North Korean Economy Watch

Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online 10-020A: April 1st, 2010
James E. Hoare
4/1/2010

I. Introduction

James E. Hoare was Britain’s Chargé d’Affaires to the DPRK from 2001-2002 and opened the British Embassy in Pyongyang. In this article on the Sunshine policy he writes, “Slowly, the policy was creating a group of people who could see benefits in remaining on good terms with South Korea and who had wider links with the outside world. Engagement has worked in other countries, most noticeably China, and I believe that it was beginning to work in North Korea. There was never going to be a speedy change in attitudes built up over sixty years, but stopping the process after ten was not a wise decision.”

This article was published by 38 North a web site devoted to analysis of North Korea from the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS. 38 North will harness the experience of long-time observers of North Korea and others who have dealt directly with North Koreans. It will also draw on other experts outside the field who might bring fresh, well, informed insights to those of us who follow North Korea.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Article by James E. Hoare

– “Why the Sunshine Policy Made Sense”
By James E. Hoare

At a recent private meeting in London, a former senior United Nations’ official, drawing on experience relating to a wide range of countries, said that transforming a “failing” or “fragile” state was not something that could be done overnight. Those involved needed to think in terms of ten to twenty years rather than weeks or months. Regardless of whether or not one accepts the idea of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) as a failed or even fragile state-and the term is often used in some quarters-the idea that one is in for the long haul in bringing about major modifications in behavior and attitude is certainly a good one to have in mind when dealing with the DRPK. It was such an approach that marked the Republic of Korea’s policy towards the North under former Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.

Since the Lee Myung-bak government took office in the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) in 2008, it is fashionable to dismiss the policies followed by his predecessors as an expensive failure. Sneers about “ATM diplomacy,” innuendo about Kim Dae-jung’s motives, and references to his successor Roh Moo-hyun’s naivety, are the commonplace of South Korean academic and press comment, and are heard much further afield. “Sunshine” or engagement have become terms of mockery. The Lee government has adopted a more aggressive policy towards North Korea. It has not refused assistance outright, but has couched its offers in such a way that rejection is inevitable-the most recent example is the “grand bargain” proposed in 2009 in which the DPRK must first give up its nuclear program to receive security guarantees and aid. This is then played back as evidence that the North is incorrigible and not deserving of assistance.

The Lee government’s approach is based on an incorrect assessment both of the Sunshine Policy and what went before it. “Sunshine” or “engagement” was not something that sprang from Kim Dae-jung’s fertile brain, though he certainly can be credited with refining and developing the idea. The policies pursued by Kim and Roh lay firmly within a tradition that goes back to President Park Chung Hee in the early 1970s and that was followed by all his successors to a greater or lesser degree. However, it was never easy to engage the North and it did not take much to divert earlier presidents from such a policy. Frustrated or annoyed, they eventually gave up the effort.

The difference after 1998 was that South Korea stuck to “sunshine” even when there were difficulties. Neither Kim nor Roh were starry-eyed and neither expected that the North would be changed overnight. Both responded to Pyongyang’s bad behavior with firmness. But they realized that circumstances had changed with the famine and other problems that hit North Korea in the 1990s. They also realized that for engagement to be successful, it was best to avoid rubbing in the fact that the country faced real problems. Even if the explanations offered for the problems often ignored the North Korean regime’s own part in bringing them about, there was nevertheless an acceptance that help was needed. The unprecedented appeal for outside assistance that brought in UN agencies and resident non-governmental organizations in the late 1990s showed that the South would help without preaching. No doubt the expense and complications of German reunification also gave pause for thought. If the two Germanys, which had not fought a savage war and were far richer, could not achieve a smooth reintegration, how could the two Koreas?

So Kim and Roh did not break off engagement as a result of “bad” behavior or outside criticism of “soft policies.” They accepted that it would take a long time to modify Pyongyang’s policies and that there were likely to be few expressions of thanks. Of course there was no instant transformation. But the new approach provided a window for other countries to establish relations with North Korea. In theory, it had long been the South’s policy to allow if not to encourage such relations, but the reality had been different. From 2000 onwards, that changed. Countries that had hitherto held back for fear of offending Seoul now found themselves encouraged to establish relations with Pyongyang.

