North Korean Economy Watch

*All of the videos referenced in this post were deleted by YouTube in September 2017*

UPDATE 1(2016-2-23): The North Koreans have re-released the original documentary in Korean. Here are links to parts one, two, and three.

ORIGINAL POST (2015-3-20): Though Yeon-mi Park is arguably one of the most well-known North Korean defectors these days, for numerous reasons I have not devoted much of my time to her work. I was also surprised when Uriminzokkiri released two videos discredit Ms. Park (Video one in three parts is here. Video two is here). Maybe someday the North Koreans will catch onto the fact that these videos actually raise the status/profile of those they are trying to vilify, but in the meantime we can have some fun with them.

Ms. Park is the third North Korean defector (of whom I am aware) about which the DPRK has made these sorts of films. She now joins company with Shin Dong-hyuk and and Ma Yong-hae, though doubtless there are more.

The second video attacking Ms. Park was interesting to me due to the use of geography to try and discredit her story. So I thought I would write about what the video claims and examine whether its assertions hold up to some basic scrutiny. As was the case with the videos attacking Mr. Shin, the North Koreans appear to unintentionally verify some Ms. Park’s claims. So let’s begin.

The video states at the 3:33 mark:

In one of her lies, Park said that about eight kilometers from Hyesan in Ryanggang Province there is a “Juche Rock” in a peak of a mountain called “Kot-dong-ji (?)” in Komsan-ri (검산리). She said if you look down from that mountain peak you can see Pongsu-ri (봉수리) of Pochon County and [the] Amnok River. She said she took that route to escape.

But in fact there is a highway from Hyesan to Pochon County and just on its left side there is a small rock called “Juche Rock.” And if you look down from there the opposite side is Changbai  County of Jilin Province, China.

On the far other side of [the] Amok River, you can see not the Pongsu-ri of Pochon County but Yonpung-dong, Hyesan City.  So how on earth did she manage to find a mountain here in the region which she is said to have crossed at the risk of her life?

The video was indeed filmed in Hyesan, but unfortunately for the North Koreans, when I combine (a) data in the video with (b) administrative data published in North Korea with (c) satellite imagery, I get results that verify claims made by Ms. Park (as described in the video).

Here is a Google Earth satellite image  of the area described in the video (where Ms. Park is alleged to have crossed the Amnok River):

To begin with, “Juche Rock” (41.449298°, 128.247329°) can clearly be seen on top of a mountain in Hyesan, Ryanggang province. I am not sure why the North Koreans wanted to bother disproving the existence of a mountain–especially if they are going to record a video from the top of it.

Secondly, “Juche Rock” is on the outer border of Komsan-ri:

Thirdly, later in the video (6:16), the North Koreans identify a house they claim was Ms. Park’s in Sinhung-dong, Hyesan City. Here is a satellite picture of that house (Marked in yellow: 41.397725°, 128.171969°):

I have no idea if the Park family actually lived here, but this house is exactly 8.48 km from “Juche Rock”. It’s a bit further on foot. So again, the satellite data is confirming what the video asserts Ms. Park claimed.

Finally, the point about the village to the north of “Juche Rock” being Yonpung-dong, Hyesan City, not  Pongsu-ri of Pochon County, was the most difficult to for me to untangle. This confusion stemmed from two causes. The first was because Ms. Park is technically wrong about “Pongsu-ri” being the next village north of Juche Rock. The second source of confusion is because the North Koreans recently changed the border between Hyesan City and Pochon County and have apparently done some renaming in the process.

I have three maps (published in North Korea) that identify ‘Yonpung-dong, Hyesan City’ as ‘Hwajon-ri (화전리), Pochon County.’ You can see the area for yourself on Google Earth at  41.460212°, 128.231495°. Apparently sometime recently (I don’t know when), the North Koreans shifted the border of Hyesan City further north into Pochon County. At this time I suspect that Hwajon-ri was renamed Yonpung-dong. The only evidence that I have of the border change is a blurry map that the North Koreans produced to show the location of Hyesan’s new economic development zone. It shows the Hyesan border has moved north from its original location, however even it retains the name “Hwajon-ri.” The only source I have that the area has been renamed “Yonpung-dong” is this Uriminzokkiri video. But all of this certainly took place after Ms. Park had left the DPRK.

