North Korean Economy Watch

Using the STALIN search engine I found the 1997 KCNA articles which claim that “natural phenomena” are signs of future prosperity in the Kim Jong il era.  All the stories are posted below. 

Here are the dates  and brief summaries of the stories:

1. 3/21/1997 –Weather protects KJI.  Sunshine pours dowm on him for photo.
2. 9/29/1997–Flowers bloom on trees when KJI nominated SG of KWP.
3. 10/1/1997–Flowers and leaves bloom on trees.
4. 10/6/1997–KJI makes fog go away, fruit trees blossom.
5. 10/7/1997–Friut trees and flowers blossom – sign of good fortune under KJI.
6. 10/20/1997–Twenty-five consecutive days of beautiful sunrise at Mt. Paektu and sounds of cheers from Lake Chon when KJI nominated SG of KWP.
7. 12/8/1997–KJI visit brings good weather.

After 1997 we see only two more stories where “natural phenomena” legitimize Kim’s rule:

8. 8/29/2001–Natural phenomena occur in Russia as KJI travels to Moscow.
9. 2/12/2009–Snow melts on KJI birthday.

Further Information:

1. Below are the comparative DPRK/ROK per-captia GDP numbers in the KJI era (usual caveats apply). The numbers are in 1990 $US and are from Angus Maddison.

2. Here is a graph comparing DPRK/ROK growth from 1950-2006, again from Dr. Maddison.  In 1950, both countries enjoyed a per-capita income of $850 (a number higher than I believe most North Koreans enjoy today).  In 2006, Dr. Maddison estimates that the representative North Korean earns an estimated $1,133 and the representative South Korean earns $18,356:

3. Below are all of the stories about the natural phenomena:
Great man and natural phenomena
Pyongyang, March 21, 1997 (KCNA) — A new legend is these days gaining circulation in korea, stirring up the hearts of people. it says, “the Snowstorm of mt. Paektu Fell in Fog”. A legendary phenomenon occured on November 24 last year when the respected General Kim Jong Il, the son of mt. Paektu and a peerlessly great man, was giving on-site guidance to the Panmunjom mission of the Korean People’s Army, an outpost of the forefront. That day, the area of Panmunjom was enveloped in thick fog from dawn. In the previous days, it had been cloudy but fog never set in in the area. The General went round various places of Panmunjom and mounted the balcony of the Panmun House to acquaint himself with the enemy situation. The fog would not go while he was making an inspection tour of the area. So, the enemy failed to observe the kpa post and, accordingly, they could not take any hint of happenings there. Mysterious is the fact that the fog began to lift suddenly and the weather cleared when the general posed for a photograph in front of the monument dedicated to an autograph signature of the great leader President Kim Il Sung. The fog disappeared after the General ended his inspection of Panmunjom. It was when he inspected the KPA Post on mt. Taedok in the western sector of the front on March 18 last year. No sooner had his car arrived at the entrance to the post within the range of the enemy observation than its sky was covered with inky clouds. Instantly the car passed by, the sky began to clear up. a mysterious natural phenomenon took place at a time when the General was inspecting a kpa unit which is defending cho island in the West Sea. After mounting a forward command post, exposed to rain and wind, he stood by a map of operations when the black rain cloud cleared and bright sunrays spread. Such a natural phenomenon happened when he posed for a photograph with sailors at a naval unit on that same day. Informed of them, people say that even the heaven ensures the personal safety of General Kim Jong Il, working mysterious wonders.

