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Haggard and Noland on sanctions

Tuesday, July 7th, 2009

Below are excerpts from an article by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland on the complexities of North Korea sanctions. The full article is worth reading.

According to Haggard and Noland in the Oriental Economist:

On June 12, 2009, in response to North Korea’s second nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed additional economic sanctions via UNSC Resolution 1874. This measure is politically significant, particularly in signaling the changing attitude of Beijing. However, it is highly unlikely that the sanctions by themselves will have any immediate effect on North Korea’s nuclear program or on the increasing threat of proliferation. Sanctions need to be coupled with a nuanced policy that includes a strongly stated preference for a negotiated solution as well as defensive measures, of which the sanctions are only one part. Proliferation can be impeded. However, elimination of the North Korean nuclear weapons capability is likely to require a regime change in Pyongyang.

…

The most interesting features of the resolution have to do with means of enforcement. In 2003 President Bush launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a loose effort to secure international cooperation in monitoring and interdicting ships that might be trafficking in WMDs or WMD-related materials. The new Security Council Resolution comes close to making the PSI a formal multilateral effort. The resolution calls upon member states to inspect vessels on the high seas or escort them to port if they have reasonable grounds to believe that they are carrying prohibited cargo. South Korea, which sat on the fence under the previous government of Roh Moo-hyun, has now formally joined the PSI effort.

An important loophole is that such interdiction must have the assent of the country under which the vessel is flagged. This provision could provide incentives for North Korea to do more shipping under its own flag. But there are clear constraints on doing so because of the country’s pariah status, and the major flags of convenience, such as Panama and Liberia, would come under strong pressure to comply. This obligation will almost certainly generate a confrontation at some point, given that North Korea has stated unambiguously that it would view such action as an act of war.

In addition to interdiction, the UNSC resolution explicitly provides for the use of financial means for stopping the flow of WMD-related trade. These measures are potentially more sweeping than those related to trade sanctions per se, since the resolution permits the blocking of transfers and even the freezing of any assets that “could contribute” to North Korea’s weapons programs or activities. Such a provision is similarly open to quite broad interpretation.

Finally, the new resolution establishes a new enforcement process by creating a panel of experts that will monitor efforts and provide recommendations to the Security Council.

Will Sanctions Work?

Despite these steps forward, the sanctions effort is not likely to yield immediate results and could even appear to backfire in the short run.

First, the North Koreans have typically responded to pressure not by complying but by escalating. The most recent cycle of escalation, culminating in the nuclear test, was in fact triggered by the sequence of UN actions described above.

Second, those favoring engagement had hoped that expanded trade, investment, and aid would encourage North Korea toward a more reformist path by demonstrating the gains from economic integration and by tilting the internal debate in favor of liberalizers. Economic inducements were probably never as powerful carrots as some believed. However, in 2005, the risk-averse North Korean leadership began reversing its limited economic reforms anyway. Kim Jong Il’s stroke in August 2008 has only exacerbated such tendencies; In the succession process, no one wants to be vulnerable to charges of apostasy. The influence of the military, a conservative, antireform institution is on the rise. In today’s environment, sanctions may be welcomed by reactionary elements as a justification for circling the wagons.

Finally, those countries most inclined to sanction North Korea no longer have much economic interaction with it anyway. Japan, once an important mainstay of the North Korean economy through transfers, has imposed an embargo (though circumvention via third countries is reputedly easy). Aid from South Korea has dropped to a trickle, and commercial relations through the collaborative Kaesong industrial park in North Korea have also been held hostage by new North Korean demands to renegotiate contracts. US economic exchanges with North Korea are miniscule. Indeed, the North Koreans even rejected the last important economic link to the United States by declining to continue a generous food aid program negotiated last year.

Thus an unintended consequence of the crisis has been to dramatically raise the share of North Korea’s trade with China, and with Iran Syria, and Egypt, countries with which it shares nuclear and/or missile interests. These latter partners show little interest in political quid-pro-quos, let alone sanctions. This geographical shift in trade makes traditional sanctions even less potent.

Consequently China has become even more central to any effective sanctions effort. China is North Korea’s largest trading partner, accounting for about one-third of its trade, and is the country’s most generous aid donor. A cut-off of critical Chinese oil shipments, much less a complete trade embargo, would bring the country to its knees.

