North Korean Economy Watch

On September 20, 2002, the DPRK’s Supreme People’s Assembly announced the creation of the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region (SAR) (KCNA announcement here).

The project was to be headed by a Chinese-born, naturalized Dutch citizen, Yang Bin…who was arrested by Chinese authorities shortly after the Sinuiju SAR was announced.  Western analysts interpreted this move as a signal that China was not supportive of either the project or the selection of Mr. Bin as its chief executive.  Needless to say the future of the project lay in doubt.

However, according to a Yonhap report (here), as of March 2007 the North Koreans still seemed interested in launching some kind of SAR/SEZ in Sinuiju, though the location had been moved from the city proper to two islands in the Yalu River, Bidan and Wihwa.

In August 2007, IFES and the Choson Ilbo reported that preparations were already underway in Sinuiju to convert the city center into a SAR/SEZ.  However, after this initial media hit, most of the news coming out of Sinuiju was related to Jang Song Taek’s 2008 anti-corruption campaign which brought most of the trading companies along the Chinese border back under the control of the Ministry of Finance.

This week, Japan’s Yomuri reports from Shenyang, China, that the Sinuiju SAR is still on and will be located on Wihwa Island:

“The zone will only cover Wi Hwa Island, which will be much easier to control, and only Chinese will be allowed to freely visit,” one of the sources said. “The plan solely aims at expanding trade with China. North Korea isn’t planning any measures that would involve a dramatic opening up.”

According to Chinese statistics, the total value of trade between China and North Korea from January to October last year was 2.12 billion dollars, up 31.7 percent from a year earlier.

Meanwhile, a diplomatic source said, “The move to beef up border trade with China is also aimed at putting pressure on South Korea.”

(FYI: Use of the phrase “beef up” is a pretty good sign that the diplomatic source was an American.)

I know the story of “The Boy Who Cried Wolf.”  I will remain skeptical about the new SEZ until I see evidence of construction myself.

You can read the full Yomuri article here:
N. Korea plans free trade zone on island
Daily Yomuri
Toru Makinoda
1/23/2009

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-1-20-1
1/20/2009

It was revealed by Open Radio for North Korea on January 19 that DPRK authorities had handed down a decree to begin enforcing a ban the sale of imported goods in markets across the country on January 20. On January 3, North Korean authorities announced a measure to the Sinuiju Citizen Association and in the Chaeha Market banning the sale of imported goods, telling traders in the market to get rid of imported goods they had with them.

According to the report, the market management office in Sinuiju (operated under the control of the City People’s Committee) posted the decree at the entrance to the Chaeha Market, emphasizing that goods manufactured overseas were banned, while goods made domestically with imported materials were allowed to be sold. The report added that among goods banned from sale, those made in South Korea would be cracked down on especially hard.

Authorities are clamping down not only on markets in the city, but are also strengthening crackdowns on homeless vagrants, known as kotjebi, or literally, ‘flower swallows’. The report stated, “The Party, security office, trade association, youth association, and other organizations in Sinuiju are at the forefront of a coordinated crackdown on Kotjebi,” and, “As the crackdown is currently underway, between 20 and 30 vagrants, on average, are caught each day…those captured vagrants at the jail are sentenced to around 6 hours of forced labor in quarries or farms outside of the city, and must work hard before being given food.”

This same source reported that due to the Beijing Olympics last August, security on the border between North Korea and China had been tightened, and as winter rolled around and the river froze, this security was further strengthened, and, “recently, due to strengthened blockade of the border, the price of bribes to cross the river have more than doubled.”

In October 2008, the number of guards along the border near Hyesan was increased, and the distance between guardposts was halved from 200 to 100 meters. In addition, not only were military border patrols dispatched to the area, civilian patrols were also set up, increasing surveillance. This led to the cost (bribe) of a river crossing to jump from 1,000-2,000 Yuan (150-300 USD) in 2008 to as much as 4000-5000 Yuan (approx. 600-800 USD) this winter.

——–
Some immediate thoughts:

1. This is the kind of information that should be posted on the leaflets South Koreans are sending across the DMZ.

2. The Daily NK recently posted the “Top Nine” most popular goods list in the North Korean markets.  Many of these are imported.

3. Lets hope that these restrictions are as difficult to enforce as the previous directives.  As we all know, banning a product does not make it go away—even in North Korea.  It raises the price to the final consumer and enriches smugglers at the expense of the state and party organs (though individual party members and security personnel benefit as smugglers).

4. These trade restrictions, if enforceable, effectively amount to an import substitution policy….a policy that has pretty much been thoroughly discredited.

