Archive for the ‘Emigration statistics’ Category

North Korean logger detained in Russian east

Friday, March 19th, 2010

According to the Associated Press (via Los Angeles Times):

The North Korean’s note, scrawled in pen, was simple: “I want to go to South Korea. Why? To find freedom. Freedom of religion, freedom of life.”

The ex-logger, on the run from North Korean authorities, handed the note over to a South Korean missionary in the Russian city of Vladivostok last week in hopes it would lead to political asylum.

Just before he was to meet Thursday with the International Organization for Migrants, a team of men grabbed him, slapped handcuffs on him and drove off, rights activists in Moscow said Friday. He was spirited away to the eastern port city of Nakhokda, where he is sure to be handed back over to North Korean officials and repatriated to his communist homeland, activists said in Seoul.

Police in Vladivostok refused to comment. A senior South Korean diplomat in Vladivostok said he had no information. Officials from the U.S. consulate in Vladivostok could not be reached for comment.

The 51-year-old would be the third North Korean logger in Russia in a week to make a bid for asylum. On March 9, two other North Koreans who had fled their jobs as loggers managed to get into the South Korean consulate in Vladivostok.

Russia’s RIA Novosti news agency reported last week that two North Koreans climbed a fence, ran past the guards and entered the consulate, saying they wanted political asylum. ITAR-Tass carried a similar report.

The incidents focused attention on the precarious existence of tens of thousands of North Koreans sent by the impoverished regime to work in neighboring Russia.

Russian government figures from 2007 put the number of North Korean laborers at 32,600, most of them working in logging in the remote east.

The Rev. Peter Chung, a Seoul-based activist, said there are about 40,000 North Korean loggers in Russia, but that some 10,000 of them have fled their work sites. Some are finding work as day laborers while others are in hiding as they try to map out how to win asylum in foreign diplomatic missions.

The North Korean described the conditions as unbearable. His government took half his meager wages, while the North Korean company operating the logging camp took 35 percent. He kept just 15 percent — about $60 a month — an arrangement that rendered him “virtually a slave,” he told activists.

He eventually fled the logging camp, taking odd jobs to survive. He also became a Christian, Chung and Kim Hi-tae said, which could draw severe punishment, even execution, back home.

The successful asylum bid of two other former North Korean loggers inspired Kim to make a similar attempt, Chung said.

Previous posts on the North Korean loggers in Russia can be found hereMore here. And here. And here.

Read the full story below:
3rd North Korean logger attempts to defect in Russia, propelled by dream of ‘freedom of life’
Associated Press (via Los Angeles Times)
Kim Kwang Tae
3/19/2010

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The DPRK’s 2008 census: results and analysis

Sunday, February 21st, 2010

Thanks to a responsive employee at the UNFPA, I obtained a summary of the DPRK’s census findings.  You can download the summary here.

Thanks to a reader I was able to obtain a copy of the entire census data set.  You can download it here.

Both documents have been added to the “DPRK Economic Statistics Page“. Happy reading.

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UPDATE 1: The Wall Street Journal’s Evan Ramstad published some analysis of the DPRK’s 2008 census data.  According to the article:

North Korea is getting bigger, older and less healthy, according to data from the country’s latest census, and its fabled million-man army might have fewer than 700,000 people.

The authoritarian government in December released results of the census conducted in 2008, saying its population had climbed to 24 million people from 21.2 million in the previous census in 1993.

More details have been published by the United Nations Population Fund, which helped North Korea conduct the census and sent five teams of observers to monitor it.

Even so, it’s difficult for outsiders, with so little access to the country, to be certain of the precision of North Korea’s data. For decades, the government has cut off the dissemination of most information about the country. The new census numbers provide a rare glimpse of official statistics.

The census reported that North Korea’s population grew at an annual average rate of 0.85% for the 15-year period, a time that included a devastating multiyear famine that analysts and foreign aid agencies estimate killed between one million and two million people.

A separate U.N. report published last year found that North Korea’s population has grown more slowly since 2005, at an annual rate of 0.4%. The global population has grown 1.2% annually since 2005, the U.N. report said.

North Korea’s census said the country’s population has proportionately fewer children and more middle-aged people than it did in 1993.

