North Korean Economy Watch

Choson Ilbo
3/10/2010

Curbing North Korea’s illicit arms trade is difficult since the renegade country launders containers carrying weapons three or four times, a defector who was in charge of illicit arms deals told the Chosun Ilbo on Monday.

The defector revealed that a factory in Jagang Province, which is believed to produce tractors, is the center of the communist country’s weapons production, including chemical warheads. The defector, who is under police protection, did not want his identity to be revealed fearing reprisal attacks against family members still in the North.

Foreign Forwarders Transport Weapons
Five departments of the North Korean government are involved in arms exports: the military arms production wing of the Workers’ Party, the Second Academy of Natural Sciences, the Surveillance Division of the People’s Armed Forces, Operational Department of the Workers’ Party and the Second Economic Committee. He said the Economic Committee, which is directly under the control of the powerful National Defense Commission, is the biggest.

The military arms production wing procures materials for the Yongbyon nuclear plant and North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. “The General Bureau of Atomic Energy only produces yellow cake [the seed material for higher-grade nuclear enrichment], while the arms production wing is in charge of the Yongbyon facility,” the defector said. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences exports missiles and also provides after-sales service for exported products by upgrading performance and exchanging components.

“The main client is the research center of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, while experiments are conducted in unison,” he said. Iran successfully test-fired a rocket on Feb. 3 which is believed to have been powered by the same engine as North Korean Rodong missiles.

But international sanctions against North Korea make it difficult to export weapons by conventional means. “This is where the Surveillance Division of the People’s Armed Forces comes in,” the defector said. Its “traders,” who studied at Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies, are fluent in English and Chinese and sign deals with “forwarders” from other countries. Through this process, North Korea sends containers across the Apnok (or Yalu) River to China one third or half filled with weapons. “The forwarder who received this cargo enters a port in a third country, where the containers are filled with freight unrelated to weapons and the paperwork is completed,” he said.

These “laundered” containers are laundered again in Hong Kong, Singapore or other ports. “The containers are mixed with other cargo in those transit points. They are searched, but not thoroughly,” the defector added. “Even if customs or other officials roll their sleeves up and search for weapons, how can they possibly find the arms among the mountains of other containers headed to other countries?”

‘Tractor Factory’ Is Weapons Production Base
North Korea’s main weapons production base is Kanggye General Tractor Plant No. 26. Before the Korean War, the plant was based in Pyongyang and made Soviet-designed PPSh 41 submachine guns but has since been relocated. Over 10,000 workers there manufacture ammunition and even chemical weapons. The People’s Armed Forces is in charge of chemical weapons production. “The Bio-chemical research center affiliated with the military is located next to the Kanggye plant,” the defector said. “The toxic gases produced at the research center are loaded onto warheads manufactured at the plant.”

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il makes a point of visiting the factory two to three times a year. He last paid a visit on Dec. 9, 2009.

AK-47 Rifles and Ammunition Are Top Sellers
“Small arms ammunition are hot export items and the Second Economic Committee even built a factory in Ethiopia,” the defector said. The rugged AK-47s, which can operate flawlessly even in the sand-filled battlefields of the Middle East, are extremely popular, he said.

Anti-tank missiles are more complicated to manufacture, so the blueprints are in Russia, while North Korean factories are merely subcontractors. North Korean arms are believed to be exported to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines. “North Korean weapons with engines [such as tanks] are extremely poor quality, but those carrying warheads are not bad,” the defector said. Around 20 percent of the parts used to make export versions of missiles are imported. But missiles for domestic use are made using mostly North Korean-made parts, so there is a difference in performance. “North Korea tried to import Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Taiwan,” he added. “This probably has something to do with the South Korean Navy’s use of the Harpoon missiles.”

Dear Choson Ilbo: We have very good satellite imagery of Kanggye. Please tell us where the Kanggye General Tractor Plant is!  Here are three guesses as to where the plant is: guess 1, guess 2, guess 3.  Kim Jong Il has a villa in Kanggye here.  Here is his private train station near Kanggye.

According to the Washington Post:

The Obama administration, concerned that Burma is expanding its military relationship with North Korea, has launched an aggressive campaign to persuade Burma’s junta to stop buying North Korean military technology, U.S. officials said.

Concerns about the relationship — which encompass the sale of small arms, missile components and technology possibly related to nuclear weapons — in part prompted the Obama administration in October to end the George W. Bush-era policy of isolating the military junta, said a senior State Department official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject.

