North Korean Economy Watch

The DPRK was formally declared on September 9, 1948, making this year the auspicious 60th anniversary. 

For a bit of a laugh, you can read the congratulatory editorial in the Workers World.

According to Yonhap, they will be minting commemorative coins…which they will no doubt be selling to foreigners for hard currency:

The Presidium of the North’s Supreme People’s Assembly, the North’s parliament, adopted a decree Saturday on issuing gold and silver commemorative coins, the North’s Korean Central News Agency said.

“The Cabinet and concerned state agencies will work on measures to carry out the decree,” it added.

The coins will feature the country’s national flag and and Korean letters reading “60th birthday” held up by a laurel tree in the fore side with the North’s national emblem in the back, according to the report.

The face value of the gold and silver coins will be 60,000 North Korean won (US$428) and 1,500 won, respectively, the report said.

According to the Choson Ilbo:

The number of North Korean refugees to the South is expected to exceed 3,000 for the first time in history this year. The Unification Ministry on Monday said 1,748 North Korean defectors made their way south in the first half of this year, up 42.1 percent from 1,230 a year ago. At this rate, the figure is expected to exceed 3,000 by the end of this year.

A mere 71 North Korean defectors came to the South in 1998, but numbers had broken the 1,000 mark by 2002 and exceeded 2,000 in 2006. The total as of the end of June stood at 13,996.

According to Yonhap, there were 2,544 DPRK defectors admitted to the South in 2007.

The news that defections are up is interesting in its own light, however, the demographic composition of these defectors could tell us much more about what is happening inside the DPRK.  If these numbers come from poor or remote provinces, they are likely a predictable result of increasing economic hardship, and their departure is inconsequential to regime stability.  If these populations represent a “brain drain” of educated or politically connected cadres, then this could be a signal of expected political turmoil.  Of course after last week’s discovery that DPRK intelligence agents have infiltrated the South’s DPRK defector community, information of this type will become scarcer than ever, at least for the general public. 

According to the CIA World Fact Book, North Korea’s population stands at 23,479,089 (as of July 2008).  I think this is an overstatement, however, this means that at a minimum, .012% of the population emigrated this year alone.

Read the full article here:
More Than 3,000 N.Koreans to Defect South This Year
Choson Ilbo
9/2/2008

According to the Daily NK, the chairpersons of the DPRK’s “People’s Units” (the smallest administrative population unit) are elected by the local membership through a show of hands.  Since the chairperson is in a position of some power, the political and economic dynamics that take place are pretty interesting.  The Daily NK notes how a chairperson’s skill at protecting his constituents from inspections by other departments is now factored into local (unofficial) real estate prices:

Quoting from the article:

“When the inspection group comes, the chairpersons of the People’s Units contact each other in advance, so inspections can be avoided. Nowadays, how a People’s Unit chairperson acts affects the price of housing.”

“People who buy homes now cannot distinguish between good and bad homes, but pay great attention to the People’s Unit in the neighborhood. If the People’s Unit chairperson is not so sophisticated, then the neighborhood cannot come together, so people tend to avoid such neighborhoods and the price of housing tends to fall as well.”

“If an inspection unit comes suddenly, the People’s Unit chairperson tends to alert every household through the children in the village, which has been described as ‘the pastime of the People’s Unit.’ The more a People’s Unit chairperson excels at this, the less damage to the people of the unit.”

“Officials or big-time merchants pay careful attention to their relationship with the chairpersons. No matter what the type of inspection is, the citizens’ attitude can be assumed via the words of the chairperson of the People’s Unit, so the fate of a household depends on the words of the chairperson.”

And if the chairperson is not good at his job?

“Depending on the extent of the damage to the People’s Unit during the inspections, people distinguish whether or not the People’s Unit chairperson is smart and experienced or not. If the chairperson is judged to be not smart, then he or she has to relinquish his or her position.”

It is interesting that the chairpersons take such an interest in protecting their constituents from outside authorities, however, it is naïve to think that local elections are responsible for this behavior.  The reality is that these chairpersons probably know a good deal of information about their residents and collect some form of direct payment, or “taxes”, for their services.  The quote above, “big-time merchants pay careful attention to their relationship with the chairpersons,” is just a more polite way of saying this.  If the chairperson position was not profitable in some way, why would anyone want it?