Here are approximate before and after pictures of the Hyesan – Pochon border changes:

To Ms. Park’s credit, however, there is an area just north of Yonpung-dong/Hwajon-ri called ‘Pongsu’ (봉수). It is not a ‘ri’, but it used to have a train station with the same name. The train station has since been torn down, but that may be the reason she remembers the area as “Pongsu.”

So to recap: The North Koreans published a video in which they called Ms. Park a liar (among other things) and used geography to prove that she had mislead people. The geographic points they raise in the video, however, tend to support comments Ms. Park is alleged to have made.

There is a separate question as to whether Ms. Park made the claims referenced in the video, and to that I have no idea. As I mentioned, I have not paid particular attention to her story.

However, I am delighted that digging into this video has taught me that the border between Hyesan and Pochon has changed.

There are other claims in the video that I don’t want to address because, frankly, I am not qualified–and it is Friday.

Two new books are out on North Korea. Together they “book-end” North Korea’s history. One takes place in the beginning. The other takes place in current times. Info and links below.

North Korea Confidential: Private Markets, Fashion Trends, Prison Camps, Dissenters and Defectors
By Daniel Tudor and James Pearson

You can learn more about the book and order it from Amazon.com.

I have read bits of this book and found it very interesting.

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The Great Leader and the Fighter Pilot: The True Story of the Tyrant Who Created North Korea and The Young Lieutenant Who Stole His Way to Freedom
By Blaine Harden

You can learn more about this book and order it at amazon.com.

Media coverage of the book here and here.

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Other books, videos, blogs, etc are here.

UPDATE 2 (2015-9-24): For what it is worth, I do not believe much of Shin’s story (either of the three versions that have now been released). I believe he continues to deceive us on significant aspects of his history.

UPDATE 1 (2015-9-24): The latest version of Escape from Camp 14 has been released. Mr Harden has added a new forward to the book, but does not appear to have altered any of the passages in the text itself despite the fact that Shin has admitted that they contain inaccurate information. Since the book’s new forward references me, I thought I should post the information I provided Mr. Harden here for public scrutiny.

First of all, here are the maps of Kaechon and Pukchang that Mr. Harden references in the book’s new forward. This map was published in a North Korean atlas released in 1978:

This map shows that the area that came to be known as Camp 18, Pongchang-ri (봉창리), is clearly inside the borders of Kaechon County in 1978.

Here are the borders of Camp 18 overlapped on the map of 1978 Kaechon:

Because Pongchang-ri is inside Kaechon and is connected by rail to Camp 14, I stated that it is “plausible” that the area that came to be known as Camp 18 was actually part of Camp 14 in 1978.

According to the North Korean atlas Samchonri published by the Pyongyang Informatics Center, “in February 1984, Pongchang-ri of Kaechon County was incorporated into Pukchang County.” I told Mr. Harden that is was “plausible” that this is when Camp 18 was separated from Camp 14, since the two camps would now be housed in different counties. Shin claimed that Camp 18 was separated from Camp 14 in Kaechon sometime around 1980 for which I have no corroborating evidence.

Here is a North Korean atlas map of Pukchang published in 1997 which indicates that Pongchang-ri (봉창리, Camp  18) is part of Pukchang County:

And here is the same map with the border of Camp 18 outlined on it:

So North Korean sources indicate that the area that came to be known as Camp 18 was part of the same county as Camp 14 (Kaechon), until it was transferred to Pukchang in 1984.

ORIGINAL POST (2015-1-18): On October 26, 2014, Uriminzokkiri uploaded two videos to YouTube to discredit human rights activist Shin Dong-hyuk. Video one is here. Video two is here.

Below are some notes I took from the videos (back in October). I shared them with a couple of friends, but never published them. Point number 4 seems most relevant to the news this weekend, that Shin spent time in Camp 18.