Mysterious phenomena in Korea
Pyongyang, September 29, 1997 (KCNA) — Mysterious natural phenomena are being witnessed in different parts of Korea while provincial party conferences adopt resolutions on recommending Secretary Kim Jong Il as General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. White flowers came into bloom on a pear tree, attracting butterflies and bees at a factory in Pyongyang on September 27. The tree is as old as the factory. On their way to work, factory workers witnessed this phenomenon and said nature also welcomes the festive event. More than 100 blossoms opened on an apricot tree at the film processing plant in the city on that same day. Eighty-five blossoms were witnessed on five ten-year-old apricot trees and two fifteen-year-olds on a stock farm in Sangwon county on September 25. Fifty pear trees on the Jangchon Cooperative Farm in Sadong district made thousands of blossoms open between September 22 and 25. About 400 blossoms came into bloom on a 20-year-old wild pear tree in a park in front of the Kaesong Municipal Party Committee building in the same period. On the morning of September 22, fishermen of the fishery station in Rajin-Sonbong city caught a 10 cm-long white sea cucumber while fishing on the waters off Chongjin. They said the rare white sea cucumber has come to hail the auspicious event of electing Secretary Kim Jong Il as Party General Secretary. Seeing the mysterious natural phenomena, Koreans say Secretary Kim Jong Il is indeed the greatest of great men produced by heaven and that flowers come into bloom to mark the great event.
(more…)

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Berif no.09-8-3-1
2009-08-03

On July 28, Kim Jong Il made his 83rd public appearance for this year. He has been seen in public considerably more this year than in previous years. Of his 83 public visits, 28 have been to military facilities, 30 have been related to the economy, and 2 dealt with foreign relations. As Kim Jong Il has made these visits, he has frequently been accompanied by Kim Ki Nam (57 times), Jang Sung Taek (50 times), Hyun Chul Hae and Bak Nam Ki (40 times each). Jang Sung Taek and Bak Nam Ki’s recent appointments during the April session of the Supreme People’s Committee indicate that they will continue to work closely with Kim Jong Il.

Rhee Myeong Su, Kim Jeong Kak, Kim Myeong Kook, Kim Yeong Chun and other members of the military elite were also seen with Kim Jong Il as he traveled. North Korean official press has covered 83 public appearances by Kim Jong Il between the beginning of January and July 18. This is nearly the number of public visits Kim has made within 12-month periods previously. These public outings appear to be in support of the 150-day battle to boost the economy and the goal of creating a Strong and Prosperous Nation by 2012.

In 2009, 36 percent of on-site visits by Kim have been related to economic campaigns, surpassing the number of visits to military facilities and growing in comparison to previous years. Of the visits to economically significant sites, at least 40 percent have been to machinery or mechanization facilities, as the North promotes new technology and modernization of its industries. Kim has also paid visits to newly opened or under-construction electrical power plants in order to underscore the importance of boosting production.

In addition, Kim Jong Il has visited at least 8 mining facilities. The North’s mines were heavily damaged during floods in the 1990s, and have struggled to recover since then. Kim’s visits have been linked to efforts to restore iron ore and magnetite mining.

This web page has avoided focusing too much on the DPRK’s leadership transition because so much of the discussion is purely speculative.  But the Washington Post has published an interesting article which fills in some of the blanks on Kim Jong Un’s biography (Kim Jong il’s successor du jour) which gives us some insights into Pyongyang’s elite youth culture.

To begin with, we now know that KJU briefly went to a public school in Switzerland from 1998-2000 where he went by the name “Pak Un.” He did not attend the same Swiss school as his older brothers.  Sources from the school describe him as a swift learner who was quiet in class and uncomfortable around girls, but “fiercely competitive” on the basketball court.  Classmates also recall that he didn’t speak out against America.

Despite the short time he spent in Western Europe, however, he did show a love of American basketball, decorating his apartment with personal photos with Kobe Bryant, attending an NBA exhibition game in Paris and sporting Nike Air Jordan shoes.

The full article is worth reading below:
Who Will Succeed Kim Jong Il?
Washington Post
Andrew Higgins
7/16/2009

Further notes:
1. Basketball is popular in the DPRK–maybe the second most popular sport after football (soccer).  Is it such a stretch to assume that elite North Korean youths get together to talk about or even watch NBA games? (There is also a baseaball field in Pyongyang here)

2. Kim Jong il is/was a Michael Jordan fan.  Madeline Albright gave him a basketball signed by Michael Jordan which is probably on display in the International Friendship Exhibition.

