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Official holiday gifts for sale in marketplace

Thursday, April 14th, 2011

For the last few years, stories have appeared in the media about people selling their official 2.16 and 4.15 holiday gifts from the leaders.

The Daily NK gets the first story this time around:

“Is it true that Day of the Sun gifts are being sold in the jangmadang?”

Most defectors answer to that question is something like, “Isn’t it obvious; selling them can give us enough money for one kilogram of rice?” In the past, gifts from Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on national holidays used to be quite precious and an honor for the people, but now they have become a way to lessen difficulties.

According to defectors, special stalls selling “Day of the Sun gifts” have even appeared.

Even the annual crackdown on selling such gifts is a mere formality. Ham In Suk, who came to the South in 2009, said, “The crackdown is carried out temporarily, but it is not effective and not particularly problematic.”

On the biggest national holidays, the Day of Sun and Kim Jong Il’s birthday, the authorities present gifts to children in day nurseries (four to five years of age), kindergartens (six year old) and elementary students (seven to eleven years old).

In one pack, there are usually around 400g of cookies, 400g of candy, 50g of jellies, 100g of rice crackers and five pieces of gum, although the quality and quantity of gifts differs by province.

A ceremony for giving the gifts to children is held a few days before the birthday in kindergartens, and elementary schools, meaning roughly February 14th and April 13th.

Then, on the afternoon of the day when the ceremony finishes you can easily find gifts in the jangmadang. People sell them to traders for a comparatively cheap price decided by weight.

A one-kilogram pack is sold for 1500 won, and the traders sell them on for 2000 won. Therefore, people can earn enough for one kilogram of rice by selling one pack of the gifts and thus have a hot dinner with family to commemorate the national holiday.

According to defectors, the General’s gifts have been on sale in the jangmadang since the March of Tribulation. This is because even though food distribution was suspended during that tough period, gifts from Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il continued.

Before that, it was apparently hard to find the gifts in the markets at all, no matter how hard lives were. At that time on the morning of the holiday, parents even made their children bow to portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il before they ate the gifts.

One defector who came to South Korea in 2009 said, “Selling gifts was beyond our imagination before the March of Tribulation, and we even stopped our children from opening the pack of cookies before saying a pledge of loyalty.”

In the 2000s, when people began to purchase Chinese products and food and several kinds of cookies in the jangmadang, the situation for snacks also changed; people in more affluent households sold their gifts from the authorities to the jangamdang to purchase more delicious cookies for their children.

In poor houses, however, parents take the gifts from their children and sell them to get a kilogram of rice. Instead of the General’s gifts, they give their children corn cookies costing around 150 won.

Here are previous posts on this topics.

Read the full story here:
General’s Gifts on Sale in the Jangmadang
Daily NK
Kang Mi Jin
2011-4-14

Posted in Food, Political economy, Price liberalization | Comments Closed

Exchange rate data

Wednesday, April 6th, 2011

The The UN World Food Prgram’s Rapid Food Security Assessment Mission (RFSA) offered some exchange rate data that I thought was worth pointing out:

Currently the official exchange rate is about USD1=KPW100 yet the market rate is closer to USD1=KPW3000. In other words, the redenomination of the national currency that occurred in November 2009 is all but neutralized. The effects of this policy on ordinary citizens appear to be mixed where people with over KPW 100,000 lost their savings. The purpose of such a policy was to control inflation by reducing money supply and to curb the growth in private enterprise. Worker salaries remained the same, but prices were reduced significantly.

The PDS prices were revised downwards in the wake of the currency revaluation making it even more affordable, at least in principle. For example, PDS prices of rice declined from KPW 44 to KPW 24 per kg and maize declined from KPW 24 to KPW 14. At these low prices the issue is the lack of commodities in the market, rather than consumers lacking money to purchase them.

An average worker makes around KPW 3,000 to KPW 4,000 per month. This translates into a dollar per month which only works in DPRK because everything is heavily subsidized and ordinary citizens do not rely on direct purchases of imported commodities. If PDS were to run out of cereals at the end April, people would not have the means to purchase cereals on the black market, where prices are KPW2000 per kilogram of rice and about KPW 1000 for maize. It is highly doubtful that the barter system which is the backbone of this informal economy will be able to withstand a shock of this magnitude over more than a couple of weeks. A humanitarian crisis is the likely outcome of such a series of events.

Posted in Banking, Black markets, Economic reform, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, Price liberalization, Public Distribiution System (PDS) | Comments Closed

Daily NK reports on DPRK food prices

Sunday, February 13th, 2011

According to the Daily NK:

Overall average prices in North Korea have doubled since the end of last year.

Sources say that the reason behind the price rises is insufficient supplies within North Korea coupled to the effect of relatively strict crackdowns on the smuggling of goods in from China.

Rice is now reportedly 2,000 won per kilo (as of the 11th). Late last year it was between 900 and 1,000 won.

