North Korean Economy Watch

According to Choson Exchange:

As we mentioned recently, Ri Chol, the broker of the Orascom deal, has moved on from JVIC. Where he has gone is not yet certain, but the choice for his replacement is interesting.

Ri Gwang Gun is the new head of JVIC and was introduced as such to the CEO of Orascom last week. Ri Gwang Gun has held various positions related to trade, including executive positions at state owned enterprises and as Minister of Foreign Trade. He apparently reports to Kim Yang Gon.

He was (is?) a Daepung Investment Group man. We’ve speculated that the existence of both Daepung and JVIC reflected a kind of “competition at the top” for influence in attracting and managing investments. They were both formed around the same time in 2009/2010 and have similar charges. Therefore, Ri Gwang Gun’s promotion could indicate a potential harmonizing of this competition.

Of course, the contours of this are difficult to see. Daepung, with stronger ties to the NDC, could be construed as taking over the JVIC from the top; perhaps the military has been able to exert itself to make sure that in the new leadership era, it does not get shut out of the investment game. (JVIC has become the more active and influential of the two groups.)

It could also be seen as a victory for JVIC, with Daepung being left to crumble and the top talent from that group being brought across. It remains to be seen if there will be some kind of exodus from either group.

Perhaps, also, it is some kind of compromise and a merger of sorts, with competing groups of elites ‘buying in’ to a unified system of investment management under the JVIC brand. They may see this as a way to increase effectiveness, avoid the negative outcomes of unfettered intra-elite competition and therefore encourage stability overall.

Pictured above: the DPRK’s two CNC plants mentioned in the post below. (L) Ryonha Factory in Pyongyang, (R) Ryonha Factory in Huichon

From the Choson Exchange web page:

The company that is tasked with producing and selling CNC is Ryonha, through its subsidiary, Unsan. The company had a booth at the recent International Trade Fair in Rason, held in North Korea’s Special Economic Zone in the far Northeast, bordering Russia and China. Their booth was staffed by a Vice President and – as one might expect – attracted lots of attention from the locals in attendance.

The president claimed annual exports of 30,000,000 euros to Europe, South America and South East Asia. He didn’t have exact details on profits, but mentioned that Unsan imported 10,000,000 euro worth of parts, mostly from Europe, such as control units and electronic relays Siemens and Arno. Their main CNC factory is 40,000 sq. meters and the “biggest in the world” according to the manager. They have two facilities, one in Pyongyang and one in Jagang with 12,000 employees in total. They want to open a factory in Rason, ideally without investors. Prices were said to be: 150,000 EUR for a European made CNC machine but only 52,000 EUR for an equivalent machine made in the DPRK, with the “same quality”.

Unfortunately for Ryonha, it seems to be a subsidiary of the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, which is under UN sanctions as a WMD proliferator. This no doubt impacts Ryonha’s ability to market itself to customers abroad. Ryonha also doesn’t seem to have a website, which can’t help, either.

Should Ryonha’s parent corporation be taken off the UN’s list of designated proliferators, it will find easier access to a global CNC market that was $6.1 billion in 2007, before the financial crisis hit. The market has contracted since then, as the crisis left a global glut in inventory in 2009, which has taken well into 2011 to clear. The sharply reduced demand, particularly from automakers, has made the CNC market particularly competitive, though a sustained economic recovery would eventually drag the industry back up to pre-crisis levels.

It’s difficult to know what kind of impact Ryonha might have on the global CNC industry, as customers and vendors alike are probably reluctant to trumpet where their machines are made. One of the effects of sanctions has been that companies try to hide their tracks when conducting business with the DPRK, even when the industry is unrelated to sanctioned items. This is sometimes done through an extra layer (or two) of outsourced contracts, or with textiles, sometimes just label-switching. This is tough to do with bigger machines, of course, leaving North Korean CNC machines facing perhaps understandable prejudices.

Its impact on the domestic market will be more significant, of course, reducing the need to spend hard currency on imported CNC machines from China and elsewhere. Perhaps then, this import substitution will allow the DPRK to use that unspent capital on projects that actually benefit the daily lives of its citizens.

Read the full post here.

According to Choson Exchange:

[The] Choson Ilbo has just reported that Ri Chol has left his post as head of the Joint Venture and Investment Committee (JVIC).

