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Another Songun-era agriculture project launched in Haeju

Friday, January 27th, 2012

Pictured Above: The DPRK’s two most famous waterways are the Paekma-Cholsan Waterway (see here and here) and the Kaechon-Lake Thaesong Waterway. A third waterway in the Miru Plain is too recent to appear on Google Earth.

According to KCNA (2012-1-26):

Waterway to Be Built in South Hwanghae Province, DPRK

Pyongyang, January 26 (KCNA) — A gravity-fed waterway will be built in South Hwanghae Province.

It is another gigantic nature-remaking project in the era of Songun as part of the far-sighted nature-harnessing plan of leader Kim Jong Il and the dear respected Kim Jong Un.

The completion of the waterway will help sufficiently irrigate tens of thousands of hectares of farmland and tideland-turned rice fields including those in Ongjin, Kangryong, Pyoksong and other several counties to ensure a safe and high yield of grain.

It will also help save tens of thousands of kilowatt of electricity and make a great contribution to the economic development and improvement of people’s living standard by preventing the damage by flood in the area along Jaeryong River.

A ground-breaking ceremony took place in Haeju City on Thursday.

Present there were Choe Yong Rim, Kim Ki Nam and other senior officials and officials of ministries and national institutions, builders and working people.

As the DPRK’s “rice bowl”, South Hwanghae Province is home to at least three additional large-scale agricultural projects at the moment: Pujiman Tideland Reclamation (Ongjin), Ryongmae Island (룡매도) land reclamation project, and the Sohae-ri-Nunggum Island Tedeland Reclamation.

Posted in Agriculture, Construction, Electricity, Energy, Kim Jong Un, Political economy | Comments Closed

Food distribution to resume for the first time in seven years

Friday, January 27th, 2012

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2012-1-25

A month into Kim Jong-un’s ascension to power, it is reported that food distribution is likely to resume nationwide in North Korea.

Many experts evaluate this as a symbolic measure to propagate the construction of a powerful economy and improve the lives of the people. For the North Koreans, the most apparent and obvious economic accomplishment is the improvement of the food situation. Thus, North Korea is most likely to take action to normalize food rations as its top priority.

According to a statement made by a South Korean government official on January 20, “Kim Jong-un and his leadership will begin the food distribution as a way to prove to its people about changes forthcoming in the new regime.”He also added, “After years of propagation for the building of a strong and prosperous nation, they must demonstrate it to the people with noticeable results.”

The amount of rations to be provided is still unclear. However, the source emphasized that it was very likely for rice rations to resume, especially with the approaching national holidays, such as the Lunar New Year and Kim Jong-il’s birthday (February 16).

He also commented that “the food distribution will be a nationwide movement and the food ration system will go into effect based on the distribution network of available food supply.”

According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), North Korea’s food production in 2011 compared to the previous year rose by 8.5 percent, sitting at about 5.48 million tons (of rough grains or 4.66 million tons of milled grains).

The minimum amount of food consumption in North Korea is 5.4 million tons, but a shortage of about 400,000 tons is expected, including the international food aid and industrial food imports. Among the recent years, this marks the largest deficiency in food supply.

However, such shortages can be overcome with additional food imports and distributing mainly rice reserves.

The last national food distribution in North Korea was in 2005, seven years ago.

North Korea is also likely to exert more effort in food processing production to improve the distribution of daily necessities. With relatively little dependence on raw material imports, North Korea is planning to improve the food situation through expanding the food processing production in agricultural, fishery, and livestock industries, with less competition with Chinese products.

Posted in Food, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kim Jong Un, Public Distribiution System (PDS), UN, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, UN World Food Program | 1 Comment »

DPRK celebrates lunar new year in its own style

Monday, January 23rd, 2012

KCNA reported that North Koreans celebrated the lunar new year by paying tribute to Kim Jong-il:

On the lunar New Year’s Day, the Korean people are ardently yearning for the leader Kim Jong Il.
People are seen laying flowers or floral baskets before portraits of smiling Kim Jong Il displayed throughout the country, recollecting the undying feats he performed for the country and the people.
An old man, Ri Thaek Ju, living in Sosong District, Pyongyang, told KCNA, “I don’t think the leader left his people. He is among the people. He is greeting the Lunar New Year with us.”

