North Korean Economy Watch

Asian Survey
November/December 2006, Vol. 46, No. 6, Pages 898-916
Jae Cheol Kim
Professor of International Studies at the Catholic University of Korea, Seoul.

PDF here: chinainDPRK.pdf

Conclusion:
China’s investment efforts suggest that it has begun to engage North Korea economically. By investing, the Chinese leadership has attempted to push the North to embrace economic reforms, which in turn could improve the North Korean economy and reduce the country’s potential for political instability. In order to lead the North to embark on reform policies, Beijing has tried to provide it with seed money and technology by encouraging Chinese companies to invest. This suggests that despite expectations and allegations from the West that China might abandon its long-time ally, China is committed to supporting North Korea.

The Chinese investment, however, has increasingly been influenced by commercial considerations. Officials in Beijing have stressed that economic exchanges with the North must be mutually beneficial. Chinese companies, which have become responsible for the majority of the investment, have paid increasing attention to market share and natural resources. That China has increasingly tried to gain economic advantage in the North suggests that Sino-North Korean relations are being transformed from being ideology-motivated to interestmotivated.

Despite a stiff increase over the past couple of years, it is hard to say that Chinese investment is either full-fledged or irreversible. Because the instability of North Korea prevents Chinese entrepreneurs from fully embracing the country, Chinese investment must be seen as a pilot project, with Chinese companies and entrepreneurs testing the water. Looking to the future, Chinese investment in North Korea is likely to increase. Despite problems, the Chinese leadership will probably continue to encourage further investment in an effort to exploit developmental opportunities while simultaneously curtailing the flow of direct aid to the North. In addition, China’s dynamic economic growth will propel its overseas investment. As China’s capital account is gradually liberalized, cash-rich Chinese companies will look for markets and resources abroad to fuel their development. The potential appreciation of the yuan will further force firms to relocate factories producing low-end products to countries where the labor cost is lower. Seen from this perspective, North Korea is a good candidate for future Chinese investment—if there is no major turbulence in bilateral relations.

Highlights:
North Korea has been reluctant to follow China’s path of reform and opening because it worried that the policy may create political problems. In an apparent response to China’s recommendation in the late 1990s for reform, for instance, Kim asked Beijing to respect “Korean-style socialism.” But China’s support for reform is not unconditional. Although Chinese leaders have repeatedly urged the DPRK to embrace market-driven reforms (even taking Kim Jong Il is on tours to see the results of China’s economic reforms), when North Korea decided to set up a special economic zone in Sinuiju, apparently without prior consultation with Beijing, China aborted the project by arresting Yang Bin, whom North Korea had designated head of the zone, in October 2002.

China, however, does not want to see turbulence on the Korean Peninsula, which could not only lead to the economic and political collapse of a socialist regime on China’s border but could also threaten regional stability. China thus has tried to sustain the Pyongyang regime by providing economic assistance–believing that reform and opening would not only revive the North Korean economy but also reduce the need for regular aid to prop up the regime, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that the Chinese government would encourage more of its companies to invest and establish their businesses in North Korea.

For Chinese firms, the prime minister’s statement amounted to a government directive, with some entrepreneurs understanding that Wen’s statement was a signal for Chinese companies to invest.  Organizations were formed to smooth such investment, including the Shenyang Municipal Association of Entrepreneurs (Shenyangshi Qiyejia Xiehui), Dandong Municipal Economic Consultation Center for the Korean Peninsula (Dandongshi Chaoxianbandao Jingji Zixun Zhongxin), and Beijing Sino-Korea Economic & Cultural Exchange Company (Beijing Chaohua Youlian). They organized explanatory meetings on investment, drawing numerous applicants.

Beijing attempted to boost investors’ confidence by signing an “Investment Encouragement and Protection Agreement” with Pyongyang in March 2005 when Premier Park Bongju visited Beijing. The framework for economic and technological cooperation was made clearer through the signing of an “Agreement on Economic and Technological Cooperation” that October. Chinese officials have given financial incentives and guarantees to firms that invest in North Korea. China’s state-run banks have not only provided companies with investment capital but also have underwritten Chinese investment for joint ventures. Beijing granted preferential treatment to products processed in the North, allowing them better access to the Chinese market. Products that were processed in the Rajin area with Chinese materials and then imported to China, for instance, were labeled domestic trade and were thus exempted from customs inspection.

