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Selling to survive

Wednesday, November 21st, 2007

Financial Times
Anna Fifield
9/19/2007

Pak Hyun-yong was, by North Korean standards, an entrepreneur. Too much of an entrepreneur. During the famine that ravaged the country in the late 1990s, Mr Pak watched his family die of starvation – first his younger brother, then his older sister’s children. Then, eventually, his sister too.

Somehow he pulled through this period, dubbed by the regime as “the arduous march”, and was spurred into taking some very non-communist, almost subversive action. He began selling noodles.

Every day he would take 10kg of “corn rice” – a poor North Korean imitation in which dried kernels are fashioned into grains – and turn it into noodles. Then he would get on his bicycle and pedal around his home town of Hamhung on the east coast, bartering the noodles for 12kg of corn rice: 10kg for tomorrow’s noodles and 2kg for his remaining family.

“The police would come by and try to persuade me not to sell the noodles, saying that I should not succumb to capitalism and that the Dear Leader would resolve our food shortages,” says Mr Pak, who escaped from North Korea a year ago and is upbeat and energetic considering the hardships he has endured.

Now 32, he is in hiding in a bleak, remote village in northern China not far from the North Korean border, together with his wife, with whom he escaped, and their new baby. They live in a one-room house with no bathroom – protected by locals who are helping them settle.

“The [North Korean] police even threatened to imprison me if I didn’t stop selling. Suddenly I realised that North Korea was a country where they would stop people’s efforts to survive,” he says, sitting on the warm floor of his house, still dressed in the apron he wears to work in a nearby butchery.

“I heard that China was a rich and modern country – that they had tractors and that people could eat rice every day, even in rural areas,” he says, shaking his head. “Chinese dogs wouldn’t eat our rice – they would ask for better.”

In almost 20 interviews along the border with China, ethnic Koreans born in China and North Korean escapees, some of whom had been in the isolated state as recently as two months ago, describe a country where change is taking place from the ground up rather than under the direction of its leader, Kim Jong-il.

North Korea remains the most tightly controlled state in the world. But recent escapees tell of the changes that are being driven by necessity in areas near China, especially in the cities of Rajin and Hoeryong in the north and Sinuiju at the southern end of the border.

While it would be an overstatement to say that this represents the type of nascent transition to free-market reforms that has occurred in countries such as Russia and China, the worsening state of the North Korean economy is leading to widespread trading and the emergence of a fledgling merchant class crossing into China, the escapees say.

Some agricultural markets – rather than just state markets – were permitted during the “economic improvements” of 2002, but ad-hoc markets have since sprung up around the country with the tacit approval, if not the encouragement, of the regime. These markets are now the backbone of North Korea’s creaking economy as the regime provides almost nothing by way of rations any more.

The parlous state of the economy is probably the driving factor behind Mr Kim’s decision to roll back his nuclear programme. The six-party denuclearisation talks are making surprisingly good progress, analysts say, as his regime seeks heavy fuel oil for its rusting industries and an end to economic sanctions.

Certainly, recent escapees from North Korea describe a desperate situation inside the country. Somewhere between 10,000 and 30,000 North Koreans are thought to be living in hiding in the north-eastern provinces of China, especially in Jilin and Heilongjiang, areas considered backward by Chinese standards.

The Financial Times travelled throughout this region to meet North Koreans while seeking to avoid endangering their lives. (North Koreans who are repatriated from China face detention in labour camps or worse, and even those who are not caught put the lives of family members at risk by talking to journalists. For that reason, names have been changed.)

“In Rajin, all the factories have stopped,” says Oh Man-bok, a 22-year-old who escaped in September from the city near the borders with Russia and China, considered relatively prosperous because it is one of the North’s main trading channels. “The men still have to go to work and have their name checked off but there is nothing to do. Sometimes they sit around and sometimes they go home. They don’t get paid but sometimes, in a good month, they get 15 days’ worth of corn in rations,” he says.

That means women are increasingly becoming the breadwinners, going to the mountains to collect edible plants or to the market to sell home-made snacks. “People survive by selling. They do whatever they can to earn money – selling fried dough sticks or repairing shoes and clothes,” Mr Oh says. “But it’s very difficult to earn enough to survive and even in Rajin, many people have to eat porridge made from the whey left over from making tofu.”

Rajin and Sinuiju, as the main thoroughfares for trade with China, have been more open than the rest of North Korea for some time, but the experiment with capitalism that has been taking place in these two cities now appears to be expanding to Hoeryong.

The city of Hoeryong can be clearly seen from the Chinese side of the border, which is marked by a shallow river only 20 metres wide in places. On the bridge between the two countries, the Financial Times watched North Korean trucks trundle into China and dozens of Chinese – and a few North Koreans wearing badges stamped with the image of Kim Il-sung, Mr Kim’s late father and founder of the state – lug bags across.

A Chinese border official says that about 100 a day cross the bridge from the Chinese side, mainly going to visit family members, although in summer as many as 300 go on tour packages to the beach on North Korea’s east coast. About 10 North Koreans a day cross into China for trading or to see their relatives. “With Rmb1,000 [$135, £65, €92] they can come to China even if they don’t have family here. So they often borrow money to come here and buy things for trading in the market in Hoeryong,” the official says.

Bribery appears to be becoming more widespread as trade and travel increases – from a few cigarettes needed to pass through internal checkpoints to the few hundred renminbi expected at border crossings. “Everyone wants to be a border guard these days,” says one Chinese-Korean trader. “They don’t explicitly say, ‘Give me money’ – they just keep going through your paperwork and asking you questions until you offer them money.”

Again, Pyongyang seems to be aware that this is happening and allows it as a way to keep people happy – rotating border guards every six months to give officials from around the country a chance to earn extra money, according to escapees.

In Hoeryong, the market used to be beside the bridge on the outskirts but this year it was moved to a school building right in the centre of town. Its 180,000 residents enjoy a relatively privileged existence because Kim Jong-il’s late mother was born there.

The market has become central to the city and to people’s lives, driven by grassroots demand, says Song Mi-ok, an ethnic Korean living in China who has made several trips to the city recently. She has gained access by visiting fake relatives, a family to whom she pays Rmb1,000 every time she pretends to visit them.

“You can find everything there,” she says of the market, which opens at 7.30am and closes at dusk. “People usually start by selling food that they have grown or made, using the profits to move into goods trading.”

North Koreans say one can buy everything in the markets “except cat horns”, as their expression has it. Rice given as aid from South Korea is on sale and people even display the bag – even though they risk having it confiscated by the authorities – because people know that South Korean rice is of high quality, Ms Song says.

