North Korean Economy Watch

Daily NK
Kim Min Se
8/31/2007

There is one place that traders curse every time they pass through North Korea and China. That is towards the corruptive and fastidious North Korean customs officers.

It is widely known that North Korean customs officers blatantly seek bribes and extort goods justifying it is for inspection.

As more and more citizens became disgruntled by the security at customs, North Korean authorities enforced strict investigations towards customs officers. However, tradesmen who travel in and out of North Korea comment that the corruption occurring at customs is still prevalent.

Wang Hae Dong (pseudonym), one tradesman who has been bringing goods manufactured in China into North Korea for the past 10 years said on 29th, “It’s becoming harder and harder to bring goods into the country because of the demanding customs officers” and “There is nothing left if you bring 100,000 yuan amount of goods as there are now many tradesmen who have been specifically sent from North Korea to acquire items manufactured in China.”

Wang, a Chinese merchant born in North Korea has been living in North Korea for over 20 years and now runs a trading company which sends items for daily living to North Korea.

Wang said, “Not only is it becoming harder to earn money but when customs officers speak rudely and undergo picky inspections, I don’t want to trade anymore and want to give everything up.” He said, “What’s more annoying is the fact that goods disappear every time inspections are made and yet there is no where to make complaints.”

“Losing one or two items of clothing is nothing. I am lucky not to get bundles of clothing taken away from me” he said.

He said, “I barely make a profit of 0.2~03 Yuan from a piece of clothing bought for 10 Yuan. I import about 5 tons of goods in 3 trucks in one go (worth 1million Yuan) but after I sell all of the goods, I’m left with about 3~40,000 Yuan. After delivery fees and taxes, there are many times I’m left with only 10,000 Yuan but when one or two bundles of goods disappear, the work becomes worthless.”

Irrespective of importing or exporting goods to and from China, all items must undergo thorough inspection at customs. Nothing is exempted from goods transported by car or containers to individual pockets and even purses.

Local traders describe the scene of North Korean customs officers opening and inspecting every piece of item as pandemonium.

Many goods also become damaged despite have been well packaged as they are roughly handled by officers. Losing one or two items is common, though there are cases where even whole boxes are lost.

Wang said, “As of 2 years ago, money was given to Chosun superintendents with an import license to clear goods because Chosun customs was so selective yet still goods went missing. What can I do? I still take goods to Chosun once a week, 4 times a month. Don’t I just have to accept the fact that I can’t redeem the lost money?”

Regarding the reasons why North Korean customs officers scavenge through all the goods like searching for lice, Wang said, “Isn’t so they can find another reason to collect extra money?” and “I think that’s what they live off.”

He added, “Every time I pass through Chosun customs, the customs officers seem like the prison guards and I feel like a criminal who is paying for his crime.”

Choson Ilbo (Hat Tip DPRK Studies)
8/30/2007

Three South Korean terrestrial TV stations agreed in July to pay tens of millions to North Korea annually for footage from North Korea’s state-run Korean Central Broadcasting Station. An SBS executive said South Korean TV stations have used TV pictures aired by KCBS for free, but in July, the Korean Foundation for South-North Economic and Cultural Cooperation, as a proxy of the North Korean TV station, concluded negotiations with three TV stations whereby SBS will pay about W20 million every year to KCBS through the foundation. MBC will pay slightly more than that, and KBS will pay about W30 million.

The foundation, chaired by United New Democratic Party member Im Jong-seok, was established in 2004. It held talks with the three terrestrial networks for a year and a half. In the talks, the three argued it was unreasonable for South Korean TV stations to pay for North Korean footage in programs that aim at promoting mutual understanding, and they generally rejected the idea of unilaterally paying North Korea when the North does not pay South Korean broadcasters for footage.

The most authoritative, publicly available map of North Korea
Version 4: August 29, 2007

Download it here 

This map covers North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks. It is continually expanding and undergoing revisions. This is the fourth version.

Additions to the latest version of “North Korea Uncovered” include the city of Manpo along the Chinese border, KEDO, Kumgang Resort expansion, Kaesong Industrial Zone, as well as a few more parks, antiaircraft sites, dams, mines, canals, etc. I have also added more links in the menu which will tell the viewer a bit about the locations themselves. I have also changed the color scheme to make the collage easier to view.

Disclaimer: I cannot vouch for the authenticity of many locations since I have not seen or been to them, but great efforts have been made to check for authenticity. These efforts include pouring over books, maps, conducting interviews, and keeping up with other peoples’ discoveries. In many cases, I have posted sources, though not for all. This is a thorough compilation of lots of material, but I will leave it up to the reader to make up their own minds as to what they see. I cannot catch everything and I welcome contributions.

