Archive for the ‘Energy’ Category

Gas prices volatile in Pyongyang as tensions run high

Monday, September 25th, 2017

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

DailyNK reports:

Following the countryโ€™s sixth nuclear test on September 3, fuel prices in North Korea have been subject to unusual volatility. The price of fuel soared in April and rose again slightly in September. But it has been reported that gasoline coupons have not been influenced by the price fluctuations, and are being actively traded on the North Korean black markets.
“As fuel prices have been fluctuating, gasoline coupons have become popular items in Pyongyang’s black markets. The merchants who previously bought dozens of coupons have started offering them for sale as the prices began to rise,” a source familiar with North Korean affairs in China told Daily NK on September 20.
And opportunities are ripe for arbitrage:
According to the source, gasoline can be purchased for the same price at the time that the coupon was issued. For example, if a 15 kg gasoline coupon was previously purchased for 30 USD, the same amount of fuel can be obtained even if the price rises suddenly to 35 USD. In this way, the dealers can make a profit by selling the coupon for 32 USD.
“The coupons are especially popular when the gasoline prices are unstable. The merchants are selling the coupons on the black markets as the fuel prices rise,” the source said.
Originally, gasoline coupons were issued from North Koreaโ€™s central government organizations and were sold to officials or foreign embassy staff in Pyongyang. But now the foreign currency earning companies are issuing the coupons themselves. The authorities have actively encouraged new strategies to earn foreign currency.
The black market is ever the present factor:
These foreign currency earning companies are said to be profiting from the fluctuating fuel prices, regardless of efforts to limit the sales of coupons.
“If the authorities move to restrict the sales of coupons, the companies will just sell the coupons on the black market. Despite strong sanctions being imposed on fuel, the major companies that are still holding a large amount of fuel become more powerful in times of fuel crisis,” a source in South Pyongan Province explained.
“Even the Pyongyang cadres have no choice but to purchase coupons on the black market.”
Full article here:
Volatile gasoline prices in Pyongyang
Seol Song Ah
Daily NK

North Korea’s ICBM-test, Byungjin and the economic logic

Tuesday, July 4th, 2017

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

At 3:30PM GMT+9 on Tuesday July 4th, North Korean television announced that the country had successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile earlier in the day. Wall Street Journal

The missile, identified as the Hwasong-14, was launched at a steep trajectory and flew 933 kilometers (580 miles), reaching an altitude of 2,802 kilometers, according to North Korean state television. The numbers are in line with analyses from U.S., South Korean and Japanese military authorities.

US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, later confirmed that the launched missile was an intercontinental ballistic one.

Here in Seoul, things seemed to continue on as usual, which tends to be the case in this city more than used to its fair share of similar news. The biggest strategic consequence, of course, is that for the US. A successful intercontinental ballistic missile of this sort could potentially strike anywhere in Alaska.

With the latest launch, North Korea takes one step further along the nuclear side of the Byungjin line of parallel development of nuclear weapons and the national economy, and arguably, one step back on the economic side of the dual-track policy. In the formulation of the Byungjin line, of course, both are interrelated. Missile launches are often described as evidence of progress in industry and science, ultimately benefitting economic progress. This launch was no exception. From KCNA:s statement yesterday, July 4th 2017 (my emphasis):

The success in the test-fire of inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14, final gate to rounding off the state nuclear force, at just one go is a powerful manifestation of the invincible state might and the tremendous capability of the self-reliant national defence industry of Juche Korea that has advanced at a remarkably rapid pace under the great Workers’ Party of Korea’s new line on the simultaneous development of the two fronts, and a great auspicious event to be specially recorded in the history of the DPRK which has long craved for powerful defence capabilities.

This launch happened in a context where North Korea is already under sanctions designed to strike at its coal exports, one of its most important sources of income, and where the US has just signaled its resolve to go after North Korea’s financial channels through secondary sanctions of Chinese entities. At the same time, Kim Jong-un’s tenure has very much come to be associated with some economic progress (albeit from a low level, and primarily benefitting the relatively privileged classes), symbolized by projects such as the recently opened Ryomyong street.

It is not yet clear what the consequences will be. The US will likely try to add more sanctions targeted against specific entities and persons that help North Korea evade sanctions, and acquire equipment for its nuclear and missile programs.

The US will probably also call for international sanctions, but as Chad O’Carroll points out, the US may have a hard time getting such measures through in a quick manner given its currently tense relationships with both Moscow and Beijing. The US may also further push Beijing to implement the already existing sanctions against North Korea, but nothing appears to have changed with the claimed ICBM-test that would fundamentally alter China’s strategic calculations in the region. In other words, it continues to regard North Korea as a buffer between itself and US forces in the region, and as a geopolitical asset.

Whatever happens, it is safe to assume that it will not be good news for North Korea’s international ties in diplomacy, trade, finance, you name it. It would be easy to assume that economic progress and nuclear weapons development are mutually exclusive, since the second leads to further international isolation and economic sanctions, and therefore hampers the first.

In reality, that may be true. The North Korean Byungjin narrative, that weapons development helps economic progress, is difficult to swallow, especially when one considers the opportunity cost that the weapons programs carry, both in terms of domestic resource dedication and the cost in international isolation.

But there is another way to look at it. Whatever the actual consequences will turn out to be, North Korea is making a strategic calculation that the gains from the test, and from overall nuclear weapons and missiles development, will be greater than the potential costs and downsides. Consider the following two factors:

First, North Korea has made economic progress in the past few years, and particularly since Kim Jong-un came to power, even under years of severe sanctions.  North Korea has been under various forms of UN Security Council sanctions since its first nuclear test in 2006. During these years, its economic development has been impacted far more by domestic policy decisions than by international developments.

Again, we are absolutely not talking about any growth miracle, and some probably exaggerate the degree of the wealth increase in North Korea over the past few years. But without a doubt, North Korea is far better off now than it was eleven years ago, and worlds apart from the famine of the 1990s. Food insecurity prevails in North Korea but the country has not seen widespread starvation since the late 1990s, and largely thanks to better economic frameworks (or rather less predatory), and increased space for private production and trade within the economic system, things are looking much better today than in many years.

Just look at this video recently published by the Daily NK, from Chongjin, one of North Korea’s largest cities in its northeast. Is this long-term, sustainable growth that will eventually lead North Koreans to enjoy the same prosperity as their counterparts in South Korea or even China? Probably not. But at least it’s something.

