North Korean Economy Watch

According to the Daily NK:

There is widespread displeasure not only at mobilization for various events planned for April but also the growing funding burden being placed on households, sources have reported.

One source from Musan in North Hamkyung Province told Daily NK on the 20th, “In all areas of North Korea including Pyongyang, everyone has been rushing around preparing for the upcoming birthday celebrations since the 15th. The authorities are collecting 20,000 won per household for the purpose of decorating streets and open spaces and to fund artistic performances.”

People in Hamheung in South Hamkyung Province have received orders to prepare eight flower pots per family for the streets and verandas of each home, a source from the city said; those without flowers are apparently purchasing them from traders. “We are so busy trying to get ready for the April celebrations right now that we don’t even have time to breathe,” the source said. “Difficult times during Kim Jong Il’s regime were nothing compared to now.”

A source from Wonsan in Gangwon Province agreed, saying, “It is tough for us to even make 2,000 won per day from trading, but the authorities are asking for 20,000 won from us to buy paint to do the exterior walls of apartments! I thought a new man would make the situation better but it has gotten worse.”

In previous years, the preparation period for April events was called the ‘big cleanup’. The stairs and hallway of apartments and the doors and fences of homes had to be painted with lime, which in recent years came to cost around 5,000 won. Thereafter, students would gather leftover paint and do the walls of their classrooms. However, the cost this year is much higher.

According to the source, “This year it is called the ‘total mobilization period,’ and they have told us that those who do not participate with sincerity will be evaluated politically.”

The period has begun fifteen days earlier than normal, too, which appears to be an effort to heighten the atmosphere for this year in particular.

The Musan source explained, “All organs, enterprises and schools are practicing songs and instruments during the afternoon, and women are using parks and public spaces to practice songs and dances until 7pm. Party cadres, to create a mood for celebration, ordered people to wear their outfits for the day, but the women all look disgruntled by the fact that they have to shiver in skirts all day in the cold.”

“There are lots of fights because local offices have exempted the Union of Democratic Women from paying festival costs, instead putting that portion on other families,” the Wonsan source added, commenting that the measure has been taken because practice hours are in the afternoon when most women ordinarily go to the jangmadang to work.

Read the full story here:
April Feeling Tiresome Already
Daily NK
Choi Song Min
2012-3-22

Pictured above: Yonhap photo of Song Hye-rim’s tomb stone in Moscow

Michael Rank writes in the Asia Times:

She died a lonely death, and she lies in a lonely grave. Once close to the center of power in highly secretive North Korea, she died in a Moscow hospital, spurned by her former lover, the Dear Leader Kim Jong-il, after suffering from paranoia and depression.

Much remains mysterious about Song Hye-rim, but a journalist from South Korea’s Yonhap news agency recently discovered her grave in Moscow’s Troyekurovskoye cemetery, where she was buried under an assumed name after fleeing Pyongyang following the breakdown of her relationship with Kim Jong-il.

She was suffering from mental illness and fled for medical treatment to Moscow, where she was admitted to hospital as O Sun Hui, the name under which she was originally buried.

But her gravestone now bears her real name, as well as her dates of birth and death – January 24, 1937-May 18, 2002 – and, on the other side of the headstone are inscribed the words “mother of Kim Jong Nam”.

It’s not known if her son has ever visited his mother’s grave, but Kim Jong-nam is certainly the black sheep of the family. The oldest son of Kim Jong-il was born in 1971 and was at one time his heir apparent, but he was disgraced when he was barred from Narita airport in 2001 when he was found to be travelling on a false passport on a trip to Tokyo Disneyland.

He now lives in Macau and southern China, and was recently quoted by a Japanese journalist as saying he expects the North Korean regime to fail because its new leader, his half-brother Kim Jong-eun, is too inexperienced. He said he had never even met his all-powerful half-brother, who is aged about 28.

The South Korean-born Song Hye-rim was an actress and a divorcee with a child when she became Kim Jong-il’s first mistress around 1970. She is said to have entered Pyongyang Film Academy in 1955, but left the following year to give birth to a daughter. She later re-enrolled and graduated, making her film debut in 1960.

