Archive for the ‘International trade’ Category

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Inter-Korean trade tumbles

Tuesday, May 21st, 2013

According to Yonhap:

Trade between South and North Korea tumbled last month after the North shut down the jointly run industrial park in its border town of Kaesong, government data showed Tuesday.

The monthly inter-Korean trade volume came to US$23.43 million in April, down 88 percent from $194.27 million recorded the previous month, according to the data from the Ministry of Unification in charge of inter-Korean affairs.

The April figure is almost similar to the average monthly trade volume of $23.94 million registered in 1995.

In early April, the North banned the entry of South Korean workers and materials into the Kaesong Industrial Complex and withdrew all North Korean workers employed by South Korean firms there in protest against Seoul’s joint military exercises with the U.S. in March.

…

Trade between the two countries, which remain technically at war since the 1950-53 Korean War ended in an armistice, had steadily increased since late in the 1980’s to register an annual record of $1 billion in 2005.

Read the full story here:
Tnter-Korean Trade Tumble
Yonhap
2013-5-21

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Posted in International trade, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Statistics, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

Chinese Banks cut ties with DPRK Foreign Trade Bank

Tuesday, May 7th, 2013

UPDATE 3 (2013-5-23): More news coming out on aid agencies that are facing new challenges in making payment transfers. According to the Associated Press:

Gerhard Uhrmacher, program manager for German humanitarian aid organization Welthungerhilfe, said when recent bank transfers failed, he managed to keep projects running by routing 500,000 euros ($643,000) to Chinese or North Korean accounts in China to pay for building supplies and other goods.

He said Welthungerhilfe, which signed the communique and works on agriculture and rural development projects in North Korea, has some reserves in Pyongyang but must also resort to carrying cash into the country by hand.

“It doesn’t give a good impression. We’re trying to be transparent, to be open to all sides and now we’re more or less forced to do something that doesn’t really look very proper because people who carry a lot of cash are somehow suspect,” said Uhrmacher who is based in Germany and has worked in North Korea for the past 10 years.

“Whatever you’re doing, everybody looks at you very closely,” he said. “That’s why we don’t like it because bank accounts are proper. Everybody can have a look at it and everybody can control it. Now we are forced to do something else.”

Some analysts said aid groups were simply “collateral damage” and that they will find a way to work around the sanctions as they have been forced to do in other countries. Others said the poorest North Koreas would be hurt if some humanitarian groups have to pull out of the country. The aid groups work on a range of issues from food security to improving health and assisting with disabilities.

UPDATE 2 (2013-5-23): Many NGOs are now unable to transfer funds to the DPRK. According to Reuters:

Aid agencies helping millions of people in North Korea could be forced to pull out after a Chinese bank cut ties with main foreign exchange bank, a humanitarian group said on Wednesday.

…

Some aid workers are now resorting to bringing in cash in person, putting them at personal risk. It is thought some agencies have only enough reserves to last a couple of months.

“All agencies with offices in Pyongyang are affected and everyone is extremely concerned,” Mathias Mogge, director of programmes for German aid group Welthungerhilfe, told the Thomson Reuters Foundation.

“This could eventually reduce our ability to carry out projects or even force a complete close down. If all the agencies had to pull out, it would affect millions of people,” said Mogge, who has just returned from the secretive country.

See here also.

UPDATE 1 (2013-5-10): Additional Chinese banks are cutting ties with the DPRK. According to the Asahi Shimbun:

China’s four largest state-owned commercial banks have suspended money transfers to North Korea as part of sanctions against Pyongyang’s missile launch and nuclear test.

The action was based on a direct instruction from a government agency, sources close to the banks said.

The Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction Bank and the Agricultural Bank of China took the step following North Korea’s third nuclear test in February, the sources said.

“North Korea came under sanctions over issues including the launch of ballistic missiles,” said a senior official at a branch of the China Construction Bank.

A source close to the Bank of China, which trades heavily in foreign currency, said the bank received instructions from a government agency that manages foreign currency trade.

…

A Chinese trading company in Dandong, a city in Liaoning province bordering North Korea, has been unable to transfer money to North Korea, a source close to the company said.