Second, and relatedly, North Korea likely has a significant amount of channels for trade and various transactions that are not commonly known, but that play highly significant roles for the economy. For example, consider the information that Ri Jong Ho, a former official in North Korea’s Office 39, supplied in a recent interview with Kyodo News. Ri claims that North Korea procures up to 300,000 tons of fuel and various oil products from Russia each year, through dealers based in Singapore. As a point of comparison, a commonly cited figure for crude oil supplies from China is 520,ooo tons per year. Proportionately, then, 300,000 tons is not close to a majority, but still a significant amount for North Korea. While intelligence services or others with access to classified information may have known this already, Ri’s claims, if true (they have not and in all likelihood cannot be fully corroborated),

The point here is that North Korea has gotten so used to going through back channels and unconventional means to acquire highly significant amounts of supplies required for its society to function. It is an economic system where unconventional (and often illicit) channels of trade are not exceptions, but core parts of the economic management toolbox. This is not to argue that sanctions do not or cannot work. Rather, it shows the extent to which unconventional methods are institutionalized within economic management in North Korea.

The North Korean government is no monolith, and there are almost certainly some parts of the governing apparatus that are more and less pleased with the ICBM-test. But in the higher echelons of the leadership, the strategic calculation is probably that even with the added sanctions that are very likely to come, North Korea will be able to continue along roughly the same economic strategies as it has thus far. Perhaps we can call it North Korea’s own “strategic patience”: continuing with patchwork strategies for international economic relations, with little concern for the impact of lack of sustainable growth on people’s livelihoods, while banking on eventual recognition as a nuclear power. Only time will tell whether targeted secondary sanctions will change that calculation.


Ri Jong Ho, high-level defector and former official in Office 39, says North Korea gets much more oil from Russia than previously known

Saturday, July 1st, 2017

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

In a fascinating interview by Kyodo News’s Tomotaro Inoue, Ri Jong Ho, a former high-level official in Office 39 of the Korean Worker’s Party, makes several fascinating claims about the supply of fuel to North Korea:

North Korea secures up to 300,000 tons of oil products from Russia each year through Singapore-based dealers, a defector who formerly managed funds for the leadership has told Kyodo News, posing a challenge for the United States as it seeks to isolate Pyongyang.

“North Korea has procured Russia-produced fuel from Singapore brokers and others since the 1990s…It is mostly diesel oil and partly gasoline,” Ri Jong Ho, 59, a former senior official of Office 39 of the Workers’ Party of Korea, said recently in the U.S. capital in his first interview with media under his own name.

Ri also said North Korea relies more on Russia than China for fuel to keep its economy moving, indicating that the U.S. drive for Beijing to restrict oil supplies over Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs will only have a limited effect.

“It is a wrong perception that North Korea is completely dependent on China,” he said.

Petroleum products have been shipped to North Korea by tankers leaving Vladivostok and Nakhodka, both in the Russian Far East, with the fuel widely used for cars, ships and trains, helping to support the North’s economy, Ri said.

Other sources familiar with the fuel deals said the petroleum products ending up in North Korea are often purchased by brokers who claim they are destined for China, with the items procured using forged paperwork.

Ri, who defected to South Korea with his family in October 2014, provided details of the activities of Office 39.

The secretive entity, said to have been established by former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in May 1974, is subject to international sanctions as the United States and other Western countries believe it is engaged in illicit economic activities and the management of slush funds for the leadership.

He said North Korea has been trying to reduce its economic reliance on China, Pyongyang’s most important benefactor, since leader Kim Jong Un issued an order to expand trade with Russia and Southeast Asian countries in August 2014.

The order followed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to South Korea a month earlier, during which he and then South Korean President Park Geun Hye expressed opposition to North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. It was the first time for a Chinese president to visit South Korea before traveling to the North.

Ri said the North Korean leader was “infuriated” by the visit, going so far as to call China an “enemy state,” and began taking measures to boost trade with Russia.

According to Ri, Office 39 has five central groups and systematically acquires foreign currency by sending laborers overseas as well as through gold mining and exports.

“It is an organization that manages the supreme leader’s coffers and the party’s funds to rule the country. It also leads trade activities to earn foreign currency,” Ri said. The office has enormous power as it is directly linked to the leadership and is independent of other government organs, he added.

Ri admitted that Office 39 has evaded U.N. sanctions by asking Chinese and Russian contacts to allow the use of their names for the opening of bank accounts for trade settlement.

The activities of Office 39 require the involvement of hundreds of thousands of people, including those in rural areas who produce items for export. Ri said the bureau is now headed by Chon Il Chun, first vice department director of the party’s Central Committee and a former classmate of Kim Jong Il, the current leader’s father.

A native of Wonsan on North Korea’s east coast, Ri was told to work in Pyongyang by the Central Committee in the mid-1980s. He operated a shipping company at Office 39’s Daehung group and later headed a trade control section in the group between 1998 and 2004.

The Daehung group earns revenue through farm exports and shipping operations, among other means. With exclusive rights to trade “matsutake” mushrooms and snow crabs, it was actively shipping those products to Japan before Tokyo imposed a total ban on trade with the North about 10 years ago.

The four other central groups are Kumgang, which dominates gold export activities, Daesong, involved in the shipment of processed products and intermediate trade overseas, Daesong Bank, in charge of the office’s banking operations, and a group dispatching workers to other countries.

Asked about the possibility that the foreign currency earned by North Korea is being used for its nuclear and missile development programs, Ri only said, “It is up to the supreme leader how to use the funds.”

North Korea receives 500,000 tons of crude oil each year through a pipeline from China, resulting in around 70,000 to 100,000 tons of gasoline and about 100,000 tons of diesel oil after refining, but the oil products are exclusively used by the North Korean army and are not good enough for cars that carry the elite, Ri said.

He also said crude oil purchased from other countries is refined by foreign companies based in China, leading to the importation into North Korea of an additional 50,000 to 100,000 tons of gasoline.

Full article here:
N. Korea procuring Russian fuel via Singapore dealers: defector
Tomotaro Inoue
Kyodo News


CNPC suspends fuel exports to North Korea

Wednesday, June 28th, 2017

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

In late June, Reuters reported that the Chinese state-owned enterprise, China National Petroleum Corporation, had suspended its exports of fuel to North Korea, ostensibly because of concerns that North Korean buyers would not be able to pay:

China National Petroleum Corp has suspended sales of fuel to North Korea over concerns the state-owned oil company won’t get paid, as pressure mounts on Pyongyang to rein in its nuclear and missile programmes, three sources told Reuters.

It’s unclear how long the suspension will last. A prolonged cut would threaten critical supplies of fuel and force North Korea to find alternatives to its main supplier of diesel and gasoline, as scrutiny of China’s close commercial ties with its increasingly isolated neighbour intensifies.

CNPC and the Ministry of Commerce did not respond to requests for comment. North Korea’s embassy in Beijing declined to comment.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang, asked about the sale suspension and whether the Chinese government put pressure on CNPC to make this decision, said: “I do not understand this situation you are talking about” and declined to elaborate.

