. A popular slogan insisted: “We must sacrifice ourselves for the sake of the country!” People were required to work long hours, give up their days off, and ignore safety requirements for the sake of an increase in output. The party was responsible for encouraging this _ and thus its representative became the top supervisor under the Daean system.

It is easy to blame Pyongyang for its disregard of human lives and sufferings. However, did it have a choice? Perhaps, but not likely. In the impoverished North Korea of the 1950s, precious few resources were available, and these had to be saved for the most important use. Human lives were cheap and plentiful, while machinery was scarce and expensive. Thus, the choice was made, and then carefully wrapped up in fine-sounding rhetoric.

To an extent, the North Koreans themselves were ready to risk their lives in this mad rush for industrialization. They believed that a few years of frantic effort would create an affluent, successful, and powerful Korea. And many people were indeed willing to give their lives for such a goal _ a minority, perhaps, but a significant one. This enthusiasm soon worn out, but around 1960 it was quite real.

For a while it appeared as if the strategy worked. The North Korean economy in 1955-1970 was growing at the breathtaking speed of 19% a year. Then it was the North, not the South that broke the world’s records pertaining to economic growth.

However, the success proved to be short-lived. By the late 1960s the first signs of stagnation appeared, and by 1980 the Northern economy was lagging hopelessly behind that of the South. Why did it happen? That is another story altogether.

Daily NK
Shin Joo Hyun
7/18/2007

Chosun (North Korea) Central TV, with the Local People’s Assembly representative elections ahead on the 29th of the month, reported on the 14th that a poster with the election slogan, “Let everyone vote in agreement,” has been produced.

North Korean Local People’s Assembly elections is a process of electing People’s Assembly representative at the province and the city under the direct control of the central government, and general cities, gun (county levels) and districts. At the election held in August 2003, 26,650 delegates were elected to the local People’s Assembly representative.

All elections at each unit of North Korea take place by each sole candidate coming forth and people voting for or against him or her. The nomination of candidates takes place by the elections party committee, who selects the candidates before the fact, and each level of organizations.

When the election date is publicly announced, events or meetings are held to encourage the approval votes of each People’s unit, civil organizations, or organs. Not only election slogans to encourage votes, but political slogans also emerge, such as “Let’s shine the military-first politics even more through participation of the populous.”

Mr. Lee, who defected to South Korea in 2004, said, “The National Security Agency tries to instill fear among the citizens by spreading rumors such as ‘So and so of a certain region voted in disagreement, so the entire family was banished. If one does not vote, he or she becomes special object of inspections.’ I did not know this there, but when I came here, I realized they were groundless acts of propagation to encourage approval votes.”

On the day of elections, if one enters the voting place, the citizens registration card is confirmed and people form lines to enter the voting area. Failure to participate in the voting is the same as being classified as anti-revolutionary persons.

In the case that one votes in agreement with the candidate, he or she can drop the voting paper in the voting box. Only in the case of disapproval can one enter the polling booth and mark X with a pencil. In reality, it is a public vote without the assurance of secrecy because the person in disagreement can be identified right away.

At the time of a vote of disagreement, the person is taken to the National Security Agency and undergo severe interrogations and is classified as a anti-revolutionary person, so no one dares to disagree. In the view of South Korean, we can become incensed about the fact that and ask ‘how can elections be so undemocratic?’ but to North Korea citizens, this is such a natural fact.”

As a result, North Korean elections are an election in words, but has a different dimension from our elections. In North Korea, the dimension of testing political character and understanding civilian population is much stronger than the meaning of electing representatives. In actuality, it is a political event to seize citizens.

With this year’s elections approaching, the inspections of North Korean borders and maritime has become much more strict and the issuance of permits for relocation has become more difficult. By doing so, means to restrain relocations have actually been implemented.

When elections end in the North, there is no special announcement on the result. Korean Central TV only reports the expected results in a lump, such as a 99.9% voting rate and a 100% approval rate.

