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Worker’s Party elders given honorary membership

Tuesday, December 6th, 2011

According to the Daily NK:

It has been confirmed that over one month in February and March this year, the Chosun Workers’ Party replaced the membership of all male party members over 60 and women over 55 with ‘honorary membership’.

It reportedly took just a month for the plan to be implemented from the Central Party down through provincial, city and county levels.

Honorary members are not required to attend weekly, monthly and quarterly self-criticism sessions in their areas of residence. In addition, honorary membership grants the right to absent themselves from frequent official meetings including study sessions, Party lectures, meetings for the dissemination of Party orders etc.

Honorary members are also exempt from a 2% deduction from wages for Party membership dues. Hitherto, cadres were still required to pay their Party dues even when the enterprises to which they had been dispatched were not operating due to shortages of raw materials, and even in retirement (usually after turning 60) Party members were still required to pay dues to local Party organizations.

On the other hand, honorary membership does still mandate presence at important events including reporting meetings or events to commemorate the birthdays of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

Many newly-honorary members are understood to have welcomed the new measure. One source from Pyongan Province told Daily NK, “When they heard it, elder Party members were calling it ‘another act of kindness from the great General’.”

However, some of the targeted cadres are less happy with having their wings clipped. A source from North Hamkyung Province said that some irritated elderly members of the Union of Democratic Women are leaving before being pushed, putting in minimum effort or simply not attending events at all.

Elsewhere, while senior Central Committee, Cabinet and other central government organ staff are holding onto their administrative duties for now, many apparently believe they know which way the wind is blowing.

Looking at the situation today, one high level official who defected to South Korea in May this year commented to Daily NK, “It is a message to all the veterans that they need to leave because this is the Kim Jong Eun era.”

Read the full story here:
Party Elders Handed Honorary Membership
Daily NK
Lee Beom Ki and Choi Song Min
2011-12-6

Posted in Democratic Women's Union, Political economy, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

DPRK 2011 food shortage debate compendium

Friday, December 2nd, 2011

UPDATE (2012-2-1): Karin Lee of the National Committee on North Korea wrote a great summary of the DPRK’s food situation in 2011:

In December 2010, North Korea began asking multiple countries for food aid. Its request to the U.S. came in early 2011, but it wasn’t until December 2011 that a deal seemed close, with the U.S. prepared to provide 240,000 metric tons (MTs) of assistance. Kim Jong Il died soon after this news hit the press, and details of the potential deal were never announced.

In the ideal world, Ronald Reagan’s “hungry child” knows no politics. But the case of North Korea is far from ideal. The U.S. government states it does not take politics into consideration when determining whether to provide aid to North Korea. Instead, the decision is based on three criteria: need in North Korea, competing demands for assistance, and the ability to monitor aid effectively. Yet these three criteria are subjective and tinged by politics.

In 2011 a succession of four assessment delegations (one by U.S. NGOs, one by the U.S. government, one by the EU and one by the UN) visited the DPRK. All found pretty much the same thing: widespread chronic malnutrition, especially among children and pregnant or lactating women, and cases of acute malnutrition. The UN confirmed the findings late last year, reporting chronic malnutrition in children under five in the areas visited — 33% overall, and 45% in the northern part of the country.

Some donors responded quickly. For example, shortly after its July assessment, the EU announced a 10 Million Euro donation. Following its own May assessment, however, the U.S. government was slow to make a commitment. Competing demands may have played a role. In July, the predicted famine in the Horn of Africa emerged, prompting a U.S. response of over $668 million in aid to “the worst food crisis in half a century.” While there was no public linkage between U.S. action on the African famine and inaction on North Korea, there could have been an impact.

But the two biggest factors shaping the U.S. government’s indecisiveness continued to be uncertainty about both the severity of the need and the ability to establish an adequate monitoring regime. At times, South Korean private and public actors questioned the extent of the North’s need. Early on, a lawmaker in South Korea asserted that North Korea already had stockpiled 1,000,000 metric tons of rice for its military. Human rights activist Ha Tae Keung argued that North Korea would use the aid contributed in 2011 to augment food distributions in 2012 in celebration of the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung and North Korea’s status as a “strong and prosperous nation.” According to Yonhap, shortly after the U.N. released the above-noted figures, South Korean Unification Minister Yu Woo-Ik called the food situation in North Korea not “very serious.”

South Korea’s ambivalence about the extent of the food crisis was noted by Capitol Hill, exacerbating congressional reluctance to support food aid. A letter to Secretary Clinton sent shortly before the U.S. assessment trip in May began with Senators Lieberman, McCain, Webb and Kyl explaining they shared South Korean government suspicions that food aid would be stockpiled and requesting State to “rigorously” evaluate any DPRK request for aid. With the close ROK-U.S. relationship one of the administration’s most notable foreign policy accomplishments, such a warning may have carried some weight.