It also reported that people are less healthy.

Babies are more likely to die: The infant mortality rate climbed to 19.3 per 1,000 children in 2008 from 14.1 in 1993, though North Korea’s rate is still well below the world average, which a 2009 report by the U.N. agency put at 46 per 1,000 children.

North Koreans are living shorter lives—average life expectancy has fallen to 69.3 years from 72.7 in 1993.

As in many places, women live longer than men, with a gap of about seven years, compared with the world average of 4.4 years.

North Korea has 5.9 million households, with an average of 3.9 people in each, according to the census.

The typical home is 50 to 75 square meters in size (540 to 800 square feet). About 85% of homes have access to running water and about 55% have a flush toilet.

The census provided only a glimpse of the country’s economic structure, but even that produced some surprises. The occupation that provides the most employment—farming—has more women, 1.9 million, than men, 1.5 million.

The second-biggest occupation, working for the government or the military, employs 699,000 people. The census doesn’t break that group down further, but the figure suggests North Korea’s military isn’t as large as had been thought.

The military is often portrayed by outside military analysts and media as a force of one million people, mostly conscripts who are required to serve 10 years.

The third-largest employment sector by number of workers is education, followed by machinery manufacturing, textiles and coal mining. About 40,000 people work in computer, electronic or optical-product manufacturing.

North Korea hasn’t shared meaningful information about its economy or its financial system with the outside world since the early 1960s.

Outside estimates of its economic performance, most prominently an annual estimate by the South Korean central bank, the Bank of Korea, are filled with assumptions that even their authors say render them almost meaningless.

Word of the availability of the North Korea census data was disseminated last week on North Korea Economy Watch, a Web site run by Curtis Melvin, a Virginia-based graduate student in economics and a specialist in North Korea.

Read the full article here:
Pyongyang Reports an Aging, Less Healthy Population
Wall Street Journal
Evan Ramstad
2/20/2010

UPDATE 2 (1/12/2011): According to the Choson Ilbo:

Each year, Statistics Korea publishes population figures for North Korea in a booklet based on surveys conducted by international organizations like the UN and data released by the Education Center for Unification under the Unification Ministry.

Most of these statistics were compiled based on a census the North took in 2008 with the UN’s help.

North Korea’s only previous census was in 1993, which established that the population is 21.21 million. Although rumor has it that several millions of people starved to death during the famine of the 1990s, nobody knows how many exactly died.

The second census in 2008 was taken with funds provided by the UN Population Fund to obtain basic data for humanitarian aid to the North. The North accepted the offer, presumably because it wanted a good grasp of the reality to develop its own economy.

The census lasted for 15 days, from Oct. 1 to 15, 2008. The North’s Central Statistics Bureau surveyed 5,587,767 households nationwide by mobilizing a total of 35,000 census takers through municipal and provincial statistics offices. The questionnaire consisted of 53 questions about income, furniture, electronic home appliances, toilets, heating system, and tap water and sewage facilities, as well as basic personal information such as age and gender.

Like in South Korea, the North Korean census takers visited homes to ask the questions face to face. Statistics Korea officials flew to China, where they taught North Korean officials census methodology and techniques, and the South gave the North as much as US$4 million for the census from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund.

According to the census, the North’s population was 24,062,000, up 2.85 million from 1993. Average life expectancy was 69.3 years, and infant mortality was 19.3 per 1,000. But these data are quite different from UN estimates, which put life expectancy at 67.3 years and infant mortality at 48 per 1,000. The credibility of the North’s census data has not been verified.

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Canada admits 66 DPRK defectors in 2009

Wednesday, February 3rd, 2010

According to the Korea Times:

Canada granted 66 North Korean defectors refugee status in 2009, which is almost 10 times higher than in 2008, a report said Saturday.

Radio Free Asia, quoting a report from the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, said that more North Koreans are expected to receive the status as there are 59 defectors currently under review.

The North American country’s first case of granting refugee status to a North Korean was in 2000. In 2008, there were seven more cases.

According to the radio, a total of 93 North Koreans had also settled down in the United States as of last December.