Those that did so found a North Korea that seemed eager for change, although very careful about how that eagerness was expressed. But there was a readiness to do things that would have seemed improbable only ten years before. While never quite admitting that the policies pursued under Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il might have had defects, those of us working in the North between 2000-2002 found a willingness on the part of officials to admit that they needed assistance and that mistakes had been made. Examples included a vice-mayor who admitted that post-Korean War town planning had many defects that were only then becoming obvious. Officials were willing to admit that the country was in need of a whole range of economic and commercial skills that had hitherto been neglected. Perhaps most telling of all, a country that had responded to the changes in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China in the early 1990s by calling home all its overseas students now was most anxious to send students abroad once again.

Engagement was thus helping to open North Korean eyes to possibilities beyond juche, but unfortunately, even before the 2002 nuclear crisis, there was relatively little follow-up on these expressions of intent. Pyongyang found difficulty in matching students to the requirements of foreign universities and other training institutions. Some countries that established diplomatic relations preferred to concentrate on human rights issues to the exclusion of other matters. Since several of these were members of the European Union (EU), their approach inevitably affected the EU’s broad approach to North Korea. Even among countries that did not give predominance to human rights, goodwill was rarely transformed into sufficient funding to make a real difference.

That said, in the British case alone, we were able to fund several sessions of economics training, an English-language training program that put initially two-now four -British teachers into DPRK universities to train English teachers, and intensive English courses for a variety of North Korean officials. In addition, non-governmental bodies such as the BBC and Reuters conducted training programs for media staff in modern methods of news presentation and communication skills. Perhaps if the United States had been more supportive of its ally’s engagement policy these efforts would have made a difference. But as the relatively benign approach towards engagement of the Clinton years gave way to hostility under President George W. Bush after 2000 that too had an impact on how far countries such as Britain would support the sunshine policy.

It was South Korea’s approach to engagement that had the greatest impact. Seoul’s aid and other measures taken under the umbrella of the “sunshine” approach brought North and South into contact across many fields. During the period from 1998-2008, the North became known to South Korean citizens in a totally unprecedented way. The process had begun earlier, especially during the Roh Tae-woo presidency (1988-93), but the trickle of information about the North of those years became a flood. And it was not only information but actual contact with North Korea. For some, this meant tightly controlled tours to the Diamond Mountains (Mount Kumgang) or towards the end of the period, to Kaesong at the western end of the Demilitarized Zone. Limited though these were, they were still a glimpse into what had hitherto been unknown and feared. There were also signs that, as the North got used to the idea of such visits, it might open up a little more; the decision to allow the use of visitors’ own cars in March 2008 was one such indication, but there were several others.

Much more important were the wide range of government and non-governmental contacts. Relatively few North Koreans came South but the traffic in the other direction was enormous. On any given day, there were likely to be several thousand South Korean visitors in the North, dealing with aid, trade, cultural, educational and even religious exchanges-both the Protestant and the Roman Catholic churches in the North had regular South Korean officiating ministers as well as hymnbooks and prayer books produced in the ROK. South Korean journalists were also a not uncommon sight. Most of this activity may have been confined to Pyongyang, by not all of it was. South Koreans were visiting many parts of the country, especially in connection with agricultural assistance and other aid-related projects. Nobody was starry-eyed about these visits. South Korean visitors were watched and controlled. But they were able to learn a lot since they could speak and read Korean. If the projects agreed to at the October 2007 summit between Kim Jong-il and Roh Moo-hyun had been implemented by the incoming Lee Myung-bak government, there would have been a huge increase in these types of contacts.

