North Korean Economy Watch

Marcus Noland comments in a Newsweek International op-ed how recent US policy changes towards North Korea (delisting the DPRK as a state sponsor of terror and exempting sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act) amount to very little:

Lifting the trade restrictions will have a minimal impact. North Korea will remain one of a few countries that does not have normal trade relations with the United States, meaning its exports will continue to be subjected to punitive tariffs of up to 90 percent.

Removing North Korea from the terrorism list means that Washington can now legally support it for membership in international financial organizations such as the World Bank. But the White House is under no obligation to actually do so. North Korea also remains excluded from US government programs that encourage trade and investment.

North Korea’s declaration will trigger a reconvening of the Six-Party Talks, which includes China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The inadequate nature of the declaration guarantees there will be yet another round of negotiations in which North Korea will reveal a bit more in return for further concessions. It is no accident that up to 50,000 metric tons of US food aid is expected to arrive in North Korea early this month. 

Writing in 2004 (yet relevant today), Marcus Noland wrote about these issues in depth.  Below are excerpts from his op-ed on US tariffs:

US importers of DPRK products are required to obtain prior approval from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets, certifying that the products were not produced by North Korean entities designated as having engaged in missile proliferation. Subject to this condition, approval is routine. US government officials report that they receive only a handful of such requests each year. Their impression is that business conditions in the DPRK pose a greater impediment to bilateral trade than the regulatory regime.

…

So, at present, with the exception of military-related products, there are few specific legal restrictions on the ability of Americans to export to or invest in the DPRK. Imports are subject to a prior approval process, but this is based on a transparent and narrowly delineated certification requirement.

Yet there is little trade between the United States and the DPRK. North Korea is among the few countries that the United States does not grant normal trade relations (NTR) status to, and North Korean exports are subject to the so-called column 2 tariff rates established by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. These tariffs tend to be the highest on labor-intensive products such as garments, in which North Korea is conceivably competitive. Though their incidence is an accident of history, and not an intentional slap, the column 2 tariffs represent a serious potential impediment to trade. Some countries, notably China, have successfully exported to the United States despite being subject to the higher column 2 tariffs (though even China eventually gained NTR status on a year-to-year basis). Most countries that have recently obtained permanent NTR, such as China, have done so through the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession process. The DPRK has shown no interest in joining the WTO.

This disinterest is unfortunate. The United States does not grant the DPRK quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), a worldwide network of bilateral trade quotas on textiles and apparel (due to expire in 2005), and WTO accession could aid the DPRK in this regard. In the case of the similarly diplomatically problematic Burmese government, the US government found it politically easier to accept an increase in Burmese exports to the United States than to negotiate publicly a textile agreement under WTO auspices with the repressive regime. WTO membership has its privileges. In any event, the DPRK is one of the rare countries that chronically do not fill their MFA quotas in Europe, where there are no sanctions, suggesting that the problem lies in DPRK’s inability to compete, not in trade barriers.

However, should the DPRK obtain NTR status, the United States would likely classify it as a nonmarket economy (NME) and subject it to onerous antidumping rules on the Chinese template. The point is that improved diplomatic relations is no panacea—the United States can be protectionist on purely economic grounds, regardless of politics.

Conversely, the United States trades with some low-income countries preferentially, unilaterally granting them limited tariff-free access through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), subject to standards concerning workers’ rights, intellectual property protection, and drug trafficking. Given North Korea’s disregard for internationally accepted labor standards, it is inconceivable that the United States would grant North Korea GSP privileges under current practices, even if diplomatic relations were normalized. Yet China, which has never received GSP privileges, vividly demonstrates that it is quite possible to prosper without such advantages.

Today, internal conditions and practices in North Korea, not legal restrictions, greatly impede bilateral trade. However, with sufficient reform and improvement in competitiveness, a broad range of policy issues would become increasingly relevant. In this regard, DPRK accession to the WTO would be advantageous. In the meantime, rather than complaining about US policy, North Korean officials would be better served by redoubling their reform efforts.