Read the full article here:
66 North Koreans Given Refugee Status in Canada
Korea Times
Kim Sue-young
1/31/2010

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DPRK diplomat defects from Ethiopian embassy

Wednesday, January 27th, 2010

According to Yonhap:

A diplomat at the North Korean Embassy in Ethiopia defected to South Korea late last year after seeking asylum at the South Korean Embassy in the African country, an informed source said Tuesday.

The 40-year-old North Korean man, identified only by his surname of Kim, stormed into the South Korean embassy in October and spent several weeks there before arriving in Seoul in November, the source said, asking not to be identified.

The relationship between the DPRK and Ethiopia goes way back…to some dark days in Ethiopia’s history. 

Here are a few previous posts on the DPRK-Ethiopia relationship

Read the Yonhap story here:
N. Korean diplomat based in Ethiopia defects to S. Korea: source
Yonhap
1/26/2010

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Reunification costs

Sunday, January 3rd, 2010

According to Peter Beck in the Wall Street Journal:

The cost [of reunification] will depend in large part on how that transition unfolds. The best of the plausible scenarios would see Korea following the German path of sudden and bloodless reunification. The worst outcome would be violence akin to the unification of Vietnam or Yemen. A middle road would resemble the chaotic post-Communist transitions of Romania and Albania. This seems most likely given the similarities between Kim’s autocratic, autarkic rule and Nicolae Ceausescu’s and Enver Hoxha’s reigns in their countries.

Any of these outcomes is sure to be expensive because the North will require massive investments to build a modern economy. The economy collapsed in the 1990s amid a massive famine that likely killed hundreds of thousands. Infrastructure, starting with the power grid, railway lines and ports, will require tens of billions of dollars to build or upgrade. Few factories meet modern requirements and it will take years to rehabilitate agricultural lands. The biggest expense of all will be equalizing North Koreans’ incomes with their rich cousins in the South, whether through aid transfers or investments in human capital like education and health-care.

Even the best-case German model will cause heartburn in South Korean officials. Despite the $2 trillion price tag West Germany has paid over two decades, Bonn had it relatively easy in the beginning. East Germany’s population was only one-quarter of the West’s, and in 1989 East German per capita income was one-third of the West. The two Germanies also had extensive trade ties.

In contrast, North Korea’s per capita income is less than 5% of the South’s. Each year the dollar value of South Korea’s GDP expansion equals the entire North Korean economy. The Northern population is half the South’s and rising thanks to a high birth rate. North and South still barely trade with each other—China-Taiwan trade is 54 times greater in dollar terms than inter-Korean trade. That the North is starting from so far behind means even more resources will be needed than Germany required to achieve convergence in standards of living.

More than a dozen reports by governments, academics and investment banks in recent years have attempted to estimate the cost of Korean unification. At the low end, the Rand Corporation has figured on $50 billion. But that assumes only a doubling of Northern incomes from their current level, which would still leave incomes in the North at less than 10% of the South. At the high end of these projections, Credit Suisse estimated last year that unification would cost $1.5 trillion, but with North Korean incomes rising to only 60% of the South. I estimate that raising Northern incomes to 80% of Southern levels—which would likely be a political necessity—would cost anywhere from $2 trillion to $5 trillion, spread out over 30 years. That would work out to at least $40,000 per capita if distributed solely among South Koreans.

All of this leads to the question of who would foot the bill. China is the greatest supporter of the current regime in Pyongyang, with trade, investment and unconditional economic assistance worth $3 billion a year. Yet even if that flow continues to the Northern part of a reunified Korea (it most likely would not), it will be a fraction of the $67 billion a year that would be needed to equal $2 trillion over three decades. After South Korea, Japan would become the largest source of aid, but the $10 billion it is prepared to pay in reparations for having colonized the North would barely make a dent.

That leaves international institutions like the World Bank—and Seoul and the United States. It will be a wise investment to secure peace and prosperity in North Asia, but that money won’t grow on trees. Policy makers need to start considering now how they would spend it, to minimize the risk of wasting it in post-reunification confusion. And officials need to think about where they’ll secure the cash. Multinational corporations will rush in, but the bulk of the burden will fall on the shoulders of South Korea—requiring careful fiscal management, borrowing and tax increases.

Korean unification is unlikely to take place in the near future, but since it will most likely be sudden and cost trillions of dollars, the time to prepare is now.