One kilogram of rice in Hoeryong market costs 900 North Korean won – a huge amount in a country where the average wage for a government employee is about between 3,000 and 4,000 won a month, or slightly more than one US dollar.

“There are a lot of people buying and it’s all money trade; there’s no bartering now,” Ms Song says. “North Koreans are poor, so it’s quite surprising to see people with a lot of money. They don’t receive money from the state – it’s all money they have made themselves.”

One Korean-Chinese man who visited relatives in Hoeryong last year also describes an increasingly active drug trade. It is not uncommon, he says, to be approached by people in their twenties or thirties selling a white narcotic called “ice” – probably a form of crystal methamphetamine. The drug fetches 20 times the North Korean price in China, making smuggling a lucrative business, but the punishment for drug trafficking in China is so severe that Hoeryong dealers try to sell it to visiting Chinese.

The markets are thriving thanks to new border regulations. While the number crossing illegally has dropped because of tighter restrictions in both countries, the number of North Koreans who are allowed to cross into China legally has steadily increased, according to several Korean-Chinese who help those who make it across the border.

North Koreans with relatives in China but not in South Korea are allowed to apply for passports to cross the border. This is creating a new group of migrant workers – those who are legal but working for themselves and their families rather than for the state. “Young people come here to work for one or two months and earn some money – they’re coming from Pyongyang as well as the regions,” says Ri In-chol, an ethnic Korean missionary from China who supports border crossers, legal or otherwise.

“They pay Rmb300-Rmb400 to get a passport and then they can cross. There is now a much freer flow because Kim Jong-il realises that this is the only way to keep the people alive. They take back money, used sewing machines and used clothes from their relatives that they can sell in the markets,” Mr Ri says.

Although Chinese clothes are most prevalent, North Koreans prefer South Korean products for their higher quality. “The labels have to be cut out of South Korean clothes, so if they don’t have a label then people assume that they’re South Korean and they like them more,” says another Chinese-Korean who has recently visited Rajin.

Indeed, Mr Ri says that North Korean officials are picky about what they will let through. “When North Koreans come to China they are allowed to take used clothes back. But when Korean-Chinese people want to give clothes to their relatives in North Korea, they have to be new because otherwise the officials think they are being looked down on,” he says. (Jeans and short skirts, seen as representative of American immorality, are still not allowed.)

The economic changes – particularly the lessening dependence on the state – are potentially destabilising for Mr Kim’s regime because they weaken the tools of control. That means that there is a fine line between what is permissible and what is not. “Kim Jong-il is tolerating this much openness because people need to survive, but if he wakes up one morning and sees capitalism is spreading too far, he will order it all to be stopped,” says Gao Jingzhu, professor of Korean studies at China’s Yanbian University, near the border.

“North Korea is small, so if there is too much change it will threaten the sustainability of the regime and it will collapse,” Prof Gao says. “North Korea is in a dilemma.”

Good Friends, a Seoul-based civic group that monitors life inside North Korea, this month said Pyongyang was cracking down on women working in street markets. “The authorities have judged that female merchants have reached a point that threatens the country’s government,” Good Friends quoted a North Korean official in China as saying.

“The men are tied to their workplaces but they don’t receive proper rations,” the official reportedly said. “This has shifted the men’s burden of supporting their families on to the women. With trade directly linked to the people’s survival, the crackdown isn’t going well.”

Indeed, it may already be too late. The increased economic interaction with China means that the flow of information to North Koreans is steadily increasing. “People’s awareness and illusions have changed,” says one Chinese-Korean who drives trucks into North Korea.

This is just the kind of contact that threatens Mr Kim’s regime, which has kept the 23m-strong population under control by cutting off access to the outside world and telling them they live in a socialist paradise. Mr Ri, the missionary, says: “People living in open areas like Rajin and Hoeryong are more exposed to the outside world but that is not the case when you go further into North Korea. So even if it is becoming more open, you never know when that is going to change. They will still come after you if you are involved in political activities.”

But recent escapees from North Korea say that people are increasingly discussing – in private – one topic that they say would have been unimaginable until very recently: the eventual death of the Dear Leader. “State control is still as strong as before but now, when people gather together as families, they say that the system is really wrong. That never used to happen before,” says Mr Pak, the man who left Hamhung last year.

“Kim Jong-il always says he will feed the people and make them happy, but that has not happened. There are many people who hope that Kim Jong-il will die soon,” he says, shrugging his shoulders. “I have to admit it: the state is already kind of breaking down.”

Posted in 1990s Famine, Agriculture, Arduous March, Black markets, Civil society, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Price liberalization, Restaurants | 1 Comment »

Working through Korean unification blues

Thursday, November 15th, 2007

Asia Times
Andrei Lankov
11/15/2007

For six decades, the myth of unification as Korea’s supreme goal has been enshrined in the official mythology of both nations. The lip service to this myth is still paid by virtually all political forces in both Koreas, but the actual policy of both Pyongyang and Seoul nowadays is clearly based on a very different set of assumptions and hopes: both sides try to avoid situations which might lead to unification.

There are good reasons for this quiet change of policy. The gap between the Koreas is too great; depending on which calculations you believe the per capita gross domestic product in the South is between 15 and 40 times higher than that of the North. Perhaps, nowhere in the world one can find two neighboring countries whose income levels would be so vastly different – and in this case the two countries happen to speak the same language.

The North Korean rulers know perfectly well that in a unified country they would be unable to keep their privileges, and also are likely to be held responsible for decades of gross human-rights abuses and economic mismanagement. South Koreans are no more willing to unify with their impoverished brethren – unification of Germany where the initial situation was much better, became an ordeal, so the unification of Korea would clearly become a disaster.

Therefore, South Korean politicians are doing everything possible to support the dictatorship in Pyongyang, assuming that “stability” in the North is necessary for South Korean economic prosperity. Sufficient to say that some 40% of all grain consumed in North Korea is either received from the South or produced with the help of the mineral fertilizer shipped by Seoul free of charge.

This policy is usually explained as a way to “create the environment for Chinese-style reforms”. This indeed might be its long-term goal, but for all practical reasons the major immediate outcome of massive South Korean aid is a continuous survival of the Pyongyang dictatorship. The statement that a “German scenario is unacceptable” has become a mantra of Seoul politicians.

However, over the past decades, Kim Jong-il’s regime has not shown the slightest inclination to reform itself. Obviously, the Pyongyang elite believes that the Chinese model, so enthusiastically extolled by the good-wishers from Seoul, is not acceptable for them. Perhaps they are correct in their fears. The existence of a rich and free South, always presented as another part of the same nation, makes the situation in Korea quite different from that of China or Vietnam.