Election slogans such as “Let everyone vote in agreement” cannot be abrupt to North Korean. However, such undemocratic election campaigns cannot continue forever by the North Korean authorities. When North Korean citizens realize that slogans to encourage votes of approval is the starting point for a dictatorship and anti-humanitarian politics, North Korea’s quality will change.

Daily NK
Park Choel Yong
7/16/2007

In Chosun (North Korea), free dating between male and female students is prevented during middle school years and even in college. If an unmarried man and woman are walking down the street arm in arm, then they have to worry about the glare of passersby. However, marriage from dating is a gradually increasing trend, but most of the time, people marry through arranged marriages.

Before the period of the food shortage before 1990, the best husband material was males who “had joined a party, performed military service, and graduated from college.” However, since 2000, a huge shift has taken place in the mentality of people.

Lately, three levels of husbands have been common. The first level is males who are included in the following three categories: those who frequently go abroad, those attend foreign-currency earning companies, and those who have high possibility of going abroad.

The second level is those who have parents who are high-ranked leaders or come from a wealthy background. The third level is those whose parents do not have power, but as individuals, are smart enough to finish military service, join the party, are able to support themselves through college.

Males, who are not classified in these categories, select as spouses females who belong to similar categories. However, even if the classes are divided as such, males who earn a lot of money are inevitably the most popular.

The candidates for No.5 Department of the Party are special-grade women

If one looks at the basis for which brides are chosen in Pyongyang, the first level are those whose parents have power and come from an affluent family. Nowadays, there are provincial men who, thanks to the spouses’ family, who succeed by achieving the status of a Pyongyang citizen.

The second level is female college graduates, whose parents may not have authority, but the individual is smart and can make a living by herself. Of course, a woman cannot do better than graduate from Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang Foreign Language University, or Pyongyang Medical College. Historically and now, women who graduate from the College of Education can work as a teacher is still an admirable bride material.

The third level is those whose parents do not have power, the household is not too affluent, and the woman did not graduate from college, but she has a strong will of survival so can conduct business well. In Chosun nowadays, women who cannot do business are not popular among the men.

However, above power, education level, and money, is a class which is counted as a special level of women among all the men. They are those whose appearances are superior that they are selected into the No.5 Department of the Party, or are actors, dancers, or singers. The No.5 Department’s females work as phone operators or as Gippeumjo (pleasure-givers, special entertainers just for high-ranking officials) of high-level leaders and should quit once they reach 25. Afterwards, they are acceded to the party, are married to military commanders of the Escort Bureau or party leaders, and enter married life and a house which have been prepared for them.

The No.5 Department of the Party is a division, which is charge of Kim Il Sung’s food, clothing, and shelter and every aspect of his private life.

A refined marriage of mutual exchange of vows and pouring drinks at home

Once the marriage partner is selected, the parents select the date of the engagement ceremony. There are differences by province, but as a whole, the groom’s side of the family prepare deok (rice cakes) and food on the day of the ceremony and go to the bride’s home. On engagement day, the parents choose the wedding date.

The wedding clothes do not require a large sum of money. The men wear suits and women can prepare traditional Chosun dresses.

Japanese-Koreans who have returned to Pyongyang wear Western-style wedding clothes, which are rarely seen, and marry. In the past, Chosun period receptions and wedding attires, invoking the national tradition, were popular, but recently, they have completely disappeared.

The wedding is first conducted at the bride’s house. The wedding itself is the exchange of Korean drink glasses at the feast table and after the exchange of bows, the ceremony ends by pouring the drinks to both sides of parents and giving bows. Then, on the next day, the party leaves for the groom’s house. There, the same ceremony is conducted. Three days later, food is prepared and the bribe’s house visits take place.

In big cities such as Pyongyang, large-scale weddings can take place. First of all, cars that are brought to the wedding vary. In Chosun, it is not easy to acquire cars, but people choose high-scale cars anyways. In the house of upper-level leaders, several cars are mobilized.

