DPRK unveils 2011-7-24 election posters

July 7th, 2011

Last night on the KCTV evening news (July 6), the DPRK unveiled the propaganda posters for the upcoming elections:

Click on the image for a larger version*.

The slogan at the bottom of the painting reads “일심단결의 위력을 시위하자”.  Thanks to a helpful reader, this translates to “Let’s demonstrate the power of single-hearted unity”.

Click on image for a larger version*.

The slogan at the bottom of the painting reads “모두다 찬성 투표하자”. Again with thanks to a reader, this means “Let’s all vote yes”.

See translated KCTV footage here.

Marcus Noland writes about the elections as a form of social control.

The Daily NK has more on the elections:

North Korea has confirmed the date of the country’s next local People’s Committee elections. According to a report put out by Chosun Central News Agency (KCNA) today, the poll is set to take place on the 24th of next month.

Citing a June 13th release put out by the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, KCNA reported this morning, “According to Article 139 of the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the decision of local People’s Committees, province, city and county People’s Committee delegate elections will proceed on July 24th.”

North Korea’s constitution demands that it conduct elections to local committees every four years. The last, which occurred almost exactly four years ago, in July, 2007, saw 26,635 delegates elected to various committees.

At the end of May, The Daily NK cited an inside North Korean source as suggesting that the elections were likely to be in June, and that the authorities were involved in the process of voter registration.

However, such elections are a formality, while the process of voter registration is used partly as a way to threaten the families of defectors. One inside source, reporting on the contents of a people’s unit meeting in late May, cited a security official, “He said, ‘We will punish or exile families who either fail to take part in or miss it because they are not here. Contact people who have gone to China for trade or gone to live there illegally and tell them to come back without fail.”

According to the Voice of Russia,  the election campaign is aimed at drawing the maximum turnout which in 2007 was officially 99.82% voters.

* Originally I used the images from KCTV, but since Yonhap later published better versions, I ammended the post to include them.

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DPRK seeks to learn about geothermal energy from PRC

July 7th, 2011

According to the China Daily:

China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have agreed to share their experience and beef up cooperation in exploring and utilizing renewable energy.

The agreement was made during a meeting on Wednesday between senior Communist Party of China (CPC) official Zhou Yongkang and a delegation from the Korean Workers Party (KWP), led by Thae Jong Su, an alternate member of the KWP’s Political Bureau and member of the Secretariat.

Thae told Zhou that the main purpose of his current China trip is to learn from China’s experience in developing geothermal resources, as specified by the DPRK’s top leader, Kim Jong-il.

The DPRK hopes to use geothermal energy in its efforts to develop its economy and build a strong and prosperous country, Thae said.

Zhou, a member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau, told Thae that China would like to enhance its exchanges with the DPRK in the field in order to jointly improve their capability to develop and utilize renewable energy.

“I once worked in China’s oil industry for a long time, so I fully understood the importance of energy to a country,” said Zhou, who is also secretary of the Political Science and Law Committee of the CPC Central Committee.

Zhou served as vice minister of the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry from 1985 to 1988 and went on to work as deputy general manager of the China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation from 1988 to 1996.

He said China has been actively promoting reforms in its energy sector during the country’s 12th Five-year Plan period (2011-2015).

Hailing the sound momentum of China-DPRK relations, Zhou recalled Kim’s successful visit to China earlier this year, during which Kim exchanged views with President Hu Jintao on major issues of common concern.

Kim also sent a congratulatory letter to Hu regarding the 90th anniversary of the CPC’s founding, Zhou said.

“We are glad to see that the two sides have engaged in high-level exchanges and substantial cooperation in various areas and made concerted efforts for common development and regional peace and stability,” he said.

Thae also conveyed greetings from Kim to Hu during the meeting.

The DPRK delegation is visiting China from July 5 to 9 at the invitation of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee.

Senior CPC official Liu Qi also met with the delegation later Wednesday afternoon.

Liu, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, said China and the DPRK currently boast “frequent high-level visits, increasing strategic communication, deepening economic cooperation and active cultural exchanges.”

“China is ready to make joint efforts with the DPRK to implement the consensus reached by the two top leaders and further expand exchanges and cooperation in all areas,” Liu said.

Liu said that he hopes the people of the DPRK see continued progress in the country’s development under the leadership of Kim.

