Archive for the ‘Energy’ Category
According to Yonhap:
North Korea’s exports of anthracite coal to China grew 15.5 percent in 2013 from a year earlier, data showed Friday.
North Korea shipped a total of US$1.37 billion worth of anthracite to China last year, compared with $1.19 billion sold to the neighbor a year earlier, according to the data from the Korea International Trade Association.
North Korea exported only $162.6 million worth of the coal to China In 2007, but the figure has grown every year since then, according to the data.
The total anthracite exported to China last year was measured at 16.5 million tons, up 39.7 percent from what was exported in 2012, the data also showed, indicating that the North sold the coal to China at cheaper prices last year.
In December alone last year, the North shipped $118.06 million worth of anthracite, almost the same amount as November’s $121.45 million.
This means North Korea continued anthracite exports to China after executing leader Kim Jong-un’s once-powerful uncle Jang Song-thaek in early December for allegedly attempting to overthrow the regime and committing anti-state crimes, including selling North Korean natural resources abroad at excessively low prices.
North Korea’s anthracite exports are one of its major income sources and China is virtually the only destination for the shipments.
Read the full story here:
N. Korea’s coal exports to China up 15.1 pct in 2013
According to Yonhap:
Trade and economic levels between South and North Korea remained quite wide last year, data showed Monday, pointing to prolonged lackluster business and economic conditions in the reclusive North.
According to the data by Statistics Korea, South Korea’s total trade volume stood at US$1.07 trillion as of 2012, which is 157 times larger than the North’s $6.8 billion. In particular, the South’s exports came to $547.9 billion, 188.9 times larger than those of the North.
The nominal gross national income (GNI) levels between the two Koreas also remained wide.
The GNI for the South was estimated at 1,279.5 trillion won ($1.21 trillion) last year, 38.2 times larger than the North, the data showed. On a per-capita basis, South Korea’s GNI was 18.7 times larger than that of the North.
South Korea also outperformed the North in infrastructure and other social overhead capital spending.
The South’s road network totaled 105,703 kilometers, which compared with the 26,114 km for the North, the data showed. The South had the power generating capacity of 81.8 million kilowatts a year, which is 11.3 times larger than the North.
The only category that the North outperformed the South was in coal production. It produced a total of 25.8 million tons of coal last year, about 10 times the amount of coal produced by the South, according to the data.
The two Koreas had a combined population of 74.4 million, with the South holding a population of about 50 million, the data showed.
The statistics agency has been providing such information on the North every year since 1995 as a way to provide a glimpse into the economic and industrial conditions of the reclusive country.
Read the full story here:
Trade, economic gaps between 2 Koreas remain wide: data
A new article in Forbes updates us on some of the changes in Rason:
Tomas Novotny has been in North Korea two days, and he looks frazzled. It was a long journey from Prague, and standing on the street in downtown Rajin, his government minder by his side, he can already see that doing business in the DPRK’s remote northeast will present an unusual set of challenges.
Novotny is here because of that railway line. A brewing technologist with the Czech firm Zvu Potez, he has come to set up a brewery. All the equipment and materials were transported by train–from Prague to Moscow, through Siberia and onto the branch line of the Trans-Korean main line.
“We’re still building the brewery. Come and see it,” says Novotny. The two containers that brought the Zvu Potez equipment from Prague lie 50 meters from the brewery. It’s a great location by the sea in Rajin’s main park. The business is a joint venture between the Czech firm and the Rason regional government, says Novotny, and will target tourists and foreigners. There are about 300 Western tourists–including Russians–a year and about 20,000 Chinese visitors to the country’s northeast.
“When they’ve finished building,” he says, shouting over the drilling, “I’m going to teach three or four locals how to brew. I hope they can speak English. If they can’t it will be interesting.”
He expects to be in Rason for six months establishing the business, but already he misses home and his young son. “I won’t get to speak to them until I go home at Christmas,” he says.
North Korea’s telecommunications challenges are a headache for business, too. Foreigners are able to get 3G on their phones, but it is expensive. International calls are possible but equally pricey.
“When telecommunications become a little more open that will indicate the seriousness of purpose,” says Andray Abrahamian, who directs Choson Exchange, a Singaporean nonprofit that focuses on business and legal training for young North Koreans in the DPRK.