Read the full Daily NK story here:
Who Is the Chairperson of the People’s Unit?
Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
8/18/2008

Visitors to either side of Korea’s DMZ will be familiar with the DPRK’s 160 meter (525 ft) flagpole in Kijong-dong. Wikipedia, citing a CNN report, claims the flag pole is the tallest in the world.  I was pretty sure of this fact as well, but according to Guinness, I was wrong.

The top 4 “unsupported” flag poles are: 1. Turkmenistan: 436 feet 2. Aqaba, Jordan: 431 feet 3. Amman, Jordan: 416 feet (126 meters) 4. United Arab Emirates: 404 feet (123.1 meters). The DPRK’s omission from this list is due to the fact that its flag pole technically sits on top of a tower, making it a “supported” structure—the equivalent of building a small flagpole on a tall building.

The DPRK might scoff at this subtlety, but even if one was to give them the benefit of the doubt, the victory would be short-lived.  According to a recent story in the Wall Street Journal, David Chambers of Trident Support Corporation is erecting a 532 foot flag pole, a full 7 feet taller than the DPRK’s, in Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku.

(Hat tip to Daniel Rothschild)

To learn more, read the very interesting and humorous article below:
Flagpole Builder Hits New Heights In Central Asia
Wall Street Journal, Page A1
Chip Cummins
8/16/2008

UPDATE:  (Reuters) Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Japan that Washington would not remove North Korea from a US list of state sponsors of terrorism on the initial deadline of Monday, Japan’s foreign minister said.

ORGINAL POST: Marcus Noland comments in a Newsweek International op-ed how recent US policy changes towards North Korea (delisting the DPRK as a state sponsor of terror and exempting sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act) amount to very little:

Lifting the trade restrictions will have a minimal impact. North Korea will remain one of a few countries that does not have normal trade relations with the United States, meaning its exports will continue to be subjected to punitive tariffs of up to 90 percent.

Removing North Korea from the terrorism list means that Washington can now legally support it for membership in international financial organizations such as the World Bank. But the White House is under no obligation to actually do so. North Korea also remains excluded from US government programs that encourage trade and investment.

North Korea’s declaration will trigger a reconvening of the Six-Party Talks, which includes China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The inadequate nature of the declaration guarantees there will be yet another round of negotiations in which North Korea will reveal a bit more in return for further concessions. It is no accident that up to 50,000 metric tons of US food aid is expected to arrive in North Korea early this month. 

Writing in 2004 (yet relevant today), Marcus Noland wrote about these issues in depth.  Below are excerpts from his op-ed on US tariffs:

US importers of DPRK products are required to obtain prior approval from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets, certifying that the products were not produced by North Korean entities designated as having engaged in missile proliferation. Subject to this condition, approval is routine. US government officials report that they receive only a handful of such requests each year. Their impression is that business conditions in the DPRK pose a greater impediment to bilateral trade than the regulatory regime.

…

So, at present, with the exception of military-related products, there are few specific legal restrictions on the ability of Americans to export to or invest in the DPRK. Imports are subject to a prior approval process, but this is based on a transparent and narrowly delineated certification requirement.

Yet there is little trade between the United States and the DPRK. North Korea is among the few countries that the United States does not grant normal trade relations (NTR) status to, and North Korean exports are subject to the so-called column 2 tariff rates established by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. These tariffs tend to be the highest on labor-intensive products such as garments, in which North Korea is conceivably competitive. Though their incidence is an accident of history, and not an intentional slap, the column 2 tariffs represent a serious potential impediment to trade. Some countries, notably China, have successfully exported to the United States despite being subject to the higher column 2 tariffs (though even China eventually gained NTR status on a year-to-year basis). Most countries that have recently obtained permanent NTR, such as China, have done so through the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession process. The DPRK has shown no interest in joining the WTO.

This disinterest is unfortunate. The United States does not grant the DPRK quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), a worldwide network of bilateral trade quotas on textiles and apparel (due to expire in 2005), and WTO accession could aid the DPRK in this regard. In the case of the similarly diplomatically problematic Burmese government, the US government found it politically easier to accept an increase in Burmese exports to the United States than to negotiate publicly a textile agreement under WTO auspices with the repressive regime. WTO membership has its privileges. In any event, the DPRK is one of the rare countries that chronically do not fill their MFA quotas in Europe, where there are no sanctions, suggesting that the problem lies in DPRK’s inability to compete, not in trade barriers.

However, should the DPRK obtain NTR status, the United States would likely classify it as a nonmarket economy (NME) and subject it to onerous antidumping rules on the Chinese template. The point is that improved diplomatic relations is no panacea—the United States can be protectionist on purely economic grounds, regardless of politics.