No doubt engagement was expensive and sometimes the means used to bring it about were shady, but it was producing benefits. The South, and to some extent the rest of the world, now has a far better understanding of how North Korea works then it did before engagement began. Within the North, a large number of people have come to see their southern compatriots in a less hostile light and have some, even if limited, understanding of the economic and social structures of South Korea. Perhaps some of the assistance provided was diverted away from its original purpose, but enough rice and fertilizer bags reached areas far away from Pyongyang and enough people were willing to ask questions about the South to show that the impact of engagement extended beyond a small circle of ruling elite. Slowly, the policy was creating a group of people who could see benefits in remaining on good terms with South Korea and who had wider links with the outside world. Engagement has worked in other countries, most noticeably China, and I believe that it was beginning to work in North Korea. There was never going to be a speedy change in attitudes built up over sixty years, but stopping the process after ten was not a wise decision.

According to the Daily Telegraph (UK):

Kim Jong-il, the Supreme Leader of North Korea, has a $4 billion (£2.6 billion) “emergency fund” hidden in secret accounts in European banks that he will use to continue his lavish way of life if he is forced to flee the country.

South Korean intelligence officials told The Daily Telegraph that much of the money was held in Swiss banks until authorities there began to tighten regulations on money laundering.

Mr Kim’s operatives then withdrew the money – in cash, in order not to leave a paper trail – and transferred it to banks in Luxembourg.

The money is the profits from impoverished North Korea selling its nuclear and missile technology, dealing in narcotics, insurance fraud, the use of forced labour in its vast gulag system, and the counterfeiting of foreign currency.

“I believe this is the most extensive money-laundering operation in the history of organised crime, yet the final destination of the funds has not been given the proper attention it deserves,” said Ken Kato, the director of Human Rights in Asia.

“Somewhere in the world, there are bankers who are earning a large sum of money by concealing and managing Kim Jong-il’s secret funds, and at the same time, almost nine million people in North Korea are suffering from food shortages,” he said. “I believe the secret bank accounts are now in Luxembourg, or have recently been transferred from Luxembourg to other tax havens.”

A spokesman for the Luxembourg government said that it was obliged to investigate all transactions involving Stalinist North Korea.

“The problem is that they do not have ‘North Korea’ written all over them,” he added. “They try to hide and they try to erase as many links as possible.”

…

Read the full article below:
Kim Jong-il keeps $4bn ’emergency fund’ in European banks
Daily Telegraph (UK)
Oliver Arlow
3/14/2010

According to the Joong Ang Daily:

North Korea has unilaterally raised rental fees for offices of foreign embassies and international agencies by 20 percent this year, at the same time that it tightens its grip on communications at the establishments, sources said.

A source privy to North Korean affairs said last week that the North Korean Foreign Ministry sent notices to the foreign offices last October and the increase took effect at the beginning of this year. The source also said commodity prices in markets specifically set up for foreigners have soared.

“Following the currency reform last November, the North may have wanted to earn some foreign currency by raising the rents and commodity prices,” the source said. “As far as I know, diplomats and their families are angry that the North has violated diplomatic protocols.”

Pyongyang has diplomatic offices for 25 nations, plus the office for World Food Program among other the United Nations agencies. Most rent out space in buildings owned by North Korea.

Pyongyang-based diplomats have also been asked to celebrate North Korean holidays by purchasing flowers or writing congratulatory messages.

“On Kim Jong-il’s 68th birthday last month, the North asked the diplomats to buy wreaths, made up of ‘the Kim Jong-il flowers,’ and write messages praying for Kim’s health under the ambassador’s name,” one source explained. The source did not know if the diplomats complied.

North Korea is also cracking down on the flow of information within foreign missions and agencies. The North rejected a request by a UN agency to use the Internet to send documents to UN headquarters. When diplomats make international phone calls, North Korean interpreters are there to listen in on the conversation, sources said.

“The North may want to block any details on Kim Jong-il’s health, disruption after the currency reform or other domestic affairs from reaching the outside world,” a South Korean government official said.

One Western diplomat, asking for anonymity, recently complained to a South Korean government official that diplomats in Pyongyang can’t talk to each other freely for fear of others listening in, and that they only vent their frustration when they’re out of North Korea.

In addition to making money from the foreign embassies in Pyongyang, the DPRK earns revenue from its embassies abroad.  See here, here, here, here, here, and here.

Most Pyongyang embassies (aside from Russia and China) are located in Munsudong (satellite image here). Recent photos of Pyongyang’s diplomatic quater here.