I hope this map will increase interest in North Korea. There is still plenty more to learn, and I look forward to receiving your additions to this project.

For several months I have been meaning to post a review of Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland’s book, Famine in North Korea, but for thousands of reasons it was always pushed back.

Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland wrote the definitive book on the DPRK’s Arduous March, and it is required reading for any serious North Korea watcher.

Now…Joshua at One Free Korea has written the definitive review of the book, so I will just put links to his posts: Part One, Part Two, Part Three.

Daily NK
Kwon Jeong Hyun
8/24/2007

The term for the train crew of North Korean Pyongyang-Beijing international rail connecting North Korea and China is limited to two years, relayed a related person of Dandong Customs in China on the 22nd.

The source at the customs said in an interview with DailyNK, “The crew of Pyongyang-Beijing international rail is a very competitive position. Only by paying a significant sum of bribe can one gain such a position.”

The source said, “Most of the international rail crew simultaneously trade. The crew who can conduct secret trade via trains is known as a covetable profession among the North Korean citizens.

Further, “The term of employment for North Korean crew do not surpass two years. There is so much corruption and the positions are quickly exchanged after the upper-level management receiving bribery from other applicants.”

He said that he has received introductions from new North Korean crews to watch over them during the 2 years.

The person said, “Most of the crew do secret trade. They think that they have offered that much, so they should earn that much as well. There are many instances where even the customs is aware of what is going on.”

He said that the product which is usually traded is cigarettes. “Cigarettes are brought in North Korea at around 4 boxes (around 2,000 packs) per a person.”

“They relay goods that outsiders send and also goods that cannot legally come out of North Korea. Please understand my difficulty in revealing the situation in greater detail. All kinds of goods can be secretly brought onto trains.”

The cigarettes are a favorite good which both the North Korean and Chinese customs make efforts to pay back the duties. However, by bringing these cigarettes secretly into North Korea without the payment of duties, the making of money is inevitable.”

The source said, “According to what I have heard from Chosun (North Korea) crews, there is a saying that failure to earn several hundreds of thousands of dollars during the two years is moronic. How many train crew are there? They consider the international rails as private trading floors, so what is there that they cannot do? I know of workers of the international freight trains who saved over 50,000 dollars.”

He said, “While observing North Korean railroads for over 10 years, I only saw once one person working as a crew for the freight train for four years.”

International rail between China and North Korea operates twice weekly. 2-3 passenger trains on the back of the Pyongyang-Shinuiju rail and 1 freight train have been divided as international rails and operate to Beijing.”

Institute for Far East Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 07-8-22-1

The Bank of Korea released a report on August 17 that details economic estimates on a variety of sectors in North Korea. Overall, North Korea’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell 1.1 percent during 2006, the first time since 1999 that the North has failed to increase its GDP. Inclement weather was one factor that played into a fall in agricultural production, and there also appears to have been little progress in the construction of public works in the country. Overall, North Korean GNI was 2.9 percent of that in the South, with per capita GNI at 1,108 USD, 6 percent of the 18,372 USD per capita GNI in South Korea.

The entire economy of the DPRK is approximately 1/35th that of the South, with the Gross National Income (GNI) a mere 1/17th the level seen in the ROK. This shows a growing divide between the two Koreas, as the comparisons in the previous year were 1/33rd and 1/16th, respectively. Due to the North Korean nuclear issues and other foreign relations problems faced during 2006, a worsening of diplomatic relations with other countries, energy shortages and other economic woes befell the North, putting the entire economy in a difficult situation.

The North showed a weakening of the agricultural and forestry industries, increasing production by a mere 2.4 percent, 2.6 percent down from 2005. Corn and other cereal production grew by 7 percent, but rice was down 6.4 percent, and bean production was down 6.6 percent from the year before, leaving overall grain output down 3.6 percent. On the other hand, shellfish and crustacean harvests grew by 1.5 percent, while timber and livestock harvests remained unchanged.

On the mining front, coal and other non-metal mined resources showed promising increases, but production of lead, zinc, and copper fell by 1.7 percent, compared to the 3.5 percent growth posted in the previous year. Despite promising increases in production of manufactured goods and growth in the chemical and heavy industries in 2005, last year North Korean production growth rates in these fields fell flat at a mere 0.4 percent, increasing production rates of fibers, clothing and shoes, but turning out less kitchenware and food-related products. Coal and fuel products looked favorable, but fabricated metals and machine parts, as well as nonferrous metal products grew at a rate of 1.1 percent, down from 5.4 percent.

