Archive for the ‘Communications’ Category

Some alleged guidelines for the Hwanggumphyong SEZ

Friday, June 24th, 2011

According to the JoongAng Daily:

The JoongAng Ilbo has acquired North Korea’s guidelines for Chinese investors at its economic development zone on Hwanggumpyong Island, and many are more liberal than those offered to South Koreans at the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

The date of the document acquired by the JoongAng Ilbo was not known.

According to the guidelines written by a joint committee for the development and organization of the Hwanggumpyong and Rason special economic zone, transactions in Chinese currency are allowed. Independent and joint banks will also be allowed to be established in the zones.

South Korean companies working in Kaesong conduct all business in U.S. dollars. Unlike South Koreans working in Kaesong, investors in the new zones will receive special privileges when it comes to using land. They are free to lease, lend or even bequeath the land to their relatives, as long it is done within a contracted period of time. Those who reside within the special economic zones can also freely use cell phones and are provided with Internet access.

Cell phones are not allowed in the Kaesong industrial complex.

The goal of the zones, the document said, was to “continue to firmly develop the traditional friendship between the two countries,” which was “agreed upon by the two greatest leaders” of China and North Korea, referring to Chinese president Hu Jintao and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

“It also supports the hopes and future gains of the people from the two countries,” it said.

The economic zones are also meant to improve North Korea’s manufacturing ability, quality of life for North Koreans and the North’s competitiveness in earning foreign currency, the document added. In order to do so, North Korea’s natural resources would be utilized to their fullest, including human resources, land and minerals.

The document’s role, it said, was to “aid the writing of more detailed development policies.” The guidelines are valid in the 470 square kilometers (181 square miles) of the Rason free economic zone and 16 square kilometers of Hwanggumpyong.

In case the zones fill up, the document hinted at the possibility of a third zone that could be established.

For Rason, the document said three piers leased out to different countries – China, Switzerland and Russia – would be modified to allow vessels of more than 50,000 tons to dock. In addition, new highways, bridges and even an airfield would be built in the area.

At Hwanggumpyong, a new port will be constructed for passengers and cargo vessels between the island and the North Korean city of Sinuiju. The document said the airport at Dandong, which is near Hwanggumpyong, would be “actively utilized.”

The document emphasized that foreign investors’ assets would not be nationalized and that all investors’ legal rights were guaranteed.

The document was written in both Chinese and Korean.

Despite all the promises in the guidelines, analysts remained skeptical as to how successful the trade zones will be. “It’s a mystery as to how many investors will be eager to invest there,” said a diplomatic source in North Korea.

Read the full story here:
Pyongyang promises China investors the moon
JoongAng Daily
Chang Se-jeong, Christine Kim
2011-6-24

Share

Daily NK on anti-socialist activities

Thursday, June 23rd, 2011

Part 1: The Illogicality of Anti-Socialist Policy
Lee Seok Young
2011-6-22

In North Korea today, those actions which are subject to the harshest oversight and most excessive punishment are those deemed anti-socialist, an expression of the extent to which such actions are seen as a threat to the regime.

Yet these very actions have already taken deep root in people’s lifestyles, spreading rapidly as a result of chronic economic difficulties, food insecurity, endemic corruption and the inflow of information from abroad.

First of all, every North Korean and defector the Daily NK meets says much the same thing; that if people had not followed an ‘anti-socialist’ path during the mid-90s famine, they could not have survived. The power which maintains North Korean society through the hardest times is that derived from anti-socialist actions, and it is those actions which the authorities would like to put an end to.

The blocking of these so-called ‘anti-socialist trends’ nominally began with Kim Jong Il’s 1992 work, ‘Socialism Is a Science’, issued following the fall of the Eastern Bloc. A time of great fear for the regime, ‘Socialism Is a Science’ expressed a determination to block out anti-socialist phenomena.

However, a famine exploded nationwide shortly after the publication of the thesis, placing these very anti-socialist modes of behavior at the core of the lives of almost everybody in the nation.

Having completely replaced Kim Jong Il and the Chosun Workers’ Party as the alpha provider of sustenance, money is now uppermost in the minds of the people. If they can, they are moving away from the collective farms, factories and enterprises to become more active in the market.

“At a time when the state didn’t provide rations and workers were not even receiving their monthly wages, the ones who started trading early on were all best able to avoid this predicament,” said one defector, “Others followed after their example and, rather than trying to find work, went straight into the market.”

Money, then, is the fundamental toxin that now threatens to shake the very basis of the Kim regime, completely undermining the ‘let’s work the same, have the same and live well’ lifestyle that the regime has long been demanding from the people.The authorities, as part of a losing battle to halt this slide, ‘educates’ the people with the mantra, “Don’t become a slave to money,” but it makes no difference.

People are growing more and more money-oriented. What simply began as a desperate rearguard action to survive extreme poverty has become a preoccupation with accumulating wealth. The many who don’t have the capital to start a business are keen to work with those who do.

One interviewee, a woman hailing from North Hamkyung Province, told The Daily NK, “They have to keep trying, but they can’t eliminate it. How could they, when the state itself is actually encouraging its spread? Everywhere you go, they demand bribes, and people with money never get punished even when clearly guilty, because everyone is desperate to earn money.”