For wedding photos, the Mansudae Arts Theater is the Best

Post the wedding ceremony, people ride rented cars and offer flowers and take ceremonial photos at the Kim Il Sung statue. They ride the car once more and take photos at various places and of statues in Pyongyang City.

The Party Foundation Commemorative Tower, the 5.1 Stadium, the Juche Ideology Tower, etc. are the major photo sites. There are political reasons for seeking out these sites, but they are also the most-decorated facilities in Pyongyang, so the pictures come out beautifully.

When one has a wedding, they have to report the marriage, carrying citizen registration cards, within a set time at the police station of jurisdiction. The bride and the groom, at this time, have to simultaneously read aloud the wedding oath.

The wedding oath pledges devotion to Kim Jong Il and as a cell of society, diligent leadership of the family, trust and reliance on each other, and walking the single path of revolution together.

In agricultural districts, the farmers do not even properly receive crops, so since they do not have anything to eat, they do not like going to the farm to work. However, the unmarried women, once they are engaged, are freed from going to the farm to work. Once there is an engagement ceremony, the woman is classified as a housewife who can receive 300 grams of provisions per day, so they are no longer required to go out to the farms and can wholly go into selling.

Thus, the young women in rural villages do not pay too much attention to the appearance or background of the grooms and in many cases, they become engaged as soon as they meet a man. Consequently, in the rural region, 19 or 20-year old married females are common. To them, marriage, which should be built on mutual love and faith, are considered as asylums for being freed from difficult labor.

Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
7/13/2007

Over the past couple of weeks, the small community of Seoul-based Pyongyang watchers was busy discussing a minor professional sensation. The Wolgan Chungang monthly, widely known for its good insights on all things North Korean, published a lengthy transcript of a speech, allegedly delivered last December, by a high-level Central Committee official. He was obviously talking to a group of prominent academics and engineers. The official’s name is cited as Chang Yong-sun, but he seems to be a complete unknown to the North Korea experts.

The authenticity of the transcript cannot be proved beyond doubt, but the Seoul expert community tends to believe that this tape was indeed secretly recorded somewhere in Pyongyang a few months ago and then smuggled to the South.

Being a former Soviet citizen, this author is inclined to believe this view as well. The tape rings true. This is how a high-level official would talk when lecturing lower layers of elite on the current situation, and such regular lectures were typical for many communist countries.

The semi-privileged met the bigwigs to get instructions on recent events, as well as some alleged insiders’ stories and anecdotes. The semi-privileged cadres felt themselves partaking in the enigmatic world of grand politics, and also learned something about the new trends in their leadership’s thinking about the world.

Most people who deal with “Chang’s lecture” concentrate on those parts of the lengthy presentation that deal with US-North Korea relations and the six-party talks on nuclear disarmament. Indeed, such issues are treated at great length by this document. Many others pay attention to rather unfavorable depictions of the Chinese or outbursts of threats against Japan.

However, I believe that there are more important things in the transcript than merely a North Korean version of what happened during former assistant secretary of state James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang or during the first rounds of the six-party talks. The tape allows us to have one more glimpse at the world view held by the North Korean elite or, at least, by its lower reaches.

What are the features of the world as seen from Pyongyang? First of all, the significance of North Korea is blown out of all proportion. Somebody would describe this as Pyongyang megalomania, but perhaps author Bruce Cummings found a better term when he talked about “North Korean solipsism”, an assumption that North Korea lies at the center of the world, and that the world itself surely must be aware of this.

The North Korean press now tells its readers that the major international conflict of the modern world is the ongoing struggle between US imperialism and heroic North Korea. Chang Yong-sun even told his audience that the development of North Korean missiles has produced a serious impact on the public-health issues in the US: “Nobody can intercept our missiles now. All the people in the US are aware of this.

“This is why all the people in the United States are completely allergic to missiles of our republic. Once they learn that we test-fired missiles, they become so worried about the rockets changing their directions and exploding over them and killing them, so they develop nervous diseases and nettle rash breaks out all over their bodies. This is what is happening in the United States.”