But China has ambivalent, conflicting interests in North Korea. It values having a fraternally allied buffer state on its border and regards the country as a useful pawn in its rivalries with the United States and India, acting as its proxy in dealings with Iran and Pakistan. Yet North Korean provocations push South Korea, Japan, and the United States closer together, and ultimately could trigger a major arms race in Northeast Asia, which would not be to China’s benefit. Finally, China has concerns that excessive pressure on the regime could provoke its collapse, in the worst case sending millions of North Korean refugees into China and ending with US troops on the Yalu River. For China, a stable, nuclear-armed North Korea is preferable to an unstable one, nuclear or not, and this consideration ultimately limits the degree of pressure that Beijing is willing to bring to bear.

Financial Levers

This does not mean that the United States and its allies are without economic options, however. Even in the absence of complete multilateral coordination, the United States can still exercise leverage if it can identify how and where North Korea finances its international trade and goes aggressively after financial intermediaries. This particular form of sanction does not require multilateral coordination, since foreign banking institutions that conduct significant business in the United States have a strong interest in avoiding institutions that the US Treasury has identified as engaged in illicit finance.

In 2005 the US Treasury signaled that a small Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia, was possibly engaged in money laundering activities on North Korea’s behalf. Without any further action, the bank immediately suffered a run on its deposits and was forced into receivership, freezing $25 million of North Korean funds. The issue became a major sticking point in the Six Party talks but also appeared to motivate the North Koreans to return to them, setting the stage for the agreements reached in 2007. Undoubtedly the North Koreans have attempted to diversify their financial linkages since then.

In sum, the world appears capable of hurting North Korea economically, but given the extreme priority that the regime places on its military capacity, it is unlikely that the pain that the world can bring to bear will be sufficient to induce North Korea to abandon core political goals. However, holding out the possibility of removing these measures could constitute one incentive for a successor government to reassess the country’s diplomatic situation and to terminate its nuclear weapons program.

Read the full articles here:
Sanctions harden the lives of ordinary North Koreans
Oriental Economist
Haggard, Noland
7/3/2009

Posted in Banking, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, International trade | Comments Closed

DPRK defector discussed financial flows

Friday, July 3rd, 2009

Last week we mentioned the curious case of Kim Kwang Jin, a high-ranking defector who helped raise money for the North Korean government who is spending a year here in DC at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. This week he spoke to Fox News and painted a broad picture of the DPRK’s financial strategy:

Trim and sharply dressed, his bushy head of hair dyed jet black, the 42-year-old Kim, once an English professor at a computer college in Pyongyang, speaks polite and fluent English, albeit in a halting style and with a heavy accent.

An interview with FOX News in late June marked Kim’s first with an American TV news channel. Kim recounted his extraordinary experiences working for the Northeast Asia Bank and Korea National Insurance Corporation, where he handled accounts worth hundreds of million of dollars.

He described two economies in North Korea: one administered by the North Korean Cabinet and nominally oriented toward serving the needs of the people; and a “Royal Court economy,” financed by illicit enterprises worldwide and providing the stream of hard currency that keeps Kim Jong Il, and his cronies, ensconsed in power and luxury.

“Kim [Jong Il] himself enjoys a lavish lifestyle,” said Kim Kwang Jin. “He is giving gifts to his associates: the Mercedes-Benz[es] and whiskeys, first-class room and [air]fare from Japan. Everything’s provided to his aides….Kim Jong Il himself is now ruling the country with [the] dollar, hard currency….Without hard currency they cannot rule the country.”

Kim Kwang Jin described a society in which bankers demand bribes from clients, doctors from patients, professors and teachers from students.

“Everybody tries to make use of their position, their authority…to survive,” Kim said.

The former banker said the regime’s largest source of hard currency comes from the clandestine manufacture and sale of weapons of mass destruction. After that comes the regime’s multibillion-dollar insurance fraud business, in which the authorities stage arson and bogus accidents to collect multimillion-dollar payouts from international banks and insurers.

“The state — Kim Jong Il himself — controls all these funds,” said Kim Kwang Jin. “It is funneled to him. And then he’s using all these revenues according to his regime’s priorities, which are now the missile program and nuclear weapons development.”

Kim Kwang Jin believes the North Korean government has never negotiated in good faith with the United States and its allies at the Six-Party nuclear disarmament talks.

“The North Koreans are coming to the table not for negotiation; they are there for winning, for implementing their strategy,” he said. To grant meaningful concessions at such negotiations, or to enact meaningful internal reforms toward democratization, would, Kim says, be tantamount to “suicide to the regime.”

Yet Kim also believes financial sanctions can compel better behavior from Pyongyang, and cites as an example the Treasury Department’s targeting from 2005 to 2008 of Banco Delta Asia: a bank in Macau, also known as “BDA,” through which the North Korean regime once transferred large sums. It was during this period, when Banco Delta Asia faced international restrictions, that the North made its most far-reaching concessions in the Six-Party Talks, only to renege on them once the sanctions were lifted.