North Korean workers in China are also believed to be having difficulties sending money home.

However, the effectiveness of these financial sanctions remains to be seen since the amount of money North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank has handled is unknown.

Much of the trade between China and North Korea is settled in cash or barter, a diplomatic source in Beijing explained.

An official at a Chinese trading company also said money can be brought into North Korea by human couriers.

The Financial Times offers additional information:

Nevertheless, the blockade is far from watertight. A smaller bank based in northeastern China across the border from North Korea said it was still handling large-scale cross-border transfers, an indication that Beijing is not willing to entirely cut off North Korea.

Here is additional coverage in the Hankyoreh.

ORIGINAL POST (2013-5-7): According to the New York Times, the Bank of China has cut ties with the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank:

The state-controlled Bank of China said on Tuesday that it had ended all dealings with a key North Korean bank in what appeared to be the strongest public Chinese response yet to North Korea’s willingness to brush aside warnings from Beijing and push ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

…

Ruan Zongze, a former Chinese diplomat in Washington who is now a vice president of the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing, said the Chinese government was responding to a recent United Nations resolution imposing further sanctions on North Korea after its nuclear and ballistic missile tests and was not responding to American pressure. He noted that the Chinese government had recently encouraged state-controlled enterprises to follow the resolution in their dealings with North Korea.

…

In a single-sentence statement on Tuesday afternoon, the Bank of China said it has “already issued a bank account closing notice to North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank, and has ceased accepting funds transfer business related to this bank account.”

A spokeswoman for the bank declined to say whether money in the account would be frozen or returned to North Korea. The spokeswoman, who insisted that her name not be used in keeping with bank policy, said the account had been closed by the end of April.

The Bank of China was the overseas banking arm of China’s central bank until the 1980s and is still majority-owned by the Chinese government, playing an important role in diplomatic and financial policy.

…

Mr. Cai said that the move by the Bank of China appeared to be “predominantly symbolic,” but later added, “It could have practical consequences, because North Korea is already under such heavy international sanctions, and China is such an important economic channel for it.

“If China narrows the door to North Korea, then its economic operations or financial flows could be affected,” he said. “But primarily this appears to be a way of China showing its views about their behavior, so that North Korea is more likely to rethink its actions.”

Here is additional coverage in the Washington Post.

Here is additional coverage in the Los Angeles Times.

Here is additional coverage in the Wall Street Journal.

Here is additional coverage in the Hankyoreh.

Read the full stories here:
China Cuts Ties With Key North Korean Bank
New York Times
Keith Bradsher and Nick Cumming-Bruce
2013-5-7

4 major Chinese banks halt money transfers to North Korea
Asahi Shimbun
2013-5-10

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Posted in Banking, Finance, Foreign Trade Bank, International trade | Comments Closed

EU trade with DPRK falls

Friday, May 3rd, 2013

According to Yonhap:

Trade volume between North Korea and the European Union (EU) more than halved last year from a year earlier after the North sharply cut exports of mineral resources, a news report said Friday.

The trade volume between the two sides came to 69 million euros (US$90.2 million) in 2012, only 43.4 percent of the 159 million euros recorded the previous year, the Washington-based Voice of America (VOA) reported, citing EU data.

The dive came as the North’s total exports to the EU shrank to 24 million euros last year from 117 million euros the previous year, according to the VOA report.

The communist country exported only 3 million euros worth of mineral resources, the main export item, to EU countries in 2012, compared with 71 million in 2011, it said.

North Korea’s imports from EU countries, meanwhile, rose 7.1 percent on-year to 45 million euros last year, led by brisk imports of machinery and electronics goods, according to the report.

Read the full story here:
N. Korea’s trade with EU halves in 2012
Yonhap
2013-5-3

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Posted in EU, International trade, Statistics, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

North Korean markets heavily filled with Chinese products and currency

Thursday, April 25th, 2013

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2013-4-25

After North Korea’s currency revaluation in 2009, North Korean currency is still unstable and North Korean markets near the DPRK-China border are reportedly filled with Chinese merchandise, with transactions being conducted mainly in Chinese yuan.