Monitoring is of equal, if not greater congressional concern. Since the 1990s U.S. NGOs and USAID have worked hard with DPRK counterparts to expand monitoring protocols, and conditions have consistently improved over time. In the 2008/2009 program, the first food program funded by the U.S. government since 2000, the DPRK agreed to provisions such as Korean-speaking monitors. The NGO portion of the program was fairly successful in implementing the monitoring protocol; when implementation of the WFP portion hit some bumps, USAID suspended shipments to WFP until issues could be resolved. The DPRK ended the program prematurely in March 2009 with 330,000 MT remaining.

In 2011 the Network for North Korean Human Rights and Democracy conducted a survey of recent defectors to examine “aid effectiveness” in the current era. Out of the 500 interviewees, 274 left the DPRK after 2010. However, only six were from provinces where NGOs had distributed aid in 2008/2009. Disturbingly, of the 106 people interviewees who had knowingly received food aid, 29 reported being forced to return food. Yet the report doesn’t state their home towns, or when the events took place. Unfortunately such incomplete data proves neither the effectiveness nor ineffectiveness of the most recent monitoring regime.

Some believe that adequate monitoring is impossible. The House version of the 2012 Agricultural Appropriations Act included an amendment prohibiting the use of Food for Peace or Title II funding for food aid to North Korea; the amendment was premised on this belief. However the final language signed into law in November called for “adequate monitoring,” not a prohibition on funding.

The U.S. response, nine months in the making, reflects the doubts outlined above and the politically challenging task of addressing them. It took months for the two governments to engage in substantive discussions on monitoring after the May trip. In December, the State Department called the promised nutritional assistance “easier to monitor” because items such as highly fortified foods and nutritional supplements are supposedly less desirable and therefore less likely to be diverted than rice. The reported offer of 240,000 MT– less than the 330,000 MT the DPRK requested – reflects the unconfirmed report that the U.S. identified vulnerable populations but not widespread disaster.

In early January, the DPRK responded. Rather than accepting the assistance that was under discussion, it called on the United States to provide rice and for the full amount, concluding “We will watch if the U.S. truly wants to build confidence.” While this statement has been interpreted positively by some as sign of the new Kim Jong Un regime’s willingness to talk, it also demonstrates a pervasive form of politicization – linkage. A “diplomatic source” in Seoul said the December decision on nutritional assistance was linked to a North Korean pledge to suspend its uranium enrichment program. Linkage can be difficult to avoid, and the long decision-making process in 2011 may have exacerbated the challenge. Although Special Representative Glyn Davies was quick to state that “there isn’t any linkage” between the discussion of nutritional assistance and dialogue on security issues, he acknowledged that the ability of the DPRK and US to work together cooperatively on food assistance would be interpreted as a signal regarding security issues. Meanwhile, the hungry child in North Korea is still hungry.

UPDATE 75 (2011-12-5): The ROK will donate US$5.65 million to N. Korea through the UN. According to Yonhap:

South Korea said Monday it will donate US$5.65 million (about 6.5 billion won) for humanitarian projects in North Korea through the U.N. body responsible for the rights of children.

The donation to the United Nations Children’s Fund, or UNICEF, will benefit about 1.46 million infants, children and pregnant women in North Korea, according to the Unification Ministry, which is in charge of relations with the North.

Seoul’s contribution will be used to provide vaccines and other medical supplies as well as to treat malnourished children next year, said the ministry.

There have been concerns that a third of all North Korean children under five are chronically malnourished and that many more children are at risk of slipping into acute stages of malnutrition unless targeted assistance is sustained.

“The decision is in line with the government’s basic stance of maintaining its pure humanitarian aid projects for vulnerable people regardless of political situation,” Unification Ministry spokesman Choi Boh-seon told reporters.

South Korea has been seeking flexibility in its policies toward the North to try to improve their strained relations over the North’s two deadly attacks on the South last year.

Despite the South’s softer stance, North Korea recently threatened to turn Seoul’s presidential office into “a sea of fire” in response to South Korea’s military maneuvers near the tense western sea border.

South Korea donated $20 million for humanitarian projects in North Korea through the UNICEF between 1996 and 2009.

Last month, the South also resumed some $6.94 million worth of medical aid to the impoverished communist country through the World Health Organization.

…

Separately, South Korea also decided to give 2.7 billion won ($2.3 million) to a foundation to help build emergency medical facilities in an industrial complex in the North Korean border city of Kaesong.

UPDATE 74 (2011-12-2): The Choson Ilbo reports that the DPRK’s food prices are rising after the 2011 fall harvest, however, the price increase is not due to a shortage of output, but rather political directives. According to the article:

The price of rice in North Korea is skyrocketing, contrary to received wisdom that it drops after the harvest season. According to a source on North Korea on Wednesday, the rice price has risen from 2,400 won a kg in early October to 5,000 won in late November.

North Korean workers earn only 3,000-4,000 won per month.

This unusual hike in rice price seems to be related to preparation of next year’s political propaganda projects.