One should not feel too sorry about the bastards, however. According to the official North Korean world view, once again reiterated by Comrade Chang, the US is responsible for everything that goes badly in Korea, and the constant military threat from the warmongering Washington is the major fact of North Korean life.

The audience was reminded that in 1950 it was the Americans who attacked North Korea, bringing death and destruction to the country (this official version of 1950 events seems to be almost universally believed by North Koreans). This great crime of 1950 has not been avenged yet, Comrade Chang reminded his listeners.

Many people in the US want to believe that such hostility stemmed from President George W Bush’s policies, but Comrade Chang reminded his audience a number of times that there is no real difference between the Republicans and Democrats: both US parties are pathologically hostile to the Country of the Beloved General. The differences between them are of a purely tactical nature, Chang Yong-sun told his audience. He said Republicans rely more on brute force, while Democrats are more canny and more willing to use ideological subversion and economic pressures.

Chang Yong-sun repeated a number of times that the major threat from the US is not that of a sudden military attack. The imperialists are not that simplistic: these days their major weapon is internal subversion. He said: “Although it appears as if the Americans do good things to us, their real nature has not changed at all. Their primary objective is, from start to finish, to undermine us from within and melt us down by disarming us ideologically.”

Chang Yong-sun repeated the message that has been delivered countless times by North Korean leaders big and small: the ideological threat of the outside world constitutes a greater danger than all imaginable military threats. He alleged that the foreign enemies have designed some grand plan of subversion. Chang said specially designated think-tanks work on this issue day and night. If his fantasies are to be believed, one of such centers is somewhere in Washington and employs no fewer than 370 retired generals whose only job is to find ways to undermine North Korea from within.

Being an enthusiastic supporter of soft power, the present author knows perfectly well that there is no coordinated plan of applying soft pressure on Pyongyang. The amount of money and efforts spent on broadcasts aimed at North Korea, on support of refugee groups and other similar activities, is ridiculously small. It is a dream to have a US research center specifically dealing with North Korean issues and stuffed with even, say, five post-doctoral candidates (let alone with 370 ex-generals).

But this raises a question: If this the case, why do Pyongyang politicians keep repeating similar statements? Why do they refer to a non-existent threat? Perhaps because they know what they should be really afraid of. They know only too well how potentially precarious against such a challenge their position is, and they probably cannot even believe that their adversaries fail to appreciate the major vulnerability of Pyongyang and do nothing to exploit the related opportunities. Comrade Chang would be really surprised to learn how weak and disorganized are actual efforts of the “class enemies” in the area that he (perhaps correctly) considers decisive.

Some twists of Pyongyang’s official mindset might come as a surprise to many readers. For example, Comrade Chang found a source of great pride in the North Korean penchant for secrecy. He used one peculiar example to explain why this secretiveness is great. According to him, the Americans defeated the Iraqis because they imitated the voice of Saddam Hussein and then sent fake orders to Iraqi troops in his name.

However, as he proudly reminded everyone, Marshal Kim Jong-il had spoken in public only once, so Americans will never find enough material for their perfidious schemes. The entire secrecy is necessary to keep foreigners at a disadvantage: “A long time ago, the Great General taught us to make sure that our internal things appears to be hazy as if covered by fog when the Americans spy on us. So we have made sure that internal things of our country appear really hazy as if in a fog when our country was viewed from outside.”

It is remarkable that the country’s economic woes are explained in a novel way, which was made possible by the nuclear test. Until 2006, North Koreans were supposed to believe that the only reasons for the recent famine were huge floods that “might happen only once a century”. Now it is admitted that the government needed money for missile and nuclear development, and hence had no other choice but to sacrifice some people to save the nation.

Chang Yong-sun said: “To be frank with you, even if one sells 50 plants as large as Kim Ch’aek Steel Mill, the money is not enough to develop a missile. During the ‘arduous march’ [Pyongyang-speak for the famine of the late 1990s], if there [was] a bit of money, it had to be spent on developing missiles, even though the generals knew that factories did not work and people were starving. This is why we have survived, and were not eaten up by those bastards. Had it not been like this, the bastards would have eaten us a long time ago.”