An online newspaper, the Daily NK, reported that markets in the city of Hyesan (Ryanggang Province) and surrounding areas are using Chinese yuan as the primary currency for transactions rather than local North Korean won.  Rice prices are standard indicators of inflation in North Korea and even rice was reported to be exchanged in yuan.  As the monetary value of domestic currency continues to fall, North Korea is experiencing hyperinflation and North Koreans are showing a preference for the more stable Chinese yuan over won.

With an exception of rice, vegetables, and seafood, manufactured goods including confectioneries, the daily necessities for sale in these markets are mostly from China.  As well, some South Korean items such as instant noodles, Choco Pies, and butane gas are sold openly in the markets.

Border areas have a higher rate of Chinese yuan usage than inland areas, as for years traders have been buying Chinese goods with Chinese yuan to sell in the domestic markets.  However, with the unstable domestic currency, more and more North Koreans have been using Chinese yuan over the last three years.  Some report goods bought with North Korean won must be converted to the CNY exchange rate.

As of mid-April, the exchange rate of 100 CNY to KPW was 130,000. However, Pyongsong and Pyongyang cities used mainly US dollars and local won in equal rates.

A video recording obtained by the Daily NK unveiled the landscape of the marketplace and nearby alley markets of  Hyesan and surrounding areas.  Items for sale include jackets, mufflers, gloves, coats and other winter clothing as well as cosmetics, perfumes, toothpaste, toothbrushes and other daily goods. Transactions were being made in Chinese yuan.

North Korean authorities are waging a crackdown against the use of the yuan in the markets but merchants continue to use yuan in secret.

The high number of Chinese goods in North Korean markets can be attributed to the failed production system of the people’s economy of North Korea, which began to tumble in the late 1990s. As the regime began to invest excessively in its military sector, production in the manufacturing sector declined.

Although North Korean products appear in the markets, most people prefer Chinese goods due to their better quality.

A recent article in the official state economics journal of North Korea, Kyongje Yongu (Journal of Economic Research), criticized the “trade companies for focusing on only one or two countries,” expressing concerns that, “the whole nation may experience political and economic pressure from trade companies that restrict foreign trade to only one country.”

Kim Jong Un has also expressed official disapproval against “import syndrome” of the people and regarded it as an obstacle hindering the development of North Korea’s light industry.

Although no specific country was named, it is believed that China makes up over 80 percent of North Korea’s total foreign trade. North Korea continues to show vigilance against its rising dependence on China.

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Posted in Banking, China, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), International trade, Price liberalization | Comments Closed

Chongjin’s Wongang Beer…almost

Sunday, April 14th, 2013

Reuters offers a cautionary tale of investing in the DPRK:

Setting up a brewery in North Korea seemed like a good idea to Harry Kim and his Chinese friends two years ago. Everyone likes beer, even in one of the world’s most closed and least understood countries, they reckoned.

Kim and his partners even got the beer flowing after workers strapped equipment onto a truck in the Chinese border town of Tumen and drove it to the North Korean coastal city of Chongjin. Chinese engineers taught the locals how to brew. City officials loved the taste, he said.

But the small Chinese-North Korean venture ran aground within months after failing to get final approval from authorities in Pyongyang.

Kim’s experience is an illustration of both the challenge and the potential of doing business in North Korea, which has grabbed global attention in recent weeks with its threats to wage nuclear war on South Korea and the United States.

“It wasn’t rejected. We just waited. The central government didn’t come and say ‘no’, but the documents were just never issued and so we eventually gave up,” said Kim, a Chinese national of Korean descent living in Tumen in China’s northeastern Jilin province.

…

There is little public information on North Korea’s beer market but one thing seems clear – demand outstrips supply.

Troy Collings, a director at Young Pioneer Tours, a travel operator based in China which takes groups into North Korea and has organised brewery visits, said there were probably less than a dozen locally made beers available in the country.

In Pyongyang, two hotels concoct their own microbrews. The Rakwon department store creates its own eponymous beer, too, he said.

“They can’t produce enough for the domestic market,” said Collings.

The opportunity was clear – and reinforced for Kim when he saw the elite in Chongjin drinking a lot of Heineken and Corona.

So, in mid-2011, Kim and two friends joined up with a North Korean businessman to put the brewery plan in motion.