This is a fascinating topic.  What are the rental rates now?  How are they determined?  If anyone has an idea, please let me know.

Read the stories below:
Diplomats in North face price hike
Joong Ang Daily
Lee Young-jong
3/15/2010

Andrei Lankov offers some thoughtful analysis on recent North Korea developments in the Asia Times:

Contrary to oft-stated accusations, Pyongyang leaders are neither irrational nor ideology-driven; they are a bunch of brilliant Machiavellians, very apt at exploiting the fears and controversies of their enemies and their partners alike.

Their country’s economy is in a sorry state, to be sure, but survival of the population has never been a major item on their agenda. They just want to stay in control and not be overthrown by popular insurrection or by a coup – they are very good at this game.

…

However, over the past year or so, something strange has begun to happen in Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership has taken some actions that have clearly damaged the interests of the ruling clique. It seems that the once formidable manipulators have for some reason lost their ability to judge and plan.

The recent currency reform is the best example of such weird and self-defeating policy decisions. For years, the Pyongyang government has waged campaigns against the unofficial and semi-official markets that have played a decisive role in North Korea’s economic life since the collapse of the state-run economy in the 1990s. As another move in this ongoing (and, perhaps, unwinnable) struggle, last November the government initiated currency reform that was meant to undermine the power of black-market merchants.

The reform was modeled on confiscation-oriented currency reforms once used in the Soviet Union and other communist countries. One morning, the populace suddenly learned that old bank notes were null and void and had to be changed for new ones within a week. The exchange rate was set as 1:100, so, for example, 1,000 “old” won should be exchanged for 10 “new” won.

Accordingly, all retail prices and fees were also reduced one hundred times. Harsh exchange limits were introduced: only the equivalent of US$30 in cash could be changed by one person. The use of foreign currency, which had become very common in North Korea’s retail economy, was banned.

The measures are standard for communist-style currency reform, since such reform usually pursues the double goal of fighting inflation and reducing the power and influence of the unofficial black economy.

However, North Korea’s planners also did something unexpected: they claimed that nominal wages and salaries would not change. In other words, a person who prior to the reform received a monthly salary of 3,000 won, would still receive 3,000 won, but paid in the new currency. Effectively, it meant that all wages in the country suddenly increased 100 times. To assure consumers, the government issued stern warnings against profiteers who dared to raise prices of goods and services.

For a brief while in December and early January, North Korean customers felt rich and consumers expected that even such luxuries as, say, Chinese bikes (a North Korean equivalent to a Porsche) were now within their reach.

The actual result was less impressive. The dramatic increase in salaries launched an equally dramatic round of inflation, so in the past three months the price of rice (and the black market exchange rate) has increased 50 times, from the official required 20 “new” won per kilogram to 1,000 “new” won. The government’s “stern warnings” were ignored. In the near future, prices are likely to return to pre-reform levels. The reform has failed completely and it only succeeded in making people irritated and in demonstrating the government’s inability to control a situation.

The unprecedented decision to raise wages doomed the entire affair from the start. But why was it done? Why was an otherwise standard package of well-tested measures saddled with this self-defeating (and, frankly, stupid) addition?

In the realm of diplomacy, North Korea is not faring much better. For decades, Pyongyang has demonstrated uncanny skills in manipulating its neighbors from whom it squeezed unconditional aid and unilateral concessions. The usual tactics consisted of three stages. In the first stage, the North Koreans raise tensions. Secondly, they launch missiles, test nuclear devices and make threatening statements. Finally, once tensions are sufficiently high for the world to feel uneasy, there are negotiations in which Pyongyang extracts aid that is essentially a reward for calming a crisis the North itself manufactured.

This time, both stage one and stage two were seriously mishandled. First, the North Koreans used both their trump blackmail cards – a nuclear test and a missile launch – almost simultaneously (analysts expected space of at least a few months before these two events). They also showered Washington with especially bellicose rhetoric, even though the Barack Obama administration was initially relatively soft on the North Korean issue.