Abrahamian has been watching North Korea for a decade and visited Rason several times. He says things are finally moving, a result of legal changes made in 2010 that helped make Rason more autonomous. Further legal changes two years ago were intended to harmonize Rason’s economic laws with those of China, he says.
“The degree to which [Pyongyang] will allow autonomy to the regional decision makers or local planners has yet to be seen. That’s a key issue for Rason–how autonomous are these places really?” asks Abrahamian, 36.
“Chinese small and medium-size enterprises, from Jilin Province but also Heilongjiang Province, are continuing to come in–Rason is experiencing growth,” says Abrahamian.
Not all the factories are new. The Rajin Garment Factory was built in 1958, long before talk of special economic zones. In the early days it produced school uniforms for North Korean students. After 1991 it took orders from China and today employs 180 staff.
The factory manager stands on the front steps. It’s early evening, and he’s watching a staff volleyball game in the car park. Has business improved since Rason was made a special economic zone?
He shrugs and says: “It’s hard to say. It’s different. For every school uniform we used to get paid 800 won and a 1,200-won government subsidy. Now there is no government subsidy.”
The workers, nearly all women, are given housing and paid 600? to 700 won a month, plus overtime, he says. Inside the factory, on the first floor, close to 100 women are clocking overtime. Wearing blue uniforms and matching head scarves, they are sewing puffer jackets, hurrying to complete a big order. The final step of the process is to sew in the label: “Made in China.”
The tag is written in English, and the woman packing the jackets doesn’t understand the visitors’ raised eyebrows. Apparently this is a common practice.
It’s noisy on the factory floor. The popular all-girl band Moranbong blasts out of speakers, drowning out the whir of sewing machines. It’s impossible to hear the drone of the generator, switched on after yet another power failure, a regular feature of life in the DPRK.
There is a deal in place to bring power from Jilin Province, but the Chinese have been holding it up using the pretext of an environmental impact study.
More Chinese power can’t hurt, says researcher Melvin, “but there are many more substantive problems the North Korean must overcome before serious large-scale investment can move into the country. The DPRK cannot currently credibly commit to any policy–no policy stability, rule of law–and has a poor record of honoring its agreements and impartially enforcing contracts. No independent company will risk serious capital in this environment.”
Another matter is fuel. Joseph Naemi is director of HBOil, an oil trading and refining company based in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. HBOil grabbed a few headlines in June when it was reported the firm had acquired a 20% stake in Sungri oil refinery in Rason. That was premature, says Naemi: HBOil has 20% of a state-dominated joint venture called Korean Oil Exploration Corp. International, and a formal commitment with Sungri has yet to be made. Another option is to invest in a refinery on the west coast of the DPRK.
“The easy option is Sungri oil refinery because it’s based on Russian technology and because of its location in terms of the dynamic state of affairs in Rason Special Economic Zone. We are conducting engineering assessment of the refinery to determine the various phases of upgrading and expanding–it’s a work in progress,” says Naemi.
Describing Rason officials as well educated and smart, he says they understand issues of foreign investment protection, taxation and the need to not only be fiscally transparent but also to offer attractive terms to investors.
“I know a number of Mongolian companies, all privately owned, that are at various stages of either investing in North Korea or finalizing their joint ventures so that they can invest. There is a robust relationship between Mongolia and North Korea,” says Naemi.
For anyone doing business, there will be surprises. Standing on the terrace of the new brewery, Novotny looks out at the recently planted lawn. The seeds have been planted in rows, five centimeters apart, all the way down to the sea. Come summer and the warmer weather, the grass should have taken. It stands to be a great spot for a bar.
“Yeah, if we’re still open,” says Novotny and laughs. He drops his voice and out of earshot of his minder adds: “Look at the grass, see how it grows in such straight lines. Things are different here.”
Read the full story here:
Things are Brewing in North Korea’s Rason Zone
Benjamin Habib writes in the East Asia Forum:
North Korea is a curious case among Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It is not an active member of any specific negotiating bloc and has been a sporadic attendee at UNFCCC Conference of Parties gatherings, where its delegates are generally silent participants. Why then does North Korea engage with the international climate change regime?