Approval from Chongjin city came easily, he said. The province, North Hamgyong, gave the green light too. And the first of three investments in equipment and supplies – the initial one worth about 200,000 yuan – was made.

Since North Korea has no system of credit and the risks of investing were high, Kim and his partners tied the beer project to seafood exports.

Before each investment was made, they were allowed to buy a cargo of North Korean seafood to sell in China. The first was about 50 tonnes of squid, he said.

…

It took about nine hours to drive from Tumen to Chongjin with the brewery equipment, including stops at customs.

The equipment was installed quickly and Chinese engineers showed the North Koreans how to brew. Soon, suds were flowing. The product was dubbed Wongang, or ‘river source’, beer.

On the first day of business the investors invited senior city and provincial leaders to the brewery for a sample. All approved, Kim said.

But the new brewery could not ramp up production without authorisation from Pyongyang, which never came despite months of waiting. There was never a response and the investors never got an explanation.

“If you push too hard it could raise suspicions,” Kim said.

It was a pity, because the North Koreans were good workers, he said, citing how the investors overcame the frequent power cuts which made it hard to use a computer to monitor the brewing process.

Instead, the investors stationed North Korean workers at each of the pressure gauges on the brewing equipment in 12-hour shifts. The workers were told if the dial reached a certain level they should turn a knob to let off pressure.

“They got chairs and sat there looking at the gauges, not sleeping all night, one person at each position,” said Kim.

Thanks to the squid hedge, the Chinese investors basically broke even. Kim now runs his restaurant in the space where the brewing equipment was stored before it was hauled to Chongjin.

Some day Pyongyang may give the green light, Kim says, but he is not holding his breath.

“As I was leaving they said ‘It’s not that we don’t want to do it, and it’s not that our senior leaders or the central government don’t want to do it, but we just don’t have practical experience with this kind of thing’.”

UPDATE: Simon notes in the comments:

There are not about a dozen locally brewed beers in the DPRK, there are literally dozens, if not many more. A great many restaurants and bars brew their own beer. The number quoted in the article isn’t close to the reality that small brewing set-ups are quite widespread in Pyongyang and other cities too.

Read the full story here:
Nuclear threats to squid hedges: it’s hard to get a beer in N.Korea
Reuters
John Ruwitch
2013-4-14

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Posted in Alcohol, China, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International trade | 2 Comments »

DPRK – Cuba relations in 1974

Sunday, March 31st, 2013

The Wilson Center’s North Korea International Documentation Project has posted a number of diplomatic cables from formerly fraternal socialist nations on the DPRK’s efforts to compete with South Korea for influence in the developing world. Below is a specific cable referring to DPRK – Cuban relations. It speaks volumes with masterful brevity (an art sorely lacking in public discourse today):

JANUARY 22, 1974
HUNGARIAN EMBASSY IN THE DPRK, TELEGRAM, 22 JANUARY 1974. SUBJECT: CUBAN-DPRK RELATIONS.

According to the Cuban ambassador accredited to this country, the DPRK asked Cuba to supply 300.000 metric tons of sugar in 1974. The Cubans replied that they could supply only 80.000 metric tons, and even this amount could be supplied only in quarterly items. If there was any delay in the [Korean] disembarkation of the delivered goods at the end of the quarter, the Cubans would halt the shipments next in line. The Korean trade officials declared that this Cuban measure was incompatible with the policy of mutual assistance that socialist countries pursued toward each other. The Cubans responded that they also needed assistance, and it would greatly help them if they could receive payment for the sugar shipments in a timely manner.

You can read all of the cables in the series here.

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Posted in Cuba, International trade, North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP) | Comments Closed

Jim Rogers goes long on DPRK coins

Friday, March 29th, 2013

The Wall Street Journal offers an interesting story on American investor Jim Rogers. Here is an excerpt from the article:

By Sunday, Pyongyang-based Korea Pugang Coins Corp. had sold its entire stock of coins, which included 20 one-ounce gold coins featuring mostly century-old generals as well as several hundred silver coins featuring North Korean sports achievements, cultural landmarks and national animals.