Senior U.S. officials have since had four meetings with their Burmese counterparts, with a fifth expected soon. “Our most decisive interactions have been around North Korea,” the official said. “We’ve been very clear to Burma. We’ll see over time if it’s been heard.”

…

Underlining the administration’s concerns about Burma is a desire to avoid a repeat of events that unfolded in Syria in 2007. North Korea is thought to have helped Syria secretly build a nuclear reactor there capable of producing plutonium. The facility was reportedly only weeks or months away from being functional when Israeli warplanes bombed it in September of that year.

“The lesson here is the Syrian one,” said David Albright, president of the nongovernmental Institute for Science and International Security and an expert on nuclear proliferation. “That was such a massive intelligence failure. You can’t be sure that North Korea isn’t doing it someplace else. The U.S. government can’t afford to be blindsided again.”

Burma is thought to have started a military relationship with North Korea in 2007. But with the passage of a U.N. Security Council resolution last June banning all weapons exports from North Korea, Burma has emerged “as a much bigger player than it was,” the senior U.S. official said.

In a report Albright co-wrote in January, titled “Burma: A Nuclear Wannabe,” he outlined the case for concern about Burma’s relations with North Korea. First, Burma has signed a deal with Russia for the supply of a 10-megawatt thermal research reactor, although construction of the facility had not started as of September.

Second, although many claims from dissident groups about covert nuclear sites in Burma are still unverified, the report said that “there remain legitimate reasons to suspect the existence of undeclared nuclear activities in Burma, particularly in the context of North Korean cooperation.”

Previous posts about the Myanmar-DPRK relationship can be found here. 

Read the full story here:
U.S. increasingly wary as Burma deepens military relationship with North Korea
Washington Post
John Pomfret
3/4/2010

UPDATE 2: According to the Los Angeles Times:

In the report, obtained Thursday by The Associated Press, the South African government said the two containers are currently stored in a state-secured warehouse in Durban while its investigation continues. It estimated the value of the conventional arms at 6 million rand (about $770,000)

The shipment’s final destination, according to the bill of lading, was the port of Pointe Noire in the Republic of Congo, the small oil-rich country often overshadowed by its larger neighbor, Congo. The Republic of Congo, whose capital is Brazzaville, has reportedly experienced a wave of recent violence.
…
The report to the Security Council committee monitoring sanctions against North Korea is entitled “breach of the Security Council resolutions…”

It traced the shipment from the DGE Corporation via the “Machinery Expand Imp Corp (cq),” both established to be in North Korea, to the Chinese port of Dalian where it was put on board the CGM Musca on Oct. 20.

The bill of lading described the contents of the two containers as “spare parts of bulldozer,” according to the report.

At Port Klang, Malaysia, the shipment was transferred to another vessel, the Westerhever, which was chartered by Delmas Shipping, a subsidiary of the French shipping company, CMA-CGM, the report said. Delmas requested that CMA-CGM Shipping Agencies South Africa (Pty) Ltd. represent the Westerhever on its voyage to South Africa.

The captain was instructed to refuel in Durban on Nov. 28-29, but due to fuel shortages in Durban, the Westerhever was ordered to take on fuel in Walvis Bay, the report said.

While en route to Walvis Bay on Nov. 27, the captain “received an email instruction from Delmas to make a U-turn and discharge the two containers in Durban, the report said.

A U.N. diplomat familiar with the report, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly, said the email informed the captain that the ship was carrying suspicious cargo which should be turned over for inspection to South African authorities in Durban.

Martin Baxendale, a spokesman for CMA-CGM, said in Paris that the company was in contact with South African authorities but said “we cannot enter into discussions relating to any details in regard to this matter.”

According to the report, “a large quantity of rice grains in sacks lined the containers and was utilized as protective buffers for the conveyance of the conventional arms.”

UPDATE 1: According to the Wall Street Journal:

According a terse, two-page account delivered by the Pretoria government earlier this month to the U.N. committee overseeing the enforcement of U.N. Security Council sanctions imposed on North Korea, South African authorities in November seized two containers filled with tank parts and other military equipment from North Korea. The report said the containers, which were loaded on a ship in the Chinese port of Dalian and bound for the Republic of the Congo, contained gun sights, tracks and other spare parts for T-54 and T-55 tanks and other war material valued at an estimated $750,000.