This line of argument is psychologically more powerful than the earlier version. Nowadays, people’s suffering can be presented not as the result of some blind misfortune caused by nature, but as a part of heroic sacrifice. People died because their country was at war and needed everything to save itself from complete destruction by the brutal enemy. Their deaths were those of heroes.

Such a change of tune is indeed typical of North Korean propaganda during the past few months. However, it might have some political consequences. This propaganda line makes it more difficult to surrender nuclear weapons even if such a notion will ever be seriously entertained by Pyongyang. If North Korea chooses to give up its nuclear arsenal, these sacrifices will be rendered meaningless.

Another propaganda line is that now people should expect a certain improvement of their lot, since the major work has been done: “Now we have conducted a nuclear test and other things, so we have to improve the people’s living standards by concentrating on economic construction.”

Still, Comrade Chang does not want his audience to entertain an excessively optimistic picture of their country’s future. Improvement will be minor and, as one might guess from some other parts of the speech, is likely to be limited to, say, complete reintroduction of Kim Il-sung-era consumer standards, which were not exactly luxurious (550 grams or cereal a day, plus a few pieces of meat on special occasions, four or five times a year).

Chang Yong-sun explained that North Korean industry is surely capable of producing quality consumption goods but cannot do it, because the ever present threat of an imperialist attack deems austerity and sacrifices necessary. He also made clear that his listeners should not await serious improvement of their lot any time soon.

The statement resonates very well with what another life-long analyst of North Korean propaganda, Tatiana Gabroussenko, wrote recently: unlike earlier eras when masses were extolled to make sacrifices for the sake of some identifiable future, nowadays North Korean leaders tell their people that no significant improvement is in sight. Comrade Chang even made a joke of this: “Since the end of the Korean War, we have lived with our belts tightened … One thing I can assure you: we’ll have to live with our belts tightened until the day our country is unified. If we do not have any more holes in our belts, let us make them.”

However, the audience was reminded that in the final count it is again the foreign forces who are to be blamed for these hardships. To quote Comrade Chang once again: “It is not because we do not know how to live better that we are not well off. Who is responsible for this? The US imperialists are responsible for this. That is why we call the US imperialists our mortal enemy with whom we cannot live under the same sky!”

Most of the speech consisted of US-bashing and Japan-bashing, but what about South Korea? Here Comrade Chang used the new tactics that have become typical for North Korean propagandists since the 2002 inter-Korea summit. Brian Myers, another remarkable specialist on North Korean culture and propaganda (not quite distinguishable areas, actually), recently wrote at length about a change of tune in Pyongyang propaganda: South Korea ceased to be depicted as the living hell, the land of depravation. The new image of the South is that of the country whose population secretly (or even not so secretly) longs to join its Northern brethren in their happiness under the wise care of the Beloved General.

This society might be relatively affluent, but it is inherently corrupt and lacks integrity, so its population knows that the only way to regain the moral purity is to join the spiritually superior North Korean civilization. The only force that prevents the South from achieving such happiness is the brutal US occupation army and a tiny handful of traitors on the Central Intelligence Agency payroll, but even those perverts are losing control over South Korean society.

Sometimes Chang’s fantasies went positively wild. He said, for example: “A portrait of the General is [respectfully] placed on the wall of the Main Hall on the fourth floor at the [Seoul] Government Building. Right now!” Then the flight of fantasy goes even further: “These days, South Korean publications do not sell in South Korean society if they do not carry the images of the General … 45% of the entire population in South Korea say that in case of a war they will fight on the side of the General.”

The domestic situation did not attract much of Chang Yong-sun’s attention, but he still made some comments on these issues. He admitted that even last December, in spite of all the government’s efforts, it was impossible to provide rations for the entire population, and that most people had to rely on the market for their needs, which is not good but was unavoidable.