I cannot find a copy of the Credit Suisse research on line this evening.  Here and here are a couple of media stories reporting on its findings.

Here is a link to the Rand Corporation study, “North Korean Paradoxes,”  mentioned above.

Here are some additional studies on this topic:

Global Economics Paper No. 188: A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks
Goldman Sachs Slobal ECS Asia research
Goohoon Kwon, CFA
September 2009
(Post here)

Currency Conversion during Korean Unification
Brookings Institution
Yeongseop Rhee, Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy
January 2009
(Post here)

Prospects from Korean Unification
Colonel David Coghlan
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army

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New papers from Johns Hopkins US-Korea Institute

Tuesday, August 25th, 2009

The third edition of the SAIS U.S.-Korea Yearbook chronicles important developments in North and South Korea that characterized their relations with their allies and enemies in 2008. Each chapter was written by SAIS students in the course, “The Two Koreas: Contemporary Research and Record,” in the fall of 2008. Their insights were based not only on extensive reading and study, but also on numerous interviews conducted with government officials, scholars, NGO workers, academics and private sector experts in both Washington and Seoul.

The Yearbook is divided into two parts: South Korea’s Foreign Relations and North Korea’s Foreign Relations. In the first part, student authors explore the dynamic foreign policy changes that were brought about by the Lee Myung-bak administration, and how these policies affected South Korean politics both at home and abroad. In the second part, student authors explore how shifting power dynamics both in the United States, as well as among the member states of the Six-Party Talks, affected North Korea’s foreign relations in 2008.

Here are links to the North Korea chapters:
Chapter 6The Torturous Dilemma: The 2008 Six-Party Talks and U.S.-DPRK Relations, by Shin Yon Kim.

Chapter 7U.S. Alternative Diplomacy towards North Korea: Food Aid, Musical Diplomacy, and Track II Exchanges, by Erin Kruth.

Chapter 8North Korean Human Rights and Refugee Resettlement in the United States: A Slow and Quiet Progress, by Jane Kim

The US Korea Institute has also published a New Working paper:

“State Over Society: Science and Technology Policy”
Download Here
ABSTRACT:
Since the late 1990s, the Kim Jong Il regime has laid an explicit emphasis on the role of science and technology (S&T) as an instrument of national power. Facing external security challenges, domestic economic stagnation, and rising political uncertainty stemming from the succession issue, North Korea has sought greater scientific and technological development for national revival. Yet few analysts have interrogated the contours of North Korea’s S&T policy or explored its dilemmas for the regime in Pyongyang. Considered a means of modernization, S&T strikes at the heart of manifold dilemmas facing the North Korean leadership as technology poses formidable challenges to the maintenance of political control by introducing new pressures to the balance of power between state and society. In this paper, Rian Jensen, a former USKI Student Fellow, identifies the goals of North Korea’s S&T policy, outlines its mode of implementation, assesses how science and technology is recalibrating North Korean state-society relations, and identifies key policy implications for the US government.

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North Korea between collapse and reform

Friday, December 19th, 2008

Asian Survey Vol. 39, No. 2 (Mar. – Apr., 1999), pp. 287-309
Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig

Download PDF here or download from Jstor.org here

The refusal of North Korea’s letters to institute serious economic reforms has frustrated those who study the country and those who seek to alleviate the suffering of the North Korean people.  Two French medical aid organizations have withdrawn from the country complaining that the Pyongyang government interfered with their work.  This is but one sign of a growing donor fatigue.  The muddling through plan that the Kim regime has adopted involves soliciting foreign aid, bargaining with its military and nuclear products, making minimal unofficial changes in the domestic economy, and waiting for the international environment to become more favorable—perhaps even expecting a resurgance of international communism.  Equally important, Kim and his ruling cohorts are willing to sacrifice the economic health of their nation for the security of their regime, just as other dictators, both communist and non-communist have done.  The painful difference in North Korea’s case is that it is half of a divided nation, posing an immediate humanitarian dilemma for the millions of Koreans in the Southern half of the penninsula whose families are suffering in the north.  For this reason more than any other, the future of North Korea cannot be ignored.  