Conversely, the United States trades with some low-income countries preferentially, unilaterally granting them limited tariff-free access through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), subject to standards concerning workers’ rights, intellectual property protection, and drug trafficking. Given North Korea’s disregard for internationally accepted labor standards, it is inconceivable that the United States would grant North Korea GSP privileges under current practices, even if diplomatic relations were normalized. Yet China, which has never received GSP privileges, vividly demonstrates that it is quite possible to prosper without such advantages.

Today, internal conditions and practices in North Korea, not legal restrictions, greatly impede bilateral trade. However, with sufficient reform and improvement in competitiveness, a broad range of policy issues would become increasingly relevant. In this regard, DPRK accession to the WTO would be advantageous. In the meantime, rather than complaining about US policy, North Korean officials would be better served by redoubling their reform efforts.

For more information, read the full articles below:
Partially True Confessions: How Big is the North Korea Deal?
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute
Newsweek (Link via the Peterson Institute)
7/7/2008

The Legal Framework of US–North Korea Trade Relations
Op-ed in JoongAng Ilbo, via the Peterson Institute web site.
Marcus Noland
4/27/2004

As reported earlier this year by the Daily NK, Kim Jong il’s brother in law, Jang Song Taek, was leading an anti-corruption campaign in North Korea’s northern provinces along the Chinese border. Aside from controlling financial leakages, these efforts could be interpreted as attempts by Kim to gain control over military-owned trade companies.

According to a past report:

The inspection group withdrew all trade certificates with exception of those certificates belonging to the families of anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters, and those certificates issued by the Ministry of Finance or the Shinuiju Municipal Administrative Committee.  Therefore, presently at Shinuiju Customs, all import items without trade certificates issued by the above mentioned three groups have to be sent back to China.

Jang’s efforts, though seemingly effective at reasserting financial control of the region, had apparently taken their toll on local commerce:

In Hyesan, Yangkang Province, markets have been significantly reduced in size and scope recently, due to the anti-socialist group’s inspections[.]

[T]he merchants were at unease when under inspection by the National Security Agency (NSA) and other governmental organizations which govern the jangmadang [markets].

For example, transportation of goods by traders has withered away since last year, as the authority of the People’s Safety Agency (PSA) [controlled by Jang] rose and [it] launched [] a strict crackdown on traders’ belongings.

The source explained the situation in Hyesan, that “Hyesan had become the city where Chinese goods were traded for the cheapest value because Chinese goods [enter the country] at Hyesan[.] [During] the (PSA) inspection period [goods] could not be transported inland due to the inspection of trains and cars. Lives of the common people became even tougher than before, since goods could not be circulated through the jangmadang in spite of their low prices.”

“The more stringent the regulation became, the more bribes cadres received and worsened were the lives of people,” the source added.

(NKeconWatch: I have “cleaned up” some of the grammar here to make it more readable.  If you want to see the original version, click here.)

And in Sinuiju:

The intensive inspection of Shinuiju, in which over 70% of Chinese-North Korean commercial traffic occurs, caused several aftereffects inside North Korea: commercial traffic passing through Shinuiju and Dandong decreased by half compared to the past, and the aftermath of the inspections in Shinuiju added fuel to the fire of price rises in jangmadang goods across the country.

For instance, sugar, which is a raw material for doughnuts or candies that are consumed the most by average civilians in the jangmadang, carried a price of around 1,500 won per kilogram before the inspections, but in mid-May, it rose to 2,100 won and vegetable oil hiked from 5,500 to 7,500 won per kilogram. Such an increase in prices also caused a significant threat to the survival of citizens who made a living off the jangmadang trade.

But the final result of the evaluation of the Shinuiju inspection, which caused quite a stir externally, has purportedly been negligible.

The source said, “The volume of trade has decreased over several months and the number of visitors to China has also been reduced by half. The results of the inspection have not produced too much difference, except for the execution of 14 corrupt officials.”

The source further noted, “The only change which has been visible to the eye is the rise in the cost of bribes offered to North Korean customs from 40 to 80 dollars per hundred kilograms of goods. There was a rumor that the loading volume carried into the North would be fixed at 120kg, from 360kg, but this has not been done yet.”(Daily NK)

The Daily NK now reports that in the wake of these developments, Kim Jong il’s National Defense Commission (NDC) has moved in and directly taken over the inspections—and economic conditions have improved:

[Markets] have become lively again in the past few days as inspections by the National Defense Commission (NDC) have gotten underway.