Somewhat spookily, she is buried just 10 meters away from Stalin’s son Vasily Dzhugashvili, who died aged 40 in 1962.

When the Yonhap reporter visited Song’s grave in 2009 it was decorated with a single carnation, left by – who knows. “As you can see the grave has few visitors,” a cemetery official remarked.

Song was the first mistress of Kim Jong-il, who died last December, and was five years older than him. Her friend, Kim Young-soon, has said that Kim Jong-il did not tell his father, the Great Leader Kim Il-sung, that he was living with a formerly married woman as that would have caused a huge scandal.

Song’s sister, Song Hye-rang, managed to defect in Geneva in 1996, bringing with her nothing but her medicines, a volume of Chekhov short stories and her diary. She has told how the Dear Leader, an ardent film buff, was at first besotted with his movie star mistress but his ardour later cooled, and his father ordered him to marry a woman he never really loved, although the marriage did not last long.

His next liaison was with Ko Yong-hui, a Japanese-born ethnic Korean and a dancer, who was the mother of North Korea’s youthful new leader, Kim Jong-eun. She is believed to have died in Paris in 2004 and the Dear Leader replaced her with his personal secretary, Kim Ok, who reportedly accompanied him on a visit to China in 2006.

The ruling Kim family is enshrouded in mystery and rumor, and what little we know for reasonably sure is based largely on defectors’ accounts such as Song Hye-rang’s autobiography and an unpublished memoir by Kim Jong-il’s stepdaughter, the niece of Song Hye-rim, who defected in 1992 after visiting her aunt in hospital in Moscow.

The stepdaughter, Ri (Li) Nam-ok, tells in her autobiography how the then crown prince Kim Jong-nam was sent to school in Switzerland, accompanied by his uncle, Jang Song-taek.

The young Kim was at first reluctant to go, but “Jang Song-taek cajoled him, ‘Come on, come with me, we will see lots of strange and funny things. Let’s go!’ The thought of spending time with his uncle must have pleased him, and Jong-Nam consented.”

So writes Ri in her memoir, according to the respected North Korea-watcher Selig S Harrison, who says that although she originally intended it to be published, she changed her mind and had publication blocked through legal action in the French courts.

Jang stayed with Kim Jong-nam in Switzerland for six months, returning to Pyongyang in August, 1981, says Harrison.

Jang has emerged as a crucial figure since the death of Kim Jong-il because he is reported to be the mentor of the new leader, Kim Jong-eun.

Jang’s stay in Switzerland was fairly short and it occurred a long time ago, Harrison notes, but he believes that it fits in with other indications that he is reform-minded.

So does Ri Nam-ok’s reference to a visit to China by Jang on behalf of Kim Jong-il in 1989. When the subject of a visit by Ri to China came up, “My father told us he had sent Uncle Jang there and he had reported back that it ‘should be seen’,” she is quoted as saying in her ghost-written memoir, The Golden Cage.

Harrison has further evidence for claiming that Jang is a reformer, citing comments by the late Hwang Chang-yop, former international secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party, and the most senior North Korean official ever to defect.

Harrison met Hwang three times in Pyongyang, and twice more after he defected to South Korea in 1998.

“Jang Song-taek is the smartest one there [in Pyongyang], and he understands that change is urgent and imperative,” Hwang told Harrison. “He has good relations with the army because three of his brothers are generals. He’s the best hope for reform, but it won’t be easy for him.”

That is an understatement, but perhaps there is hope that North Korea will launch much-needed reforms to its sclerotic political and economic system under its mysterious new leader.

Read the full story here:
North Korean secrets lie six feet under
Asia Times
Michael Rank
2012-2-18

UPDATE 1: Luke Herman provides some additional infomration here.

ORIGINAL PSOT: January has been quite interesting for DPRK watchers as we are seeing the steps taken to establish the legitimacy of Kim Jong-un. Below I have cataloged some visible components of this process:

Kim Jong-un’s “on the spot guidance” (OSG):

Kim Jong-un began the year with a visit to Kumsusan palace to pay respects to president Kim Il-sung and leader Kim Jong-il. The political and cultural symbolism speaks for itself.