We do see a rhetorical commitment in reporting documentation, along with various capacity-building programs, which do have greenhouse gas mitigation as a spin-off effect. However, it is the capacity-building dimension that appears to be the primary motivation for North Korea’s UNFCCC engagement. We know that the DPRK has agricultural productivity problems independent of climate vulnerability in terms of soil infertility, land degradation and labour-intensive production in addition to its small arable land base.
North Korea’s reporting documents to the Rio Conventions (a regime made up of the UNFCCC, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification) strongly emphasise capacity-building to address these weaknesses. The documents refer to hillside land reclamation, seed propagation and selective breeding programs to produce crops with greater climate tolerance, as well as programs to improve the efficiency of pre- and post-harvest cultivation practices and soil fertility-building projects.
It is also evident that North Korea is using the UNFCCC as a vehicle to upgrade its energy sector. North Korea’s energy sector problems are well known, plagued by problems like liquid fuel shortages, bottlenecks in coal supply chains for electricity generation, and poor electricity generation and transmission infrastructure, all of which is a significant drag on the national economy.
The UNFCCC offers capacity-building opportunities for North Korea’s energy sector through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is one of the key mechanisms for cooperative greenhouse gas abatement embedded within the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM was designed with the dual purpose of assisting developed states to comply with their emission reduction commitments, and assisting developing countries with sustainable development.
North Korea has six verified CDM projects which consist of developing hydropower installations in partnership with Topič Energo, a Czech company. There are further projects under consideration in the CDM verification process. Indeed, the CDM contains a number of compelling possibilities for North Korea, including opportunities for foreign direct investment and technology transfer to upgrade the North Korean energy sector.
Some suggest that North Korea is milking the CDM as a source of foreign currency revenue through the sale of carbon credits. CDM projects create certified emission reduction credits that developing country parties can sell in international carbon markets. Yet a quick appraisal of the numbers indicates why revenue potential is unlikely to be North Korea’s primary motive for CDM participation: North Korea’s CDM projects have generated just under 200,000 carbon credits, which are worth just over US$1 million at the July 2013 EU carbon market spot price of between US$5–6 per ton. This is clearly not a large revenue source, though there is potential for revenues to increase as North Korea’s CDM portfolio expands.
Read the full article here:
North Korea’s surprising status in the international climate change regime
East Asia Forum
According to Yonhap:
North Korea’s trade with China gained 4.4 percent from a year ago in the first nine months of this year, new data showed Tuesday, raising questions about the effectiveness of sanctions put in place to punish the North for conducting its third nuclear test earlier this year.
Trade volume rose to US$4.69 billion between January and September from $4.49 billion for the same period last year, according to the data released by the China Customs Information Center.
The data, seen by Yonhap News Agency, showed that North Korea’s exports to China jumped 9.4 percent to $2.09 billion during the nine-month period, while its imports from China fell 2.3 percent to $2.6 billion.
A South Korean diplomatic source in Beijing suspected that North Korea’s shortage of hard currency might be a factor for the decline in imports.
“North Korea’s lack of foreign currency may be partly attributable to the fall in imports of Chinese goods,” the source said on the condition of anonymity.
During the first nine months of this year, North Korea’s imports of Chinese crude oil, however, rose to 415,000 tons, compared with 402,000 tons for the same period last year.
China did not export crude oil to North Korea in June and July this year, but resumed crude exports in August, according to the source.
In August and September, China exported 165,000 tons of crude oil to North Korea, the source said.
Read the full story here:
N. Korea-China trade up 4.4 pct in Jan.-Sept. despite sanctions
According to the Asahi Shimbun:
China is holding petroleum that was heading to North Korea from Iran in an apparent attempt by Beijing to maintain its control over Pyongyang, sources said.
According to Chinese sources, the petroleum was part of North Korea’s contract to import about 500,000 tons of condensate, a light oil, from Iran. North Korea, seeking to diversify its energy sources, started discussions on the deal last year.
The agreement was reached with the cooperation of a major Chinese state-run petroleum company.
The condensate is believed to have been shipped from Iran over a number of occasions on tankers registered to a third nation. But Chinese authorities ordered the tankers to stop when they reached the Chinese coast in the Yellow Sea this spring.