As a result, the excessive activity of the North Koreans backfired: the US foreign policy establishment finally realized that North Korea would not surrender its nuclear program under whatever circumstances. This reassessment of the situation (or belated realization) meant that the US was now far less willing to shower Pyongyang with concessions. In the past, gifts were presented as incentives to surrender nuclear weapons, and since such surrender is now seen as unlikely, such generosity is not necessary. (See US finally wise to Pyongyang’s ways, Asia Times Online, November 12, 2009)

The North Koreans are now beginning to realize that the old trick is not working. They have only themselves to blame. Had they been slightly more careful last year, a significant part of the US establishment would still nurture the illusionary dream of “denuclearization through negotiations”.

The third stage of asking for aid was also handled badly. The unnecessarily aggressive rhetoric of the past was replaced by unusual softness in a short time – previously, the switch took months. Since August, North Korea has essentially begged to restart negotiations with the US and, especially, South Korea.

Pyongyang is demanding to restart cooperation projects. It is quite remarkable, since two of the three major projects – tours of Keumgang Mountain and Kaesong city tours – were abruptly stopped by North Korean authorities a year ago. Needless to say, the South Korean government is not too eager to restart negotiations. After all, so-called intra-Korean cooperation is essentially unilateral South Korean aid in disguise and Seoul sees no reason why it should hurry with the resumption of money transfers to Pyongyang. North Korean softness is (wrongly) seen by Seoul hardliners as a victory of the hard line they are advocating, so they say that an even harder approach will probably bring greater success.

Meanwhile, the North Korean government also did something it has never done before: it said “sorry” to the people. In January, Nodong Sinmun, a government mouthpiece, reported that Dear Leader Kim Jong-il felt bad for being unable to provide his subjects with the level of material affluence they were once promised.

The promise was moderate, to be sure. In the 1960s, Kim Il-sung, the founding father of the country and also father of the current dictator, promised that eventually all Koreans would eat rice (not corn or barley) and meat soup, live in houses with tiled roofs (not thatched), and wear silk clothes.

Every North Korean knows that even this moderate paradise has failed to materialize. However, the fact has never been admitted openly. In the past, economic difficulties and hardships, if mentioned at all, were always explained as they should be explained in a solid dictatorship, that is, by references to scheming enemies, above all US imperialists.

This time, Kim’s remark indicated that the system itself might bear some responsibility for economic problems.

In accordance with the new mood, a high-level official allegedly expressed his regret about the chaos created by the currency reform while addressing a large group of the party faithful. This might appear like normal behavior, but in a dictatorship that claims the possession of absolute truth and an infallible leader, such statements are very unusual – and, indeed, dangerous. They are likely to be seen as signs of fallibility and weakness, and every dictator knows that such signs should not be shown.

In other words, something has changed in Pyongyang recently – seemingly, after Kim’s illness in late 2008, when he reportedly suffered a stroke. The most likely explanation seems to be biological: the increasing inability of the ailing dictator to pass reasonable judgments and control people around him.

One can easily imagine how the Dear Leader (perhaps even driven by genuine sympathy to his long-suffering people) would look through a currency reform plan and say: “And what about poor wage-earners? Should we not reward the people who remained loyal to the socialist industry and did not go for black markets? Why not increase their salaries, so they will become affluent, more affluent than those anti-socialist profiteers of the black market?” Few, if any, officials would dare to explain the dire economic consequences of such generosity.

It is also possible that the deteriorating health condition of Kim has led to growing rivalry between factions so the North Korean leadership is now increasingly disunited, with rival groups pushing through their own agendas.

At any rate, something unusual seems to be happening in Pyongyang and it’s probably the time to think about the future a bit more seriously. We are heading towards serious changes, and unfortunately nobody seems prepared.

Read the full story here:
Is the Dear Leader losing his grip?
Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
3/5/2010

Choson Ilbo
2/26/2010

North Korea is still demanding rice and fertilizer in return for an inter-Korean summit, even as it keeps sending increasingly urgent messages to Seoul to bring such a summit about.

Since a secret meeting between South Korean Labor Minister Yim Tae-hee and Kim Yang-gon, the director of the North Korean Workers’ Party’s United Front Department, in Singapore in October, “North Korea has kept asking us for a huge amount of economic aid in return for arranging a meeting” between President Lee Myung-bak and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, a South Korean government source said on Thursday.