As we argued last fall, the name of the game for Pyongyang’s elites is securing trade and investment deals. Two main investment organs exist, the JVIC and the Daepung Investment Group. We have in the past heard rumors of other similar international investment organizations being under consideration, also. From these overarching groups, down to smaller State Owned Enterprises, there is considerable competition to show that one’s organization can deliver.

Ri Chol was a close ally of Kim Jong Il’s and the organization he came to be associated with, JVIC, rose to prominence after he helped put together the Orascom deal and was given stewardship. He was even with Kim on his last official visit, to a joint venture supermarket in Pyongyang.

He also spent most of the 1980’s and 1990’s in Switzerland in various diplomatic capacities, not the least of which was acting as a minder to Kim Jong Il’s children as they studied at private school.

What might his departure portend?

A few possibilities come to mind.

- Has the JVIC fallen out of favor with the new leadership? If this is the case, Ri might be tasked with building a new organization, perhaps with a similar focus. It would seem redundant to add another, rather than reform this one, but redundancy is hardly unheard of in planned economies.

- Has Ri himself fallen out of favor? Is he being put out to pasture? Again, it is impossible to know, but it seems that such a long term friend of the Kims, who has a personal relationship with Kim Jong Un from his school days would be a key ally at this time, especially since his deals are driving economic growth in North Korea. (Though who knows? Perhaps Kim the Younger has never liked him.)

- If not an issue with Ri personally, the move could be a part of a factional reshuffling. Bartering and dealmaking for control of the commanding heights of the economy is no doubt underway as the new government consolidates its power. It might have been deemed necessary to grant control of the JVIC to another group of Pyongyang movers and shakers – of which Ri Chol is not a part.

- Also very possible is that the very top leadership is planning to give Ri some new responsibility elsewhere. JVIC may have been judged to be running smoothly enough that Ri’s skills would be more effectively used another important organization.

This of course is highly speculative. All we really know is that Ri Chol, with a track record of securing investment, has left the JVIC. Whatever the case may be, he is worth watching in the coming months, as Pyongyang is compelled to keep investments from China and elsewhere coming.

You can read a longer bio on NK Leadership Watch.

From the Choson Exchange web page (November 5):

In October 2011, John Kim, a board director of the Choson Exchange, visited the Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Zone. The following is a summary of some of his findings based on site visits and talks with senior officials in the SEZ. An longer account of his travels and impressions will be available soon. This information helps elaborate on our report from August.

Rajin Port
The Rajin Port employs 1400 workers. The Chinese have conducted feasibility tests regarding two new piers, but currently the port houses three piers with 9-9.5 meters draft. A 30,000 metric ton coal storage warehouse was built at Pier 1 by the Chinese, who moved 80,000 metric tons through the facility in five shipments from January to September. Pier two, largely dedicated to container shipment, is currently dormant and a Swiss company is currently using Pier 3 to ship manganese and talc out of the region. The Russians also have a 49 year lease agreement signed in 2008.

Oongsang [Ungsang] Port
Oongsang Port exported Russian lumber until 1985, but remains largely quiet now except for the occasional fishing boat. The present draft of 7 meters constricts any major future activity, so the North Koreans hope to bring in over $100M to widen the draft to 9 meters. After Rajin Port activity surpasses capacity there, Oongsang Port will become the next regional hub for drybulk activity.

Sonbong Port
Originally opened in the early 70’s, the draft within the port is 7 meters, but a fully laden Very Large Crude Carrier containing 270,000 metric tons of oil can offload at an offshore facility further out at sea. Two pipes, 63 cm in diameter, run for 9km underground before reaching the storage facility at “Victory Petrochemical”, a simple refinery that was designed to refine crude and send oil products (gasoline, naphtha, jet fuel, diesel and fuel oil) back to the port for export. In addition to this two way flow, fuel oil also arrived sporadically at the port as part of aid packages from 1994 to 2008.

Sonbong Power
This power plant was originally designed to take fuel oil from Victory Petrochemical as feedstock and generate power to feed back to Victory. Since the refinery has been offline, Sonbong Power has at times provided electricity to the region, but with fuel oil prices close to $700/metric ton and current electricity prices at 6.5 eurocents/kwh, the economics of running the plant do not work leaving the 800 workers employed here largely idle.