3. Kim Jong Chol (and probably Kim Jong nam) attended the International School of Bern (locaton here).  The North Korean embassy in Bern is here. Kim Jong Un reportedly attended the Schule Liebefeld Steinhölzli (located here).  However, I am a little confused about where he lived.  The article states that KJU lived in Liebefeld (Bern suburb) at No. 10 Kirchstrasse (10 Kirch Street), not at the DPRK’s embassy which was just down the road.  I wonder why that is…

4. Kim Jong Un’s older brother, Kim Jong Chol, was photographed attending the 2006 World Cup in Germany where he also attended an Eric Clapton concert.

5. Kim Jong nam, Kim Jong il’s eldest son (and a nice guy I hear), spends most of his time in Macao.  His son (KJI’s grandson) was recently photographed with his South Korean school friends at a Rain concert.

6. Charles Jenkins claims he bought Michael Jackson tapes on the Pyongyang black market.

Andrei Lankov
Asia Policy 8, July 2009
The National Bureau of Asian Research

Download the article (PDF) here. 

Executive Summary
This article explains why the North Korean government has attempted to reassert state control over society—which had been eroding from 1994–2002—and offers predictions regarding the impact that this shift will likely have on North Korean society.

Main Argument
From 1994 to 2002 North Korean society changed tremendously: state-run industry collapsed, the rationing system ceased to function, and free-market activity, though still technically illegal or semi-legal, became most citizen’s major source of income. Although not initiated by the government, in 2002 some of these spontaneous changes won the belated and conditional approval of the regime.

The evidence emerging in the last three to four years demonstrates, however, that the North Korean government has chosen not to tolerate those changes. This policy of recrudescence, while economically self-destructive, makes political sense because the existence of an affluent and free South Korea makes North Korea far more insecure. The leadership in Pyongyang has reason to believe that any domestic liberal reform in North Korea would lead to a regime collapse.

Policy Implications
1. Pyongyang’s decision to reject reformist policies is based on a rational and well-informed assessment of North Korea’s domestic and international situation. Therefore, the outside world can do very little to influence the regime’s position, and thus there is no chance of meaningful reform in North Korea in the foreseeable future as long as the current regime remains in power.

2. Because the current policy makes sustainable economic growth impossible, the North Korean government will need to rely on stratagems to secure vital foreign aid, with the U.S. being one of the main (but not only) targets of these maneuvers. The “North Korean problem” will remain a part of the international landscape in the foreseeable future.

3. If the current attempt by the government at counter-reform fails, this failure will create additional avenues for influencing the North Korean government from within.

Download the article (PDF) here. 

UPDATE: IFES has contacted us with an update to this report:

“North Korea exports between 2-3 million tons of coal, collecting approximately 200 million USD.”

Original Post:
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-6-9-1
6/9/2009   

The North Korean military, which has recently taken a hard-line position internationally with rocket launches, a nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch preparation, appears to be strengthening its position domestically, as well. It has reportedly taken charge of coal exports, previously the responsibility of the Cabinet, and other key economic interests.

According to sources inside North Korea, authority to export anthracite, the North’s most valuable export item, was transferred from a trading company under the control of the Cabinet to a military trading company earlier this year. North Korea exports between 200-300 tons of coal each year, collecting approximately two billion USD in foreign currency. Previously, this was shared among branches of the government, with the military, the Korean Workers’ Party and the Cabinet all similar export quotas.

One source stated, “Recently, China’s trade minister signed a contract for 60,000 tons of coal from a military-run trading company, and delivered one million USD-worth of corn as payment,” noting, “previously, North Korea’s trade partner [with China] was the Cabinet-controlled trade company.” The same source went on to note that it was “exceptional that as North Korea suffers from foreign capital shortages, it demands payment not in cash, but in corn…it looks like it is measure for military use.”

Other sources reported that, as of this year, the military has also taken control of the Bukchang Thermoelectric Power Plant, the country’s largest steam-powered electrical station. The Bukchang plant, built with Soviet supplies in 1968, can produce up to 2 million kW of electricity. It was formerly operated by the Ministry of Electric Power Industry, which is under the control of the Cabinet, but at the beginning of year, some authorities were purged on charges of bribe-taking and providing power designated for government facilities to foreign capital enterprises and other businesses. Since then, the military has run the plant.