A source with direct knowledge of the matter said CNPC decided to put fuel sales on hold “over the last month or two” and described it as a “commercial decision”.

“It’s no longer worth the risks,” said the source. Chinese and international banks are stepping up compliance checks on companies dealing with countries on the U.S. sanctions list, such as North Korea, he said.

The North Korean agents who mostly buy the diesel and gasoline have been unable recently to pay for the supplies — CNPC normally requires upfront payments, the source said.

Reuters was unable to determine if the agents have started facing credit problems with Chinese and international banks worried about sanctions compliance issues.

Two other sources briefed about CNPC’s decision confirmed the suspension of diesel sales, but did not know directly about the gasoline move. The three people declined to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter and are not authorised to speak to the media.


Last year, China shipped just over 96,000 tonnes of gasoline and almost 45,000 tonnes of diesel worth a combined $64 million to North Korea, where it is used across the economy from fishermen and farmers to truckers and the military.[O/CHINA4]

Most of that was sold by CNPC, which has grown over the past two decades to dominate China’s energy trade with Pyongyang.

Data for May released on Friday showed China supplied significantly lower volumes of diesel and gasoline compared with a month earlier, although monthly tonnages can vary widely. June data will be released in late July.

Fuel prices in North Korea, meanwhile, have sharply risen in recent months, suggesting a tightening in supply.

A Reuters analysis of data collected by Daily NK showed the price of gasoline sold by private dealers in Pyongyang and the northern border cities of Sinuiju and Hyesan had hit $1.46 per kg on June 21, up almost 50 percent from April 21. Until then, they had remained relatively stable since late last year.

Diesel prices averaged $1.20 per kg as of June 21, more than double over the same period, according to Daily NK, a website run by defectors who collect prices via phone calls with North Korean fuel traders.

Full article:
Exclusive: China’s CNPC suspends fuel sales to North Korea as risks mount – sources
Chen Aizhu

This does not seem to imply that the CNPC altogether halted crude oil deliveries to North Korea, only deliveries of fuel purchased on a commercial basis. And usually, the first follow-up question to ask in reaction to news of China halting deliveries of supplies X, or the imports of good Y, is “for how long”?

These deliveries may of course have happened on other contracts, but NK Pro reports continued North Korean oil tanker presence in Chinese oil terminals in both May and June.


Chinese imports of North Korean coal down since February ban, data says

Tuesday, May 23rd, 2017

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Reuters reported today on the most recent figures on China-North Korean trade. They show that coal imports have declined, to the lowest level in three years, according to Reuters. It must be remembered that coal trade (in volume terms, not necessarily in USD-numbers) has climbed for several years in a row since 2010, so a relative decline does not mean catastrophically low levels. Also, of course, Chinese customs data should be taken with a huge grain of salt.


The world’s second-largest economy bought goods worth $99.3 million in April from North Korea, the lowest monthly tally since at least June 2014, according to Chinese customs data. Previous data was not available.

That compares with $114.6 million in March and $167.7 million a year earlier.

A fifth of the April total was iron ore imports, which hit 285,000 tonnes, their highest since August 2014. That was up 10 percent from a month earlier and 2-1/2 times higher than a year earlier.


Cho Bong-hyun, who heads research on North Korea’s economy at IBK Bank in Seoul, said China’s imports from North Korea were likely to continue to decline due to Pyongyang’s repeated missile tests and the suspension of coal shipments to China.

“This won’t be disastrous for North Korea, but it will obviously hurt North Korea because it tends to export goods to China worth around $3 billion per year,” he said.

The value of imports from North Korea has fallen month-on-month since December, the data showed.


China’s exports to North Korea eased to $288.2 million in April, down 12 percent from March. Exports for the first four months of the year were up 32 percent at $1 billion.

Diesel shipments to North Korea in April more than halved from March to 2,606 tonnes and gasoline sales dropped 6 percent to 13,496 tonnes. North Korea gets most of its oil needs from China.

Crude oil exports from China to North Korea have not been disclosed by customs for several years, but sources have put it at about 520,000 tonnes a year.

Cutting off oil to North Korea for an extended period would be a crippling measure that analysts have said they don’t expect China would take.


Data released later on Tuesday showed China did not take any North Korean coal in April for a second straight month, after Beijing’s ban of such imports following repeated missile tests by Pyongyang.

China imported 1.53 million tonnes of coal worth $72.3 million from North Korea in April 2016.

Full article:
China’s imports from North Korea sink as coal ban bites
Josephine Mason


North Korea-China trade grew by almost 40 percent in the first quarter of 2017

Thursday, April 13th, 2017

Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

Reports New York Times

China released the first-quarter trade data just days after President Trump urged its leader, Xi Jinping, to clamp down on trade with North Korea. The two leaders met at Mr. Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida last week.

With signs indicating that North Korea could be planning a nuclear or missile test as early as Saturday, a United States Navy strike group led by the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson is steaming toward the Korean Peninsula in a show of force. But the Trump administration has indicated that economic pressure — particularly imposed by China, with which North Korea conducts almost 90 percent of its trade — is its preferred form of deterrence.


The data released on Thursday showed that China’s trade with North Korea grew 37.4 percent in the first quarter of this year from the period in 2016. Chinese exports surged 54.5 percent, and imports increased 18.4 percent, the General Administration of Customs said at a news conference in Beijing.

China buys iron ore, zinc and other minerals from North Korea, as well as growing amounts of seafood and garments manufactured in the North’s well-equipped textile factories. China reported that its imports of North Korean iron were up 270 percent in January and February compared with the period in 2016.

But imports of coal dropped 51.6 percent in the first three months of 2017 compared with the first quarter of last year, said Huang Songping, a spokesman for the customs agency. Coal has been the biggest hard-currency earner among North Korea’s fairly limited menu of exports.


After the United Nations sanctions were announced, some economists said it was still possible for Chinese businesses to import coal on an off-the-books basis, using transactions that would not be recorded by customs officials.

But since mid-February, Chinese coal traders have said that their business has virtually vanished. “It’s over,” said a coal trader who operates from Dandong, a city on China’s northeastern border that functions as the main center of business with North Korea. The trader spoke on the condition of anonymity because he feared reprisals from the city authorities.

Full article:

China Says Its Trade With North Korea Has Increased
Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang


Still too early to tell on Chinese imports of North Korean coal

Monday, March 27th, 2017

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

It is still far too early to say anything of certainty or substance on Chinese compliance on the UN resolution cap of $400 million on coal imports from North Korea. A few figures have come out over the past week that are of interest on the issue. Altogether, the statistics suggest that two parallel processes are at play. While China certainly seems to have imposed the coal ban at least in part to comply with the UN-mandated $400 million import cap, it also continues to shift its consumption to domestic coal in the face of a drive to draw down on coal consumption altogether.