Gas-fired electrical generation was up 17 percent, while hydroelectric power grew only 2.7 percent, falling from 4.4 percent in 2005. Other infrastructure projects were also on the decline, with only 49 km of road paved in 2006.

The number of foreign tourists declined, with visitors to Kumgang Mountain falling from 366,000 in 2005 to only 265,000 last year, adding to the 21.8 percent decline in the food and lodging sector, but the transportation and communication sector grew by 5.1 percent, leading to an overall gain of 1.1 percent in the service industry.

The gap in overseas trade between the two Koreas increased from 182-fold to 212-fold as North Korean foreign trade fell off 5.2 percent. Imports in the North were up 2.3%, although seafood imports were down 48.4 percent. The slack was made up by a 34.1 percent increase in the import of plastics, a 31.2 percent increase in imported chemical goods, and a 12.4 percent increase in imported machinery.

During 2006, inter-Korean exchanges grew 27.8 percent, reaching 13.5 billion USD. South Korean exports to the North grew 16 percent as Seoul increased rice and fertilizer aid, and exports to the Kaesong Industrial Complex grew. On the other hand, North-South cooperative projects grew 52.7 percent as South Korea increasingly imported North Korean zinc, sand, and other natural resources.

In order to give some perspective to the North Korean economic data, the Bank of Korea offered the following comparisons:

DPRK/ROK/Ratio
Population (thousand) 23,079/48.297/2.1
Economic Growth (2006) -1.1%/5.0%
Nominal GNI (100 million USD) 256/8,873/34.7
Per Capita GNI (USD) 1,108/18,372/16.6
Exports (100 million USD) 9.5/3,254.6/343.8
Imports (100 million USD) 20.5/3,93.8/151.0
Coal Production (10,000 tons) 2,468/280/0.11
Electrical Use (10,000 kW) 782/6,551/8.4
Electrical Production Capacity (100 mill. KW) 225/3,812/16.9
Petroleum Imports (10,000 bbl) 384/88,843/231.4
Cereal Production (10,000 tons) 448.3/530.0/1.2
Rice Production (10,000 tons) 189.4/468.0/2.5
Seafood Harvest (10,000 tons) 92.3/303.3/3.3
Iron Ore Mining (10,000 tons) 504.1/22.7/0.05
Nonferrous Metals Mining (10,000 tons) 8.6/187.7/21.8
Automobile Production (10,000) 0.44/384.0/872.8
Steel (10,000 tons) 118.1/4,843.3/41.0
Cement (10,000 tons) 615.5/4,920.9/8.0
Fertilizer (10,000 tons) 45.4/318.3/7.0
Chemical Products (10,000 tons) 2.9/145.7/50.2
Railways (km) 5,235/3,392/0.6
Roads (km) 25,544/102,061/4.0
Port Loading Capacity (10,000 tons) 3,700/69,213/18.7
Shipping Capacity (10,000 tons) 90.4/1,180.2/13.1

Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
8/19/2007

Sometimes even Stalinist propaganda tells the truth. When the North Korean newspapers occasionally told grossly exaggerated horror stories about South Korean inflation, they stressed that nothing like that could possibly happen in North Korea. This was the case indeed. For nearly half a century, from the late 1950s to the late 1980s retail prices in North Korea remained essentially unchanged. One kilogram of rice cost 0.08 won in 1960. It was still the same price in 1990.

This was possible because almost nothing was actually “sold’’ in North Korea. Communist states often rationed goods distributed through retail trade, but in most cases it was only a handful of most prestigious goods that were subjected to rationing _ like, say, cars. North Korea went much further: by the early 1970s, retail trade in the North ceased to exist, being completely replaced by an elaborate public distribution system. Rations depended on a type of work performed, but also on one’s position within a complicated hierarchy of social groups, as well as one’s place of residence (inhabitants of major cities, and Pyongyang in particular, enjoyed much better rations than those in the countryside).

There were some markets, of course, barely tolerated by the government. But until the late 1980s markets were small, with their trade volume being almost negligible. It seems that most people were reasonably satisfied with what they could get from the state distribution system _ of course, it helped that they knew next to nothing about the situation in other countries, so they could not compare.