The military equipment was concealed in containers lined with sacks of rice, said the confidential South African report, which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Shipping documents identified the cargo as spare parts for a “bulldozer,” according to the report, which said the goods were shipped by a North Korean company.

ORIGINAL POST: According to Reuters (via Yahoo):

South Africa has told a U.N. Security Council committee it intercepted a North Korean weapons shipment bound for Central Africa, which diplomats said was a violation of a U.N. ban on arms sales by Pyongyang.

The seizure took place in November, when South African authorities received information that a ship headed for Congo Republic was carrying containers with suspicious cargo, according to a letter sent by South Africa to the Security Council’s North Korea sanctions committee.

Several Western diplomats described the incident as a “clear-cut violation” of Security Council resolution 1874, which bans all North Korean arms exports and most weapons-related imports in response to its nuclear program.

The letter, parts of which were seen by Reuters on Monday, said a North Korean company was the shipping agent and the cargo was first loaded onto a ship in China, then transferred to a vessel owned by French shipping firm CMA CGM in Malaysia.

Diplomats said the French company alerted authorities to the fact it had suspicious cargo on board and was not believed to have done anything wrong. The South Africans intercepted the vessel and seized the containers, which held tank parts.

The letter, which the committee received last week, said the South Africans discovered “that the contents fell within the definition of conventional arms in that the contents consisted of components of a military tank T-54/T-55.”

The letter said the documentation for the containers described the cargo as “spare parts of bulldozer.” T-54 and T-55 tanks were designed and produced in the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s but were later upgraded and made in other countries.

Neither the French company nor the countries involved had any immediate comment.

Congo Republic, which borders Democratic Republic of Congo, has suffered a wave of violence in the Pool region between the capital Brazzaville and the oil port town of Pointe Noire that has broken a period of calm after a decade of instability.

COMMITTEE TO DECIDE
The diplomats said the committee was planning to send letters to countries involved in the case — such as North Korea, Republic of Congo, Malaysia and France — seeking more information so it can decide whether the North Koreans or any other nations were in breach of U.N. sanctions.

Resolution 1874, approved in June 2009, was passed in response to Pyongyang’s second nuclear test in May 2009 and expanded the punitive measures the Security Council had imposed on North Korea after its first atomic test in October 2006.

Last year’s resolution also authorized countries to inspect suspicious North Korean air, land and sea cargo and to seize any banned goods.

“The latest incident shows that the sanctions are working,” one Western diplomat told Reuters. “But it also shows that we have to be vigilant. The DPRK (North Korea) is still trying to violate the sanctions.”

Last week I mentioned that the UN Security Council was investigating four cases of alleged DPRK sanctions violations–but I only knew what three of the cases were:

Case 1: A North Korean shipment of chemical-safety suits that may have been destined for Syria’s military.

Case 2: Italy’s seizure of two luxury yachts allegedly bound for North Korea

Case 3: Thailand’s interdiction of North Korean arms aboard a plane allegedly bound for Iran

And now we know Case 4: Shipping of contraband to Central Africa.

UPDATE:  It looks like case 4 was a shipment of contraband to central Africa.

ORIGINAL POST: Ertugrul Apakan, Chair of the 1718 Sanctions Committee, is reported to be investigating four cases of UNSC sanctions violations by the DPRK. I have listed 3 of the 4 cases below with links (as identified by Business Week):

Case 1: A North Korean shipment of chemical-safety suits that may have been destined for Syria’s military.

Case 2: Italy’s seizure of two luxury yachts allegedly bound for North Korea

Case 3: Thailand’s interdiction of North Korean arms aboard a plane allegedly bound for Iran

Case 4: ?

According to Business Week:

Apakan told a closed session yesterday that South Korea said the suits were from North Korea and that his committee had received an unsolicited letter from Syria denying any involvement, according to diplomats who attended the briefing. They asked not to be identified.

Bashar Ja’afari, Syria’s ambassador to the UN, said his government sent the letter because South Korea’s report of the incident stated that the suits were bound for his nation. He said Syria conducted a “deep inquiry” and concluded it had nothing to do with the case.

Syria and the DPRK were also allegely working on a nuclear reactor together and Syria’s Tishreen War Museum was built by the North Koreans.

Security Council Report, an independent not-for-profit organisation in affiliation with Columbia University’s Center on International Organization, published a February 2010 report on the DPRK which contains additional information.  See it here.