Asย UPI reports, one angle is that China instituted the ban to pre-emptively ensure compliance with the cap, knowing that deliveries early in 2017 would come close:

The official, who spoke to local news service Newsis on the condition of anonymity, said a Chinese decision announced Feb. 18 to suspend all North Korean coal imports included an accounting of “excess” North Korean coal that was delivered to China in late 2016, according to the report.

“China is of the mind to carry over the excess of December [imports] to this year’s upper limit,” the official said.

Resolution 2321 also bans North Korea sales of copper, nickel, silver, zinc and even statues.

China agreed to play a key role in the agreement. All exports of North Korea coal would not exceed $400 million per annum or 7.5 million tons yearly.

In 2017, China has so far imported about $126 million of coal in January and $100 million in February.

While the total number of coal imported appears to be well below the annual quota, when the December data is included China reaches the upper limit of coal restrictions, the South Korean official said.

Full article:
Report: China suspended North Korea coal imports to not exceed quota
Elizabeth Shim
United Press International

Bloomberg reports the same figures, but give an added context. It is not only coal imports to China from North Korea that have fallen. Those from Australia and Mongolia have dropped, too:

China’s imports of North Korea anthracite coal in February fell 18.7 percent from a year ago to the lowest since January 2015, after a ban on imports as a result of the reclusive nation’s missile program. Imports of anthracite coal, a hard coal with a high energy content used in steel mills, dropped to 1.23 million tonnes in February from 1.45 million tonnes in January, data from the General Administration of Customs released on Thursday.

Waning shipments from North Korea follows Beijing’s decision in late February to ban coal imports entirely after Pyongyang tested an intermediate-range ballistic missile in a direct challenge to international efforts to stabilise the Korean peninsula.

The ban has also sent steel mills who use anthracite as a feed stock to find alternatives in the domestic market. Chinese anthracite prices gained more than 50 yuan($7.26) per tonne to around 780 yuan($113.26) in February, data provided by China Sublime Information Group showed. Imports from China’s top supplier Australia <COA-AUCN-IMP> in February plunged 29 percent from January to 5.16 million tonnes, the lowest since May. Still, Australian imports were 16.8 percent higher than a year ago, the data showed. The decline adds to speculation that China is trying to control coal imports to aid the country’s efforts to reduce overcapacity at domestic mines.

The head of China’s quality supervision agency vowed to crack down on low-quality coal import. Traders in southern Chinese ports also reported cases of cargoes delayed due to customs checks. Coal shipments from Mongolia <COA-MNCN-IMP> tumbled 37 percent from January to 1.97 million tonnes, though it more than doubled from the same period last year.

Full article:
China’s North Korean coal imports drop to two-year low on ban

Inย other words, it is not only imports of North Korean coal that have dropped. Imports from other countries have fallen too. The “import ban” and fall in imports, rather than beingย linked by direct causation, may stem from a combination of factors that were already at play. Any conclusions that “China is putting the squeeze on North Korea” or the like are still premature.

On a different note regarding China-North Korea-trade, NK Economy Watch editor Curtis Melvin notes on Radio Free Asia that the Nampo port oil terminal has been upgraded.ย Perhaps a sign of long-term expectations on the North Korean side of long-run trade ties with China…


China says it is suspending imports of North Korean coal for the rest of the year

Saturday, February 18th, 2017

By Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein

In yet another so-called “strong signal”, China’s commerce ministry said on Saturday it won’t be importing any more coal from North Korea for the rest of the year. Remember, that coal that was already basically supposed to not be imported after last year’s sanctions (save for that generating revenue for humanitarian purposes). And the imports of which was already supposed to be capped at a low monetary limit. And so on and so forth.

Of course, as a usual caveat this time couldย be different but whether or not this decision will be enforced, and how strictly, remains to be seen, to put it mildly. China has other concerns in its relationship with the Korean peninsula and North Korea than signalling its commitment to the international community. Moreover, as I have written before,ย there are many factors that impact Chinese imports of North Korean coal than central government decisions. Domestic demand is one, and hasย probably played a greater role than diplomatic considerations over the past few years.

Other than the missile launch, one could suspect this is also a signal against the killing of Kim Jong-nam, who livedย under Chinese protection.


China’s commerce ministry said Saturday it will suspend the import of North Korean coal, apparently in response to the latest provocations made by Pyongyang.

Beijing’s Ministry of Commerce said the decision, which comes into effect on Sunday, is in line with the United Nation’s sanction against North Korea. The suspension will be valid through Dec. 31, the ministry added.

“As coal takes up a significant portion of Pyongyang’s trade with China, the decision is anticipated to have a significant impact on North Korea,” an expert on China said.

Coal is estimated to take up 40 percent of North Korea’s exports to China.

China had banned imports of coal from North Korea in April last year, but had been making exceptions for those intended for household use, which led to criticism over the regulation’s effectiveness.

North Korea fired a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) called the Pukguksong-2 on Sunday from an air base in the country’s northwestern province toward waters off its east coast.

Full article:
China suspends imports of N.Korean coal
Yonhap News

(Updateย 02-19-2017):ย an analysis from Choson Exchange:

When the UN Security Council imposed the cap on coal trade, China was left with the question of how such a cap could be implemented. Would there be an auction system for quotas? Is it able to track forward contracts or does it only know belatedly the level of coal trade after import figures come out? This problem came to the fore last year when the Chinese were unable to meet their commitments regarding the import cap as they wrestled with these problems.

China has generally chosen to ensure adequate flexibility in the wording of UNSC sanctions to give it wiggle room, rather than outright violating those rulings. Allowing a coal cap to pass at the UNSC indicates their willingness to adhere to the ruling. In imposing a ban for 2017, China probably took into account rapidly rising coal prices and a probable rush by companies to frontload sales ahead of the cap to predict that the coal cap would be breached far earlier in the year. Rather than risk a violation of the coal cap limit, China is proactively clamping down on trade.

Domestic concerns might also play a part. China is restricting domestic production of coal. Between domestic producers and North Korean ones, China obviously prefers the former.

Full article:
Why China imposed a ban on North Korean coal imports
Choson Exchange blog


Uptick in North Koreaโ€™s Renewable Energy Production

Thursday, November 17th, 2016

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)

In North Korea, there are now three solar-powered ferries that sail the Taedong River: the Okryu 1, the Okryu 2, and the Okryu 3.

