Haeju receives South Korean broadcasts

February 22nd, 2008

How pervasive is the flow of outside information in North Korea?  Typically stories in the media answer this question as though geography is the determinate variable: Cities near the Chinese border are the most influenced by heterodox ideas (since cell phones, clear television signals, and smuggling have been commonplace for years), and cities in the south (along the DMZ) are the most isolated (aside from Kaesong).  North Korea’s internal travel restrictions prevent foreign ideas from spreading.  This view was recently repeated by Andrei Lankov.

“The Kaesong exception” is thought to be correlated to the growth of the the Kaesong Industrial Zone.  The theory goes that the thousands of North Koreans who are employed in Kaesong (who work in South Korean facilities for South Korean managers) pick up bits of outside information at the margin and share it with their friends and family back home.  It is not an unreasonable theory.   

A new story in the Daily NK, however, presents evidence which points to ideological contamination on a nationwide scale (irrespective of geography).  The story claims that the city of Haeju is not only thoroughly exposed to South Korean radio and television – it is a production hub of a pirate video market:

“We can receive the TV broadcast of KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) and SBS (Seoul Broadcasting System) fine in Haeju. Sometimes, we can watch MBC (Moonhwa Broadcasting Corporation) as well. I watched Dae Jo Yong (a popular TV drama from KBS) on TV. However, I wanted to watch it again, so I bought a CD and watched it several more time.” He said, “We can get copies of South Korean TV programs from China. However, a great number of copies are also produced in Haeju.”

In a nod to communist efficiency, the subject interviewed in the Daily NK story even claims that in Haeju it is easier to pick up South Korean television signals than those from North Korea! 

With a “manufacturing” facility in Haeju, black market DVDs or VCDs can be copied and distributed throughout the south east even if security is tighter along the Chinese border.  Additionally, these DVDs/VCDs would be cheaper and more widely distributed because they are produced locally (as opposed to using Chinese labor/capital) and will require fewer middlemen to get them across the border and into the hands of consumers.  If this has been going on for some time, then it is safe to assume that most urban centers from Haeju to Pyongyang have regular access to South Korean media! 

Of course a decline in acceptance of the state ideology means the government must rely on external controls (rather than an individual’s self-control) to maintain the system.  The good news is that external controls can be avoided through technolgy, corruption, or both: 

“In the border areas with China and South Korea such as Hwanghae and Kangwon Province, the North Korean authorities try to prevent people from watching S. Korean TV by soldering and pre-tuning TV sets to Chonsun (North Korea) Central TV. Lately, the authorities also attempt to restrict the usage of remote control by covering the sensor with silver paper.

However, North Korean people circumvent the regulation. Instead of giving away their remote control to the authorities, they purchase an extra and watch the TV as they please after removing the silver paper. After all, the authorities’ efforts to control TV channels turn out to be futile for those who have remote control TV sets.

The full article can be found here:
North Korean People Copy South Korean TV Drama for Trade
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
2/22/2008

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Posted in Black markets, Civil society, Communications, Economic reform, Film, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Television | 4 Comments »

DPRK anti-corruption drive: purge, policy change, or both?

February 21st, 2008

A little over a week ago, the North Korean government announced an anti-corruption campaign in two agencies: the United Front Department and the National Economic Cooperation Council. 

As I said then, these sorts of campaigns have nothing to do with making the bureaucracy more accountable or responsive to public demands, but are political maneuvers to prevent “rents” or funds from being channeled to uses that lie outside the leadership’s control (or some faction of the leadership).  In other words, they are regime enhancing (like a purge).

Today, the Daily NK offers a scenario whereby this anti-corruption drive might be a necessary precondition for a drastic policy change: 

The fact that the Guidance Department is involved in the current investigation may be a sign that Kim Jong Il is trying to rebuild the party so that he can change the focus of policy from the military to economic matters. Kim Jong Il has already created a militarily powerful country by acquiring nuclear weapons. Now he wishes to improve other areas.