Given that the central authorities demand Party funds from regional bodies, and regional Party and military cadres in turn work with smugglers, and the cadres charged with inspection turn a blind eye to criminal acts in exchange for bribes, the whole system is, as the interviewee said, rotten from the top down.

One defector who left his position as a cadre in a Yangkang Province enterprise agreed, recalling, “The Party periodically collected money from our factory, but since all the machinery had long since stopped running, they made us work in the market and give 30% of the profits to the authorities. It was the state that promoted anti-socialism in consequence.”

Another defector originally from North Hamkyung Province said in a similar vein, “The National Security and People’s Safety agents stationed on provincial borders stop people without the right permit to travel, but let them pass in exchange for a few packs of cigarettes. Some even ask for your wrist watch. It’s not just the people; the whole nation is busy being anti-socialist.”

Increasing exposure to foreign materials is also influencing the situation somewhat. Such things are especially popular with students and women working in the markets, two groups which are more up-to-date than most.

South Korean and Western culture is being transmitted quickly via DVD, and materials that are brought into the state from China by traders and smugglers are also pushing forward new trends such as the ‘Korean Wave.’

To the North Korean people, who once lived in near complete isolation from the rest of the world, the introduction of foreign materials has intensified their yearnings for a new life style. The stricter the regulations become, the thirstier for something else the people become.

Part 2: Crackdowns Enhancing Anti-Socialist Cycle
Mok Yong Jae
2011-06-23

‘Anti-socialism’ in North Korea is a destabilizing force disturbing the foundations of the system. For that reason, the authorities place a great emphasis on rooting it out. Inspections are frequent and their targets varied. But the fact is that this has done little to stop the growth of such activities; in fact, quite the opposite; some believe that targeted inspections actually increase instances of smuggling, for example.

These focused inspections are handed down in the name of the ‘Party Center’ in other words Kim Jong Il. The latest inspections over anti-socialist trends in border areas have been being carried out by Kim Jong Eun’s direct instruction. First people are educated about and warned against ‘anti-socialist behavior’, then provincial Party and military cadres launch an inspection.

If a concerted inspection is to be unleashed on a given area, an inspection unit is set up, and it does the work. In the case of recent inspections targeting drugs and defection, the inspection units have even been sent from the Central Committee of the Party. The makeup of the unit can differ slightly depending on the target of the inspection, but usually includes agents from the National Security Agency (NSA), People’s Safety Ministry and Prosecutors Office. Precise search sites are usually selected at random and the searches conducted without warning, while ‘criminals’ are flushed out in part by getting citizens to report on one another.

However, the effectiveness of this system has a limit. This is primarily due to an overwhelming degree of official corruption at nearly all levels.

The Spread of Bureaucracy and the Limits of Inspections

The primary agents conducting the inspections, agents from the NSA and PSM, collude with smugglers for their own benefit. Anti-socialist activities are not a new means of survival, and the more commonplace the inspections become, the more focused the agents doing it become on their own self-interest; i.e. rent seeking rather than uncovering instances of wrongdoing.

For example, agents seek out big smugglers only in order to offer them an opportunity for their actions to be ignored, something they will do for a price. A source from Yangkang Province explained to The Daily NK, “Hoping not to lose their goods, also so as to avoid prison, in many cases smugglers try to win over agents. They talk to the official for a while, and if they think ‘this guy can be won over’ then some even gently encourage them to find a way to forego any punishment.”

Then, when the inspecting agents begin dropping heavy hints about expensive merchandise, electronics or a piano, for example, the smugglers say, “I’d be delighted to buy that for you,” and for that receive their freedom.

Thus, it is rare for money to change hands directly; goods are bought in China and handed over when the inspection period has come to a close. The smuggler also obtains a permit to import a certain amount of other goods without penalty in the future. By winning over agents in this way, assistance in future times of trouble can also be secured.

In addition, as Lee Jae Won, the former chairman of the Korean Bar Association Committee on Human Rights in North Korea and someone who has interviewed a great number of defectors as author of the 2010 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, concludes, “Anti-socialist activities are extremely common for North Korean cadres in public positions such as prosecutors and judges.” The bribing of prosecutors and judges in exchange for leniency or to escape conviction is a daily occurrence, as much as bribing the security forces and cadres.

What Anti-socialist Counteroffensive? Officials are the source of Antisocialism

Now much more so than in the past, cadres and agents are directly involved in the antisocialist activities.

A Chinese-Korean trader who often goes between Dandong and Shinuiju told The Daily NK, “There are so many drugs in North Korea that even the officers supposed to be policing it are taking drugs themselves. Some of them even asked me to take opium to China and sell it. I go back to North Korea every year to visit relatives, and I’ve seen officers there doing bingdu (methamphetamines) with my own eyes.

It is also said that the families of cadres are the main source of South Korean movies and dramas on DVD. Party cadres are, in effect, the very source of the Korean Wave that their bosses in Pyongyang ban on the premise of defending the state from the ‘ideological and cultural invasion of the South Chosun reactionaries’.