“The BDA case was a frightening thing to the regime,” Kim said. “It was a blow to [Kim Jong Il’s] personal funding, to the economic sector which is now supporting the regime. And even the national economy, the people’s economy run by [the] Cabinet, is influenced by this BDA case.

Here is his interview on Fox News via YouTube.

Read the full story here:
North Korean Defector Describes Inner Workings of Isolated Regime
Fox News
James Rosen
7/2/2009

Posted in Banking, Finance, Insurance, Korea National Insurance Corporation | 1 Comment »

White House forms DPRK sanctions team

Sunday, June 28th, 2009

According to the Washington Post:

The White House is ramping up its efforts to enforce sanctions against North Korea by forming a new interagency team to coordinate U.S. actions with other nations, senior administration officials said today.

The new team will be led by former ambassador to Bolivia Philip S. Goldberg, who is slated to leave for China in the near future as the U.S seeks concerted action to stop the North Korean regime from developing nuclear weapons.

“There is a broad consensus about the need to have a focused and engaged effort to see that these sanctions are implemented … and that we’re sharing information with each other,” one official said, speaking on background.

U.S. officials described the new group as a way to focus the administration more squarely on implementation of the latest sanctions, which were approved by the United Nations in the wake of North Korea’s nuclear test last month.

The officials said they are hoping the group — with representatives from the State Department, the White House, the National Security Agency, Treasury and others — will help “shine a spotlight” on the actions of the regime.

“We wanted somebody who woke up every morning and thought about nothing but sanctions implementation,” one official said. “It’s a huge difference when you have somebody who isn’t worried about any of the other aspects of this.”

The White House also announced a renewed effort to use the authority of the U.N. resolution to take financial actions against the North Korean regime in an effort to choke off the money flowing from small arms trade and other activity.

Treasury officials have issued a public memorandum to private financial institutions reminding them of the global condemnation and other risks of doing business with the North Korean regime.

The letter warns that North Korean banks and institutions often use deceptive techniques to engage in financial transactions that could place legitimate financial firms at risk.

“Financial institutions should apply enhanced scrutiny to any such correspondent accounts they maintain, including with respect to transaction monitoring,” the letter states.

One senior official said the U.S. is confident that the financial sanctions will over time help to further isolate North Korea and pressure its leaders to abandon its nuclear program.

“It’s going to take time to have a bite,” he conceded. “But we’re trying to get out of the box quickly.”

The Bush administration also had a sustained effort to implement United Nations sanctions after North Korea first tested a nuclear weapon in 2006.

The Counterproliferation Directorate of the White House National Security Council coordinated the effort, while the State Department and Treasury also co-chaired an interagency effort to examine specific cases that eventually worked their way up the chain for approval.

A team of senior officials, led by the undersecretary of State for arms control, traveled to Asia to work closely with allies. But the effort was dropped after Bush shifted course and decided to pursue diplomacy with North Korea.

Their first stops: China then Malaysia.

Citations:
New North Korea Sanctions Team Formed
Washington Post
Michael D. Shear and Glenn Kessler
6/26/2009

U.S. North Korea sanctions team to visit Malaysia
Reuters UK
7/2/2009

Posted in Banking, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, International trade, Korea Ryongbong General Corp, USA | 1 Comment »

North Korea on Google Earth v.18

Thursday, June 25th, 2009

North Korea Uncovered version 18 is available. This Google Earth overlay maps North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, markets, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks.

This project has now been downloaded over 140,000 times since launching in April 2007 and received much media attention last month following a Wall Street Journal article highlighting the work.

Note: Kimchaek City is now in high resolution for the first time. Information on this city is pretty scarce. Contributions welcome.

Additions to this version include: New image overlays in Nampo (infrastructure update), Haeju (infrastructure update, apricot trees), Kanggye (infrastructure update, wood processing factory), Kimchaek (infrastructure update). Also, river dredges (h/t Christopher Del Riesgo), the Handure Plain, Musudan update, Nuclear Test Site revamp (h/t Ogle Earth), The International School of Berne (Kim Jong un school), Ongjin Shallow Sea Farms, Monument to “Horizon of the Handure Plain”, Unhung Youth Power Station, Hwangnyong Fortress Wall, Kim Ung so House, Tomb of Kim Ung so, Chungnyol Shrine, Onchon Public Library, Onchon Public bathhouse, Anbyon Youth Power Stations.

