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NK Refugees Settling in South Ineligible for US Asylum

Friday, April 6th, 2007

Korea Times
4/6/2007

The U.S. Justice Department on Thursday overturned a Los Angeles court’s decision and ruled North Korean refugees who previously settled in South Korea are not eligible for asylum in the United States, according to the Yonhap News Agency.

Under the ruling, two such refugees were ordered to return to South Korea. The decision is also likely to affect other similar appeals filed by the former North Koreans.

A decision made Wednesday by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), a department agency, said the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 “does not apply to North Koreans who have availed themselves of the right to citizenship in South Korea.’’

The two people who have requested asylum in the U.S. are thus “precluded from establishing eligibility for asylum as to North Korea on the basis of their firm resettlement in South Korea,’’ Yonhap quoted the BIA as saying.

The two, one male and one female, crossed into the U.S. two years ago from the Mexican border. They filed an appeal when they were ordered to leave.

Yonhap, South Korea’s semi-official news service, said the BIA decision overturns earlier actions by the Los Angeles Immigration Court which granted asylum to a number of North Korean defectors who had legally been living in South Korea before seeking resettlement in the U.S.

The North Korean Human Rights Act states that the U.S. should facilitate the acceptance of refugees from the communist country, but there are varying interpretations on whether it applies to those who received asylum in South Korea.

The State Department had expressed alarm at the earlier decision by the L.A. immigration court, arguing that the act only applies to those who did not obtain legal status in another country.

The BIA said that in reaching the decision, it has “considered that each respondent has significant ties with South Korea, i.e. citizenship and children who live there.’’

“We also note that while living in South Korea, the respondents were employed, moved freely around the country, made public speeches, raised a family, and easily arranged travel to Mexico,’’ it said.

Posted in Emigration, Emigration statistics, USA | Comments Closed

Key facts on relations between North and South Korea

Monday, February 26th, 2007

Reuters (Hat tip DPRK studies)
2/26/2007

Senior officials from South and North Korea resume talks on Tuesday, seven months after dialogue broke down in acrimony over Pyongyang’s missile tests.

Following are key points in the ties between the two:

STILL AT WAR

– An armistice ending the 1950-53 Korean War dominates the relationship between the two Koreas. Nearly 1.2 million North Korean soldiers and South Korea’s 680,000 troops remain in a tense military standoff despite political and commercial ties that have warmed since 2000.

– The two have enough missiles and artillery pointed at each other to largely destroy major cities on both sides of the Korean peninsula.

POINTS OF EXCHANGE

– An industrial park in Kaesong just a few minutes’ drive from the heavily-fortified border is home to 21 companies employing about 12,000 North Korean workers.

– About 1.4 million South Koreans have visited the Mount Kumgang resort in the North just above the border on the east since the tours began in 1998. Roughly a quarter of a million made the visit in 2006 even as tension spiked following the North’s missile and nuclear tests.

– About 102,000 people crossed the border last year, not including Kumgang tourists and most of them South Koreans visiting the North for business. The total exchange of people was 269,336 as of the end of 2006.

TRADE

– Cross-border trade was $1.35 billion in 2006 up from $1.05 billion a year ago, largely from the strength of the Kaesong industrial park.

HUMANITARIAN AID

– South Korea has supplied between 200,000-350,000 tonnes of fertiliser a year to the North since 2000.

– It has also shipped up to 500,000 tonnes of rice a year to the North in the form of low-interest, long-term loans. Food aid has been suspended since the North’s missile tests in last July.

REFUGEES, PRISONERS OF WAR AND ABDUCTEES

– South Korea believes more than 1,000 of its people are still alive in the North either as civilian abductees or as prisoners captured during the Korean War.

– North Korea has said 10 South Korean POWs and 11 civilians were alive there.

– More than 1,000 North Koreans each year have fled hunger and persecution in the North and sought refuge in the South. In the first six months of last year, 854 arrived in the South for a total of 8,541. (Source: South Korean Unification Ministry, Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee, Reuters)

Posted in Economic reform, Emigration, Emigration statistics, Foreign aid statistics, Foreign direct investment, International Aid, International trade, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Military, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, South Korea, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Statistics, Tourism, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

Relief goods mirror plight of stunted N. Koreans

Wednesday, August 30th, 2006

Yonhap
8/30/2006
Sam Kim

Thousands of used but clean shirts, pants and other clothes are stacked in big heaps in warehouses outside Seoul to be sent to poverty-stricken North Korea. But they can’t be sent as they are, because North Korean officials want to get them their way: all without English writing on them and their size no bigger than “large.”