The North Korean governmentโ€™s wire service, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), reported on November 4, 2016: โ€œThe ferries sail between Kim Il Sung Square and the Tower of the Juche Idea, guaranteeing that citizens can travel during the rush hour. . . . These solar powered-ferries provide ferry services both to workers and for guests from home and abroad in the form of tourist and chartered services.โ€

According to KCNA, the three ferries were built at Ryongnam Shipyard, each weigh 45 tons, have a maximum speed of 6 knots, and can take up to 50โ€“60 passengers.

According to Yun Hyok, the captain of Okryu 1, โ€œthe ferry is powered by the energy of sun light . . . the driving system was created with the energy and skill of our engineers. The ship can run for around 8 hours when fully charged.โ€

Since the 1990s, North Korea has expressed determination to achieve energy independence, with Kim Jong Un pointing to resolving electricity difficulties as being a priority back in 2011. Subsequently, in 2013, a law was introduced to encourage research and the production of renewable energy, and at this yearโ€™s Seventh Party Congress it was announced that two hydropower stations had been opened. The importance of energy independence was also emphasized at the congress. It has also been confirmed that North Korea has been pursuing a long-term plan to raise the amount of energy produced from renewable sources to 5 million kW. In order to achieve this target, the plan envisages by 2044 that wind power will provide 15 percent of total energy demand.

This plan was discovered through internal materials on display at the Natural Energy Research Centre, formed in November 2014 as a result of an order issued by Kim Jong Un to develop energy resources that do not pollute the environment.

An overseas visitor to the Natural Energy Research Centre said that โ€œthe Centre in Pyongyang has a diagram of the 30-year plan to develop renewable energy with the title โ€˜The dream and ideal of Natural Energy Science developmentโ€™. . . . The materials there also indicate plans to train specialists in the science of โ€˜natural energyโ€™ development, and plans related to the development and trial sites for wind power, geothermal energy, and solar thermal energy.โ€

Such plans mean that North Korea plans to develop renewable energy, in addition to building hydroelectric power plants and/or using Chinese/Russian power to deal with energy shortages. In other words, they intend to attempt to reduce their consumption of fossil fuels and develop renewable energy. Since Kim Jong Unโ€™s rise to power, a variety of measures have been put in place and investments made to broaden the use of renewable energy.


Electricity and the five year plan

Tuesday, May 17th, 2016

According to Yonhap:

A pro-North Korean newspaper based in Japan said Tuesday that easing electric power shortages will be a prerequisite for North Korea to implement its new five-year plan for economic growth.

Without spelling out details, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un laid out a five-year strategy aimed at boosting the country’s moribund economy at the party congress which concluded its four-day run on May 9.

Kim stressed that resolving the shortage of electric power is critical to carrying out his vision for economic growth, saying that nuclear power generation needs to increase.

The Chosun Sinbo hailed the North’s economic plan, saying that if realized, the move will pave the way to improve the livelihood of people and boost balanced growth.

“North Korea is likely to focus on developing the defense industry…and to make efforts to tweak its advanced technology on the military and space programs to be applied into the improvement of North Koreans’ livelihood,” the newspaper said.

At the party congress, the North’s leader made it clear that he will “permanently” defend the pursuit of his signature policy of developing nuclear weapons in tandem with boosting the country’s moribund economy, commonly known as the “byeongjin” policy.

The newspaper said that the communist country is expected to lay out measures to back up the “dual-track” policy at the party level.

“As Pyongyang raised the issue of power shortages, the country is likely to focus on uses of nuclear power,” said Chang Yong-seok, a researcher at Seoul National University’s Institute for Peace and Unification Studies.

Kim’s vision for economic growth came after the U.N. Security Council slapped its toughest sanctions to date on North Korea for its fourth nuclear test in January and long-range rocket launch the following month.

Analysts said that Kim’s five-year economic development vision is too short on detail, especially when compared with his grandfather Kim Il-sung’s blueprint for economic growth which was unveiled at the party congress held in October 1980.

The North’s founder unveiled the 10-point plan to build a socialist country by setting special targets in economic sectors.

Here is a link to the Choson Sinbo article.

Here is the text:

๊น€์ •์€์กฐ์„ ์˜ ์ง„๋กœ๏ผ๋‹น ์ œ7์ฐจ๋Œ€ํšŒ ๋ณด๊ณ ์—์„œ(2)

2. ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜์œ„์—…์˜ ์™„์„ฑ์„ ์œ„ํ•˜์—ฌ

์ธ๋ฏผ๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ ์œ ์กฑํ•˜๊ณ  ๋ฌธ๋ช…ํ•œ ์ƒํ™œ์„๏ผ์ž๊ฐ•๋ ฅ์— ๊ธฐ์ดˆํ•œ ๋ถ€ํฅ์ „๋žต์˜ ์ถ”์ง„

์กฐ์„ ๋กœ๋™๋‹น์€ ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜์‹œ์ฑ…์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๋ชจ๋“  ์ธ๋ฏผ๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ ์œ ์กฑํ•˜๊ณ  ๋ฌธ๋ช…ํ•œ ์ƒํ™œ์„ ๋ณด์žฅํ•˜๋Š”๊ฒƒ์„ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋กœ ์‚ผ๊ณ ์žˆ๋‹ค.(์กฐ์„ ์ค‘์•™ํ†ต์‹ )
์กฐ์„ ๋กœ๋™๋‹น์€ ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜์‹œ์ฑ…์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๋ชจ๋“  ์ธ๋ฏผ๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ ์œ ์กฑํ•˜๊ณ  ๋ฌธ๋ช…ํ•œ ์ƒํ™œ์„ ๋ณด์žฅํ•˜๋Š”๊ฒƒ์„ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋กœ ์‚ผ๊ณ ์žˆ๋‹ค.(์กฐ์„ ์ค‘์•™ํ†ต์‹ )

๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฐ•๊ตญ์˜ ํ‘œ์ƒ

์กฐ์„ ๋กœ๋™๋‹น ์ œ7์ฐจ๋Œ€ํšŒ๋Š” ์˜จ ์‚ฌํšŒ์˜ ๊น€์ผ์„ฑ-๊น€์ •์ผ์ฃผ์˜ํ™”์˜ ๋ชฉํ‘œ์™€ ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜๊ฐ•๊ตญ๊ฑด์„ค๊ฐ•๋ น์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฐ•๊ตญ๊ฑด์„ค์„ ํ˜„์‹œ๊ธฐ ์กฐ์„ ๋กœ๋™๋‹น๊ณผ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๊ฐ€ ใ€Š์ด๋ ฅ์„ ์ง‘์ค‘ํ•ด์•ผ ํ•  ๊ธฐ๋ณธ์ „์„ ใ€‹์œผ๋กœ ๊ทœ์ •ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค.