Posted in Agriculture, Alcohol, Architecture, Art, Automobiles, Aviation, Banking, Coal, Communications, Construction, Dams/hydro, Education, Electricity, Energy, Environmental protection, Film, Football (soccer), Forestry, Gambling, Gasoline, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Golf, Google Earth, Health care, Hoteling, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), Intranet, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Mass games, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Nuclear, Oil, Pyongyang Metro, Railways, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Religion, Restaurants, Sea shipping, Sports, Tourism, Transportation, Wind | 4 Comments »

DPRK reinsurance update

Sunday, June 21st, 2009

In December 2008 this blog discussed how the DPRK’s Korea National Insurance Corporation (KNIC) received USD$58 million from several European reinsurance companies in a legal settlement.

Well, the Washington Post offers an update on how the money is being moved and even highlights the story of a defector who claims to be involved in the DPRK’s insurance racket:

For Kim Jong Il’s birthday, North Korean insurance managers prepared a special gift.

In Singapore, they stuffed $20 million in cash into two heavy-duty bags and sent them, via Beijing, to their leader in Pyongyang, said Kim Kwang Jin, who worked as a manager for Korea National Insurance Corp., a state-owned monopoly.

Kim said he helped arrange the shipment and watched in February 2003 as the cash was packed. After the money arrived, Kim Jong Il sent a letter of thanks to the managers and arranged for some of them to receive gifts that included oranges, apples, DVD players and blankets, Kim said.

“It was a great celebration,” he said.

The $20 million birthday present and the gratitude of its recipient, who is known as the Dear Leader, were annual highlights of a sophisticated global insurance fraud that North Korea has concocted to provide its communist leadership with hard currency, said Kim, who spent five years as an executive of the state insurance company in Pyongyang and worked for a year at its banking subsidiary in Singapore before defecting to South Korea.

The British court ruled the way it did [NKeconWatch: this might be an error as the court did not rule on the case–it was settled] because the reinsurance companies contractually agreed to be bound by the North Korean court system (which to nobody’s surprise systematically rules in favor of domestic agencies and firms). Since the western reinsurance firms could not prove that the DPRK was committing fraud, they had to pay up.

And how does this program work?

While working for North Korea’s insurance monopoly, Kim Kwang Jin said, he and other managers had a tightly focused mission: to find reinsurance companies and brokers in different parts of the world who would accept high premiums to reinsure KNIC’s policies.

Those policies, he said, usually covered losses from common North Korean disasters such as mining accidents, industrial fires, transportation crashes and crop losses due to floods.

“The major point of the reinsurance operation is that they are banking on disaster,” he said. “Whenever there is a disaster, it becomes a source of hard currency.”

According to Kim, KNIC would target a different potential disaster and a different reinsurance company each year. “We pass it around,” he said. “One year, it might be Lloyd’s; the next year, it might be Swiss Re; and the next, Munich Re.”

In London, the expert on the insurance industry familiar with the helicopter case echoed Kim’s assessment of how KNIC operated. He spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized by reinsurers to talk about the case.

“They pay good premiums, and they are very sophisticated, very clever,” he said. “They would divvy business up into very small bites and use different brokers in different places. The division of losses was such that it would never be apparent to a prospective reinsurer just how bad the business was.”

The North Koreans were known in the reinsurance industry for their capacity to prepare meticulously documented claims, speed them through puppet courts in Pyongyang and demand quick payment from international reinsurers. The North sometimes restricts the ability of reinsurers to dispatch investigators to verify claims.

The North Korean insurance monopoly sometimes took advantage of the geographical and political ignorance of brokers and reinsurers, according to the London-based insurance expert. Some brokers and companies, he said, thought they were dealing with a company from South Korea, while others were unaware that North Korea is a secretive totalitarian state with one of the world’s worst human rights records.

…

When he worked at KNIC, Kim said, annual revenue from North Korea’s reinsurance claims was about $50 million to $60 million. Most of that money, he said, was used to scout out potential disasters inside North Korea, to buy more reinsurance on the global market and to pay premiums.

“The remaining hard currency should have been used to help people recover from disasters and accidents, but it was not used that way,” Kim said. “It is just going into the pocket of Kim Jong Il.”

He said cash shipments of $20 million arrived yearly in Pyongyang, usually in the week before Feb. 16, which is Kim Jong Il’s birthday and a national holiday. In his six years at KNIC, Kim said, bags of cash arrived in Pyongyang from Singapore, Switzerland, France and Austria.

The money, he added, was delivered to an entity called Bureau 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee. It was created by Kim Jong Il in the 1970s to collect hard currency and give him an independent power base, according to defectors, Seoul-based analysts and published reports. These sources agree that Bureau 39 spends foreign currency on luxury goods for the North Korean elite, components for missiles and other weapons programs.