A source in North Korea reported to Daily NK on Friday that “Merchants in Hyesan these days are fish in water. They say that they would not mind at all going through such inspections for an entire the year!”

Part of the reason for the turn around has been a change in focus.  Whereas Jang’s work hit many “ordinary” North Koreans (particularly those working for the wrong trading companies), NDC inspections are focused on controlling the mid- to upper-level cadres.  It is entirely speculatory to ask whether Kim’s strategy was to unleash Jang to get control of the region and afterwards assert direct control himself, or whether complaints from locals forced the NDC to end Jang’s campaign.

Of course this is all unverified information from inside North Korea, so who knows how much of it is correct!

From Dr. Leonid Petrov in the Asia Times:

Russia cooperation with North Korea
Since the early 2000s, overall relations between Russia and the DPRK have been improving. The DPRK’s importation of refined oil from Russia saw its first increase in 2002-2003 (from $20 million to $96 million) and was caused by the beginning of the US-DPRK nuclear confrontation and the subsequent demise of the international Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization project that was to construct a light water reactor nuclear power plant in North Korea.

During 2004-2005, petroleum trade between Russia and North Korea grew from $105 million to $172.3 million. Until the six-party talks produced their first results, in the list of Russia’s exports to the DPRK, oil products dominated at 63%. Rampant corruption in both countries also let a trickle of Russian oil to be smuggled to North Korea unaccounted for.

In 2006, Russia was the DPRK’s third-largest trading partner after China and South Korea and absorbed 9% of the total $3.18 billion spent by the North on imports (approximately $286 million). The Kremlin’s approval of international sanctions against the former communist ally was accompanied by the curtailment of trade with the North. At the time of North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, Russia’s trade statistics showed that exports of petroleum had dropped 91.1% compared to the same period of the previous year.

The pragmatic mood in bilateral relations prevails, and these days Russia delivers oil and food to North Korea only in accordance with its obligations associated with progress at the six-party talks. This year, Russia has already delivered 100,000 tonnes of fuel oil to the DPRK in two batches and, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin, a top Russian envoy to the six-party talks, will deliver another 100,000 tonnes by October 2008. In June, the Russian government announced it would provide 2,860 tonnes of flour to the DPRK. According to an official KCNA news agency report, this food aid arrived at the border city of Sinuiju in the DPRK’s northern Pyongan province in early July.

Recently, for the first time in the post-Soviet era, North Korea saw a major Russian investment. In the city of Pyeongseong, the Russian auto plant KamAZ opened its first assembly line, specializing in the production of medium-size trucks named “Taebaeksan-96”. Although less than 50 trucks were assembled in 2007, this cooperation became an important milestone in the development of bilateral relations. While the project doesn’t violate United Nations sanctions on North Korea, it shows Moscow’s drive to expand its influence in the country. Ironically, the more trucks assembled the heavier North Korea’s dependence on imported fuel, engine oils and other petrochemical products.

The importance of the DPRK’s Rajin-Seonbong special economic zone to Russia’s national interests continues to grow. The state-run monopoly OAO Russian Railways is currently upgrading its railway connections with North Korea in Khasan-Tumangang, investing at least 1.75 billion roubles (US$72 million) into this project, and plans to participate in an ambitious plan to rebuild a trans-Korean railway. By connecting Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian railroad, Russia hopes to benefit form the transit of South Korean and Japanese cargo which could be sent via its territory to Central Asian and European markets. Pyongyang seems to endorse these plans and other Russian initiatives, but does not commit any financial resources.

Eighty percent of overall bilateral economic trade between Russia and North Korea consists of cooperation, barter and investment-in-kind between the regional areas. The most active Russian regions trading with the DPRK are Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Maritime province (Primorsky Krai) itself exports to North Korea more than $4 million worth of refined oil per year. There are no oil fields in Maritime province and oil has to be borrowed through a chain of federal bureaucratic structures from the oil-rich areas of Eastern Siberia. Instead of money, the local governments agree to receive the labor of North Korean workers.

North Korean laborers in Siberia and the Far East were common under the Soviet system and they are still visibly present. In 2004, the Russian Federal Immigration Service issued 14,000 visas for foreign laborers, of whom North Koreans numbered 3,320 in 2005 and 5,000 in 2006. Since the DPRK has no other way to pay in goods or services, its government started paying for oil imported from Russia by dispatching thousands of laborers at zero cost. Following strong demand from local companies, just in 2006 regional authorities of Primorsky Krai agreed to issue an extra 5,000 working visas to North Koreans. This openness is contrary to local government policy that normally restricts the entry of labor from China.