A source from Pyongan Province confirmed the story, telling The Daily NK, “These DVDs and VCDs come from the houses of cadres who travel overseas a lot. The children of cadres love watching them. The families of traders have a lot of them, too, but it’s the cadres they’re spreading from.”

Thus, while the central Party single-mindedly attacks anti-socialist behaviour, the cadres and agents who are meant to be carrying out the orders are deeply involved in the ‘anti-socialism’ themselves. The more crackdowns that occur, the more contact there is between the elite and security forces on the one hand and smugglers and traders on the other, offering more opportunities for symbiosis. It is for this reason that some claim the inspections are actually catalyzing the anti-socialism.

Meanwhile, An Chan Il of the World North Korea Study Center pointed out to The Daily NK that the whole thing is completely inevitable, saying, “These inspection teams are not receiving proper rations from the state, so of course they take bribes instead when sent out into the field. Administrative irregularities and corruption are at the very heart of these anti-socialist inspections. The only way for the families of inspecting agents to survive is for the father to be a part of this anti-socialist behavior.”

Choi Yong Hwan from the Gyeonggi Research Institute agreed, adding, “These inspections are intensifying social inequality. The fundamental cause of this is the collapse of the state rationing system due to economic difficulties. It’s a situation where even the agents are hungry, so there is a permanent pattern of them attempting to guarantee their own survival via corruption. There is a vicious cycle repeating here, whereby those who are able to ingratiate themselves with the inspecting agents and cadres survive, and those who do not or cannot get punished.”

Share

N. Koreans use phones to sneak information out

Wednesday, June 15th, 2011

According to the Korea Herald:

North Korea is a country that has been almost entirely isolated from news around the world for the past 60 years. The regime in Pyongyang allows Internet access to only a fraction of government officials and its power elite as it prepares for a third-generation hereditary succession to a young man in his late 20s.

The people of North Korea have been brainwashed since childhood to pay respect to the country’s idolized “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung and his son “Dear Leader” Jong-il.

So was Kim Hung-kwang until he began watching South Korean movies and drama in 1995.

“Toddlers are taught by their parents to say ‘thank you, Dear Leader’ before every meal,” Kim said in an interview with The Korea Herald.

“I had been a brainwashed, proud member of the (North Korean Workers’) party myself, until I came across South Korean films in 1995 and eventually learned that the outside world was much better.”

The computer engineering professor managed to flee the North seven years later and arrived in the South in 2003. He was joined by his family two years later.

Born in the eastern coastal city of Hamheung in 1960, Kim graduated from Kim Chaek University of Technology in Pyongyang, meaning he had been one of the North Korean regime’s highly trusted party members. While working as a professor of computer engineering at the Communist University, he was caught for lending some CDs containing South Korean drama to a friend and was sent to a collective farm as punishment.

This prompted him to defect to the South via China in 2003.

In 2008, he launched North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity with about 300 professors, engineers, doctors, journalists and writers from the North.

Now, he runs a dormitory and school for children of fellow defectors from the North, an Internet broadcasting station and publishes a periodical of articles by his colleagues.

The NK Intellectuals Solidarity is also a well-known source of breaking news from the North such as the currency denomination measure in late 2008 thanks to its informants around the China-North Korea border areas.

About 3,000 mobile phones are believed to be secretly used in the North for business purposes or delivering local information across the border, according to Kim.

“About 10 of them are ours, through which we hear about what’s going on there from our informants,” he said.

The informants in the North face the danger of getting caught by the authorities while speaking on the phone near the Tumen and Yalu Rivers with their co-workers in China.

One of Kim’s informants was caught two years ago on charges of spying and was tortured to death.

“She was a mother of three in her 30s who told us things like how the locals perceive the latest economic policies, but (the North Korean authorities) branded her as a spy,” Kim said.

“(Her death) was traumatizing and made us question if we should keep doing this. But we decided not to stop because otherwise, we wouldn’t be able to know about the inhumane crimes committed in the North.”

Kim’s solidarity has also sent in about 300 USBs technically modified to avoid detection.

The USBs do not contain any propaganda, but information on “what the defectors found surprising in the South,” dozens of new media programs such as PDF viewer, MP3 player software and e-books to enable more North Koreans to view South Korean video and text files, Kim said.

“Contrary to what we had expected, copies of Wikipedia entries turned out to be the most popular (among the North Koreans),” he said.

Currently, only five homepage servers are registered under the North Korean domain (.kr). The country connected itself to the Internet in mid-August, but only a handful of selected people are believed to have access to the Web.

Over 20,000 North Koreans have defected to the South since the Korean War ended in a truce in 1953. Hundreds are entering the South each month now mostly via China.

“I think about 4,000 people will arrive (in the South) next year,” Kim said.

“Women used to take up about 80 percent (of the defectors) before, but lately the percentage of men is going up.”

The North still maintains tight vigilance along its borders, but an increasing number of people manage to avoid the authorities’ eyes mainly thanks to bribery.

“Nowadays, it costs between 3.5 and 4 million won to bribe a single person (a soldier along the border, for example) in order to cross the border. The price goes up as (the North) tightens borderline vigilance,” Kim said.

About the North Korean people’s consciousness that they were being mistreated by the dynastical regime in Pyongyang, Kim said it was still in a “germinal stage.”

