North Korean Economy Watch

Blane Harden wrote an excellent article for the Washington Post on the KPA takeover of state-owned trading companies and how these companies are increasing natural resource exports to China.  (As an aside, China has just recently ceased publishing North Korean trade data).  This is interesting because just a year-and-a-half ago we were discussing Jang Song-thaek’s anti-corruption campaign which was supposed to be closing down KPA companies and making them reapply for export licenses with the Ministry of Foreign Trade (meaning the WPK could start dipping into the revenue pools).

Quoting from Mr. Harden’s article:

The potential profits are eye-popping: China is one of the world’s most voracious consumers of raw materials, and North Korea’s mineral reserves are worth $5.94 trillion, according to an estimate by South Korea’s Ministry of Unification. China has been critical of North Korea’s nuclear program and missile tests, but it also has vastly increased its economic ties with Kim’s government.

Kim is increasingly creaming off a significant slice of Chinese mineral revenue to fund his nuclear program and to buy the loyalty of elites, according to “North Korea, Inc.,” a recent report by the United States Institute of Peace, a Washington-based group funded by the U.S. Congress.

The report echoes the views of North Korean analysts in South Korea, Japan and the United States, who say the military has elbowed out other ministries and the Korean Workers’ Party to take control of exports that earn hard currency. The military is also sending trucks to state farms to haul away as much as a quarter of the annual harvest for its soldiers, analysts say.

“The military is by far the largest, most capable and most efficient organization in North Korea, and Kim Jong Il is making maximum use of it,” said Lim Eul-chul of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul.

North Korea is perhaps the world’s most secretive and repressive state, but it makes no attempt to hide the ubiquitous role the military plays in the daily lives of the country’s 23.5 million people. Soldiers dig clams and launch missiles, pick apples and build irrigation canals, market mushrooms and supervise the export of knockoff Nintendo games. They also guard the country’s 3,000 cooperative farms, and help themselves to scarce food in a hungry country.

…

Missile sales were for many years major earners of foreign currency, according to a report for the Strategic Studies Institute by Daniel A. Pinkston, who is now a Seoul-based analyst with the International Crisis Group. But the cost of the arms trade has gone up and sales have declined as a result of U.N. sanctions imposed after the North’s nuclear tests in 2006 and this year, South Korean analysts say.

The military has thus turned to its new Chinese cash cow. As the army has taken over management of mines in North Korea, mineral exports to China have soared, rising from $15 million in 2003 to $213 million last year. Led by those sales, the North’s total trade volume rose last year to its highest level since 1990, when a far more prosperous and less isolated North Korea was subsidized by the Soviet Union.

A unique advantage the Korean People’s Army brings to foreign trade is a well-disciplined workforce that has to be paid — nothing. Soldiers receive food, clothes and lodging, but virtually no cash. This competitive edge makes military-run trading companies especially attractive to the North’s leadership, according to the Institute of Peace report.

Based on confidential interviews with recent North Korean defectors, four of whom said they worked for trading companies run by the military, the paper concludes that a “designated percentage of all revenues generated from commercial activities . . . goes directly into Kim Jong Il’s personal accounts.” The rest of the revenue flows into the operating budget of the military.

The full article is worth reading here.

Additionally, the report by the Institute of Peace cited above, “North Korea, Inc.”, can be downloaded here. The paper is on my reading list this weekend, but here is the introduction and conclusion:

Introduction: Assessing regime stability in North Korea continues to be a major challenge for analysts. By examining how North Korea, Inc. — the web of state trading companies affiliated to the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), the Korean People’s Army (KPA), and the Cabinet — operates, we can develop a new framework for gauging regime stability in North Korea. Insights into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)1 regime can be gained by examining six core questions related to the DPRK state trading company system. First, what are DPRK state trading companies and how did they emerge? Second, how do DPRK state trading companies operate? Third, what roles do they play? Fourth, why are DPRK state trading companies important? Fifth, what major transformations are taking place in the DPRK state trading company system? Sixth, what are the implications of the manner in which this system is currently functioning?