DPRK citizens are sent to Russia to work as woodcutters and builders but some have also managed to find work in the agricultural and marine industry. Through the presence of these laborers, Russia has enjoyed a partial repayment of the DPRK’s post-Soviet debt through North Korean workers being contracted to work in mines and lumber mills in Russia’s Far East.

The wages they are able to make in Russia are far greater than what they would make at home. However, the foreign worker quota is set not by provincial governments but by Moscow, which often tries to put a stop to these programs due to the complexity of the matter. Part of this opposition stems from the fact that the North Korean workers in Russia still fall under DPRK laws and, therefore, are subject to intrusive supervision.

Among the most difficult but negotiable issues in the way of Russia-North Korea cooperation remains the problem of external debt. During the Soviet era, the DPRK incurred a debt of approximately $8 billion, which Pyongyang still owes to Moscow but cannot repay. This debt remains a stumbling block in most negotiations on new aid and development programs. However, this debt can potentially make trilateral Russian-Korean relations closer and stronger.

In January 1991, soon after the opening of diplomatic relations with South Korea, Moscow received $3 billion from Seoul in the form of a three-year loan. The collapse of the Soviet Union left this loan largely unpaid. The new Russian government in the 1990s provided South Korea with armaments worth $150 million to be counted as payment in kind for the remaining debt. In 2003, after bilateral negotiations on this issue were completed, part of this Russian debt was canceled and the remainder was rescheduled to be paid over the next 23 years.

Taking into account its own debts to the South, Russia could easily write off a significant portion of North Korean debt. To resolve this question, a certain agreement between all three parties is needed. To engage in a mutual and reciprocal round of debt cancelation, Russia might choose to see the North and the South as one country. Such an agreement would have unblocked the road for broader cooperation between Russia and the two Koreas, and simplified Russia’s energy cooperation with China and Japan.

The full article is worth reading here:
Russia is key to North Korea’s plight
Asia Times
Leonid Petrov
7/24/2008

UPDATE 2: According to the Associated Press:

[A South Korean] NIS official, who asked not be named, citing an internal policy, told The Associated Press that China had no plans to close all bridge links with North Korea “out of concerns of diplomatic friction with North Korea.”

The official also said China would not ask all North Koreans in China to leave, saying that Beijing plans to crackdown on North Koreans who illegally stay in China and Beijing plans to restrict renewing visas for North Koreans. 

UPDATE 1:  According to the Associated Press, China plans to close all the bridges to the DPRK during the Olympics, starting next month.  This will have a devastating impact on trade with Sinuiju, Manpo, Hyesan, Hoeryong, and many other trading hubs along the Chinese border.

ORIGINAL POST: According to an interesting article in Bloomberg (thanks to reader) China is acting to reduce the chances that North Korea issues will interfere with coverage of the Olympic games in Beijing this summer.

According to the article:

China asked some North Korean work units to leave the country or move their business operations during the Olympic Games, according to documentation from the North Korean embassy obtained by Bloomberg News.

Citing security issues, China asked North Koreans, except trade representatives and government-dispatched personnel, to leave by July 31 and not return until the end of September, the Korean-language statement said. The embassy in Beijing gave the order to North Koreans in a July 11 directive, according to a copy of the document obtained by Bloomberg News.

The order took effect from July 13 and those who delay departure would be fined or not allowed to reenter China, according to the document. Workers scheduled for dispatch to China from July 1 should delay their departure until Sept. 25, it said.

and…

It isn’t clear how authoritative the directive is. Five North Korean businessmen contacted by Bloomberg news provided different departure dates, or said they were not affected by the directive. The people refused to be identified in print, citing possible recriminations.

A press attaché at the Chinese embassy in Tokyo who declined to give his name said he wasn’t aware of the directive and that there would be no way to confirm its existence.

Read the articles here:
China asks some North Koreans to leave ahead of Olympics
Bloomberg
Hideko Takayama
7/15/2008

Report: China to shut down all bridges linked to NKorea during Olympics
Associated Press
7/21/2008

China to step up inspections at border with North Korea during Olympics to stop migrants
Associated Press
Kwang-Tae Kim
7/22/2008

As Marcus Noland has noted, one of the most difficult aspects of developing scenarios of North Korea’s future is that we do not know Kim Jong il’s vision for the DPRK after he has passed. Is he grooming members of his family to take his place or just to make sure they are wealthy and protected? Is Kim looking at China as a model? Some reports claim he is looking at Thailand’s royal family. What about a military dictatorship?