Pyongyang has tried to soothe its starving people by promising that food supply will be normalized next year, the deadline Pyongyang has set to become a “strong and prosperous nation.”

“But if the food conditions do not improve next year and turns out that it was all words and no action, people will really turn their backs against the government,” Kim said.

“They will know for sure that they are merely being used by the government. They will think that an individual’s basic rights should be placed above their government and start thinking about why there is such a major gap between what the current regime says and the reality.”

The North Koreans are now starting to learn about the need for a social safety net and how the South Korean society is going about its welfare policies through the limited information they receive from outside, Kim said.

“The third stage will be discussing what they have learned among themselves,” he said.

“Starting from groups of two or three people, the discussions will expand and eventually allow certain groups to take action.”

South Korea has reportedly been making contingency plans for various scenarios including a “sudden change” in the North such as the collapse of the Kim regime that will lead to a massive movement of refugees across the inter-Korean border.

“In case of a sudden change, the South can run a buffer zone just south of the border to temporarily house the refugees and prepare them for life in the South, although blocking the people’s free travel would be another issue,” Kim said.

“But because it would be a temporary measure, I don’t think we need to worry too much about a mass influx of refugees.’

Kim also noted that while preparing for a sudden change or unification, South Koreans should not underestimate the North.

“The South has no nuclear weapons, no inter-continental ballistic missiles, no cyber warfare troops, and most important of all, it suffers from internal conflict,” he said, mentioning an online survey last year that showed that some South Koreans did not trust their own government’s conclusion that the North torpedoed the Cheonan.

Kim said the North was training some 3,000 hackers to attack the IT systems of major South Korean institutions.

The prosecution concluded last month that North Korea was behind the cyber attack that paralyzed the banking system of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, or Nonghyup, in April.

“Our website was attacked in the same way they attacked Nonghyup,” Kim said.

“The North is very good at stirring up social conflict in the South, prompting certain pro-North groups to call on the government to ‘appease the North,’ or send money to Pyongyang. Their aim is to set up a pro-North regime in the South,” Kim said.

As for the “pro-North people” in the South, Kim said they seemed to hold an illusion that the North Korean system might settle their personal grudges or social problems in the South despite the fact that the Kim regime’s ideology has failed in reality.

Kim called on the South Korean government to set up a clear set of rules and conditions regarding the extent of humanitarian aid the South can send to the North in cases of natural disasters, for example, so that emergency aid to the North becomes more transparent.

Read the full story here:
N. Koreans use phones to sneak information out
Korea Herald
Kim So-hyun
2011-6-15

Share

Orascom releases 2011 Q1 shareholder report

Friday, May 20th, 2011

You can see the whole report here (PDF).

According to Martyn Williams (PC World):

The number of 3G cellular subscriptions in North Korea passed half a million during the first quarter, the country’s only 3G cellular operator said this week.

The Koryolink network had 535,133 subscriptions at the end of March, an increase of just over 100,000 on the end of December 2010, said Orascom Telecom. Egypt’s Orascom owns a majority stake in Koryolink, which is operated as a joint venture with the state-run Korea Posts and Telecommunications Co.

Subscriber growth has been strong ever since the network was launched in late 2008, but the most recent quarter delivered the first signs that Koryolink is having to work harder for new subscribers.

The January to March period was the first time since the third quarter of 2009 that the number of new subscribers during the quarter failed to be more than the previous quarter. In the October to December quarter, the company added just over 130,000 new customers.

Revenue for the quarter was a record US$25.7 million, a jump of 185 percent on the same period of 2010. Orascom doesn’t disclose net profit figures for the company.

The company is keen to launch new value-added services to raise average revenue per user (ARPU) and during the quarter it began offering MMS (Multimedia Messaging Service). Customers gave the service a positive response, Orascom said.

But despite the efforts, ARPU fell to its lowest level since service began in 2009. At just US$12.7 per month, it was down 40 percent on the same period last year.

Orascom also launched pre-paid cards denominated in euros to boost foreign exchange earnings from North Korea. The scratch cards offer free voice and value-added service use during off-peak hours.

The company’s network now covers 92 percent of the population.

North Korea is one of the world’s most heavily controlled countries and communication is severely restricted. Most cell phones don’t have the ability to make or receive international calls.

The Daily NK offers some additional information:

Cell phone customer numbers are rising while the price of the handsets is falling, according to sources from inside North Korea.

One such source from Pyongyang reported on the 18th, “The phone bill is no different from in the past, only the price of the cell phone itself is falling.”

According to sources, in Pyongyang a single-piece handset has gone from $280 to $250, and a clamshell design from $400 to $380 (at the exchange rate in South Pyongan Province, one dollar is presently worth 2,500 North Korean won, while a kilo of rice continues to drift in the 2,000 won range).

The source explained, “Cell phone users keep increasing. In Pyongyang, approximately 60% of people between their 20s and 50s use cell phones. Especially for the younger generation in their 20s and 30s, a cell phone is seen as a necessary item,” he said.

A source from Shinuiju also commented, “Around three out of ten young people have got a cell phone, and prices have been cut a bit.”