They also laid floral baskets at Kim Il-sung statues (video here):

Floral baskets were placed before the statues of President Kim Il Sung in different parts of the country on the lunar New Year 2012.
Service personnel and Pyongyangites from all walks of life and school youth and children and overseas compatriots staying in the socialist homeland, visited his statue on Ryongnam Hill to pay tribute to him.

…And they also performed plays offering well wishes to Kim Jong-un:

Schoolchildren’s performance “Country of Eternal Sun” took place at the Mangyongdae School Children’s Palace Monday on the lunar New Year 2012.
The performance began with prelude “Please accept, the dear respected Kim Jong Un, our greetings on lunar New Year.”
The performers made a deep bow to Kim Jong Un, representing the unanimous best wishes of the younger generation of the DPRK.

So there are “three generations” of post-revolution North Koreans, and each one now has their own leader to pay homage to on Lunar New Year. Interestingly, Lunar New Year was banned by the DPRK until the 1980s as it was classified as a Chinese holiday. But why ban a cultural holiday when you can co-opt it for political purposes?

The AP also published this story.

UPDATE 1: On January 24, KCNA reported that Kim Jong-un hosted a banquet for senior members of the North Korean government.

UPDATE 2: On January 25, the Daily NK reported some very interesting information from within the DPRK which further shows how the Lunar New Year has been co-opted as a tool for the legitimization of Kim Jong-un’s rule:

A Chinese trader who resides in Pyeongseong, North Korea, arrived in Dandong on January 21 for the start of the Lunar New Year holiday period. The trader, who in this article we will call ‘John’, received permission to visit China after waiting over a month to leave the country since the death of Kim Jong Il. John met with his suppliers in Dandong to order items he would take back into North Korea, before departing for Shenyang to visit relatives.

Daily NK met with John in Shenyang on January 22 to ask him whether or not the rations announced by North Korean authorities had actually been distributed as planned. As he is a Chinese expatriate, he says he did not receive any rations this time, however “ordinary people did get them. The rations were half white rice and half mixed-grain rice.”

“Even within Pyeongseong, people got different rations depending on what street or neighborhood they live in – some got 3 days worth, others got 5. Our People’s Unit gave 3 days. But that wasn’t the problem; in one area people got grain rice mixed with corn, and the really unlucky amongst them were disappointed to find that their rations had already gone off.”

“On the way here I also heard from people living in Sinuiju who were given corn soup rather than rice of any sort,” John says. Given that corn soup costs roughly half as much to provide as other grain rations, evidently the government distributed corn-based rations in some cities and counties in order to help carry out its plan.

According to John, authorities also offered to supply fish to citizens. “They handed out coupons to buy a sailfin sandfish for 2,800 won and called this an order from Kim Jong Eun.” With this coupon citizens could head to a government-run store and purchase the fish for 2,800 won, however John says that most people declined to buy from the government-run stores when fresh sandfish could be bought from the market for 3,300 won.

Regarding crackdowns on foreign currency, John said that “It would be hard for people like me to live if the government stopped people using the Yuan. When I purchase stock I have to pay for it in Yuan, so if I wasn’t able to do that I wouldn’t be able to trade. That might end up being the case again. The ‘gruppas’ (inspection teams) are showing up to carry out crackdowns on illegal foreign exchange transactions, but this has just driven most people to do it in the privacy of their own houses.”

“Even people who lose their foreign currency in the crackdowns can get it back with a bribe. How can you stop that? Even cadres like foreign currency, so how can it work if they order a crackdown?”

Posted in Art, Civil society, Food, Kim Jong Un, Political economy, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | 1 Comment »

CRS report on the implications of Kim Jong-il’s death

Wednesday, January 18th, 2012

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is the research branch of the US Congress and the number one information source for congressional staff. CRS is responsible for maintining updated research publications on numerous policy concerns and they recently published a report on the death of Kim Jong-il.

Download the full report here (PDF).