Within the context of the anti-corruption campaign, today’s Daily NK does a wonderful job identifying the specific agencies involved in reorganizing the DPRK’s levers of power:

The Defense Security Command of the [Korean] People’s Army and the National Security Agency are also launching inspections, but these kinds of inspection are limited. A Defense Security Command investigation can inspect military organizations, local party organizations and individual cadres, but it cannot investigate party branches in the capital and the National Security Agency. At the same time, the National Security Agency’s investigators cannot access the party organizations in Pyongyang, the military and the Defense Security Command.

However, the Guidance Department’s inspection can examine every organization including party organizations in Pyongyang, the Defense Security Command, and the National Security Agency. [A Guidance Department investigation requires Kim Jong Il’s direct authorization. It is often said that if one is the target of such an investigation, one stands little chance of reprieve.]

There are only two known examples of a Guidance Department-led investigation in North Korean history. The first was the investigation of the National Security Agency in February, 1984. […] The second case occurred in 1997 and was known as the Shimhwajo case, resulting in the hushed-up removal of many of Kim Il Sung’s close associates. This inspection was approved by Kim Jong Il and was operated by Jang Sung Taek, Kim’s brother-in-law and the First Vice-Director of the Guidance Department. Through the investigation, thousands of high officials who followed Kim Il Sung were punished, expelled, secretly executed, or sent to prison camps.

To read about another similar change in the balance of power in the DPRK, read the rest of the story here:
Inside the North Korean Shake-up
Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
2/21/2008

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Posted in Inter-Korean summit, Organization and Guidance Department, Political economy | 2 Comments »

“Special provisions are not necessary. Just do not regulate the markets”

February 21st, 2008

market.jpgAt its height, North Korea’s socialist infrastructure was responsible for the vast majority of the people’s standard of living.  Ration coupons and large purchases (such as for a car or refrigerator) were all provided through one’s employer.  This is because society was vertically integrated, with state-owned companies and ministries providing a broad array of social services that are handled by a variety of agents in a capitalist society (food, housing, education, childcare, health care etc..). There was little room for markets, or even prices, in people’s lives.

Although this system only worked for North Koreans in large urban areas, and excluded those in smaller villages and the country side who were much more dependent on themselves, for the vast majority of North Koreans today that system (or social contract) is a distant memory.  Out of fiscal necessity it has been chiseled away over the years, and as a result the scope for individual entrepreneurship in both the public and private spheres is increasing.  I do not want to give the impression that capitalism is running wild, but when compared to the past, the control of the North Korean state over the lives of its people is diminished.

One practice which has been retained to some degree, however, is the distribution of gifts or special provisions on the birthdays of the two leaders, Kim il Sung and Kim Jong il.  The scale of one’s gift, however, allegedly depends on one’s rank in society.  A common farmer might get a new pair of socks.  A senior Worker’s Party official probably receives a good deal more.  One estimate puts the value of these special gifts at USD$20m. 

The origins of these gifts are mixed.  Some are donated by foreigners.  Some are imported by the leadership.  Others are made domestically by the people themselves.

According to a story in today’s Daily NK, creeping marketization – bringing with it an increase in price and quality discrimination,  has left many North Korean consumers less than impressed with this year’s gift offerings:

A North Korean source in Shinuiju said in a phone conversation on the 17th, “When looking at the goods provided this time around, the quality has gone up as a whole in contrast to the past. However, the citizens did not attach too much significance to the ‘Great General’s gift’ as in the past.”

The source relayed the public sentiment as “Goods more valuable than his gifts are all over the place in the jangmadang. A portion of the people has said, ‘Special provisions are not necessary. Just do not regulate the markets.'”

In Shinuiju, a bottle of luxury liquor, 2kg of tangerine, and two pheasants were provided to the party organization through the “special provision’ and a bottle of liquor and a modest amount of fruits such as apples and tangerines were given to regular organizations. The People’s Units received a bottle of liquor, a toothbrush, and a bar of soap and pre-school and elementary school students received five pieces of gum, two rice crackers, two packs of chips, and one pack of candy.