The deputy CEO of Beijing Sino-Korea Economic & Cultural Exchange Company, a Beijing company that helps Chinese companies invest in the North, has been quoted as saying that whether a company is able to invest in North Korea depended not on the company’s will but on whether the North would accept it or not. Foreign investors, he added, needed to meet the criterion of “political reliability.” In practice, concerns about political contamination limit North Korea’s economic cooperation with South Korea, whose government has eagerly pushed economic integration with the North. North Korea’s opening therefore means an opening toward China, and this in turn gives Chinese companies very rare advantages.

Labor costs in the DPRK are low [compared to China], running only 70–80 yuan (about US$10) per month.  Building a factory is very cheap, up to one million yuan (about $120,000).  Chinese entrepreneurs see that what North Korea needs is largely light industrial products. Because brand consciousness there is weak, these investors believe that many Chinese companies, even small- and medium-sized ones, can compete in the North Korean market.  The scope for making profits is bigger in North Korea than in China because manufacturers can charge more for similar products in the North. For example, the price of a cigarette lighter is three to five yuan ($0.36 to $0.60) in Pyongyang but only 0.5 yuan ($0.06) in Wenzhou, China.

Although big state-owned companies account for the majority of Chinese outward investments, they rarely invest in North Korea, leaving this to small- to medium-sized companies. In the past, most Chinese investors were Korean-Chinese merchants from two areas in China: Liaoning Province and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. They do not expect that they can make profits in the North Korean market right away; rather, they plan to be ready for when the North opens to the world, by moving into the market early.

Chinese investment projects in North Korea are not only small in number but also weak in scale. There are no detailed data available on their average size, but they likely are no exception to the fact that China’s outward investment is generally characterized by its small scale and low level of technology.

Although North Korea wants capital in such sectors as home appliances, construction materials, electronic communications products, and machine building, Chinese investment is heavily concentrated in the sectors where China’s needs lie, such as resource extraction, or where its companies can make a profit, such as service sectors. The official Chinese guideline for outbound investment, noted above, recommended investment only in such manufacturing sectors as textiles, clothing, and food products, leaving aside other sectors for which North Korea wants investment.

The North lacks basic frameworks needed for drawing in foreign investment. Policies, laws, and regulations about tax, for instance, are not in place. There is no well established market mechanism for running the economy. The government is still heavily involved in economic management; therefore, potential investors need to have personal networks to open doors, a point that worries potential Chinese investors.  North Korea lacks a sound political environment for enticing foreign investment. The country’s economic policies, especially those related to reform, shift continuously, raising questions about the official commitment to reform.

Pyongyang Department Store No. 1
Zeng Changbiao, chief executive officer (CEO) of the Zhongxu Group, in a much publicized deal in 2004, signed a contract to run Pyongyang’s Department Store No.1 for 10 years. He said his main motive for investing was to take over the North Korean market. He wants to be dominant in the North Korean retail business by securing and expanding market share. But it is not clear whether the contract was put into practice.  An article in a journal published by the National Development and Reform Commission, a ministry-level organization of the Chinese government, suggested that little had changed at the department store by the middle of 2005. South Korean officials also say that the store is still run by North Korea. Zhongxu Group’s Zeng received the lowest tax rate—5% income and 5% import—in the North Korean tax system.

This is one of three big department stores that were being run either by the Chinese alone or jointly.  Shenyang Municipal Association for Trade Promotion opened Daesong Market in Pyongyang, the first wholly foreign-owned company in a non-science sector.

Musan
China has shown an interest in joint resources development projects. The best known case is the project to develop the Musan iron mines. It is not easy to draw an exact picture of Chinese investment in the mines because many press reports suggest different stories. According to a Korean report, a Chinese company from Jilin Province planned to invest about $500 million in the mines. Ta Kung Pao, a Hong Kong newspaper, reported that three companies from Jilin—Tonghua Iron & Steel Group (Tonggang), Yanbian Tianchi Company, and Sinosteel Corporation (Zhonggang)—contracted rights to exploit the Musan iron mines for 50 years. According to the report, the Chinese companies were going to invest 7 billion yuan (about $865 million) and planned to produce 10 million tons of iron ore each year.  In the case of the Musan mines, 2 billion yuan (about $240 million) out of the 7 billion China committed to invest was allocated to building roads and railways from Musan to Tonghua in China. Sizable investment levels might help Jilin secure access to seaports in North Korea.