But the North seems to have no interest in giving in to South Korean demands to put denuclearization and the repatriation of prisoners of war and abduction victims on the summit agenda. “The North basically wants economic gain in return for letting us make political use of an inter-Korean summit for the upcoming local elections” on June 2, the source said. “It seems that the North still feels nostalgic for the Sunshine Policy,” which netted it huge benefits over the past decade.

The first inter-Korean summit in 2000 was announced only three days before the general election and was bought through a secret payment of billions of won. The second summit in 2007 was announced two months before the presidential election. Since 2000, the North has received more than 300,000 tons of rice and the same amount of fertilizer almost every year worth more than W1 trillion (US$1=W1,163) a year.

In another secret meeting between South Korea’s Unification Ministry and the North Korean Workers’ Party’s United Front Department in November, the North again insisted on specifying humanitarian aid in an agreement to be signed at an inter-Korean summit.

A “tree planting campaign for North Korea” initiated recently by the Presidential Committee on Social Cohesion also reportedly went awry because the North demanded a huge aid of food in return for letting South Korea plant trees there.

Kim Jong-il is apparently not aware that Seoul is serious about ending this cash-for-summits policy. A South Korean government official with experience in inter-Korean talks said, “At secret meetings, each side often had its own way of interpreting agendas. Maybe North Korean delegates who are accustomed to the Sunshine Policy are trying to interpret the current government’s messages the way they did with past governments.”

It seems the North has attempted to earn economic aid worth W1 trillion by prevaricating over the issue of the POWs and abduction victims, offering to handle it like part of reunions of separated families, and discussing the nuclear issue only with the U.S. 

Whether the attitude will change remains to be seen. The North is now in a worse economic situation than before in the wake of a recent disastrous currency reform on top of international sanctions and a severe food shortage.

Prof. Cho Young-ki of Korea University said, “The North is in dire need of support from the outside including South Korea to stabilize the regime for a smooth transition of power” to Kim’s son Jong-un. “It is possible that the North will reluctantly accept our request depending on progress in the six-party nuclear talks.”

The government believes that a dramatic turning point in inter-Korean relations could be reached if the North makes “big decisions” in the nuclear or POW issues, according to Kim Tae-hyo, the presidential secretary for foreign strategies.

Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
2/22/2010

In late January, Kim Jong Il held a meeting of his highest officials, including Jang Sung Taek, Director of the Ministry of Administration of the Party, aiming to find ways to alleviate the negative side effects of November’s currency redenomination. In the meeting, the group apparently agreed to release emergency supplies of rice to those on the brink of starvation.

According to a Daily NK source, “Following the meeting, which he chaired, Kim Jong Il handed down a handwritten decree to the chief secretaries of all provinces on January 20 in which it was stated, ‘Preventing anyone from starving to death is your obligation.’”

Chief Secretaries of Provincial Committees of the Party, the recipients of the decree, handed on the threat to their subordinates, warning provincial cadres, “You will resign if anyone starves to death, because this was a direct instruction from the General.”

In the decree, the three most vulnerable provinces were named as Yangkang, South Hamkyung, and Kangwon Provinces, so the officials governing those provinces are understandably nervous. They are the provinces where most casualties occurred during the March of Tribulation, and they remain the most food insecure.

Under the decree, the Ministry of Procurement and Food Policy makes daily deliveries of 5kg of relief rice to each people’s unit and 5-15kg to each factory and enterprise. Chairpersons of people’s units and managers of factories are required to observe the circumstances of the people under their control and provide those in the greatest danger of starvation with relief rice first.

In late January, quite a number of households were reportedly facing starvation due to the aftermath of the currency redenomination; notably sky high prices coupled to strict market regulations. However, there have been no reports of starvation since relief rice deliveries began on February 1.

Alongside the chairpersons of People’s Units, cadres working for local government offices are required to cross-check whether or not starvation is occurring. In theory, they are reprimanded if they do not report the situation truthfully.