The situation began to change around 1990 when the old distribution system collapsed under the pressure of an economic crisis. From 1993-94 there were increasing problems with rations, and from around 1996 rations pretty much stopped altogether. Some food was still distributed in major urban centers, but even there the distributed amount was so meager that nobody could survive on rations alone. A large-scale famine ensued, with at least half to one million dead (the oft-cited figure of three million victims seems to be an exaggeration).

People turned to trade and handicrafts, and with this arrival of a market economy inflation became a North Korean phenomenon as well. Even in the 1980s market prices exceeded the official prices in the state shops. By the mid-1990s, the difference was much greater. In theory, rice still cost 0.08 a kilo, but by 2000 its price on the market reached 45-50 won. Official wages remained unchanged, however, so around 2001 the average salary was approximately 20 times less than the income necessary for physical survival. People had no choice but to augment their income.

The government understood that there was no way to restore the old system: a decade of economic crisis had undermined the basic machinery of distribution and obviously the system was beyond repair. Thus, in 2002 the much trumpeted “July 1 Reforms” were introduced.

It’s difficult to describe these measures as “reforms”–the government simply gave official recognition to the situation which had existed for quite a few years.

The distribution system (long defunct) was curtailed. There was a dramatic increase in the retail prices of basic goods and services _ obviously in an attempt to approximate the prices of the market. Thus, that one-kilo of rice which cost 0.08 won since July cost 44 won.

Wages increased as well. Obviously, the wage increase was not even, and some groups have gained _ or lost _ more than others. It was estimated that the average increase in wages has been approximately 2500 percent (that is, 25 times). At the same time, prices have increased 3000-4000 percent (that is, 30-40 times). This necessitated the issue of 1000 won bills _ the largest denomination in North Korean financial history since the 1959 currency reform. Later, 5000 won bills were issued as well.

But the measures had another effect. The increase in salaries meant that the market was instantly flooded with cash. Needless to say, the only outcome could be inflation. Some people speculated that this was the intention of the Pyongyang leaders who hoped to kick-start the economy in such a way. Perhaps. But I would not be surprised if in 15 or 20 years down the track we learn from interviews and talks with the planners of this reform that they did not really expect inflation. Pyongyang economic managers have not had much exposure to market theory, and are sometimes very naive in their understanding of these questions.

Indeed, by October 2002 the market price of rice had increased to 120 won per kilo. In 2003, the price doubled to 250-300 won, and now it is about 1000 won. Inflation has become a part of North Korean life.

What will happen next? Will the North Korean leaders manage to stabilize the situation, or will a new wave of economic crisis wipe out the entire North Korean system? We do not know yet. But it is clear that there is no return to old days when a kilo of rice could be had for 0.08 won _ that is, if you were lucky enough to live in an area where they distributed grain rations in rice, not in maize.

Korea Times
Na Jeong-ju
8/16/2007

North Korea’s economy posted negative growth in 2006 for the first time in eight years on decreased production of agricultural and fisheries goods, the Bank of Korea (BOK) said Thursday.

In its estimate for the North’s economic growth, the central bank said the North’s real gross domestic product (GDP) shrank 1.1 percent in 2006 from a year ago, a turnaround from a 3.8 percent expansion in 2005. Until 2006, the North’s GDP had grown for seven years in a row since a 6.2 percent rise in 1999.

The GDP is the total output of goods and services produced within a country.

“Due to bad weather, North Korea’s agricultural, forestry and fisheries production fell with the construction industry remaining sluggish,” the BOK said. “North Korea seems to have suffered a blow as its international relations deteriorated due to its nuclear issues on top of a shortage of energy.”

The economic gap between the two Koreas grew larger last year.

North Korea’s nominal GDP increased 5.8 percent from a year ago to $25.6 billion last year, while South Korea’s GDP rose to $887.3 billion. South Korea’s GDP is 34.7 times larger than that of North Korea, widening from a 32.6-fold difference in 2005.

North Korea’s per-capita gross national income (GNI) came to $1,108 last year, up from $1,056 a year earlier, while South Korea’s per-capita GNI of $18,372 was 16.6 times bigger than that of the North, expanding from a 15.5 fold-difference. The North’s population reached 23.1 million, while the South’s was 48.3 million.

North Korea’s trade remained unchanged year-on-year at $3 billion last year, compared with South Korea’s $634.9 billion. The South’s trade was 212 times bigger than the North’s last year, rising from a 182-fold difference in 2005.

Pyongyang saw its exports dip 5.2 percent year-on-year to $950 million in 2006 as outbound shipments of animal products, non-metal goods and machinery decreased, while imports gained 2.3 percent to $2.1 billion.