The source added, “Those receiving the ‘title of hero’ and the Secretaries in charge of the county parties were given boxes marked with the label ‘gift,’ but its contents are uncertain.”

Another source in Hoiryeong in a phone conversation on this day said, “A bottle of liquor, a bar of soap, and a bottle of toothpaste were provided through the February 16th holiday provision and the children received a pack of candy, two packs of chips, a pack of pea candy, two packs of rice crackers, and seven pieces of gum.”

He also expressed discontent, saying, “It is pitiful to have to wait in line in front of the stores through which provisions are handed out for a mere bottle of liquor and soap.”

In the Hyesan, Yangkang Province region, laborers working at state enterprises were given 3kg of Annam rice (wild rice) and a bottle of liquor and oil were given to average households.

North Korea, in time for Kim Jong Il’s birthday in 2007, provided around 10 food items and daily necessities, including liquor and beer, cider and rice tally, oil, chips, and gum, to civilians.

In 2007, 200g of chips, 200g of candy, 100g of rice snacks, and five pieces of gum were given to elementary school students. Due to the shortage in foreign currency, special provisions were not offered to average civilians.

A caveat to this story is that all of the data points are from the large cities on the Chinese border.  These cities have benefited the most from trade with China and in all likelihood are the most “ideologically contaminated” in the DPRK.  

Source:
Jangmadang Goods Are More Valuable Than the General’s Gifts
Daily NK
Choi Choel Hee
2/21/2008

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Posted in Alcohol, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Light Industry, Manufacturing, Political economy, Price liberalization | 2 Comments »

PBS Will Broadcast Concert From North Korea

February 19th, 2008

Update: Today the New York Times reports that the North Korean government has agreed to broadcast the New York Philharmonic’s Pyongyang concert live on state television.  Why is this interesting? First of all, this means that the US national anthem, and many other beautiful songs, will be played over North Korea’s airwaves–probably for the first time.  Secondly, communist countries are typically very hesitant to broadcast anything live. 

easttheater.JPGThe concert will take place in Pyongyang’s East Theater, located in the Munsu district on the east side of the city.

One thing is for sure, Politics aside, the performance will certainly be more interesting than the concert South Korea’s Shinhwa and Baby V.O.X. put on in Pyongyang! 

Original Post: 2/7/2008 
Today the New York Times (link requires free registration) ran a story on who will be broadcasting the New York Philharmonic’s concert in Pyongyang…

The New York Philharmonic’s concert in North Korea on Feb. 26 will be broadcast that evening on [New York’s local PBS station] WNET, Channel 13, and distributed two days later on PBS, broadcast officials said Wednesday.

In an unusual arrangement, ABC News will cooperate with WNET, New York’s public television station, to produce the broadcast.

Because of the time difference, the concert will actually take place before dawn New York time on Feb. 26. A live broadcast will be made available for any takers by EuroArts Music International, which produces and distributes classical music programming and has the rights to the broadcast outside South Korea.

The most interesting part of the story, however:

One place where the broadcast is still uncertain is North Korea itself. Government officials there have not said whether the concert will be shown on local television, according to Eric Latzky, the Philharmonic’s spokesman.

Given North Korea’s deep isolation and the government’s tight control over its citizens, the broadcast issue is of crucial interest. Orchestra officials said they had pressed hard to have the concert shown on North Korean television, to ensure that it would be heard by more than just a small audience of dignitaries. The broadcast of any event from North Korea is rare.