Most of the coins were purchased by Mr. Rogers, an American commodities investor now based in Singapore, said a Korea Pugang Coins representative, who didn’t give her name. The company knows Mr. Rogers from last year’s fair, when he bought the entire lot of North Korean coins offered.

Mr. Rogers, who started the Quantum Fund with George Soros in the 1970s, couldn’t be reached for comment, but had said in a previous interview: “Coins and stamps are the only way I can invest in North Korea.”

By invest in, Mr. Rogers means he wants to wager against the long-term prospects for the isolated, economically struggling country. He views his purchase as a bet on the collapse of North Korea.

“At some point down the line, North Korea will cease existing as a country. Then the value of the coins will go up,” Mr. Rogers said.

According to North Korea’s state-controlled news agency, a special series of gold coins were minted last year to commemorate Kim Jong Il, the country’s leader who died in late-2011. The inscription: “The Great Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il Will Always Be Alive.” However, none of those coins were put up for sale at the Singapore fair.

Mr. Kim was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Eun.

Situated next to the American Numismatic Association, the North Korean stand drew immediate attention from many visitors, when the Singapore International Coin Fair opened its doors Friday morning. By lunchtime, the sales team, wearing Kim Jong Il pins on their jackets, hardly found time to finish their sandwiches and cans of Coca-Cola KO -0.59% .

Thirteen of the gold coins were purchased by an assistant of Mr. Rogers, said a representative of state-owned Korea Pugang Coins. “He wanted to buy more, but we only had 13 left,” she said. The company offered the gold coins for 2,500 Singapore dollars, or $2,014—well above Friday’s closing gold price of $1,598.25 an ounce.

Mr. Rogers is a fervent believer that the commodities bull-run will continue and that China and other Asian nations will set the global economic agenda for this century. He advocates investing in frontier markets such as Myanmar and Cambodia, and in 2007, sold his New York mansion and moved to Singapore, in part because he thinks it is crucial for his children to learn Mandarin.

…

Korea Pugang Coins has minted coins in Pyongyang since 1987, but the mintage is only around 2,000 each year, as North Korea’s own gold resources are limited.

The coins draw only a limited amount of buyers within North Korea and are mainly sold to international investors and collectors at fairs in Hong Kong, Beijing and Singapore, the company said.

Estonia-based Tavex Group, a company that specializes in gold and currencies, made a deal with Pyongyang in 2008 to sell North Korean gold coins.

But the North Koreans ended it after the first shipment of coins from a 2007 series featuring elephants, rhinos, owls, lions and buffalos.

“We sold them at a relatively high price to collectors, but demand was not big,” says Tomas Pavelson, who works in sales at Tavex Group.

“Actually, we still have one left.”

See some examples of DPRK coins here and here.

Here is some additional information from the Choson Ilbo:

In March last year, American investor Jim Rogers went to an international coin fair in Singapore and snapped up 13 rare North Korean gold coins each valued at 2,500 Singaporean dollars, as well as hundreds of silver coins worth 70 Singaporean dollars each.

The commemorative coins were produced by Pyongyang-based Korea Pugang Coins Corp., a subsidiary of Pugang Trading Corp.

Pugang Trading operates under the “guidance” of the Workers Party’s Munitions Industry Department but is believed to be run by Chon Song-hun, the son of the former North Korean ambassador to China, Chon Myung-su. The younger Chon is a former professor at Kim Il-sung University.

The firm imports and manufactures motorcycles and owns six subsidiaries involved in metals, machinery, chemicals, electronics and pharmaceuticals production. It also owns a gold mine that supplied the commodity for the coins.

Pugang Pharmaceutical has even exported health products to South Korea and runs a mineral water business. The group’s annual transaction volume amounts to US$150 million with 15 overseas branch offices, including in Beijing and Moscow.

Now Pugang Trading is on the UN Security Council’s blacklist, but the company is still very active in the North.

“Pugang is the North Korean equivalent of South Korea’s Samsung Group,” said Cho Bong-hyun of the IBK Economic Research Institute. “It appears to have been thriving even after Kim Jong-un stepped into power.”