In late January, rice even reportedly reached 3,000 won in some areas. A source explained why, “There were rumors that state rice stores were empty, because even those people who are targeted for state distribution didn’t get any food in late January in some areas.” So, he went on, “Around that time, wholesalers colluded to fixed the price at 3,000 won.”

Thereafter, the source said, “Now, rice has dropped to around 2,000won,” explaining that, “When the price went up, the supply increased, so the price was amended again.” According to the latest research by The Daily NK, rice is now selling for 2,000 won in Pyongyang and Shinuiju, while in Nampo it is 1,900 won and 1,800 won in Hyesan..

Corn, which generally costs half as much as rice, now sells for between 1,000 and 1,200 won, which is exactly double the price at the end of last year. Pork, which sold for 3,500 won per kilo in December last year, now goes for 6,500 won.

Sugar is even worse, having tripled: late last year it was 1,700 won per kilo, but has now reached more than 5,000 won. Red chilli pepper powder has also gone up from 7,000 won per kilo to 15,000 won.

Even though the North Korean authorities emphasized improving light industrial and agricultural production in the New Year’s Common Editorial, in reality the country is experiencing serious inflation due to a lack of goods in the markets. Therefore, it seems inevitable that people’s lives will get harder.

Read the full story here:
Inflation on the Rise in 2011
Daily NK
By Park Jun Hyeong
2/13/2011

Posted in Agriculture, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, Price liberalization | 1 Comment »

DPRK food prices drop

Monday, January 31st, 2011

According to the Choson Ilbo:

The price of rice and foreign currency exchange rate in North Korea have both dropped drastically in a matter of a week, according to Radio Free Asia.

The radio station reported Saturday that rice in Hyesan, Yanggang Province was selling for 2,000 won per kg as of Friday, down from 3,300 won or nearly 40 percent from six days earlier. The Chinese yuan was trading for 400 North Korean won, down from 520.

A local source said that various rumors had prompted merchants to stockpile rice and then suddenly release it. The source also added that the rice requisitioned for the military, a key cause of recent price increases, is being siphoned off and sold, bringing the price down.

Read the full story here:
Rice Prices in N.Korea Plunge 40%
Choson Ilbo
1/31/2011

Posted in Food, Price liberalization | Comments Closed

North Korean economy suffers in the new year: Power shortages and prices on the rise

Thursday, January 27th, 2011

Pictured above: Nampho Glass Bottle Factory visited by Kim Jong-il

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
(NK Brief No. 11-01-26)
1/26/2011

According to North Korean media, Kim Jong Il began this year’s onsite instruction with a visit to the Nampo Glass Bottle Factory. The January 20th issue of the Choson Sinbo also ran an editorial stating that “These days, in our country, improving the lives of the people is especially emphasized.” It also noted that Kim Jong Il’s first onsite visit of the year was to a site important to improving people’s standard of living. The paper boasted that great efforts were being made in the development of light industry — especially factories producing daily-use goods and food products — and revealed that the bottle factory in Nampo will play an important role in meeting the increased countrywide demands for packaging from factories large and small.

Despite this praise, the reality is that the people of North Korea are suffering ever-worsening economic conditions. Just as South Korea is in the middle of a cold spell, the North has suffered chilling conditions ever since the end of December. The Korean Central News Agency reported on January 22, “The cold-weather conditions are expected to continue until the end of January,” and, “this cold spell is causing more than a little damage to the lives of the people and to spring farming preparations.”

As the cold spell drags on, their hardship will continue. North Korea is ill-prepared to deal with such cold weather; freezing pipes make it difficult for the people to access fresh water, while food and firewood are in short supply. Hunger and cold are exacerbated this winter because those without access to firewood or heating oil are also faced with an environment devoid of wild plants or animals.

Power shortages have also grown more severe in the new year. On January 20, Open Radio for North Korea (ORNK) reported that an area of the Yanggang Province has been without electricity since the first of the month. Even Pyongyang has been experiencing power difficulties, with electricity only available to most residents for 1~2 hours each day. ORNK reported that “recently in North Korea, students and parents have been burdened with supplying firewood for school heating, while the prices of coal and wood are skyrocketing in the markets.”

The cost of food has also shot through the roof. Rice, corn, pork, and other staple foods are becoming increasingly more expensive. Young-wha Lee, a spokesperson for the Japanese human rights organization Rescue the North Korean People! Urgent Action Network (RENK), announced on January 17 that a source inside North Korea had reported a 500 Won jump in the price of rice within Pyongyang, from 1,400 Won per kilogram on the January 7 to 1,900 Won within 3~4 days. Corn jumped from 750 to 950 Won, and pork was up from just under 4,000 Won to its current price at around 5,000 Won. Gasoline now costs 3,500 Won.