Liu also briefed Thae on Beijing’s economic and social development.

In response, Thae said the DPRK and China now enjoy prosperous ties, which have been carefully nurtured by the countries’ top leaders. The DPRK is willing to work with China to carry out practical cooperation and bolster relations to a new high, he added.

Read the full story here:
China, DPRK to boost renewable energy co-op
China Daily
2011-7-7

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Informal sellers on the rise in DPRK markets

July 7th, 2011

Pictured above (Google Earth, October 2010): (left) informal street market in Hadang-dong, (right) official market in Hadang-dong

According to the Daily NK:

Sources have reported a large increase in the number of ‘grasshopper traders’ in the alleyways around many of North Korea’s markets.

‘Grasshopper traders’ are individuals who conduct their trade activities without an official permit beyond official market boundaries, meaning that when security forces arrive they have to jump, like grasshoppers, to a new location. Growth in this kind of phenomenon would tend to suggest that the class of capital-holding middle class traders is shrinking, while the number of those trading day-to-day in order to make ends meet is growing. It is also related to the fact that official efforts to eliminate grasshopper trading are not as strict as they have been.

One source living in the traditionally more affluent capital, Pyongyang, explained to The Daily NK today that even there, “The number of grasshopper traders has increased a lot of late. There are too many to count,” adding that in the case of Hadang Market, the normal 100-200 grasshopper traders has grown to between 300-400 over a very short period.

Another source from Yangkang Province agreed, saying, “There are grasshopper traders camped in every alleyway around Hyesan Market. People are coming in twice the numbers they normally do, so cracking down on them is not easy.” Other local sources have revealed that markets in the provinces of North Hamkyung and Pyongan are in much the same state.

As expected, with an increasing degree of grasshopper trading comes an increasing number of market watch guards. However, whereas in the past those caught engaging in grasshopper trading stood to lose their wares, nowadays grasshopper traders are just warned about their conduct.

The Pyongyang source explained, “The number of market watch guards has increased by around ten, but their crackdowns are much weaker than they used to be. I know that the authorities have ordered them not to confiscate traders’ wares by force, just to enforce public order.”

This appears to be because the authorities fear that some of their excesses are inflicting too much harm on public opinion.

The Pyongyang source explained, “In many cases people oppose the young market watch guards’ attempts to take the belongings of traders by force, saying ‘they are worse than the Japanese’, and the authorities seem to care about that.”

Officials and the security forces are also being careful about their conduct because of fear of investigation, and this may also be affecting the market environment. Rumors are circulating which suggest that some cadres are being punished for things such as taking bribes.

On this point, the Pyongyang source added, “The central Party is conducting an inspection of the public organs charged with controlling the markets. The word is that people working for these organs are being investigated for things like taking bribes, going to the homes of traders to demand things, or just taking what they want from market stalls.”

Read the full story here:
Grasshopper Numbers Rising Fast
Daily NK
Choi Cheong-ho
2011-7-4

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China cracking down on DPRK-made methamphetamine

July 7th, 2011

Picture above from the Daily NK.

According to the Donga Ilbo:

China has begun cracking down on North Korea`s narcotics trade in China along with South Korean intelligence, having seized 60 million U.S. dollars worth of drugs from the North last year, according to a South Korean government source Monday.

“It’s only a fraction. The volume of drug trafficking in China will be much greater than that,” the source said.

This is the first time for China to unveil the volume of narcotics made in North Korea.

Beijing had been reluctant to raise the matter in public though it found Pyongyang`s increased drug trafficking as a threat. China diplomatically protects the North in nuclear issues but started a crackdown with South Korea apparently because it can no longer tolerate the North`s narcotics, which threatened China`s three northeastern provinces bordering the North.

The drugs seized by Beijing are said to have the best quality, going beyond the level individuals can produce. So Pyongyang is considered to be manufacturing narcotics on the national level at factories.

“China is pretty much pissed off,” a diplomatic source said, adding, “China believes that North Korea’s drug trafficking has grown more serious since last year.”

Though Beijing did not specifically mention the North when it stressed a crackdown on drugs, it implied North Korean-made narcotics.