With Bureau 39 skimming off hard-currency earnings returned to North Korea by KNIC’s global operation, Kim said, claims to disaster victims had to be paid in won, North Korea’s currency.

“That money is nearly worthless at present, because the economy has collapsed,” he said. “This means that little is done to help people recover from fires or whatever.”

But Kim Jong Il has been pleased with the state insurance company, Kim said.

“It brings him large amounts of hard currency,” Kim said. “Working in insurance is one of the best professions in North Korea. Many people want to do it.”

Mr. Kim is working in the Washington DC area this year with the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.

Read the full artocle here:
Global Insurance Fraud By North Korea Outlined
Washington Post
Blane Harden
6/18/2009

Posted in Bureau 39, Finance, Insurance, Korea National Insurance Corporation, Minjok Insurance General Company | 5 Comments »

The Political Economy of North Korea: Implications for Denuclearization and Proliferation

Tuesday, June 16th, 2009

Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
East-West Center Working Papers
Economics Series, No. 104
Download paper here (PDF)

Abstract:
Despite North Korea’s turn away from economic reform and the constraints of the second nuclear crisis, the country has in fact become more economically open. But it has emphasized closer economic relations with China and other trading partners that show little interest in political quid-pro-quos, let alone sanctions. Yet the U.S. can still exercise economic leverage by going aggressively after third-party financial intermediaries. This particular form of sanction does not require multilateral coordination, since foreign banking institutions that conduct significant business in the United States have a strong interest in avoiding institutions that the United States Treasury has identified as money laundering or proliferation concerns.

There is some evidence that North Korea moderated its missile proliferation activities during periods when rapprochement with the United States, and to a lesser extent Japan, was a priority, but in the absence of such interest and as legitimate trade, investment, and aid dry up, the incentives to intensify proliferation activities increase.

The internal organization of the North Korean economy has important implications for any policy seeking transformation via engagement. The economy is structured in such a way that outside economic ties are still largely monopolized by stateowned enterprises and other gatekeepers, such as the military. Under such circumstances, the precise design of engagement policies requires very close scrutiny. Even nominally commercial relations can be exploited if the North Korean counterparties believe that they are ultimately political in nature, subsidized and thus vulnerable to blackmail. If economic ties are truly commercial in nature, those choosing to trade and invest with North Korea do so at their own risk. Under these circumstances, private actors will make economic decisions fully factoring in political risk, and North Korea will bear the costs if it chooses to renege on commitments or fails to provide a supportive policy environment.

Paper prepared for the conference on “North Korean Nuclear Politics: Constructing a New Northeast Asian Order in the 21st Century,” University of Washington, June 4-5, 2009. We would like to thank the Smith Richardson, MacArthur, and Korea Foundations for financial support and Jennifer Lee for research assistance.

UPDATE: A shorter version of this paper can be found here.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Arms shipment, Banking, China, Economic reform, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Illicit activities, Military | Comments Closed

Currency Conversion during Korean Unification

Wednesday, March 18th, 2009

Writing for the Brookings Institution’s Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Yeongseop Rhee, Nonresident Fellow in Foreign Policy, takes on the topic of eventual currency union between North and South Korea, assuming that the two Koreas will eventually be unified and that the unification will follow a rapid process rather than a gradual one.

Under these conditions, Rhee discusses the complications of determining a proper conversion rate for the DPRK won, rejecting the official and black market rates, ultimately determining that an undervlued DPRK won conversion rate is preferable to a situation in which the DPRK won is converted at a rate above its true exchange value (a la German reunification). Quoting from the article:

The decision on a conversion rate will depend upon which policy objective is the most important. Considering their relative impacts and past experiences, I suggest that price/macroeconomic stability and competitiveness of North Korean industries should have the high priority: undervaluation of North Korean currency is therefore more desirable.[3] The experiences of other socialist countries show that inflation was one of the most difficult problems at the beginning of economic reforms. Even though the details of each country’s reform path depend upon the state of the economy, price/macroeconomic stabilization has to be the initial priority. Once price/macroeconomic stability is guaranteed, foreign capital – which North Korea eagerly needs for its successful transformation and development – can be attracted.

The undervaluation of North Korean currency is also desirable in terms of labor migration. According to studies on German unification,[4] the most important reason for migration from East to West was not the high incomes in West Germany, but the lack of job opportunities in East Germany. This implies that the overvaluation of North Korean currency to improve the standard of living of the North Korean people would cause more migration because of suffering competitiveness of North Korean firms and job opportunity, and would further place a higher burden on the government budget.