According to a South Korean online source for news on North Korea, Daily NK, one can see the impact of inflation by taking notice of the price gap of around 200 Won per kilogram of rice in Pyongyang and rice in rural areas (North Pyongan Province’s Sinuiju and Ryanggang Province’s Hyesan, in particular). It is noteworthy that prices are shooting up in January, rather than during the lean season of March and April.

Good Friends, a South Korean-based humanitarian organization, has also relayed reports of inflation from sources within North Korea. It has reported that rice was selling in Pyongyang for as much as 2,100 Won per kilogram on January 7, significantly more than the 1,600 Won per kilogram reported at the end of last year. Prices continued to hover around 2,000 Won until recent rations eased shortages and brought the price back down to around 1,500 Won. As North Korean organizations and social units distribute these overdue holiday rations, there has been a fall in food prices.

However, these rations were not seen in all areas of the North, and in those regions where residents were not provided food, prices remain high. Rice in Hamheung jumped from 1,500 Won per kilogram on January 1 to 1,800 Won just one week later. On January 7, similar prices were seen in Chongjin (1,750 Won) and Sinuiju (1,800 Won). Ten days later, rice in Chongjin had climbed to 1,980 Won, and was threatening to break the 2,000 Won barrier. Corn in Pyongyang was selling for 950 Won per kilogram on January 7, while it cost 780 Won in Chongjin and 850 Won in Hamheung, Sinuiju, and Pyongsong. By January 17, corn averaged between 750 and 800 Won. Only in Pyongyang, agricultural regions, and other areas receiving rations had prices fallen to 600 Won per kilogram.

According Good Friends, grain prices in the North have shot up this year because several Party officials in charge of grain imports are behind schedule with incoming shipments, and the rising value of the US dollar and Chinese yuan have driven up the cost of overseas purchases.

Posted in Electricity, Energy, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Light Industry, Manufacturing, Price liberalization | 1 Comment »

Security agents raise money from defector families

Thursday, January 27th, 2011

Pictured above: Ontan Worker’s District, Onsong (Google Earth)

According ot the Daily NK:

In advance of next week’s lunar New Year’s Day holiday, National Security Agency agents are concentrating on getting together things for the holiday from households of those whose family members have crossed into China or South Korea.

Exploitation by the NSA or other powerful state apparatus is exceedingly common, of course, and the obtainment of necessities for holidays such as Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s birthdays, the Korean thanksgiving day (Chuseok) and lunar New Year’s Day are often covered via exploitation of the people. The difference this time, however, is that the specific targets are the families of defectors.

A source from North Hamkyung Province told The Daily NK today, “NSA agents in charge of northern border regions including Onsung have been engrossed in preparations for the holidays and generating private benefits, targeting smugglers and households with family members who have crossed into China or South Korea.”

The source explained, “Modes of exploitation by agents of the NSA and People’s Safety Ministry and cadres of the Party or prosecutors have been varied of late. They win houses which have problems over to their side and then get them to give certain things.”

The source said that as the lunar New Year’s Day comes closer, these moves have become more active and transparent. “NSA agents visit all of these houses and force them, or sometimes beg for things. They are no different from thieves, just without a knife.”

According to the source, the Conspiracy Research Office of the NSC in Onsung, North Hamkyung Province, which employs 25 agents, has allotted each agent items to get from their district.

There are two sets of items: one set is ten bottles of liquor, 5kg of pork, 20 packs of expensive cigarettes called “Yeomyung,” and the other set contains 20kg of gasoline, a certain amount of fruit and candy, and bottles of oil. Each agent has to select one set.

According to Onsung Jangmadang standards, a bottle of liquor can be bought for 4,000 won, 1kg of pork for 5,000 won, a pack of “Yeomyung” for 6,000 won, 1kg of gasoline 3,000 won, and a bottle of oil for 5,000 won.

In Ontan workers-district within Onsung, there are three agents. The goods assigned to them are also unaffordable, but only defector families have to provide them, the source said.

The source explained, “When an agent visits one’s home, they won’t leave until the host has set up a table of drinks for him. After drinking some, the agent coaxes them, ‘Have you got some news from the South?’ ‘Are you getting money well?’ or ‘When you get a call next time, you should grumble that the situation is hard, so that they will send more money.’”

Sometimes, agents call for bribes for their own family events, too. The source said, “While talking, agents hint furtively that there will be a family event and call for something for that, saying, ‘There will be nothing bad for you if you help out.’”

“Agents say openly that, ‘If more money is delivered, we can live well; it’s is a good thing, and a way to maintain socialism.’ They only need so much as to smell money and they come running,” the source complained.

Due to possible revenge from agents, people cannot complain about the situation and have to provide them with the things they demand, according to the source, who added, “However, the effect works only at that moment when they get the goods. When a problem occurs for these defector families, they are nowhere to be seen.”