For more information, read the full articles below:
Partially True Confessions: How Big is the North Korea Deal?
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute
Newsweek (Link via the Peterson Institute)
7/7/2008

The Legal Framework of US–North Korea Trade Relations
Op-ed in JoongAng Ilbo, via the Peterson Institute web site.
Marcus Noland
4/27/2004

UPDATE 3:  Executive Order: Continuing Certain Restrictions with Respect to North Korea and North Korean Nationals

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, find that the current existence and risk of the proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, and I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat. I further find that, as we deal with that threat through multilateral diplomacy, it is necessary to continue certain restrictions with respect to North Korea that would otherwise be lifted pursuant to a forthcoming proclamation that will terminate the exercise of authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 1 et seq.) (TWEA) with respect to North Korea.

Accordingly, I hereby order:

Section 1. Except to the extent provided in statutes or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this order, the following are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:

all property and interests in property of North Korea or a North Korean national that, pursuant to the President’s authorities under the TWEA, the exercise of which has been continued in accordance with section 101(b) of Public Law 95-223 (91 Stat. 1625; 50 U.S.C. App. 5(b) note), were blocked as of June 16, 2000, and remained blocked immediately prior to the date of this order.

Sec. 2. Except to the extent provided in statutes or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the date of this order, United States persons may not register a vessel in North Korea, obtain authorization for a vessel to fly the North Korean flag, or own, lease, operate, or insure any vessel flagged by North Korea.

Sec. 3. (a) Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 4. For the purposes of this order:

(a) the term “person” means an individual or entity;

(b) the term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization; and

(c) the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.

Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government consistent with applicable law. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.

Sec. 6. The Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to submit the recurring and final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).

Sec. 7. This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

GEORGE W. BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June 26, 2008.

UPDATE 2: How much plutonium does the DPRK have?

From the Daily Times (Pakistan):

But there may be problems ahead with the declaration. Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper reported an informed source as saying the North declared it produced around 30 kg (66 lbs) of plutonium, while US officials have said they think it is closer to 50 kg. Sung Kim, a State Department envoy who witnessed the cooling tower blast, told reporters in Seoul on Saturday that there might not be enough time to complete the North’s denuclearisation before President George W Bush leaves office in January 2009.

‘Emotionally attached’: Kim said North Koreans engineers appeared to have formed an “emotional attachment” to their atomic programme that has become apparent during international efforts to dismantle it. Kim told reporters that he saw emotion in Ri Yong-ho, head of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, and his colleagues when they all witnessed Friday’s demolition of the plant’s cooling tower. “I think I detected a sense of sadness when the tower came down but I thought he put it well when he was asked what this all meant for him and he said that he just hoped this would contribute to peace and stability,” said Ri.  

UPDATE 1:
“US Treasury says N.Korea sanctions remain in place”
Reuters via Guardian
David Lawder
6/26/2008

U.S. Treasury financial sanctions aimed at ending North Korean money laundering, illicit financing activities and weapons proliferation remain in effect despite the easing of other sanctions against Pyongyang, a Treasury spokesman said on Thursday.

The move by the Bush administration to lift some sanctions after North Korea delivered a long-delayed account of its nuclear activities will not restore the country’s access to the international banking system, Treasury spokesman John Rankin said.

North Korea was largely cut off from the international banking system in 2005 when the Treasury named Banco Delta Asia, a small bank in the Chinese gambling enclave of Macau, as a primary money laundering concern.

The Treasury accused the bank of circulating counterfeit U.S. currency produced by North Korea, and of knowingly handling transactions by North Korean entities involved in illicit activities, including the narcotics trade and sales of counterfeit cigarettes and other goods.

Both North Korea and Banco Delta Asia have denied the Treasury’s allegations.

Although about $25 million in frozen North Korean funds in Banco Delta Asia was released last year, the sanctions against the bank, which prohibit transactions with U.S. banks, remain in effect, Rankin said. International banks have largely shunned Banco Delta Asia as well.

As recently as April, Treasury officials said so called “supernotes” — high quality counterfeit $100 bills produced by North Korea, were still surfacing.

“The lifting of sanctions associated with the Trading with the Enemy Act, and removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism does not represent North Korea’s re-integration into the international financial system,” he said.

Sanctions that prohibit U.S. companies from owning, leasing, operating, insuring North Korean-flagged shipping vessels, as well as registering vessels in North Korea, remain in place. 