Similarly, the Chinese press has reported that the Musan iron mines development project was canceled by officials in North Korea, embarrassed by publicity over the deal because it highlighted the degree of foreign investment, a subject that Pyongyang would prefer to handle quietly.

Raijin
Rason International Logistics Joint Company-Rason International secured the exclusive rights to run the No. 3 and No. 4 piers of Rajin port for 50 years. In order to secure the rights, China committed to investing 30 million euros ($36 million) to build an industrial park, tourism facilities, and a road from the trade district of Rason city to Rajin Port. North Korea in turn committed to providing China with 5 to 10 square kilometers of land to build the industrial park.

From the Daily NK
10/29/2006
Yang Jung A

Swiss government started to impose a sanction on N. Korea from 26th, following the U.N resolution.

On the 25th, Othmar Wyss, Deputy head of Export Controls and Sanctions of Switzerland,in an interview with RFA(Radio of Free Asia) said that, “Luxury goods exported to N. Korea are just watches, which amounted for 16,000 dollars from January to September this year and amounted for 237,000 dollars last year.”

Compared to the amount of luxury goods exported to other countries, it was very small. But since the Swiss-made watches are for controlling important figures of Kim Jong Il, the sanction is expected to influence the Kim Jong Il regime.

‘Kim Il Sung’s commemorative watches’ that the names of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are carved have begun to be awarded to the Party officials who contributed to the regime and were convention participants since 1972. N. Korea demanded to carve date and name in Korean when it ordered Omega, Rolex and Lanco from Swiss. N. Korea had imported a significant number of watches even during the food crisis of the late of 90’s.

The embargo items that Swiss government imposed a sanction on are caviar, wine, tobacco, luxury clothes, carpets and fur overcoats, electronic appliances, cars and watches. In addition, the items that are able to be used for producing both of the Weapons of Mass Destruction and of civil cannot be imported. Computer software and mechanical equipments amounted for around 400,000 dollars.

According to information received from ‘Swiss Watch Industry Association’, N. Korea had imported 24,000,000 dollars of watches from Swiss from 1995 to 2004.

Korea Times:
Kim Sue-young
10/26/2006

South Korean broadcasting stations have paid North Korea up to $1 million since 2003 in return for permission to produce programs in the North, a lawmaker said yesterday.

Citing a report of the Ministry of Unification, Rep. Kwon Young-se of the main opposition Grand National Party (GNP) said that local broadcasters have been engaged in a price competition, as they pay a large amount of money to the North.

“A total of 10 inter-Korean broadcasting cooperation projects have been approved since 2003,” the lawmaker said. “The Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS) paid Pyongyang $1 million for the production of a singing contest program in July 2003 and a performance by pop singer Cho Yong-pil in May last year, respectively.”

Those companies have also paid between $500,000 and $800,000 for other television programs on North Korean food or the remains of the Koguryo Kingdom (37 B.C.-A.D. 668), Kwon said.

A ranking official of the Korean People Artist Federation said last September that three major television broadcasters _ KBS, SBS, and Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) _ raised the level of the financial support, according to Kwon.

“Minor cable channels that cannot afford to pay the large amount of money don’t even contact North Korea,” the official was quoted as saying. “The government should regulate the soaring prices.”

The lawmaker also quoted an official of the Korea Development Institute complaining of Seoul’s difficulty negotiating with Pyongyang because of the large sum of money.

“Broadcasters gave North Korea a lot of money to attract events for their programs, which made North Korea indifferent to economic cooperation projects,” Kwon said.

Daily NK
10/26/2006
Yang Jung A

Since the passing of the U.N. North Korea Resolution 1718, there has been an urgent focus on China’s measures on North Korea. Although China did not elucidate that it would adopt the sanctions, in reality, acquaintances of North Korea-China trade are saying that the sanctions are having effects on certain locations.

Even until now, the Chinese government has not revealed any measures to implement North Korea sanctions

Liu Jianchao spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “Although we may act compliantly to the Security Council’s resolution, China’s aim is not for sanctions. Countries related must not take this issue upon their own discretion and escalate this situation to make it worse.”

Tradesman ‘A’ met on the 25th in Liaoning, Dandong China said that little had changed in trade operations around the North Korean border. However, inspection at customs has tightened drastically, and whether or not new investments into North Korea has rapidly decreased or that banks are experiencing turmoil, warning signals are on the rise. The biggest threat amongst tradesmen is the increased feeling of insecurity.