A source from South Pyongan Province agreed, too, saying, “Cell phone bills and prices have dropped compared with in the beginning. A basic cell phone (single-piece) is $225 and an expensive one is $300. You pay 30,000 won in our money, and then you can use it for 200 minutes.”

The source went on, “But when you buy a $10 card, you can use it for 600 minutes. This is a state policy to earn dollars.”

He explained that according to the jangmadang exchange rate, $10 is currently 25,000 won, meaning that payment for credit in dollars is of huge benefit in terms of value for money.

However, there is still an application fee of $800 and registration fee of $100, as before.

The source reported, “Cell phone traders purchase cell phones using their families’ and relatives’ names,” because only one handset per person is allowed. “Since there are many people who have obtained a cell phone in another’s name, their cell phones occasionally get confiscated when they go to the telephone office to pay the bill and get their ID checked.”

In a connected story, Radio Free Asia reported on the 19th that Koryo Link has added another 100,000 subscribers to its books since the end of last year, bringing the total number to 535,133 as of the end of March.

However, in contrast with Pyonyang and the interior areas of North Korea where usage is growing, the battle in the border region is still to restrict and control cell phone usage. Distinguishing a Chinese cell phone is not easy, so cracking down on the practice of using them is not easy, either, and therefore the method of applying for a cell phone has been made more difficult, among other measures.

According to one Yangkang Province source, “One person who took cell phones brought in by smugglers in March, remodeled and sold them was arrested by the People’s Safety Ministry, and in the light of that the process for applying for a cell phone here got stricter. The person who wishes to buy the phone must have the signature of a National Security agent now. In the beginning, there was no such rule.”

In North Korea, applications for cell phones are handled by sales offices; however, the procedure is more difficult now, and so some get the handset from a smuggler and only the number from the local office, in order to avoid the process. Of course, bribes are necessary to facilitate that, currently approximately $400-$450 in Yangkang Province.

According to sources, an official North Korean cell phone works on a different frequency to those from China in order to stop their being used to connect outside the country. However, if the frequency of a smuggled phone is changed to match North Korea’s, then the cell phone can be used.

And according to Mobile Business Briefing:

Orascom Telecom’s North Korean mobile arm, koryolink, surpassed the half a million subscriber mark in the first quarter, representing growth of 420 percent year-on-year. Orascom noted during its Q1 earnings yesterday that its North Korean subscriber base has reached 535,133, up from 125,661 a year earlier. While the numbers are still relatively small, Orascom’s North Korean venture – which was first launched in December 2008 – is being closely watched; koryolink is the only commercial operator in the notoriously secretive and totalitarian country and therefore has huge growth potential – as well as being a risky investment. Orascom said that current mobile penetration in North Korea is just 2 percent. Its revenue from koryolink rose 185 percent year-on-year to US$25.8 million in Q1, while earnings (EBITDA) hit US$22.6 million, giving it an impressive EBITDA margin of 87.6 percent.

koryolink’s network currently consists of 341 base stations covering the capital Pyongyang, 14 main cities as well as 72 smaller cities, Orascom said. The network also extends over 22 highways. As of the end of Q1 2011, koryolink covers 13.6 percent of the country’s territory and 92 percent of its population. In January 2011, koryolink launched MMS services for the first time, the latest addition to its VAS portfolio. The firm has also focused on maximising foreign currency revenue, launching in February a recharge card that can be bought in Euros.

Share

Koryolink employee numbers and other info…

Sunday, May 8th, 2011

Pictured above: Locations of Koryolink (Orascom) moblie phone towers I have identified in the DPRK.  Supposedly 300 exist in total.

The German Financial Times published a story on Orascom.  Much of it was familiar material, but it did contain one interestign nugget I had not seen before:

Etwa 20 Ägypter und mehr als 200 Nordkoreaner arbeiten für Koryolink – die meisten der Expats im Management, ein Großteil der Nordkoreaner als Techniker und im Service. Für die Kundenbetreuung wurde ein modernes Callcenter eingerichtet. Das Netz deckt die Großstädte, die Autobahnen und die Schienenwege ab, insgesamt etwa 15 Prozent der Staatsfläche. In dem Gebiet leben 91 Prozent der Bevölkerung.

And putting this through Google Translate we get:

Throughout the country, told Heikal, meanwhile, more than 300 transmitters spread. Some 20 Egyptians and more than 200 North Koreans work for Koryolink – most of the expatriates in management, the majority of North Koreans as a technician and service. For customer support a call center was established. The network covers the major cities, highways and rail lines, totaling about 15 percent of state land. In the field 91 percent of the population live.

The service has grown to over 500,000 users but still remains out of the hands of the vast majority of the population:

Auch wenn jetzt theoretisch jeder ein Handy haben darf, sind die Tarife für die meisten Nordkoreaner unbezahlbar. 200 Freiminuten und 20 SMS kosten im Monat 800 nordkoreanische Won, nach offiziellem Wechselkurs sind das rund 5,50 Euro. Dazu kommen die Freischaltgebühr und die SIM-Karte für 50 Euro – zahlbar in Devisen. Wer sich nichts in der wuchernden Schattenökonomie dazuverdient, kann sich das nicht leisten.