ORIGINAL POST: Today North Korean made the nuclear declaration required by the February 2007 six-party agreement.  This web site does not focus on the nuclear issue, but this turn of events represents a significant US policy shift with economic implications for the DPRK.  The coverage has been overwhelming, so below are media excerpts that cover most of the angles:

“Pyongyang Submits Nuclear Declaration”
Wall Street Journal
Evan Ramstad
6/26/2008

After keeping the U.S. and other countries waiting for 15 months, North Korea delivered a description of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons, setting up the next – and more difficult – stage in an international effort to disarm and reshape the isolated, authoritarian country.

North Korean diplomats gave a declaration of its nuclear-weapons program to Chinese counterparts in Beijing who have been coordinating the six-nation talks. In return, U.S. President George W. Bush announced the lifting of some trade sanctions and beginning of the process of removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terror. (Read the text of the White House statement here).

Under the February 2007 deal, North Korea also agreed to disable a nuclear plant that provided fuel for its nuclear weapons, a step that’s also nearly complete. On Friday, it plans to blow up the cooling tower at the nuclear plant and invited TV crews from several countries, including the U.S. and South Korea, to record the event.

The contents of North Korea’s declaration weren’t immediately disclosed. In recent weeks, U.S. diplomats have said they didn’t expect it to include a key piece of data – how many nuclear weapons the country has built. The document also is believed to be limited to North Korea’s efforts to develop plutonium as a nuclear fuel, but doesn’t mention suspected research into highly-enriched uranium as a fuel nor its suspected proliferation efforts to Syria.

“North Korea removed from US ‘axis of evil’”
London Times
Jeremy Page and Richard Lloyd Parry
6/26/008

The US move, which will also see a lifting of long-running sanctions, would mark the most significant thaw in relations between Washington and Pyongyang since the 1950-53 Korean War. Mr Bush said that it was intended to reward and encourage North Korean co-operation and accelerate the tangled negotiations on the country’s nuclear disarmament.

In the first instance, America will exempt North Korea from sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act, a piece of First World War legislation that was employed during the Korean War, and which restricts trade with Pyongyang by US companies and citizens. The only other country subject to its provisions is Cuba.

It also gave notice that it would start the 45-day process of removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, where it stands alongside Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria. Sanctions against them include a ban on arms sales, economic assistance, and an obligation on the US Government to oppose loans to listed countries by such international institutions as the World Bank.

“Diplomacy Is Working on North Korea”
Wall Street Journal
Condoleeza Rice
6/26/2008; Page A15

In its declaration, North Korea will state how much plutonium it possesses. We will not accept that statement on faith. We will insist on verification. North Korea has already turned over nearly 19,000 pages of production records from its Yongbyon reactor and associated facilities. With additional information we expect to receive – access to other documents, relevant sites, key personnel and the reactor itself – these records will help to verify the accuracy and completeness of Pyongyang’s declaration. North Korea’s plutonium program has been by far its largest nuclear effort over many decades, and we believe our policy could verifiably get the regime out of the plutonium-making business.

Getting a handle on North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program is harder, because we simply do not know its full scale or what it yielded. And yet, because of our current policy, we now know more about North Korea’s uranium-enrichment efforts than before, and we are learning more still – much of it troubling. North Korea acknowledges our concerns about its uranium-enrichment program, and we will insist on getting to the bottom of this issue.

Similarly, we know that North Korea proliferated nuclear technology to Syria, but we do not know whether that is the end of the story. Rather than just trying to address this threat unilaterally, we will be more effective in learning about North Korean proliferation and preventing its continuation through a cooperative effort with Japan, South Korea, China and Russia.

And in return for these steps, what have we given thus far? No significant economic assistance. No trade or investment cooperation. No security guarantees or normalized relations. And our many sanctions on North Korea, both bilateral and multilateral, remain in place.

“‘Good start’ to UN’s Syria probe”
BBC
6/25/2008

The head of a UN team investigating allegations that Syria has been working on a secret nuclear weapons programme says their work is off to a good start.

The IAEA official, Olli Heinonen, said inspectors had taken samples at the al-Kibar site in the Syrian desert.