You can read the stories here:
Concert in North Korea to Be Broadcast Live
New York Times
Daniel Watkin
2/19/2008

PBS Will Broadcast Concert From North Korea
New York Times
Daniel Wakin
2/7/2008

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Posted in Art, Civil society, Music, Political economy, USA | 2 Comments »

More on the DPRK-Orascom deal…

February 18th, 2008

Since Orascom announced at the end of January that it was going into the cell phone business in the DPRK, there has been a lot of follow up reporting which has flushed out a broader picture of the DPRK’s attempts to launch a mobile phone network.

Today Yonhap is reporting that Pyongyang will likely go live with the Orascom project in April, although on a piecemeal schedule:

The measure will affect only Pyongyang, the North’s capital, this time and gradually expand to cover other major cities in the communist country, the Tokyo Shimbun said, quoting an unnamed North Korean official in Beijing.

North Korea has prohibited its people from using mobile phones since a deadly explosion occurred at the Ryongchon train station near the North’s border with China in April 2004. Debris of a mobile phone with adhesive tape attached to it was reportedly found at the scene of explosion, leading the authorities to impose the sudden ban in the belief that the mobile phone could have been used as a detonator.

More details of the deal also emerged:

Cheo [an Orascom subsidiary] secured a 25-year license and will invest up to US$400 million in network infrastructure. The North Korean state company owns a 25 percent stake in Cheo, Orascom said.

How accessible will the  new phones be?

Choi Yeong-cheol, 43, who defected from North Korea in 2006, said that senior party and administrative officials as well as trade workers were given mobile phones for free in 2002. “But ordinary people have not even dreamed of using a mobile phone because it cost them 170,000 North Korean won,” Choi told Daily NK, a Seoul-based Internet newspaper. The figure of 170,000 won is big money considering the average monthly payment for ordinary North Korean workers is up to 3,000 won (US$1) now.

The full article can be found here:
N.K. to lift mobile phone ban in April: Japanese daily
Yonhap
2/18/2008

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Posted in Cell phones, Communications, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Joint Ventures | Comments Closed

DPRK tries to increase “taxes” on bus (coach) market

February 18th, 2008

bus.jpgDuring the late 1990s, North Korea suffered a terrible economic collapse which resulted in famine and massive social dislocation.  During this time, most ministries and state-owned companies  were cash-strapped and unable to maintain their operations.  Out of desperation they turned to private investment for much needed revenues by outsourcing many basic services. (Individuals who were capable of taking up such opportunities were probably small in number at the time, but apparently now compose a healthy sub-section of the population.)

Outsourcing has benefited both the government and private entrepreneurs.  Outsourcing allows state-owned companies to receive capital financing from private individuals as well as a share of joint-venture revenues (tax revenues).  Private entrepreneurs need a legal business environment where they know they will not be subject to ex-post expropriation of profits.  Leasing the name of a government body gives them some of this legal cover.  This system is no doubt tolerated because it allows the government create space for entrepreneurship (and tax revenue) within the existing state structure while still maintaining de jure control of the means of production.   

According to the story in the Daily NK, the regulations for establishing a legitimate passenger bus company under this system (or “coach” company for readers in Her Majesty’s Commonwealth) are fairly strict.  Once an individual acquires a bus (appx US$6,000-10,000), he has to register it with the government body for whom he is working.  Revenues are then split 70/30 (the government taking 30%) for three years, after which the individual is required to “donate” the privately acquired bus to the state-owned enterprise.  This policy literally gives North Korean entrepreneurs just three years to recoup their investments!

The response of the North Korean business community was predictable:  investors sell the buses before the three years are up or they forge registration papers.  This is not hard to do in the DPRK.  In fact if you have just one other associate who owns a bus in similar condition, all you need to do is trade with him every three years and re-register the new vehicle. 

Word of this game has finally reached the top and they have responded by increasing their share to 70% of passenger bus revenues–leaving just 30% for the purchaser of the vehicle.  It is unclear from the story if investors are still required to “donate” their busses after three years, but realizing that the confiscation of buses was not enforceable, the North Korean government probably just opted for a larger share of the revenue over time.