The increased number of economic assets in control of the military reflects the military’s recently-strengthened position within the regime. The North Korean economy can be divided into several sectors: Kim Jong Il’s private fund, managed by Party operations; the military-industrial ‘second economy’; and the official economy, under the control of the Cabinet. The military’s increasing control over the official economy appears to be a move to completely implement ‘Military-first Politics.’

Daily NK
Yoo Gwan Hee
5/18/2009

In North Korea, the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) cell is the lowest ranked organizational unit. The KWP is composed of the Central Committee, provincial committees, city and county committees, primary party committees, sectional party committees, and the party cell at the lowest level. The party cell, as the fundamental unit, carries out the Party’s aims and implements its decisions.

Every member of the Party is officially affiliated with a party cell. In principle, even the “Great Leader” Kim Il Sung and the “General” Kim Jong Il are included in the party cell structure and must carry out their roles and responsibilities such as reporting to the party cell secretary, undergoing reeducation sessions, and strictly adhering to party rules.

The rules and regulations of the KWP stipulate, “The party cell is the basis of life in the Party and, as such, concentrates the masses on the Party and is the combat unit of the Party which directly implements the party line and policies.”

The party cell has between 5 and 30 members; units with 31 or more members form a primary party committee with further cells beneath.

General meetings of the cells, as the leading organization of the Party, must be held at least once a month. The party cell secretary is an unpaid official.

The rules and regulations also delineate the duties of party cells as follows: ▲ establish the one-ideology system among the party members and the working masses; ▲ expand the lower ranks; ▲ enhance the party involvement of the members; ▲ strengthen the ideological education of both newly-admitted and candidate members and working masses; ▲ accept the requests of the working masses and combat counterrevolutionary elements; ▲ strengthen the societal organization of the working masses; ▲ embody the Cheongsan-ri spirit and the mindset of anti-Japanese guerillas in all business activities; ▲ toughen the Worker and Peasant Red Guard and prepare for mobilization; and ▲ report the party expenditures of the members and the candidate members to the party committees.

For the purpose of strengthening the party cells, the first party cell secretaries competition was held in the Pyongyang Gymnasium in March 1994. The second such competition was held 13 years later over a two-day period on October 27 and October 28, 2007 at the April 25 Cultural Hall.

In 1990, after the Chosun Central News Agency’s (KCNA) No. 5 Bureau No. 2 Cell members sent a letter pledging their utmost devotion to Kim Jong Il, the “Party Cell of Loyalty” concept was launched.

To stimulate the “Party Cell of Loyalty” idea, meetings, recitals of official speeches, decisions and decrees and research discussions were emphasized upon.

In this year’s New Year’s Editorial, the party cell was designated as the advance offensive vanguard unit and it was demanded that party members and workers collectively stir up reform.

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Archived article from KCNA in 2009, acknowledging North Korea’s turn to a formally tax-free economy system in 1974 (found through a cached page here):

March 21. 2009 Juche 98

DPRK, First Tax Free Country

Pyongyang, March 21 (KCNA) — The DPRK promulgated the historic law on liquidating the tax system, a legacy of the old society, once and for all on March 21, Juche 63 (1974), declaring the DPRK, the first tax free country in the world.

President Kim Il Sung saw to it that the Third Session of the Fifth Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK adopted and promulgated the law to the whole world.

He expounded the establishment of a fair tax system in his famous work “The Ten-Point Programme of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland” already in the period of the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle. After the national liberation (August 15, 1945), he made every possible effort to do away with the predatory tax system of the Japanese imperialists, establish a popular and democratic one in the country and lessen the tax burden of the people in a systematic way.

The DPRK reduced the income tax of the factory and office workers by 30 percent, alleviated the tax burden of private traders and industrialists considerably and scaled down the agricultural tax in kind from 25 percent of grain output to 20.1 percent again in 1955 after the Korean war, and to 8.4 percent from 1959.

Along with the progress of the socialist construction, the growth of income of the state-owned economy and the heightening of the political and ideological awareness of the working people, the agricultural tax in kind, which had been introduced right after the liberation, was completely abolished by the year of 1966 in accordance with the publication of “Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country” by the President. The tax paid by the people accounted for some two percent of the state budget revenue.