“It was a good start, but there’s still work that remains to be done,” he said.

“For this trip we did what we agreed to. We achieved what we wanted on this first trip. We took samples which we wanted to take. Now it’s time to analyse them.”

Mr Heinonen also said he was generally satisfied with the level of co-operation by Syria.

Additional information: 

To read a hawk perspective, see Josh’s post at One Free Korea.  Also, the Telegraph (UK) reports that Vice President Cheney tried to block the deal.

David Kang spoke to NPR’s Market Place.

US move reduces Japan’s negotiation leverage over DPRK.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-5-29-1
5/29/2008

It has come to light that North Korea has lowered, and in some cases abolished, medical requirements for new recruits conscripted in this year’s spring military draft. A source inside North Korea told the “Daily NK” on May 26th, “Originally, men had to be over 148cm tall and over 43 kg in order to enter the military, but this year conscripts under 148cm and less than 43kg are also required to enter military service provided they suffer from no diseases.” The medical requirements for military conscription in North Korea were lowered to 148cm height, 43kg weight, and 40/40 vision in 1994.

The source went on to say, “Originally, people with eyesight less than 40/40 could not enter the military, but this year even middle-school students with eyesight so bad they need to wear glasses are all being drafted,” and that since fall of last year, authorities from the military mobilization bureau in charge of carrying out medical checks have been working on orders that the only thing to prevent conscription is disease.

Adolescents being conscripted this year are those that were born between 1991~1993, the first generation from the period of North Korea’s devastating famine during the mid 1990s to be sent to the military. In addition, as the generation born at a time when the North’s birthrate was falling sharply, the population of the generation now facing conscription is considerably smaller than that of the older generations.

Daily NK’s source also added, “Because the number and health of the new conscripts is less than wanted, [authorities] pressed for enlistment of female students as well…Last March, a guideline was set that women not carrying out military service could not be promoted to executive positions.”

Beginning in spring of this year, parents of female students in middle schools in farming communities were summoned to “family conferences” at which they heard a political address telling them that “from now on, in order to become executives and develop socially, women also must go to the military, without exception.”

Rumors are spreading among North Korean middle-schoolers that “from now on, military service is being lengthened,” and, “Now women are also required to serve in the military.” The source added that there is also a sense of unease among commissioned soldiers, who do not know whether their time will be extended, as well.

In March of 2003, during the sixth session of the tenth Supreme People’s Committee, the ‘System of Military Service for All Citizens’ was adopted, requiring men to serve ten years in the military and women to serve in supporting roles for seven years. Those eligible for conscription are between the ages of 17 and 25, have completed middle school, and have no blemishes on their family tree.

The most authoritative map of North Korea on Google Earth
Download it here

This map covers North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, markets, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks. It is continually expanding and undergoing revisions. This is the tenth version.

This version includes: Expansion of infrastructure (railroads, electricity grid, elite areas, political monuments, burial mounds, dams, military facilities, and factories) in Hamhung, Chongjin, Sariwon, Raijin-Songbon (Rason) and other cities. Updates in Pyongyang: Pothonggang Exhibition Hall, Ssuk Island, Patriotic Martyrs Cemetary, Ostrich Farm, Kang Pan Sok Revolutionary School, Kumsong School, Manyongdae 1,000 Seat Restaurant. Specific manufacturing facilities and companies: Wonsan Rolling Stock Factory (RR manufacturer), Songnim-Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex, Bukchang Thermal Power Plant, Sunchon Cement Factory, Namhung Youth Chemical Complex, Feb 8 Vinalon Complex, Hamhung Wood Carving Factory, Chongjin Chemical Fiber Complex, Unjong-ri Cooperative Farm, Sariwon Chicken Farm, Kanggye Chicken and Duck Farm, Hungju Youth Power Station, Korea Rason Taehung Trading Corporation. Updated Cultural Locations: Paeksang Pavilion (Anju), site of the DPRK’s first cricket game (2008), Sariwon Folk Village, Sinpha Revolutionary Site, International Friendship Exhibition, Paeksang Pavilion, Lake Sijung. Other locations: air force test bombing range, Kyo hwa so 1: Kaechon (overlay). Additinoally, most canals were eliminated from this version except the major projects on the west coast.