Chinese-style reforms, if undertaken by Pyongyang, are bound to produce a certain openness of the country and certain relaxation of political control. As a result, the North Korean populace will soon learn about South Korean prosperity and will be less afraid of the regime’s repressive machine. It’s questionable to what extent the North Koreans would be willing to obey a government whose track record has been so bad after they see an attractive alternative of the South.

Hence, North Korean leaders have made a rational decision: to keep stability and their own privileges, in recent years they have used foreign aid to roll back the changes which happened in the mid-1990s. Instead of reforms, they now do everything possible to limit or ban private economic activity and reassert their control over society.

Despite the government’s resistance to reform, the North Korean system is gradually crumbling from below, and this slow-motion disintegration might turn into an uncontrollable collapse in any moment. A sudden death of even a serious illness of Kim Jong-il is almost certain to trigger a serious crisis. If this happens, all bets are off, but it seems that a collapse of the system, Romanian or East German style, is one of the most likely outcomes.

This is what people in the South fear most. Indeed, unification might indeed spell economic and social disaster for the rich South. There are different estimates of the “unification costs”, the amount of money that would be necessary to close the yawning gap between the two Korean economies. The most recent estimate was made public last October. A report prepared by a committee at the South Korean National Assembly states that if unification happened in 2015, it would cost US$858 million to raise North Korean per capita income to half of the South Korean level. This is guesswork, of course, but everybody agrees that the amount of money necessary for reconstruction of the impoverished North could ultimately be counted in trillions of US dollars.

The “unification cost” is a hot topic, but many problems are of a social nature and have nothing to do with money issues. For decades, North Korea has remained one of the world’s most isolated regimes whose rulers once perfected Stalinism to the level undreamt of by Joseph Stalin himself. The population, with the exception of a tiny elite, has very vague and distorted ideas about the outside world.

North Korea is a well-educated society, but the technology and science they teach at the colleges is of 1950s vintage. The average North Korean engineer has never used a computer. Society has been conditioned to perceive the total distribution of goods and services as the norm, and experts seem to agree that the average North Korean defector in the South has serious problems when it comes to making consumer or career decisions for oneself (no such decisions are necessary or even possible under the North Korean system).

So, it is easy to see why South Koreans are so afraid of unification. However, history does not flow in accordance with human desires. If the North Korean state collapses, South Koreans will have few choices but to prepare themselves for unification at time and under circumstances which they would not be too happy about.

As the East European revolutions of 1989-1990 (or, for that matter, of nearly all popular revolutions) have demonstrated, once changes begin, nobody can control the pace and direction of events. Now it is time to think what should be done if an emergency happens and the North Korean regime follows the fate of nearly all regimes which once were its models and aspirations – Albania, Romania and the Soviet Union itself. When a crisis starts unrolling, it doesn’t leave much time for rational thinking.

Alas, any open media discussion of this subject remains taboo in the South. There are fears that such discussions might annoy the North, undermining inter-Korean detente. The Korean nationalist left, now (barely) in power, still believes that the Chinese solution is possible and “progressive”, and also perceives any talks about regime collapse in the North as a reminder of the official anti-communism of the past. The right is slightly more realistic, but it seems that its supporters are not too eager to discuss the difficulties such a turn of events could bring about.

It will be a simplification to think that South Koreans are completely unprepared for such an eventuality. Seoul government agencies do not like to talk about it, but it is clear that somewhere in government there are secret files with short-term contingency plans, to be put in motion in case of a power collapse in the North. However, these plans deal with immediate consequences of the crisis, especially with handling of refugees, and not with the long-term strategy of reconstruction, and this strategy is actually the hardest part of the task.

The major task is to smooth the transition, to make the shock of unification less painful and more manageable. It seems that one of the possible solutions is a confederation. The idea of confederation has been suggested many times before, but in most cases it was assumed that the two existing Korean regimes would somehow agree to join a confederative state. Needless to say, one has to be very naive to believe that the North Korean rulers could somehow co-exist with South Korea, which even in its worst times was a relatively mild dictatorship committed to a market economy (and become a liberal democracy two decades ago).

Such confederation is plainly impossible. However, in this case we mean a different type of state union, a provisional confederation, whose sole and clearly stated task would be to lay the foundations for a truly unified state and to cushion the more disastrous effects of North Korea’s transformation.

Such a confederation will become possible only when and if the North Korean regime changes dramatically, and a new leadership in Pyongyang will have no reasons to fear the influence of the democratic and capitalist South. In other words, only a post-Kim government can be realistically expected to agree to such a provisional confederation. It does not really matter how this government will come to power, whether through a popular revolution, a coup or something else. As long as this government (most unlikely, bowing to pressure from below) would be genuinely willing to unite with the South, it might become a partner at these negotiations and a participant of the confederation regime.

The confederation regime should make North Korea a democracy, one that introduces political freedoms and basic political rights. There should be an explicit statement about the length of the provisional confederation regime, and 10 to 15 years seems to be ideal. A longer period might alienate common North Koreans who will probably see it as an attempt to keep them from fully enjoying the South Korean lifestyle while using them as “cheap labor”. On the other hand, a shorter period might not be sufficient for any serious transformations.

One of the tasks of such a provisional system will be to control cross-border movement. South Koreans are now haunted by nightmarish pictures of millions of North Koreans flooding Seoul and other major cities, where they will push the South Korean poor from unskilled jobs or resort to robbery and theft. Such threats are real, and the confederation will make it relatively easy to maintain a visa system of some kind, with a clearly stated (and reasonable) schedule of gradual relaxation. For example, it might be stated that for the first five years all trips between the two parts of the new Korea will require a visa, and North Koreans will not be allowed to take jobs or long-time residency in the South. In the following five years these restrictions could be relaxed and then finally lifted.

South Korean fears of a North Korean crime wave might be well-founded – notoriously tough North Korean commandos indeed make ideal mafia enforcers. However, the North Koreans also should be protected from the less scrupulous of their new-found brethren – for example, from South Korean real estate speculators. In the case of uncontrolled unification, South Korean dealers will rush to buy valuable property in the North, a task which will not be too difficult in a country where $10 a month is seen as a good income.

South Korean dealers vividly remember what happened in Kangnam, former paddy fields which were turned into a posh neighborhood in southern Seoul. In some parts of Kangnam land prices increased more than a thousandsfold within a decade or so, making a lucky investor super-rich, and there are good reasons to believe that the price of land in Pyongyang or Kaesong could sky-rocket as well.