In a previous post, we linked to a Newsweek story on the Chinese crackdown:

Twenty years ago, Yanji had only 44 registered drug addicts. Last year, the city registered almost 2,100 drug addicts, according to a 2010 Brookings Institution report, with more than 90 percent of them addicted to meth or similar synthetic drugs. Local officials acknowledge that this is very likely a gross undercount and that the actual number may be five or six times higher. “Jilin Province is not only the most important transshipment point for drugs from North Korea into China, but has itself become one of the largest markets in China for amphetamine-type stimulants,” the Brookings report said.

Chinese authorities recently conducted a provincewide crackdown, code-named Strong Wind. But for law enforcement, the drug presents a particular problem. Unlike other drugs, it’s nearly impossible to trace the origin of meth. Still, officials, residents, and experts believe that much of the methamphetamine consumed in this Chinese region is manufactured across the border in North Korea, a longtime exporter of drugs. “Clearly,” the Brookings report said, amphetamine-type stimulants “from North Korea have become a threat to China in recent years.”

In an article published last year, Cui Junyong, a professor at Yanbian University’s School of Law, posited that a large amount of the illegal drugs ingested in Yanji came from North Korea. Supporting his point, the border patrol last year arrested six North Koreans in a high-profile bust, including a dealer named “Sister Kim.” Although sources estimate that a gram of meth in North Korea costs roughly 10 times the price of a kilo of rice—about $15—it’s still much cheaper than in China.

“Selling ice is the easiest way to make money,” says Shin Dong Hyuk, who was born in a North Korean concentration camp in 1982 and escaped to South Korea in 2005. Every defector, he added, “knows about ice.”

Perhaps because of its alliance with its benighted neighbor, the Chinese government has been extremely careful about pointing its finger at North Korea; reports on drug busts in Jilin province euphemistically refer to the drugs as coming from a “border country.”

“We don’t publicize” the drugs coming from North Korea because it would touch on “the good relationship between China and North Korea,” an official, requesting anonymity, from Jilin’s anti-drug unit says. But he adds, “Of all the drugs we’ve seized this year, it’s mostly been ice, because that’s our main drug here.”

According to Yun and others, North Korea’s methamphetamine production is centered in Hamheung, the site of a chemical-industrial complex built by the Japanese during World War II, which has a high concentration of chemists and was reportedly one of the worst-hit cities during the famine.

Earlier this year, a US Department of State report to the Congress alleged that the DPRK’s state-sponsored drug production was on the wane–though “private” production and trade along the Chinese border remained a problem.  According to one report:

In an annual report submitted to Congress, the US State Department said “no confirmed instances of large-scale drug trafficking” involving the North Korean state or its nationals were reported in 2010.

It said there was not enough information to confirm that the communist state was no longer involved in drug manufacture and trafficking “but if such activity persists, it is certainly on a smaller scale”.

This is the eighth consecutive year that there were no known instances of large-scale methamphetamine or heroin trafficking to either Japan or Taiwan with direct North Korean state involvement, it said in the 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

“The continued lack of public reports of drug trafficking with a direct DPRK (North Korea) connection suggests that such high-profile drug trafficking has either ceased or been sharply reduced,” the report said.

The report said, however, that trafficking of methamphetamines along the North Korea-China border continues and press reports about such activities have increased in comparison to last year.

“These reports… point to transactions between DPRK traffickers and large-scale, organised Chinese criminal groups” in locations along the border.

“Press reports of continuing seizures of methamphetamine trafficked to organised Chinese criminals from DPRK territory suggest continuing manufacture and sale of DPRK methamphetamine,” the report said.

This and continued trafficking in counterfeit cigarettes and currency suggests that “enforcement against organized criminality in the DPRK is lax”, it added.

Additional Information:
1.  Back in March, Andrei Lankov wrote about this situtaion.

2. Earlier this year, the DPRK arrested some Japanese men in Rason for “trafficking and counterfeit”.

3. In June, China intercepted a meth shipment from the DPRK.

4. Marcus Noland also has posted on this topic.

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DPRK trade update: China (up), South Korea (down)

July 7th, 2011

UPDATE 1 (2011-7-13): Marcus Noland wrote some comments on the DPRK’s trade with China:

In an earlier post we argued that North Korea’s trade dependency on China, while large and rising, is frequently exaggerated in public discussions. According to press reports, the Korean Development Institute has apparently gone some way in rectifying this situation, determining that China accounts for 57 percent of North Korea’s trade—a far cry from the 80 percent derived from the KOTRA figures that ignore North-South trade, yet still well above the 30-40 percent we obtain on the basis of IMF figures. Like KOTRA, the KDI figures appear to be missing trade—their overall estimate for total North Korean trade, approximately $6 billion, is well below the $8-11 billion reported in recent years by the Fund. Those figures are not unimpeachable—just take a look on our recent posting regarding their FDI data, but it is striking that the numbers diverge by such large margins.