Kim Jong-un’s second guidance trip (reported on the same day) was reportedly to the Seoul Ryu Kyong Su 105 Guards Tank Division. This visit is symbolically important because it was on a guidance trip to this very same division that (according to the North Korean narrative) Kim Jong-il began his “Songun” (Military First) leadership.  According to KCNA (2010-8-24):

An oath-taking meeting of servicepersons of the three services of the Korean People’s Army took place at the Ssangun-ri Revolutionary Site in Sukchon County, South Phyongan Province, on Tuesday on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Supreme Commander Kim Jong Il’s start of the Songun revolutionary leadership.

The reporter and speakers at the meeting recalled that Kim Jong Il started the Songun revolutionary leadership by providing field guidance, together with President Kim Il Sung, to the Seoul Ryu Kyong Su 105 Guards Tank Division of the KPA on August 25, Juche 49 (1960) stationed in Ssangun-ri.

Here is a satellite image (Google Earth) of the Ssangun-ri Revolutionary Site (쌍운리 혁명사적지,  39°25’3.20″N, 125°44’30.74″E):

Joseph Bermudez wrote more about the Seoul Ryu Kyong Su 105 Guards Tank Division here. Kim Jong-il last visited the unit on 2010-12-31.

The remainder of Kim’s guidance trips in January have been overwhelmingly military in nature:

KPA Air Force Unit 1017
Concert Given by Military Band of KPA
Flight Training of KPA Air Force Unit 378
Demonstration by Players of Western Area Aviation Club (KPA)
Mangyongdae Revolutionary School (KPA)
Lunar New Year Reception
Machine Plant managed by Ho Chol Yong (KPA)
Kim Jong Un Inspects Command of KPA Large Combined Unit 671
Kim Jong Un Inspects KPA Air Force Unit 354
Kim Jong Un Inspects KPA Unit 3870
KPA Unit 169 honored with the title of the O Jung Hup-led Seventh Regiment
Music and dance performace
Hero Street Meat Shop
Pyongyang Folk Village (KPA)
2012 New Year’s concert “The Cause of the Sun Will Be Immortal” given by the Unhasu Orchestra
Seoul Ryu Kyong Su 105 Guards Tank Division
Tribute to Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il at (Kamsusan)

The media/propaganda campaign:

1. On Kim Jong-un’s birthday, KCTV ran a much–written–about, hour–long documentary titled, Inheriting the Great Achievement of the Military First Revolution of (Mount) Baekdu, which highlights Kim Jong-un’s bona fides as a great military strategist (see full video here). It also allegedly mentions Jong-un’s mother, though not by name, who was born in Japan.

At this point I don’t have much to add on the film except a translation of Kim Jong-un’s quote in the film, which may be his first official one, provided by C. La Shure in the Korean Studies Digest:

“I am accustomed to working through the night and so am not bothered by it. The most joyous and happiest moments for me are when I can bring joy to the comrade supreme commander. Thus, though I have stayed up several nights, I have worked without knowing weariness. Even when I work through several nights, once I have brought joy to the comrade supreme commander, the weariness vanishes and a new strength courses through my whole body. This must be what revolutionaries live for.”

2. Kim Jong-un’s “motherly” or “nurturing” traits have also been emphasized — imitating not only Kim il-sung’s appearance but also his public mannerisms (a la Bryan Myers):

Pictured above:  (Top) The cover of B.R. Myers’ book, The Cleanest Race. (Bottom) Kim Jong-un’s visits to KPA Unit 354 (L) and the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School (R)

3. Kim Jong-un has issued several autographs which look remarkably like his father’s (and grandfather’s):

Pictured above: (L) Kim Jong-il’s signature taken from North Korean television. (R) Kim Jong-un’s signature as reported by KCNA on 2012-1-3. The Choson Ilbo also picked up on this.

4. The KCNA web page now has a special content filter built specifically to highlight Kim Jong-un’s activities.  They have also started printing his name in a larger type.

5. Kim Jong-un is now part of the DPRK’s infamous criticism sessions. According to the Daily NK:

“The Central Party is propagandizing the greatness of Kim Jong Eun through criticism sessions, and coming down hard on anybody who is reported to have said anything hinting at any doubt of his greatness,” the source said, adding, “all cadres are being careful not to get caught out by this, without exception.”