“In addition, we have color restrictions,” Ahn Jeong-hui, director of the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, the donor of the clothes and other relief goods. “Strong colors could easily repulse North Koreans.”

Whenever impoverished North Korea suffers from flood and other natural or man-made disasters, sympathetic South Korean civic organizations usually respond to their appeal for emergency aid with warm hearts.

The shipment-in-waiting is for thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of North Koreans who were made homeless in massive floods in mid-July.

There were no official North Korean announcement on the extent of the flood damage but its media said “hundreds” of people were killed or missing. One South Korean relief group said “thousands” were killed.

The South Korean civilian aid is in addition to more than US$200 million worth of relief goods scheduled to be sent by the Seoul government, which include 100,000 tons each of rice and cement, 50,000 tons of reinforced steel bars and a number of trucks and other construction equipment.

With its economy in shambles, impoverished North Korea turned to international handouts in 1995 to help feed its 23 million people. U.N. relief workers said the largest floods in the country are expected to result in 100,000 tons of crop damage this year.

After years of dealing with North Korea, South Korean donors have learned that helping the communist country is not just about sending large quantities of supplies. It requires certain “customization,”

“The maximum size of clothes we send to North Korea is ‘large,'” said Hyun Il-hyun, secretary at Join Together Society, another South Korean relief agency, “We know anything bigger, like ‘extra large’ or ‘extra extra large,’ won’t fit North Koreans.”

“What will fit elementary school kids in South Korea will usually fit North Korean middle-schoolers,” she said. “Most North Korean adults will fit well into what South Korean teenagers wear.”

Chronic food shortages and malnutrition have stunted many North Koreans, making some look like dwarfs. Television footage broadcast in South Korea showed gaunt North Koreans scouring winter fields for grains left by reapers.

Nearly 8,700 North Koreans have defected to South Korea since the Korean War ended in 1953, including 1,139 in 2002, 1,281 in 2003, 1,894 in 2004, 1,383 in 2005 and 1,054 in the first seven months of this year. Many complained of hunger in their communist homeland.

A 2004 survey of 2,300 North Korean defectors showed that average North Korean men and women are 5.9 centimeter and 4.1 centimeters shorter than their South Korean counterparts, respectively. An average 14-year-old boy from North Korea is up to 15.8 centimeters shorter than the same-aged South Korean.

English-embellished clothes are not welcome, either, in North Korea, relief workers said.

“We pick out any clothing that has English writing on it,” Hyun of Join Together Society said. “North Korean authorities apparently don’t want their people to think the clothes are coming from their sworn enemy, the U.S. We also restrict clothes that have the names of South Korean organizations.”

North Korea has asked them to increase shipments of rice and flour instead of instant noodles, according to South Korean relief workers.

“We will comply with the North Korean request and no longer send instant noodles,” said Ahn of the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation. “I think the North’s request has do to with the South Korean marks and logos on the packings.”

According to South Korean government officials, North Korea tightly controls the flow of information among its people. All radio sets are pre-set to monitor only state broadcasts.

Posted in Emigration statistics, International Aid, South Korea | Comments Closed

My Name Is Min, Mrs. Min…

Tuesday, September 13th, 2005

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
9/13/2005

One can imagine how the friends and relatives of Min Yong-mi, a 35 year old housewife, were shocked to learn in June 1998 that the woman was detained as a South Korean special agent who had undergone special training and snuck herself into the North to destabilize the North Korean government.

What did earn the woman, an otherwise quite typical South Korean ajuma, a mother of two children, such a James Bond style reputation? Obviously, few comments she made on June 20, 1999, when talking to a guide while on tour in the Kumgang Mountains.

Actually, the description of what happened at 1:40 pm differ. All reports agree that the entire affair began when Mrs. Min asked a North Korean tour guide or “environmental inspector” how to read a rare Chinese character in one of the names of the Buddha that was carved on a rock. The “inspector” (in all probability, a plain clothes policemen) did not know the character as well. The conversation followed.