ORIGINAL POST(2011-7-7):

Trade with China: According to the APF (2011-7-6):

North Korea’s reliance on China for trade deepened last year after South Korea severed most ties with Pyongyang, accusing it of torpedoing of one of its warships, a think-tank said Wednesday.

The state Korea Development Institute said in a report the North’s trade with China was worth $3.47 billion last year, up 29.3 percent from a year earlier.

Such trade accounted for 56.9 percent of its total trade of $6.09 billion last year, up from 52.6 percent in 2009.

The trend intensified this year, with the value of North Korea-China trade nearly doubling to $1.43 billion during the first four months from the same period a year earlier.

This was mainly due to a sharp rise in the North’s coal exports, the institute said.

In contrast, the North’s exports to South Korea plunged from an average $40 million per month in January-May last year to a mere $1 million per month in the first four months of this year.

“The North drastically expanded exports of such strategic materials as coal to China” after its trade with the South was almost cut off, the report said.

This sudden surge in exports contributed to energy shortages in the North during the past winter.

Here is the report home page (Korean). Here is the report (Korean-PDF)

Trade with South Korea: According to Yonhap:

Trade between South and North Korea shrank more than 14 percent in a year following economic sanctions imposed on the North in retaliation for its sinking of a South Korean warship, the Unification Ministry said Sunday.

Total inter-Korean trade dropped to US$1.73 billion in the year spanning from June last year to May this year, declining 14.41 percent from $2.02 billion in the same June-May period a year earlier, according to the ministry.

The decline came after the sitting Lee Myung-bak administration declared on May 24 last year its resolution to bring the North’s March 26 sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan to the United Nations Security Council.

The South also imposed economic sanctions on the North in reaction to the ship attack that killed 46 crew members. The North has denied responsibility for the attack.

General trade and processing trade, in which North Korea imports resources and manufactures them to re-export to the South or another country, plunged 76.45 percent to $165.9 million during the cited period, the ministry said. Both of the trade types have been banned since the May resolution.

Inter-Korean trade has shown an even steeper downtrend since the beginning of this year as pre-paid manufacturing orders, which were exempt from the trade ban, nearly came to an end, according to the ministry.

During the January-May period, cross-border trade stood at $685.2 million, down 21.5 percent from the same five-month period last year, it said.

However, the volume of trade via the Kaesong industrial complex, an inter-Korean joint economic project, rose 24.2 percent to $1.55 billion over the past year, the ministry added.

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Kim Jong-il guidance focused on economy in 2011

July 7th, 2011

According to Yonhap:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has focused his inspection tours on economic facilities in the first six months of the year, an official said Wednesday, indicating that he wants to improve his country’s faltering economy ahead of next year’s landmark centennial anniversary of his late father’s birth.

Kim made 63 public appearances during January and June, the largest number ever compared to the same period in previous years.

On 28 of the outings, the North Korean leader inspected economic facilities, Unification Ministry spokeswoman Lee Jong-joo told reporters.

Kim “has been increasing activities on economic areas since 2008,” she said.

The North has vowed to improve light industries and agriculture as part of its stated campaign to build a prosperous and powerful nation next year, the centennial of the birth of the country’s late founder, Kim Il-sung, the father of current leader Kim.

The move comes amid doubt about whether the North can make any economic breakthrough by next year.

North Korea has built some 500 houses in its capital of Pyongyang, far short of its goal of building 100,000 houses by next year, according to the National Intelligence Service, Seoul’s spy agency.

During the first half of this year the North Korean leader inspected just one military unit and made 13 other military-related public appearances, including art performances, Lee said.

Meanwhile, Kim’s son and heir apparent, Kim Jong-un, accompanied his father on 35 inspection trips, more than 80 percent of which were related to the military.