Disclaimer: I cannot vouch for the authenticity of many locations since I have not seen or been to them, but great efforts have been made to check for authenticity. These efforts include pouring over books, maps, conducting interviews, and keeping up with other peoples’ discoveries. In many cases, I have posted sources, though not for all. This is a thorough compilation of lots of material, but I will leave it up to the reader to make up their own minds as to what they see. I cannot catch everything and I welcome contributions.

On Wednesday I attended a panel discussion featuring Marcus Noland, co-author (with Stephan Haggard) of Famine in North Korea, and three North Korean defectors.  Here is the video of the event.  Below is the information on the event from the Peterson Institute website:

Press release (slightly updated w/ comments from the talk)
North Korea is once again headed toward widespread food shortage, hunger, and risk of outright famine. According to Peterson Institute Senior Fellow Marcus Noland, “The country is in its most precarious situation since the end of the famine a decade ago.”

Click for larger view

Calculations by Noland and Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego, indicate that the country’s margin of error has virtually disappeared. For technical reasons, estimates produced by the United Nations’ World Food Program and Food and Agriculture Organization (total demand) probably overstate demand implying recurrent shortages year after year (figure 1 above). Noland and Haggard argue that in recent years available supply has exceeded more appropriately calculated grain requirements (adjusted total demand) but that this gap has virtually disappeared. “This is a yellow light about to turn red,” says Noland.

 
Click for larger view

Food prices have almost tripled in the last year, skyrocketing at a rate faster than either the overall rate of inflation or global food prices (figure 2 above). Anecdotal reports describe a breakdown in institutions and increasingly repressive internal behavior. Noland and Haggard forecast that the North Korean regime will ultimately weather this challenge politically by ratcheting up repression and scrambling, albeit belatedly, for foreign assistance.

The North Korean food crisis, now well into its second decade, presents a difficult set of ethical choices. North Korea is critically dependent on food aid, but the government has recklessly soured its relations with the donor community. Yet in the absence of vigorous international action, the victims of this disaster will not be the culpable but the innocent. As of this writing, it already may be too late to avoid at least some deaths from hunger, and shortages of crucial agricultural inputs such as fertilizer are setting the stage for continuing food problems well into 2009.

Paper presentation
Noland discussed two recent papers, written with Haggard and Yoonok Chang, Hansei University, which are based on a pathbreaking survey of more than 1,300 North Korean refugees in China (11 different cities).  The survey provides rare and extraordinary insight into both life in North Korea and the experiences of the refugees in China.

Paper 1: Exit Polls: Refugee Assessments of North Korea’s Transition 
Results from a survey of more than 1,300 North Korean refugees in China provide insight into changing economic conditions in North Korea. There is modest evidence of slightly more positive assessments among those who exited the country following the initiation of reforms in 2002. Education breeds skepticism; higher levels of education were associated with more negative perceptions of economic conditions and reform efforts. Other demographic markers such as gender or provincial origin are not robustly correlated with attitudes. Instead, personal experiences appear to be central: A significant number of the respondents were unaware of the humanitarian aid program (40%) and the ones who knew of it almost universally did not believe that they were beneficiaries (96%). This group’s evaluation of the regime, its intentions, and accomplishments is overwhelmingly negative—even more so than those of respondents who report having had experienced incarceration in political detention facilities—and attests to the powerful role that the famine experience continues to play in the political economy of the country.

Paper 2: Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence from China 
Chronic food shortages, political repression, and poverty have driven tens of thousands of North Koreans into China. This paper reports results from a large-scale survey of this refugee population. The survey provides insight not only into the material circumstances of the refugees but also into their psychological state and aspirations. One key finding is that many North Korean refugees suffer severe psychological stress akin to post-traumatic stress disorder. This distress is caused in part by their vulnerability in China, but it is also a result of the long shadow cast by the North Korean famine and abuses suffered at the hands of the North Korean political regime: first and foremost, perceptions of unfairness with respect to the distribution of food aid, death of family members during the famine, and incarceration in the North Korean gulag, where the respondents reported witnessing forced starvation, deaths due to torture, and even infanticide and forced abortions. These traumas, in turn, affect the ability of the refugees to hold jobs in China and accumulate resources for on-migration to third countries. Most of the refugees want to permanently resettle in South Korea, though younger, better-educated refugees prefer the United States as a final destination.