According to one version, Mrs. Min merely said that after unification the guide would be able to meet her in Seoul. However, it is more likely that the talk was far less innocent. Obviously, somehow Mrs. Min and her guide began to talk about defectors to the South (still a relatively small group in those days). Mrs. Min assured her North Korean interlocutor that the defectors were doing all right. The guide expressed his disbelief and said that all defectors are sentenced to hard labor. Mrs. Min assured him that this was not the case and said something like “If you come to the South, you will see for itself.” According to another version, she said something more moderate, to the effect that defectors were getting by quite well in the South.

Whatever the case, she was ordered to surrender her provisional ID and pay a fine of $100. Realizing that she was in trouble, Mrs. Min complied immediately, but it was too late. She was detained, accused of subversive propaganda, and spent about a week in detention, being interrogated by officers who arrived from Pyongyang.

The detention of Mrs. Min was the first crisis in the history of the Kumgang Project, then as now the largest joint operation of the two Koreas, a showcase of economic cooperation between the two governments.

The project was conceived in 1989, when Chung Ju-yung, the founder of the Hyundai Group, visited North Korea for the first time. One of the schemes briefly discussed in 1989 was an idea of a large tourist park in the North, to be patronised by South Korean tourists. The park was to be located in the Kumgang (“Diamond”) Mountains which for centuries have been regarded in Korean culture as an embodiment of scenic beauty. The mountains conveniently lay near the DMZ, the border between two Korean states.

It took, however, a decade and some major political changes to start the project moving. It was only in November 1998 that the Kumgang Mountain Tourist Project began to operate.

The idea was simple. The North Koreans created a type of ghetto for the South Korean visitors. A part of the Kumgang Mountains was fenced off, and the local population was moved away. The South Korean tourists took a cruise ship to the area. The ship moored in a local harbour, while the visitors went on mountain walks and sight-seeing trips.

This clever scheme solved the greatest problem Pyongyang saw in its interactions with the South – the problem of information flow. The North Korean commoners are supposed to believe that their South Korean brethren are suffering under the cruel yoke of the US imperialists. Understandably, their government does not want them to know that the per capita GNP in the South is 20 to 30 times higher than in the North. In the Kumgang Mountain Project the rich Southerners were kept out of sight of the average North Koreans, being accompanied only by a handful of carefully selected minders.

However, there always was a threat that South Koreans would do something improper. They were instructed before their trip not to talk politics at all. But how could those spoilt people from a decadent bourgeoisie society be trusted to behave themselves? A subject lesson in obedience was needed.

Some circumstances make us suspect that the entire affair was prepared in advance, and that the guide was deliberately provoking Mrs. Min. However, this is likely to remain uncertain until the collapse of the North Korean regime and the de-classification of their documents. It is still probable that Mrs. Min was simply unlucky. But it is clear that the North Korean side expected something like it to happen.

Mrs. Min’s ordeal lasted for a week. Pyongyang radio claimed her as a South Korean spy, the tours were suspended for a time, and frantic diplomatic activity ensued. Mrs. Min was released after six days of detention, to spend some time in hospital. But the North Korean authorities had attained their goal: they demonstrated that tourists are better to mind their tongues while enjoying the scenic beauties of the Kumgang area.

There were more detentions of South Korean tourists, none of which received comparable publicity. But the lesson had been given, and South Koreans learned to behave themselves.

The Mrs. Min incident contributed to the ongoing crisis of the Kumgang project. This crisis came to a climax in spring 2001 when the tours were almost discontinued. The Kumgang project was salvaged by a large-scale government intervention, but that is another story…

Posted in Emigration, Emigration statistics, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, South Korea, Tourism | Comments Closed

The Transformation of Class Structure and Class Conflict in North Korea

Friday, July 8th, 2005

International Journal of Korean Unification Studies
Vol. 14, No.2, 2005, pp 52-84.

PDF Here: transformation of class structure.pdf

Abstract
This study examines how North Korea’s class structure transformations influenced the social transformations, and seeks to understand the structural characteristics of North Korea by examining in detail the existing shape of each social class. This study found that North Korea’s socialist transformation was the process of dismantling every social class, such as the landowners, farmers, commerce and industry, and intelligentsia classes, etc. The 1946 land reform dismantled the landowner class, the 1958 agricultural collectivization dismantled the farmers class, and the 1958 nationalization of commerce and industry did the same to the petty bourgeoisie. The only class remaining in North Korea is the managers of the governing class. There was no class differentiation, only dismantlement. Thus, with social classes dissolved, the governing class remains as the monolithic class monopolizing social, economic, and political power in North Korea, with no other social power to act as a balancer. This type of class structure may constitute the social conditions of political dictatorship in North Korea.