1. Shin’s father, Shin Kyong-sop (신경섭?) claims he was born in Ryongbuk-ri, Mundok County: 룡북리, 39.498574°, 125.455410°. However, this ri was made part of Chongnam District. Chongnam District was initially carved out of Mundok County in 1980. In 1998 it was abolished and reincorporated into Mundok County. However, in 1999 Chongnam District was re-established with Ryongbuk-ri and Sin-ri of Mundok County. Either Shin’s father did not know that his home village had been moved into a new jurisdiction [because he has been incarcerated and not updated], or he is reporting that the ri was part of Mundok when he was born (it was). Ryongbuk-ri is appx 67km from Tukjang (as the crow flies), where Shin’s father lives now (according to the videos). More on Tukjang below.

2. The video asserts that Shin was born in 1980 (1:01, in video 1) and that his original name is Shin In-gun (신인근). Shin acknowledged this name, I am unsure about the birth year.

3. Shin claims he is from Oedong-ri (외동리, 39.575453°, 126.071407°) which is inside [officially unacknowledged] Camp 14. (1:37, Video 1). Camp boundaries in yellow.

4. Shin’s father claims that they did not live in a political prison camp [Camp 14] (1:52, Video 1), but in Pongchang-ri (봉창리, 39.562650°, 126.077345°). Pongchang-ri is on the opposite side of the Taedong River from Oedong-ri in Camp 14, where Shin claims he is from. Pongchang-ri became part of Pukchang County in February 1984. Before that, Pongchang-ri was officially part of Kaechon County (where Camp 14 is located).

However more importantly, Pongchang-ri is inside the former Camp 18. Shin’s father offers a photo he claims is of a six-year-old Shin in Pongchang-ri. The year would be 1986, but Camp 18 was not closed until the 2000s. So revealing that Shin lived in Pongchang-ri as a child is admitting he was in a prison camp (Camp 18)…just not the one he claims to have been from (Camp 14). So now the North Koreans and Shin can at least agree he was in Camp 18.

I have posted 2010 KCTV footage of Pongchang-ri (coal mine) here which matches the satellite imagery of the site.

5. Dad says Shin went to primary school in Pongchang and secondary school in Tukjang (2:07, Video 1). But graduated from a different secondary school (“Suwon Secondary School”) and got a job in the “Suwon Pit”.  [How common is it for North Korean schoolchildren to change secondary schools? Under what conditions does this happen?]  Mr. Song Yoon-bok, chief secretary of “No Fence in North Korea,” has told me that the father did not say “Suwon” but rather “Suan,” and Uriminzokkiri misspelled it in English on the videos. “Suan” is a small area of eastern Pongchang-ri, and “Several former Camp 18 survivors now living in Seoul certainly remember the name and location…in Camp 18.” I cannot find this area on any maps, but a defector named Kim Hye-Suk identified it in this publication.

After the Suwon/Suan pit, Shin’s father claims he left home and moved to Puhung Mine in Unsan (2:53, Video 1). However when Shin was 12, (December 1992), Puhung Workers` District was incorporated into Sunchon City. It is still in Sunchon City. So his father is incorrect about the county/city that his son’s mine was in (unless Shin started working there before he was 12).

Shin’s father also says that most of Shin’s injuries come from mining accidents (3:23, Video 1). As of 2015-1-17, Shin still maintains his injuries are from torture.

Also, the father does not seem surprised when he is asked about family members being “raped to death” (4:05) [Like he does when he is asked about “reward Marriage”]. I believe that even most North Koreans would have a more visceral reaction to that question. Implies more coaching.

6. According to the video, Shin’s parents live in Kalgol-dong No. 146 of Tukjang Workers’ District. 39.577267°, 126.225550°. The North Korean video footage matches satellite imagery of Tukjang Workers’ District, but not of Kalgol-dong (3:20, Video 1). Tukjang Workers’ District lies just outside boundaries of former Camp 18.

  

UPDATE 1 (2015-1-26): The Milyong Revolutionary site has not appeared on the evening news (to the best of my knowledge) since the fire was reported.

ORIGINAL POST (2014-1023): According to the Daily NK:

A raging wildfire that broke out on October 21st in North Korea’s Samjiyon County, Yangkang Province is said to have burned down former leader Kim Jong Il’s home on Mount Baekdu near Milyong, the alleged birthplace of the late leader, the Daily NK has learned.

“The fire in Samjiyon County has spread to Baekam County putting the country in a state of emergency,” a source in Yangkang Province told the Daily NK on Tuesday. “The Baekdu Milyong home and most of the historic revolutionary landmarks have gone up in flames.”