Victory [Sungri] Oil Refinery
Literally translated as “Victory Chemical Plant”, this refinery was completed in 1973 with a 40,000bbl/day crude distillation unit that typically yields 40~50% residual fuel oil for an average crude feed. Investment into upgrading capacity in the international market has led to an eroding of margins for simple refineries like Victory. Currently the refinery is idle and would need over $500M in investment to become competitive.

Hye Song Trading Company
Mr Kim visited a Sewing Factory owned by Hye Song, which runs 8 such factories employing 2000 workers. Output is recorded for the entire year on a bulletin board at the front entrance of the company. All employees except the handyman were women.

Cell Phone use more prevalent
The number of cell phone users in the DPRK crossed 1 million earlier this year and one official commented that the overwhelming majority of urban households have at least one cell phone. This particular official had 4 phones for a household of 3. Foreigners are allowed to use cell phones on a different network, and users of the domestic and foreign network can not call each other. All usage is prepaid.

Handset Type: Local
Purchase Cost: 1570-2200 RMB
Usage Cost: 250 minutes and 20 text messages, while each additional minute is charged at 60 NKW (about .1 RMB/min)

Handset Type: Foreigner
Purchase Cost: 1800-2400 RMB
Usage Cost: Does not include any free minutes and are charged at 2RMB/min

Banking System has room for growth
There are two banks in Rason, the Central Bank, which is focused on domestic transactions, and the Golden Triangle Bank, which is focused on foreign currency transactions. Transactions for goods and services are conducted almost entirely in cash, usually in RMB or NKW. Mechanisms for savings are credit have room for development. As banks take a fee to deposit and withdraw cash, merchants prefer to hold money in cash (usually RMB). Credit is also available almost exclusively through friends or family.

Bottlenecks
A number of issues require solving if Rason is serious about attracting large scale foreign investment. Among these are reliable access to travel visas, reasonable communications costs with the outside world, a more mature banking system with savings and credit mechanisms and favorable tax treatment with a consistent legal framework. The mere fact that Rason is experimenting with market reform is encouraging, and Mr Kim is optimistic about economic development in the region and the nation as a whole.

According to Choson Exchange:

In August this year, Choson Exchange, a non-profit focused on economic policy, business and legal knowledge exchange with North Korea (DPR Korea), implemented a study trip for DPRK policymakers to exchange policy ideas and experience in Singapore with policymakers. Thanks to the sponsorship of the Swiss Cooperation Office DPR of Korea, we were able to implement an insightful and engaging series of discussion with participating Koreans. We focused our program on younger Koreans, with 6 of the 7 North Koreans being under 40 years old, out of which 2 were under 30 years old. 3 institutions were represented in the visit, which involved 10 intensive days of meetings and discussions.

In particular, some of the young participants we selected for the program were able to ask astute questions on development issues and coordination among economic agencies. During the post-trip debriefing, participants highlighted specific aspects of Singapore’s economic development experience which they found particularly interesting and relevant for their country. They also gave feedback on policy ideas which they believe could be adapted to their country. Choson Exchange followed up on the discussions with consultations in Pyongyang 5 days after the program ended.

We would like to thank speakers who volunteered their time and experience at this event in their personal capacities. Speakers included:

- The former Chairman of Singapore Airlines, Singapore Stock Exchange, Temasek Holdings, Development Bank of Singapore, Nepture Orient Lines and Permanent Secretary at various Ministries

- The former Minister for Finance and Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office

- The Chief Economist for Bank of America Merrill Lynch in Southeast Asia

- The CEO of Centennial Asia Advisers and former Chief Economist for SocGen Asia-Pacific

- Directors and Economists at various Ministries in Singapore

- Private sector speakers or hosts from McKinsey & Co., Bain & Co., Goldman Sachs and Capital Group

We would also like to thank Member of Parliament Lily Neo for hosting dinners for the visiting delegation.

38 North
Andray Abrahamian
2011-8-29

A bus bumps and bruises its way along the unpaved road, carrying would-be investors to Rason’s First Rason International Trade Exhibition which ran from August 21-25, 2011, in Sonbong. The windows are open, until a crimson humvee barrels past, its powerful suspension dancing on the road, leaving behind a plume of beige dust. The bus windows snap shut, the still air quickly gets hot and more than one of the passengers wishes we were Chinese high-rollers, being whisked to the Emperor Casino and Hotel, which sits beautifully on Korea’s East Sea, overlooking Bipa Island and flanked by lush green mountains and crystal waters.