์„ธ๊ธฐ์™€ ์„ธ๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์ด์–ด ๋ฒŒ์–ด์ง„ ์กฐ๊ตญ๋ณด์œ„์ „, ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜์ˆ˜ํ˜ธ์ „์—์„œ ์Šน๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ๊ฑฐ๋‘” ์กฐ์„ ์˜ ์ง„๋กœ๋Š” ใ€Š๊ฐœํ˜ใ€‹, ใ€Š๊ฐœ๋ฐฉใ€‹์˜ ๊ธฐ๋ฐœ์„ ๋“ค๊ณ  ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ฅผ ์ถ”์ผœ์„ธ์šด ๋‚˜๋ผ๋“ค์ด ๊ฑท๋˜ ๊ธธ๊ณผ๋Š” ๋‹ค๋ฅด๋‹ค. ์กฐ์„ ์˜ ์ ๋Œ€๊ตญ๋“ค์€ ์ œ์žฌ, ๋ด‰์‡„์˜ ํ•ด์ œ์™€ ์™ธ๊ตญ์ž๋ณธ์˜ ๋ฅ˜์ž…์ด ์—†์ด๋Š” ์กฐ์„ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์˜ ํšŒ์ƒ์€ ๋ถˆ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•˜๋‹ค๋ฉฐ ๋ณ‘์ง„๋กœ์„ ์˜ ํฌ๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ•์š”ํ•˜๊ณ ์žˆ์ง€๋งŒ ํ˜๋Ÿฌ๊ฐ„ ์„ธ์›”์„ ์ž๋ž‘์ฐจ๊ฒŒ ์ดํ™”ํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ณ ๊ท€ํ•œ ํฌ์ƒ์šฐ์— ์ด๋ฃฉํ•œ ์Šน๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ์ž๋ถ€ํ•˜๋Š” ๋‹น๊ณผ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๊ฐ€ ์ด์ œ์™€์„œ ๋ถ€๋‹นํ•œ ์••๋ ฅ์— ๊ตด๋ณตํ•˜์—ฌ ํƒ€ํ˜‘๊ณผ ์ข…์†์˜ ๊ธธ์„ ํƒํ•˜๋ฆฌ๋ผ๊ณ  ์ƒ๊ฐํ•˜๋Š”๊ฒƒ์€ ์–ด๋ฆฌ์„๋‹ค.

๋‹น ์ œ7์ฐจ๋Œ€ํšŒ ๋ณด๊ณ ๋Š” ์กฐ์„ ์ด ๊ฑด์„คํ•˜๋ ค๊ณ  ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฐ•๊ตญ์˜ ํ‘œ์ƒ์„ ๋ฐํ˜”๋‹ค. ๊ทธ ํ•˜๋‚˜๋Š” ใ€Š์ž๋ฆฝ๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฐ•๊ตญใ€‹์ด๋‹ค. ๋‹ค์‹œ๋งํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ตญ๋ฐฉ๊ฑด์„ค๊ณผ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฑด์„ค, ์ธ๋ฏผ์ƒํ™œ์— ํ•„์š”ํ•œ ๋ฌผ์งˆ์ ์ˆ˜๋‹จ๋“ค์„ ์ž์ฒด๋กœ ์ƒ์‚ฐ๋ณด์žฅํ•˜๋Š” ๋‚˜๋ผ, ์ธ๋ฏผ์˜ ์ž์ฃผ์ •์‹ ๊ณผ ์ฐฝ์กฐ์ •์‹ , ๊ณผํ•™๊ธฐ์ˆ ์˜ ์œ„๋ ฅ์œผ๋กœ ์ „์ง„ํ•˜๊ณ  ๋ฐœ์ „ํ•˜๋Š” ๋‚˜๋ผ๋‹ค.

์˜ค๋Š˜ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ๋ฏฟ์„๊ฒƒ์€ ์˜ค์ง ์ž๊ธฐ ํž˜๋ฐ–์— ์—†๋‹ค, ๋ˆ„๊ตฌ๋„ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ๋„์™€์ฃผ๋ ค๊ณ  ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์œผ๋ฉฐ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ ๋‚˜๋ผ๊ฐ€ ํ†ต์ผ๋˜๊ณ  ๊ฐ•๋Œ€ํ•ด์ง€๋ฉฐ ์ž˜์‚ด๊ณ  ํฅํ•˜๋Š”๊ฒƒ์„ ๋ฐ”๋ผ์ง€ ์•Š๋Š”๋‹คโ€ฆ ๋‹น๋Œ€ํšŒ ๋ณด๊ณ ์˜ ๊ตฌ์ ˆ์ด๋‹ค. ์—ฌ๊ธฐ์—๋Š” ํ˜„ ๊ตญ์ œ์ •์„ธ์™€ ์„ธ๊ณ„๊ฒฝ์ œ์งˆ์„œ์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋žญ์ •ํ•œ ๋ถ„์„๊ณผ ํŒ๋‹จ์ด ๊น”๋ ค์žˆ๋‹ค.

์กฐ์„ ์˜ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฑด์„คํ˜„์žฅ์— ํœ˜๋‚ ๋ฆฌ๋Š”๊ฒƒ์€ ์ž๊ฐ•๋ ฅ์ œ์ผ์ฃผ์˜์˜ ๊ธฐ๋ฐœ์ด๋‹ค. ๋‹น๋Œ€ํšŒ ๋ณด๊ณ ๋Š” ์ž์ฒด์˜ ํž˜๊ณผ ๊ธฐ์ˆ , ์ž์›์— ์˜๊ฑฐํ•˜์—ฌ ์ž๊ธฐ ๋ ฅ๋Ÿ‰์„ ๊ฐ•ํ™”ํ•˜๊ณ  ์•ž๊ธธ์„ ๊ฐœ์ฒ™ํ•ด๋‚˜๊ฐ„๋‹ค๋Š” ์ฃผ์ฒด์ ๊ด€์ ์—์„œ ๋ชจ๋“  ๋ฌธ์ œ๋ฅผ ํ’€์–ด๋‚˜๊ฐˆ๊ฒƒ์„ ๊ฐ•์กฐํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค.

๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฑด์„ค์—์„œ ์‚ฌ๋Œ€์™€ ์™ธ์„ธ์˜์กด์„ ๋ฐฐ๊ฒฉํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋˜๋Š”๊ฒƒ์€ ์กฐ์„ ์˜ ์ง€ํ–ฅ์ด ์ผ๋ฐ˜์ ์ธ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ถ€ํฅ์ด ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฐ•๊ตญ์˜ ๊ฑด์„ค์— ์žˆ๋‹ค๋Š”๊ฒƒ๊ณผ๋„ ๊ด€๋ จ๋œ๋‹ค. ์กฐ์„ ์€ ๊ตญ๋‚ด์ด์ƒ์‚ฐ์ด๋‚˜ ๊ตญ๋ฏผ์†Œ๋“์˜ ์ˆ˜์น˜๋งŒ์„ ๋†’์ด๋Š”๋ฐ ์น˜์šฐ์น ๊ฒƒ์ด ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜์‹œ์ฑ…์— ๋”ฐ๋ผ ๋ชจ๋“  ์ธ๋ฏผ๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ ์œ ์กฑํ•˜๊ณ  ๋ฌธ๋ช…ํ•œ ์ƒํ™œ์„ ๋ณด์žฅํ•˜๋Š”๊ฒƒ์„ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋กœ ์‚ผ๊ณ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ธ๋ฏผ์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ์ธ๋ฏผ์˜ ๋‚˜๋ผ, ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฐ•๊ตญ์˜ ๊ฑด์„ค์€ ์ž๋ณธ์ฃผ์˜๋ฐฉ์‹์œผ๋กœ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ฅผ ๋ฐœ์ „์‹œ์ผœ์˜จ ๋‚˜๋ผ๋“ค์˜ ใ€Š์„ ์˜ใ€‹๋‚˜ ใ€Š์›์กฐใ€‹๋”ฐ์œ„๋Š” ์• ๋‹น์ดˆ ๊ธฐ๋Œ€ํ•˜์ง€ ๋ง์•„์•ผ ํ•  ์ „์ธ๋ฏธ๋‹ต์˜ ๊ธธ์ด๋‹ค.

5๊ฐœ๋…„์ „๋žต์˜ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰

๋‹น ์ œ7์ฐจ๋Œ€ํšŒ๋Š” 2016๋…„๋ถ€ํ„ฐ 2020๋…„๊นŒ์ง€์˜ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ฐœ์ „ 5๊ฐœ๋…„์ „๋žต์„ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰ํ• ๋ฐ ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ณผ์—…์„ ์ œ์‹œํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค.

์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜๊ณ„ํš๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฐ€ ์‹ค์‹œ๋˜๋Š” ์กฐ์„ ์—์„œ๋Š” ๊ณผ๊ฑฐ์— ใ€Š5๊ฐœ๋…„๊ณ„ํšใ€‹, ใ€Š7๊ฐœ๋…„๊ณ„ํšใ€‹๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ์ „๋ง๊ณ„ํš์ด ์ˆ˜๋ฆฝ, ์‹คํ–‰๋˜์˜€๋Š”๋ฐ 1990๋…„๋Œ€ ์ดํ›„๋Š” ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฐ€ ๋‚œ๊ด€์— ์ฒ˜ํ•˜์—ฌ ์ „๋ง๊ณ„ํš์„ ์„ธ์šธ ํ˜•ํŽธ์ด ๋˜์ง€ ์•Š์•˜๋‹ค. ์ด๋ฒˆ์— ๋‹จ๋…„๋„๊ฐ€ ์•„๋‹Œ 5๋…„๊ฐ„์˜ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๊ฐ€ ใ€Š๊ตญ๊ฐ€๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ฐœ์ „์ „๋žตใ€‹์œผ๋กœ ์ •๋ฆฝ๋˜๊ณ  ๋‹น๋Œ€ํšŒ ๋ณด๊ณ ๊ฐ€ ๊ทธ ์ˆ˜ํ–‰๋ฌธ์ œ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ•์กฐํ•œ๊ฒƒ์€ ์กฐ์„ ์˜ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฐ€ ๋ณธ์—ฐ์˜ ์ฒด๊ณ„๋ฅผ ๊ฐ–์ถ”์–ด๋‚˜๊ฐ€๊ณ ์žˆ์Œ์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ฃผ๋Š” ์ง•ํ‘œ๋‹ค.

๊ตญ๊ฐ€๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ฐœ์ „5๊ฐœ๋…„์ „๋žต์˜ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋Š” ์ธ๋ฏผ๊ฒฝ์ œ์ „๋ฐ˜์„ ํ™œ์„ฑํ™”ํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ถ€๋ฌธ์‚ฌ์ด์˜ ๊ท ํ˜•์„ ๋ณด์žฅํ•˜์—ฌ ๋‚˜๋ผ์˜ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ฅผ ์ง€์†์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ฐœ์ „์‹œํ‚ฌ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ํ† ๋Œ€๋ฅผ ๋งˆ๋ จํ•˜๋Š”๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค. ์ด ์ „๋žต์ˆ˜ํ–‰์˜ ์„ ๊ฒฐ์กฐ๊ฑด์ด ๋ฐ”๋กœ ์ „๋ ฅ๋ฌธ์ œ์˜ ํ•ด๊ฒฐ์ด๋ฉฐ ๋‹น๋Œ€ํšŒ ๋ณด๊ณ ๋Š” ์›์ž๋ ฅ๋ฐœ์ „์˜ ์ถ”์ง„ ๋“ฑ ์ผ๋ จ์˜ ๋ฐฉ๋„๋“ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด์„œ๋„ ์–ธ๊ธ‰ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค.

์กฐ์„ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ฅผ ๋‘˜๋Ÿฌ์‹ผ ํ™˜๊ฒฝ์€ ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜์‹œ์žฅ์ด ์กด์žฌํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ทธ๋ฅผ ์ „์ œ๋กœ ํ•˜์—ฌ ๋‹ค๋…„๋„์— ๊ฑธ์นœ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ฐœ์ „๊ณ„ํš์ด ์ˆ˜๋ฆฝ, ์‹คํ–‰๋˜๋˜ 1980๋…„๋Œ€ ์ด์ „์‹œ๊ธฐ์™€ ๋‹ค๋ฅด๋‹ค. ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ถ€ํฅ์˜ ์ถœ๋กœ๋Š” ์™ธ๋ถ€๊ฐ€ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ๋‚ด๋ถ€์—์„œ ์ฐพ์•„์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋‹น๋Œ€ํšŒ ๋ณด๊ณ ๋Š” ๊ณผํ•™๊ธฐ์ˆ ์„ ์‚ฌํšŒ๋ฐœ์ „์˜ ์ถ”๋™๋ ฅ์œผ๋กœ ์‚ผ์„๋ฐ ๋Œ€ํ•˜์—ฌ ์ง€์ ํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ณผํ•™์ž๋“ค์ด ๋‚จ๋“ค์ด ๊ฑธ์€ ๊ธธ์„ ๋”ฐ๋ผ๋งŒ ๊ฐˆ๊ฒƒ์ด ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ ๋ฏผ์กฑ์ ์ž์กด์‹ฌ์„ ํญ๋ฐœ์‹œ์ผœ ๋…„๋Œ€์™€ ๋…„๋Œ€๋ฅผ ๋›ฐ์—ฌ๋„˜์œผ๋ฉฐ ๋น„์•ฝํ• ๊ฒƒ์„ ํ˜ธ์†Œํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค.