He also explicitly stated that growth of the markets is not compatible with the socialist system: “All the people’s talk is money and again money. Is this socialism?” It is remarkable, however, that the virtues of socialism were seldom mentioned in the speech: its rhetoric was overwhelmingly nationalistic.

Chang Yong-sun also admitted that some North Koreans are very rich, and that their fortunes are now measured as a few hundred million North Korean won (100 million won is roughly equivalent to US$50,000). He did not make a secret that under less critical conditions the government would strike these reactionary elements hard, but under the current circumstances such a radical solution is impossible because of ongoing economic difficulties.

In essence, he admitted that government is not capable of controlling society as tightly as it wishes (or as it used to in the good old days of Kim Il-sung’s ultra-Stalinist rule): “Those ideological perverts are no longer counted as our people. Why are we not able to strike [them]? We are not able to strike them because we are not able to provide rations to the entire population.”

So the picture is quite clear. North Korea as depicted by Comrade Chang is a small but proud state that lives under the constant threat of annihilation by brutal enemies, betrayed by money-hungry allies. It fights for a great goal of national unification. There are signs that this goal is getting nearer, but people should not expect too much: life will not become easy any time soon.

Compromise with enemies is impossible since they, especially the Americans, will never change their nature, will never stop dreaming about destroying the small and proud republic led by the Beloved General. However, the country has finally developed military means that make all enemies’ schemes powerless. This project required great sacrifice, but the people who died during famine were in essence soldiers: their deaths saved many more lives.

There are internal problems in this society, largely because the government lacks resources to make sure things move smoothly (and it is assumed that government should be ultimately responsible for everything). However, these problems should not distort the larger view of ongoing heroic struggle and new victories.

Dr Andrei Lankov is an associate professor in Kookmin University, Seoul, and adjunct research fellow at the Research School of Pacifica and Asian Studies, Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea. He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia.

Bloomberg
Bradley Martin
7/10/2007

A black Volkswagen Passat with smoked windows glides down a suburban Pyongyang road. Its license plate begins with 216 — a number signifying Kim Jong-il’s Feb. 16 birthday, and a sign the car is a gift from the Dear Leader.

Even without a 216 license plate, a passenger sedan bestows VIP status in a country where traffic is sparse and imports are limited by external sanctions and domestic restrictions alike.

Just across the border, South Korea is the world’s fifth-largest automotive manufacturer. To an ordinary North Korean, though, a private car is “pretty much what a private jet is to the ordinary American,” says Andrei Lankov, author of a new book “North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea.”

He estimates there are only 20,000 to 25,000 passenger cars in the entire country, less than one per thousand people.

Discouraging private car ownership is not just a matter of ideology in a communist country, Lankov said in a phone interview from Seoul, where he teaches at Kookmin University. The passenger car, usually black and chauffeur-driven, “is the ultimate symbol of the prosperity of high officials,” he says. They keep the vehicles scarce “so everybody knows they are the boss.”

Measuring, copying

North Korea moved early — shortly after the Korean War, and ahead of the South — to mass produce trucks and 4-wheel-drive Jeep-type military vehicles. Craftsmen took apart imported Soviet tractors, trucks and utility vehicles, measuring the parts to make copies.

The indigenous civilian passenger-car industry, too, mostly made knockoffs of models produced elsewhere. After importing a fleet of Mercedes-Benz 190s, the country produced replicas under local model names into the 1990s. Unfortunately, the domestically-made copies were dogged by reports about “terrible overall quality,” says Erik van Ingen Schenau, author of a new pictorial book, “Automobiles Made in North Korea.”

Lee Keum-ryung, a former used-car trader who defected from North to South Korea in 2004, agrees. The knockoffs came with “no air conditioning, no heater, and they’re not tightly built or sealed,” he says. “If you drive out of the city and return, your car will be full of dust. It’s like an oil-fueled cart.” Lee, 40, uses a pseudonym because he fears repercussions from North Korea.