Here is the summary of the report:

North Korea represents one of the United States’ biggest foreign policy challenges due to its production and proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, the threat of attacks against South Korea, its record of human rights abuses, and the possibility that its internal problems could destabilize Northeast Asia. The North Korean government’s December 19, 2011, announcement of the death of the country’s Dear Leader, Kim Jong-il, has the potential to be a watershed moment in the history of the Korean Peninsula and the region.1 Ever since the death of his father, the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung, in 1994, Kim Jong-il had sat at the apex of a highly centralized, brutal regime. During his tenure, his regime subjected North Korea’s people to profound impoverishment and massive food shortages, developed nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and sold technology related to both programs abroad.

The effect of Kim Jong-il’s death on North Korea’s stability is uncertain. Many experts doubt that his anointed successor, his third son Kim Jong-un, will over the course of time be able to maintain effective control over his country due to his relative inexperience and the mounting internal and external pressures confronting North Korea. Yet, the North Korean regime under the elder Kim proved to be remarkably resilient, and many of the forces that held it together will continue to operate even if the young Kim himself remains weak. A key to the Kim Jong-un regime’s stability will be its ability to continue obtaining and distributing funds, mostly from external sources. Of particular importance will be China’s willingness to provide commercial, financial, and other support for the regime. Over the years, China reportedly has resisted repeated U.S. and South Korean attempts to discuss North Korea contingency plans. It is unclear whether Kim Jong-il’s death will change this situation, though there have been calls to redouble outreach to Beijing. A possible opportunity for high-level dialogue could come in January 2012, when Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping visits Washington, DC. Xi is widely expected to be chosen as China’s top leader over the coming year.

Very little is known about the inner workings of the North Korean elite, as evidenced by the U.S. and South Korean intelligence services apparent surprise at the announcement of Kim Jong-il’s death. Even less is known about Kim Jong-un, who is believed to be in his late 20s and to have attended primary school in Switzerland in the 1990s. Kim Jong-un was being groomed to be the successor since his father’s August 2008 stroke that put a spotlight on the succession question.

In the days after the announcement, U.S. and South Korean officials issued statements that expressed support for the North Korean people, hope that the new leadership will continue recent diplomatic initiatives with Washington and Seoul, and a desire for a smooth transition in Pyongyang. (For the text of these statements as well as a joint message from several Chinese state and communist party organs, see the Appendix. U.S. and South Korean influence over events in North Korea is widely believed to be limited. In the coming weeks, the Obama Administration will be confronted with a decision of whether to persist with two proposed new agreements that reportedly were in the process of being concluded with the Kim Jong-il government in mid-December: a resumption of U.S. food assistance, and in return, a reported agreement by North Korea to shut down key sites of its nuclear program and open them to international monitoring. Members of Congress will have the opportunity to support or oppose these moves, as well as to propose new pressure and engagement tactics of their own.

I have kept an archive of all recent CRS reports on the DPRK. You can see them here.

Posted in Kim Jong Un, Political economy, USA | Comments Closed

Lankov on the DPRK’s political calculations

Sunday, January 15th, 2012

Lankov writes in the Korea Times:

This year, President Lee Myung-bak’s New Year address paid much attention to North Korea issues. The South Korean President warned the North against fresh provocations but the general tone of his speech was conciliatory.

Lee said that now is the time to put aside past problems and start to rebuild relations anew. Tellingly, he did not repeat that Seoul expects Pyongyang to apologize for the two military incidents of 2010 ― the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeongpyeong Island.

Are there chances that Pyongyang will react to this charm offensive and rush to resume talks with Seoul? Don’t hold your breath ― such chances are very remote. Pyongyang decision makers understand perfectly well that an immediate detente is not in their long-term interests.

Pyongyang’s foreign policy goals are surprisingly easy to describe: They are regime security and obtaining unconditional aid (the former is an absolute priority with the latter a rather distant but still significant second). In other words, North Korea’s foreign policy makers want to squeeze as much aid as possible from the outside world but only so long as this aid comes without too many conditions which might have impact on regime security.

Since 2008, the North Korean state has found itself in a rather unpleasant situation: U.S. aid stopped almost completely while the amount coming from South Korea has dramatically decreased. In this new situation, North Korea has been left with just one aid provider ― that is, China. This is not a situation that Pyongyang’s elite is happy about.