The good news is that it is not likely that many people pay 70% of revenues either.  After-all, someone has to collect these taxes and he has needs too.  Sounds like some kind of arrangement could be reached…

You can read the full story here:
North Korea Regulates Operation of “Service Car”
Daily NK
2/18/2008

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Posted in Automobiles, Black markets, Civil society, Economic reform, Price liberalization, Private property, Transportation | Comments Closed

The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated..

February 17th, 2008

Update:
It seems opposition efforts to spare the South Korean Ministry of Unification were not entirely successful. Yonhap is reporting that even though the ministry will retain its name, much of the rest of it is on the chopping block.

Sources said that if the ministry is retained, its five divisions and one office may be reduced to a single office and three bureaus, with part of its work transferred to the other ministries.

The ministry’s five division headquarters — including unification policy, economic cooperation and cultural exchange — are likely to be reorganized into smaller bureaus, with public relations and information analysis to come under the direct control of the minister.

The office in charge of the Kaesong industrial complex may be turned over to the newly created Ministry of Knowledge-based Economy.

However, the ministry may retain control of inter-Korean dialogue headquarters, the inter-Korean transit office, and a settlement support team for people who have fled North Korea.  (Yonhap)

Although I personally favor an engagement policy with the DPRK, sending the signal that MoU standard practices will no longer be tolerated might actually encourage the DPRK to use donated funds and supplies in an acceptible way.  Remember: carrots AND sticks.  See the game theory here.  However, since the DPRK’s new game seems to play the US, China, Russia, and South Korea off of each other, some are concerned that pushing the DPRK too hard on accoutability and transparency in managing their donations might simply shift North Korea more firmly into China’s corner–which according to Lankov, they already have a strong incentive to do… 

Original Post: 2/8/2008
In the political shake up following the recent South Korean elections, incoming President Lee Myung-bak floated the idea of merging the Ministry of Unification (responsible for the North Korea protfolio) with the South Korean Foreign Ministry.  The story is here.

Today, Reuters is reporting that the Unification Ministry is here to stay.  Afterall, the first rule of bureaucracy is, “Why have one ministry when you can have two at twice the cost!” 

South Korean lawmakers have agreed to spare the ministry responsible for relations with North Korea and reject a call for its closure made by the president-elect, local media reported on Saturday.

The compromise allows the Unification Ministry to stay while lawmakers try to strike a deal to shut other ministries in a plan backed by Lee to streamline government, local media reported lawmakers as saying.

Critics say Lee’s proposal to close the ministry primarily responsible for relations with North Korea could send the wrong signal to Pyongyang, which has long accused Lee’s conservative party of plotting to keep the peninsula divided.

The Unification Ministry has been at the centre of criticism that the outgoing government had been too soft on the impoverished North, pouring aid across the border despite internationally condemned missile and nuclear tests. (Reuters)

The full article can be found here:
South Korea to keep ministry on North: media
Reuters
Rhee So-eui
2/8/2008

New gov’t to downsize Unification Ministry
Yonhap
2/17/2008

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Posted in Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Inter-Korean summit, Joint Ventures, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Political economy, RoK Ministry of Unification, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | 1 Comment »

“Crossing the Line” now out on DVD

February 16th, 2008

crossing.jpgThe third film by Dan Gordon and Nick Bonner is now out on DVD.  

The film’s official web site is here.

Order the film on Amazon.com here.

Nick and Dan, what’s next?

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Posted in Civil society, Film | 2 Comments »

English education in the DPRK

February 16th, 2008

English education in North Korea is on the increase.  On each of my visits in 2004 and 2005 I saw classes of all ages learning English–from elementary school students to older professionals.  (I wonder if Chinese tourists are taken to Chinese language classes?)

While visiting Pyongyang in 2005, I met a Canadian woman who was teaching English at the Grand Peoples’ Study House, and she seemed to be doing a good job teaching “conversational” English.  Here is a photo of one of her student’s notepads.