However, it is easy to predict the resentment of those North Koreans who will lose their dwellings for what would initially appear to be a fortune, but soon will come to be seen as small change. If real estate speculations are left uncontrolled, in a few years entire North Korean cities could become the property of South Korean dealers – with predictable consequences for relations between northerners and southerners. Hence, the provisional confederation regime, while encouraging other kinds of investment, should strictly control or even ban the purchase of arable land and housing in the North by South Koreans.

Another painful issue is that of land reform, distributing the land of state-run agricultural cooperatives among individual farmers. One of the major challenges would be claims of land owners who lost their property during the North Korean radical land reform of 1946. A majority of the dispossessed landlords fled to the South in 1945-1953 when some 1.5 million inhabitants of the North crossed the border between the two Koreas. Their descendants now live in the South and, as both anecdotal evidence and some research testify, carefully kept the old land titles. It is just a minor exaggeration to say that an arable plot in the North usually has an aspiring landlord residing in Seoul. These claims remain technically valid since the Republic of Korea has never recognized the North Korean land reform of 1946.

For generations, the North Koreans have been told by their government that the collapse of the communist regime will bring back the nasty landowners who have been laying in wait in the South. If in this particular case the propaganda statements are correct, this would produce a very serious negative impression on North Koreans, further increasing their alienation and disappointment.

Under protection of the confederation regime, a land property system could be redesigned, or rather created from scratch. The recognition of the 1946 land reform and its results is a necessary first step. To placate former owners, some partial compensation might be paid, even though the present author is not certain whether grandchildren of former landlords, usually rich and successful men and women, are really in dire need of such compensation.

As the next step, the cooperative property should be distributed among its members, preferably among the people who are really present in their villages (perhaps, a free rent system might be the first step). At any rate, by the end of the confederation period, land and real estate in North Korean should be safely privatized, with North Korean residents (and, perhaps, recent defectors) being major or even sole participants in this process.

One of the more controversial parts of the package might be a general amnesty for all crimes committed under the Kim family regime. This is especially necessary because the fear of persecution seems to be one of the reasons which keeps the North Korean elite, including its lower ranks, united around the inefficient and brutal regime. They believe that collapse of the Kims’ rule will mean not only the bend of their privileges (which actually are quite small – only a handful of top officials enjoy a really opulent lifestyle in North Korea), but they are more afraid of judicial persecution and even mob violence.

It is not incidental that North Korean officials and guides in Pyongyang ask one foreign visitor after another about the fate of former East German bureaucrats. Indeed, despite considerable liberalization in recent years, the regime remains exceptionally brutal, and its officials have no illusions about this. Unfortunately, this fear of persecution has kept the murderous regime going for the past decade or so and led to many more deaths.

One might argue that such unconditional amnesties to all Koreans is probably “unethical”. Perhaps, but let’s face it: the sheer scale of the crimes committed makes any serious and fair investigation impossible. About half million people have been in prison during those decades, and many more exiled, and nobody will be capable of investigating all these cases carefully and impartially. A great number of people have been directly or indirectly involved with the human-rights abuses, and again, it is impossible to investigate a few hundred thousand former officials who by the nature of their job might have been responsible for some criminal actions. Hence, only partial, selective symbolical (and therefore largely politically motivated) justice can be served at best.

A general amnesty would solve two problems: first, it will make former North Korean bureaucrats less willing to resist changes; second, it would diminish the scale of intrigue and manipulations, since people would not be fighting to avoid the fate of arbitrarily chosen scapegoats. It should become part of the law, and to be taken seriously the amnesty should be made as straightforward and unequivocal as possible.

Of course, amnesty does not mean complete forgiveness. There might be restrictions for former party and secret police officials to occupy certain positions in a post-Kim Korea (a policy pioneered by Eastern Europe). It might be a good idea to create non-judiciary commissions to investigate former abuses, like it was done in post-apartheid South Africa. This commission might lead to truly awful discoveries, but the promise of amnesty should be kept even if it will become clear that North Korean prison camps were not much different from Adolf Hitler’s Auschwitz or Pol Pot’s Tuol Sleng in Cambodia.

The confederation treaty also should include some legal measures which will make certain that North Koreans will not remain the source of “cheap labor”, to be used (and abused) by South Korean businesses.

For example, the military of the two Koreas should be integrated first, and there should be large quotas reserved for former North Korean servicemen in the united army. Politically, the North Korean military might become a hotspot of social discontent: the 1.2 million-strong North Korean armed forces probably lack the skills necessary for modern warfare, but this force consists of professionals who have not known anything except the barracks life and intense nationalist indoctrination. If former military officers are given commissions in the post-unification forces, their skills and zeal will find a good and useful outlet. Otherwise, the very same people are likely to join the ranks of organized crime.

It is also important to provide large admission quotas for North Korean youngsters at major South Korean universities. Korean society is both hierarchical and meritocratic, and being a graduate of a major Seoul school is a necessary condition of entry for nearly all important jobs. It is not incidental that the entire life of a middle-class South Korean family is often designed to facilitate exam preparations for the children.

Unfortunately, for decades to come even the most gifted North Koreans will be unable to compete on equal terms with much better prepared South Korean students, and this means that they can realistically hope to get only to lower-level universities, usually in the North. Both actual and perceived quality of education in those schools will remain relatively low for decades, and this will ensure that North Koreans, even with “new” college-level education, will be permanently relegated to subaltern positions. Hence, affirmative actions are necessary, even if such measures are certain to provoke an hysterical outcry from Seoul and Busan parents.

The confederation regime will help to solve another important problem – that of the North Korean middle class. As East Europe demonstrated, a majority of active supporters of democracy and reform has come from local-educated urban groups, a close analogue of the Western “middle class”. The same is likely to happen in Korea.

However, the same people will become very vulnerable after unification. Who will hire an engineer who has not seen a computer? What can be taught by a social science teacher who spent his or her college years memorizing Kim Il-sung’s genealogical tree and the “Dear Leader’s” asinine pronouncement on everything, from rice planting to nuclear physics? Who will visit a former North Korean doctor whose medicine is essentially on the 1950s level?

During the confederation regime, special efforts could be made to re-educate those people, at least partially, preparing them for a new environment while still allowing them to continue their professional work in the North. Most of them will be unable to adjust, unfortunately, but at least the 10 or 15 years leniency will give a chance to the lucky and determined few, and will also provide others with time to find other ways to make a living.