Read the full story here:
Defector Families Are Moneybags for NSA Agents
Daily NK
Im Jeong Jin
1/27/2011

Posted in Finance, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Ministry of State Security (MPSS, NSA, SSD), Political economy, Price liberalization | Comments Closed

Marcus Noland on NK’s refugees and economy

Sunday, January 16th, 2011

Evan Ramstad at the Wall Street Journal: Korea Real Time interviews Marcus Noland:

Only a handful of outside economists spend the enormous time required to delve into the mysteries of North Korea.

Marcus Noland is one of them. With his research and writing partner Stephen Haggard, Mr. Noland has written several books about the North, including a definitive study on the famine that gripped the country from the mid- to late-1990s and resulted in the death of at least 1 million people and perhaps upwards of 2 million.

In a new book published this week, called Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea, Messrs. Noland and Haggard produce the results of interviews they and their researchers conducted with more than 1,600 North Koreans who fled the country. The interviews took place from 2004 to 2008 and involved people who left North Korea as early as 1991.

The book documents the remarkable changes inside the North through the eyes of people who lived through them. Of course, it’s a group that holds negative views of North Korea. But the economists do their best to take that into account.

Mr. Noland, who is based at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, discussed the book with us. Here’s an excerpt of the interview:

WSJ: Most books and studies on North Korea by people outside the country are focused on the nuclear weapons issue and the geopolitics around that. Why have you focused on refugees and the economy?

Mr. Noland: An understudied aspect of the North Korea story, we believe, is the really quite dramatic internal changes that have been going on in North Korea over the last 10 to 20 years. North Korea poses an analytical challenge in that access is limited and the conventional ways that one could go studying a country aren’t available. In this context, the diaspora of refugees leaving the country is an important source of information.

The refugees themselves constitute a first-order crisis. Most of these people, in a clinical setting, would probably be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Their mental health issues appear to be related not only to the difficult circumstances they faced in China but their experiences in North Korea.

WSJ: What is the cause of those stresses?

Mr. Noland: Specifically the loss of family members and family separations associated with the famine. The sense among many of them that they were abandoned in their moment of greatest need. The feeling that they were not given access to international humanitarian aid, which many of them believe was diverted to the military. And the experience of many of them of having been arrested and incarcerated in North Korea’s vast and sprawling penal system.

So the refugees themselves are an issue. They also provide us a window into North Korea.

WSJ: What did you learn from them?

Mr. Noland: Our book addresses three broad issues, which they illuminate.

The first is the underlying economic changes in the country. What we find is the economy has essentially marketized over the last 15 years or so, not as any kind of planned reform but rather as a function of state failure. What is extraordinary is the degree of marketization that the refugees portray when describing their daily lives. They describe a situation in which doing business or engaging in corrupt or illegal activities is increasingly seen as the way to get ahead in North Korea. And positions in the state or the party are still highly desired and seen as a way to get ahead, but not out of patriotism because these positions increasingly provide a platform for extortion of the general population.

Which brings us to the second big theme of the book and that is the criminalization of economic activity and the use of this vast penal system not only for its traditional use as a tool of political intimidation but for economic extortion. What we find is that changes in the North Korean legal code have criminalized vast areas of economic life, the sort of economic life that real people actually lead. In their daily lives, most if not all of North Korea’s non-elites run afoul of some of these statutes, which in effects makes everyone a criminal.

The fact that everyone is running afoul of some statute is combined with the fact that the police are given extraordinary discretion in who they arrest and who they incarcerate and for what period of time. We find that the North Korean penal system has four components. The worst and best known are the long-term political prisons, the North Korean gulag that was set up by Soviet advisors. There’s also a set of institutions that are effectively felony prisons, where you put the murderers and the rapists. Then there are a set of institutions that correspond to misdemeanor jails in other societies. What has developed since the famine period of the 1990s is a fourth set of institutions that have been codified. Those primarily house people who have made economic crimes, such as hiring labor for money or selling things in the market that you’re not supposed to be selling. We go through the enormous expansion of articles in the North Korean legal code to cover these crimes, such as illegally operating a restaurant.

This is a fantastic instrument for extortion. It means if you were engaging in entrepreneurial behavior, the police can come to you and say ‘You’re engaged in illegal activity. We can take you, take your spouse, take your kid and put them in this institution where you know horrible things happen.’ So the penal system not only serves its traditional function as a platform for political corruption but we find it is now a platform for economic predation as well.

We discovered something that we call the ‘market syndrome.’ It is a series of characteristics that seem to be linked with engaging in market activities. People who engage in market activities are 50% more likely to be arrested than their counterparts. They are more likely to harbor more negative appraisals of the regime than their counterparts. And in a society where people are afraid to express their opinions, these guys who are engaged in the market, who have been to jail and been released, are more likely to express their views to others. That is to say that the market is emerging as a kind of semi-autonomous zone of social communication and potentially political organizing. And in that sense, the regime is right to fear the market.