6. Kim Jong-un  is being called “father” in the official media.  According to the Daily NK:

Choson Central News Agency (KCNA) on the 25th reported that Kim Jong Eun made a visit to the Mangyondae Revolutionary School. During his visit, Kim Jong Eun was greeted by staff and students as “Dear Father,” a designation stressing loyalty.

Rodong Shinmun, a day before, ran an article entitled ‘The sun shines forever’. It stated “our people broken hearted at the loss of our nation’s Father (Kim Jong Il ) and out of love our father (Kim Jong Eun) warmly welcomed the return of our people from overseas.” This statement showed that Kim Jong Eun has succeeded being called ‘father’ following Kim Jong Il.

The newspaper went on to praise Kim Jong Eun, “our people are all one in our father and persist with single-minded unity and great heart.”

7. The Lunar New Year holiday was co-opted to celebrate the rise of Kim Jong-un. In addition to public ceremonies and performances in honor of one of the three leaders (Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un), the practice of distributing holiday rations in the name of the leader was resumed. In a sign of the “back to the future” economic policies which may be on the horizon, the DPRK is rumored to be interested in reviving nation-wide food distribution through the PDS.

8. KCNA announced an amnesty for convicts. Details were scarce.

Pictured Above: The DPRK’s two most famous waterways are the Paekma-Cholsan Waterway (see here and here) and the Kaechon-Lake Thaesong Waterway. A third waterway in the Miru Plain is too recent to appear on Google Earth.

 According to KCNA (2012-1-26):

Waterway to Be Built in South Hwanghae Province, DPRK

Pyongyang, January 26 (KCNA) — A gravity-fed waterway will be built in South Hwanghae Province.

It is another gigantic nature-remaking project in the era of Songun as part of the far-sighted nature-harnessing plan of leader Kim Jong Il and the dear respected Kim Jong Un.

The completion of the waterway will help sufficiently irrigate tens of thousands of hectares of farmland and tideland-turned rice fields including those in Ongjin, Kangryong, Pyoksong and other several counties to ensure a safe and high yield of grain.

It will also help save tens of thousands of kilowatt of electricity and make a great contribution to the economic development and improvement of people’s living standard by preventing the damage by flood in the area along Jaeryong River.

A ground-breaking ceremony took place in Haeju City on Thursday.

Present there were Choe Yong Rim, Kim Ki Nam and other senior officials and officials of ministries and national institutions, builders and working people.

As the DPRK’s “rice bowl”, South Hwanghae Province is home to at least three additional large-scale agricultural projects at the moment: Pujiman Tideland Reclamation (Ongjin), Ryongmae Island (룡매도) land reclamation project, and the Sohae-ri-Nunggum Island Tedeland Reclamation.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2012-1-25

A month into Kim Jong-un’s ascension to power, it is reported that food distribution is likely to resume nationwide in North Korea.

Many experts evaluate this as a symbolic measure to propagate the construction of a powerful economy and improve the lives of the people. For the North Koreans, the most apparent and obvious economic accomplishment is the improvement of the food situation. Thus, North Korea is most likely to take action to normalize food rations as its top priority.

According to a statement made by a South Korean government official on January 20, “Kim Jong-un and his leadership will begin the food distribution as a way to prove to its people about changes forthcoming in the new regime.”He also added, “After years of propagation for the building of a strong and prosperous nation, they must demonstrate it to the people with noticeable results.”

The amount of rations to be provided is still unclear. However, the source emphasized that it was very likely for rice rations to resume, especially with the approaching national holidays, such as the Lunar New Year and Kim Jong-il’s birthday (February 16).

He also commented that “the food distribution will be a nationwide movement and the food ration system will go into effect based on the distribution network of available food supply.”

According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), North Korea’s food production in 2011 compared to the previous year rose by 8.5 percent, sitting at about 5.48 million tons (of rough grains or 4.66 million tons of milled grains).

The minimum amount of food consumption in North Korea is 5.4 million tons, but a shortage of about 400,000 tons is expected, including the international food aid and industrial food imports. Among the recent years, this marks the largest deficiency in food supply.