Conclusion:  Despite lingering problems with the fragmented Public Distribution System, the challenges of chronic food shortages, and a deteriorating economic infrastructure system, the DPRK regime has proven to be remarkably resilient. By operating North Korea, Inc. — a network of state trading companies affiliated to the KWP, the KPA, and the Cabinet — the regime is able to derive funds to maintain the loyalty of the North Korean elites and to provide a mechanism through which different branches of the North Korean state can generate funds for operating budgets. During periods when the DPRK’s international isolation deepens as a result of its brinkmanship activities, North Korea, Inc. constitutes an effective coping mechanism for the Kim Jong Il regime.

While North Korea remains an opaque country, we now have greater access to unique defectors with the following characteristics — prior experience working in DPRK state trading companies and current business dealings with former colleagues in North Korea through channels in China. By closely examining DPRK commercial activities and capabilities, a new field of North Korea analysis can be structured to produce insights into the internal dynamics of the DPRK regime. This new line of inquiry would help to broaden our understanding of an evolving North Korea.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-11-02-1
11/2/2009

The North Korean agricultural ministry has announced that the countries food shortages are expected to be even greater next year. Edition 302 of the newsletter “North Korea Today,” distributed by the group Good Friends, reports that the Ministry of Agriculture announced harvest predictions for farms in North and South Hwanghae and Pyongan provinces, North Korea’s ‘ricebowl region’. It stated that if the country was to avoid a food crisis next year, everyone would need to strictly manage this year’s crops. It was also reported that the central party authorities in North Korea, after receiving the report, called for the opening of all customs houses in the border region and for trading companies to seek new avenues for trade. An order was passed down to “relentlessly trade with the outside in order to bring in much food.”

With food shortages this year and last, and now news that there will be food problems next year as well, it is rumored that there is a growing number of angry people in the normally mild-mannered Hwanghae Province. In addition, this is driving a growing number of people to turn to crime in order to put food on the table. On October 26, Free North Korea Radio quoted a source as stating, “As rumors spread across North Korea that large-scale famine, the likes of which were seen in the mid-1990s, will again sweep through country next year, anxiety is shooting up among the people and crimes of necessity are on the rise.”

According to the source, “Crimes of necessity, like pillaging granaries on farms, are spreading like never before as people act quickly to ensure food supplies,” and, “Fighting has grown fierce between people trying to maintain their standard of living.” Furthermore, “The number of people in the Dancheon region of South Hamgyeong Province just ‘sitting down and starving to death’ is exploding,” and, “Not long ago, there was even one incident of and armed soldier guarding a threshing floor of one farm being attacked by a gang of thieves.”

The source explained, “People are well aware that this year yielded poor harvests, but that they cannot rely on aid from the international community because of the Kim Jong Il regime’s indiscriminant pursuit of nuclear development.” The source also added, “These days, people are rationalizing illegal activities in the belief that ‘you can rely on no one but yourself.’”

It was also reported that in Hyesan, Hyeryeong, Onseong and Musan, most food prices are at higher levels than what are usually seen in the spring, despite the fact that it is now fall harvest season. According to Free North Korea Radio, October 23rd prices of rice, flour and corn in Hyesan, Hyeryeong, Onseong, and Musan were as follows: Hyesan, rice = 2,550-2,750 won/1 kg, flour = 2,400-2,600 won/1 kg, corn = 850-900 won/1 kg; Hyeryeong, rice = 2,500-2,800 won/ 1 kg, flour = 2,400-2,700 won/ 1 kg, corn = 800-1,000 won/1 kg; Onseong, rice = 2,450-2,600 won/ 1 kg, flour = 2,500-2,700 won/1 kg, corn = 700-900 won/1 kg; Musan, rice = 2,500-2,700 won/1 kg, flour = 2,400-2,600 won/1 kg, corn = 850-1,000 won/1 kg

According to the article:

The U.N. expert panel set up to assist the implementation of sanctions on North Korea began formal operations Friday.

Six of seven panel members attended a meeting convened by the U.N. Security Council’s sanctions committee on North Korea.

The expert panel has been established under Resolution 1874, which the Security Council adopted on June 12 in response to North Korea’s second nuclear test on May 25.

The panel is to play an auxiliary role in implementing the penalties the sanctions committee worked out following the nuclear test.

Kyoto University graduate school professor Masahiko Asada, the panel member representing Japan, told reporters after the closed meeting that the participants had a ”good” discussion. He is an expert on arms trade control and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Asada and six other members were selected from the five permanent Security Council members — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — plus Japan and South Korea.