And that brings us to the final theme, and that is the political attitudes of these people and nascent dissent. What we find is people have very negative appraisals of the regime. That’s not surprising. We’re sampling from a group of people that have voted with their feet and one would expect them to have negative views, though we go through fairly elaborate statistical exercises to try to control as best we can for the demographic characteristics of the people we’ve interviewed.

People have very negative views of the regime. They are increasingly disinclined to believe the regime’s meta-narrative, which rationalizes their misery as a function of being held captive by hostile foreign forces. Most of these people hold the government itself as responsible for their plight.

WSJ: You two previously wrote one of the seminal studies on the North Korean famine (Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform), what did the refugees tell you about living through that?

Mr. Noland: Both Steph and I were really struck by was just how the famine experience reverberates. The famine was more than 10 years ago. It ended in 1998. A significant share of the people, I think about a third, reported separation from, or death of, family members during that process. You had people out scavenging to find food. People going to China. Family separation and death of family members just continued to reverberate.

We asked them: ‘Were you aware of the international food aid program?’ The numbers differ in our surveys, but significant numbers of people were unaware of the food aid program. It was astonishing to us.

Then, among the ones who were aware, we asked `Do you believe you were a beneficiary?’ Only a small minority responded yes. And when we run all the regressions, this status of knowing of the existence of the program but believing you were not a beneficiary, this is a profoundly demoralizing experience. These people feel they were abandoned at this time of need, when they were seeing their families and neighbors dying. They believe it’s going to the army and the elites. That group of people, when we run the psychological tests and ask them their views of the regime, this is an embittered group. The effect of that experience is bigger than being in the prisons.

We wrote a book on the famine, so obviously we’re interested in it. But we were surprised and we wouldn’t have guessed that this experience continues to reverberate among the people who lived through it.

Read the full story here:
Marcus Noland on NK’s Refugees and Economy
Wall Street Journal: Korea Real Time
Evan Ramstad
1/12/2011

Posted in 1990s Famine, 2002 Economic reforms, Arduous March, Black markets, DPRK Policies, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Political economy, Price liberalization | Comments Closed

DPRK rice price stubbornly high

Wednesday, December 29th, 2010

According to the Daily NK:

Even though the price of rice is over 1,300 won per kilogram in North Korean markets, cadres and the upper class are hoarding rice and grain. This is because a rumor is spreading saying that the international community may suspend food aid to North Korea next year due to the Yeonpyeong attack so the price of rice may not drop next year.

A source from Hoiryeong, North Hamkyung Province, said that, “In the Hoiryeong Jangmadang, rice sells over for 1,300 won per kilogram. Even though it is an unreasonably higher price than in previous years, the wealthy are hoarding the rice they will consume for the next year.”

Immediately after the Yeonpyeong attack, the price of rice soared to over 1,300 won and has stayed at that level. This is because the value of the Yuan has gone up since the currency redenomination last year.

The source explained, “Despite the high price of rice, people purchase it in bulk because they believe that next year the price may not decline considering the current trend.” He added, “A rumor that we won’t receive food aid next year due to being internationally isolated has been circulated by those who get international and domestic information via foreign radio or those who have visited China for private reasons.”

The source reported that, “Based on the experiences of the last decade, people know very well that there will be no food aid from the outside world when the situation is tense like it is this year.”

“Not only those who support themselves through commerce, but also family members of officials of the National Security Agency and People’s Safety Ministry, who primarily live off the national distribution system, are spending all the money they’ve saved to buy up food. They buy reserve provisions in order not to worry about a possible suspension of the distribution system.”

According to the explanation of the source, at the time of the November 30 currency redenomination last year, those who had goods to trade did not get hit hard. Therefore, wealthy people try to obtain more food despite the high price.

Read the full story here:
The Rich Hoarding Rice
Daily NK
Yoo Gwan Hee
12/29/2010

Posted in Economic reform, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization | Comments Closed

An upbeat DPRK economic report from China…

Wednesday, December 22nd, 2010

A reporter in China feels the last year has been a good one for the DPRK (in economic terms). I would take issue with some parts of his article (posted below), but the time I can devote to blogging is pretty slim until the end of January (field exam for school). You are smart enough to form your own opinions in the meantime!

Here is the full article from China Daily:

Few people know that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was a relatively prosperous country in the late 1970s and 1980s. In 1979, its grain output reached 9 million tons, increasing to 10 million tons in 1984. In fact, it used to be a rice exporter during that period.

The DPRK economy started declining in the 1990s when a lot of its resources were diverted to defense and heavy industries, seriously hindering the development of agriculture and light industries. Besides, environmental destruction damaged the rich soil, making it impossible for the country to return to its past agricultural glory.

As a result, the DPRK’s economy registered negative growth in the late 1990s, and didn’t improve until 2000.