The passengers of the humvee-part of the casino’s fleet-will long be checked in and gambling their fortunes away by the time we complete our two and a half hour journey. However, it won’t always be this way. Rason’s 50km road to the border is finally being upgraded. Indeed, the 2.5 hour journey took 3.5 hours in June. Since then, the road has been widened, the first stage of the construction plan, allowing for traffic to flow both directions more easily and smaller passenger vehicles to overtake the more cumbersome truckers who ply the road.

Its construction is an important sign in the development of the Rason Special Economic Zone. Rason, an amalgamation of the names of the area’s two biggest cities, Rajin and Sonbong, could theoretically be a vibrant hub for both logistics and manufacturing. It is located in the far Northeast of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, bordering Russia and China. It has abundant, cheap labor and the region’s northernmost ice-free port. It has been a legal entity since the early 1991, but has struggled to reach its potential in the face of ambivalence from Pyongyang and difficult geopolitical circumstances.

Local administrators have bold plans for this experiment in economic opening-up and to develop as the Rason Municipal People’s Committee has imagined, an efficient road link with China’s Northeastern provinces is vital. For about a decade, improvements to the road have been “under discussion” and “coming soon,” but it is now undeniably underway. Work began in May of this year…READ MORE HERE

Chronicle of Higher Education
Geoffrey See (Choson Exchange)
2011-7-28

In the early 1980s, Theodore Schultz, a Chicago economist and Nobel laureate, visited a China that was just opening up. Impressed by his translator during the trip, he offered the young man an opportunity to attend the University of Chicago’s doctoral program in economics. Thirty years later, the young man, Justin Lin, who helped built one of the top economics department in China at Peking University, became the first chief economist of the World Bank from Asia. Without that scholarship, things might have turned out very differently for Justin Lin, Peking University, and the World Bank.

Today, we have North Korea, an isolated country with young people equally curious about business, finance, and economics, and in a system similar to China’s in the 70s or 80s. On my first trip to Pyongyang, in 2007, a student from Kim Il Sung University, North Korea’s leading university, told me that she wanted to join a trading company to prove that women can be great business leaders. She asked if I could bring economics or business textbooks for her the next time I visited the country. Her example shows there is a hunger for knowledge in the isolated country. And with international-education opportunities, some of these people could become globally integrated and enlightened leaders.

For universities that seek to educate the leaders of tomorrow who will have an impact on the world, supporting North Korean students contributes immensely to this mission. By equipping intelligent and dynamic North Koreans with knowledge and networks, universities can give them an enormous head start in shaping the future of their country.

Choson Exchange, an academic-exchange organization I started, recently selected three talented North Koreans under 30 years of age for scholarships to study business, finance, and economics overseas through a rigorous process. We brought in a managing partner from a top-tier management-consulting company to conduct due diligence to first select high-quality financial, policy, and other institutions with clear emphasis on training young employees. We asked these institutions to nominate young candidates for a scholarship program, and we put the nominees through several rounds of interviews. We were surprised at the quality of the candidates. All three recipients we selected spoke excellent English, and were able to discuss in English the merits of different fiscal incentives and legal structures, or the need for legal reforms in tackling corruption. Two of them spoke other foreign languages.

Perhaps we should not be surprised. North Korean students benefit from a cultural and political emphasis on education. In addition, the dearth of opportunities for North Koreans to study overseas allowed us to pick from a pool of incredibly bright students. For universities competing to lure in high-potential individuals, North Korea provides low-hanging fruit. Unfortunately, many administrators at universities believe, without bothering to meet candidates, that no North Korean could be good enough for their programs.

North Korean candidates will need scholarships. And universities, in this period of cost-cutting, are understandably hesitant in providing scholarships to candidates from a country most people have little interest in. But the two or three places a university can provide amount to an insignificant cost. Even if universities could not care less about North Korea, they should recognize the potential for such a program to attract donor, academic, or corporate interest from South Korea when the political relationship between the two Koreas improves.

Universities undoubtedly will have concerns about such a program. North Koreans are unlikely to be able to apply to universities through the usual process, which will require flexibility on the university’s part in devising an alternative but equally rigorous process. This will probably require creative partnerships with nonprofits or companies in Pyongyang.