Turkish Ambassador to the United Nations Ertugrul Apakan, who chairs the sanctions committee, described the meeting as ”useful.” But he declined to elaborate, citing the confidential nature of the proceedings.

A U.N. diplomatic source said the seven panel members have already begun work on an individual basis, aiming to compile their first report in mid-November.

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon named the seven members in the summer and the panel was initially to have started work in September. But the Chinese representative quit and the selection of a new representative for the country took time, delaying the panel’s first meeting until Friday.

In mid-July, the sanctions committee worked out a new set of sanctions on North Korea, imposing a travel ban on five officials and asset freezes on five entities for their involvement in nuclear weapons and missile development programs. The entities were in addition to three the committee designated in April.

U.N. members are also reportedly considering expanding a list of individuals and entities subject to sanctions depending on new information from member states.

The expert panel is tasked with collecting information and analyzing the implementation of the sanctions. It can recommend that either the Security Council or the sanctions committee take action if it deems their efforts to punish North Korea insufficient.

The sanctions committee was set up after the Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 in October 2006 following Pyongyang’s first nuclear test.

Track this year’s US and UN sanctions activities starting here.

Read the full article here:
U.N. expert panel on N. Korean sanctions begins operation
Kyodo News
10/30/2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-10-19-1
10/19/2009

Trade between North and South Korea has fallen more than 20 percent during the first eight months of 2009. Between January and September, exchanges between the two amounted to 929.7 million dollars, 24.1 percent less than the 1.2243 billion dollars recorded during the same period in 2008.

Inter-Korean trade has grown steadily over the past several years, marking 1.056 billion USD in 2005, 1.35 billion USD in 2005, 1.8 billion USD in 2007 and 1.82 billion USD last year. 2009 was the first year in which inter-Korean trade numbers have fallen. According to customs officials, inter-Korean trade in August, at 136.62 million USD, only registered 84 percent of that seen a year prior.

Trade numbers have continued to fall over the last 12 months. During that time, 3,399 items were exported, with a net worth of 53.81 million dollars, while 3,005 goods were imported, worth 82.8 million USD. A trade deficit of 28.99 million USD for South Korea is likely to continue through December. Sixty-four percent of goods exported from North Korea were light industrial products, the large majority being textiles. Fishery exports also made up 14 percent, or 1.24 million USD, of the North’s products sent to South Korea.

The South’s trade deficit, hitting 1.8 million USD, has been ongoing for the last 11 months. Overall, however, trade has been declining, largely due to the international financial difficulties and North Korea’s most recent nuclear test. South Korea, in accordance with UN resolution 1874, has restricted the export to North Korea of 13 different luxury goods in response to the North’s second nuclear test. Seoul has agreed to ban the export of thirteen different luxury goods, including wine, liquor, cosmetics, leather goods, furs, rugs, pearls and other jewelry, electronic goods, cars, boats, optics, clocks, musical instruments, art supplies and collectibles.

That said, as the South Korean economy recovers from the current global financial woes, it also appears that inter-Korean relations may improve. With the recent reunion of separated families and other North Korean moves to reengage Seoul, it may be possible for inter-Korean exchanges to again grow.

UPDATE: Contrary to earlier reports (below) that South Korea was set to begin importing sand from the DPRK, it turns out that they are tightening import restrictions on goods from the DPRK.  According to Yonhap:

The government has tightened rules on imports of sand, pine mushrooms and anthracite from North Korea, the Unification Ministry said Tuesday, in an apparent move to keep a close eye on cash flows into Pyongyang.

The three items have been allowed into South Korea only with a declaration to the customs office, but the toughened rules now require their importers to receive approval from the unification minister, said ministry spokeswoman Lee Jong-joo.

“Inter-Korean trade volumes of pine mushrooms, sand and anthracite have rapidly increased recently,” Lee said in a press briefing, without specifying the hike rates.

“This revision was prepared in consideration of two things — transparency of inter-Korean trade and keeping the import volume at a proper level,” she added.

Seoul has so far required approval from the unification minister, only when excessive imports of a certain item are feared to harm local producers. Those three items are not considered to fall into that category.

North Korean sand has been rumored to be linked to the country’s military. The concerns prompted Seoul to ban local sand importers from traveling to North Korea after it launched a long-range rocket in April, and such trips are not still allowed.