The confederation model does have serious shortcomings. For example, there are good reasons to believe that the new North Korean political elite will consist largely of Kim-era officials (or their children) who will retain their old habits, including that of corruption and inefficiency. A Northern democratic government would be prone to populist decisions, based on pressure from below, and North Koreans are likely to have particularly naive views on how their society and economy can and should operate, so some mistakes introduced via popular vote might become ruinous and costly.

But no ideal solution is possible. One should not harbor too many illusions. The recovery of North Korea will be prolonged and painful. Even if unification happens tomorrow, the difference between the two Koreas will remain palpable until 2050, if not longer. Tensions, misunderstanding and even outright hostility between northerners and southerners are bound to continue for a long time.

There are no easy and simple solutions. But the current state of affairs cannot continue indefinitely, and it is time to think how unavoidable problems can be mollified. The current policy of Seoul administrations merely helps to postpone the problems created by Korea’s division, and the disastrous choices made by the North half of the country. But sooner or later, Korea and the entire world will have to face these problems – and solve them.

Posted in 1946 Land Reform Law, Agriculture, Economic reform, International Aid, International trade, Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Military, Political economy, Real estate | Comments Closed

North Korea Shuts Down Most of Its Complex Microbial Fertilizer Factories

Sunday, November 11th, 2007

Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
11/11/2007

A source inside North Korea reports that most of the country’s complex microbial fertilizer factories built during the mass starvation period in 1990s for increase of food production have been shut down.

The source said, “Those factories built between 1996 and 1997 in Kyongsung county of North Hamkyung Province had produced fertilizers only for one year following the construction. The year after, they were shut down. Now, the factory buildings are cleared”

North Korean media has praised till quite recently about North Korea’s advanced technology for producing complex microbial fertilizers. They said that the country’s fertilizer-producing technology and nature farming methods helped solve the food crisis and protect the ecosystem of North Korea. South Korean media have also once positively reported upon North Korea’s new fertilizer-producing technology.

However, the source said, “The situation is pretty much the same across the country. Most factories had stopped operating the year after the construction. It was Kim Jong Il who gave orders to build those fertilizer plants. But many factories fell into ruins.”

North Korea had built more than one hundred complex microbial fertilizer plants throughout the country during the mass starvation period in 1990s because it needed quite an amount of fertilizers to increase crop production.

The agricultural technology, which uses complex microbial fertilizers is a natural farming method developed by Dr. Teruo Higa, a professor at Ryukus University, Okinawa, Japan and the founder of Effective Microorganisms(EM) technology. Since complex microbial fertilizers contain 100 times more nutrients than ordinary fertilizers, they are used in many places in South Korea such as Yichu city of Kyungki Province where environment-friendly agriculture method is being practiced.

When crop production rapidly decreased in the mid 1990s, the failure was attributed to soil acidification, and Kim Jong Il urged his people to spread burnt soil, decomposed grass and compound fertilizers composed of soil, manure and chemical fertilizers over the field.

Unfortunately, that did not work. Then, Kim Jong Il gave another order to produce complex microbial fertilizers in large quantities in an attempt to increase crop production. Upon his order, North Korea started promoting the construction of complex microbial fertilizer plants through Chongryon (General Association of North Korean Residents in Japan) and built more than one hundred factories nationwide for the period of one year including ‘Patriotic Center for Complex Microorganism,’ whose construction work was completed in June, 1997.

Many North Koreans had to use pure grain to make complex microorganisms instead of costly granulated sugar. However, that was a bad idea because there was food shortage across nation and a great number of people were staving to death. Moreover, North Korea should not have wasted grain for microorganism production in such situation because it takes three years to see any effect of the use of microorganisms on crop production.

Kim Yong Hwa (pseudonym), a defector from Hyesan city of Yangkang Province, who used to work at ‘Patriotic Center for Complex Microorganism’ said, “350 kg of corn is used to make one ton of fermentation solution. That amount of corn is sufficient enough to feed one person for an entire year. Overall, the plant had used 38 tons of corn during its first two- year operation.”

The defector said, “The workers received food ration, but it wasn’t enough. So, many people stole corn power and even fermentation solution from the factory.” The defector added, “When people heard that we were using corn to make fertilizers, they found it hard to believe at first, but soon flared up in anger, saying ‘those microorganisms are eating us.’”

The defector said, “In addition, we did not know what to do with microorganisms we had produced because we didn’t have gas and a means of transportation. Sometimes, containers for storing microorganisms were lost or broken. We also had difficulty to move around microorganisms because they were produced in liquid form.”

Kim said the locals did not believe the expert’s explanation that microorganisms would produce germs three years later, which produce nitrogen gas, and therefore make soil rich. He said that the locals disapproved the use of corn for the production of microorganisms, and had no interest in sowing microorganisms in the field. Therefore, Kim said, the plant had to close.

South Korean experts have continued to point out the problem of soil acidification in North Korea and encourage the use of organic fertilizers. Nevertheless, many defectors criticized the use of grain for the production of complex microbial fertilizers for being detached from the realities of food situation in North Korea.

Lee Min Bok, a defector who used to work at North Korean Academy of Agricultural Science, said, “Staring with 1979, soil acidification became a serious problem, and Kim Jung Il has been giving orders to improve soil condition. The use of microorganisms can better the condition to some extent. However, North Korea needs to come up with comprehensive policies on its agricultural structure, anti-flood afforestation, and the establishment of production systems for chemical and organic fertilizers to solve the acidification problem.”

The source inside North Korea said, “In 1996, the authorities began praising about the effect of complex microbial fertilizers. Disappointedly, there weren’t any significant effect. So, starting with 1999, many fertilizers plants began to shut down.” The source added, “Most plants fell into ruin except few large factories such as Patriotic Center for Complex Microorganism in Pyongyang and a fertilizer plant in Rasun.”

North Korea began to display an interest in the production of complex microbial fertilizers because it had failed to produce enough manure and chemical fertilizers before. The South Korean government agreed to provide North Korea with 300,000 tons of chemical fertilizers this year and 400,000 tons next year.

According to Rodong Shinmun (North Korean state newspaper), Kim Jong Il spoke about the worldwide decrease in the production of chemical fertilizers, and stressed the importance of the use of microbial fertilizers in May, 2004.

Posted in Agriculture, Labor conditions/wages, Manufacturing | Comments Closed

Google Earth North Korea (version 6)

Sunday, November 11th, 2007

The most authoritative map of North Korea on Google Earth
North Korea Uncovered: Version 6
Download it here

This map covers North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks. It is continually expanding and undergoing revisions. This is the sixth version.