A South Korean government official said, “It seems the North Korean government is not releasing rice harvested this year in order to save it up” for celebrations of regime founder Kim Il-sung’s centenary next year, when the North has vowed to become “a powerful and prosperous nation.”

UPDATE 73 (2011-11-24): According to the Daily NK, DPRK television is calling on people to conserve food:

With barely a month left until 2012, the year in which people were promised a radical lifestyle transformation to coincide with the North Korea’s rebirth as a ‘strong and prosperous nation’, programs calling upon people to conserve food are now being broadcast by Chosun Central TV and the fixed-line cable broadcaster ‘3rd Broadcast’.

Chosun Central TV is broadcasting the programs as part of ‘Socio-Culture and Lifestyle Time’, which begins directly after the news on Thursdays at 8:40pm. The majority of the content is apparently now about saving food.

A Yangkang Province source told The Daily NK on Wednesday, “Recently the head lecturer from Jang Cheol Gu Pyongyang Commercial University, Dr. Seo Young Il, has been appearing on the program both on television and the cable broadcasting system, talking about saving food.”

In one such program, Professor Seo apparently noted, “In these days of the military-first era there is a new culture blossoming, one which calls for a varied diet,” before encouraging citizens to eat potatoes and rice, wild vegetables and rice and kimchi and rice rather than white rice on its own, and then adding that bread and wheat flour noodles are better than rice for lunch and dinner.

It is understood that older programs with titles such as ‘A Balanced Diet is Excellent Preparation for Saving Food’ and ‘Cereals with Rice: Good for Your Health’ are also being rebroadcast, while watchers are being informed that thinking meat is required for a good diet is ‘incorrect’.

Whenever North Korea is on high alert or there is a directive to be handed down from Kim Jong Il, both of Chosun Central TV and the 3rd Broadcast are used to communicate with the public. For this reason, some North Korea watchers believe the recent food-saving campaign may reflect a particularly weak food situation in the country going into the winter.

According to the source, one recent program showed a cookery competition involving members of the Union of Democratic Women from Pyongyang’s Moranbong District. During which, one woman was filmed extolling the virtues of potato soup, saying “If we follow the words of The General and try eating potatoes as a staple food, there will be no problem.”

Read all previous posts on the DPRK’s food situation this year blow:

(more…)

Posted in 2011 food shortage debate, Agriculture statistics, EU, Food, Germany, Public Distribiution System (PDS), Russia, Statistics, UN, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, UN World Food Program, UNICEF, United Kingdom | Comments Closed

KPA Journal Vol. 2, No. 7

Thursday, December 1st, 2011

Joseph Bermudez, now a Senior Analyst with DigitalGlobe’s Analysis Center and author of The Armed Forces of North Korea, has posted the latest issue of KPA Journal. You can download the PDF here.

Topics include: M-1979/M-1989 170 mm Self-propelled Guns (Part II) and “Yu Kyong-su, The Father of KPA Armor Forces.

Note: The satellite imagery used in this journal issue can be found on Google Earth here: 39.750290°, 124.820099°

Posted in Korean People's Army, Military | Comments Closed

KPA Journal Vol. 2, No. 6

Friday, November 25th, 2011

Topics include: M-1979/1989 170mm SPGs (Part 1) and and article on the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly by Michael Madden.

Posted in Military, Supreme Peoples Assembly | Comments Closed

DPRK makes discreet investor plea to French students

Thursday, November 24th, 2011

Pictured above (Google Earth): The University of Toulouse, France. See in Google Maps here.

According to AlertNet (Reuters):

Secretive and isolated North Korea is searching for economic allies in the unlikeliest of ways: showing videos of happy North Korean tourists to young French university students in a 13th century convent.

The reclusive communist state has no official diplomatic relations with France, one of only two European Union countries to cut ties with North Korea until it abandons its nuclear weapons programme and improves its human rights record.

But just weeks after Paris decided to open a cooperation office in the North Korean capital, its ambassador to Paris-based UNESCO accepted an invitation to address students from the University of Toulouse within the gothic surroundings of the Franciscan convent’s capitular chamber.

The meeting marked Ambassador Yun Yong Il’s first public appearance in France.

“They are the future,” said Yun, when asked by Reuters why he picked Toulouse to talk. “I’m here for the students who have been waiting to hear from a North Korean official for a year.”

Tensions have gradually eased on the Korean peninsula since the sinking of a South Korean warship 20 months ago and the North’s revelation of a uranium enrichment facility that opens a second route to make an atomic programme.

North Korea and the United States have also held a series of bilateral meetings geared at restarting broader regional de-nuclearisation talks, giving the North a window of opportunity to raise its diplomatic efforts around the world.

Yun, a former political director at the Foreign Ministry, faced about 100 students.

At times, the future political science graduates looked on bemused and surprised as the four-hour presentation cut from a hazy tourism video of the 1980s showing rolling mountains, happy North Koreans on holiday and copious seafood platters to a well structured monologue about the country’s woes and potential.