Chon’s brother Yong-hun, meanwhile, apparently controls the import of diesel fuel into North Korea as the head of a company affiliated with the party’s Finance and Accounting Department. “North Korean businesses usually split their profits 50:50 with the party,” said a government source here. “The Chon brothers are believed to be worth millions of dollars.”

Another tycoon is Cha Chol-ma, a former diplomat who amassed a fortune worth millions of dollars by taking charge of business projects the North engages in overseas to earn hard currency.

“As a market economy evolves in North Korea, we are seeing early signs of monopolization of wealth,” said a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification here. “Tycoons have grown wealthy through collusion with high-ranking party members.”

Experts say North Korean businessmen also act as proxy investors on behalf of high-ranking party members, who cannot get involved in business, and often share the profits.

Read the full story here:
Executing a North Korean Coin Flip
Wall Street Journal
Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen
2012-3-29

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Posted in Fiscal & monetary policy, Gold, International trade, Mining/Minerals | Comments Closed

DPRK imports of Chinese silver surge

Thursday, March 28th, 2013

According to Yonhap:

North Korea imported an unusually massive amount of silver from China in January, possibly in relation to leader Kim Jong-un’s birthday that month, sources and China’s customs office said Thursday.

Data from China’s customs office showed that North Korea imported 661.71 kilograms of Chinese silver for US$653,128 in January.

The monthly import is unusually enormous given that the North took in only $77,593 worth of precious metal and other jewels for the whole of 2012. The corresponding amount for 2011 was $57,000.

Before January this year, the North had hardly spent more than $10,000 on monthly imports of such goods, according to the data.

Given the leader’s birthday on Jan. 8, North Korea watchers said the massive amount of imported silver may have been used to produce silverware souvenirs to celebrate the leader’s birthday.

“It’s difficult to assume the exact purpose of the silver imports,” a source said. Given that late leader Kim Jong-il used to bring in foreign brand luxury sedans and expensive watches to treat the country’s top echelon on major holidays, the bulk of silver imported in January may have been used for similar purposes, the source said.

Backing this assumption, the customs data also showed that the North imported an unusually large amount of costume jewelry worth $10,447 in the same month.

A reader points out this Daily NK story hypothesizing that the silver could have been used in batteries:

As such, there are suspicions that the recent North Korean decision to import more than 600kg of silver through China was done to facilitate the production of batteries for submersible production.

A North Korean military source told Daily NK on the 4th, “The [North Korean] Navy has been producing submersibles at every shipyard on their east and west coasts ever since the attack on the Cheonan in 2010.”

According to the inside source, prior to the Cheonan sinking such vessels were produced at one shipyard, the disguised ‘Bongdae Boiler Factory’ in Sinpo, South Hamkyung Province, at a rate of five per year. However, following the sinking of the Cheonan that rate went up four times to 16 per year, as the vessels started being produced across multiple shipyards including Yongampo, Chongjin and Rajin.

The source explained, “The reason why the North Korean authorities are increasing production of this kind of submersible that can fire torpedoes is to maximize their underwater attack capacity. The subs can take 12 to 15 soldiers yet still sink destroyers weighing thousands of tons with their twin torpedoes.”

“The engines noise on the submersibles is very quiet, making them able to approach their targets underwater in secret, while it is impossible to trace crimes such as the Cheonan incident,” the source went on, adding that during North Korean military training exercises they also emphasize the essential nature of the subs.

The rising production is pushing up demand for batteries, the source then went on to add, saying that this required the bulk production of both silver and zinc. “All the silver produced in North Korea is supplied to the shipyards,” he claimed.

The source admitted to being confused, therefore, at North Korea’s recent decision to import 660kg of silver from China, declaring, “There is lots of silver being produced in North Korea, so it’s hard to say why they are importing it from China…I suppose it may have been just that more batteries were being produced so they needed more silver.”

Read the full stories here:
N. Korea imports massive amount of Chinese silver in Jan.: data
Yonhap
2013-3-28

NK Producing More Silvery Subs
Daily NK
2013-4-5

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Posted in China, International trade, Mining/Minerals, Statistics, Trade Statistics | 1 Comment »

Collection of DPRK laws and regulations

Wednesday, March 27th, 2013

A much-appreciated colleague has sent me a PDF document published by the DPRK’s Committee for the Promotion of External Economic Cooperation in 2003. It that contains hundreds of pages of DPRK laws and regulations.