Additions to the newest version of North Korea Uncovered include: Alleged Syrian nuclear site (before and after bombing), Majon beach resort, electricity grid expansion, Runga Island in Pyongyang, Mt. Ryongak, Yongbyon historical fort walls, Suyang Fort walls and waterfall in Haeju, Kaechon-Lake Taesong water project, Paekma-Cholsan waterway, Yachts (3), and Hyesan Youth Copper Mine.

Disclaimer: I cannot vouch for the authenticity of many locations since I have not seen or been to them, but great efforts have been made to check for authenticity. These efforts include pouring over books, maps, conducting interviews, and keeping up with other peoples’ discoveries. In many cases, I have posted sources, though not for all. This is a thorough compilation of lots of material, but I will leave it up to the reader to make up their own minds as to what they see. I cannot catch everything and I welcome contributions.

Posted in Advertising, Agriculture, Architecture, Automobiles, Aviation, Banking, Black markets, Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Communications, Computing/IT, Dams/hydro, Department Store No. 1, Economic reform, Education, Electricity, Energy, Environmental protection, Film, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Football (soccer), Forestry, Gambling, Gasoline, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Golf, Google Earth, Hana Electronics Company, Health care, Hoteling, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), Hyesan Youth Cooper Mine, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Kim Il Sung University, Korea Computer Center (KCC), Library, Light Industry, Mansudae creative Company (art studio), Manufacturing, Mass games, Maternity Hospital, Military, Mining/Minerals, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Musan Mine, Music, Nuclear, Pyongyang Embroidery Institute, Pyongyang Film Studio, Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC), Pyongyang International Information Center of New Techn, Pyongyang International Trade Fair, Pyongyang Metro, Railways, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Real estate, Religion, Restaurants, Sea shipping, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Sports, Steel, Supreme Peoples Assembly, Television, Tourism, Transportation, Water, Wind | Comments Closed

Pigs and Chickens… (better title ideas welcome in the comments)

Tuesday, November 6th, 2007

Poultry company looks North for land, workers
Joong Ang Daily
11/7/2007

A South Korean food company said yesterday it will start building a chicken farm in North Korea later this year as part of its efforts to produce chickens using the North’s cheap labor.

Maniker Company, the nation’s second-largest chicken processing company, said it agreed with North Korean officials last month to establish the farm in Kaesong, where an inter-Korean industrial complex is located.

“Construction will start later this year and the farm will be operational early next year,” said Choi Young-sam, a spokesman for Maniker, by telephone.

North Korea will provide the site and workers for the construction, Choi said, adding the project is partly supported by the South Korean government.

The agreement was reached at a meeting in Pyongyang when two executives of Maniker visited the North in late October, the spokesman said.

Details such as how much money Maniker and the South Korean government will spend on the chicken farm have yet to be fixed, Choi said.

In the Kaesong Industrial Complex, located 70 kilometers north of Seoul, 26 South Korean companies employ about 16,000 North Korean workers who produce garments, kitchenware and a number of other goods.

North, South Korea collaborate on strategy to end food shortage
Courier News (Via DPRK Forum)
11/6/2007

North Korea and South Korea have decided to start a jointly operated hog farm in the North’s capital to help alleviate the communist nation’s chronic food shortages, a South Korean official said Tuesday.

The agreement came as a follow-up to a wide range of accords reached by the leaders of the two Koreas last month.

The farm will run for a two-year trial period in Pyongyang and aim to breed 5,000 hogs, with the South providing the animals, feed, equipment and building materials, and the North providing the land, electricity, water and labor, South Korea’s Unification Ministry said.

Officials of the two countries negotiated the deal in talks in the North Korean border city of Kaesong on Monday and plan to meet again to map out details, such as when to open the farm, ministry spokesman Park Won-jae said in Seoul.

“The hogs are aimed at resolving the North’s food shortage problem,” Park said, adding that the animals would not be exported to South Korea or elsewhere.

North Korea suffers from chronic food shortages and has struggled to increase its grain production in recent years. The country was hit by famine in the mid-1990s that killed an estimated 2 million people.

In the second-ever inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in early October, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il agreed on accords aimed at easing tensions and boosting cross-border economic exchange programs. The measures included the launch of cooperative farm programs.

The two Koreas are still technically at war, as their 1950-53 Korean War ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty.

Posted in Agriculture, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Manufacturing | 1 Comment »

Hyundai Motor union leaders visit N. Korea for noodle project

Wednesday, October 31st, 2007

Yonhap
10/31/2007

Union leaders of Hyundai Motor Co., South Korea’s largest carmaker, left for North Korea to attend a ceremony to mark the completion of a corn noodle plant in the North’s capital, union officials said Wednesday.

Hyundai’s 44,000-strong union has donated 500 million won (US$553,800), collected from unionized workers for a mere $13 each, to help a South Korean humanitarian group build the noodle factory in the impoverished North.

Posted in Agriculture, Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Light Industry, Manufacturing | Comments Closed

The Price of Cabbage in North Korea Is Prohibitive

Monday, October 29th, 2007

Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
10/29/2007

South Korean housewives are afraid to open their wallets due to the threefold increase in the price of cabbage and radish compared to last year with the kimchi preparation season ahead. The skyrocketed price of cabbage in North Korea has also caused concerns about disturbance to the kimjang (kimchi preparation) season.

Lee Ok Ran (45), who trades in Hoiryeong, relayed in a phone conversation with DailyNK on the 25th, “Due to the flood damage and the delayed seedtime, the amount of the cabbage harvest has decreased significantly. In the middle of October, we have to enter the kimjang season, but are worried because the price of cabbage has risen exorbitantly. The saying that the price of cabbage is like the price of gold seems fitting now.”

Ms. Lee said, “Large cabbage has not been reaped yet, so cabbage from China has mostly been sold in the jangmadang (markets). Unripe cabbage made in North Korea is being sold at 450~500 won per bundle and Chinese-produced cabbage costs around 1,800~2,000 won.” Last year, North Korean-produced cabbage was sold for 200~250 won per bundle.

He explained, “Chosun (North Korea) cabbage has a lot of insect marks and the leaves are tough, but on the other hand, Chinese-produced cabbages have better quality, so generally reflect over a twofold difference in price. Mostly, the party leaders buy and eat these cabbages rather than average civilians.”

However, with the soaring price of North Korean cabbage, the cost of imported cabbage has increased significantly.

Ms. Lee added, “In the winter, there is only one type of a sidedish—kimchi–so they are called ‘a half-year’s gourmet food.’ At this time, if we cannot prepare kimchi, we will not see kimchi for the entire year next year.”