“Our country is open to everybody who wants to come. You just have to ask for a visa in Paris!” said Yun, who speaks fluent French, but opted to talk in his native language and let his deputy translate into English.

Pyongyang has slowly opened its doors under strict conditions to foreign tour groups, mostly Chinese as a way of earning hard currency.

Yun, who wears a lapel pin of President Kim Jong-il on his suit, said the country’s lack of hard currency as a result of tighter sanctions has made it turn to foreign investors on the “basis of mutual respect and interests”.

“We are looking forward to multilateral and multifaceted economic co-operation with other countries,” he said.

“We are definitely opposed to monopolistic investment of a single country,” said Yun, adding that the country’s natural resources provided opportunities for investors to tap.

CHINESE MODEL, CHINA TRAP

Michel-Louis Martin, director of Toulouse University’s security and globalisation research group said the event was not just propaganda.

“They are trying to go beyond what they usually have to say about North Korea. Don’t forget in France, North Korea is not very well known,” said Martin.

The country’s desire to diversify its economy has echoes of China when it began to allow foreign investment and gave permission for entrepreneurs to start up businesses in the 1970s.

Yun’s presentation attempted to steer clear of its frictions with the United States, South Korea and even its relationship with China, focusing instead on his country’s economic problems.

But by the end he stepped up the rhetoric, firmly laying the blame for Pyongyang’s “misfortune” on the United States.

Michel Dusclaud, a researcher at the University of Toulouse who convinced Yun to speak, said it was normal for ancestral hatreds to come out. Despite this, he said, it was clear the North was beginning to accept that if it did not diversify, it would be engulfed either by its souther neighbour or China, which still has territorial claims to it.

“They have to open up for international cooperation otherwise they will be eaten up by South Korea or China,” Dusclaud said. “It’s imperative, but it’s not because they like us.”

With his speech finished, Yun was quick to shuffle out of the Gothic chapel, declining to speak to Reuters, but also telling a student who attempted to pose a question on whether North Korea’s political system could last:

“I’ll see you in Paris and then we’ll talk.”

Read the full story here:
N.Korea makes discreet investor plea to French students
AlertNet (Reuters)
John Irish
2011-11-24

Posted in China, Economic reform, Education, Foreign direct investment, France, International trade, Mining/Minerals, Ministry of foreign Affairs | Comments Closed

Ideology classes being extended for KPA

Monday, November 7th, 2011

According to the Daily NK:

A source within North Korea has revealed to Daily NK that political education classes for the Chosun People’s Army have been extended from 12 to 19 hours a week in what the source sees as an effort to increase unity within the military.

The order to extend ideological instruction apparently came from the General Political Bureau of the Ministry of Peoples’ Armed Forces in early September. Following as it did the late Colonel Muammar Qadhafi’s escape from the Libyan capital Tripoli in the middle of August, this points to the possibility that the beginning of the Libyan leader’s end had a part to play in the nervy North Korean regime’s decision.

The source claims that all military units were handed new schedules for political education at that time, stating, “Every week commissioned officers get extra materials to conduct classes and enlisted soldiers have had their basic hours extended from 12 to 19.”

In reality this means that the classes, which used to be for two hours every day from Monday to Saturday, have now been extended to three hours, with the 30 minutes each morning previously allotted for reading and interpreting party policy and the works of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il extended to 40 minutes.

Commanding officers have had their own classes covering the correct method of instructing subordinates bumped up from three or four times a month to twice a week. These classes are to help them become acquainted with the guidance materials sent down from Pyongyang.

So-called ‘political commissars’ attached to companies follow the guidelines of the General Political Bureau in carrying out political education. Given their license to assess the ‘appropriateness’ of company commanders, in many ways they occupy a role more influential than that of commanders themselves.

The source claims that Special Forces were the guinea pigs for the new policy, with Marine Corps, specialist security forces and guidance department troops getting the first taste of the new orders.

The ideological training of ordinary soldiers is said to involve interpretation of Rodong Shinmun editorials, which serve as the main de facto public mouthpiece for official opinion, along with ideological ‘debate’ sessions.

“At the end of October we began studying a piece from the Rodong Shinmun called ‘We are all Descendants of Kim Il Sung’, and have been had debate sessions regarding another article which was about how to make our lives even better than they already are,” the source explained.

“A stationed officer from the Political Bureau sits in on the debate sessions and plays the role of a facilitator, making sure everything goes smoothly. They are drumming up excitement within these sessions by giving a day’s holiday to the best participants,” said the source.

Interestingly, meanwhile, the source added that the state is still choosing not to report on the death of Gaddafi or other Libya news, while “Most soldiers think the ramping up of political studies is some sort of preparation for winter training.”

Every year North Korea holds winter training from December 1 until June. On top of ideological education, training also involves marching, shooting, martial arts, war strategy and other drills.