Compilation-of-laws-and-regs-for foreign-investment

Click here to open the PDF document

Here is a list of the contents:

1. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Foreign Investment

2. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Equtiy Joint Venture

3. Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Equity Joint Venture

4. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Contractual Joint Venture

5. Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Contractual Joint Venture

6. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Foreign Exchange Control

7. Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Foreign Exchange control

8. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Foreign-Invested Bank

9. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the Leasing of Land

10. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Foreign-Invested Business and Foreign Individual Tax

11. Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Foreign-Invested Business and Foreign Individual Tax

12. The Customs Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

13. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the Protection of Environment

14. The Insurance Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

15. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on External Economic Arbitration

16. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on External Civil Relations

17. The Notary Public Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

18. The Civil Proceedings Act of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

19. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Processing Trade

20. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Bankruptcy of Foreign-Invested Enterprises

21. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the Rason Economic and Trade Zone

22. The Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises

23. Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises

24. Regulations on the Financial Management of Foreign Invested Enterprises

25. Regulations on the Introduction of Latest Technologies by Foreign-Invested Enterprises

26. Regulations on the Naming of Foreign-Invested Enterprises

27. Regulations on the Registration of Foreign-Invested Enterprises

28. Labor Regulations for Foreign-Invested Enterprises

29. Regulations on the Resident Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone

30. Regulations on Entrepot Trade in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone

31. Regulations on Contract Construction in th Rason Economic and Trade Zone

32. Regulations on Forwarding Agency in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone

33. Regulations on Statistics in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone

34. Regulations on Tourism in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone

35. Regulations on Financial Management of Foreign-Invested Enterprises in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone

36. Regulations on Foreigner’s Immigration Procedure and Stay in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone

37. Customs Regulations For the Rason Economic and Trade Zone

38. Regulations on Finding in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone

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Posted in Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International trade, Law on the Rason Economic and Trade Zone, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | 3 Comments »

DPRK running a current account surplus

Monday, March 18th, 2013

The Bank of Korea has long reported that the DPRK has been running a current account deficit (see their summary report of the DPRK economy in 2011 here).

While working on their own statistics, however, Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard assert that the DPRK may be running a current account surplus:

DPRK-trade-surplus-Noland

According to Noland:

[In all likelihood],  North Korea has run current account deficits for most of its history. That meant that the country was consuming more than it was producing, and the difference had to financed from abroad. However, on our calculation, largely on the back of expanding trade with China, the current account went into surplus in 2011. Our preliminary calculations suggest that the country probably also ran a surplus in 2012.

This is bad news, both for North Korea and the rest of us. It is bad news for North Korea because as a relatively poor country, they should be running a current account deficit, importing capital, and expanding productive capacity for future growth. Instead, our calculation suggests that they are exporting capital. Consumption at home is being needlessly compressed (the recent UNICEF survey documents continuing chronic food insecurity for some significant part of the populace) and instead, money is flowing abroad, presumably to finance the future consumption of the elite. Steph Haggard, in a post last week, pointed to evidence that this capital may be flowing into accounts in China.

It is also bad news for us. If North Korea is running current account surpluses, then they are less vulnerable to foreign pressure.

The Wall Street Journal offered additional information:

Messrs. Noland and Haggard said that taking a pulse on North Korea’s economy is inevitably speculative. Pyongyang doesn’t release trade figures, so estimates are made based on data provided by third parties.

According to South Korean estimates, North Korea’s total trade with its only major ally, China, nearly tripled to around $5.6 billion between 2007 and 2011, and in 2011 it showed a deficit of $700 million in goods trade—a major component of its current account. For there to be an overall surplus, as the research of Messrs. Noland and Haggard suggests, other components in the current account would have to be more than enough to offset that goods-trade shortfall.

“If there were massive dollar remittances back home by overseas North Koreans or a sharp increase in foreign tourists to the North, it would be possible for North Korea to run a current-account surplus despite a trade deficit,” said a Bank of Korea official in Seoul. “But you never know the exact reasons unless you see the full data.”

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