Slow recovery

Material and energy shortages that accompanied a famine in the 1990s brought state-run factories to a halt. Recovery has been slow, and Schenau said he believes even domestic production of Jeep-style vehicles has been replaced by imports from Russia and China.

Imports have similarly come to dominate what passes for the passenger-car market. Used cars — mostly Japanese-made — are the mode of transit for many members of the new trading and entrepreneurial class that has emerged in the last couple of decades. Under a loophole in the country’s long-standing private-car ban, these vehicles typically enter the country disguised as gifts to North Koreans from their relatives in Japan’s Korean community, Lankov says.

Lee says “a relative abroad” helped him buy his first car when he was 23. “But as an ordinary person, I couldn’t keep it under my name, and I didn’t have a number plate of my own,” he says. “A friend was a high police official with many cars under him. I borrowed a plate.”

‘A very affluent life’

Lee had “a very affluent life” before he defected, importing 10-year-old cars from Japan and selling them both in North Korea and, for a time, across the border in China. “I had money, status,” he says. “I enjoyed everything people my age could have.”

A small passenger vehicle for which his agent paid $1,500 at the docks in Japan would sell for $2,500 to $3,000, Lee says. A bigger car — say, a Toyota Crown — might cost him $4,000 to $5,000; he would sell it for $8,000.

While Japanese trade figures show annual exports of some 1,500 passenger cars, mostly used, to North Korea in 2005 and 2006, the total for this year is zero. After Kim’s government tested a nuclear device last October, Japan placed passenger cars on a list of banned luxury exports.

Perhaps as a sign of displeasure with Japan’s sanctions, Kim ordered most Japanese cars confiscated, according to a February 2007 dispatch by South Korea’s Yonhap news agency. The order, if it indeed was issued, hadn’t been carried out by the time of a May visit to Pyongyang, when a number of Japanese cars could be seen.

German inroads

When a European-made import passes by, it’s often owned by the state, used by high officials and foreign dignitaries. Sweden’s Volvo had a hefty market share in the 1970s; Germany’s Audi and Volkswagen have made inroads lately. Mercedes is particularly well-represented in Kim’s personal fleet of hundreds of vehicles, according to Lee Young Kook, a defector who served in Kim’s bodyguard force.

In a 2003 Yonhap story, Lee said the security-conscious leader traveled in motorcades of identical cars to confuse would-be assassins and generally maintained 10 units each of any model so five would always be road-ready.

With the nation’s access to imports constricted, a relatively new player in the market, Pyonghwa Auto Works, has attempted to fill the gap. The company was created when Seoul-based Pyonghwa Motors, which began as a car importer affiliated with Rev. Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church, teamed up as majority partner in the 70-30 venture with the North Korean state-owned trading firm Ryonbong Corp.

Kits of parts

The first assembly line was set up in 2002 at the west coast port city of Nampo to produce, from kits of parts, a version of the small Fiat Siena, called the Hwiparam (Whistle) in Korean.

So far, the factory has built about 2,000 cars and pickup trucks, according to Noh Jae Wan, a spokesman in Seoul for Pyonghwa Motors, who said it is the only manufacturer now turning out passenger cars in North Korea. According to a February announcement by Brilliance China Automotive Holdings, Pyongyhwa has agreed to let Brilliance use part of the Nampo plant to assemble Haise minibuses.

While some news accounts have mentioned the possibility that the North Korean cars may eventually be sold in the South, “this will take time,” Noh said in an interview. “It can only happen when the two Koreas reach some significant agreement on trade or other international circumstances change.”

Korea Herald
7/8/2007

Japan should refrain from its hostile policy toward North Korea and actively take part in a six-party actions plan to achieve a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, a pro-North Korean newspaper in Japan said Saturday.

Chosun Sinbo, a pro-North Korean newspaper published in Tokyo, said on Saturday that Japan should be out of the six-party discussions if it continues to avoid the energy assistance program.

Japan, a member of six-party nuclear disarmament talks, is at odds with North Korea over about a dozen Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korean agents decades ago. Japan refuses to provide any economic aid to the North until the kidnapping issue is resolved.