North Korean civilians have prepared for kimchi by harvesting cabbage or radish seeds, planted starting late July immediately after reaping wheat and corn, from the end of October.

The reality of the cabbage scarcity is due to the loss of the majority of cabbage, which had just started sprouting in early August, in the flood.

The North Korean Central News Agency and the Chosun Shimbo issued by Chongryon (General Association of North Korean Residents in Japan) reported on the 10th, “In some areas of South Pyongan and Kangwon, collective farm laborers plowed the fields submerged in the flood and have started re-sowing.”

The North Korean farmers started sowing cabbage and radish seeds again, but the amount of the harvest is expected to be half of the annual average amount. Due to this, North Korea’s “kimjang combat,” which is supposed to start the middle of October, is supposed to be hit with a huge setback.

In North Korea, using military language such as “combat” for important events is customary. Just as there is the spring rice-planting combat, the summer weeding combat, and the fall harvesting combat, the words, “kimjang combat,” are used during kimjang season.

In northernmost Yangkang, North Hamkyung, kimjang season begins in the middle of October. Come November, all regions of North Korea, such as South Hamkyung, Jagang, North Pyongan, South Pyongan, and Hwanghae are swarming from the combats.

However, the price of cabbage has exorbitantly this year and by kimjang season, the price of hot pepper and seasoning skyrockets, so the concern of North Korean ordinary people for surviving the winter will be raised a notch.

Posted in Agriculture, Chongryun, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Price liberalization | Comments Closed

Jangmadang Will Prevent “Second Food Crisis” from Developing

Friday, October 26th, 2007

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
10/26/2007

There is a prospect of the rise of “second food crisis” next year because of the flood disaster and the resulting food shortage.

A senior researcher at Korea Rural Economic Institute, Kwon Tae Jin said warningly, “Unless North Korea comes up with a special plan to secure food supply, there will come another food crisis next year, which is as severe as the one in the mid and late 1990s.”

Kwon anticipated that North Korea would need 5.2 million tons of grain for domestic consumption. Unfortunately, it is expected that North Korea would produce around 3.8 million tons of grain. This means there will be a shortage of 1.4 million tons of grain.

The statistics indicates there is a real possibility of a food crisis. North Korean authorities announced that the flood inundated about 2.2 billion ㎡ of farmland, which accounts for 14 percent of the country’s farmland. It is estimated that 2.2 billion ㎡ of farmland produces at least 500,000 tons of grain.

However, another prospect says that although food shortage is inevitable, it will not lead to mass starvation in North Korea as it did in the mid-1990s. Most of defectors from North Korea said, “Since the mid-2000s, things have changed. There won’t be any serious starvation.” They said that the current situation is different from that of those days under the central food distribution system. They added that the Jangmadang (markets) economy has changed a way for life among North Korea people.

◆ The amount of demand for food is overestimated

It should be double-checked whether North Korea really needs a minimum of 5.2 million tons of grain. There is criticism that the estimate of food demand which was calculated by some South Korean experts on North Korea and relief organizations is unrealistic. It is also pointed out that the estimate is calculated based on the nutrition standard of South Korea.

Defectors said that mass starvation would not have occurred if North Korea had at least a half of 5.2 million tons of grain in the mid 1990s.

Although the international standard for daily nutritional intake is between 2,000 and 2,500 kcal/day, North Korea sets the standard at 1,600 kcal/day, which amounts to 450 grams of grain.

It is easy to estimate the minimum amount of food demand needed in North Korea. Let us say every individual including children and the elderly needs 550 grams of grain per day, which is equal to the daily amount of food distributed to every adult by the state. With the population of 22 million in North Korea, the country then needs 12,100 tons of grain each day and 4.4 million tons of grain per year.

It is known that the North Korean government provides 550 grams of grain for adults and 300 grams for both children and the elderly. According to CIA’s World Fact Book 2004, the population aged between 15 and 64 in North Korea is around 15 million, which accounts for 67.8 percent of total population. This means the population of children and the elderly together reaches about 7 million. If we do the math, we come into conclusion that the amount of food needed in North Korea every year is 3,777,750 tons of grain.

Recall that North Korean people had received the aforementioned amount of food through the state food distribution until early 1990s. Of course, the country did not suffer from mass starvation back then.

The mass starvation during the mid-1990s resulted from huge decrease in food production between 1994 and 1998. In those years, North Korea produced about 2 million tons of grain, which fell far below the needed levels of food production. Hwang Jang Yop, former secretary of the Worker’s Party also testified that in the fall of 2006, while he was still in North Korea, he once heard the secretary of agriculture Seo Kwan Hee worrying about extremely low food production.

Therefore, it is correct to estimate the minimum amount of food needed in North Korea at 3,777,750 tons of grain. If the food production decreases below 3 million tons, then the food prices will skyrocket, and the possibility of mass starvation will be increased.

◆ A New way of life among North Korean people helps prevent them from falling victim to starvation.

North Koran people do not believe in the state authorities any more. The people know that they suffered from horrible starvation because they relied on the state and its food distribution system. During the crisis, many people had desperately waited for food to be distributed until they collapsed and died. Nowadays, North Korean people find a means of living by themselves at Jangmadang.

“There is no free ride” is the words on everybody’s lips in North Korea, which means that everyone must work hard in order to make a living. The lowest class became a day laborer.

The mass starvation of the mid-1990s has brought a significant change into North Korean society. Except a few, most of North Korean people do not rely on the state’s food distribution system. Instead, they have come up with a variety of survival techniques such as engaging in business, illegal trade with China or real estate transactions, receiving support from defected family members, and house sitting.

In that manner, North Korean people make money and use it to buy rice. An affiliate at the Bank of Korea who studies price trends of North Korea said, “Since the adoption of the July 1 Economic Improvement Measure, the price of rice and corn has increased the least.” If the prices go up, people would tighten their belts and decrease their spending on every item except rice. This means they are not that vulnerable to starvation as they used to.

◆ Businessmen are good at securing food.

Recently, a number of rich businessmen have emerged. Some have tens of thousands dollars, and others as many as several million dollars. Groups of Jangmadang businessmen have been organized with these rich businessmen as the leaders.

These businessmen come and go to China as they please and supply food and goods to Jangmadang in North Korea. If the rice price in North Korea is expensive than in China, they buy Chinese rice and sell it at Janmadang. In this way, they help balance supply and demand at the market.