Other speakers: Several North Korean defectors also spoke as part of North Korean Freedom Week here in Washington DC.  Comments and biographies below:

Kim Seung Min: Founder and Director of Free North Korea Radio, the broadcasting program providing news and information to North and South Korea and China. Kim attended both elementary and high school in Pyongyang before serving in the North Korean Army. He escaped from North Korea to China in 1996 but was arrested and repatriated. While traveling from Onseong to Pyongyang to face punishment for leaving the country without government permission, he jumped from a moving train to escape to China again and eventually made his way to South Korea. He worked as a laborer at a coal factory in Yenji, China, until his uncle in South Korea helped him to escape to South Korea. He attended Yonsei University and Graduate School at Joong Ang University, where he received a Master of Arts degree. After serving in leadership roles in the North Korean defector groups, he founded Free North Korea Radio, which was available on the internet beginning April 2004 and began broadcasting on shortwave in December 2005 with regular daily broadcasting beginning in April 2006. (Born 5/6/62 in Jangang Do, North Korea)

*Mr. Kim was a captain in the KPA for 16 years.  He talked about how soldiers were no better off in terms of access to food than ordinary North Koreans.  Starting in 1986, the DPRK state limited food supplies to the military to only rice, leaving the generals up to their own devices for feeding the army.  This led to a break-down in discipline and now people resent the personal behavior of many soldiers who are looking for food.

Kang Su Jin:Founder and Representative of the Coalition for North Korean Women’s Rights, the only organization focused specifically on increasing awareness of the horrors facing North Korean women in China, the role of women in democratizing North Korea, empowering and encouraging North Korean women who have resettled in South Korea, and building cooperation with other organizations. Kang was a member of the elites from Pyongyang and was the Manager of Supply from 1991 to 1998 of the Bonghwasan Hotel in Pyongyang, the biggest hotel in Pyongyang, which catered to high-ranking party and army officials and was used for special events. When food distribution stopped in Pyongyang in 1996, the regime announced that all hotels had to operate on their own, and conditions became very difficult for the workers. Kang visited China and saw how much better off the people were and decided to defect to South Korea. (Born 10/23/66 in Pyongyang, North Korea)

Kim Young-il:President and Founder of People for Successful Korean Reunification (P-SCORE), an organization founded in the fall of 2006, specifically to ensure the successful reunification of the Koreas would not adversely affect the South Korean economy. To that end, PSCORE, chiefly composed of young people, studies other reunification models, informs about the human rights conditions in North Korea, and prepares and educates young North Koreans to be ready to help lead a reunified Korea. Because Kim was not born into an elite family in North Korea, he was not allowed to attend university and was destined to become a coal miner after serving his mandatory military service. While in the military he witnessed many people including soldiers dying of starvation. His own uncle died of starvation and his cousins were left to wander the streets. His family made the decision to defect to China in August of 1996 instead of starving to death in North Korea. They survived there for five years bribing the police not to turn them in until they safely defected to South Korea in January 2001. Lim received a BA in Chinese from Hankook University of Foreign Studies in August 2006. (Born 4/10/78 in Hamheung, North Korea)

*Mr. Kim still communicates with people in the DPRK on a regular basis.  He said that the price of rice inside the DPRK is sensitive to external supply shocks (or even the rumors of external supply shocks).  This means that reports of aid cut offs could result in temporary domestic price spikes even if aid is delivered.

UPDATE: Photo and coverage in the Daily NK.

UPDATE: Yonhap reports that the food shortage was also discussed at the cabinet meeting:

North Korea has recently convened a Cabinet meeting to discuss food shortages, China’s Xinhua News Agency said Sunday, as international concerns grow over the North’s economic woes.

The North’s Cabinet recently held an enlarged session and decided to address the chronic shortages of food and consumer goods, the news agency said, citing a recent edition of the cabinet daily Minju Joson.