The ships were then towed to ports in Dalian, Liaoning province, and Qingdao, Shandong province. Sources said the condensate remains in those ports, which have restricted access to outsiders.
China is believed to have asked North Korea to pay about $2 million (about 196 million yen) for storage expenses.
“Once China realized that North Korea was beginning to depend on Iran for petroleum, China began using various measures to remain engaged so it can maintain its influence over North Korea,” a diplomatic source knowledgeable about relations between China and North Korea said.
Under the North Korea-Iran contract, Pyongyang is to pay Tehran for the condensate, but the condensate itself must be first sent to a Chinese state-run petroleum company.
“Because North Korea does not have the most advanced refineries, it had to ask China to refine the condensate,” a source in the petroleum industry said.
It is unclear what legal basis China is using for holding up the shipments because condensate and other petroleum products needed for daily living are not banned under U.N. economic sanctions imposed against North Korea.
However, one source involved in the transaction said, “As part of the economic sanctions that were imposed against military actions taken by North Korea, inspections were carried out by Chinese authorities, which asked that the petroleum be kept at the port.”
Until now, China is said to have provided about 80 percent of the petroleum used in North Korea. The main means of transport were through a pipeline that runs along the Yalu River between the border of the two nations as well as by ship.
According to Chinese customs statistics, the export volume was about 520,000 tons a year.
“Not only has a ban on petroleum export shipments been imposed by China, but the total import volume through the pipeline has also been reduced to one-third the level of the same period of the previous year,” a source involved in trade between China and North Korea was told by a North Korean government source in September.
China remains North Korea’s biggest backer, even with the contract with Iran.
Read the full story here:
China holding up shipment of Iranian petroleum to North Korea
Evaluation of Kim Jong Un’s first two years: The rise in construction of sports and entertainment facilities and exports to ChinaWednesday, October 16th, 2013
Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
The first chairman of the National Defence Commission of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, took office two years ago. Since then, construction of sports and entertainment facilities are reported to have increased considerably. According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, North Korea’s Pyongyang Folk Park (September 2012), Taesongsan General Hospital (March 2013), and Haedanghwa Service Complex (April 2013) were recently completed. Since the launch of the Kim Jong Un regime, the Masik Pass Ski Resort and other similar sports facilities have been undertaken and are nearing completion.
In addition, the People’s Theatre (April 2012), Rungna People’s Pleasure Ground (opened in July 2012), Sunrise Restaurant (September 2012), and Unification Street Center (September 2012) have been recently renovated. In addition, the Mirim Riding Club, Pyongyang Gymnasium, Munsu Wading Pool, Aprok (Yalu) River Amusement park, Karma Hotel, and New Day Hotel and other hotels around Pyongyang are currently under renovation and repair. Entertainment and sports facilities around other major cities are being constructed as well. Furthermore, after the successful launch of Kwangmyongsong 3-2 last December, North Korea has begun to construct major residential complexes for scientists, granting them preferential housing in Unha scientist residence, Kim Il Sung University educator residence, and Pyongsong residence. Other large-scale housing projects are also reported to be under development.
In the wake of major celebrations in North Korea — such as the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung and 60-year anniversary of the “Victory in the Fatherland Liberation War” — a large memorial was erected and existing facilities were repaired. Specifically, the Korean People’s Army Exhibition of Arms and Equipment, Kumsusan Memorial Palace, War Victory Monument, and the Cemetery of the Fallen Fighters of the KPA were refurbished.
Unlike the large-scale construction of sports and entertainment facilities, new constructions of harbors, roads, power plants and other social overhead capital (SOC) is reported to be in decline.
Last August, North Korea’s trade with China has shown an 8 percent increase in exports and 6 percent decrease in imports, following a similar trend from last year. According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, North Korea’s current trade volume with China is reported to be 4 billion USD (1.89 billion USD in exports and 2.2 billion USD in imports).
North Korea’s most popular export items are mineral resources such anthracite, coal, and iron ore. In the case of clothing products — which are mostly consigned processing — there has been an increase of 42 percent (200 million USD) against the previous year. Major categories of imports from China are crude oil, food, and fertilizers. Compared to the previous year, food imports have declined 57 percent (17.4 million tons), and fertilizer and crude oil imports are also showing gradual reduction at 27 percent (18.3 million tons) and 6 percent (34.6 million tons), respectively.