And again, via Google Translate:

Even though now may theoretically have a cell phone each, the rates for most North Koreans are priceless. 200 free minutes and SMS cost 20,800 North Korean won per month, according to the official exchange rate is around 5.50 €. Then there are the activation fee and the SIM card for € 50 – payable in foreign currency. Anyone who does nothing, earned in the sprawling shadow economy can not afford that.

And on the human resources front…

Auch bei seinen nordkoreanischen Mitarbeitern bemerkt er Veränderungen. “Vom technischen Können her sind sie sehr gut, die Herausforderungen lagen eher im kaufmännischen Bereich und im Marketing”, sagt Heikal. “Aber wir bilden sie im Unternehmen aus, und wir organisieren für sie Trainings im Ausland, vor allem in China. Ich spüre, dass sich ihre Mentalität über die vergangenen drei Jahre gewandelt hat. Sie beginnen, das Geschäft zu kapieren.”

Bisher sind nordkoreanische Angestellte noch nicht ins oberste Management vorgestoßen, aber mittelfristig sollen sie die ägyptischen Expats ablösen. Natürlich wünscht sich das Regime, dass die eigenen Leute dort die Verantwortung übernehmen – und hegt trotzdem, wie so oft, schwere Bedenken dagegen. “Auf der Managementebene muss man mit der Außenwelt kommunizieren”, gibt Heikal zu bedenken. “Wir diskutieren das mit den Behörden. Sie verstehen das Problem, aber ich denke, das wird noch etwas dauern.” Er lächelt. “Im Rückblick erkennt man enorme Verbesserungen und Veränderungen, aber wir haben noch viel vor uns. Eine ganze Reihe von Dingen wird noch eine Menge Geduld brauchen.”

via Google Translate:

Even with his North Korean employees, he noticed changes. “From her technical ability, they are very good, the challenges were more in the commercial sector and in marketing,” says Heikal. “But we are training in the company, and we’ll arrange for her training abroad, especially in China. I feel that their mentality has changed over the past three years. You begin to understand the business.”

So far North Korea’s workers are not pushed into top management, but the medium they are to replace the Egyptian expatriates. Of course, the regime hopes that their own people over there take the responsibility – and still cherishes, as so often, serious concerns about it. “At the management level needs to communicate with the outside world is,” says Heikal pointed out. “We discuss with the authorities. You understand the problem, but I think it will take some time.” He smiles. “In retrospect, there are vast improvements and changes, but we still have a lot to us. A whole series of things still need a lot of patience.”

Read the full story here:
Die Pyramidenbauer von Pjöngjang
German Financial Times
2011-5-8

Share

Star JV Co. takes over .kp domain

Thursday, May 5th, 2011

UPDATE (2011-5-19): Martyn Williams writes in PC World:

Control of North Korea’s top-level Internet domain has been formally assigned to a government-backed venture after the previous operator, a German company, let the national domain disappear from the Internet for several months.

The dot-kp domain was officially transferred at the beginning of May to Star Joint Venture, a North Korean-Thai company that has been chartered with providing “modern Internet services” to the insular country. Star JV has been in de-facto control of the domain name since December last year.

Dot-kp was first assigned in 2007 to the Korea Computer Center, one of the country’s top computer science establishments. KCC had agreed to let a German businessman, Jan Holtermann, set up a satellite Internet connection to North Korea and run the dot-kp domain through a German company, KCC Europe.

The company ran the domain and a handful of North Korean websites from servers in Berlin until mid 2010 when they suddenly disappeared from the Internet.

“In 2010, the authoritative name servers for the .KP became completely lame, effectively stopping the top-level domain from operating,” said the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), the body that coordinates basic addressing functions of the Internet, in a report published this week.

“Korea Computer Center reached out to KCC Europe, its Germany-based technical registry provider, to have service reinstated. After several months without response, Korea Computer Center terminated KCCE’s agreement to operate the .KP domain,” the report said.

At around the same time, Star JV was beginning to bring Internet connectivity to Pyongyang via China. The company had already taken control of IP (Internet Protocol) addresses long reserved for North Korea but never used, and it brought the country’s first website onto the global Internet around October 2010.

The site, for the domestic news agency, was initially only accessible via its IP address since the dot-kp DNS (Domain Name Service) was still under the control of KCC Europe.

But that changed in December “in light of the continuing lack of operation of the dot-kp,” said the IANA report.

The Korea Computer Center supported giving Star JV interim control of the dot-kp domain and the first websites began using North Korean domain names in January this year.

The change was made official in May when the IANA database was updated to show Star JV as the coordinator of the domain.

Several attempts to contact Jan Holtermann, the German businessman that ran KCC Europe, both for this story and previous stories have proved unsuccessful. German company records show KCC Europe was dissolved on Jan. 31 this year.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-5-5): According to Martyn Williams:

Control of North Korea’s dot-KP Internet top-level domain has been assigned to Star JV, the North Korean-Thai joint venture that’s behind the recent wiring of Pyongyang to the global Internet.

The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which administers country code domains, updated its database on Monday, May 2, to assign the KP domain to “Star Joint Venture Company.”

This means control for the KP domain now rests with Star JV. Star took control of North Korea’s Internet address space last year and has been building up the North Korean Internet.