DPRK budget expenditures grow 2.5% this year
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-4-16-1
4/16/2008

On May 9, the sixth round of North Korea’s 11th Supreme People’s Assembly opened, at which this year’s budget expenditures were announced to be 2.5% greater than last year. It was also reported at the assembly that the Cabinet would pursue a new 5-year plan to develop the nation’s science and technology sector by 2012.

Despite officially holding a seat on the Assembly, General Secretary Kim Jong Il did not attend this year’s assembly meeting. In addition, there was no mention during the assembly of inter-Korean, U.S.-DPRK or other foreign relations.

Cabinet Deputy Prime Minister Roh Doo-chul announced this year’s budget, stating that “this year, in order to strengthen national defense, and while building strength, to decisively advance the people’s economy and existing industry as well as improve the lives of the people, the national budget expenditure plan will be expanded to 102.5% of last year.”

According to this statement, this year’s budget is estimated to be 451.5 trillion won (3.2 billion USD). An estimated 15.8%, or 71.3 billion won (510 million USD), is slated for national defense. Last year’s national defense budget was 15.7%, or 69.2 billion won (490 million USD), of the national budget.

North Korea has also decided to increase budget allocations for energy, coal, and metal industries as well as the railway sector by 49.8% as compared to 2007, and will focus investments on staple industries. In the past, the North had stressed the importance of the ‘four main sectors’ of improvement in the people’s economy, including energy, but this year the government will actually focus investment on these sectors.

Cabinet Prime Minister Kim Young-il stated, “From this year until 2012, we will proceed forward with a new 5-year plan for the development of national science and technology…As we systematically increase national investment in this sector, we will raise the sense of responsibility and the role of technicians and raise the level of science and technology development as quickly as possible.”

In 2012, North Korea will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth of national founder Kim Il-sung, and has set a goal of constructing an economically powerful nation by that year.

Read the Yonhap story here:
N.K. discusses food shortage in Cabinet meeting
Yonhap
4/20/2008

Reuters excerpt: 

North Korea has been selling multiple rocket launchers to military-ruled Myanmar since the two countries restored ties last year in violation of U.N. sanctions, Japan’s NHK public broadcaster reported.

Quoting unspecified diplomatic sources, NHK said in a report late on Wednesday that the launchers were the same type as those deployed near the demilitarized zone separating the Korean peninsula.

The report could not be independently confirmed.

A Security Council resolution passed after North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test blocks trade with the secretive communist country in dangerous weapons, heavy conventional weapons and luxury goods.

Read the whole story here:
North Korea sells rocket launchers to Myanmar: report
Reuters
4/3/2008

The DPRK is sending a barrage of signals that it is not happy with the policy changes that are on the new South Korean government’s agenda (denuclearize and account for all nuclear activities, reform, repatriate missing South Korean citizens, etc):

1. February 25, 2008: the DPRK increases fighter jet maneuvers near the DMZ. (Source: N.K. flight maneuvers rise near border, Korea Herald, Jin Dae-woong
4/1/2008

2. March 27, 2008: the DPRK expels eleven South Korean officials from industrial zone. (Source: South Koreans kicked out of North Korea’s Kaesong industrial centre, The Times of London, Leo Lewis, (3/27/2008)

3. March 28, 2008: the DPRK test fires missles off its coast. (Source: North Korea sends a missile warning, Asia Times, Donald Kirk, 3/29/2008)

4. March 30, 2008: the DPRK issues blunt statements about deteriorating relations and suggesting complete destruction of the South if it is attacked. (Source: Pro-North Korea newspaper says relations with South at lowest since after nuclear test, Associated Press, 3/31/2008)

5. April 1, 2008: The DPRK breaks its silence on direclty challenging South Korea’s new president, labeling Lee Myung Bak a “traitor” and a “sycophant toward the U.S.” (Source: North Korea Calls South Korean President a `Traitor’, Bloomberg, 4/1/2008)

6. April 3, 2008: North Korea accuses the South Korean Navy of violating its territorial waters, “The South Korean military’s warmongers have sent three battleships deep into our territorial waters in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) at around 11:45 am (0245 GMT) on April 3,” and “South Korea’s military should clearly bear in mind that an unexpected countermeasure will follow if they continue to push battleships into (our waters) and raise tensions.” (Note here they are trying to pin the military escalation on South Korea) (Source: North Korea accuses South of entering its waters, Reuters, 4/3/2008)