In 2009, when the international community was still worried over its second nuclear test in May, the DPRK launched economic development campaigns such as the “150-day battle”, and vowed to make the year a turning point toward economic strength and prosperity.

Let’s see the changes in the country after more than one year of the campaigns.

This year has seen many changes in the DPRK. New technologies such as computerized numerical control have been introduced to help light industries, and more cash crops grown to raise funds or exchange them with other countries for grain.

The year has seen a remarkable increase in the number of neon lamps and lights on Pyongyang’s roads and in residential buildings. Thanks to the construction of hydropower stations such as the Huichon Power Station in Chagang province and Wonsan Youth Power Station in Kangwon province, Pyongyang and Kangwon’s Wonsan city now get relatively stable electricity supply.

A drastic change in the DPRK’s economy this year is the drop in the price of rice. The DPRK government has lowered the price of rationed rice from 46 won to 24 won a kg.

In the open market, rice price dropped from 2,000 won a kg in 2009 to 1,500 won a kg in September this year. In November, it fell further to 900 won a kg in Pyongyang’s markets.

The availability of consumer goods has increased both in variety and quantity because of more and improved supply channels. Residents now rely on goods rationed by the government, as well as those available in markets and convenience stores. More special shops are selling necessities, although they cost more than in ration shops.

Contrary to some experts’ prediction, currency reform has not created a crisis or led to economic depression in the country. In 2009, the exchange rate of the yuan to the won was 1:500. This year it is 1:200, more than doubling the purchasing power of people in the DPRK.

Moreover, even though the currency reform has shrunk people’s fortunes, most of them have not suffered economic shocks.

Several facts prove that the living standards in the DPRK have improved this year. The supply of DPRK-made beer has increased, in variety and volume both, and the country may not need to import beer anymore. A bottle of rice beer costs about 600 to 700 won. More restaurants have opened in cities, and bicycles have become common in places where they were rare to find earlier.

Even the number of cell phone users has increased – to at least 80,000 – though the 200,000 to 600,000 won needed to use a mobile phone is still high and the handsets and service need to be improved.

In more sense than one, this year has a special meaning for the DPRK, not least because it chose its next generation leader. The year marks the 65th anniversary of the ruling Labor Party, too.

Though the DPRK’s claim of building an economically prosperous country in two more years may be exaggerated, we can see some obvious changes in the country. It is opening up to the rest of the world and shifting its attention from defense to people’s welfare.

But there is no denying that the DPRK now wants to develop the economy. This will become clearer if one has followed the country’s official media. During the new year’s comment, the Korean Central News Agency used the words “improving people’s lives” 16 times, a rarity earlier. Even in 2009, the words were used only once.

The DPRK tried to increase people’s income in 2002 but failed because it didn’t have enough goods then. The high inflation that followed made things worse.

Though last year’s currency reform didn’t raise people’s income directly, it has defused the currency bubble to a large extent. And this time the supply of more goods to meet rising demands has helped the country to move forward.

The currency reform, despite some negative effects, has not only improved people’s living conditions, but also built a sound financial base for the DPRK to welcome international economic cooperation in the near future.

If time and conditions allow, economic interaction could help the DPRK maintain peace in the region. The possibility of the DPRK economy suffering a 2002-like setback, however, cannot be ruled out.

Its weak agriculture and light industries are still not in a condition to support development in the long term. Plus, it has to depend on imports for 80 percent of consumer goods in the short term.

But 2010 is still a special year for the DPRK, for it is standing at a crossroads from where it can start attracting investment because capital now holds the key.

That means opportunities for China. The market for consumer goods such as light bulbs and cell phones are expanding in the DPRK, while rising demand for other products has created a larger profit space. Besides, the DPRK could open its resource markets to raise funds.

The DPRK’s economic development is good for China’s security and overall economic cooperation in the entire region. The international community should use this opportunity to help the DPRK open up to the rest of world. That would go a long way in resolving the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue than flexing of military muscles.

Read the full story here:
DPRK at economic crossroads
China Daily
Jin Meihua
12/22/2010

Posted in Agriculture, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization | 9 Comments »

Korean volatility affecting DPRK food prices and exchange rate

Wednesday, December 15th, 2010

According to the Daily NK:

North Korea’s attack on Yeonpyeong Island on November 23rd has caused a spate of rice price instability in the markets. Even though it is December, rice is now selling for around 1,300 won per kilo, as much as 500 won more than it was just one month ago.

This is contra to the normal trend, which is that the price of food generally declines because farmers on collective farms get food distribution from the state at this time.

A source from North Hamkyung Province explained the details to The Daily NK yesterday, saying, “The price of rice, which was between 800 and 900 won in mid-November, started going up on around the 23rd, and is now over 1,300 won.“

“People have been taken aback by the soaring food prices,” he added

According to the source, on the 8th and 9th the rice price in Hoiryeong Market apparently hit 1,900 won, the highest this year.