The author then goes on to address the timing of monetary unification (rapid vs. delayed conversion), prefering to emulate the German model of early conversion. Quoting from the article:

First, most proponents of a late currency union argue that currency unification needs to be delayed for a few years until North Korean economy is stabilized and improves to a certain level. However, a temporary delay of a few years will not guarantee the improvement of the North Korean economy to a certain level but is more likely to lead to its deterioration. Even though the North Korean economy may improve, it actually must grow much faster than South Korean economy for a long time to reach a certain compatible level. For example, even assuming North Korean economic growth of 10 percent per year – which would be extremely difficult – it will still take nearly one generation for North Korean per capita income to reach one half of the South Korean level. This suggests that it is impossible to improve the North Korean economy to a certain level compatible with South Korea’s within a few years. Thus, in terms of feasibility, an early union is better.

Second, a gradual strategy for economic reform and opening, such as China has chosen, would not be applicable to North Korea. In comparison with China, North Korea is over-industrialized like Eastern European countries. In this type of economy where the state sector is dominant, there is little reserve of labor outside the state sector that can provide the engine for growth for a new non-state sector, and gradualism cannot work in that context. A sharp downturn in industrial production upon the outset of market reforms is inevitable, and a significant loss of employment in the industrial sector should be expected and accepted as a structural adjustment in North Korea. Thus, the unified fiscal and monetary policy framework to promote structural reforms should be prepared as soon as possible through an early currency union.

Third, according to the theory of optimum currency area, if there exists an adjustment mechanism such as flexible prices and wages or other measures to absorb asymmetric shocks, it is more likely for two countries to form an optimum currency area. When the two Koreas are unified, large fiscal transfers from South Korea to North Korea can play that role of adjustment mechanism because asymmetric shocks to North Korea can be compensated by these fiscal transfers. The two Germanys could form an optimum currency area after the unification because of the centralization of the fiscal system. Thus, as long as fiscal transfers are guaranteed, which will be a sure fact in the case of Korean unification, the loss of the exchange rate policy instrument would not matter much in terms of absorbing asymmetric shocks, and an early monetary union is preferable.

Read the full article on the Brookings web page here.

(more…)

Posted in Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, South Korea | Comments Closed

North Korea Google Earth

Wednesday, March 11th, 2009

North Korea Uncovered v.16
Download it here

The most recent version of North Korea Uncovered (North Korea Google Earth) has been published. Since being launched, this project has been continuously expanded and to date has been downloaded over 32,000 times.

Pictured to the left is a statue of Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo. This statue, as well as many others identified in this version of the project, was built by the North Koreans. According to a visitor:

From the neck down, the Kabila monument looks strangely like Kim Jong Il: baggy uniform, creased pants, the raised arm, a little book in his left hand. From the neck up, the statue is the thick, grim bald mug of Laurent Kabila (his son Joseph is the current president). “The body was made in North Korea,” explains my driver Felix. In other words, the body is Kim Jong Il’s, but with a fat, scowling Kabila head simply welded on.

This is particularly interesting because there are no known pictures of a Kim Jong il statue. The only KJI statue that is reported to exist is in front of the National Security Agency in Pyongyang. If a Kim Jong il statue does in fact exist, it might look something like this.

Thanks again to the anonymous contributors, readers, and fans of this project for your helpful advice and location information. This project would not be successful without your contributions.

Version 16 contains the following additions: Rakwon Machine Complex, Sinuiju Cosmetics Factory, Manpo Restaurant, Worker’s Party No. 3 Building (including Central Committee and Guidance Dept.), Pukchang Aluminum Factory, Pusan-ri Aluminum Factory, Pukchung Machine Complex, Mirim Block Factory, Pyongyang General Textile Factory, Chonnae Cement Factory, Pyongsu Rx Joint Venture, Tongbong Cooperative Farm, Chusang Cooperative Farm, Hoeryong Essential Foodstuff Factory, Kim Ki-song Hoeryong First Middle School , Mirim War University, electricity grid expansion, Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground (TSLG)” is also known as the “Musudan-ri Launching Station,” rebuilt electricity grid, Kumchang-ri suspected underground nuclear site, Wangjaesan Grand Monument, Phothae Revolutionary Site, Naedong Revolutionary Site, Kunja Revolutionary Site, Junggang Revolutionary Site, Phophyong Revolutionary Site, Samdung Revolutionary Site, Phyongsan Granite Mine, Songjin Iron and Steel Complex (Kimchaek), Swedish, German and British embassy building, Taehongdan Potato Processing Factory, Pyongyang Muyseum of Film and Theatrical Arts, Overseas Monuments built by DPRK: Rice Museum (Muzium Padi) in Malaysia, Statue de Patrice Lumumba (Kinshasa, DR Congo), National Heroes Acre (Windhoek, Namibia), Derg Monument (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), National Heroes Acre (Harare, Zimbabwe), New State House (Windhoek, Namibia), Three Dikgosi (Chiefs) Monument (Gaborone, Botswana), 1st of May Square Statue of Agostinho Neto (Luanda, Angola), Momunment Heroinas Angolas (Luanda, Angola), Monument to the Martyrs of Kifangondo Battle (Luanda, Angola), Place de l’étoile rouge, (Porto Novo, Benin), Statue of King Béhanzin (Abomey, Benin), Monument to the African Renaissance (Dakar, Senegal), Monument to Laurent Kabila [pictured above] (Kinshasa, DR Congo).