Switch of control to Star doesn’t come as a surprise as the company started issuing dot-kp domains in January this year. It’s a further sign that the joint venture between the North Korean government and Thailand’s Loxley Pacific is now responsible for the DPRK’s Internet links with the rest of the world.

The administrative and technical contact details are now listed as:

President
Star Joint Venture Company
Potonggang2-dong, Potonggang District
Pyongyang
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Email: [email protected]
Voice: +8502 381 3180
Fax: +8502 381 4418

That’s the address and contact details of the international relations department of North Korea’s Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.

The website for domain name registration is listed as www.star.co.kp. This website came online in the last few weeks, but it’s still being built.

Administrative control of the domain name was previously held by the Korea Computer Center with technical control in the hands of Jan Holtermann, the German businessman who previously ran a satellite-Internet connection to the country.

Martyn has been keeping an eye on the Star JV co for some time.  See here, here, and here.

Previous posts on the Korea Computer Center are here.

Share

DPRK’s largest communications center

Monday, May 2nd, 2011

UPDATE 1 (2011-4-29): Martyn Williams claims to have identified the name and purpose of the large communications center I identified on satellite imagery of North Korea:

If you’ve ever listened to The Voice of Korea on shortwave, you’ve probably heard broadcasts from this transmitter site. Kujang is one of the largest transmitter locations in the DPRK with, according to official records, 5 shortwave transmitters each capable of delivering a 200kW signal. That’s powerful enough to reach most corners of the world, given a clear frequency and good conditions.

I am not convinced that the site posted below is actually the Kujang short-wave transmitter. First of all, the towers are not located in the right county (Hyangsan, not Kuajng) and there are many more than five transmission towers.

I will post more as I uncover it.

ORIGINAL POST (2010-2-11): In Myohyangsan County ( 40.078134°, 126.111790°) is the largest collection of communications towers I have found in the DPRK…more than 20 towers clustered together.

communications-thumbanil.JPG

You can click on the image to see a larger version.

Hat tip to a reader.

Share

Koryolink sees increase in users and revenue

Tuesday, April 19th, 2011

Martyn Williams writes in PC World:

North Korea’s only 3G cellular operator continues to report strong demand for its service and saw record revenue and growth in subscriber numbers in 2010, its majority shareholder said Monday.

The Koryolink service ended 2010 with 431,919 subscribers, more than quadrupling its customer base over the year, said Egypt’s Orascom Telecom. Orascom owns three-quarters of the cellular carrier through Cheo Technology, a joint venture with the state-run Korea Posts and Telecommunications (KPTC).

Revenue hit US$66.4 million, up 155 percent on the year.

Koryolink launched its service in the final weeks of 2008 amid some skepticism about whether North Korea’s government, which keeps tight control on its people, would really permit the general populace to own cellphones.

The continuing subscription growth appears to have proven the critics wrong. Anecdotal evidence from foreigners that have visited Pyongyang also points to an increasing number of people being seen on the street with cellphones.

There remains plenty of room to grow. The current subscriber base represents less than 2 percent of the population. Koryolink offered cheaper tariffs in 2010 to put its cellphone service within reach of more people, and might have to continue lowering prices if it wants to greatly expand penetration inside what is one of Asia’s poorest countries.

The service now covers 91 percent of the population including the capital, Pyongyang, 14 other cities, and 22 major highways. In addition to basic voice service, a video phone service was introduced in the third quarter. SMS and MMS messaging services and high-speed data service are available, although subscribers cannot access the Internet through their cellphones.

While subscriber numbers and revenues grow, it remains unclear if Orascom is making any money in North Korea. The company doesn’t disclose net profit figures for the unit, but provides profit before accounting for interest payments, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Measured this way, the company posted profits of $57.8 million, up from $17.2 million in 2009.

But perhaps an indication of Koryolink’s profitability, or at least its potential, can be found in Orascom’s recent deal to merge most of its telecom operations with Russia’s Vimpelcom. The deal includes carriers in a handful of countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, but excludes two: its home market of Egypt and Koryolink in North Korea.

Orascom’s 2010 annual report (Just released) can be found here (PDF).

More about the Vimpelcom deal here.

Martyn discusses the firm’s performance here.

Choson Ilbo has more here.

Read the full story here:
North Korea’s Sole 3G Operator Sees Users and Revenue Surge
PC World
Martyn Williams
2011-4-19

Share

On DPRK information sources…

Tuesday, April 19th, 2011

UPDATE: On a related note…

North Korea’s Digital Underground“, The Atlantic, April 2011

ORIGINAL POST: The following blurb appeared in a recent article on 38 North:

Feeding this confusion are serious problems with information collection about the domestic situation in North Korea. Policymakers in Seoul and Washington rely heavily (whether they know it or not) on testimony or information provided by North Korean defectors. Defectors and networks of informants who move across the China-North Korea border, are key sources for a new constellation of media organizations like Daily NK, Open North Korea Radio, Free North Korea Radio, Good Neighbors, Radio Free Asia (U.S.), Asia Press (Japan), and other internet media. To be sure, people coming out of the DPRK can be important sources of information—for example, these networks brought out information about the 2009 currency reform. However, the new “media” organizations are not staffed by independent, professional journalists. To the contrary, they are propaganda organs and advocacy organizations designed to undermine regime stability in the North. Their reports frequently lack verification, yet regularly appear in Yonhap News, the leading South Korean government news agency, without any filtering. Major conservative newspapers, such as Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo, and Donga Ilbo, quote them as is. International news media, including the wire services and leading American newspapers, in turn, reprint them as world news. Unverified reports and politically motivated characterizations of North Korean instability are transmuted into truth. There are even cases of defectors reportedly being pressured to tow the official line. For example, Yonhap News was pressured to remove a senior reporter, herself a defector, from its North Korea desk when she discounted exaggerated reports by defector organizations of instability around the Kim family succession and currency reform failures.