The Marmot’s Hole posted some great information on the DPRK-Malta relationship.  I encourage you to read his full post, but below I have posted information he provided from the Malta Independent:

With the Labour Party trying to project an image of a progressive and moderate all-inclusive party with new ideas, this newspaper asked Dr Sceberras Trigona, a former Foreign Minister in the Labour 1981-1987 government, for his views on the agreement he had signed with North Korea in July 1982.

At the time North Korea’s regime had, and still has, few ties with other countries due to its policy of self-reliance. However, Malta under Labour had close connections with the Asian country, with Kim Jong-Il, son of then dictator Kim Il-Sung, studying English at the University of Malta and reportedly visiting frequently with then Prime Minister Dom Mintoff.

Contact with Dr Sceberras Trigona was first made via telephone on Thursday, and he asked that the questions be sent by e-mail. The questions were as follows: 1) Given the political climate of the time, what led the Labour government to sign such an agreement with North Korea? 2) Why was a clause included in the agreement stipulating that the agreement should be kept a secret? 3) Would you sign such an agreement again if you were given the chance?

The answer to these questions received on Friday was two words: “Times change,” Dr Sceberras Trigona said tersely.

The signing of the agreement in 1982 had sparked off a political controversy after it was revealed by then Opposition Leader Eddie Fenech Adami during a Nationalist Party mass meeting in Floriana on 4 December 1983.

Newspaper reports later said that a high-level investigation had been started in the Foreign Affairs Ministry to find out who had leaked the information to Dr Fenech Adami.

In actual fact, two agreements had been signed for “a free offer of military assistance” with North Korea. The first agreement was signed in Valletta on 25 March 1982, three months after the perverse result of an election that returned the Labour Party to government in spite of obtaining fewer votes.

A second agreement, this time signed in Pyongyang in July of that same year, superseded the first, changing only the number of weapons and ammunitions that North Korea agreed to donate to Malta.

For Malta, the first agreement was signed by then Interior Minister Lorry Sant at the specific request of Dr Sceberras Trigona, who then signed the second agreement.

The agreement stipulated that North Korea “will, free of charge, provide (Malta) with weapons and ammunitions”.

The difference between the first and second agreement was in the number of weapons and amount of ammunition that North Korea agreed to give Malta – the number was increased in the second agreement.

Otherwise, the agreements were more or less the same. North Korea was responsible for the transportation of weapons and ammunition, and dispatched military instructors to train and teach local military personnel. Four instructors were sent for three months and were paid according to their military rank equivalent to those of Maltese officers.

The agreement stipulated that the Maltese government had to provide a one way ticket from Malta to Pyongyang to the instructors and “subsistence expenditure during the flight and expenses for lodging, meals, medical treatment, transport means (including the driver) and salaries during their stay in Malta, and training equipment needed in the education of the Maltese military personnel”.

The Maltese government had also agreed to “protect” the Korean instructors and “ensure their safety, and exempt them from Customs duties and taxes”.

Both sides also agreed to “observe strict secrecy in respect of all transaction made pursuant to this agreement and shall not disclose any matter hereof to any third country”.

Read the Marmot’s Hole post here.

Read the Malta Independent article here:
1982 Labour government “secret” agreement with North Korea
Malta Independent
Stephen Calleja
Date unknown

Just east of Myohyangsan (SE of Huichon) is the largest collection of communications towers I have found in the DPRK…more than 20 towers clustered together.

You can click on the image to see a larger version, or you can see it in Wikimapia here.

I have spent more time than I can count looking at the DPRK on Google Earth, but there are still some treasures out there waiting to be found.

Hat tip to a reader.

UPDATE 12: Thailand to release pilots.  According to the AP (via the Washington Post):

Thai prosecutors dropped charges against the five-man crew of an aircraft accused of smuggling weapons from North Korea, saying Thursday the men would be deported to preserve good relations with their home countries.

The Attorney General’s Office said the decision was made after the governments of Belarus and Kazakhstan contacted the Thai Foreign Ministry and requested the crew’s release to face prosecution at home.

“To charge them in Thailand could effect the good relationship between the countries,” said Thanaphit Mollaphruek, a spokesman for the Attorney General’s Office. “We have decided to drop all the charges and deport them to their home countries.”

“To charge them in this case would not be a benefit to Thailand,” he added.

The crew - four Kazakhs and a Belarusian - were expected to be released later in the day, said their lawyer Somsak Saithong.