Last year, US$73.35 million worth of sand, $14,93 million of pine mushrooms and $25.1 million of anthracite were imported from North Korea. Sand was the largest imported item, while anthracite was 9th and pine mushrooms 18th.

With the tightened entry rules, the government can “make a judgment on the site about whether each business is appropriate and get sufficient information about them, thereby enhancing the transparency of inter-Korean trade and its soundness,” the spokeswoman said.

Read the full Story here:
South Korea stiffens import rules on N. Korean products
Yonhap
10/27/2009

ORIGINAL POST: RoK looking to import sand from DPRK (again)
According to Yonhap:

South Korea has suspended sand imports from North Korea since April, when the North test-fired a long-range rocket. Seoul had banned sand importers from traveling to the North.

South Korea first brought in North Korean sand for use at local construction sites in late 2002, as part of an inter-Korean accord signed by leaders of the two Koreas in 2000.

“The government is reviewing the resumption of imports of the North’s sand, given strong requests from businesses and the overall state of current inter-Korean relations,” an informed government official said, requesting to be unnamed.

The South Korean government is expected to decide soon whether to lift the travel ban on sand importers as well, according to officials.

Seoul reportedly placed the travel restriction on sand importers due to suspicions that payments for sand shipments were pocketed by military authorities in the North.

Read other stories about the sand trade here.

Read the full story below:
Seoul mulls resuming sand imports from N. Korea: sources
Yonhap
Tony Chang
10/22/2009

I have not read the full report yet, but here are the details:

PRESS RELEASE EXCERPT: A newly released Asia Society/U.C.-Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation report focuses on economic engagement with North Korea as a peaceful means of inducing change in the DPRK. As the likelihood of some form of US-DPRK talks increases, this report proposes a fundamental rethinking of Washington’s approach toward the DPRK. Economic engagement, properly integrated into a system of sanctions, can transform North Korea into a country that can better provide for its people’s welfare and engage with other countries in a non-hostile manner. As the report shows, North Korea’s history of experiments with reform is limited, and domestic resistance to transition is formidable. But recent trends and tentative past efforts suggest some impulse toward reform and opening from within. North Korea should be actively engaged from the inside to encourage change in its domestic and foreign policy.

The report identifies a number of potential benefits to the U.S. and its allies of economic engagement with the DPRK.

* Economic engagement would encourage the transformation of the DPRK’s political economy and foreign policy, with direct benefits to international peace.
* It would open space for the Korean people to have greater contact with outsiders, and vice versa.
* It would reinforce changes that are already taking place from the ground up.
* An active economic engagement policy would bring the long-term strategic approach of the U.S. into alignment with those of its allies and partners.

The report recommends a combination of the following avenues to initiate the new policy approach: official contacts, Track Two dialogues, academic exchanges, and non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) development programs. The report further recommends that the U.S. government adopt a new visa policy to increase contacts significantly. Finally, the report suggests how the U.S. could help enable international financial institutions to begin to interact with North Korea.

Download the full report here (PDF).

UPDATE:  Here is a longer version of this article in Foreign Affairs.

ORIGINAL POST: Andrei Lankov offers policy prescriptions for changing North Korea in today’s New York Times. Below are some excerpts from the article which is worth reading in full:

…Since outside pressure is ineffective, change will have to come from the North Koreans themselves. The United States and its allies can best help them by exposing them to the very attractive alternatives to their current way of life.

…To crack Pyongyang’s control over information and bring about pressure for change from within, truth and information should be introduced into North Korean society. As the Cold War demonstrated, cultural exchanges can be effective in transferring forbidden knowledge and fostering critical thinking. Exchanges can also bring young members of the North Korean intelligentsia into contact with the outside world. Away from police surveillance (and close to Internet-equipped computers), they would learn much about the true workings of the world.

Of course, the regime might be disinclined to support any initiative with subversive potential. But since the immediate-term beneficiaries of such initiatives would be self-interested members, relatives and clients of the ruling class, they would likely support opportunities for exchange and professional training even if they posed longer-term risks to the system.

The importance of encouraging North Korean rulers to support exchanges is one reason why talks with the regime are important, whether through the six-party structure or not. Although talks will not solve the nuclear issue, they can reduce the likelihood of confrontations and support an environment conducive to exchange and interaction.