He promulgated his famous work “On Abolishing the Tax System” as a law of the Supreme People’s Assembly and thus abolished the tax system for good and brilliantly realized the long-cherished desire of the people.

The promulgation of the law was a historic event which brought to reality the ardent desire of the Korean people to live in a tax-free country and made them as the proud masters of the country free from tax. This opened up a new tax-free era for the humankind and demonstrated the incomparable superiority of the Korean-style socialist system and the might of the independent national economy.

UPDTE 5: (h/t Werner) Here is a link to the full list of SPA members (in Korean).   Kim Jong il’s district, 333, is the only one not published.  Jang Song Taek (Kim’s borther in law) is representing district 31.

UPDATE 4: Michael Madden sends in more biographies of prominent North Koreans:

Kim Kyong Hui, biography here
Ju Sang Song, biography here
Ji Yong Chun, biography here
Choe Ryong Hae,  biography here
Kim Yong Ju, biography here

UPDATE 3: Daily NK coverage of the election results here. 

UPDATE 2: Yonhap reports that fewer lawmakers were replaced than in the 2003 election, when there was a 50% turnover.  Choe Sung-chol, vice chairman of the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee handling inter-Korean affairs, was removed from the Assembly, according to its new list. 

UPDATE 1: The AP is reporting that none of Kim Jong il’s sons were (s)elected to the SPA.  Who was (s)elected?  I am still waiting on the full list, but the AP reports the following:

Members of the new parliament announced Monday included Kim Yong Nam, the North’s No. 2 official and the ceremonial head of state; Jang Song Taek, head of the Workers’ Party’s administrative department and Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law; and Kang Sok Ju, the first vice foreign minister.

Read the full story here. 

ORIGINAL POST: On Sunday, March 8, the DPRK will hold “our-style elections” for members of the Supreme People’s Assembly.  Organizaitonal charts of the North Korean government can be found here, although they are based on the a de jure reading of DPRK’s legal procedures not the de facto operation of the political system.  A list of top policymakers (in state offices) can be found here.  I will post relevant material as it becomes available.  In the meantime, here is some related information:

1. DPRK recent military personnel changes.

2. Kim Jong il nominated for SPA.

3. CIA publishes list of policymakers.

4. DPRK ministerial shakeup.

5. Election day pictures: 1, 2, 3.

6. KCNA coverage of the election: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

7. Biographies if prominent NK policy-makers by Michael Madden posted below.

The Associated Press provides some context for the (s)election:

North Korea holds elections Sunday for its legislature, the Supreme People’s Assembly. A look at key factors in the upcoming poll:

WHAT’S AT STAKE: Voters will elect the country’s 12th Supreme People’s Assembly for a five-year term. The assembly currently has 687 deputies but the number, which is linked to the country’s population, could change.

WHY IT’S IMPORTANT: Legislatively, the assembly is a rubber-stamp body. But since members double as key officials, the election provides a glimpse of the ruling elite in the secretive country.

WHO’S RUNNING: Only one candidate runs in each constituency. By law, individuals and organizations can recommend candidates, but the ruling Workers’ Party is widely believed to pick candidates. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is running in constituency No. 333.

THE VOTE: Officially, it’s a secret vote. In reality, it’s not. To vote against a candidate, voters go to a special booth to cross out the name, making it obvious who is doing so. Defectors say opposing a candidate is unthinkable. Polls typically open from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. and results are announced the following day.

TURNOUT: In the last election in 2003, turnout was 99.9 percent, state media said. All citizens aged 17 or older are eligible to vote.

The Donga Ilbo offers, “6 Rising Stars in the North Korean Elite”:

A report by the South Korean Unification Ministry presented to the National Assembly yesterday mentioned six politicians among the 20 most frequently mentioned by the North’s official daily Rodong Shinmun last year as rising stars in Pyongyang’s hierarchy.

The six were not mentioned in 2007.