Highlights:
In North Korea, the fundamental ownership relations of the traditional class structure were dismantled in the name of socialist construction. The victims of this construction were the traditional classes of landowner, petty bourgeoisie, farmer, and intellectual.

When the 1946 Land Reform Law was passed, it was enacted in a month. The law provided for government confiscation of land properties over 5 chongbo (1 chongbo=2.45 acres). When completed, 1,000,325 chongbo of 1,982,431 under cultivation at the time. At the time, land owned by the Japanese state, Japanese people, and religious organizations was barely 4%. the remaining 96% was in the hands of Korean landowners and tenants. It affected 405,603 of the 1,121,295 registered farming households. 4 in 10 households had land confiscated in part or whole. Ten years after land reform, many were again prospering, and theor political influence became noticeable. Kim il Sung sought to reassert control over them. In 1958, land reform was reversed and farms were colectivised.

Nationalization of industry, traffic, transportation, communications and bank finances, including over 1034 important factories and businesses. In 1947 80.2% of industry was held in state control. Private commerce made up the rest. After the Korean War, private enterprise production consisted of small-scale mills, metal workshops, rubber factories. by May 1957, the number of private industrial enterprises was 633. By August 1958, this activity was completely eliminated.

To purge the intellectuals (who were educated in the old ways) Kim il Sung proposed, “we have to speed up the construction of socialism, and fo rthat purpose, we have to fight against the conservatism of the intellectuals.” This started with technicians and economic managers. Then dissident writers.

All social powers were ousted: Landowners, farmers, businessmen, and intellectual classes. All menas of production were nationalized and socialiazed, so all became employees of the state, and the state became the sole employer. North Korea’s new system consists of the rulers and everyone else (two groups).

To prevent remanats of the past from gaining influence, North Korea classified each individual according to their family background, and discriminated on this classification (starting in 1957).

Yunan and Soviet factions were purged in the August Faction Incident in 1956. Cabinet Decision 149 mandates that ousted individuals be put in area 20km from the sea coast and demarcation line, 50km away from Pyongyang and Kaesong, 20km away fro mother cities and limited residential areas. These individuals received a special stamp on their ID cards and were registered with the social security agency.

The North Korean managerial (ruling) class is an exclusive group which has institutionalized a system so that it may keep its privileges. Only the sons and daughters of the core class can become promoted within the managerial class. Children of Cadres only marry children of cadres.

Core class is 3,915,000 people in 870,000 households. Wavering is 3,150,000 in 700,000 households. Hostile is 7,930,000 in 173,000 households.

In the workplace, all indivduals are obliged to be part of one of three organizations: the party, the Youth League, or the Workers Union.

Supplies are divided into special numbers. 1,2,3,4, etc. Those in higher positions are afforded higher rank in distribution. “How could Party Secretaries, who don’t do anything,obtian objects of a 4 level?”

Private relationships are only possible through the party.

Self-criticism sessions are carried out every week. Since these are routine, people know each other and act accordingly. Becuase everyone has to criticize each other they tend to do so in a modest way.

Peasants most angry. Laborers and office workers have time to do business on the side, but peasants do not. Some bright peasants do tend private plots.

People complain openly now.

While the core class focused on inner-systemic solidarity when faced with a crisis, the wavering and hostile classes were the first to enter the black market. After business expanded in the country side like wildfire the government brought the businesses into the open in July 2002. The marginalized societies led the change in values. Reportedly the collude with the regulatory authorities and security guards, borrow and rent vehicles for biusiness.

Only those sub-classified as Manyongdae line (Kim Il Sung’s lineage), Baektusan line (Kim Jong Il’s lineage), and Ryongnamsan line (People who graduated with Kim Jong Il from Kim Il Sung University) are able to receive official government posts.

Of the total population, 10% makes up the power-holding ruling class. Another 40% make up a lower social rung doing business and making deals.

Posted in 1946 Land Reform Law, 1990s Famine, 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture statistics, Arduous March, Black markets, Civil society, Economic reform, Emigration statistics, Political economy, Price liberalization, Private property, Songbun, Statistics | Comments Closed

North Korea Development Report 2003/04

Friday, July 30th, 2004

KIEP has published the North Korea Development Report 2003/04 (follow the link to download all several hundred pages!)