However, such shortages can be overcome with additional food imports and distributing mainly rice reserves.

The last national food distribution in North Korea was in 2005, seven years ago.

North Korea is also likely to exert more effort in food processing production to improve the distribution of daily necessities. With relatively little dependence on raw material imports, North Korea is planning to improve the food situation through expanding the food processing production in agricultural, fishery, and livestock industries, with less competition with Chinese products.

KCNA reported that North Koreans celebrated the lunar new year by paying tribute to Kim Jong-il:

On the lunar New Year’s Day, the Korean people are ardently yearning for the leader Kim Jong Il.
People are seen laying flowers or floral baskets before portraits of smiling Kim Jong Il displayed throughout the country, recollecting the undying feats he performed for the country and the people.
An old man, Ri Thaek Ju, living in Sosong District, Pyongyang, told KCNA, “I don’t think the leader left his people. He is among the people. He is greeting the Lunar New Year with us.”

They also laid floral baskets at Kim Il-sung statues (video here):

Floral baskets were placed before the statues of President Kim Il Sung in different parts of the country on the lunar New Year 2012.
Service personnel and Pyongyangites from all walks of life and school youth and children and overseas compatriots staying in the socialist homeland, visited his statue on Ryongnam Hill to pay tribute to him.

…And they also performed plays offering well wishes to Kim Jong-un:

Schoolchildren’s performance “Country of Eternal Sun” took place at the Mangyongdae School Children’s Palace Monday on the lunar New Year 2012.
The performance began with prelude “Please accept, the dear respected Kim Jong Un, our greetings on lunar New Year.”
The performers made a deep bow to Kim Jong Un, representing the unanimous best wishes of the younger generation of the DPRK.

So there are “three generations” of post-revolution North Koreans, and each one now has their own leader to pay homage to on Lunar New Year. Interestingly, Lunar New Year was banned by the DPRK until the 1980s as it was classified as a Chinese holiday. But why ban a cultural holiday when you can co-opt it for political purposes?

The AP also published this story.

Read more about holidays in the DPRK here.

UPDATE 1: On January 24, KCNA reported that Kim Jong-un hosted a banquet for senior members of the North Korean government.

UPDATE 2: On January 25, the Daily NK reported some very interesting information from within the DPRK which further shows how the Lunar New Year has been co-opted as a tool for the legitimization of Kim Jong-un’s rule:

A Chinese trader who resides in Pyeongseong, North Korea, arrived in Dandong on January 21 for the start of the Lunar New Year holiday period. The trader, who in this article we will call ‘John’, received permission to visit China after waiting over a month to leave the country since the death of Kim Jong Il. John met with his suppliers in Dandong to order items he would take back into North Korea, before departing for Shenyang to visit relatives.

Daily NK met with John in Shenyang on January 22 to ask him whether or not the rations announced by North Korean authorities had actually been distributed as planned. As he is a Chinese expatriate, he says he did not receive any rations this time, however “ordinary people did get them. The rations were half white rice and half mixed-grain rice.”

“Even within Pyeongseong, people got different rations depending on what street or neighborhood they live in – some got 3 days worth, others got 5. Our People’s Unit gave 3 days. But that wasn’t the problem; in one area people got grain rice mixed with corn, and the really unlucky amongst them were disappointed to find that their rations had already gone off.”

“On the way here I also heard from people living in Sinuiju who were given corn soup rather than rice of any sort,” John says. Given that corn soup costs roughly half as much to provide as other grain rations, evidently the government distributed corn-based rations in some cities and counties in order to help carry out its plan.

According to John, authorities also offered to supply fish to citizens. “They handed out coupons to buy a sailfin sandfish for 2,800 won and called this an order from Kim Jong Eun.” With this coupon citizens could head to a government-run store and purchase the fish for 2,800 won, however John says that most people declined to buy from the government-run stores when fresh sandfish could be bought from the market for 3,300 won.

Regarding crackdowns on foreign currency, John said that “It would be hard for people like me to live if the government stopped people using the Yuan. When I purchase stock I have to pay for it in Yuan, so if I wasn’t able to do that I wouldn’t be able to trade. That might end up being the case again. The ‘gruppas’ (inspection teams) are showing up to carry out crackdowns on illegal foreign exchange transactions, but this has just driven most people to do it in the privacy of their own houses.”