Aidan Foster-Cater responds in this Asia Times article:

How do we know anything about North Korea? Where can you find reliable information? If sources conflict, how does one judge between them? Bottom line: Who ya gonna trust?

These are key questions. And they’re as old as the hills – which North Korea has more of than facts. My own interest in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is now, dare I confess, in its fifth decade. Even when I started, back in the 1960s, data of any kind were a problem. There were almost none to speak of.

No point asking Pyongyang. I was a fan in those days, but even so I winced at the regime’s clunky propaganda, and its emptiness: the absence of even the most basic facts and figures.

In the 1950s, North Korea did publish some statistics, but in the 1960s they stopped. Why? As growth slowed, paranoia and secretiveness ballooned. Nicholas Eberstadt has noted it was the same in the USSR and China, when Stalin’s and Mao’s excesses were at their height [1]. In Moscow and Beijing the mad blackouts eventually ended. In Pyongyang, darkness still rules.

Normal countries need numbers. A national budget with no figures: What a crazy idea! Not in North Korea, where this bizarre charade is enacted every year, most recently on April 7.

What passes for a parliament in Pyongyang usually meets for just one day a year, in spring. The main business is to pass the budget, which they duly do. (There’s no debate, obviously.)

And no numbers, either. Take a look at the official Korea Central News Agency [2]. Finance minister Pak Su-gil uttered a few percentages, but not a single actual solid figure. Weird.

Until 1994, they at least gave the budget totals, so we could work out some of the rest. South Korea’s Unification Ministry (MOU) reckons it heard a real number on the radio, once, and on that basis offers its own guesses here and there. Yet this is meagre stuff. A joke, really.

But I’ve banged on about this before in these pages [3], so what’s new pussycat? Two things.

First, I personally have taken this matter up, at the highest level. Only the other day I had words on the subject with the Speaker of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) himself. No really, I did. Choe Thae-bok, an urbane gent of 82 and a very senior figure, spent a week in London just before the SPA session. Tea at the House of Lords, that sort of thing. All a bit surreal, and it’s easy to scoff. But at times like these, it’s important to keep the doors open.

Over a convivial dinner at Asia House, I asked Choe about those budget blanks. He said he’d look into it, but I admit I wasn’t holding my breath. Ah well. He must be a busy chap.

Fortunately in 2011 we can supplement Pyongyang’s crummy crumbs with more solid fare. It’s a new world: the information age! NK may resist, but two things have changed – a lot.

First, and obviously, the Internet has been a boon. We who follow North Korea are no longer sad lonely nutters. Online we can find each other – we are legion! – and pool our knowledge. Kind folks like Curtis Melvin at NKeconwatch and Tad Farrell at NKNews, among others, have put a lot of work into creating crucial online resources on North Korea. (For their pains, they have survived more than one cyber-attack [4]. Who on earth would do a thing like that?) So now we can collate and compare notes.

Read the rest below the fold….

(more…)

Share

KCNA web page gets a makeover

Thursday, April 14th, 2011

There are two KCNA web pages.  The older one is run by the Chongryun in Japan (here). The newer one is managed by the Korea Computer Center (KCC). This newer web page was recently updated. It went off line a few days ago and emerged today with a different format. You can see a screen shot above.

The URL is slightly different.  The previous version of the KCC’s KCNA web page was http://www.kcna.kp/kor.  The new one is simply http://www.kcna.kp. The default language is Korean, but if you can read a little Korean, you can find the language settings and change the language to:

English: http://www.kcna.kp/goHome.do?lang=eng

Spanish: http://www.kcna.kp/goHome.do?lang=spa

Japanese: http://www.kcna.kp/goHome.do?lang=jpn

Another great change has been the addition of a reasonably functional search bar.  The older Chongryun KCNA web page has no search function (Hooray for the Stalin Search Engine).  The previous version of the KCC’s KCNA web page contained a search bar that was too small to type “Kim Jong il”.  Now you can do a search for “The Great Leader Comrade Kim Jong il”–which produces one result.

No doubt Martyn Williams will have more to say about this page when the sun gets to his side of the planet.  Today he reports on the launch of the DPRK’s new Voice of Korea web page.

Below are some recent posts on the DPRK’s moves to the internet:

KCNA re-launched on DPRK-owned IP address

Hackers find creative way to celebrate KJU birthday

DPRK organization opens Twitter account

Uriminzokkiri on Youtube

Naenara, TaeMun, and KCNA get new URLs

Martyn William’s list of DPRK web pages

Share