‘A’ said, “The (Chinese) government has advised that investments in North Korea should not exceed $300,000,” and that “Conditions in North Korea are risky, so investments should be made with this in mind. Isn’t this basically saying, don’t make investments?”

He said, “There are rumors spreading in North Korea that the Chinese government will dismantle the customs house in 40 days. Although there are not many people who believe this rumor, we only hear these rumors because people are feeling insecure.”

Tradesman ‘B’ said, “Though remittances to North Korea can be made much the same as before, it has become very strict and difficult to create new accounts. Rather than being a directive from the government, it seems that banks are independently taking measures for their own protection.”

In the past, when a Chinese bank made transactions with North Korea, they would have to work in collaboration with the North Korean Gwang Sung Bank. A Chinese businessman would deposit funds into the Chinese bank and the North Korean businessman would collect the money through North Korea Gwang Sung Bank. This system has not been completely stopped. In ‘B’s’ opinion, transaction details and procedures have merely become more strict.

As deposit transactions between North Korea and China become inconvenient, more and more tradesmen are turning to cash transactions. Various media have reported that 4 banks in Dandong have begun to make restrictions on foreign transactions with people or corporations of North Korean origin.

Though China’s North Korea sanction is rough on independent private-sectors, this is an indication that the Chinese government is taking action in response. to the Security Council’s resolution.

From the New York Times:
Jim Yardley
10/25/2006

[edited]Sanhe, China–Truckers carrying goods into North Korea across the sludge-colored Tumen River say inspections are unchanged on the Chinese side. Customs agents rarely open boxes here or at two other border crossings in this mountainous region, truckers and private transport companies say.

Nor are any fences visible, like the barrier under construction near China’s busiest border crossing at the city of Dandong. There were early reports that inspectors in Dandong were at least opening trucks for a look, but so far statistics and anecdotal reports in the Chinese news media indicate that, essentially, everything remains the same.

What is visible here, though, is the growing and, in some ways, surprisingly complicated trade relationship between China and North Korea. China remains North Korea’s most important aid donor and oil supplier, but, conversely, China is now importing growing amounts of coal and electricity from North Korea. Chinese entrepreneurs, meanwhile, are starting to buy shares in North Korean mining operations and, in one case, trying to gain access to the Sea of Japan by leasing a North Korean port as a potential shipping hub.

The upswing in Chinese economic activity — which is already raising questions about whether the intent is more strategic than commercial — is one of the reasons that China has sent mixed signals about how aggressive it will be in inspecting border trade to meet the United Nations sanctions. For now, at least, some truckers in this region say the only change in border inspections has come on the North Korean side, where customs agents are checking loads more carefully for items deemed contraband by Kim Jong-il’s government.

“We used to sit with North Koreans that we know and have a chat,” said Jiang Zhuchun, a trucker waiting to cross into North Korea on Tuesday afternoon. “But after the nuclear test, we are only allowed to sit alone in our trucks.”

The United States has praised China for approving the sanctions against North Korea, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice used her visit to Beijing last week to emphasize the common desire to restart diplomatic talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. China’s leaders are said to be deeply angered over the nuclear test and have signaled they may take a harder line against their longtime ally. Last week, some banks in Dandong froze certain accounts and financial transactions with North Korea.

But the question of inspections along the 866-mile border between China and North Korea is a different matter. The sanctions authorized countries to inspect cargo entering and leaving North Korea and barred the sale or transfer of material that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Yet the sanctions are still less than two weeks old, and some details have still not been worked out. For example, the sanctions ban luxury goods without defining them.

The United States wants tightened border inspections by China as a tool for squeezing the North Korean economy and ensuring that North Korea cannot buy or sell nuclear materials. China is worried that destabilizing North Korea could begin an exodus of refugees and has resisted changing inspections. This week, with rumors swirling about a possible border crackdown, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, said China intended to comply fully with the sanctions, but also said inspections along the border would remain “normal.”

The Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region, the name of the sprawling district that includes the Sanhe border checkpoint, is not the primary trade route between China and North Korea; Dandong, with its more direct route to Pyongyang, the North’s capital, is by far the busiest. But the Yanbian area is wedged into a geopolitical hotspot where China, North Korea and Russia all come together.

In interviews and visits to three crossings from Yanbian into North Korea, truckers, transportation company agents, investors and others confirmed without exception that trade is continuing across the border much as it always has. Customs agents examine bills of lading but usually open shipments only when they are tipped in advance to someone trying to smuggle goods like beer or liquor without paying customs duties, several people said.