…

Thailand’s Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya indicated earlier this month the men would be released, telling reporters in Geneva the government had “suggested to the office of the attorney general to release them because the U.N. resolution does not oblige Thailand to … bring up charges on the pilots and the crew.”

Thursday’s decision was likely to spark international criticism. The weapons’ ultimate destination remains a mystery, though Thailand has said the plane’s final destination appears to have been Iran. Experts have also voiced concerns that authorities in the former Soviet republics have turned a blind eye to illicit activities of air freight companies that use Soviet-era planes to fly anything anywhere for a price.

A Thai government report to the U.N. Security Council, leaked to reporters in late January said the aircraft was bound for Tehran’s Mahrabad Airport.

But Thai government spokesman Panitan Wattanayarkorn said subsequently that “to say that the weapons are going to Iran, that might be inexact.”

“The report only says where the plane was going to according to its flight plan, but it doesn’t say where the weapons were going to,” he said. “It’s still under investigation, and the suspects are under our legal system.”

Investigations by The Associated Press in several countries showed the flight was facilitated by a web of holding companies and fake addresses from New Zealand to Barcelona designed to disguise the movement of the weapons.

Read previous posts on this topic below: 
(more…)

According to the AP (Via Boston Herald):

President Barack Obama’s top intelligence official said Tuesday that North Korea relies on its nuclear weapons program because of a crumbling military that cannot compete with South Korea.

Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair described in testimony before the U.S. Congress a North Korean army that struggles with aging weapons, poorly trained, out-of-shape soldiers, inflexible leaders, corruption, low morale and problems with command and control.

North Korea, Blair said, has little chance of reversing a huge gap in military capabilities with South Korea and so “relies on its nuclear program to deter external attacks on the state and to its regime.”

…

Officials from South Korea, the U.S., Japan, Russia and China have been working to get North Korea back to nuclear disarmament talks after Pyongyang walked away from the negotiations last year. For more than a decade, the North has gained energy and aid concessions from the talks and then backed away from nuclear agreements.

Blair said the United States does not know whether the North had made nuclear weapons but that it has that capability. He said that while a 2006 nuclear test was a “partial failure,” the May test of last year was more successful.

Blair said North Korea has shipped missiles to Iran and Pakistan and helped Syria build a nuclear reactor.

The North is thought to have enough weaponized plutonium for at least half a dozen atomic bombs. North Korea argues that it was compelled to develop nuclear weapons to cope with a military threat from the United States, which has about 28,500 troops in the South.

Blair said North Korean leader Kim Jong Il wants recognition of his country as a nuclear weapons power, something he said the United States will not do.

Dennis Blair’s Annual Threat Assesment of the US Intelligence Commuity can be read here. Here is what it had to say about the DPRK:

North Korean WMD and Missile Programs

Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the security environment in East Asia. North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries including Iran and Pakistan, and its assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor, exposed in 2007, illustrate the reach of the North’s proliferation activities. Despite the Six-Party October 3, 2007 Second Phase Actions agreement in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how we remain alert to the possibility North Korea could again export nuclear technology.

The North’s October 2006 nuclear test was consistent with our longstanding assessment that it had produced a nuclear device, although we judge the test itself to have been a partial failure based on its less-than-one-kiloton TNT equivalent yield. The North’s probable nuclear test in May 2009 supports its claim that it has been seeking to develop weapons, and with a yield of roughly a few kilotons TNT equivalent, was apparently more successful than the 2006 test. We judge North Korea has tested two nuclear devices, and while we do not know whether the North has produced nuclear weapons, we assess it has the capability to do so. It remains our policy that we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, and we assess that other countries in the region remain committed to the denuclearization of North Korea as has been reflected in the Six Party Talks.

After denying a highly enriched uranium program since 2003, North Korea announced in April 2009 that it was developing uranium enrichment capability to produce fuel for a planned light water reactor (such reactors use low enriched uranium); in September it claimed its enrichment research had “entered into the completion phase”. The exact intent of these announcements is unclear, and they do not speak definitively to the technical status of the uranium enrichment program. The Intelligence Community continues to assess with high confidence North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past, which we assess was for weapons.

Pyongyang’s Conventional Capabilities. Before I turn the North Korean nuclear issue, I want to say a few words regarding the conventional capabilities of the Korea People’s Army (KPA). The KPA’s capabilities are limited by an aging weapons inventory, low production of military combat systems, deteriorating physical condition of soldiers, reduced training, and increasing diversion of the military to infrastructure support. Inflexible leadership, corruption, low morale, obsolescent weapons, a weak logistical system, and problems with command and control also constrain the KPA capabilities and readiness.