…although I cannot find a copy of it anywhere. It is probably being sent around in PDF form and only available in Chinese.
According to the New York Times:
In a sign of growing concern about North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, China published a long list on Tuesday of equipment and chemical substances to be banned from export to North Korea for fear they could be used in adding to its increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons programs.
If put into place, the export controls would be some of the strongest steps taken by China, the North’s closest ally, to try to limit the country’s nuclear programs. The announcement indicates that China is now following through on some United Nations Security Council sanctions it approved months ago, according to a noted American arms expert.
The list of banned items was released amid a flurry of reports suggesting that North Korea is accelerating its two nuclear weapons programs. Two weeks ago, new satellite photographs showed that North Korea might be resuming production of plutonium at its newly reconstructed nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. And this week, two American arms experts reported that North Korea appeared to have learned to produce its own crucial components for uranium enrichment.
The move also comes less than a week after China made an unsuccessful attempt to revive talks aimed at persuading the North to give up its nuclear capabilities. The United States continues to resist restarting the talks, which North Korea has used in the past to extract concessions without making long-term changes to its nuclear program.
“The release of the new export control list is a signal China is concerned about the speeding up of weaponization” of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, said Zhu Feng, the deputy director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies at Beijing University, who called the move “very important.” In particular, he said, the Chinese are concerned about resumption of plutonium production at the Yongbyon complex, the centerpiece of North Korea’s nuclear program.
Another Chinese expert on North Korea, who declined to be identified because of his position in the government, said the publication of the list “says that China is increasingly unsatisfied with North Korea’s actions.”
“This is one of the practical actions to show it,” he said.
Both plutonium and highly enriched uranium can be used in nuclear bombs, but analysts say the North’s plutonium program is much further along. At least two of the three bombs the country has tested used plutonium.
China has long resisted punishing North Korea for its nuclear programs, but has appeared increasingly frustrated as the North’s young leader, Kim Jong-un, has appeared to ignore Chinese pleas for moderation. China agreed to the United Nations sanctions after the North conducted a nuclear test this year over Chinese objections.
The North responded to the sanctions with months of nuclear threats against South Korea and the United States, which, analysts say, ended only after China exerted strong pressure, apparently fearful of instability that could harm its economic progress.
David Albright, the American expert who said China was now implementing the United Nations sanctions passed in March, added that the Chinese ban “will help, since North Korea procures so much from China.” Mr. Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security, added that China could take additional measures to “dramatically increase the inspection of goods into North Korea by road and rail.”
China has moved before to stop the export of other technologies that could be used in nuclear programs, including missile technology, though it did not single out any countries when it did so.
The items on the list China released Tuesday were called “dual-use technologies” because they can be used for either civilian or military purposes, and they included items that could be used to build more chemical weapons and to make biological weapons.
Banned items include Ebola, a virus that can be used for medical research as well as a biological weapon; nickel powder; radium; flash X-ray generators; and microwave antennas designed to accelerate ions. China’s Commerce Ministry, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the General Administration of Customs, and the Atomic Energy Authority jointly published the list.
In a statement, the Ministry of Commerce said the items in the 236-page document were prohibited from being sent to North Korea because “the dual-use products and technologies delineated in this list have uses in weapons of mass destruction.”
Reuters also adds:
Released by the commerce ministry along with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the China Atomic Energy Authority, the document describes items that could be used to build nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as technology that could build and fuel nuclear reactors.
The ban took effect on Monday (September 23).
Read the full stories here:
China Bans Items for Export to North Korea, Fearing Their Use in Weapons
New York Times
China releases list of goods banned from export to North Korea
China issues long list of banned items for exports to N. Korea
According the Russian outlet Izvestia (translated by Google Translate):
Tensions between the U.S. and North Korea do not interfere with the group Evraz, the largest shareholder is Roman Abramovich, it is advantageous to work with both countries: part of the holding coal company “Raspadskaya (Распадской)” began selling coal in North Korea. At the end of 2013 the total supply of “Raspadskaya” to North Korea could reach $ 32 million – half of it is comparable to last year’s total exports from Russia to North Korea.