“No matter who you talk to, they will tell you there is not much difference,” said Jin Lanzhu, whose trading company is one of the largest in the region.

On Wednesday morning inside the Chinese customs yard in the border city of Tumen, small groups of North Koreans, each wearing their mandatory pins with images of either North Korean leader Kim Jong-il or his father, Kim Il-sung, waited to cross the bridge. They had nylon sacks stuffed with shoes and clothes, television sets, a refrigerator. Some carried bags of rice.

“How many bags do you have?” asked a female Chinese customs agent in a blue uniform. She looked them over and walked away without opening any. She did forbid the North Koreans to take several boxes of fruit because of a problem with worms. Then, the men began loading the sacks onto a flatbed truck operated by the customs office to carry smaller loads to the North Korean side. Two North Korean women complained to a local taxi driver that they had to pay 400 yuan, or about $50, for the service.

“They don’t really check over here,” one North Korean woman said of Chinese customs. “They do on the North Korean side.”

A similar scene unfolded later in the day at a smaller crossing in the dingy town of Kaishan, where the customs port is so small that trucks take a dirt road to a crumbling checkpoint. On Wednesday, a young soldier watched laborers load about 150 used televisions and boxes of medicine into a North Korean truck that had crossed the river to collect the shipment.

“I’m here for security,” the soldier said.

Trade between China and North Korea has grown rapidly in recent years — as has North Korea’s trade deficit with China, in part, because China no longer appears to be selling oil at a subsidized rate. China now accounts for almost 40 percent of North Korea’s total foreign trade; bilateral trade has more than doubled to $1.1 billion in 2005 from $490 million in 1995. In Yanbian alone, trade with North Korea jumped 82 percent in 2004 and another 20 percent in 2005, according to a local newspaper account.

Divining what the increased traffic says about the state of North Korea’s economy is a subject of debate. New research and interviews in the Yanbian region suggest that North Korea, a country that regularly suffers blackouts, is now exporting growing amounts of coal, minerals and even electricity to China, which is hungry for energy and raw materials. In exchange, North Korea is no longer importing as much raw material and machinery as it had in the past.

Instead, North Korea is importing food, clothes, daily sundries, outdated televisions and appliances and, of course, oil. The trend could suggest that North Korea’s recent experiments with private markets may be expanding, some analysts said.

A recent study by the Nautilus Institute, a San Francisco-based research group, used customs statistics to describe the trend, but also concluded that it might indicate that North Korea’s nonmilitary manufacturing industries were in sharp decline. One Chinese investor in a North Korean coal mine agreed. “They seemed to have stopped the factories,” said the investor, who asked not to be identified. He said doing business with North Korea was very risky and cautioned that numerous Chinese businessmen had lost money. “There are zero guarantees and protections.”

Even so, Chinese entrepreneurs and companies, both private and state-owned, are starting to buy interests in North Korean mines to export raw materials. The amount of investment is not clearly defined, but different Chinese proposals call for building truck routes between inland trade centers in northeast China to the North Korean coast, according to Chinese media accounts.

A Chinese property developer, Fan Yingsheng, told the Chinese news media that despite the nuclear test, he was still pursuing plans to develop the North Korean port of Rajin into a shipping center for goods from China. He said he would soon fly to Pyongyang to sign a final agreement.

The flurry of Chinese activity has not gone unnoticed by South Korea and others in the region, analysts say. Like China, South Korea has resisted harsh economic sanctions and refused to shut down its own trade deals with North Korea in part because of concerns about a swift collapse of the North Korean government. But South Korea is also positioning itself, to some degree against China, to be the dominant player in the future of North Korea.

China, meanwhile, has said the activity is not strategic positioning but natural economic outgrowth for a booming, entrepreneurial economy in need of resources. Li Dunqiu, a North Korea specialist with a research institute under China’s State Council, or cabinet, recently wrote that “laws of the market economy” were the driving force in Chinese investment in North Korea.

Along the border, it is easy to see how the daily traffic from China is a lifeline for North Korea. One woman from Yanbian said her family had recently come across to buy rice and other essentials. But Mr. Jin, the owner of the trading company, said charity was not at the essence of China’s trade with North Korea.

“The business interest is the most important thing,” he said. “Helping them comes after that.” Then, pausing to reflect on the potential and perils of trading with North Korea, he added: “North Korea is just like China in the past. It is a blank sheet of paper. You can draw wherever you want to. The question is whether the paper is going to be there at all times for you to draw on.”