This year I have actually been keeping a spreadsheet of KJI’s guidance trips.  I have a list of 80 public appearances by Kim Jong-il and 47 could be considered economic.  It is kind of hard to determine since many facilities are actually dual-use and provide goods for both the civilian and military economies.  Also, many “cultural” activities in which Kim Jong-il partakes are actually military-related since he attends them with KPA leaders.  Anyway, I have provided the full list of KJI’s public appearances and links to the relevant KCNA stories in this Excel spreadsheet.  You can do your own calculations.

 

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Philippines donates to DPRK school

July 7th, 2011

Pictured above (Google Earth): Suspected location of Kaeson Middle School (Google Maps)

According to the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs:

Foreign Affairs Undersecretary for Policy Erlinda F. Basilio turned over to the Pyongyang Kaeson Middle School a Philippine donation of Philippine and ASEAN books, as well as a computer set consisting of one desktop computer, one laptop computer, and one printer last July 1.

Undersecretary Basilio was in Pyongyang with other Philippine officials to take part in scheduled Policy Consultations with the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Established in August 1960 and located in Pyongyang’s Moranbong District, Pyongyang Kaeson Middle School was designated the Philippines-DPRK Friendship School on 23 August 2010, as part of the 10th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The school is run by nine officials and 79 teachers, and has a student population of 1,454.

The donation was undertaken in cooperation with the Philippine Embassy in Beijing and the PH-Korea Friendship Society, based in Pyongyang.

The Philippines and the DPRK established diplomatic relations on 12 July 2000.

Additional information:

1. The DPRK routiney names schools and farms as “Country X-DPRK Friendship school/farm”.   For example, the Songyo Secondary School is also the “DPRK-Mongolia Friendship School”.  I have written about “friendship farms” before (here and here).

2. The PH [Philippine]-Korea Friendship Society is an “organization” in the “TaeMun” (대문) portfolio.  대문 is the North Korean abbreviation for 대외문화련락위원회, or in English, the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.  I say “organization” because in reality this friendship society, like all of the others, contains only one or two part-time members.  TaeMun takes its origins from an imported Soviet office named the All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (Всесоюзное общество культурных связей с заграницей), known in the West by the acronym VOKS (from the Russian “BOKC”).  Historically, its  job was to create sympathetic constituencies in foreign countries and provide the North Korean government with an alternate channel of foreign information, but since the Arduous March they have transformed their mission to focus more directly on resource acquisition.  There is some tension between TaeMun and the DPRK Foreign Ministry.  TaeMun has a web page here.

3. Here are some previous posts on the DPRK-Philippines relationship: here, here, here and here.

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DPRK defectors in the US

July 6th, 2011

According to KBS Global:

The Voice of America (VOA) said Wednesday that two North Korean defectors were granted refugee status and settled in the U.S. in June.

The VOA referenced a report by the U.S. State Department that said from October last year through June, a total of 21 North Koreans entered the U.S. as refugees.

The VOA reported that since the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act in the U.S. in 2004, the number of North Korean refugees entering the U.S. has increased to 122.

Previous stories stories about DPRK emigration can be found here.

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Cost of defetion

July 6th, 2011

According to a recent article in the BBC:

Mrs Kwon says she makes $2,000-$3,000 (£1,250-£1,875) a month, helping people escape. And she says that is nothing to be ashamed of.

“Nowadays, they’re asking for 3.5m won per person to bring someone out of North Korea to China,” she says.

“That’s about $3,500. And from China to South Korea would cost another $2,500. I don’t have that kind of money, so I had to say ‘No’. The cost is rising because it’s getting more difficult to get people out.”

Recent reports – which are very difficult to verify – say North Korea is tightening security along its border with China; the main route for defectors trying to leave. As the risks increase, so does the price.

Additional Information:
1. Story citation: Shadowy world of Korea’s people smugglers, BBC, Lucy Williamson, 2011-7-6

2. Previous posts on emigration from the DPRK to the ROK.

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A.Q. Kahn claims Pakistan military sold nuclear technology to the DPRK

July 6th, 2011

 

According to the Washington Post:

The founder of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb program asserts that the government of North Korea bribed top military officials in Islamabad to obtain access to sensitive nuclear technology in the late 1990s.