Posted in Agriculture, Architecture, Art, Automobiles, Aviation, Banking, Coal, Communications, Computing/IT, Construction, Dams/hydro, Education, Electricity, Energy, Environmental protection, Figure skating, Film, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, Football (soccer), Forestry, Gambling, Gasoline, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Golf, Google Earth, Health care, Hoteling, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), Intranet, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Leisure, Library, Light Industry, Mansudae Overseas Development Group, Manufacturing, Mass games, Military, Mining/Minerals, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Music, Nuclear, Oil, Pyongyang Metro, Railways, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Real estate, Religion, Restaurants, Sea shipping, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Sports, Telephones, Television, Tourism, Transportation, Water, Wind | 10 Comments »

North Korea’s transformation: A legal perspective

Thursday, February 12th, 2009

The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) published an interesting paper (with the above title) on legal reform in the DPRK. Below are some highlights. Links to the entire paper at the bottom.

As citizens have been left without state provisions for subsistence since the state did not have the material resources to supply the people through its central rationing system, the vast majority of individuals and organizations had to support themselves. Legitimizing commercial and market activity and expanding the scope of private ownership were a part of this effort. One of the most important laws reflecting this transformation is the Damage Compensation Law (sonhae bosang-beop), which is the North Korean version of a general torts law. This law holds an individual or any legal entity liable for its tort when damage is inflicted. Monetary compensation is the rule, while restoration is allowed when possible.

Under the socialist system, where the state is responsible for the provision of a citizen’s livelihood, tort law was of little use. Even in the case of death, one’s family would not suffer economically since the state provided sustenance rations. However, with the collapse of the public distribution system, the North Korean authorities could no longer maintain their socialist system. Since an individual now has to rely on his or her own devices, the loss of the employment, for example, directly inflicts a financial burden on the individual or family. Therefore, damage to property or person should be compensated for by the responsible party. Therefore, the new damage compensation law acts as a new mechanism for the protection of private property, and strengthens individual responsibility for negligent acts that inflict damage on others.

and…

Relaxation of law and order, along with the laxity of organizational control due to economic difficulties, changed individual attitudes toward government authorities and organizations in which these individuals were members. Individuals became more independent from the state and its organizations, since both the state and more directly engaged organizations lost important means of control over individuals in society due to the lack of resources and the inability to provide basic necessities to the people.

Under these circumstances, individual victims had no appropriate method to seek compensation for damage through an official dispute resolution process. This has led to an environment in which self-remedy has become the rule, rather than the exception. Although new criminal law punishes those who have used force in asserting their rights, there is no effective means of dispute resolution outside of taking advantage of officials willing to look the other way in exchange for favors, or hiring thugs to more directly resolve disagreements. Citizens can buy justice through bribes, and law enforcement officials are especially helpful in these endeavors when their palms are greased. This is much more economical as well as effective than bringing a case to the relevant official agency, which is generally incapable of resolving problems and instead further exploits the situation.

On courts and lawyers…

For example, the most prominent role of the court in North Korea, where other types of lawsuit are very unusual, was to handle divorce settlements, since divorce through simple agreement of the two parties was not allowed. Ordinary citizens went so far as to perceive settlement of divorce to be the most important role of the court. Criminal cases were also unusual. Political crime is handled through a non-judicial process, while many deviances are resolved through unofficial processes within more local organizations. The role of the court in resolving disputes was negligible, aside from divorce. Since the role of law enforcement agencies is to protect the state and secure the socialist system, the most important qualification for them is not legal expertise, but rather, loyalty and devotion to the North Korean ideology and system.