From the Joong Ang Daily:
Bank sees North pain if sanctions take hold
10/24/2006
Choi Hyung-kyu, Ser Myo-ja

The Bank of Korea said yesterday, in a report prepared for a legislator, that international financial sanctions on North Korea could deal a heavy blow to the North’s shaky economy.

In an assessment for Representative Yim Tae-hee of the Grand National Party, the central bank said a 30-percent reduction in foreign currency inflows to North Korea would lower economic activity by three-quarters of a percentage point. A halving of North Korea’s external trade, the paper said, would reduce economic growth by nearly 5.5 percentage points; a 70-percent falloff in trade would drop economic output by 8.25 points.

Estimates of economic activity in centrally planned economies are difficult at best, however, and North Korea’s secrecy makes such estimates even more tenuous.

“When international financial institutions join in the sanctions and cut the influx of the annual $800 million in foreign currency to the North, Pyongyang will face serious trouble,” Mr. Yim said.

He added, without citing sources, that the North earns about $300 million through legitimate activities, such as inter-Korean economic cooperation deals and remittances from North Koreans abroad, adding that counterfeiting and drug trafficking bring in about $500 million more annually.

Christopher Hill, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Asia, arrived in Hong Kong on Saturday to meet, among others, William Ryback, the deputy chief executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.

“The U.S. team asked the Hong Kong authorities to cooperate in its effort to freeze North Korean assets in Hong Kong and Macao,” a Hong Kong source said yesterday. “Hong Kong gave a positive answer.”

Another Hong Kong government source said Mr. Hill also asked the government there to help inspect suspect North Korean ships.

“A North Korean ship under a U.S. intelligence watch is on its way to Hong Kong,” the official said. “Mr. Hill asked the authorities to inspect the boat thoroughly when it enters port here.”

From the Daily NK:
10/23/2006
Kang Jae Hyok

According to a North Korean source, while international community has been worried that North Korea will undergo “the second march of tribulation”, recently the number of North Korean people who lay in rice has been increasing.

Kim Jong Hee(pseudonym, 39), Chungjin resident said on the phone interview with the DailyNK that, “In spite of Fall, the price of rice is not decreasing”, and “These days the number of people who buy rice is sharply increasing”.

Kim added that from last June the price of rice is 1,000~1,200 won (0.30 US$~0.36 US$) per 1kg and in August it increased up to 1,300 won, yet even in October(now) the price is not decreasing. The price of corn wet up to 300 or 400 won.

It is natural that in fall the price of rice goes down and in spring goes up. So people lay in rice in fall. However, given that the price of rice does not go down until now, in the next spring it will be expected to go up more. Because of it, it seams that people lay in more rice in advance.

The exchange rate of yuan in black market is 360won of North Korea per 1 yuan. In 1990, the exchange rate was 1:25 and in 2002 after the 7.1. Economic Management Improvement Measure it was 1: 300. Recently it goes up to 1: 360. In addition, 1 dollar is 3,300 won of North Korea.
“Only interested in survival, never in nuclear test”

Responding to a question “do you know North Korea did nuclear test?”, Kim said that, “I do not care about whether the North Korean government did the test or not. I am busy supporting our family so I have time to think about that”. According to him, because there have been electronic lights there, people cannot know about what happened in the world.

Kim who is a vendor selling Chinese goods in Sunam market, Chungjin said that for a few days Chinese vendors have not come in Chungjin and now are around Haeryung. In the past the Chinese vendors came in once a week, yet now it is letting up at the same time the price of goods are increasing.

Regarding this trend, some people explained that because of the tension in Korean peninsular caused by the nuclear test the Chinese vendors have visited less and less and because of the censoring in goods introduced in North Korea, the amount of goods coming in North Korea has decreased.

Kim said that now Chinese goods in North Korean markets amount for more than 80%. If the sanction of China against North Korea is taken, the North Korean Jangmadangs will be negatively influenced.

Kim also said that, “Unless the Chinese goods are not introduced, we cannot survive”, and now it is the time to lay in rice for the next spring. This is what is most important to us now”.

Yonhap:
10/19/2006

China has closed three customs offices in northeastern China that handle trade with North Korea following Pyongyang’s nuclear test on Oct. 9, a report by the Communist Party-owned Global Times said Thursday.