Universities are also rightfully concerned that such opportunities will disproportionately benefit the progeny of the North Korean elite, who they might not believe deserve such opportunities. While candidates will likely be upper- to upper-middle class Koreans who have access to the best educational resources in the country, this is not necessarily incomparable to students coming from other developing countries where getting high-quality English education is often the preserve of those with resources. The very richest and most elite of North Koreans (a small pool) do not require scholarships for their sons and daughters. They already send their progeny to France or Switzerland for education.

With a combination of luck, good processes, and a supportive university, perhaps sometime down the road, the next chief economist for the World Bank could come from North Korea. And the person would be able to tell you how he or she changed how business and economics is studied in the country.

Evan Ramsatad writes in the Wall Street Journal’s Korea Real Time Blog:

Choson Exchange, which has previously concentrated on academic avenues into North Korea, this week published a report on the legal framework North Korea has developed for accepting foreign direct investment.

It resembles China’s structure to a large degree, including requiring that outsiders work with a local business to make an investment and are subject to review by a special commission and potentially other government bodies.

The 14-page report is based chiefly on research from a recent trip to Pyongyang. There, they listened to government officials explain the structure they’ve set up and the places they’d most like to see be developed by foreign investors.

At the top of the list: Rason, the port city in the northeast part of the country that Russia has built a rail line to and China is building a four-lane highway to. Already, Switzerland has reportedly invested in a berth at the city’s port and Norway and other countries helped develop a wind energy project just outside the city.

The report’s conclusion is that North Korea’s foreign investment laws “provide a logical if bureaucratic framework” for foreigners to approach the country. But Choson Exchange said a big ambiguity remains: will North Korea be fair?

To get investor confidence, the group said North Korea “will need to establish a practice of applying and enforcing its laws fairly and consistently, even where the result is not always in the best interest of the DPRK or its state-owned entities.”

The full report published by Choson Exchange can be found on their web page here (PDF).  According to the summary:

In June, Choson Exchange took a fact-finding and training needs-mapping trip to Pyongyang. The main impetus for the trip was to get a better understanding of the legal structure that the DPRK has in place to govern inbound foreign investment. We found a legal structure that draws heavily on China’s experiences. Our full findings are in this report.

Key points include:

- Investment projects categorized into encouraged, permitted, restricted and prohibited categories.

- As in China, foreign enterprises require a local business vehicle to conduct FDI; the primary business vehicles available in the DPRK are limited liability corporate bodies and representative offices.

- The JVIC (Joint Venture and Investment Commission) and other government bodies (if applicable) will review the business scope, capitalization and other aspects of a proposed corporate body prior to incorporation.

- Investment in Rason will be particularly encouraged. According to JVIC, corporate bodies established in Rason can also apply to do business elsewhere in the DPRK.

- The operations and governance of DPRK corporate bodies are set out in law, including scope of activities, investment scale, limited liability, location, management, staffing and repatriation of profits.

- Domestic and Foreign arbitration is the primary mechanism for resolving commercial disputes between DPRK and foreign parties.

- Some ambiguities remain. Will laws be enforced uniformly and consistently?

Below are some very interesting reports and publications. All well worth reading:

Foreign Assistance to North Korea
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Mark E. Manyin, Mary Beth Nikiti
Download here (PDF).  See other CRS reports on the DPRK here.

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U.S.-DPRK Educational Exchanges: Assessment and Future Strategy
The Freeman Spogli Institute
Edited by: Gi-Wook Shin, Karin J. Lee
Read the whole book  here (PDF)

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Beyond Good Intentions: The Challenges of Recruiting Deserving Young North Koreans
38 North
Goffrey See, Choson Exchange

From the Choson Exchange Facebook Page (May 1, 2011):

We are looking for volunteers with an interest in North Korea and the right skill sets to lead workshops in Pyongyang in the September-October period, and for North Koreans outside of Pyongyang in the July-August period.

Those with the following skill sets would be most appreciated and are welcome to email us at CEteam@chosonexchange.org to discuss volunteering opportunities. Those with relevant experiences outside of these areas are welcome to join our mailing list and Facebook page to stay in touch about future opportunities:

Economic Policy
1. Fiscal & Monetary Policy
2. Business Environment Development
3. Investment Policy & Sourcing

Banking
1. Risk Management – Credit, FX, Market, Liquidity, Operational…etc.
2. Asset-Liability Matching
3. Banking IT Systems

Entrepreneurship
1. Developing Business Plans
2. Feasibility Studies