This phenomenon, which is rare but not unprecedented, seems to have been caused because the North Korean authorities are trying to raise domestic and international tension on the Korean Peninsula.

An example of this can be seen in a statement released by a North Korean “social organization”, Chosun Peace Protection National Committee, on the 11th, in which it proclaimed, “Our military and the people are both prepared for either expanded skirmishes or all-out war.”

Elsewhere, people’s unit lectures over the last few weeks have focused on asserting phrases like this one, heard in a northern provincial city lecture, “Since the current situation is extremely tense, you have to live lives appropriate to that tension.”

This atmosphere naturally has spilled over into the markets, where food wholesalers and the “donju,” holders of large amounts of capital, have reacted negatively, according to the source, who explained, “The latest mood is similar to the time when the authorities declared a ‘Quasi-war Footing’ in 1993. As the atmosphere gets more serious, money holders begin to obtain and cling onto foreign currency, so foreign currency dealing and circulation volumes fall and food trade is choked off. Therefore, rice prices soar.”

In additional, military tensions between North and South are having an influence on trade between the North and China, so the amount of Yuan flowing into North Korea has also shrunk, which is another cause of rising currency exchange rates and therefore domestic rice prices.

The source said, “People are saying that this happened because of the gunfight between the North and South,” going on, “For this troubling rumor that a war could break out, smuggling volumes between North Korea and China have also shrunk.”

Although rice has now settled back to 1300 won from its high of 1900 won, the source said many people are still concerned for the winter season.

“Since the 10th, the Yuan has gone down to 330 or 340 won, so the rice price has dropped to around 1,300 won accordingly,” the source said. “But we are worried about whether or not we can afford to eat enough corn porridge this winter.”

The Daily NK has also conducted an additional investigation of currency rates and rice prices in Pyongyang, Shinuiju and Hyesan, comparing December 7th to 13th with November 24th to 30th, to check the effect of this trend across the country.

In the North Korean capital, one U.S. dollar has increased from 1,400 won to 1,750 won, while rice has gone from 750 won to 1,250 won per kilo.

In Shinuiju, meanwhile, both foreign currency exchange rates and rice prices are marginally worse again, moving from 1,450 to 1,800 won per dollar and from 800 won to 1,300 won per kilo respectively, while in Hyesan, the dollar exchange rate mirrored that in Pyongyang, but rice had been hardest hit, going from 900 won to 1,350 won.

Additionally, in Shinuiju on the 9th one Yuan had soared to 420 won, near the level of the period before the redenomination.

This December 2010 price trend is occurring for the third time since 2000. The first was in December, 2005 when the authorities stopped all food trade because the state apparently planned to resume full food distribution. Thereafter, rice prices almost doubled. The second time was in December last year, a phenomenon caused by a measure shutting down the market following the currency redenomination.

According to the Korea Times:

North Korean merchants are exchanging their local currency en masse as war jitters in the wake of Pyongyang’s attack on Yeonpyeong Island have stoked fears that the won may lose its value in the case of war, a report said.

According to North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity (NKIS), a Seoul-based NGO comprised of defectors with lines into the North, currency exchange rates have skyrocketed since the Nov. 23 incident. One hundred yuan, which before the shelling went for 2,000 won, is now worth 35,000 won, NKIS said in a report released Sunday.

“Merchants have heard rumors that if there is war, North Korean bills will become worthless scraps of paper,” NKIS quoted a source as saying, causing traders to exchange their won while they can.

Price of daily goods have also skyrocketed, the report said, with rice jumping from 900 won per kilogram to 1,600 won. Corn climbed from 4,000 won per kilogram to 6,000 won, it said.

The source said the soaring prices have been caused by jitters in the market over the heightened tensions in the wake of the Nov. 23 attack, saying the North’s military has been in a “quasi state of war” since the incident.

The rumors that the won will lose its value in case of a war have slowed market activities as merchants have raised prices and are waiting to see if further military action is on the cards.

Traders in China, from who markets in the North secure much of their goods, have also become reluctant to make transactions involving North Korean currency and are trading what won they have, the source said.

The price jump comes on the heels of reportedly enormous inflation caused by a botched currency reform last year.

The regime redenominated banknotes at a ratio of 100:1 in November last year in a move to squelch a bourgeoning private sector. But the move led to runaway inflation as the price soared by some forty times within the year, according to reports.

The U.N. estimated last month that some 5 million North Koreans will face food shortages this year due to lack of staple grains, while the economy is believed to be suffering heavily from international sanctions imposed for the regime’s missile and nuclear tests.

Meanwhile, Pyongyang, which claims Seoul instigated the shelling by firing into its territory during a military drill, continued to threaten the South over the weekend, saying, “The army and the people of the DPRK are ready for both an escalation and an all-out war.”