Since the 1960s, North Korean diplomats have worked hard to ensure that their country would always have at last two overseas sponsors. It was preferable if the two sponsors had uneasy, if not hostile, relations, so that their rivalry could be used to ensure that only limited concessions would be given in exchange for aid.

For the early 1960s until the late 1980s, China and the Soviet Union were the sponsors. From the early 1990s, the Chinese continued and the Soviet Union was replaced by South Korea and the United States.

In order to decrease their dangerously high dependence on China, North Korean diplomats now want South Korea to resume large-scale aid ― in other words, to re-implement a version of the “Sunshine Policy,” the North Korean-directed policy of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun when they were president in 1998-2007.

North Korean leaders are careful observers of the ever-changing South Korean political scene. They have to be, since milking the South has long since become their major source of revenue. They hope that the coming parliamentary and presidential elections will be won by the Korean nationalist left.

This is understandable, since left-leaning politicians in South Korea have always been more willing to provide the North with aid, without asking too many awkward questions. In recent years, it seems that the left has lost part of its earlier enthusiasm for such a policy, but one should still reasonably expect that a left-leaning (or as it would proudly style itself, “progressive”) administration will indeed be more receptive to Pyongyang’s demands.

So what should North Korea do to increase the chances of the South Korean left-leaning parties? Pretty much the only thing they can do is to “not” help the right, and this is exactly the reason why the recent conciliatory remarks by President Lee are likely to fall on deaf ears.

While the North Korea issue is marginal in South Korean politics, the left-leaning opposition can blame the Lee administration for its real (or alleged) mishandling of the North and the resulting instability on the Korean Peninsula (admittedly, this type of electoral rhetoric has a kernel of truth to it). Therefore, if the North agrees to play according to Lee’s rules, it will help the South Korean “conservatives” in presenting themselves as people who, at the end of the day, know how to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Of course North Korea would be rewarded if it were to talk right now. But from Pyongyang’s point of view it makes a great deal of sense to wait another year, in anticipation of the electoral success of the South Korean left. If the left is not successful in the end, then they can still easily make a deal with the next right-leaning administration. It is telling that in recent months the presidential contenders of the right have also indicated that they would be softer in their approach towards the North.

Therefore we should not expect a dramatic diplomatic breakthrough anytime soon. Fortunately though, we also do not have to be that afraid of fresh North Korean provocations. Consideration of South Korean electoral politics will probably mean that the North will try to avoid clashes with the South.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea’s political calculations
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
2012-1-15

Posted in International Aid, Kim Jong Un, Political economy, South Korea | Comments Closed

Kim Jong-il’s funeral procession

Friday, January 13th, 2012

I thought I would post a few satellite images to correct the Yonahp account of Kim Jong-il’s funeral procession (it is a tad incorrect).

First, here is the map that Yonhap published:

Click the image above to see a larger version

Here is the actual funeral procession route which I mapped out on Google Earth while watching this two-hour documentary on the event (it is amazing what you will watch when jet lagged!):

Here is some clarification on specific parts of the route:

1. It started and ended at Kumsusan Memorial Palace.

2. The motorcade turned at Jonsung Square across the street from the Fatherland Liberation War Museum:

3. The procession passed by the Monument to the Party Founding:

4. The procession entered Kim Il-sung square from the North, circled it, then continued south for appx four more blocks before turning around and again passing Kim Il-sung square on its way to the Arch of Triumph:

Have a good weekend!

Posted in Google Earth, Kim Jong Un | 1 Comment »

Ruediger Frank on sources of legitimacy in the DPRK

Thursday, January 12th, 2012

Reudiger frank has written a couple of related articles on political legitimacy in the DPRK. Here are links to both of them:

1. North Korea after Kim Jong Il: The Risks of Improvisation (38 North)

2. North Korea after Kim Jong Il: The Kim Jong Un era and its challenges (Japan Focus)

Posted in Kim Jong Un, Political economy | Comments Closed

Kim Jong-un’s succession secured with key job placements

Wednesday, January 11th, 2012

According to the Daily NK:

Since Kim Jong Eun arrived in public life, North Korea has been handing out preferential promotions to the children of high cadres in the Party and military to secure the loyalty of the elite to Kim Jong Eun by creating a shared sense of destiny.