ํ•œํŽธ ๋‹น๋Œ€ํšŒ ๋ณด๊ณ ๋Š” ๋ฌด์—ญ๊ตฌ์กฐ์˜ ๊ฐœ์„ , ๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ๊ตฌ๋“ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ํˆฌ์ž์กฐ๊ฑด๋ณด์žฅ ๋“ฑ ๋Œ€์™ธ๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ด€๊ณ„๋ฅผ ํ™•๋Œ€๋ฐœ์ „์‹œํ‚ฌ๋ฐ ๋Œ€ํ•ด์„œ๋„ ๊ฐ•์กฐํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ž๊ฐ•๋ ฅ์ œ์ผ์ฃผ์˜๋Š” ใ€ŠํŽ˜์‡„๊ฒฝ์ œใ€‹์™€ ๋ฌด๊ด€ํ•˜๋‹ค. ์„ธ๊ณ„ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ ๋‚˜๋ผ๋“ค๊ณผ์˜ ๊ต๋ฅ˜, ํ˜‘๋ ฅ์˜ ์ถ”์ง„์€ ์กฐ์„ ์˜ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ถ€ํฅ์ „๋žต์—์„œ ๋ณ€ํ•จ์—†๋Š” ๊ธฐ๋‘ฅ์˜ ํ•˜๋‚˜๋‹ค.

๋ณ‘์ง„๋กœ์„ ์˜ ์‹คํšจ์„ฑ

์กฐ์„ ์˜ ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜๊ฒฝ์ œ๋Š” ์‹œ๋Œ€์˜ ์š”๊ตฌ์™€ ์ธ๋ฏผ์˜ ๋ฆฌ์ต์„ ๋ฐ˜์˜ํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ถ€๋‹จํžˆ ๋ณ€ํ™”๋ฐœ์ „ํ•˜๊ณ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ง€๋‚œ ์„ธ๊ธฐ ๋งˆ์ง€๋ง‰๋…„๋Œ€์— ์ง๋ฉดํ•œ ์ตœ์•…์˜ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์ ์‹œ๋ จ์„ ๊ทน๋ณตํ•œ ๋‹ค์Œ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๋‚˜๋ผ์˜ ๊ฒฝ์ œ์‚ฌ๋ น๋ถ€์ธ ๋‚ด๊ฐ์˜ ์—ญํ• ์ด ๋” ๊ฐ•์กฐ๋˜๊ณ  ๋‚ด๊ฐ์ฑ…์ž„์ œ, ๋‚ด๊ฐ์ค‘์‹ฌ์ œ์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅด๋Š” ๊ฒฝ์ œ์ž‘์ „, ์ง€ํœ˜์˜ ์งˆ์„œ๊ฐ€ ์„ธ์›Œ์กŒ๋‹ค. ์ƒˆ ์„ธ๊ธฐ์— ๋“ค์–ด์„œ์„œ๋Š” ใ€Š์šฐ๋ฆฌ์‹ ๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ด€๋ฆฌ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•ใ€‹์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ํƒ๊ตฌ์™€ ์‹ค์ฒœ์ด ์ƒˆ ์ฐจ์›์—์„œ ์ด๋ฃจ์–ด์ง€๊ณ  ์ตœ๊ทผ๋…„๊ฐ„์€ ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜๊ธฐ์—…์ฑ…์ž„๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ œ๊ฐ€ ์‹ค์‹œ๋˜์—ฌ ์€์„ ๋‚ด๊ณ ์žˆ๋‹ค.

๋‹น์ค‘์•™์œ„์›ํšŒ ์ œ7๊ธฐ ์ œ1์ฐจ ์ „์›ํšŒ์˜์—์„œ๋Š” ๊ฒฝ์ œ์‚ฌ๋ น๋ถ€์˜ ์ฑ…์ž„์ž์ธ ๋‚ด๊ฐ์ด๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ๋‹น์ค‘์•™์œ„์›ํšŒ ์ •์น˜๊ตญ ์ƒ๋ฌด์œ„์›(5๋ช…)๊ณผ ๋‹น์ค‘์•™๊ตฐ์‚ฌ์œ„์›ํšŒ ์œ„์›(11๋ช…)์œผ๋กœ ์„ ๊ฑฐ๋˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๊ฒฝ์ œ๊ฑด์„ค๊ณผ ํ•ต๋ฌด๋ ฅ๊ฑด์„ค์˜ ๋ณ‘์ง„๋กœ์„ ์„ ์ฒ ์ €ํžˆ ๊ด€์ฒ ํ•˜์—ฌ ๊ทธ ์‹คํšจ์„ฑ์„ ๋”์šฑ ๋†’์ด๋Š” ๋Œ€์ฑ…๋“ค์ด ๋‹น์ ์ฐจ์›์—์„œ ์ด๋ฃจ์–ด์ ธ๋‚˜๊ฐˆ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค.

๊ตญ๋ฐฉ๊ณต์—…์„ ์šฐ์„ ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ฐœ์ „์‹œํ‚ค๋ฉด์„œ ๊ฒฝ๊ณต์—…๊ณผ ๋†์—…์„ ๋™์‹œ์— ๋ฐœ์ „์‹œํ‚ค๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋„, ๊ตฐ์‚ฌ์™€ ์šฐ์ฃผ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ๋ถ€๋ฌธ ๋“ฑ์˜ ์ตœ์ฒจ๋‹จ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์„ ๋ฏผ์ƒ๊ธฐ์ˆ ๋กœ ์ „์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ์ธ๋ฏผ์ƒํ™œํ–ฅ์ƒ์œผ๋กœ ์ด์–ด๊ฐ€๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•๋ก  ๋“ฑ ์กฐ์„ ์˜ ๊ตญ๋ ฅ์— ๊ฑธ๋งž๋Š” ๊ฒฝ์ œ์ •์ฑ…์ด ๊ตฌ์ฒดํ™”๋ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋ณด์ธ๋‹ค. ์กฐ์„ ์‹ ์‚ฌํšŒ์ฃผ์˜๊ฒฝ์ œ์˜ ์ง„๋ฉด๋ชจ๋Š” ์•ž์œผ๋กœ ๋‹น๋Œ€ํšŒ์—์„œ ์–ธ๊ธ‰๋œ ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๊ฒฝ์ œ๋ฐœ์ „5๊ฐœ๋…„์ „๋žต์ด ์ˆ˜ํ–‰๋˜๋Š” ๊ณผ์ •์— ๋ณด๋‹ค ๋šœ๋ ท์ด ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋‹ค.

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