Abdul Qadeer Khan has made available documents that he says support his claim that he personally transferred more than $3 million in payments by North Korea to senior officers in the Pakistani military, which he says subsequently approved his sharing of technical know-how and equipment with North Korean scientists.

Khan also has released what he says is a copy of a North Korean official’s 1998 letter to him, written in English, that spells out details of the clandestine deal.

Some Western intelligence officials and other experts have said that they think the letter is authentic and that it offers confirmation of a transaction they have long suspected but could never prove. Pakistani officials, including those named as recipients of the cash, have called the letter a fake. Khan, whom some in his country have hailed as a national hero, is at odds with many Pakistani officials, who have said he acted alone in selling nuclear secrets.

Nevertheless, if the letter is genuine, it would reveal a remarkable instance of corruption related to nuclear weapons. U.S. officials have worried for decades about the potential involvement of elements of Pakistan’s military in illicit nuclear proliferation, partly because terrorist groups in the region and governments of other countries are eager to acquire an atomic bomb or the capacity to build one.

Because the transactions in this episode would be directly known only to the participants, the assertions by Khan and the details in the letter could not be independently verified by The Washington Post. A previously undisclosed U.S. investigation of the corruption at the heart of the allegations — conducted before the letter became available — ended inconclusively six years ago, in part because the Pakistani government has barred official Western contact with Khan, U.S. officials said.

By all accounts, Pakistan’s confirmed shipments of centrifuges and sophisticated drawings helped North Korea develop the capacity to undertake a uranium-based route to making the bomb, in addition to its existing plutonium weapons. Late last year, North Korea let a group of U.S. experts see a uranium-enrichment facility and said it was operational.

The letter Khan released, which U.S. officials said they had not seen previously, is dated July 15, 1998, and marked “Secret.” “The 3 millions dollars have already been paid” to one Pakistani military official and “half a million dollars” and some jewelry had been given to a second official, says the letter, which carries the apparent signature of North Korean Workers’ Party Secretary Jon Byong Ho. The text also says: “Please give the agreed documents, components, etc. to . . . [a North Korean Embassy official in Pakistan] to be flown back when our plane returns after delivery of missile components.”

The North Korean government did not respond to requests for comment about the letter.

Jehangir Karamat, a former Pakistani military chief named as the recipient of the $3 million payment, said the letter is untrue. In an e-mail from Lahore, Karamat said that Khan, as part of his defense against allegations of personal responsibility for illicit nuclear proliferation, had tried “to shift blame on others.” Karamat said the letter’s allegations were “malicious with no truth in them whatsoever.”

The other official named in the letter, retired Lt. Gen. Zulfiqar Khan, called it “a fabrication.”

The Pakistani Embassy in Washington declined to comment officially. But a senior Pakistani official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity “to avoid offending” Khan’s supporters, said the letter “is clearly a fabrication. It is not on any official letterhead and bears no seal. . . . The reference to alleged payment and gifts to senior Pakistani military officers is ludicrous.”

There is, however, a Pakistani-Western divide on the letter, which was provided to The Post by former British journalist Simon Henderson, who The Post verified had obtained it from Khan. A U.S. intelligence official who tracks nuclear proliferation issues said it contains accurate details of sensitive matters known only to a handful of people in Pakistan, North Korea and the United States.

A senior U.S. official said separately that government experts concluded after examining a copy of the letter that the signature appears authentic and that the substance is “consistent with our knowledge” now of the same events. Both officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the diplomatic sensitivity of the allegation.

Olli Heinonen, a 27-year vet­eran of the International Atomic Energy Agency who led its investigation of Khan before moving to Harvard’s Kennedy School last year, said the letter is similar to other North Korean notes that he had seen or received. They typically lacked a letterhead, he said; moreover, he said he has previously heard similar accounts — originating from senior Pakistanis — of clandestine payments by North Korea to Pakistani military officials and government advisers.

The substance of the letter, Heinonen said, “makes a lot of sense,” given what is now known about the North Korean program.

Jon, now 84, the North Korean official whose signature appears on the letter, has long been a powerful member of North Korea’s national defense commission, in charge of military procurement. In August, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed financial sanctions on his department for its ballistic missile work.