“Even people who lose their foreign currency in the crackdowns can get it back with a bribe. How can you stop that? Even cadres like foreign currency, so how can it work if they order a crackdown?”

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is the research branch of the US Congress and the number one information source for congressional staff.  CRS is responsible for maintining updated research publications on numerous policy concerns and they recently published a report on the death of Kim Jong-il.

Download the full report here (PDF).

Here is the summary of the report:

North Korea represents one of the United States’ biggest foreign policy challenges due to its production and proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, the threat of attacks against South Korea, its record of human rights abuses, and the possibility that its internal problems could destabilize Northeast Asia. The North Korean government’s December 19, 2011, announcement of the death of the country’s Dear Leader, Kim Jong-il, has the potential to be a watershed moment in the history of the Korean Peninsula and the region.1 Ever since the death of his father, the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung, in 1994, Kim Jong-il had sat at the apex of a highly centralized, brutal regime. During his tenure, his regime subjected North Korea’s people to profound impoverishment and massive food shortages, developed nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and sold technology related to both programs abroad.

The effect of Kim Jong-il’s death on North Korea’s stability is uncertain. Many experts doubt that his anointed successor, his third son Kim Jong-un, will over the course of time be able to maintain effective control over his country due to his relative inexperience and the mounting internal and external pressures confronting North Korea. Yet, the North Korean regime under the elder Kim proved to be remarkably resilient, and many of the forces that held it together will continue to operate even if the young Kim himself remains weak. A key to the Kim Jong-un regime’s stability will be its ability to continue obtaining and distributing funds, mostly from external sources. Of particular importance will be China’s willingness to provide commercial, financial, and other support for the regime. Over the years, China reportedly has resisted repeated U.S. and South Korean attempts to discuss North Korea contingency plans. It is unclear whether Kim Jong-il’s death will change this situation, though there have been calls to redouble outreach to Beijing. A possible opportunity for high-level dialogue could come in January 2012, when Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping visits Washington, DC. Xi is widely expected to be chosen as China’s top leader over the coming year.

Very little is known about the inner workings of the North Korean elite, as evidenced by the U.S. and South Korean intelligence services apparent surprise at the announcement of Kim Jong-il’s death. Even less is known about Kim Jong-un, who is believed to be in his late 20s and to have attended primary school in Switzerland in the 1990s. Kim Jong-un was being groomed to be the successor since his father’s August 2008 stroke that put a spotlight on the succession question.

In the days after the announcement, U.S. and South Korean officials issued statements that expressed support for the North Korean people, hope that the new leadership will continue recent diplomatic initiatives with Washington and Seoul, and a desire for a smooth transition in Pyongyang. (For the text of these statements as well as a joint message from several Chinese state and communist party organs, see the Appendix. U.S. and South Korean influence over events in North Korea is widely believed to be limited. In the coming weeks, the Obama Administration will be confronted with a decision of whether to persist with two proposed new agreements that reportedly were in the process of being concluded with the Kim Jong-il government in mid-December: a resumption of U.S. food assistance, and in return, a reported agreement by North Korea to shut down key sites of its nuclear program and open them to international monitoring. Members of Congress will have the opportunity to support or oppose these moves, as well as to propose new pressure and engagement tactics of their own.

I have kept an archive of all recent CRS reports on the DPRK.  You can see them here.

Lankov writes in the Korea Times:

This year, President Lee Myung-bak’s New Year address paid much attention to North Korea issues. The South Korean President warned the North against fresh provocations but the general tone of his speech was conciliatory.

Lee said that now is the time to put aside past problems and start to rebuild relations anew. Tellingly, he did not repeat that Seoul expects Pyongyang to apologize for the two military incidents of 2010 ― the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeongpyeong Island.

Are there chances that Pyongyang will react to this charm offensive and rush to resume talks with Seoul? Don’t hold your breath ― such chances are very remote. Pyongyang decision makers understand perfectly well that an immediate detente is not in their long-term interests.