Because the conventional military capabilities gap between North and South Korea has become so overwhelmingly great and prospects for reversal of this gap so remote, Pyongyang relies on its nuclear program to deter external attacks on the state and to its regime. Although there are other reasons for the North to pursue its nuclear program, redressing conventional weaknesses is a major factor and one that Kim and his likely successors will not easily dismiss. Six Party Talks and Denuclearization. In addition to the TD-2 missile launch of April 2009 and the probable nuclear test of May 2009, Pyongyang’s reprocessing of fuel rods removed from its reactor as part of the disablement process appears designed to enhance its nuclear deterrent and reset the terms of any return to the negotiating table. Moreover, Pyongyang knows that its pursuit of a uranium enrichment capability has returned that issue to the agenda for any nuclear negotiations. The North has long been aware of US suspicions of a highly enriched uranium program.

We judge Kim Jong-Il seeks recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapons power by the US and the international community. Pyongyang’s intent in pursuing dialogue at this time is to take advantage of what it perceives as an enhanced negotiating position, having demonstrated its nuclear and missile capabilities.

…

North Korea and Venezuela possess more limited intelligence capabilities focused primarily on regional threats and supporting the ruling regime. North Korea continues to collect information on US technologies and capabilities. Venezuela’s services are working to counter US influence in Latin America by supporting leftist governments and insurgent groups.

Michael Rank

I posted last year about a British Korean War pilot who is buried in North Korea. This got me interested in MIAs (missing in action) in the Korean War more generally, particularly Americans as there was in the 1990s rather surprisingly a joint US-North Korean programme to recover their remains.

This Clinton-era project foundered after a few years, not at all surprisingly, but there are now, equally surprisingly, signs the North Koreans want to revive it.

Admiral Robert F. Willard, the head of U.S. Pacific Command, said on Jan 27: “We’re going to enter into discussions with [North Korea] [about MIAs]. That is what we know right now.”

“They are willing to talk about it and we’re willing to address the particulars with them.”

“It’s a complex problem. We’ve been in (North Korea for recovery missions) before, and it appears that we’re being invited to consider going back again,” Willard told reporters at Camp Smith, Hawaii, according to the Honolulu Advertiser. “It’s something that we’ll take seriously and we’ll enter into dialogue with them and find out where it will lead.”

No date has been agreed on restarting the search for the remains. More than 8,100 Americans remain unaccounted for from the Korean War, according to the Department of Defense.

During Operation GLORY in 1954, North Korea returned the remains of over 2,000 Americans, the Department of Defense says .

“Between 1954 and 1990, the U.S. was not successful in convincing North Korea to search for and return additional U.S. remains,” the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) states on its website.

“However, from 1990 to 1994, North Korea exhumed and returned what they claimed were 208 sets of remains. Unfortunately, their records and recovery methods have hampered U.S. efforts to identify most of these. The North Koreans co-mingled the remains and the associated personal effects. These difficulties underscored clearly the need for joint field activities in which U.S. expertise would guide the recovery process and improve the identification results.”

Larry Greer, director of public affairs of the DPMO in Arlington, VA, confirmed to me that the North Korean army “informed the United Nations that they were willing to talk about remains recovery operations. That was at a Panmunjom meeting on the 26th [Jan], our time. The U.S. has not yet responded.”

The US military newspaper Stars and Stripes last year quoted a US Defense Department anthropologist who had taken part in the hunt for MIA remains in the North as saying he was frustrated that the operation north of the border had been suspended.

“I am always disappointed when politics interfere with human rights and bringing closure to families whose relatives died in Korea so long ago,” said Jay Silverstein during a search for remains in South Korea close to the border with the North.

He said he hoped some day to return to North Korea to continue to search for the remains of U.S. service personnel. “I found the North Koreans very pleasant to work with,” said Silverstein, who was overseeing the excavations in Hwacheon county about eight miles from the border with North Korea.

“My experience was very positive. It gave me a lot of hope for the future … that relations between the North and the South and the West and the rest of Asia will someday be improved.

“I found [the North Koreans] to be very reasonable people. Very friendly. We could sit down and have a beer, or smoke a cigar, and talk. It was quite pleasant,” he added. [Surely the first time a US military official has ever said anything nice about North Koreans? Ed]

Apart from the suspended agreement with North Korea, the United States reached an agreement with China in 2008 “to formalize research in Chinese archives on Korean War POW/MIA matters.”