Upon hearing the news, a defector in Seoul commented, “It seems that the people will not lie still and suffer that dire situation. Kim Jong Il may have done this because he senses a crisis situation this time.”

According to the Daily NK:

Since the redenomination on November 30 last year, the cost of crossing the Tumen River has risen as high as 10,000 Yuan on the back of tighter border regulations.

A source from North Hamkyung Province told the Daily NK on Thursday, “Since border security was strengthened in February, it has cost at least 10,000 Yuan to cross the border into China.” This is equal to around 400,000 North Korean won at the black market exchange rate, or $1400.

In 2006, the cost of crossing the Tumen River around Musan and Onsung in North Hamkyung Province was just 500 Yuan.

The reason is because now there is an alliance of brokers monopolizing the crossing business, and a number of regulations designed to both circumscribe the ability of citizens to cross and limit the relationship between guard companies and local citizens.

In the distant past, if people wanted to cross the river, they approached guards and haggled over the price directly. However, now people have to rely on professional brokers who put them in contact with guards and guides in China. One pays a price to the broker, who shares it with North Korean border guards and Chinese guides respectively at a ratio of 4:3:3.

The North Korean authorities designated the period from February 5th until Kim Jong Il’s birthday on the 16th as a period of “special vigilance,” handing down special instructions to strengthen the border guard and regulations covering migration in border cities.

According to a Daily NK source, this measure is primarily intended to limit the ability of those suffering since the redenomination to smuggle or cross the border to make money in China, as well as to regulate citizens in advance of Kim Jong Il’s birthday, which is customary.

The source emphasized, “Since December last year, the number of citizens using human networks in China to make money has been increasing. Therefore, agents of the National Security Agency and the People’s Safety Agency have been watching those people closely.”

The source further explained, “Now, the authorities are forcing border guards to observe each other in order to track down those doing business with brokers and border crossers. In January, in Yusun-dong, Hoiryeong, one company commander was dismissed after a platoon commander informed on him for assisting border crossers.”

In the mid-2000s, along the border near settlements such as Namyang, Sambong, and Jongsung in North Hamkyung Province, the authorities set up nail boards and extra barbed wire along the Tumen River in order to inhibit defection. However, as these physical measures were not as effective as hoped, in 2006 the authorities took to switching guard posts between different guard companies without notice and awarding a prize, membership of the Party, to guards who caught people crossing the border. These measures were designed to break down connections between individual guards and the local populace

Therefore, the source added, “These days, no border guards are helping people cross the river, and the cost is soaring.”

Read the full story here:
Tight Rules Make Border Costs Soar
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
2/19/2010

According to Bloomberg, Kim Jong Un [Eun] might have his own flower.

North Korea celebrated Kim Jong Il’s birthday today with tens of thousands of flowers. The most intriguing blossom is a new variety of begonia sent on his son’s birthday that may signify preparations for a succession.

Floral tributes arrived from China, Japan, Laos, Russia and Syria, the Korean Central News Agency reported this month. The inclusion of a new breed of begonia delivered on the Jan. 8 birthday of youngest son Kim Jong Un follows a pattern of using flowers to help legitimize the ruling family’s power, according to Paik Hak Soon, a director of inter-Korean relations at the Seongnam, South Korea-based Sejong Institute.

“North Korean leaders have used the flowers as a propaganda tool to glorify their leadership,” Paik said. “The flower is an obvious sign that Kim Jong Il is preparing a handover,” he said, adding that both Kim and his father Kim Il Sung, who founded the nation, have their own designated blossoms.

Flower symbolism?  I believe Emperor of Japan is owed some royalties!

Anyhow, I was looking forward to seeing pictures of  the new “Kimjongeunia” but it turns out the flower might not exist.  According to the same article in Bloomberg:

[Kim Il Sung] received a hybrid orchid in 1965 from Indonesian President Sukarno and named it Kimilsungia. Kim was given his begonia in 1988. It is called Kimjongilia and dubbed the “immortal flower” to glorify his leadership.

KCNA said both Kim Jong Il’s flower and the begonia delivered on Jan. 8 were sent by a Japanese botanist named Mototeru Kamo. The KCNA report didn’t mention the son.