…There are other ways to weaken the regime through the spread of information. As during the Cold War, radio broadcasts remain a reliable method of disseminating information, and an increasing number of tunable radios are being smuggled into North Korea. Videos and DVDs smuggled from South Korea are watched widely. It makes sense, then, to support the production of documentaries that inform North Koreans about daily social and economic life in South Korea, contemporary history and political matters such as reunification. And instead of continuing its current harmful ban in the sale of Pentium-class personal computers, the United States should encourage their spread inside North Korea.

Broadly, the U.S. government can take part in cultivating a political opposition and alternative elite that could one day replace the current regime. Due to many factors, those few North Koreans who are politically aware hardly constitute a community of dissenting intellectuals. An increasing number of North Koreans have doubts about the system, but they remain isolated and terrified. Washington should focus, therefore, on aiding the dissident community in South Korea, where some 16,000 North Korean defectors live.

Combining engagement, information dissemination and support for émigrés is the only way to promote change. This approach, however, might be a hard sell to most Americans. It is likely to bring about only incremental change — at least until the situation reaches a breaking point, which could be years away.

But Americans should recognize that there are no quick fixes. For two decades, Washington has searched for solutions, sometimes by way of concessions, sometimes by way of threats. Both approaches have failed and — given the goals of the North Korean regime — would fail again and again. Only low-profile and persistent efforts aimed at promoting change from within will make a difference.

Read the full article below:
Changing North Korea
New York Times
Andrei Lankov
10/13/2009

According to the Financial Times:

North Korea’s mineral wealth is receiving close scrutiny, with South Kor­ea’s government this week valuing reserves at $6,000bn (€4,070bn, £3,670bn). Encouraged by data on metals, Goldman Sachs last month predicted the economy of a unified Korea could rival Japan’s by 2050.

…

Trade with China is growing, reaching $2.8bn last year from about $2bn in 2007. But military authorities in North Korea are perceived as hostile to the changes in society and infrastructure that foreign investment could bring.

“If the North opens its mineral resources to foreign countries, that is tantamount to taking a military, social and political gamble, jeopardising their security,” said Lim Eul-chul, of Seoul’s Institute of Far Eastern Studies.

A South Korean diplomat closely involved with nuc­lear talks doubted Pyong­yang would allow China to make big investments inside its border. “They cannot permit that kind of influence,” he said.

Although they were long communist allies, North Korea and China have a mutual mistrust, partly tied to territorial claims.

Still, limited foreign investment in the sector is not impossible. Colin McAskill, executive chairman of Koryo Asia, says he has signed a letter of intent and memorandum of understanding to invest in North Korean metals and argues his model would not interfere with sovereignty issues that concern Pyongyang.

Switzerland’s Quintermina has posted reports on its website saying it is looking to extract magnesite in North Korea.

Chinese investors are believed to have some metals interests and are also involved in coal mining.

“The Chinese companies that have tried to do business in North Korea complain a lot that the regulations change frequently and that the power supply is erratic,” said a Chinese academic in Beijing.

One quote in this article struck me as a little off:

A South Korean diplomat closely involved with nuc­lear talks doubted Pyong­yang would allow China to make big investments inside its border. “They cannot permit that kind of influence,” he said.

First of all, China has already made plenty of investments inside the DPRK and the Chinese government and companies already exert influence.  There is a difference between having influence and being in control.  Secondly, China is the largest market for North Korean exports.  Even though they might not “own” the North Korean assets from which they purchase the goods, the North Koreans are limited in terms of who will/can trade with them.  In this sense China earns surplus through either bulk purchase discounts or monopsony power.

Read the full story here:
China eyes N Korea’s mineral wealth
Financial Times
Christian Oliver
10/6/2009

Radio Free Asia
Junho Kim
10/6/2009

North Korea is launching a crackdown on official corruption in its key mineral export sector, a crucial source of foreign exchange for a country where millions go hungry and the ruling party has total control of resources.

“[North Korea] is currently restructuring mineral exporting companies, because such trading entities have been found to be corrupt and inefficient and involved in various abuses,” said the China-based representative of a company importing minerals from North Korea.

The source added that many importers dealing with North Korean exporters had been negatively affected by their lack of professionalism and reliability.