One North Korea expert said, “North Korea’s leadership has been controlled by Kim Jong Il. Those frequently mentioned by media can be considered powerful politicians. After the elections Sunday, North Korea’s political elite will be replaced. In the process, we need to pay more attention to the rising stars.”

The most notable among the six is Ri Yong Chol, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League. He ranks 15th for being mentioned 45 times last year.

Since being elected secretary in December 2007, Ri has often appeared on the political scene. He even had an interview with the state-run (North) Korean Central News Agency on the implementation of projects announced in a New Year’s joint editorial.

Kim Jong Il established the league, a fringe organization of the ruling Workers’ Party whose previous name was the Socialist Working Youth League, to strengthen the political foundation of his successor.

To lure the “third and fourth generations of revolution,” Kim renamed the body the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League after his late father.

In 2007, the list of the North’s top 20 politicians had nobody from the league. Ri’s rapid rise indicates Kim Jong Il’s strategy to strengthen the power of his successor.

Kim Thae Jong, vice director of the international department of the party’s Central Committee, ranks ninth for appearing 62 times in the media. He was a frequent player in diplomacy last year and even appeared in the royal box when North Korea held a national event to commemorate the 17th anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s taking office as supreme commander of the North’s military in December last year.

In 2007, Vice Marshal Kim Il Chol was the sole military officer among the top 20 elites but fell out of last year’s list.

Replacing him were marshals Hyon Chol Hae (11th) and Ri Myong Su (13th). Hyon accompanied Kim Jong Il most often last year and Ri ranked second in that category.

Among Cabinet members, Foreign Trade Minister Ri Ryong Nam, who was mentioned by media 43 times, ranked 17th. Kim Jong Il appointed nine new ministers including Ri last year.

Most of the six ministers appointed since October last year have been emerging technocrats.

Michael Madden submits these brief biographies of some DPRK notables:

Kim Ki-nam, biography (PDF), photo
Ri Yong-mu, biography (PDF)
Kim Il-chol, biography (PDF), photo
Jon Pyong-ho, biography (PDF)

Jang Brothers

Jang Sung-taek, PDF biography here, recent photo with Kim Jong il here.

Jang Sung-gil
Birth date: January 13, 1939
Last known position: Lieutenant General, KPA

Positions held:
1981: Colonel, and Vice-Commanding Officer, Second Corps, KPA
1982: Colonel, and Commanding Officer, 13th Division, Second Corps, KPA
Vice-Commanding Officer, Second Corps, KPA
1985: Major General, Commanding Officer, 32nd Division, Fifth Corps, KPA
1992: Vice-Commanding Officer, Fourth Corps, KPA
1992: Promoted to Lieutenant General, KPA (April)*
1996: Commanding Officer, 105th Division, Ryu Kyong-su Tank Command, KPA (December)

Presumed to be relieved of command of the 105th Tank Division, during JST’s p.n.g. status.

*General Jang is part of the same 1992 class that promoted Kim Yong Chun

Jang Sung-u
Born: 1935, Kangwon Province
Education
Kim il Sung Military Academy

Positions held:
1971: Vice Department Director, Organization and Guidance Department, CCKWP
1977: Promoted to Major General, KPA
1980: Member, CCKWP (October)
1982: Dlegate, 7th SPA (February)
Awarded Order of Kim il Sung (April)
1984: Promoted to Lieutenant General, KPA (May)
1986: Delegate, 8th SPA (November)
1988: Director-General, Reconnaissance Bureau, MPAF
1989: 1st Vice Director, Public Security Department (January)
1990: Delegate, 9th SPA, representing Saenal, South Hwanghae (April)
Promoted to Colonel-General, KPA (presumed April)
Member, Qualification Screening Committee, SPA (May)
1991: Director, General Political Bureau, State Security Department (December)
1992: Interim Position in the Central Command, KPA (April)
Director-General, General Political Bureau, State Security (May)
1994: Commanding Officer, Third Corps, KPA
Member, Kim il Sung Funeral Committee [#85]
1995: Dismissal, as Director-General, General Political Bureau, State Security Department (November)
1996: Commanding Officer, Third Corps, KPA (July)
1998: Delegate 10th SPA (July)