Summary: As a result of North Korea’s isolation from the outside world, international
communities know little about the status of the North Korean economy and its
management mechanisms. Although a few recent changes in North Korea’s economic system have attracted international interests, much confusion remains as to the characteristics of North Korea’s recent policy changes and its future direction
due to the lack of information. Therefore, in order to increase the understanding of readers in South Korea and abroad, KIEP is releasing The North Korea Development Report in both Korean and English. The motivation behind this report stemmed from the need for a comprehensive and systematic investigation into North Korea’s socio-economic conditions, while presenting the current status of its industrial sectors and inter-Korean economic cooperation. The publishing of this second volume is important because it not only supplements the findings of the first edition, but also updates the recent changes in the North Korean economy. The topics in this report include macroeconomics and finance, industry and infrastructure, foreign economic relations and inter-Korean economic cooperation, social welfare and science & technology.

This report also covers the ‘July 1 Economic Reform’ launched two years ago and
subsequent changes in the economic management system. The North Korea
Development Report helps to improve the understanding of the contemporary North
Korean economy.
Table of Contents

Part I Macroeconomic Status and Finance
Chapter 1 Current Status of the North Korean Economy and Its Prospects
Chapter 2 National Financial Revenue and Expenditure
Chapter 3 Banking and Price Management

Part II Industrial Management and Problems
Chapter 4 The Industrial Sector
Chapter 5 The Agricultural Sector
Chapter 6 Social Overhead Capital
Chapter 7 Commerce and Distribution Sector
Chapter 8 The Defense Industry

Part III International Economic Activities
Chapter 9 Foreign Economic Relations
Chapter 10 Special Economic Zones
Chapter 11 Inter-Korean Economic Relations

Part IV Social Security and Technology Development
Chapter 12 Social Security and Social Services
Chapter 13 Science and Technology Sector

Part V The Recent Economic Policy Changes
Chapter 14 The Contents and Background for the Recent Policy Changes
Chapter 15 The Features and Problems of the Recent Economic Policy Changes
Chapter 16 Prospects and Future Tasks of the July 1 Economic Reform

Posted in 1990s Famine, 2002 Economic reforms, Agriculture, Agriculture statistics, Arduous March, Banking, Biotech, Cell phones, Communications, Computing/IT, DPRK Policies, Economic reform, Email, Emigration statistics, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign aid statistics, Foreign direct investment, GDP statistics, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Health care, Insurance, Internet, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), KIEP-Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Price liberalization, Radio, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Songun, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Statistics, Telephones, Trade Statistics | Comments Closed

N Korean ‘defector’ goes home

Wednesday, August 21st, 2002

BBC
8/21/2002

A North Korean engineer who said he was forced to travel to South Korea against his will on a boat with 20 defectors has returned home to the Stalinist state.

Boat engineer Ri Kyong-song, 33, told South Korean officials that he had been detained against his will and wanted to be reunited with his family in the North.

Mr Ri walked back into North Korea on Wednesday, passing through the truce village of Panmunjom inside the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas.

“Long live our great general!” Mr Ri called out as he crossed, referring to the North’s leader Kim Jong-il,

The 20 other North Koreans have sought asylum in the South.

The group had left North Korea by boat on Saturday and spent two days at sea before being intercepted by South Korean maritime officials.

It was the first direct maritime defection between the two Koreas in five years.

Tied up

South Korean officials said Mr Ri had made it clear that he was forced to travel to the South against his will and wanted to join the rest of his family in the North.

He told investigators that he had been imprisoned and tied up on the boat by other families who wanted to defect from the Communist state.

The head of the North Korean Red Cross had urged officials in the South to allow Mr Ri’s swift return on humanitarian grounds.

Both nations still remain technically at war, and share one of the world’s most heavily fortified land frontiers.

But despite the difficulties, the number of North Koreans reaching the South and seeking asylum continues to roughly double each year.

Nearly 600 have defected to the South this year, escaping food shortages and political repression in the North.

Aid groups estimate that tens of thousands of North Koreans are sheltering illegally in China, which shares a porous border with the North.

Beijing does not recognise them as refugees and has tended to send those caught back to North Korea.

Posted in Emigration, Emigration statistics, International/Korean Red Cross | Comments Closed

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