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Assessing the economic performance of North Korea,1954–1989: Estimates and growth accounting analysis

Friday, December 19th, 2008

Journal of Comparative Economics, 35 (2007) 564–582
Kim, Byung-Yeon, Kim, Suk Jin, and Lee, Keun

PDF of paper here

Abstract: This paper adjusts the official data from North and South Korean sources, taking into account hidden inflation to estimate North Korea’s GNP growth rates from 1954 to 1989. The factors of economic growth are decomposed subsequently into changes in inputs and factor productivity. Finally, a panel cointegration technique is used to assess the level of productivity in the North Korean economy in comparison with that of the former Soviet Union. We find that the average of annual growth rates of North Korean GNP and GNP per capita from 1954 to 1989 was 4.4 and 1.9%, respectively. The results from decomposition suggest that the prime cause of slow economic growth was extremely low or even negative total factor productivity. According to the panel cointegration estimation, productivity in North Korea was lower than that of the Soviet Union by 33%.

JEL classification: P27; E01; O47
Keywords: North Korea; Growth; Growth accounting; Panel cointegration

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North Korea statistics

Sunday, November 16th, 2008

I get many requests for North Korea’s economic statistics.  In order to make these things easier to find, I have created a page on the menu to the right called “North Korea Economic Statistics.”  This resource provides links to the most frequently quoted and cited statistics.  It is not yet complete, but I will be continually expanding it. 

I believe these should be taken with buckets of salt, but here they are nonetheless.

Also on the menu are links to the following information:
North Korea Academic Resources
North Korea Blogs
North Korea Books
North Korea CRS Reports
North Korea Films

If you have anything to add to any of these resources, please let me know. 

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Korean height gap

Sunday, October 19th, 2008

This week the Wall Street Journal did a pretty thorough review of the North – South Korean “height gap” after John McCain mentioned it in a presidential debate.  Here is a hefty quote from the post (well worth reading here):

…Several checked and (here, here, and here) found studies supporting his claim of a height gap, though the gap’s size depends on which South Koreans and North Koreans you’re measuring. The researchers behind these studies told me that McCain’s statement is true of younger Koreans, but not of adults. (A McCain campaign spokesman didn’t respond to my request for the source of the claim.)

One study of North Korean refugees compared to South Koreans of the same age found that South Korean young men were 2.3 inches taller than their North Korean counterparts, while the gap among young women was 2.6 inches. Meanwhile, among non-refugee boys and girls living in both countries between the ages of one and a half and six and a half, a separate study found that the height gap was around three inches (varying slightly by age and gender); between six and a half and seven and a half, the height gap was 4.9 inches for girls and five inches for boys.

The height gap is so age-dependent for two reasons, researchers told me: People of different ages experience peak growth at different times, and at different times the discrepancies between the two Koreas in nutrition, health and overall well-being may differ. Also, adults who were undernourished as children may catch up slightly later.

“Adults were raised 20 to 50 years ago — thus, you proxy the environmental impact in the past, so it does not really make sense comparing different time periods,” Daniel Schwekendiek, author of the study of child heights, said.

Schwekendiek, an economist at Germany’s University of Tuebingen, was a postdoc student of Sunyoung Pak, a biological anthropologist at Seoul National University who conducted the refugee study. Pak said it’s unclear whether refugees are a representative sample of the North Korean population, though she did point out that the older people she studied, born in the 1930s, were taller than their southern-born counterparts, suggesting that there has been a growing height gap, as North Korean height growth stagnated. (People, like other mammals, tend to be heavier and taller at greater latitudes, Pak said.)

Schwekendiek’s samples were randomly selected — in North Korea, by the United Nations in 10 of 12 provinces, to investigate malnutrition, and in wealthier, healthier South Korea, by the Korean Research Institute of Standards and Sciences, on behalf of industries that wanted to produce goods that fit children.

Both researchers said height is a useful measure of well-being because North Koreans and South Koreans share genetic ancestry, and also because height numbers are more reliable and objective than economic stats coming out of Pyongyang. “As height and weight are measured physically, this leaves less room for political manipulation compared to conventional health and human welfare indicators,” Schwekendiek said.

Wall Street Journal
The Numbers Guy

The Korean Height Gap
10/15/2008

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