Read the full story here:
More Ideology for the Troops!
Daily NK
Lee Seok Young
2011-11-07

Posted in Education, Kim Jong Un, KPA General Political Bureau, Military, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, Political economy | Comments Closed

DPRK mineral exports to China increase

Sunday, November 6th, 2011

UPDATE 1 (2014-1-21): See more recent data here and here.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-11-6): According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s mineral exports to China have tripled this year compared to a year ago, a study showed Sunday.

A joint study of Chinese data by Yonhap News Agency and Seoul-based IBK Economic Research Institute showed that China imported 8.42 million tons of minerals from North Korea from January to September this year, worth US$852 million.

Over the first nine months of last year, China brought in 3.04 million tons of minerals from the North for $245 million.

Most of the minerals were anthracite coals, the data showed. This year, of 8.42 million tons, 8.19 tons were anthracites.

China is the sole major ally and the biggest economic benefactor for North Korea, a reclusive regime under international economic sanctions following its nuclear and long-range missile tests.

Cho Bong-hyun, an analyst at the IBK institute, said North Korea may be trying to earn much-needed hard currency as it aims to become a powerful and prosperous country by 2012.

“Last year, North Korea ordered its institutions to meet their goals in foreign currency income by this year,” Cho said. “Since exporting minerals is a military business, we can see that the military is trying to meet its target. In addition, the steep mineral export growth was attributable to the lifting of the cap on the amount of mineral exports, as ordered by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.”

China appears to be trying to stockpile mineral resources at affordable prices, Cho added. North Korean anthracites were traded at an average of $101 per ton, whereas the international standard for quality anthracites is $200 per ton.

“Given that North Korean coals are of very good quality, trade with China must have been made at a fairly low price,” Cho said.

Meanwhile, sources said North Korean authorities last month entirely halted its coal exports, as the impoverished country fears a shortage of energy resources during the upcoming winter.

From January to September this year, China exported 732,000 tons of minerals to North Korea, most of them crude oil.

Here is the IBK web page. If anyone can find a copy of this report and send it to me to post, I would appreciate it.

Additional information:
1. The economics lessons: A. The more isolated the DPRK’s economy from the global trade and financial system, the greater monopsony power Chinese firms can exert on their North Korean trading partners. B. The rents earned in the current DPRK-China trade regime are visible and have organized constituencies. Unfortunately the much greater gains that could be reaped if the North Korean economy was more open, integrated, and dynamic remain unseen and their potential beneficiaries remain unknown and unorganized.

2. The Nautilus Institute published a very interesting paper by Nathaniel Aden on China DPRK trade back in June. See it here.

3. Here is the most recent US Geological Survey report on the DPRK’s mineral sector.

Read the Yonhap story here:
N. Korea’s mineral exports to China tripled from last year: study
Yonhap
2011-11-6

Posted in Copper, Gold, Graphite, Iron Ore, Mining Industry Department, Mining/Minerals, Rare Earths, Sand | Comments Closed

Interesting weekend fare: Cars, cola, Disney, history, and lift troubles

Sunday, November 6th, 2011

Cars

Uriminzokkiri posted this short video of rush-hour traffic in Pyongyang (YouTube):

I will leave it up to the reader to determine if the video was staged. What is more interesting to me is to see the variety of vehicles used in the shots. I saw at least one American Dodge Van in the footage (similar to the one I saw parked next to the Pueblo in 2005). If you know a lot about cars, feel free to try identifying other vehicles in the footage.

And continuing on the automotive front–a tourist to the DPRK took this picture in September 2010:

The picture above is of an American-made, petrol-guzzling “Hummer H2” (MSRP in 2008 – USD$53,286; 10 mpg_-US; 24 L/100 km; 12 mpg_-imp). The license plate on the vehicle is 평양 22-2722.

In September 2011, Eric Lafforgue took the picture below of what appears to be a second Hummer on the streets of the DPRK.

The license plate on this vehicle is “23-199”. I cannot read the city name on the plate. According to the photographer:

During my stay in North Korea, i [sp] saw 2 Hummer cars. This is the fist time i [sp] hear north korean people making cristisms about something in their country! They all told me it was a shame to see such a car in North Korea, as it needs lot of fuel. Some people told me that the car number tells that it belongs to a local media (press or tv).

Cola

Mr. Lafforgue has also brought up another interesting topic through his pictures: North Korea’s cola wars!

On the left is a Picture of Cocoa “crabonated drink” [sp] taken by Eric Lafforgue in 2008. On the right is a picture of “코코아 탄산단물” (Translation: “Cocoa Carbonated Drink”) taken by Eric Lafforgue in September 2011.

I might have been inclined to believe they were the same product with different labels (and maybe they are?), however, they appear to be manufactured by different companies. The cola on the left is manufactured by a company called “룡진” (Ryongjin), a company about which I cannot find any additional information, and the beverage on the right is manufactured by “모란봉” (Moranbong). I presume that “Moranbong” is actually the Moranbong Carbonated Fruit Juice J.V. Company. According to Naenara:

Moranbong Carbonated Fruit Juice J.V. Company
Add: Taedonggang District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea
Fax: 850-2-381-4410

The company formed in 2004 produces a wide assortment of carbonated fruit juice and health drink.