On the other hand, the Lawyer’s Act of 1993 prescribes the required qualifications of a lawyer. Those who are eligible to work as lawyers are those who are certified legal professionals, those who have working experience of no less than 5 years in legal affairs, or those who have a professional license in a certain area and have passed the bar examination after a short-term course in legal education. This qualification for working as a lawyer signifies that the state wants to equip the judicial system with legal professionals. Although there is no explicit professional qualification for a judge or prosecutor, we may assume that legal professionals have been elected or recruited in practice. This trend is likely to be reinforced as these social changes continue to unfold.

New provisions were also introduced to reinforce the judicial system. For example, interference with a law enforcement official’s performance of duties is now a punishable offence ; Threatening a witness or exacting revenge has been criminalized ; Non-execution of judgment will now be punished. Although the introduction of these provisions was an expression of the government’s effort to bring in a more effective judicial system, it would not be an easy task under the vague status of transformation. The state is very cautious and reluctant to undertake bold or fundamental changes due to concerns about political instability. Therefore, it takes time for various coherent mechanisms to fully support a market system.

You can download the entire paper in PDF format here.

You can read it on the IFES web page here.

Posted in 2002 Economic reforms, Automobiles, Aviation, Black markets, Damage Compensation Law, DPRK Policies, Economic reform, Finance, Foreign direct investment, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Insurance, International trade, Joint Ventures, Lawyers Act, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Price liberalization, Private property, Railways, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Real estate, Sea shipping, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Transportation | 2 Comments »

Remittances to DPRK grow

Tuesday, February 10th, 2009

From the Choson Ilbo:

The number of North Korean refugees who remit money to their families in the North is rising. “Some 15,000 North Korean refugees have settled in the country, and over 6,000 of them are remitting money to North Korea,” a government official said. “We understand the size of the remittances is also growing.” An official with a refugee organization said there must be more than 10,000 who remit money to their families in the North.

If some 6,000 North Korean refugees here send money North, and a refugee remits US$1,000 a year, some $6 million is sent to North Korea per year. To that should be added 20,000-30,000 of the 100,000 North Koreans estimated to live in China.

Remittance routes are clandestine. Money is remitted to a Chinese broker, who contacts another in North Korea, who pays the recipient with his own money and settles the account with the Chinese broker later, leaving no documentary trail.

Currencies are usually American dollars and Chinese yuan. Commissions range between 15 and 20 percent, according to sources. “Remittances through brokers designated by North Koreans generally reach the recipient without a hitch, but Chinese brokers contacted in China are liable to steal the money,” a refugee said. The brokers handle tens of millions of dollars and are linked to organized gangs.

In the past, remittances required enormous bribes. First a man had to be sent to North Korea to bribe guards, with commissions exceeding 40 percent. But with the emergence of remittance brokers and the establishment of an organized system, the amount of money that reaches North Korean families has increased substantially.

The North Korean won is practically worthless in international exchange. A North Korean workers’ average salary was between W2,500 and 3,000 as of the end of 2008. Given that US$1 is traded at W3,200, $1,000 is the equivalent of 100 years’ worth of earnings and buys two apartments in places like Chongjin, North Hamgyeong Province, or Hamhung, South Hamgyeong Province.

In the past, the DPRK has promoted remittances—particularly to Koreans repatriated from Japan and their families. The DPRK government then extracted its share of these funds by offering western goods for sale in hard currency shops at inflated prices.

The DPRK could do worse at promoting its legitimacy than to adopt the same policy in regards to remittances from every other country. If the DPRK allowed remittances to flow through official channels, the government could simply extract a service fee equal to or slightly below the black market rate. That is a win-win (except for the smugglers).

UPDATE: Japanese goods were (are?) historically sold at the Ragwan Deaprtment Store next to the Changwang Hotel (North-West of the Central District).

Another point to consider is the unfortunate role of politics in preventing the adoption of efficiency-enhancing economic reforms. In the case of remittances, the DPRK would certainly have political problems with letting defectors send money to their relatives back home. Under this particular constraint smuggling might be the next best option. Since the operation is clandestine, the government does not have to acknowledge it exists, yet at the same time people can receive their remittancs and (some part of) the governance structure collects “taxes”.

What “taxes”? The few people who are carrying out the financial transactions will have pay decent protection money to a sponsor high in the food chain. The work is risky for numerous reasons, but we know some important people are behind it becuase the operation requires managers to keep enough hard currency on hand to cover the monthy/anual remittance payments from 6,000+ defectors.

Read the full article here:
Refugees’ Remittances to N.Korea ‘Growing’
Choson Ilbo
2/10/2009

Posted in Finance, Foreign aid statistics, International Aid, South Korea, Statistics | Comments Closed

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