“The 10th Corps [a military body charged with maintain order and security] in Yangkang Province, the State Security Department, and provincial units of the People’s Safety Ministry are all on high alert,” the source elaborated. “To determine the cause of the fire, cadres from the Central Party have also been dispatched.”

…

North Korea appears to be trying to wipe out the fire by mobilizing residents in the area. “They started broadcasts from the 20th in downtown Hyesan, and even on the Third Broadcast [fixed cable system to which only North Korean residents are exposed], they’ve been saying that everyone actively must lend a hand to get the fire under control,” the source said. It is not only in Hyesan City, but residents in Bochon [Pochon], Unheung [Unhung], Baekam [Paekam], and Shinpa [Sinpha] Counties that have also been mobilized to combat the wildfire.

“The autumn air is dry and so are the leaves. On top of that the winds are strong, so they haven’t been able to effectively fight the fire,” she went on. “Despite days having passed since the fire broke out, they haven’t been able to tame the flames.”

“Already people are saying, whether the fire was deliberate or an accident, anyone tied to it will probably be executed,” she said, speculating, “If it’s arson, it will be a huge problem, since it will be seen as treason. Even if that’s not the case, they will be held accountable for not managing a key historic site of the country.”

“Some security officials have said that this incident will not end with simply one or two people being held responsible,” the source alleged. “Even provincial Party members have been staying onsite, eating and sleeping there, to try to put out the fire.”

North Korean state media outlets have yet to report on the fire, but attention is on how or if it will provide coverage of the incident.

I am unable to obtain a recent satellite image of the area, but this one was published in the Donga Ilbo:

This satellite image is fairly low quality, but it does not appear to me that there is a fire at the Milyong Revolutionary site.

Read the full stories here:
Fire Swallows Kim Jong Il’s Landmark Home
Daily NK
Kang Mi Jin
2014-10-23

The AP reports that Jeffrey Fowle has been released from the DPRK.

Here is coverage in Reuters, Daily NK, The Guardian.

Secretary of State Kerry says no quid-pro-quo.

Previous stories on the case here.

The Nautilus Institute has published an interesting paper on energy infrastructure in the DPRK’s initial four special economic zones: Rason, Hwanggumphyong, Kaesong, Kaesong, and Kumgang.

Here is the publication information and  a link:

“Supplying Energy Needs for the DPRK’s Special Economic Zones and Special Administrative Regions: Electricity Infrastructure Requirements”
Nautilus Institute
Roger Cavazos & David von Hippel
2014-8-19

Here is the introduction:

The Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) uses special economic zones as a mechanism for engaging in commercial activity with other nations without substantially converting its economy to a market model; earning hard currency while reducing some of the social and political risks associated with a broader opening of the DPRK economy. The DPRK recently announced its intent to increase the number of Special Designated Zones, including Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and Special Administrative Regions (SAR) in the country by fourteen.[1] In most cases, these Special Designated Zones (we will use “Special Zone”, or “SZ”,as the generic term in this Working Paper to apply to Special Designated Zones) will require energy supply (and demand) infrastructure that is now missing, or insufficient, at all existing and proposed Special Zone sites. Even though past is not prologue—and the mechanisms for supplying energy needs to new SZs may be different than those used in the past, this paper seeks to briefly describe already existing Special Zones in terms of their present energy requirements. Present requirements provide rough estimates of the energy requirements of the newly proposed zones. Specifically we examine: the Rason Special Economic Zone and Special Administrative Region, the Hwanggumphyong Special Economic Zone, the Wihwado Special Economic Zone, the Kumgang Mountain Tourist Area, and finally, the Kaesong Industrial Zone. These specially designated zones ideally contribute to economic development in North Korea as well as provide economic benefits to the Chinese and Russian provinces bordering North Korea. Chinese plans to resuscitate and/or invigorate the economies of their three Northeast provinces bordering North Korea would certainly be moved forward by trade with a richer North Korea and access to strategic North Korean ports just across the border. Although this paper does not cover Russian plans, the motivations for Russian investments in North Korean SZs are likely similar—the desire to boost the economies of the areas of the Russian Far East that adjoin the DPRK, and to improve access to markets in Asia.