Inter-Korean trade increased 27.8 percent from a year earlier to $1.4 billion. South Korea’s shipments to North Korea advanced 16 percent to $830.2 million, mainly on increased rice and fertilizer aid.

Inbound shipments from the North jumped 52.7 percent to $519.5 million on a hike in inter-Korean projects and mineral imports, the BOK said.

North Korea’s agricultural, forestry and fisheries industry declined 2.6 percent year-on-year last year, a turnaround from a 5 percent gain in 2005. The construction industry dipped 11.5 percent after gaining 6.1 percent the previous year.

The mining sector growth decelerated to 1.9 percent from 3.5 percent. Its manufacturing sector expansion slowed to 0.4 percent from 4.9 percent. The services industry grew 1.1 percent last year after increasing 1.3 percent in 2005, the central bank said.

North Korean economy posted 2006 downturn
Joong Ang Daily
Jung Ha-won
8/17/2007

North Korea’s economy shrank for the first time in eight years last year as agricultural production declined due to natural disasters and sluggish infrastructure development, according to estimates by South Korea’s central bank.

The Bank of Korea said yesterday that it believes North Korea’s 2006 gross domestic product declined 1.1 percent from a year earlier, the first downturn since 1999. The BOK, since 1991, has estimated the figures based on data from South Korean intelligence agencies and other research institutes. North Korea does not release economic data.

According to the estimate released yesterday, North Korea’s agriculture and marine industries last year declined 2.6 percent from 2005, when production rose by 5 percent.

“North Korea suffered from a serious flood last year, in stark contrast to 2005 when there was no major flood and farm production was good,” said a BOK official who refused to be named.

Growth in mining production, one of North Korea’s major industries, slowed to 1.9 percent from 3.5 percent in 2005. Manufacturing inched up 0.4 percent, down from 4.9 percent growth in 2005.

Construction sector production showed the biggest downturn at 11.5 percent from a year earlier, compared to 6.1 percent growth in 2005, as road and railway construction slowed, the central bank said.

Using satellite data, the bank estimated North Korea built just 49 kilometers (30.4 miles) of new roads last year, a sharp decline from 310 kilometers built in 2005.

Korea Times
8/15/2007

To understand what is at stake, we need to look back at key events in the past that led to North Korea’s isolation in the global economy.

U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea began on June 28, 1950, only three days after North Korea invaded South Korea, when the United States invoked a total embargo on exports to North Korea. Over the years, many more U.S. sanctions have been imposed against North Korea, and North Korean companies. Three of these sanctions have had a significant impact.

The first was the suspension of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status, imposed on September 1, 1951. This sanction, which is still in effect, made it impossible for North Korea to even consider exporting its products to the United States.

The second is the placement of North Korea on the list of countries that support international terrorism. This sanction, imposed on January 20, 1988, followed North Korea’s blowing up of Korea Air Lines 858 on November 29, 1987, off the waters of Thailand.

This sanction has entailed many restrictions, including denial of North Korea’s ability to borrow money from international financial institutions.

The third measure is not a single action, but has taken the form of a tightening grip around the financial network used to fund North Korea’s illicit financial activities.

Although the ultimate target is North Korea, the threat of actual sanctions has been targeted against banks, including Banco Delta Asia, which deal with North Korea’s accounts. These financial sanctions involving Banco Delta Asia have been the focus of recent overt and covert negotiations between North Korea and the United States.

On September 17, 1999, President Clinton agreed to the first significant easing of economic sanctions against North Korea since the Korean War ended in 1953.

The U.S. easing of sanctions against North Korea, announced on June 19, 2000, may have been too little to persuade the leaders of North Korea to give up their prized long-range missile technology. North Korea carried out a nuclear test on October 9, 2006, and the United Nations passed Resolution 1718, further tightening North Korean economy.

There is no doubt that all these sanctions are having an impact on the North Korean economy. For instance, the North Korea’s annual trade deficit has averaged between $800 million and $1 billion in recent years, depending on whether deficits against South Korea are included.

The huge trade deficit is not sustainable, and it will eventually lead to a decrease in North Korea’s trade and gross domestic product. Studies indicate that the entire trade deficit appears to have been financed by weapons sales, illicit activities, and funds flowing from South Korea through joint projects. With the two UN resolutions adopted during 2006 and the tightening of North Korea’s financial transactions that began in 2005, North Korea should find it increasingly more difficult to pay for its trade deficit.