According to Khan, in the 1990s, Jon met then-Pakistani President Farooq Leghari, toured the country’s nuclear laboratory and arranged for dozens of North Korean technicians to work there. Khan detailed the payments Jon allegedly arranged in written statements that Henderson, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, shared with The Post. Henderson said he acquired the letter and the statements from Khan in the years after his 2004 arrest by Pakistani authorities.

Henderson, who has written extensively about Khan, said he provided the letter to The Post because he lacked the resources to authenticate it himself.

He said the letter and the statements constitute new evidence that Khan’s proliferation involved more-senior Pakistani officials than Khan himself. Khan has been freed from home detention but remains under round-the-clock surveillance in a suburb of Islamabad, where the government has recently threatened him with new sanctions for illicit communications.

Some of Khan’s past statements have been called into question. Pakistani officials have publicly accused Khan — who is still highly regarded by many in his country — of exaggerating the extent of official approval he received for his nuclear-related exports to North Korea, Libya and Iran. In 2006, then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf accused Khan of profiting directly from nuclear-related commerce.

Although Khan “was not the only one who profited from the sale of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons technology and components . . . by Pakistani standards, his standard of living was lavish,” and the disclosure of his private bank account in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates — with millions of dollars in it — was highly suspicious, said Mark Fitzpatrick, an acting deputy assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation during the George W. Bush administration.

Khan says the bank account was used by associates and a charity he founded, and the Pakistani government never asked him to return any money. He said that in 2007 — six years after his formal retirement and complaints of financial hardship — Musharraf arranged for a lump-sum payment equivalent to $50,000 and a monthly pension of roughly $2,500, which Khan says “belied all those accusations and claims.”

Although U.S. officials disagreed for years about North Korea’s uranium-enrichment capability, the dispute was settled in November when the Pyongyang government invited Siegfried Hecker — a metallurgist who formerly directed a U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory — to see a newly renovated building at Yongbyon that housed more than 1,000 enrichment centrifuges.

Hecker said in an interview that although the government did not disclose their origins, their size, shape and stated efficiency were close to a centrifuge model, known as the P2, that Khan obtained illicitly from Europe. Khan has said that he helped give North Korea four such devices.

“The combination of the Pakistani design, the Pakistani training and the major [Pakistani] procurement network they had access to” allowed North Korea to “put the pieces together to make it work,” Hecker said.

According to Khan’s written account, the swap of North Korean cash for sensitive Pakistani technology arose during a squabble in 1996 over delays in Pakistan’s payment to North Korea for some medium-range missiles. U.S. officials said they had heard of this dispute.

In the letter, Jon first thanks Khan for his assistance to North Korea’s then-representative to Islamabad, Gen. Kang Tae Yun, in the aftermath of a bizarre shooting incident in which an assailant supposedly gunning for Kang accidentally killed his wife. But the heart of the letter concerns two key transactions: the provision of a kickback to speed the overdue Pakistani missile-related payments and additional payments for the nuclear-related materials.

Khan, in his written statements — including an 11-page narrative he prepared for Pakistani investigators while under house arrest in 2004 that was obtained by The Post — said the idea for the kickback came from a Pakistani military officer.

Khan said Kang responded by delivering a half-million dollars in cash in a suitcase to a top Pakistani general, who declined it. Khan said Karamat, a more senior officer at the time, then said: “I should arrange with Gen. Kang to pay this money to him for some secret [Pakistani] army funds. He would then sanction the payment of their outstanding charges.”

“I talked to Gen. Kang, and he gave me the $0.5 million in cash, which I personally delivered” to Karamat, Khan wrote. He says this payment only whetted the army’s appetite, however: Karamat, who had just become chief of the army staff, “said to me that he needed more money for the same secret funds and that I should talk to Gen. Kang.”

Kang then started bargaining, saying that his superiors “were willing to provide another $2.5 million, provided we helped them with the enrichment technology,” Khan wrote.

Once the details of that assistance were worked out, Khan wrote, “I personally gave the remaining $2.5 million to Gen. Karamat in cash at the Army House to make up the whole amount.” Khan said he transferred all the funds on two occasions in a small canvas bag and three cartons, in one case at the chief of army staff’s official residence.

On the top of one carton was some fruit, and below it was $500,000 in cash, Khan wrote in a narrative for Henderson. Inside the bag was $500,000, and each of the other two cartons held $1 million, Khan wrote.