Kamo, who said he has visited North Korea about 10 times, denied sending a new flower to commemorate Kim Jong Un. Neither had the 1988 begonia been intended for the father, Kamo said by telephone from his office in Kakegawa, Japan. “At the time, no one knew anything about Kim Jong Il,” he said. “Therefore, there’s no way I could create a flower to suit his image. Horticulture and politics should be separate.”

Read the full story here:
Birthday Flower May Be Part of Kim Jong Il Succession
Bloomberg
Bomi Lim
2/15/2010

February 16 is Kim Jong Il’s official birthday and the second most important national holiday in the DPRK. I will let you guess the first.  The celebration actiities were predictable: fireworks, synchronized swimming, public pledges of loyalty, dancing, and of course the Kimjongilia flower show. The usual.

KCNA, however, pointed out one new tradition of which I was unaware:

Turtle Dishes Begin to Be Served
Pyongyang, February 13 (KCNA) — Okryu Restaurant in Pyongyang has begun serving dishes made of snapping turtle on the occasion of the birthday of leader Kim Jong Il, February 16.

One can be treated in the restaurant with various kinds of turtle dishes such as turtle soup, raw dishes made of turtle heart, liver or spawn, steamed or fried turtle and turtle porridge.

Liquors of famous brands including Pyongyang Soju brewed at the Taedonggang Foodstuff Factory are adding to the taste of the dishes.

The dishes are associated with leader Kim Jong Il’s loving care for improving the people’s diet as required by a thriving nation.

He gave meticulous instructions as to turtle breeding and cookery, hoping that turtle dishes, good for health, would be served well to the people at restaurants.

Refurbished Okryu Restaurant, famous for Pyongyang cold noodles, took the lead in making preparations to successfully realizing the leader’s wish.

Its employees built a habitat in order to raise turtles on a large scale.

They completed a unique cookery for diversified turtle dishes to suit the Korean people’s taste through several sampling parties.

Along with turtle food the restaurant also delights customers with caviar and other rare dishes.

It has a plan to include bullfrog, salmon and other high-grade dishes in its menu.

The Okryu Restaurant is located here.

The Daily NK offers some unofficial news about Kim Jong il’s birthday holiday:

While the North Korean media praises Kim Jong Il’s greatness on his 68th birthday, the common citizens are having a quiet time, suffering under a growing food crisis.

This year’s Lunar New Year holiday fell around Kim Jong Il’s birthday, so sources report that the authorities gave the people time off from the 14th for three days. However, special distribution for the holiday was patchy this year, differing in quantity from province to province.

One source from Musan, North Hamkyung Province reported, “Even though we are facing the General (Kim Jong Il)’s birthday, there is no liquor being distributed. Just for cadres and soldiers, a 500ml bottle of liquor and a kilogram of pork are being supplied.”

The source added that general food prices are fluctuating. “Rice prices in the jangmadang are different all the time. On the 15th, over 450 won, but in the afternoon it went down to 400 won. And, now it is up to almost 500 won.”

“There are a number of people who are starving. Even though the jangmadang is open, these people cannot purchase rice due to its high price. However, liquor sellers are seemingly able to earn money because people need it for memorial ceremonies for their ancestors.”

A source from Yangkang Province reported the situation there, “The authorities have provided us with four days of mixed rice and corn. There has been no other special distribution, except cookies for children from their schools. However, even though people have received food distribution, the price of rice is up around 500 won.”

Only in Hoiryeong have residents received as much as Pyongyang citizens. They got one bottle of liquor and one day’s rice, according to a source in the city.

Links to previous birthday posts can be found here.

According to the Associated Press:

North Korea has given “gifts of love” to all its children ahead of leader Kim Jong Il’s birthday.

The North’s official Korean Central News Agency reported on the gifts Saturday without further elaboration. Defectors have said cookies and candies were given to children for past holidays.

Kim’s birthday and that of his late father, Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s founder, are the nation’s biggest holidays. Kim turns 68 on Tuesday.

Read Previous posts on Kim Jong il’s birthday gifts here and here. 

See photos of last year’s birthday gifts here.