The daily said the closures involved border offices in Donggang and Shanghekou, both in Liaoning Province, and one in the city of Tumen, in Jilin Province. Before the actions were taken, Beijing formally operated a total of four customs points with its neighbor.

It said at present only the customs point of Dandong, facing the North’s border city of Shinuiju across the Amnok River, was open to handle bilateral trade.

The paper also said that as of Tuesday, the number of vehicles coming over to Dandong stood at under three, compared to between 20 and 30 in the past.

The Global Times did not say if the closure or lack of vehicle traffic is due to the tensions surrounding North Korea’s nuclear weapons test. It added that Chinese merchants have started to ask for money in advance before shipping goods to North Korea, which is different from past practices when the delivery was sometimes made in advance of payment.

China, which is one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, signed off on a resolution last week authorizing economic sanctions to be imposed on North Korea. Pyongyang had disregarded warnings by Beijing not to test its nuclear device, which has raised speculation that the close ties that existed between them may have become frayed.

Related to the strained business ties, another Chinese weekly magazine claimed that a Chinese bank that provides funds to construction firms has stopped transactions with North Korea’s trade bank starting this year. The United States had been urging financial institutions around the world not to make transactions with North Korea that could help that country’s illicit trade and alleged money-laundering practices.

Another Chinese newspaper claimed that authorities have tightened their inspection of all cargo leaving North Korea since last week.

From the Joong Ang:
Ministry: North got $1 billion since 1998
10/18/2006
Lee Young-jong
Ser Myo-ja

The Unification Ministry yesterday defended itself against accusations that the Roh Moo-hyun administration and its predecessor, that of Kim Dae-jung, were at least partly responsible for giving the North the cash it needed to fund its nuclear weapons programs.

Ministry data released yesterday said that South Korea sent nearly $1 billion in cash to the North from March 1998 until August of this year. The ministry said those payments were in connection with “legitimate economic activities.” Nearly half of that cash flow, it said, was from tourism receipts at North Korea’s Mount Kumgang resort, and almost all the remainder was a $500 million payment by Hyundai Group to North Korea for exclusive rights to run the tours.

When Hyundai Group first began the tour program in 1998, Lim Dong-won, then the Blue House senior secretary for security affairs, ordered the Unification Ministry to devise ways of monitoring the payments to ensure that they were not diverted to military uses. But a Unification Ministry official recently admitted the obvious: “There was and is no way to see how the North spent the money,” he said.

The same is true in the other inter-Korean programs, although the amounts are relatively smaller. Nearly $21 million has been paid to the North in the Kaesong Industrial Complex project, including the wages of 800 North Korean workers there. The few million dollars remaining in the total were payments for South Koreans to attend events such as the annual Arirang Festival.

The ministry’s statement yesterday said the Hyundai payment of $500 million was made in August 2000. In fact, it was made in June, just before the first inter-Korean summit that month, and a special counsel who looked into the then-secret payment described it as an inducement for North Korea to agree to the summit. Seven persons were later convicted of violating Korea’s foreign exchange laws in connection with the matter.

Critics on the right believe the ministry’s estimates are woefully incorrect; the Grand National Party, for example, has put the amount at $8.4 billion over the past eight years.

The ministry also challenged the Grand National Party’s argument that South Korea had spent nearly 2.2 trillion won ($2.3 billion) for a failed light-water reactor project in North Korea.

The ministry said the figure was only about 1.4 trillion won.

It also noted that that project was an international one and had begun under the Kim Young-sam administration in 1994. Only a tiny part of that funding involved cash payments to North Korea, the ministry said.

From the Daily NK:
If a Second Tribulation March Arrives?
10/17/2006
Han Young Jin

On the 14th, the Rodong Shinmun, a N. Korean state newspaper, urged “We must take a strong conviction in regards to socialism and go out to fight with faith and optimism.” On the 13th, the Minju Chosun (Democratic Korea), the government organ, claimed “Even if we have to face the second and third ‘Tribulation March,’ you need not worry. Rather we must fight with overt confidence and audacity.”

Ever since the nuke experiments government channels have been using this propaganda This suggests that North Korean authorities were already prepared for sanctions by the international community.

People’s mentality “If you trust the nation, you will die of starvation”

During the first “Tribulation March” in the mid-90’s, about 300,000 people died over a period of 3 years from starvation. What would happen if the second tribulation march was to occur as a result of the U.N. North Korea resolution? How would it differ from the first?