The key issue is not whether North Korea deserves the lifting of all the sanctions imposed against the country on the basis of its behavior since 1950, but how to bring about a peaceful resolution of pending security and humanitarian issues without military confrontation. This brings us to the importance of the upcoming summit between President Roh and North Korean leader Kim.

My assessment is that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 led to an important change in the approach of North Korean leaders toward a better calculation of costs and benefits.

Institute for Far Easter Studies
NK Brief No. 07-8-14-1

The second inter-Korean summit meeting is coming up soon, scheduled to open on August 28 in Pyongyang, and interest is building regarding discussion on economic cooperation. It is true that the North is prioritizing political and military issues in order to shore up its government by normalizing relations with the United States. However, considering its serious economic woes, the ability of South Korea to offer a ‘gift package’ can significantly influence the success or failure of this summit.

It is not yet clear how economic cooperation will fit into the agenda, but Seoul and Pyongyang have been constantly discussing this issue, so some insight has been given. In particular, the ‘consumer’ North has been referring to domestic and international cooperation, and through Pyongyang’s requests, some clarity has been added to what goals could unfold during the upcoming meeting.

Energy Sector

The North Korean economy is saddled with severe shortages of electricity and fuel oil, causing production to slow and therefore stagnating consumption, putting the country into an ongoing vicious circle of economic depression. North Korea possesses facilities to produce 7.7 million kW of steam- and hydro-electric power, but in reality is incapable of operating these facilities at more than 30%.

The opinion that expansion of North Korea’s electrical infrastructure is necessary, not only for the North, but also for South Korea, is gaining strength. South Korean projects to develop North Korean mines and import its coal have been delayed due to a lack of electrical power. In the future, enterprises looking to set up in North Korea will also require a steady supply of electricity.

In what way the two Koreas will cooperate on energy is not yet known, but North Korea is sticking to its demand for light-water nuclear reactors. If construction were restarted on the reactors begun by the now-defunct Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), North Korea could quickly have not only the energy production amount currently available, but an additional 2 million kW, as well.

North Korea’s power facilities are in a state of deterioration, but the number of facilities in the North are adequate for the current state of the economy, so a plan for the restoration of generation and transmission facilities, or the 2 million kW of electrical power offered by the South Korean government two years ago could be considered sufficient.

Natural Resource and Infrastructure Development

One other highly probable agenda item on inter-Korean economic cooperation will be development of natural resources. This is because a model in which North Korea’s relatively abundant underground natural resources are developed, and in which these resources being used by South Korean businesses, would create a ‘win-win’ result for both Seoul and Pyongyang.

According to a report given by the Korea Resources Corporation at a conference last year, North Korea possesses upward of forty different valuable minerals, including iron-ore. Analysis of these North Korean resources shows that a considerable amount of South Korea’s 40 trillion won (430 billion USD) worth of mineral imports per year could be brought in from North Korea instead.

As development projects in North Korea’s graphite mines are already underway, and the import of North Korean anthracite is being considered in order to meet quickly growing demand for charcoal in the South, cooperation in the natural resource sector appears to be one of the core points to inter-Korean economic cooperation.

As for North Korea’s railways, the heart of the country’s distribution infrastructure, completion of the section of track on the Kyungui Line between Kaesong Station and Moonsan Station, as well as the section of the East Sea Line between Mt. Kumgang Station and Jejin Station, means that the infrastructure for regular service between the two countries is now in place, although talks regarding the details of such regular service are not being held.

If regular service on these two lines between North and South Korea can be achieved, expensive transportation costs can be reduced, and of course, in the future, connection of the railway with continental rail networks such as the Trans-Siberian Rail and the Trans-China Rail would help to enable the Korean Peninsula to emerge as the hub of North East Asian distribution.

Furthermore, considering the fact that North Korea’s mining facilities and technology, as well as its ports, loading facilities, and other transportation infrastructure, are severely lacking, a plan linking development of natural resources to projects developing infrastructure also appears viable. It is also already known, to some extent, the nature of North Korean needs in its infrastructure sector, and if this upcoming summit closes successfully, it is expected that an inventory of these needs will become more concrete.

Vitalizing Kaesong Industrial Complex

The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is also an important undertaking. At the moment, a problem has arisen concerning the construction of a second KIC, but even if only the originally planned 26.4 million square-meter complex is built, the fact is that currently the first 3.3 million square-meter stage is complete, and considering that it employs North Korean labor, this is no easy feat. Companies moving into the KIC are asking that easy communication with South Korea and simplified import procedures be prioritized.