Pyongyang’s foreign policy goals are surprisingly easy to describe: They are regime security and obtaining unconditional aid (the former is an absolute priority with the latter a rather distant but still significant second). In other words, North Korea’s foreign policy makers want to squeeze as much aid as possible from the outside world but only so long as this aid comes without too many conditions which might have impact on regime security.

Since 2008, the North Korean state has found itself in a rather unpleasant situation: U.S. aid stopped almost completely while the amount coming from South Korea has dramatically decreased. In this new situation, North Korea has been left with just one aid provider ― that is, China. This is not a situation that Pyongyang’s elite is happy about.

Since the 1960s, North Korean diplomats have worked hard to ensure that their country would always have at last two overseas sponsors. It was preferable if the two sponsors had uneasy, if not hostile, relations, so that their rivalry could be used to ensure that only limited concessions would be given in exchange for aid.

For the early 1960s until the late 1980s, China and the Soviet Union were the sponsors. From the early 1990s, the Chinese continued and the Soviet Union was replaced by South Korea and the United States.

In order to decrease their dangerously high dependence on China, North Korean diplomats now want South Korea to resume large-scale aid ― in other words, to re-implement a version of the “Sunshine Policy,” the North Korean-directed policy of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun when they were president in 1998-2007.

North Korean leaders are careful observers of the ever-changing South Korean political scene. They have to be, since milking the South has long since become their major source of revenue. They hope that the coming parliamentary and presidential elections will be won by the Korean nationalist left.

This is understandable, since left-leaning politicians in South Korea have always been more willing to provide the North with aid, without asking too many awkward questions. In recent years, it seems that the left has lost part of its earlier enthusiasm for such a policy, but one should still reasonably expect that a left-leaning (or as it would proudly style itself, “progressive”) administration will indeed be more receptive to Pyongyang’s demands.

So what should North Korea do to increase the chances of the South Korean left-leaning parties? Pretty much the only thing they can do is to “not” help the right, and this is exactly the reason why the recent conciliatory remarks by President Lee are likely to fall on deaf ears.

While the North Korea issue is marginal in South Korean politics, the left-leaning opposition can blame the Lee administration for its real (or alleged) mishandling of the North and the resulting instability on the Korean Peninsula (admittedly, this type of electoral rhetoric has a kernel of truth to it). Therefore, if the North agrees to play according to Lee’s rules, it will help the South Korean “conservatives” in presenting themselves as people who, at the end of the day, know how to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Of course North Korea would be rewarded if it were to talk right now. But from Pyongyang’s point of view it makes a great deal of sense to wait another year, in anticipation of the electoral success of the South Korean left. If the left is not successful in the end, then they can still easily make a deal with the next right-leaning administration. It is telling that in recent months the presidential contenders of the right have also indicated that they would be softer in their approach towards the North.

Therefore we should not expect a dramatic diplomatic breakthrough anytime soon. Fortunately though, we also do not have to be that afraid of fresh North Korean provocations. Consideration of South Korean electoral politics will probably mean that the North will try to avoid clashes with the South.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea’s political calculations
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
2012-1-15

I thought I would post a few satellite images to correct the Yonahp account of Kim Jong-il’s funeral procession (it is a tad incorrect).

First, here is the map that Yonhap published:

Click the image above to see a larger version

Here is the actual funeral procession route which I mapped out on Google Earth while watching this two-hour documentary on the event (it is amazing what you will watch when jet lagged!):

Here is some clarification on specific parts of the route:

1. It started and ended at Kumsusan Memorial Palace.

2. The motorcade turned at Jonsung Square across the street from the Fatherland Liberation War Museum:

3. The procession passed by the Monument to the Party Founding:

4. The procession entered Kim Il-sung square from the North, circled it, then continued south for appx four more blocks before turning around and again passing Kim Il-sung square on its way to the Arch of Triumph:

Have a good weekend!

Reudiger frank has written a couple of related articles on political legitimacy in the DPRK.  Here are links to both of them:

1. North Korea after Kim Jong Il: The Risks of Improvisation (38 North)

2. North Korea after Kim Jong Il: The Kim Jong Un era and its challenges (Japan Focus)