This week, Andrei Lankov weighs in with several scenarios he has outlined in four Daily NK stories:

Scenario 1:Kim Jong il follows the China/Vietnam model. Agriculture privatized along with a number of small- medium-sized firms. Workers Party remains in control. Lankov believes this scenario politically unobtainable since the inflow of knowledge of the outside world, particularly of the wealth in South Korea, will make incumbent political legitimacy almost impossible to maintain.

Scenario 2: The North Korean regime collapses because it does not have the power or resources to maintain its authority. If this happens, South Korean might not have any choice but to move to take over despite the high economic costs.

Scenario 3:If North Korea does collapse, South Korea does not have to be the only government to assert control in the territory. China has political and economic incentives to be heavily involved in North Korea’s re-composition, or to enter into a protective relationship with incumbent North Korean authorities. Market reforms would follow and opposition would be manageable.

Scenario 4: Weak political power gives various factions (including the military) space to revolt. Neither China nor South Korea want to get involved in an internal clash and North Korea descends into medium-term chaos.

Taking a step back, I use Lankov’s examples to build a broader scenario map using his drivers (regime strength/weakness and foreign intervention/non-intervention):

(Click on image for larger view)

Along the vertical axis is the strength of the DPRK’s central government. It is strong in the top two quadrants and weak in the bottom two quadrants. Along the horizontal axis is intervention or non-intervention by China or South Korea.

Using this framework, we see that Lankov’s first scenario falls into quadrant 2 (upper right), and economic reforms lead to a weakening of the central government, pushing the country into quadrants 3 or 4. This transition is based on the notion that the North Korean central government, or whichever coalition holds it together, can’t survive an economic transition, mainly due to the visible success of South Korea. I think this is an interesting argument, but I am not entirely convinced by it. Hong Kong is not inspiring revolts in China for the same reasons that North Korea does not need to fall prey to political upheaval—mainly, keep people from organizing and dispersing information, and make sure that some fraction of the productive gains from economic reforms are strategically redistributed as political rents. Of course, it would be interesting to see if a communist government could survive in Hong Kong if China was the giant, capitalist neighbor.

Special shout out to Herman Khan here.

Comments welcome.

ReadLinks to Lankov’s articles below the fold:
(more…)

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-7-29-1
7/29/2008

Of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s public appearances during the first half of the year, fully half of them were to military installations or other defense-related sites, making it the most frequented sector, but compared to previous years, the number of visits to sites related to the economy rose considerably.

According to North Korean media sources, from January through June, Kim Jong Il made a total of 49 public visits. Of these, 25 (51%) were to military facilities, while 15 (31%) were to factories, cooperative farms, and other sites related to the nation’s economy. 3 (6%) public appearances were meetings with foreign dignitaries, and 6 (12%) were to public performances and other events.

In January, Kim made five on-site visits to economically important areas, after which there was a lull until May, when Kim appeared at six sites, and then made another 4 economy-related visits in June. In July, Kim has already made three visits to Jangan and North Pyongan Provinces, showing up at production facilities in those areas.

Between January and July of 2007, Kim made only six visits to sites related to the economic sector, less than a third the number of visits this year. In fact, with only 19 site visits for all of 2007, Kim’s appearances in the first half of this year have almost surpassed last year’s total, which itself was an increase over the 16 visits made in 2006.

The first public appearance made by Kim Jong Il in 2008 was at the Yaesung River Power Plant construction site on January 6, and was followed up by an appearance on January 21 the ‘18th National Program Contest and Exhibition’, emphasizing the government’s drive to resolve economic difficulties.

In the same month, Kim Jong Il visited a poultry and pork processing plant, a mushroom plant, a food processing facility, a rabbit breeding farm, and a youth mine, directly inspecting sites related to the lives and livelihoods of the people, appearing to emphasize the slogan announced in this year’s New Year’s Joint Declaration, “Prioritization of the People’s Lives”. Kim’s ‘economic walk’ was seemingly put on hold by a flurry of negotiations between the United States and North Korea regarding the North’s declaration of its nuclear programs and the attempt by the new South Korean government’s revamped policy towards North Korea between February and April, but then regained traction in May, with a visit on the 4th to a mountain orchard in Kangwon Province.

This year, Kim Jong Il’s on-site instructions at facilities related to building the economy and improving the lives of the people appear to be focused on stressing the need to resolve food shortages and ensure that everyone is fed.