During the first half of 2013 “Raspadskaya” delivered to North Korea coking coal at $ 4.5 million, follows from the statements of the company. In the total volume of exports “Raspadskaya” is about 4%, which makes the DPRK fifth largest export market for sales of coal (after China, Ukraine, South Korea and Japan).
In the DPRK embassy in Russia, “Izvestia” reported that, except for “Raspadskaya”, none of the Russian coal industry supplies goods to North Korea. There’s also clarified that the recipient of coal – Metallurgical Works named. Kimchaek- one of the largest steel companies in North Korea. Total design capacity metkombinatu them. Kimchaek on all kinds of products, according to various estimates, 6.5 million tons, but in recent years the plant has significantly underutilized. According to South Korean estimates, the actual production of steel in all of North Korea is 1.25 million tons per year (Statistics Korea itself does not publish a lot of years).
The volume of coal supply to the “Raspadskaya” to North Korea – to 20 kt (4-5 railroad tracks) on a monthly basis under the current annual contract, described in the company. Price is tied to the international price system (quotation Australian HCC with a discount for the quality of the brand SHCC). That is the sum total of the contract – about $ 32 million, considered BCS analyst Oleg Peter and Paul: The current market price of coking coal at $ 152 per ton (FOB Australia), but the average price for the first half was $ 134.
- Last year, the entire bilateral trade between Russia and North Korea amounted to less than $ 80 million – says Ludmila Zakharova, a senior researcher at the Center for Korean Research Institute of Far Eastern Studies. - At present, trade between our two countries in a state of crisis, Russia accounts for less than 1% of North Korea’s foreign trade.
In 2012, Russian exports to Korea totaled $ 65 million, told “Izvestia” in Economic Development. North Korea among foreign trade partners of Russia occupies 124th place with a “specific weight of 0%,” stated in the department. Starting this year, however, there is growth of sales: in January-July 2013 two-way trade turnover of Russia and North Korea reached $ 56 million ( an increase of 31% compared to the same period in 2012), including Russian exports totaled nearly $ 51 million (an increase of 38%).
A small volume of direct trade is partially offset by other forms of economic cooperation continues Ludmila Zakharova. For example, it is estimated that about $ 100 million a year is the so-called labor services: experts from North Korea come to work in Russia (for the current year quota for North Korean workers reached 35 thousand people). Since the DPRK shortage of agricultural land, there are projects to provide Koreans to lease farmland in the Primorye Territory. In the last few years has intensified investment direction of Russian-North Korean cooperation. The other day, completed the reconstruction of the railway Hasan-Rajin. Investment in this project is a joint Russian Railways and the Ministry of Railways North Korea amounted to more than $ 200 million
According to data provided by the Ministry of Economic Development, the amount of accumulated investment of Russia to the DPRK at the end of the first quarter of 2013 amounted to only $ 572 million, while the DPRK in Russia – more than $ 79 million
Evraz – a vertically integrated global company with assets not only in Russia but also in other countries, including the United States. Evraz North American division includes several large steel companies formerly known as Oregon Steel, Rocky Mountain Steel, Claymont Steel and Ipsco.
- Evraz to some degree of risk. Under existing U.S. sanctions against the DPRK any large company with offices in the U.S. carries certain risks, working with North Korea – warns Ludmila Zakharova. - America includes a list of objects sanctioned North Korean banks and organizations that are involved in nuclear and missile program. All legal entities operating in the United States, engaging in economic relations with the companies on this list are subject to the relevant law and can not only get the fines, but generally lose access to the U.S. market and the U.S. banking system. In this case, unlike the UN sanctions, the U.S. rules imply a sufficiently broad interpretation than may be exploited Evraz. Of course, the steel industry is difficult to draw to a nuclear program, but you can.
The contract with the DPRK was verified for international risks assured “News” in the “Raspadskaya”.
- At Evraz in America a lot of assets, but the supply of this market are small. Much more dangerous for her to lose access to local banking system – says Oleg Peter and Paul. - Still, the U.S. market civilized, hardly any of the competitors Evraz want to speculate on its relations with the DPRK. Also tied to the steel industry’s nuclear program would be extremely difficult.
If any Russian translators care to improve on the text offered by Google Translate, please do so.
Read the full story here:
Компания Абрамовича подзаработает в Северной Корее