It has an affiliated factory equipped with hi-tech facilities that conform to hygienic requirements of GMP, ranging from production of bottles and drinks to packing.

Its products include apple, grape, peach, orange, cocoa, lemon and strawberry carbonated juices.

A multifunctional super-antioxidant health drink “Pirobong” is a drawing card in the world market.

The company will steadily increase investment in the development of new brand of drinks and further promote exchange and collaboration with partners across the world.

So why does the DPRK produce competing colas? Wouln’t that be wasteful duplication of processes? No. Monopolys are generally more wasteful than competitive firms. Though in the past there were few producers of carbonated drinks in the DPRK (Ryongsong Food Factory, Kyongryon Patriotic Soda Factory), the DPRK seems to have moved away from near-monopoly production to a more competitive industrial organization in the production of soda.

Kim Jong-il’s sister, Kim Kyong-hui (KKH), is director of the Light Industry Department in the Worker’s Party and as a result holds all colas in her job portfolio. Without having any special data on the DPRK’s cola market, I would speculate that KKH promotes competition between the different soda producers to increase efficiency and profits for the ultimate goal of improving the positions of her discretionary official and unofficial budgets.

As an aside, earlier this year Forbes ran a story about meetings held between the DPRK’s Taepung International Investment Group and Coca Cola. Taephing is directed by Jang Song-thaek, Kim Kyong-hui’s husband.

Disney

In the past I have pointed out the appearance of Disney characters on North Korean apparel (see here for example). Now they are showing up on mobile phones:

History 1

Here is a video of Lim Su-kyung in Pyongyang (1989). Here is a story about her in the Daily NK. I think I just found her Facebook profile!

History 2

Here is a map of Pyongyang produced int he 1800s. Other maps of the region here. Hat tip to Kwang On Yoo.

Lift troubles

Here is a 30+ minute video shot in Pyongyang–nearly entirley in the dark. Hat tip to Leonid Petrov.

The video caption reads: “We were touring the 3 Revolutions Exhibition in Pyongyang in 2009, when our elevator lost all power and 11 of us were stuck in blackness, hanging by a North Korean thread.”

Posted in Animation, Art, Automobiles, Light Industry, Light Industry Department, Manufacturing, Transportation | Comments Closed

Daily NK reports Workers’ Party shakeup in North Pyongan

Thursday, November 3rd, 2011

UPDATE 3 (2011-11-3): According to the Daily NK:

Following September’s mass censure of more than thirty Party cadres in North Pyongan Province and Shinuiju, sources have informed Daily NK of an additional investigation leading to at least five executions and one suicide in a fishing region of the province.

According to the sources, the investigation was concentrated Unjong Village on the island of Shinmi, part of Seoncheon County around 70km south east of Shinuiju City [See in Google Maps here].

According to one of the sources, “On the 28th of last month they gathered provincial Party cadres and trading organ workers at Seoncheon Hall [See in Google Maps here] to report the inspection results and strengthen solidarity.”

The source gave more detail, saying, “They said they shot the head of the unit, his vice (female; 39), the captain of a clam fishing vessel, the local Party secretary responsible for food distribution and the head of Unjong Village cooperative farm, firing sixty bullets into each person at the shooting range of Seoncheon County Chosun People’s Army Base.”

The head of the fishing unit was executed on suspicion of having embezzled $60,000 and shifted it to a bank in China, the source explained.

“Aside from the execution of those five people, the local chief prosecutor then committed suicide,” the source went on. “The head of the local NSA and ten cadres were also dismissed.” The source also noted that the incident led to the dismissal of at least one provincial Party secretary.

While the investigation was ongoing the adopted daughter of the head of Unjong Village cooperative farm apparently even tried to hide the head of the fishing team in their family home so as to conceal her own father’s misconduct, but ended up in detention herself as a result.

According to the sources, the investigation was conducted by agents sent not from Pyongyang but from North Hamkyung Province, and as the shockwave of the devastation in Seoncheon County spread up to the provincial Party level, this fact began to cause regionalism to flare.

One of the sources explained, “The inspection team from North Hamkyung Province had no love for that place and they punished everyone one-by-one, so the incident got bigger. I have no idea where they will destroy next.”

This was apparently done so that the work could be driven forward by that regionalism, but also so its planners in Pyongyang could avoid complaint. This is not uncommon on the Korean Peninsula; indeed, in South Korea under military dictatorship units were frequently dispatched to other parts of the country to quell disturbances.

Elsewhere during the Seoncheon Hall meeting, the fates of key people in the original purge of North Pyongan Province (as previously reported by Daily NK) were also reported;

Kim Yoon Ho, the provincial guidance department head, was exiled to Dongrim County on charges of illegally mobilizing farm workers. However, his case is now under review thanks to the intervention of the provincial Party Chief Secretary.