“The overwhelming majority of North Korean trading companies are involved in exports of minerals, so the need to revamp them is evident and understandable,” the source said.

More than 58 percent of North Korea’s U.S. $1.13 billion exports in 2008 consisted of minerals and mining products.

The restructuring would target companies with unexplained gaps in their financial accounts and those that embezzled funds during the export process, the China-based source said.

Investigation slows exports

North Korea is a key source of magnesite, a mineral used in steel-making, synthetic rubber production, and the preparation of magnesium chemicals and fertilizers.

A China-based ethnic Korean businessman surnamed Nam said Chinese importers are having trouble filling orders for molybdenum, a metal used to make heat-resistant aircraft parts, electrical contacts, industrial motors and filaments.

“For about a month, discussions on imports of molybdenum from North Korea to China were suspended at the request of the North Korean authorities, who asked their Chinese counterparts to be patient and wait a little more,” Nam said.

In an attempt to further tap abundant mineral resources, the authorities are attempting a clean-up of the mineral export sector, the China-based source said.

Following an investigation of corrupt and inefficient mineral-exporting North Korean companies, export quotas might be assigned to such companies, and those found guilty of abuse could be imprisoned, the source said.

Swiss-based mining venture Quintermina was recently formed to secure magnesia materials from North Korea, the company said on its Web site.

It said the magnesite resources of North Korea, an extension of the magnesite-talc belt from the northeastern Chinese province of Liaoning, China, are estimated at 3 billion tons, and capable of producing around 100,000 tons per year.

From Voice of America (excerpts):

In Russia’s largest port city on the Pacific Ocean, Vladivostok, several small-framed Asian men are bustling around a half-built apartment building, trying to move large metal beams. They are North Koreans sent out by their government to earn much-needed foreign currency for the country.

Kim Dong Gil came from North Korea’s second largest city of Hamhung. He brags that North Korean workers have the best skills in the Russian construction market, which is also filled with laborers from Central Asia and Vietnam.

The estimated 5,000 North Koreans in Vladivostok come from various backgrounds and even include doctors.

“I didn’t have any construction skills since I used to be with the military,” said Kim Soon Nam, who served in the army back home. “I learned from scratch when I arrived here. I got trained by a really young person who used to curse and swear at me all the time.”

Despite the stress of living and working in a foreign country, the North Koreans have come to appreciate the culture of capitalism.

“Back home I couldn’t make money even if I wanted to. But here if I work hard, I can make a dozen times more,” explained Han Jong Rok.

Choi Jong-kun, an assistant professor of political science at Yonsei University in Seoul, says money is just one reason to leave home. The other is improving one’s status among North Korea’s political elite.

“If they bring in more money, then they would sort of have sort of upward mobility in their social class,” explained Choi Jong-kun.

North Korea does not reveal significant economic data, but exporting workers is considered a key source of hard foreign currency.

A report by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy in Seoul estimated in 2007 that Pyongyang earns at least $40 million to $60 million a year from labor exports. Outside of Russia, the institute has tracked North Korean workers in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bangladesh, China and Mongolia.

In Vladivostok, every North Korean worker is required to pay the Pyongyang government around $800 each month.

Kim Soon Nam says he works extra hours to make sure he has money for himself.

“If we want to save some money, we have to work Sundays and holidays, too,” he said. “We must earn a lot of money no matter what. North Koreans have to work from 8 am to 10 pm.”

The North Koreans in Vladivostok usually get a five-year visa, but many get extensions to earn more money. They sleep in dormitories and live to work, spending much of their time outside the construction sites doing extra jobs in local Russian homes.

Kim Chul Woong, a welder, says he is willing to sacrifice time from his family back in Pyongyang to give his son opportunities few North Koreans enjoy, like a computer.

“The video footage on the computer can enhance children’s intellectual development, but I don’t have the kind of money,” he said. “When I go back home after working in Russia I’ll have a good amount of money. I can buy expensive stuff for my son. If he wants to do music I can buy him a violin or a guitar.”

He says he is taking advantage of the work while he can get it. Kim Chul Woong says the construction jobs are dwindling in Russia because of the economic crisis. There is also greater competition from newly arriving Central Asians who are as hungry for dollars as he is.

Read the full story here:
N. Korean Workers Earn Dollars for Construction Work in Russia
Voice of America
Young Ran-jeon
9/28/2009