Jang’s inner circle

Cho Chun Hwang
Position: First Vice Department Director, Propaganda and Agitation Department, CCKWP
Education:
Baccalaureate, History, Kim il Sung University

Previous positions:
1972-1990: Mr. Cho worked as a staff member, division director, and department deputy director in the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the CCKWP.
1991: Vice Department Director, Propaganda and Agitation Department, CCKWP
1997: First Vice Department Director, Propaganda and Agitation Department, CCKWP (June)
2000: Vice Department Director Propaganda and Agitation Department, CCKWP (July)

Ri Yong Bok
Position(s): Chief Secretary, Nampho City People’s Committee
Member, 11th SPA
Member, Qualification Screening Committee, SPA

Positions held:
1972: Chairman, KIS League of Socialist Working Youth (December)
Presidium member and delegate, 5th SPA (December)
1982: Vice Department Director, Youth Guidance and Three Revolutions Department, CCKWP (June)
1998: Delegate (606 ED), 10th SPA (July)
Appointed Chief Secretary, Nampho City People’s Committee

Ri Kwang Gun
Position: unknown, possibly in Europe; former Minister of Foreign Trade
Born: 1935
Education:
Namsan Senior Middle School
Pyongyang Foreign Language Institute, German Department
Kim il Sung University

Positions held:
1965: Lecturer, German Department, Pyongyang Foreign Language Institute
1972: Professor, German Department, Kim il Sung University
1977-1978: Ministry of Foreign Trade
1979: State External Economic Affairs Commission
1987: 1st Secretary, Economic Affairs, DPRK Representative to Germany
1991: State External Economic Affairs Commission
1997 (presumed): Korea General Equipment Import and Export Corporation
2000: Appointed Minister of Foreign Trade, DPRK (December)

O Kuk Ryol
Born:  1931, Jilin, PRC
Education:
Mangyongdae Revolutionary School
Kim il Sung University
USSR Croatia Military University (1962)

Positions held:
1964: Promoted Major-General, KPA Air Force
Appointed, Dean, KPA Air Force Academy (November)
1967: Promoted Lieutenant-General and Commanding Officer, KPA Air Force (October)
Delegate, 4th SPA (November)
1970: Appointed Members, CCKWP (November)
1972: Delegate, 5th SPA (December)
1977: Appointed Vice Chief of Staff, KPA (October)
Delegate, 6th SPA (November)
1978: Appointed Alternate Member, Political Bureau, CCKWP
1979: appointed Chief of Staff, KPA (September)
[His command of the KPA Air Force was succeeded by Jo Myong Rok]
1980: Promoted to Colonel General, KPA (September)
Member, CCKWP; Member, Political Bureau (October)
Member, Central Military Committee
1982: Delegate, 7th SPA (February)
Member, Central People’s Committee
Awarded Order of Kim il Sung (April)
1985: Promoted General, KPA (April)
1986: Delegate, 8th SPA (November)
1988: Removed as KPA Chief of Staff (February)
Removed from the Political Bureau, CCKWP (April)
Removed from Central Military Committee (April)
Appointed Director of Civil Defense, CCKWP (November)
1989: Appointed Department Director, Strategy Department, CCKWP (July)
1992: Order of Kim il Sung (April)
1994: Member, Kim il Sung Funeral Committee (#45) (July)
1995: Member, O Jin-U Funeral Committee (#43) (February)
1998: Delegate (356 Electoral District), 10th SPA (July)
2003: Delegate, 11th SPA
2009: Appointed Vice Chair, NDC (February)

Ongoing: Member, CCKWP; State Funeral Committee

Jang rival

Ri Jah Gang
Postion held:  1st Vice Department Director, Organization and Guidance, CCKWP
Born: 1930
Education:
Kim il Sung University

Positions held:
1973: Cadre, Organization and Guidance Department, CCKWP
1975: Vice Director, Organization and Guidance Department, CCKWP
2001: 1st Vice Director, Organization and Guidance Department, CCKWP (July)