Kim Cheol Ho (son of candidate member of the Politburo and head of the Party Cadres Department Kim Pyeong Hae, and Shinuiju municipal guidance head) was exiled to Dongchang County.

Local People’s Committee Chairman Park Cheon Geun was demoted.

The secretary of Wonlim, a marine products enterprise, was sent to Changson County on charges of embezzling $2,000.

However, Kim Jae Hwa, a Supreme People’s Assembly delegate and Shinuiju city commercial director, only received a light punishment from the Party even though he stole 70 tons of beans from the state.

UPDATE 2 (2011-10-4): According to the Daily NK:

The Daily NK has learned that the recent mass purge of more than 30 cadres from the provincial and municipal arms of the Party in North Pyongan Province and Shinuiju City came about as part of efforts to help bed in the Kim Jong Eun era while aiding new provincial Party Chief Secretary Lee Man Geon in taking hold of provincial affairs.

3 of the top 10 figures in the North Pyongan Province Party hierarchy were among those swept away in the purge at the start of last month, including the provincial Party propaganda and guidance heads and figures from within the security apparatus.

Lee, who reportedly led the purge, rose to his current position as a result of the promotion of predecessor Kim Pyeong Hae to a central Party post at the Chosun Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference in September, 2010

However, it appears that, partly because Kim had been promoted rather than removed, Lee struggled for almost a year to seize control of the provincial levers of power. Accordingly, the current assessment from inside North Korea is that Lee, with the backing of Kim Jong Eun, launched a power struggle to liquidate the Kim Pyeong Hae faction.

One source explained more today, saying, “On July 6th, a ‘gruppa’ from the central Party accompanied the General on an onsite inspection in Shinuiju, and they did some extensive vetting of provincial and city cadres. At that time, Chief Secretary Lee Man Geon joined with the Kim Jong Eun faction and set about sorting them out on charges of corruption.”

“Lee Man Geon read Kim Jong Eun’s mind and, so as to implant the successor’s faction, actively pursued charges of corruption against the cadres then kicked them out,” the source went on.

Meanwhile, Kim Pyeong Hae, who had become a candidate member of the Politburo and the head of the Party Cadres Department, also appears to have stopped work for the time being.

According to the source, “Kim Pyeong Hae was stopped from working in the middle of September. His second son Kim Gyeong Ho (former guidance head for the Shinuiju municipal Party) also lost his job; this really surprised Shinuiju cadres.”

Kim Pyeong Hae has not been seen in public since September 12th, after appearing on name lists at public events every day from the 8th until that time. That does not mean that Kim has been removed permanently, it is too early to say that, but it does appear that he may have been taken out of the front line for the time being.

UPDATE 1 (2011-9-27): According to the Daily NK:

The removal of more than 30 cadres in North Pyongan Province represents an anticipated shift in the provincial power structure for the purpose of establishing the Kim Jong Eun leadership structure. Branding existing cadres as corrupt, removing them and transfusing in fresh blood are all part of the liquidation and reformation work of the Kim Jong Eun era.

Although unsurprising in itself, the ‘purge of North Pyongan’ has, however, exceeded expectations in terms of target and scale. Everyone knew that Kim Jong Eun, having guaranteed the loyalty of organs of state security, had begun to work on the Party apparatus, but that he would do so in such a lightning fast and apparently violent manner did come as a surprise.

More than 30 cadres have been dismissed, including the North Pyongan Province propaganda secretary and Guidance Department head. The two, in addition to the head of workers’ unions in the province, were among the ten most powerful Party figures in the whole region. In particular, the head of the Guidance Department could be called the yoke at the core of the egg of provincial Party operations.

But slicing off limbs in this way, only one year after the former North Pyongan Province Party secretary was himself replaced by Lee Man Geon, offers a warning; show absolute loyalty to Kim Jong Eun.

As the second-in-command in practice, Kim has been dealing out cadre changes at higher levels since 2009. This has included inflicting retirement on Kim Young Joo, Kim Il Cheol and more, while rapidly elevating people like Lee Young Ho.

The purging of the former deputy head of the National Security Agency, Ryu Kyung, was taken in much the same way when it came to light earlier this year; namely as a part of the establishment of the succession system.

It was thus to be expected that having changed much of the central structure via the Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference last year, Kim would begin to realize changes in the provincial structure. Kim is now doing so, exercising his oversight powers via the central Party guidance structure and purging corrupt cadres.

“He can take away from this the ‘effect of a domestic crackdown’, namely the atmosphere of loyalty it creates, and the ‘effect of change’, namely the ability to plant his own younger people by cutting people for being corrupt,” explained Cheong Seong Chang of the Sejong Institute to The Daily NK today.

Such processes are rather common in dictatorships, and this is far from being the first time such events have unfolded in North Korea, either. Various corruption incidents ‘came to light’ during the March of Tribulation in the 1990s, used by Kim Jong Il to quiet complaints about the leadership in Pyongyang.