Additionally, she was paid in Euros; lived in the Central District (unlike most expats who are confined to the Yangdakdo Hotel and the Munsu diplomatic neighborhood); and she was recruited in China.

There can’t be too many Canadian women teaching English in Pyongyang, so I wonder if she is the same teacher featured in this Yohap story on the DPRK’s TEOFL exam scores:

Canadians seem to dominate the English profession in Pyongyang, another one was featured in this Yohap story on the DPRK’s TEOFL exam scores:

The average TOEFL score in the computer-based test by North Korean nationals has improved from 178 in the 1998-1999 period to 189 in 2003-2004 and 190 in 2004-2005.

The annual number of North Korean citizens taking the test, which stayed around 1,000 before June 2000, topped 4,000 in the 2003-2004 period and surpassed 6,000 in 2005-2006.

According to North Korean defectors in Seoul, Pyongyang has emphasized the importance of learning English since the 1970s.

“People are very eager to learn so there is a lot of improvement. Some of my students scored 500 on the (written) TOEFL exam,” Jake Buhler, a Canadian who taught English in North Korea for three months in 2004, was quoted by the radio station as saying.

English is now taught at all middle and high schools as well as universities in North Korea, according to Shin Eun-hi, a North Korean defector who taught English at the prestigious Kim Il Sung University and a foreign language college in Pyongyang. North Koreans previously avoided from learning English, calling it a language of U.S. imperialists.

However, she said only a small number of select people receive high-level English education. “The North Koreans who take the TOEFL are mostly students studying in third countries like China, Foreign Ministry officials and spies headed overseas,” another defector told Yonhap News Agency, requesting anonymity. “Such people are not inferior to South Koreans in their English skills.” 

The full article can be found here:
N. Koreans, S. Koreans have similar TOEFL average: report
Yonhap
2/14/2008

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Posted in Education | 4 Comments »

‘Back to the future’ for Pyongyang’s markets?

February 15th, 2008

When looking at North Korea’s cities on Google Earth one can’t help but notice the number of monuments to the Great Leader.  But if you are looking for the true heart of the cities, in other words where all the people are, you need to look closely for North Korea’s markets.  They do have them–in all of the major cities visible on Google Earth:

pyongyangmarket.JPG kaesongmarket.JPG
wonsanmarket.JPG sinuijumarket.JPG
(Clockwise from upper left) Markets in Pyongyang, Kaesong, Sinuiju, and Wonsan

This week, the Daily NK reported that the new regulations and crackdowns on market activity are meeting with resentment in Pyongyang. 

What happened?  Supposedly Pyongyang’s new Party Chief Secretary suggested to Kim Jong Il the idea of converting the jangmadang into farmers markets (in other words only selling agricultural goods from the countryside as in the past), and Mr. Kim approved it.

As of January 15, public announcements were placed on the entrances of marketplaces detailing what could/could not be sold in the market.  Violators are subject to having their goods confiscated by inspection units (these sorts of policies are ripe for promoting corruption).

Ever entrepreneurial, North Korean sellers simply adapted, shifting location from inside the marketplaces to back-alleys.  Seemingly, they are still subject to inspection and confiscation in these local neighborhoods, but apparently the risk is lower.  Several of these street markets are also visible on Google Earth:

sidewalkstalls2.bmp

But others have decided to stay put in the markets and simply hide their goods:

A portion of the people still secretly trade in the jangmadang. Simultaneously avoiding the inspection units, they refrain from putting out the goods and bargain with customers by holding up signposts. When they tell the passing-by customers, “This is what I have,” a bargain is reached. Of course, the goods are temporarily stored at a nearby residence and taken out after the bargain. (Daily NK)

Lankov also discussed the regulations and games people play to avoid the market inspection units here. 

The full article can be found below:
Jangmadang Will Be Converted to Farmers Markets
Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
2/13/2008

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Posted in Black markets, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Political economy, Price liberalization, Uncategorized | Comments Closed

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