Under a deal adopted on Feb. 13, North Korea is to receive 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil in exchange for shutting down its key weapons-related nuclear facilities. South Korea is responsible for the first shipment of 50,000 tons.

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
7/1/2007

What is the “North Korean KGB?’’ This common question is actually rather meaningless _ not because North Korea does not have an analogue to the Soviet agency (it does), but because the structure of the North Korean “intelligence community’’ is remarkably complicated. In North Korea there are three major independent intelligence services _ and an array of minor sub-services.

Each service has its own field of responsibility and expertise, but in some areas they are compete fiercely. Presumably, such competition makes the North Korean leaders a bit less restive in their sleep: in a dictatorship, an excessive concentration of intelligence in one agency’s hands is fraught with danger.

Since we have mentioned the KGB, let’s start from North Korea’s closest analogue, the Ministry for Protection of State Security or MPSS. Back in the 1950s, the MPSS’s predecessor grew up absorbing a serious influence from the KGB. Like its Soviet prototype, the MPSS combines the functions of political police, counterintelligence, and political intelligence.

As a political police force, the MPSS runs a huge network of informers, manages the camps for political prisoners, and enforces manifold security regulations. As a counterintelligence agency, it does everything it can to prevent foreign spies from effecting infiltration into North Korea. And, finally, it is engaged in intelligence gathering overseas and, to some extent, in South Korea. A special role of this agency is emphasized by the fact that it is headed not by a regular minister but by Kim Jong Il himself. Yes, the “Dear Leader’’ is also the minister of his own security _ a wise arrangement, perhaps, taking into consideration the tendency of intelligence bosses to become too powerful.

However, the mighty MPSS is not very prominent when it comes to operations in South Korea. A North Korean peculiarity is the existence of the party’s own intelligence branch. The Korean Workers Party’s (KWP)own secret service is euphemistically called the Third Building _ after the number of the building in which the relevant departments are located. The Third Building bureaucracy consists of a few departments and bureaus, each with its peculiar tasks.

The KWP’s secret service has survived from the late 1940s when the party operated in both parts of the country. The Communist underground in the South, and the then powerful guerrilla movement, were managed by special departments of the KWP Central Committee. The South Korean Communist underground was wiped out in the early 1950s, but the related bureaucracy in the North survived and found justification for its existence (once created, bureaucracies are very difficult to kill). Its raison d’etre is the need to promote Juche/Communist ideas in the South, with the resurrection of the Communist movement as a supreme goal; a Communist-led unification is a more distant task. In the course of time, these goals were seen as more and more remote, but were never abandoned completely.

In fact, the Third Building is largely responsible for attempts to influence the South Korean political situation, and for gathering intelligence which makes such influence more efficient. The United Front Department, a part of the Third Building, is also responsible for clandestine operations in other countries where it strives to change the local attitudes in North Korea’s favor.

Since the Third Building should aim at starting local insurrections, many of its staff have undergone commando-style training. The only known political assassination in recent years was conducted by the officers of the Operational Department, which is a part of the Third Building. In 1997 they hunted down and shot dead Yi Han-yong, a relative of Kim Il-sung who had defected to the South and published some highly critical books about the North Korean ruling dynasty.

In addition to the MPSS and the Third Building, North Korea also has a military intelligence service whose operations largely target South Korea. Their major interest is the South Korean military and the USFK, as well as any intelligence which may be of use should a new war erupt on the Korean Peninsula.

Many people still remember the September 1996 incident when a North Korean submarine ran ashore on the eastern coast and was abandoned by the crew whose members became engaged in frequent clashes with the police and army. This was a routine operation of military intelligence that went wrong due to a navigational mistake. The commandos were supposed to survey the military installations on the coast, and then move back to the North, but it did not work as intended.

The efforts of North Korean intelligence services are concentrated on the South. But this does not mean that other countries are immune to their activity. The North Korean spies are especially active in Japan, and this was once again demonstrated by the dramatic events of 2001.