7. April 3, 2008: North Korea announces it is suspending all dialogue with South Korea and closing the border to Seoul officials, its toughest action in a week of growing cross-border tensions. (North Korea cuts contacts with South, The Austrailan, Park, Chan Kyong, 4/3/2008)

8. DPRK violates NLL three times (Yonhap) 5/22/2008

Reasons not to panic:

1.  Although eleven South Korean officials have been expelled from the Kaesong Zone, Some 48 South Koreans and five North Koreans still work at a separate inter-Korean management committee overseeing the industrial zone, where about 800 South Koreans work along with more than 25,600 North Korean laborers for 69 South Korean companies.  In other words, it is still business as usual for the most part. (Source: Pro-North Korea newspaper says relations with South at lowest since after nuclear test, Associated Press, 3/31/2008)

2.  DPRK statements about about attacking the South are a response to statements aired in public by General Kim Tae-young at a National Assembly hearing on his nomination as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff where he claimed his people had plans for use any time it was deemed necessary to take out the North’s nuclear facilities. (Source: North Korea sends a missile warning, Asia Times, Donald Kirk, 3/29/2008)

3. While all of this was going on, 159 CEO’s of small- to medium-sized South Korean enterprises toured North Korea in search of investment opportunities. (Source: 159 CEOs Begin Trip to North Korea, Korea Times, Kim Sue-young, 3/19/2008)

4. Tourism to the DPRK continues unhampered.

5.  The Pyongyang International Trade fair in May is on and business delegations are still welcome.

6. April 3, 2008: The South’s unification ministry said it did not believe civilian exchanges would be affected. Two Seoul-funded projects in the North - the Kumgang resort and the Kaesong industrial complex - are major hard currency earners for the impoverished nation. (North Korea cuts contacts with South, The Austrailan, Park, Chan Kyong, 4/3/2008)

7. Inter korean trade this year is up! (Yonhap)

As many readers know, I have been mapping out North Korea’s military facilities (along with many other things) on Google Earth for some time.  Having never served in the military, I am not qualified to speculate on what many military locations are, but I discovered a web page that has a phenomenal explication of specific locations, even including 3-D overlay images (two  of the may comparisons are at the top of this post).

Anyone who is interested in Google Earth, or North Korea’s military infrastructure, needs to check out the full offerings at “Fortress North Korea” on “militaryphotos.net”.

And if you have not done so, download “North Korea Uncovered v.8″ on Google Earth here.  Sorry Google Maps users, the file is too large.

The New York Times (free registration required) ran an article today on Baengnyeong Island, South Korea’s northern most island which is below the NLL (the de jure, though disputed, sea border between the DPRK and the ROK), but only 10 miles from the coast of North Korea.

Fishermen have gone missing from this island for years, and occasionally, naval clashes erupt between the DPRK and ROK.  The latter problem, though not the former, was an agenda item on the most recent Inter-Korea talks between Kim Jong Il and the former South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun.

The island is now a sad reminder of the costs of division and isolation:

[F]or Chang Hyung-soo, a 64-year-old retired diver here, this narrow strip of water is what separates him from his hometown [in the PDRK]. It also separates him from three of his friends who were lost in fog while fishing and taken to North Korea three decades ago.

and… 

“A few weeks ago, a 93-year-old man came here to take a last look at his hometown across the channel before he died,” Mr. Chang, the retired diver, said from the hilltop. “But he could see nothing because of the fog. I still remember the old man’s tears of disappointment.”

Complicating the matter, however, is the competition from Chinese fishersmen granted territorial access by the DPRK:

To make matters worse, hundreds of Chinese fishing boats, after paying fees to the North Korean Navy, have sailed into waters between their islands and North Korea in recent years while the South Korean fishermen have been restricted to waters close to their own shores.

“The Chinese trawlers catch anything, everything, and deplete our seas,” said Kim Myong-san, 78, who first came to the island as a marine and settled here with his wife.

Notes:
One Eye on the Fish, the Other on North Korea
New York Times
Choe Sang-Hun
1/31/2008

Top image from Google Earth. Download “North Korea Uncovered” to see this location on your own Google Earth.