According to the Institute for Far Eastern Studies:

After North Korea rained artillery onto Yeonpyeong Island, military tensions have continued to grow, impacting the price of rice and the currency exchange rate in the North”s traditional markets. On December 13, NK Intellectual Solidarity reported that this has shaken the livelihoods on North Korean people. According to the group, rice has shot up 77 percent, from 900 won to 1600 won per kilogram, since the November 23 attack. The price of corn has also gone up by 50 percent, to 600 won per kilogram. At the same time, the exchange rate for Chinese yuan has risen, at least in the market in Hyeryong, from 220 to 350 won per yuan, a 59 percent increase.

Daily NK has also reported that post-Yeonpyeong food price increases have been significant, and as the Autumn harvest comes to a close in December, smaller rations to those working on collective farms is expected. A contact in North Hamgyong Province reported, “Rice prices that were 800-900 won [ per kilogram] in mid-November shot up to 1100 won and have recently risen to 1300 won…people are reeling at the sudden rise in prices.” According to the source, rice hit a high of 1900 won in the Hyeryong market around December 8-9.

The very first to reflect military tensions between the to Koreas were money handlers and wholesalers. A source in North Korea compared today”s atmosphere with that experienced in 1993, and explained that as people”s concerns about war increase, money traders become more conservative, tightening up the exchange of currency and therefore slowing the entire wholesale market, driving up prices. A survey by DailyNK from December 7-13 revealed that the exchange rate in Pyongyang rose from 1400 to 1750 won between November 24 and the end of the month, while the price of rice rose from 750 won to 1250 won per kilogram over the same period. In Sinuiji, the exchange rate rose from 1450 to 1800 won, while rice costs went up from 800 to 1300 won per kilogram. Hyesan showed similar trends, with the exchange rate rising from 1400 to 1800 won and rice rising from 900 to 1350 won per kilogram.

While food prices have fallen from their peak after the Yeonpyeong shelling, they are still high enough to cause significant difficulties for the average North Korean. Price hikes seen recently are three times as severe as those seen from 2000-2010, including the huge jump seen in 2005 when authorities attempted to reintroduce the central rationing system. Combined with last year”s failed currency reform attempt, the latest price hikes have severely strained the livelihoods of most North Koreans.

UPDATE: From the Institute for Far Eastern Studies

DPRK prices, exchange rate, skyrocket after shelling
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-12-15
12/15/2010

After North Korea rained artillery onto Yeonpyeong Island, military tensions have continued to grow, impacting the price of rice and the currency exchange rate in the North”s traditional markets. On December 13, NK Intellectual Solidarity reported that this has shaken the livelihoods on North Korean people. According to the group, rice has shot up 77 percent, from 900 won to 1600 won per kilogram, since the November 23 attack. The price of corn has also gone up by 50 percent, to 600 won per kilogram. At the same time, the exchange rate for Chinese yuan has risen, at least in the market in Hyeryong, from 220 to 350 won per yuan, a 59 percent increase.

Daily NK has also reported that post-Yeonpyeong food price increases have been significant, and as the Autumn harvest comes to a close in December, smaller rations to those working on collective farms is expected. A contact in North Hamgyong Province reported, “Rice prices that were 800-900 won [ per kilogram] in mid-November shot up to 1100 won and have recently risen to 1300 won…people are reeling at the sudden rise in prices.” According to the source, rice hit a high of 1900 won in the Hyeryong market around December 8-9.

The very first to reflect military tensions between the to Koreas were money handlers and wholesalers. A source in North Korea compared today”s atmosphere with that experienced in 1993, and explained that as people”s concerns about war increase, money traders become more conservative, tightening up the exchange of currency and therefore slowing the entire wholesale market, driving up prices. A survey by DailyNK from December 7-13 revealed that the exchange rate in Pyongyang rose from 1400 to 1750 won between November 24 and the end of the month, while the price of rice rose from 750 won to 1250 won per kilogram over the same period. In Sinuiji, the exchange rate rose from 1450 to 1800 won, while rice costs went up from 800 to 1300 won per kilogram. Hyesan showed similar trends, with the exchange rate rising from 1400 to 1800 won and rice rising from 900 to 1350 won per kilogram.

While food prices have fallen from their peak after the Yeonpyeong shelling, they are still high enough to cause significant difficulties for the average North Korean. Price hikes seen recently are three times as severe as those seen from 2000-2010, including the huge jump seen in 2005 when authorities attempted to reintroduce the central rationing system. Combined with last year”s failed currency reform attempt, the latest price hikes have severely strained the livelihoods of most North Koreans.

Read the full stories here:
Tensions Driving Rice Price and Exchange Rate Hikes
Daily NK
Yoo Gwan Hee
12/14/2010

DPRK prices, exchange rate skyrocket after shelling
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-12-15
12/15/2010

‘Yeonpyeong shelling causes inflation in Pyongyang’
Korea Times
Kim Young-jin
12/13/2010

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