The Chinese side seems to have been reluctant to share much information with the Americans so far, but the Chinese news agency Xinhua reported last October that “Chinese military archivists have identified more than 100 documents that could lead to the repatriation of the remains of the United States personnel who disappeared during and after the Korean War”.

It added that “China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Archives Department has been combing more than 1.5 million archives of the then People’s Volunteer Army (PVA), the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the PLA headquarters during the Korean War.

“Archivists have given at least four valuable archives found in the first 10 percent to the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) of the U.S. Department of Defense.”

The Chinese report mentioned how archivists had located the site where a U.S. bomber crashed in 1950 in the southern province of Guangdong. “After visiting the site and interviewing 19 witnesses who helped them identify the burial site of U.S. crew, they believe the possibility of finding the remains is high,” it added.

The DPMO’s Greer said that “We are making slow steady progress” in the joint archive project.

He said that in September 2009 the US hosted six PLA archivists for annual discussions and to review arrangements, and that the archivists provided additional information on the Guangdong crash site which was part of their annual report in June 2009.

In October 2009, General Xu Caihou 徐才厚, vice-chairman of the PLA’s Central Military Commission, presented four Chinese-language documents to Defense Secretary Robert Gates during a visit to Washington.

“The documents concerned the Guangdong site and a F-86 Korean War crash site in China about which we were already aware.We have requested permission to investigate the Guangdong Province crash site in April this year,” Greer told me in an email.

“At the September 2009 meeting we also discussed amending our arrangement to facilitate the transfer of actual documents from the PLA archives to us and to permit joint PLA archives-DOD accounting community remains recovery work in China. The amendment process is underway now, but not final,” he added.

The South Koreans, who lost tens of thousands of soldiers in the war, would also like to hunt for their remains in the North.

President Lee Myung-bak said in a New Year’s address this would be an appropriate way to mark the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War.

But relations between the two Koreas are so frigid that I would lay a much bigger bet on the US search for MIAs restarting than on a similar agreement being signed between Pyongyang and Seoul.

With many thanks to Daily NK for drawing my attention to North Korea’s interest in reviving the MIA search.

The US has rejected the DPRK offer.  According to Reuters:

The United States on Thursday rebuffed a North Korean offer to reopen talks on finding U.S. soldiers missing since the Korean War, saying Pyongyang must first resume discussions on ending its nuclear ambitions.

Joseph Bermudez, a military analyst for Jane’s Intelligence Review and author of The Armed Forces of North Korea, has launched a journal dedicated to the discussion of the DPRK military: KPA Journal.

According to the introduction by Mr. Bermudez:

The goals of this modest publication are to allow me to freely share with readers new, interesting or updated information concerning: all aspects of the Korean People’s Army (KPA, more commonly known as the North Korean Army) from its birth until present; ballistic missile development; intelligence operations (e.g., seaborne infiltration operations, etc.); and other defense and intelligence issues concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, more commonly known as North Korea).

As I have researched, written and lectured on these subjects during the past 25+ years I’ve frequently come upon fragments or collections of interesting information that either didn’t fit into then current projects or that was deleted by editors in order to save space. Recently, while conducting research for three book projects—Combat History of the Korean People’s Army, DPRK Intelligence Services 1945-1975, and an update to my earlier North Korean Special Forces: Second Edition—I once again encountered numerous examples of these fragments and collections. Rather than let this information remain in my files unused I’ve decided to use it for KPA Journal.

Additionally, as I have written reports and articles concerning recent DPRK related issues new information has subsequently come to light. It is my hope to utilize KPA Journal to share such updated information with readers. While it is my hope that KPA Journal will eventually be a monthly publication, initially it will be distributed on an irregular basis until the time arrives when I can dedicate more energy to it.

A KPA Journal website is under construction and should be online later this year at www.kpajournal.com. It will eventually serve as a repository for issues of KPA Journal, declassified documents, longer research projects, previously authored articles and more.

Should readers find any of this information of interest or value, and decide to use it in your own research efforts, I would greatly appreciate your citing KPA Journal as your source.

Readers are encouraged to share KPA Journal with friends and colleagues. If they wish to be added to the mailing list, or should you not desire to be on the mailing list, please contact me at kpajournal@gmail.com.

Download Vol. 1, No. 1 here (PDF).