Furthermore, Chinese residents in North Korea and Chinese businessmen also joined the North Korean businessmen as providers at the market. They too sell food produced in China at Jangmadang when food prices go up in North Korea. If possible, they even sell rice reserved for the People’s Army. There was an accusation that the state authorities supplied food aid from overseas for the People’s Army while collecting food produced in North Korea at the same time.

Of course, some businessmen could deliberately keep a hold on food supply anticipating an increase in food prices. However, that kind of unfair activity is temporary. Although it is too early to tell, the “invisible hand” of the market, however small it is, is operating in North Korea and acting as a preventive measure against starvation.

Posted in Agriculture, Arduous March, Black markets, Economic reform, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Political economy, Price liberalization, Public Distribiution System (PDS), Uncategorized | Comments Closed

Inside North Korea: A Report by Good Friends Chairman Venerable Pomnyun and Seungjoo Baek

Wednesday, October 24th, 2007

Inside North Korea: A Report by Good Friends Chairman Venerable Pomnyun and Seungjoo Baek
SAIS US Korea Institute
September 19, 2007

For audio, click here.

Chairman of the Good Friends Center for Peace, Human Rights and Refugees, the Venerable Pomnyun, briefed audience members at SAIS on current trends inside North Korea, including issues surrounding the current food crisis caused by the flooding, continuing health crisis, and the breakdown of the education system.

Good Friends, one of the largest Korea-based organizations providing humanitarian aid inside the D.P.R.K. and to refugees in Northern China, contributes some of the most accurate and timely reports on conditions inside North Korea. The Venerable Pomnyun visited Washington D.C. with a team of experts to discuss the on-going food shortage and proliferation of non-government controlled information. While here, they briefed Congress and held a day-long conference at CSIS.

Highlights of his comments (paraphrased, not direct quotes):

In contrast to the much lower number of famine deaths provided by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland Pomnyun maintained the 3 million number claimed by Good Friends in the past.
He provided a short narrative of coping mechanisms people have adopted to stay afloat (selling and manufacturing in homes). Society is being sustained by activities that are still considered illegal.
He claims the food situation is getting worse, and he does not think the DPRK can resolve the situation on its own. Now people buy all their food on the market.
He claims that people’s lives are not improving.
TB is on the increase along with other epidemics. Since there is no electricity, water is not clean.
He offered that there are four levels of hospitals: clinics at the town level, hospitals in cities and some towns, hospitals at province level, and specialist offices in the Pyongyang area.
Hospitals and clinics are not working at the city/province level. The situation is better in Pyongyang hospitals. The amount of international medical aid, however, is not enough for even the Pyongyang hospitals.
Medical aid is the second most needed good (after food). People do not get medicines from the hospital, but from the markets. With low salaries, however, medicines are difficult to afford. [Because the institutional environment is still not supportive of entrepreneurship] there are qulaity problems with pharmaceuticals purchased at the markets.
The education system, though ‘free’ is not functioning well. Due to the food shortage problem, students do not go to school. Teachers also do not come to class. The cost of education is being pushed back to students directly. For example, students buy chalk for teachers. As a result, however, poor students cannot attend school. The rich students are hiring tutors, so we are seeing a market in private education emerge in the DPRK.
The DPRK is slowly moving to a private economic system. Men who cannot get work are now jokingly referring to themselves as “guard dogs,” because they sit at home all day.
North Koreans do not trust the government or party. People on their death beds are telling their children to trust their descendents, not the government. People still spend much of their time trying to subsist, but these complaints will not become a political issue. The political system is stable and will not collapse any time soon.

Posted in Agriculture, Civil society, Education, Good Friends, Health care, International Aid | 1 Comment »

South Korea’s Average Life Span 78 years – North Korea’s 64…a 14-year Difference

Tuesday, October 23rd, 2007

Daily NK
Namgung Min
10/23/2007

North Korean civilians’ average life span was disclosed to be approximately 14-years lower than the average life span in South Korea.

The Ministry of Health and Welfare said through inspection documents of the administration on “North Korea’s Health and Medical Situation,” which was recently submitted to the National Assembly.

According to this document, the North Korean civilians’ average life span is 61.4 years for males and 67.3 for females, an average of 64.3 years. For South Korea, the average is 78.1 years, with 74.4 for males and 81.8 for females.

The significant difference in average life span for North and South Korea reflects the fact that the severely worsened medical environment in North Korea.

According to the document, North Korean teenage boys’ smoking rate is supposed to be at an extremely alarming level. In the case of 16-year old males, the smoking rate is around 59.9%. This exceeds by 20.7% the smoking rate of South Korea high school students, provided by the Korean Association of Smoking and Health.

Cigarettes in North Korea, in contrast to South Korean cigarettes, contain a very high level of tar and nicotine content as well as higher toxicity, due to the fact that cigarettes lack filters or are hand-made.

One defector said, “In North Korea, even very young children smoke cigarettes without reservation and easily come in contact with them because they do not have much else to do.”

The document also revealed that 32~40% of North Korea’s 20~34 year olds show signs of malnutrition and approximately 34~36% of them are anemic patients.

These results can be attributed to North Korea’s continuous food shortage situation; disease rates due to malnutrition and anemic are high.

North Korea’s birth rate is 1.94, higher than South Korea’s 1.19. However, the infant mortality rate, between `99~`02, was 23.5 per 1,000 persons, but conversely, the `06 mortality rate was 42 persons, 14 times higher than South Korea’s (at 3 persons).
The health span (a period without sickness or handicap) is 52.3 years old (based on 2000 data), a significant decrease from South Korea’s 67.8 years (in 2005).

The reason why North Korea’s health and medical situation is so tenuous as shown above is due to the lack of the state’s investment in this area. The actual situation is that there is an unmistakable gap between North Korea’s single dollar payment for a person’s health and medical fee and South Korea’s $625.

Further, in North Korea, it is extremely difficult to obtain basic medical goods, such as cold medicine or antibiotics.

One defector who escaped in 2005 said, “In North Korea, even if one wants to go to the hospital, he or she cannot receive treatment without any money and there is not even a full equipment of medicine. It is much easier to buy medicine in the jangmadang than in a hospital, because there is more variety and it is more easily obtainable. Only, the price of medicine, compared to other products, transcends the imagination.”

The Ministry of Health and Welfare plans to invest 294 million won (approx. USD316,120) to modernize the People’s Hospital in Gosung and Songdo in Kaesung next year, besides continuing medical support for North Korea.

Posted in Agriculture, Civil society, Disease prevention, Health care, Pediatrics, Tobacco | Comments Closed

North Korean Economy Watch