According to a well-informed source in Seoul, the children of former senior cadres continue to emerge into top leadership positions while the children of current cadres arrive at the core of Party affairs.

Many of the most recently appointed Party secretaries and departmental vice directors are the sons and son-in-laws of former or current high officials.

For example, International Secretary Kim Young Il and Tae Jong Su, the General Affairs Secretary in the Department of Administration, are sons-in-law to former State Inspection Committee Chairman Jeon Moon Seob and former Deputy Prime Minister Jeong Il Ryong respectively. Also, Oh Il Jung, who was made Vice Director of the Chosun Workers’ Party at just 50 or so years of age, is the son of former Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces Vice Director Oh Jin Woo.

Elsewhere, Choi Yong Hae, the son of former Vice Director of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces Choi Hyun, as well as being a Party secretary has also been made a military general and elevated to the Party Central Military Commission.

In the cabinet, Baek Yong Chun, who presides over Chosun Central Bank, is the son of former Foreign Minister Baek Nam Sun, and Trade Minister Lee Yong Nam is the nephew of People’s Safety Agency Vice Director Lee Myung Soo. Both have advanced to the Party Central Committee under the watchful eye of Kim Jong Eun. The brother of Kim Ok, Kim Jong Il’s fourth and final partner, has also been elevated on the younger Kim’s watch.

There are many more examples, the source said, going on, “The reason behind these high-speed promotions is that their parents or father-in-laws are in high positions,” before noting one more good example, “Lee Yong Ho’s father Lee Myung Jae was a close confidante of Kim Jong Il, having served as Vice Director of the Party’s Propaganda and Agitation and Guidance Departments, and in Kim’s secretarial office.”

◆ Current high speed promotions for relatives a dangerous game

However, while the close relationship between family history and promotion will serve these young leaders well, it could turn into a double-edged sword.

The source pointed out, “The special treatment these children get is not because their performance or skills are better than anyone else but because their high official parents have or had special relationships with Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. In recent years, this tendency to ‘pass down’ has expanded due to Kim Jong Eun’s succession using it as a way to ensure loyalty by tying them together as a ‘group sharing a common destiny’.”

However, he commented, “Forming these special privilege groups will increase the complaints from the people and of course from other officials, and in the end weaken the cohesiveness of the entire system.”

The Korea Times also reports some similar information:

North Korea has handed out decent jobs to children of former and current North Korean elite in what could be an attempt to help ensure the dynastic power succession goes smoothly, a source familiar with the isolated country said Tuesday.

Jang Yong-chol, a nephew of Jang Song-thaek, became North Korea’s ambassador to Malaysia in 2010 before fully serving out his term as Pyongyang’s top envoy to Nepal, the source said.

Jang Song-thaek, a four-star general and brother-in-law of late leader Kim Jong-il, has long been considered a key official in helping Kim’s son, Kim Jong-un, consolidate power.

Kim Jong-un has recently become the supreme commander of the country’s 1.1 million-strong military as part of his moves to strengthen his power base following his father’s sudden death last month.

Top North Korean officials repeatedly swore their loyalty to the young leader, calling him “the brilliant commander” and “another peerless patriot.”

Children of Workers’ Party secretary Kim Yong-il and Vice Premier Kang Sok-ju, a veteran negotiator and key foreign policy advisor to the late leader, have been dispatched to North Korea’s overseas diplomatic missions, the source said.

Meanwhile, Ri Son-il, son of Ri Yong-ho, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, and Cha Dong-sup, son-in-law of the People’s Armed Forces Minister Kim Yong-chun, are engaged in works to either earn foreign currency or attract foreign investment, the source said.

The nepotism appears to be the North’s attempt to secure the loyalty of the elite to make sure the third-generation power transition goes smoothly, the source said.