…

On the list of so-called reliable members of the KPA, General Jang Song-u is near the top.  General Jang’s last known position was in the Third Army Corps, whose primary mission is the military defense of Pyongyang.  The Third Army Corps is also responsible the maintenance and support of the Kamsusan Memorial Palace, where General Jang serves as a kind of military officer in residence.   General Jang has always had the support of his younger brother, Jang Song-taek, and the brothers’ careers have advanced on parallel paths in the KPA and the KWP.  Although, due most likely to his military affiliation and the advantage of age (he is eleven years older than Song-taek), General Jang was the first brother admitted to the CCKWP apparatus when he was assigned as a Vice Director of the Organization and Guidance Department CCKWP in 1973.  This was the same year that another Kim Jong il associate with KPA duties, Ri Ji Gang, was assigned to Organization and Guidance.  Based on the accounts of KPA and DPRK State events from the KCNA, General Jang was neither reassigned nor demoted when his brother was removed from the Organization and Guidance Department and confined to his chalet.  Among the capacities in which General Jang has served: he was the commanding military officer in the troop review and parade on the 50th Anniversary of the KWP Foundation in 1995 and; he has assumed interim operational command over the Escort/Bodyguard Units.  Jang Song-u occupies the intersection of the politico(politburo)-military structure and the intelligence agencies (including State Security and the Escort/Bodyguard Units).  The conjunction of General Jang’s political connections and military assignments give him a significant role in matters concerning succeeding governments to Kim Jong il.  In many ways, General Jang’s profile resembles that of those close Kim il Sung aides who eased Kim Jong il into his current job.

Writing for the American Enterprise Institute, Andrei Lankov argues that neither sanctions nor direct engagement will change the North Korean system.  Quoting from the summary of his paper:

North Korea must be transformed from within. Neither sanctions nor direct engagement will work. What is needed is an effort to increase contacts between North Korea and the outside world through cultural and educational exchanges and through economic cooperation that exposes North Koreans to South Koreans and their vastly better way of life. Increased radio and video penetration combined with support for defectors who can aid the transformation when the Kim Jong Il regime ends will also be necessary.

Dr. Lankov’s paper can be read here.

A PDF can be downloaded here.

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Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-2-26-1
2/26/2009

It has been reported that 2-3 day’s worth of special rations were issued to parts of North Pyongan and South Hwanghae provinces, including to those North Koreans working in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, to mark the February 16 birthday of Kim Jong Il.

For families with more than four members, 2 kilograms of rice and 2 kilograms of noodles, with corn making up the rest of the rations. Smaller families received a kilogram each of rice and noodles, in addition to corn. Recently, rations have been in very short supply, even on farms, so North Koreans have been very much looking forward to these special rations.

Since last year, the number of guards stationed at farms was increased sharply, along with increasingly more intrusive house searches, as the theft and consumption of food by those living on the farms was banned. Over the past few years, as the state failed to provide steady rations to the farmers and families on the agricultural plots, these farmers began stealing rice from the cooperative farms as a means to maintain their lifestyles.

However, in November and December of last year, inspections were carried out in cities and districts as grain management on farms was strengthened, leading to an increase in theft of foodstuffs. Those caught stealing would be dragged in front of labor authorities and often sentenced to confinement.

The districts receiving these special rations were all specifically chosen by North Korean authorities. Hweryong City, in North Hamgyong Province, is the hometown of Kim Jong Il’s mother, Kim Jong Sook, while the Samjiyon district, in Yanggang Province, is where Kim Jong Il claims to have been born. Kaesong was thought to have been chosen in order to propagandize the rations to the outside world.

One source reported that in 2006, an anti-socialist group emerged in the city of Hweryong, and that leaders of citizen groups were appealing, “It is difficult to live in our mother (Kim Jong Sook)’s hometown…Let’s all flee to China,” and since Kim Jong Il became aware of the uprising, special rations have been given on holidays and other special occasions. That said, currently, Kim Jong Il’s practice of gift giving continues to be aimed at the leading class in the North, with city and district Party secretaries also receiving gifts, along with central Party authorities. Gifts are also provided to state heroes and model laborers.

See previous posts on Kim’s birthday rations here.

See photos of Birthday rations from the Daily NK here.