There is a limited but growing amount of information available to understand how these Special Zones are defined by North Korean policy, how they are currently faring in terms of economic performance, and what future zones will likely require in terms of energy usage. There is also a growing body of rules and regulations by which North Korea and China plan to govern these zones. Except for the Kaesong industrial complex, it appears that all these zones are significantly short on the energy infrastructure necessary to supply their modest current demands, let alone any future projected demands. North Korea’s decision to declare several such zones in North Korea’s interior may possibly indicate a desire to stitch together North Korea’s electrical transmission and distribution networks which are currently more a patchwork of regional grids rather than a unified national grid. Previous Special Zones have always been on or near North Korea’s periphery. Because previous zones were located on the DPRK’s frontiers, they were largely able to “plug in” to already developed electricity transmission and distribution systems on the other side of the border (in China, Russia or South Korea). While we present no specific calculations here, the cost to renew the DPRK’s entire transmission and distribution (T&D) system will certainly cost billions to tens of billions of dollars which could consume on the order of 10 percent or more of North Korea’s GDP for 5 to 10 years, assuming, as estimated by Republic of Korea (ROK) sources, that North Korea’s GDP is in the neighborhood of 40 billion dollars. The costs of T&D renewal are thus well beyond anything North Korea is likely to be able to afford to do in the short-term on anything but a piecemeal basis.

Despite gaps in our knowledge of how Special Zones in the DPRK have formed and operate or will operate, there is a substantial amount of information available from English, Chinese and Korean-language sources describing the basic plans for investment and the businesses that North Korean, Chinese, and in some cases Russian partners hope to develop in some Special Economic Zones. What is missing from the plans for which information is available, however, are detailedplans for building the energy infrastructure required to support the amount of economic activity (in factories, ports, hotels, workers quarters, and other elements of the SZs) envisioned. The electricity infrastructure required to support the economic plans is modest by most industrial standards. The existing infrastructure in most of the SZs, however, is grossly inadequate, and thus will require significant international investment to allow the SZs to operate as planned.

Investing in SZ infrastructure is likely to be more complex than a typical industrial investment. Sources of investment funds for SZ infrastructure could include businesses from a number of nations, and/or government or multilateral funds. Each potential lender/investor will have its own criteria for deciding on whether a given investment is reasonable or too risky. In theory, involving a number of different actors from different nations in DPRK SZ infrastructure investments would help to diversify the risk borne by any given company or nation, and to create a broader constituency for working with North Koreans using business practices that comply with international law and standards. In part, a broader constituency of coordinated investors could also help to discourage the “rent-seeking” by officials that is often a part of projects in the DPRK (and in many other countries). Because the amount of infrastructure-building required is high, there is significant potential for illegal rent-seeking, that is, for example, for DPRK authorities to inflate the price of “surveys” or permits, or the cost of securing import rights for equipment needed for the SZs, in order to gain personally from the transaction.

Working conditions in SZs will be another area of concern for investors and for foreign firms seeking to operate facilities in new or existing SZs. Anecdotal reports suggest that industrial facilities in general in the DPRK tend to operate with limited evident concern for worker safety. In the absence of pressure from investing companies, it is also likely that working conditions will remain poor and dangerous, as there does not appear to be a significant set of DPRK regulations related to industrial safety. Nor, for that matter, does there appear to be a well-established and well-funded government body dedicated to establishing, monitoring and enforcing industrial safety regulations.

This paper describes several of the Special Zones now operating in or in the advanced planning process in the DPRK, together with what is known about plans for their development. For each, it provides a description of the likely energy requirements, based on what can be determined regarding planned activities at each site, and examines adjoining energy infrastructure to identify probable degrees of energy shortfalls that foreign investors, working with DPRK counterparts, will need to overcome. Some of issues and policies that policymakers inside and outside of the DPRK will need to consider in order to arrange for the financing and construction of the requisite infrastructure to operate the SZs.

You can download the PDF here.

A valued reader sent in this photo from a restaurant in the DPRK:

And the DPRK’s premier music ensemble, “The Moranbong Band” performed “Phantom of the Opera” in Pyongyang: