North Korean Economy Watch

I have updated the list of Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports published on North Korea and posted them here.  I have also added a hyperlink under “pages” on the menu tab to the right.

Updates include:
US Assistance to North Korea: July 31, 2008
North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat: January 24, 2008
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program: January 21, 2008
North Korea’s Abduction of Japanese Citizens and the Six-Party Talks: March 19, 2008
The Kaesong North-South Industrial Complex: February 14, 2008
The North Korean Economy: Leverage and Policy Analysis: August 26, 2008

UPDATE:  Inspectors barred.

North Korea has barred international inspectors from a nuclear reprocessing plant that produces weapons-grade material and intends to restart activity there in a week, the International Atomic Energy Agency said on Wednesday.

The decision by North Korea comes as the Vienna-based nuclear agency also announced it had completed on Wednesday the removal of all seals and surveillance cameras from the reprocessing plant, one of several sites at its vast Yongbyon nuclear complex. The removal was carried out following a formal request to the agency by the North two days ago.

…[T]he North Koreans “also informed IAEA inspectors that they plan to introduce nuclear material to the reprocessing plant in one week’s time. They further stated that from here on, IAEA inspectors will have no further access to the reprocessing plant.”

The inspectors have worked there, living in guest quarters on the site, since July 2007. (Herald Tribune)

ORIGINAL POST: North Korea has formally requested that the IAEA remove its seals and surveilance equipment from the Yongbyon processing facility.  According to the Associated Press:

North Korea had said that it was making “thorough preparations” to start up Yongbyon, which it began disabling last year under a now-stalled disarmament-for-aid deal.

“Some equipment previously removed by the DPRK during the disablement process has been brought back” to Yongbyon, ElBaradei told the closed meeting in comments made available to reporters. DPRK is the abbreviation of North Korea’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

While the reactor remains shut down, “this morning, the DPRK authorities asked the agency’s inspectors to remove seals and surveillance equipment,” he said  (Associated Press).

According to Bloomberg, the South Korean government responded to this news by threatening to cut off promised energy assistance (previously negotiated as a reward to the DPRK for denuclearization progress). 

South Korea has so far delivered about 40 percent of a promised 1 million tons of energy aid to North Korea (Bloomberg).

According to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, South Korea has also delayed shipment of “aid materials” to the DPRK including “steel pipes”.

The US is still maintaining its aid commitments as agreed to under the six-party talks.  According to the Choson Ilbo  (quoting the Congressional Research Service), the US has already paid the DPRK $20 million to dismantle the Yongbyon facility (famously blown up earlier this year) in addition to:

Spending close to US$1.3 billion on aid to North Korea since 1995, including: approximately 2.5 million tons of food worth over $700 million (since 1995), approximately $150 million on fuel oil provisions, and $400 million on the KEDO light water reactor.

This year the U.S. government plans to donate an additional 500,000 tons of food and an additional $100 million in oil shipments.

The DPRK claims this turnabout is a response to the US government’s failure to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terror (a symbolic gesture as it carries little economic significance).  The US claims that the DPRK did not meet the disclosure requirements necessary for it to justify taking such action.

In July 2008, the Congressional Research Service published a paper on the DPRK’s terrorism list removal.  Read it here.

Read the full articles below:
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The South Korean Ministry of Unification has reports on economic output at the Kaesong Industrial Zone.  Below are the highlights from Yonhap:

The total output by South Korean factories operating in North Korea has exceeded US$400 million, Seoul’s Unification Ministry said Monday.

Companies at the Kaesong industrial complex produced goods worth a total of US$410 million between January 2005, when the compound was opened, and July this year. One-fifth of all goods produced were exported, according to the ministry handling inter-Korean affairs.

The output in the first seven months of this year amounted to $140 million, up 51 percent from the same period last year.

As of August, 79 firms operated in the area, employing more than 32,000 North Korean workers, mostly women.

Read the full article here:
Production in inter-Korean business town tops $400 million
Yonhap
9/15/2008

Iason Athanasiadis, an Istanbul-based writer and photographer, recently visited the DPRK to see the Arirang performance.  He wrote about his trip in The National.  Below are some highlights:

Tourism:

Often referred to as the world’s final frontier, North Korea accepts just under 2000 Western tourists every year and offers residency to a handful of foreign businessmen. Barely 100 Western foreigners live in Pyongyang, including diplomats and businessmen.

Doing Business in Pyongyang:

Waiting to have my bags X-rayed I bumped into a European permanent resident, a cheerful trader who imported computer parts from China into North Korea. Once a month, he said, he travels to Shenyang to stock up on monitors, laptops and motherboards. In North Korea, he “donates or sells them at no profit”. His hope is that, when North Korea opens up, he will be well-positioned to profit handsomely from the new economy. Since he didn’t come across as a staunch advocate of Communist ideals, I assumed he was reaping some additional profit from his sojourn in Pyongyang, about which he remained modest.

He described Pyongyang as like any other large city, but with cleaner air. Entry into North Koreans’ houses is banned, as is leaving the city for the countryside without permission and an escort. Romantic relations with North Korean women are similarly prohibited. The only locals who would come to his parties are business associates. Looking through the windows, he talked about the small, unmarked jet parked in the runway that he thought contained American nuclear inspectors.

“They’re very intelligent, thinking people,” the European businessman said of the North Koreans. “They are all independent thinkers. But they’re also split personalities, they compartmentalise their thoughts. Even I’ve brainwashed myself when I’m here. I self-censor.”

Later, he sent me an e-mail quoting a Cold War-era Sting song titled Russians whose refrain runs “We share the same biology; Regardless of ideology.” “You give a smile, they give a smile and the world is in peace,” he wrote. “And I can tell you: the Koreans do love their children.”

Perspective:

The lack of perspective in their cloistered lives became clearer at night, when the guides invited me into the hotel bar to review the pictures I had taken during the day. How were these men, who had never set foot in the West, supposed to judge what did or did not depict North Korea in a negative light? Innocuous pictures – like one of men squatting on the pavement with a portrait of the Great Leader in the distant background – were deleted, while photos that showed what any outsider would immediately recognise as rampant poverty and societal breakdown barely caught their eye.

Pyongyang:

The night before the opening performance of the Games, I sat in my room, listening to the sounds of Pyongyang slumbering. The DPRK is subject to a permanent curfew. A central switch turns off lights inside apartments shortly after the day’s last radio broadcast. That night, the only light came from the May Day stadium, where last-moment preparations continued for Arirang’s opening night. The only sounds coming through the open window were of bricks tumbling on some distant construction site. Some lights winked in the dark buildings. A parade ground drill rhythm wafted from the stadium. Then, all sounds stopped, aside from the breeze, an occasional ship’s horn, and the repetitive monotone of metal striking metal, as if some lone Stakhanovite worker was still out in the darkness and the silence, fulfilling another quota-surpassing day. At 3am, long after all sound had subsided, an amplified voice started up, slicing the night with slogans.

You can read the full article here:
The mass ornament
Iasson Athanasiadis
The Naitonal
9/5/2008

On this page, I will keep a list of DPRK statutes and summaries:

1. Foreign Investment Law
2. Free Economic and Trade Zone Law
3. Equity Joint Venture Law
4. Contractual Joint Venture Law
5. Foreign Enterprises Law
6. Taxation of Foreign Invested Enterprises
7. Relevant Labor Laws
8. Leasing Land 
9. Dispute Resolution
10. Domestic Sales Tax Regulations
11. Manufacturing & Export Operations
12. External Economic Arbitration Law
13. Commercial Joint Venture Law
14. Constitutions (x2)
15. Customs Law
16. Law on Economic Plans
17. Fisheries Law
18. Foreigners in FEZs
19. Intellectual Property

Click “read the rest of this entry” below to see summaries and statute text.

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Instutite for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-8-28-1
8/28/2008

Recently published Chinese customs statistics reveal that trade between North Korea and China in the first half of 2008 was 1.151 billion USD, 25 percent higher than in the same period last year.

Exports were up 13.5 percent at 330 million USD, while imports grew by 31.1 percent to 820 million USD. This means that the trade deficit for this period, 491 million USD, was 44.1 percent greater than the first half of 2007.

Mining topped the list of North Korean export industries, with 118 million USD worth of ores exported to China making up 36.2 percent of all goods sent across the border. Exports included 71 million USD worth of fossil fuel, 39 million USD worth of steel, 30 million USD in clothing, and 9 million USD in aluminum. On the other hand, Chinese goods imported by the North included 302 million USD in fossil fuels, making up 36.9% of all imports. 68 million USD in machinery, 37 million USD in electronics, 30 million USD in food, and 30 million USD worth of vehicles (excluding trains) were also brought in.

Mining exports were up 69.4 percent over the first half of 2007, making up the largest part of the increase in exports. The rising international price on natural resources was a factor in the North’s increase in exports of iron ore. The 68.1 percent rise in the import of fossil fuels, on the other hand, made up the largest share of the increase in imports, and this can also be attributed to the increase in global fuel prices. 

Last week, the Choson Ilbo reported on trade, tourism and other exchanges between the two Koreas:

The number of [South Korean] tourists to North Korea plunged more than 60 percent last month following the shooting death of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang resort.

The Unification Ministry says the number dropped to about 21,000, almost a 20 percent decrease from July of last year. The resort was closed after the shooting.

The amount of trade between the Koreas also dropped 1.5 percent from last year.

Although commercial transactions at the jointly-operated Kaesong Industrial Complex in the North increased more than 28 percent year on year, non-commercial transactions, such as aid to the North, plunged more than 80 percent.

Read more here:
Tourism to N. Korea Drops 60% in July
Choson Ilbo
8/18/2008

Myanmar severed diplomatic relations with the DPRK after North Korean agents attempted to assassinate South Korea  president Chun Doo Hwan on his October 1983 visit to Rangoon.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored in April 2007.  Shortly after, North Korea was accused of selling rocket launchers to Myanmar’s SPDC (Orwellian acronym for: State Peace and Development Council)–formerly known as SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council).

Now the AFP reports that trade has expanded into natural resources, with which Myanmar is abundantly blessed:

Military-run Myanmar is to begin exporting rubber to North Korea, in a further warming of relations between the reclusive governments of the two countries, a weekly newspaper reported Tuesday.

“They will start by importing at least 10,000 tonnes within the first year,” Khaing Myint of the Myanmar Rubber Planters and Producers Association was quoted as saying by the Myanmar Times.

“We are extremely pleased to add another client nation to our export destinations for our rubber. We expect the first batch to be delivered in October,” Khaing Myint reportedly said.

Read the full article here:
Myanmar to begin rubber exports to North Korea
AFP
8/19/2008

North Korean Cigarette Production: Chinese Cigarettes Disappear
Daily NK
Moon Sung Hwee
8/12/2008

The market share of North Korean cigarette manufacturers has been increasing because North Korean cigarette factories have turned their gaze on domestic low-priced brands instead of counterfeit products.

A source from North Korea explained on the 8th that “There are lately dozens of cigarette brands which are being produced in North Korea, from low-priced ones to expensive ones made for high officials. Now, we rarely see people looking for foreign-made cigarettes in the markets.”

He added that “We can see 500 won per pack cigarettes and also cheap brands, like 300 won cigarettes which are made by individuals. When compared to rice prices, cigarette prices have sharply declined, as well as their quality having advanced when compared to the pack price.”

According to the statistics of the Korean International Trade Association, since 2000 imports of Chinese cigarettes have increased every year and in 2003, reached a maximum of 9.4 million dollars.

The source continued, “Competition to obtain Chinese cigarettes among Cigarette smugglers was keen, but now, consumers of North Korean cigarettes are increasing in number and the productivity of manufacturers is increasing as well. Therefore, individuals who produced cigarettes at home took a heavy blow to their business.”

North Korean cigarette makers converted from counterfeit to private development

Since the early 1990s, North Korea has felt keenly the necessity of earning foreign currency after suffering the aftereffects of the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, North Korean authorities have had an interest in producing and trading drugs and counterfeit cigarettes that need a low initial investment and quickly convert into money. Since 1992, North Korea has mass produced imitations of Mild Seven, Crown, 555, Dunhill and other international brands.

When suffering the “March of Tribulation” in the late 1990s, middle managers started taking an interest in counterfeit cigarette markets, which had been occupied by the authorities. In Nampo, Pyongsung, Pyongyang and other big cities, with the appearance of counterfeit cigarettes made by individuals, competition between the national cigarette traders and private manufacturers in the jangmadang started. Workers of cigarette factories kept secretly packing papers of the counterfeit cigarettes and sold them to the private manufacturers.

The North Korean authorities eventually took measures to punish the private manufacturers, to confiscate their products and search the workers’ bodies one by one.

However, after printers were allowed to be used in some factories related to IT departments of universities in 2002, managers of printers being in collusion with private manufacturers started printing the packing papers of cigarettes.

Production of tobacco leaves privately, manufacturing of cigarettes by the factory

After the start of the 2000s, North Korean authorities turned their gaze on domestic demand for cigarettes. The biggest North Korean cigarette factory is Ryongsung Cigarette Factory, where most counterfeit cigarettes made by North Korea were produced. As sales increased since 1997, the No. 39 Department of the Workers’ Party, which operates, accumulates and manages Kim Jong Il’s slush funds, has been directly operating the factory. The top quality counterfeit cigarette in North Korea, CRAVEN “A,” so called “Cat cigarette” by North Koreans, are produced in the factory.

The past price of CRAVEN “A” was much more expensive than Chinese cigarettes, such as Hongmei, BAT, Zhangbaishan and Tianping, being equivalent to two kilograms of rice. However, among cadres and the wealthy they were excessively popular. At the time, Chinese brands of cigarette in North Korea were generally valued at around the price of one kilogram of rice.

With profits increasing since 2003, North Korean authorities have tried to increase production by re-opening ruined factories that had closed their doors for lack of resources during the March of Tribulation.

In 2002, “Rasun” and “Sunbong,” which were produced in cooperation with Chinese entrepreneurs, came out in the Rajin-Sunbong area at a lower price than Chinese cigarettes.

Competition between factories to produce high quality and tasty cigarette toughens

Meanwhile, some of private manufacturers who went under in the competition have disappeared from the cigarette market or been merged with big factories.

There is no reason for being poor if North Korea works like it produces cigarettes

The source said that “These days, affiliates with cigarette factories buy dried tobacco leaves from individuals.”

According to the source, on seeing the high quality of cigarettes, people currently say, “That’s the reason why we should open and reform our market and system. If we produce other goods like we produce cigarettes, we won’t have any reason for being poor anymore.”

The Ryongsung Cigarette Factory in Pyongyang produces “Pyongyang,” “Geunseol (construction),” “Hyunmoo (a kind of mythological animal),” “GGoolbeul (Honey Bee),” “MT. Daesung,” “Dongyang (the Orient),” “Saseum (Deer),” and “Galmaegi (Sea Gull)” and the Sungcheon Cigarette Factory produces “Haedangwha (Sweetbrier),” “Yonggwangro (Furnace),” “Deungdae (Lighthouse),” and “Manbyungcho (a name of a herb).”

Koksan Factory in Hoiryeong produces cigarettes for soldiers; “Baeseung (ever-victorious),” “Ildangbaek (a match for a hundred),” “Chobyung (Sentry),” and “Poongnyon (a fruitful year).”

UPDATE:  (Reuters) Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Japan that Washington would not remove North Korea from a US list of state sponsors of terrorism on the initial deadline of Monday, Japan’s foreign minister said.

ORGINAL POST: Marcus Noland comments in a Newsweek International op-ed how recent US policy changes towards North Korea (delisting the DPRK as a state sponsor of terror and exempting sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act) amount to very little:

Lifting the trade restrictions will have a minimal impact. North Korea will remain one of a few countries that does not have normal trade relations with the United States, meaning its exports will continue to be subjected to punitive tariffs of up to 90 percent.

Removing North Korea from the terrorism list means that Washington can now legally support it for membership in international financial organizations such as the World Bank. But the White House is under no obligation to actually do so. North Korea also remains excluded from US government programs that encourage trade and investment.

North Korea’s declaration will trigger a reconvening of the Six-Party Talks, which includes China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The inadequate nature of the declaration guarantees there will be yet another round of negotiations in which North Korea will reveal a bit more in return for further concessions. It is no accident that up to 50,000 metric tons of US food aid is expected to arrive in North Korea early this month. 

Writing in 2004 (yet relevant today), Marcus Noland wrote about these issues in depth.  Below are excerpts from his op-ed on US tariffs:

US importers of DPRK products are required to obtain prior approval from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets, certifying that the products were not produced by North Korean entities designated as having engaged in missile proliferation. Subject to this condition, approval is routine. US government officials report that they receive only a handful of such requests each year. Their impression is that business conditions in the DPRK pose a greater impediment to bilateral trade than the regulatory regime.

…

So, at present, with the exception of military-related products, there are few specific legal restrictions on the ability of Americans to export to or invest in the DPRK. Imports are subject to a prior approval process, but this is based on a transparent and narrowly delineated certification requirement.

Yet there is little trade between the United States and the DPRK. North Korea is among the few countries that the United States does not grant normal trade relations (NTR) status to, and North Korean exports are subject to the so-called column 2 tariff rates established by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. These tariffs tend to be the highest on labor-intensive products such as garments, in which North Korea is conceivably competitive. Though their incidence is an accident of history, and not an intentional slap, the column 2 tariffs represent a serious potential impediment to trade. Some countries, notably China, have successfully exported to the United States despite being subject to the higher column 2 tariffs (though even China eventually gained NTR status on a year-to-year basis). Most countries that have recently obtained permanent NTR, such as China, have done so through the World Trade Organization (WTO) accession process. The DPRK has shown no interest in joining the WTO.

This disinterest is unfortunate. The United States does not grant the DPRK quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), a worldwide network of bilateral trade quotas on textiles and apparel (due to expire in 2005), and WTO accession could aid the DPRK in this regard. In the case of the similarly diplomatically problematic Burmese government, the US government found it politically easier to accept an increase in Burmese exports to the United States than to negotiate publicly a textile agreement under WTO auspices with the repressive regime. WTO membership has its privileges. In any event, the DPRK is one of the rare countries that chronically do not fill their MFA quotas in Europe, where there are no sanctions, suggesting that the problem lies in DPRK’s inability to compete, not in trade barriers.

However, should the DPRK obtain NTR status, the United States would likely classify it as a nonmarket economy (NME) and subject it to onerous antidumping rules on the Chinese template. The point is that improved diplomatic relations is no panacea—the United States can be protectionist on purely economic grounds, regardless of politics.

Conversely, the United States trades with some low-income countries preferentially, unilaterally granting them limited tariff-free access through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), subject to standards concerning workers’ rights, intellectual property protection, and drug trafficking. Given North Korea’s disregard for internationally accepted labor standards, it is inconceivable that the United States would grant North Korea GSP privileges under current practices, even if diplomatic relations were normalized. Yet China, which has never received GSP privileges, vividly demonstrates that it is quite possible to prosper without such advantages.

Today, internal conditions and practices in North Korea, not legal restrictions, greatly impede bilateral trade. However, with sufficient reform and improvement in competitiveness, a broad range of policy issues would become increasingly relevant. In this regard, DPRK accession to the WTO would be advantageous. In the meantime, rather than complaining about US policy, North Korean officials would be better served by redoubling their reform efforts.

For more information, read the full articles below:
Partially True Confessions: How Big is the North Korea Deal?
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute
Newsweek (Link via the Peterson Institute)
7/7/2008

The Legal Framework of US–North Korea Trade Relations
Op-ed in JoongAng Ilbo, via the Peterson Institute web site.
Marcus Noland
4/27/2004