The reason that 300,000 people died from starvation lies in the fundamental man-made disaster, where Kim Jong Il’s political ideology of “government teachings” and development of reform were abandoned after his death to “revival of one’s own strength.”

Beginning with munitions workers, about 50,000 people who trusted and were loyal to the government, including many intellectuals such as scientists and technicians died of starvation.

When comparing the past to the present, the people of the 90’s trusted only in their government as they did not have any other knowledge. Thus they were hit with a sudden blow, however this time it is different, as the North Korean people are already filled with “immunity.”

Above all, North Korean people are now aware of their own existence and are saying “If you trust the nation, you will die from starvation.” At the time, people tacitly in trade knew that they would not die of hunger. Today, high officials have changed their mentality and have abandoned the ideology of being the “People’s emissary” to ‘I must devise a plan to live, while I have the power.’

Since 2000, irrespective of whether or not the nation distributed rations in the fall, people have begun to devise their own ways to live. While city dwellers are living off their trade, villagers are providing their own rations through cultivation and farming off mountains.

After the 7.1 economic measures, capitalism was steadily introduced and the people’s spontaneity increased. Hence, this time it seems that the mass starvation of the mid-90’s may be escaped.

However, as a result of long term malnutrition, it is possible that many deaths will occur from disease and infectious epidemics.

A complete breakdown in industry and infrastructure

According to data from the World Food Program (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), North Korea’s output of grain in 95~96 was 4,070,000 tons and 2,874,000 tons in 96~97. This is a significantly low figure compared to the necessary amount of 6,400,000 tons.

Even today, little has changed. Last year, the typhoon caused an output of 4,800,000 tons of crop. Hence, the insufficient rations of the 90’s ‘Tribulation March’ period, is similar to this time.

During the first tribulation march, there was no electricity so factories ceased operations and workers began to sell equipment taken from their workplace in trade of rations. What happened was a collapse in the main infrastructure of factories.

The worker’s riot in 1996 that arose from suppression of operations at the Yellow Sea Iron Works, also originated from workers taking factory materials to trade for food. A defector from ‘September Iron Works’ in Pyongan said “During the tribulation march, everyone took materials from work to trade. If it occurs again, people will most probably dig up the main support.”

The infrastructure collapse of the 90’s was near to impossible to rebuild by North Korea alone. Since 1998, the economy has somewhat stabilized, however full reconstruction has never been acheived and rather only parts of the country has recovered.

The key point will be when China participates in the North Korea sanctions

If the second tribulation march was to occur, the main point will be commerce with China. Last March, Professor Xuwenji of Northeast Asia Research and Development Institute, Jilian University visited North Korea. He said “About 70% of North Korean markets are made up of Chinese products, 20% of products are made in North Korea and the remaining 10% is either Japanese or Russian products.”

Currently, daily necessary products such as toothbrushes, toothpaste, and soap, welding rods and even tires at North Korean markets are all made in China. In the case that the trade of daily necessities is disconnected, this will undoubtedly affect North Korea dramatically. In the end, the key point is to what extent China will compliantly follow the North Korea resolution.

The number of Chinese enterprises trying to evade North Korean investments is also variable. After North Korea’s nuclear experiment, rumors spread that Chinese banks beginning from Dandong had ceased remitting funds to North Korea and that many Chinese businesses had begun to suspend or terminate North Korean investments.

If commerce is suspended between North Korea and China, North Korea will not be able to satisfy all of its necessary daily products by relying on illicit trade.

There are also rumors that barbed wire will be placed bordering the region of the Yalu River, which will further affect smuggling of goods. As official trade between the two countries becomes illegal and daily necessities cannot be supplied from China through smuggling, the North Korean people will experience yet another fatal blow to their lives.

Furthermore, if North Korea does proclaim its second tribulation march and returns to the times of the mid-90’s, the Kim Jong Il regime could be greatly affected.

Above all, as the mentality of the people has changed, no longer will they listen submissively to the government. Rather, they will be more inclined to find ways to sustain their own life existence and make all attempts to defect to China. Amongst these circumstances, there may even be bloodshed between soldiers and the people.

Also, if high ranking military officials and soldiers decide that they cannot possibly live amongst these circumstances, it is possible that they will abandon their barracks. One thing is certain they will not simply sit around and wait to die from starvation. If high ranking military officials and soldiers did withdraw from their barracks on the mass, it is possible that the Kim Jong Il regime will face a threat to destruction.