The late leader also assumed power in 1994 when his father, the North’s founding leader Kim Il-sung, died of heart failure at the age of 82. (Yonhap)

Read the full stories here:
Nepotism Running Riot in Kim’s NK
Daily NK
Kim Yong-hun
2012-1-11

Children of NK officials receive job favors
Korea Times
2012-1-11

Posted in Cabinet, Kim Jong Un, Labor conditions/wages, Political economy, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Amnesty to be applied to convicts in DPRK

Tuesday, January 10th, 2012

UPDATE 3 (2012-2-9): ICNK reports that the amnesty was put into motion before Kim Jong-il’s death:

On January 10, KCNA announced a prisoner amnesty be conducted in February. Within North Korea, the move is being propagandized as a sign of the benevolence of their new leader, Kim Jong Un, in a bid to popularize him, bolstering his position as his father’s replacement.

However, the amnesty was clearly being planned long before Kim’s succession, originally to commemorate the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung, the 70th birthday of Kim Jong Il and to mark 2012 as the year of the “Strong and Prosperous State”.

The amnesty is also seen as an attempt to pacify discontent citizens within the North, temporarily placating the population while also alleviating international pressure on the regime for its human rights abuses. The amnesty will also benefit authorities in that it will ease some of the burden on the camps’ overpopulation and food supply.

In early February, an ORNK source from Hyesan, Yangkang Province said, “Some elites and upper class people laugh at this amnesty, saying that since the authorities will not be able to meet the promise to make a ‘Strong and Prosperous State’, they did it instead of achieving the strong state so as to cover up their failure.” Meanwhile, others have claimed that, “They carried it out only because they didn’t have any space in prisons, but the authorities try to show off their benevolent policies.”

…

Previous amnesties have been held in 2002, 2005 and 2010 to celebrate Kim Il Sung’s birthday and anniversaries of the establishment of the Workers’ Party. In 2005, North Korean authorities said “The amnesty is to realize the generosity and magnanimity of our Party, which establishes the will and achievements of Suryeong (Kim Il Sung) and brightens the 60th liberation of the country and founding day of the Chosun Worker’s Party.”

UPDATE 2 (2012-2-7): As of today there has been no further information released about the amnesty–either in terms of numbers released, the crimes they are alleged to have committed, or the areas from which they originate or were incarcerated, or the type of facilities in which they were held.

UPDATE 1 (2012-1-11): Accordign to Xinhua, the pardons will be the first in more than six years.

ORIGINAL POST (2012-1-10): According to KCNA (2012-1-10):

Pyongyang, January 10 (KCNA) — The DPRK will apply amnesty to convicts from February 1 on the occasion of the centenary of birth of President Kim Il Sung and the 70th birth anniversary of leader Kim Jong Il, according to a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK on Jan. 5.

The Cabinet and relevant organs will take working measures for those to be released thanks to the amnesty to work and live under stable conditions.

It is the steadfast will of the Workers’ Party of Korea and state to embody generation after generation the noble benevolent and all-embracing politics of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il who energetically worked till the last moments of their great lives, undergoing all sufferings for the people’s happiness throughout them, always finding themselves among them, the decree said.

This story was also covered by the Daily NK, and the BBC.

This may not be Kim Jong-un’s first amnesty. The Daily NK reports that a number of criminals judged to have committed their crimes due to poverty were granted an amnesty in commemoration of the 65th anniversary of the Workers’ Party founding in September 2010.

Posted in Kim Jong Un, Political economy | 1 Comment »

2012 Joint Editorial

Tuesday, January 3rd, 2012

Some thought it was possible that Kim Jong-un might deliver a new year’s address (as Kim Il-sung always did), but instead the leadership has chosen to follow the practice of the Kim Jong-il era by issuing a “joint editorial” by Rodong Sinmun, Joson Inmingun, and Chongnyon Jonwi.

Since I am writing this post well after the joint editorial has already been published, numerous commentators have already weighed in: Choson Exchange, Daily NK, Washington Post, CNN, Business Week, Hankyoreh, IFES, Xinhua.

Below is the full text of the Joint New Year Editorial c/o North East Asia Matters. My hat off to anyone who actually reads the whole thing:

(more…)

Posted in Domestic publication, Juche, Kim Jong Un, Kim's New Year Address (Joint editorials), Political economy, Songun | Comments Closed

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