“Kim Jong Il regularly dismissed people, to both turn people’s anger at the leadership onto the mid-level cadres and at the same time evade responsibility for anything by suggesting that it was mid-level bribery that was precluding the people’s economy from improving,” according to Cheong.

In 1999, for example, there was the simultaneous purging of a number of figures from Yangkang Province, including the provincial Party general secretary and NSA secretary, Unheung County secretary and the political commissar for the No. 376 Unit of the Chosun People’s Army.

The provincial general secretary was dismissed on the premise that he had failed to prevent the rapid influx of ‘capitalist culture’ across the Sino-North Korean border, the NSA man because he had embezzled Party funds, and the Unheung County secretary and political commissar because they had taken bribes. All were subsequently executed, as is also often the case.

ORIGINAL POST (2011-9-26): According to the Daily NK:

The punishment of more than thirty officials from Party organs in North Pyongan Province is sending shockwaves through the national Party apparatus.

A number of sources within North Korea have confirmed the news in conversation with The Daily NK in the last few days, saying that the situation began to unfold at the beginning of this month and that the individuals were nominally singled out due to corruption.

The recent purge reportedly includes:

▲ Dismissal and loss of all privileges for the head of the provincial Guidance Department
▲ Sacking for the provincial propaganda secretary, as well as the head of the workers’ union and department responsible for power supply
▲ Demotion for the head of the Shinuiju People’s Assembly
▲ Sacking for the head of the city’s security forces and more than ten other city cadres
▲ Internal punishment for more than ten other party officials

A source from Sinuiju said “The dismissal of the propaganda secretary and head of the Guidance Department, people who are effectively in charge of the provincial party, as well as the removal of the municipal People’s Assembly chairman, all within a few days of one another, has left Shinuiju cadres in shock.”

The dismissed propaganda secretary was effectively the third most powerful cadre in North Pyongan Province, a man whose principal responsibilities include overseeing the idolization of the Kim family and the political education of the people, while the head of the Guidance Department and the workers’ union were effectively the 4th and 10th most powerful. As the main figure in the provincial Party Assembly, the head of the Guidance Department also had oversight powers over the chief secretary and organizing secretary. The appointment of all the dismissed officials falls under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Party Guidance Department.

Thus, the majority of defectors believe it implausible that the Party would punish so many heavyweight figures for corruption at once, even with the storm trooper inspections of a month ago as a catalyst.

Vice-President of Radio Free Chosun, Jang Sung Moo agreed, telling The Daily NK today, “It is highly unlikely that the authorities would get rid of the third, fourth and tenth most powerful figures in North Pyongan Province just for corruption. There is a good chance that there will be further charges down the track regarding other matters; espionage for example. That’s the only way ordinary people will be able to grasp it.”

South Korean intelligence agencies are already aware of the high profile sackings.

The highly irregular events in North Pyongan Province have caused consternation in other regions as well, sources say. According to one, “The numerous sackings of important cadres has left other cadres worried. Many of them can’t understand why their colleagues are being replaced all of a sudden.”

Interestingly, one of the dismissed cadres, the now ex-head of Shinuiju’s Guidance Department, is former North Pyongan Province Chief Secretary Kim Pyeong Hye’s son. Kim is regarded as one of Kim Jong Il’s closest associates after being promoted to the head of the Party Cadres Department at last year’s Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference. Thus, many people find it unlikely, at best, that corruption would be enough to bring down the son of one of Kim Jong Il’s trusted associates.

Accordingly, the purge could be a part of plans to facilitate Kim Jong Eun’s seizure of control of the Party. It is generally accepted that his takeover of the security forces is mostly complete, and instilling a measure of fear in the provincial elite is one method Kim is now likely to employ to help cement his grip.

Read the full stories here:
North Pyongan Party Cut Down to Size
Daily NK
Lee Seok Young
2011-9-26

Posted in Kim Jong Un, Political economy, Worker's Party | Comments Closed

Some recent DPRK publications (UPDATED)

Monday, October 31st, 2011

“North Korea on the Cusp of Digital Transformation”
Nautilus Institute
Alexandre Mansurov

“North Korea: An Up-and-Coming IT-Outsourcing Destination”
38 North
Paul Tija, GPI Consulting

“NK People Speak, 2011” (Interviews with North Koreans in China)
Daily NK (PDF)

“The Rise and Fall of Détente on the Korean Peninsula, 1970-1974”
Wilson Center NKIDP
Christian F. Ostermann and James Person
(Coverage of the report in the Donga Ilbo can be found here)

Don’t Expect a Pyongyang Spring Sometime Soon
Center for Strategic and International Studies (via CanKor)
Hazel Smith

Posted in Computing/IT, GPI Consultancy, Hana Electronics Company, Korea Computer Center (KCC), North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP), Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC) | Comments Closed

North Korean Economy Watch