If the account is correct, the ultimate destination of the funds in any event remains unclear. Pakistani officials said in interviews that they found no trace of the money in Karamat’s accounts after an investigation. But the military is known to have used secret accounts for various purposes, including clandestine operations against neighboring India in the disputed Kashmir region.

Karamat said that such a delivery would have been impossible and that he “was not in the loop to delay, withhold or sanction payments” to North Korea. He called the letter “quite mind-boggling.”

The letter also states that Zulfiqar Khan, Karamat’s colleague, received “half a million dollars and 3 diamond and ruby sets” to pave the way for nuclear-weapons-related transfers. Zulfiqar Khan, who later became the head of Pakistan’s national water and power company, was among those who had witnessed the country’s nuclear weapons test six weeks before the letter was written.

Asked to respond, he said in an e-mail that he considered the entire episode “a fabrication and figment of imagination,” and he noted that he had not been accused of “any sort of dishonesty or irregularity” during 37 years as a military officer. He denied having any connection to North Korean contracts.

The senior Pakistani official said that Karamat and Zulfiqar Khan were “amongst the first to initiate accountability” for Abdul Qadeer Khan and his colleagues, and that implicating them in illegal proliferation “can only be deemed as the vengeful reaction of a discredited individual.”

In the letter, Jon requests that “the agreed documents, components” be placed aboard a North Korean plane. He goes on to congratulate Khan on Pakistan’s successful nuclear test that year and wish him “good health, long life and success in your important work.”

The Pakistani intelligence service interrogated Karamat in 2004 about Khan’s allegations, according to a Pakistani government official, but made no public statement about what it learned. Musharraf, who oversaw that probe, appointed Karamat as ambassador to Washington 10 months later, prompting further scrutiny by the U.S. intelligence community of reports that Karamat had arranged the sale of nuclear gear for cash.

Those inquiries, several U.S. officials said, ended inconclusively at the time because of Karamat’s denial and Washington’s inability to question Khan.

The letter can be found here.

For those of you who are interested, here is the biography of Jon Byong-ho from the Yonhap  North Korea Handbook (p. 796):

Jeon Byeong-ho
Current Posts: secretary (in charge of munitions), Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee (wpK CC)
Educ.: Anju Middle School, Pyeongyang; Ural Engineering College, USSR
Born: March 1926 (Musan, North Harngyeong Province)
Career:
security staff, Anju Security Guards, South Pyeongan Province, Aug. 1945
security squad for Kim II-sung’s House, Aug. 1945
studied at Ural Engineering College, USSR, just before the Korean War, 1950
engineer, chief engineer, manager, Ganggye Tractor Factory (Military Logistics Factory), Jagang Province, End of 1951
vicedirector, Machine Industry Dept. (originally Military Logistics Dept.), Oct. 1970
alternate member, WPK CC, Nov. 1970
director general, General Bureau of Second Economic Committee, 1972
member, WPK CC, Oct. 1980-
delegate, Seventh SPA, Feb. 1982
chairman, Second Economic Committee, March 1982
awarded Order of Kim II-sung, Apr. 1982
alternate member, Politburo, WPK CC, Aug. 1982
delegate, Eighth SPA, Nov. 1986
secretary (in charge of munitions), WPK CC, Dec. 1986
member, Politburo, WPK CC, Nov. 1988-
delegate (Geumbit, South Hamgyeong Province), Ninth Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), Apr. 1990
member, Military Committee; director, Military Industry Policy Inspection Dept., May 1990-
director, Economic Policy Supervisory Dept., March 1994
member (11th), Kim Il-sung Funeral Committee, July 1994
awarded title of Labor Hero, Feb. 1998
member, Tenth SPA (254th electoral district), July 1998
member, Military Committee, Sept. 1998

He has since taken a post at the National Defense Commission and “been put out to pasture” (see here also).  According to another Washington Post article: “U.S. officials confirm that he long directed North Korea’s defense procurement and nuclear weapons efforts, putting him in a position to know about the events the letter depicts.”

The Guardian and Arms Control Wonk also covered this story.

Read the full story here:
Pakistan’s nuclear-bomb maker says North Korea paid bribes for know-how
Washington Post
R. Jeffrey Smith
2011-7-6

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