5. According to this IFES article, markets are controlled by a local “Market Management Office” which is in turn subordinate to each “City People’s Committee.”  According to the Worker’s Party organizational chart (view here), Each City People’s Committee is subordinate to a Provincial People’s Committee (PPC).  All PPCs are subordinate to the Central Committee of the Workers Party.  I am skeptical, however, that this is the only channel of authority.  Are the DPRK’s markets part of any ministry’s portfolio?

UPDATE:  A reader points out in the comments that the DPRK is in fact looking to sell its remaining UNUSED fuel rods…so I made a fairly substantial mistake here.  My confusion on the subject seems to have come from my reading of the Joong Ang Ilbo‘s coverage, but I take full responsibility for not paying close enough attention to the other stories.

Here is the specific quote: “The North asked us to focus on discussing how to handle the spent fuel rods as much as possible” (Joong Ang Ilbo)

The revised facts:

1. The DPRK has 14,800 fresh fuel rods—equivalent to just over 100 tons of uranium (RIA Novosti)
2. The materials are reportedly worth over US$10 million (Yonhap). 

ORIGINAL POST:
Hwang Joon-gook, a South Korean diplomat in charge of the denuclearization talks with Pyongyang, led a team of South Korean officials and civilian nuclear experts on a fact-finding mission to the DPRK  to decide whether to buy Pyongyang’s spent fuel rods.

The facts:
1. The DPRK has 14,800 spent fuel rods (Joong Ang Ilbo)
2. This is equivalent to just over 100 tons of uranium (RIA Novosti)
3. The materials are reportedly worth over US$10 million (Yonhap). 
4. The rods are apparently up to 15 years old (Yonhap).
5. The US alleges that the DPRK is enriching uranium as well.  Richardson has more information here.

Just last week, Selig Harrson reported that the DPRK told him “it has already weaponized the 30.8 kilograms (67.8 pounds) of plutonium listed in its formal declaration and that the weapons cannot be inspected.” This amount of plutonium could fuel four or five warheads.

According to NTI:

“Even if the D.P.R.K.-U.S. diplomatic relations become normalized, our status as a nuclear-armed state will never change as long as the U.S. nuclear threat to us remains, even to the slightest degree,” said the [DPRK’s] Foreign Ministry, which issued a similar message several days earlier.

For its own reasons, Russia does not consider the DPRK a nuclear power despite the fact that they have detonated a nuclear device—a fact that would raise eyebrows across the DPRK if reported by the local media. In fact, it was the Russians who supplied the DPRK with the Yongbyon reactors in the first place!

In support of Russia’s position, however, Yonhap offers the following:

North Korea detonated its first atomic device in 2006. The relatively small underground test had less than a kiloton in yield, below what is considered a successful nuclear test.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-1-15-1
2009-01-15   

The exchange rate for the North Korean won shot up approximately 13-15 percent at the end of last year, and has maintained this high rate into January, according to an article in the on-line newsletter, “Open News for North Korea,” on January 12.

According to the inaugural edition of the newsletter, the exchange rate last year was around 3,200 won per USD, or 460 won per Yuan, with only slight fluctuations, but shot up to 3,630 won per USD and 530 won per Yuan in December. In the first weeks of the new year, it has fallen only slightly, to 3,540 won per USD, and 530 won per Yuan.

According to traders who import and export between North Korea and China, “The sudden rise in the exchange rate appears to be related to trade regulations on goods imported from the North,” and they stressed, “After North Korea protested to China about inferior Chinese goods leading to accidents around the country, China decided to set an example, and unilaterally imposed [trade] restrictions.”

Because business with China makes up almost 50 percent of North Korea’s trade, if DPRK-PRC trade, and in particular, North Korea’s exports to China, are restricted, this would cause a large shock to the foreign currency market,” and, “China’s regulatory measures were eased as January come around,” but, “this year, North Korea is strengthening crackdowns on domestic markets, making it difficult to expect the exchange rate to return” to last year’s lower numbers. According to the article, “There is a foreign currency crisis in North Korea, as well, the scale of which is so great it can’t even be compared to what is happening in the South.”

The black market price for U.S. dollars has shot up from a low of 200 won, in July 2002, to 3,200 won in July of last year, and has continued to rise, peaking at 3.500 won currently. This is a sixteen-fold increase in just over six years. The newsletter put this in perspective by explaining, “North Korea has experienced a foreign currency crisis like that seen in South Korea in 1998 every year since 2002.”

North Korea’s haphazard currency distribution and chronic trade deficit has led to a reduction in the country’s foreign currency reserves, while the failure of the authorities’ currency stabilization policies combined with the growing demand for U.S. dollars by North Korean residents seeking imported goods have led to the sharp growth in the exchange rate.

According to the Korea Times:

North Korea has opened a consulate branch office in Dandong, a major Chinese city bordering North Korea, displaying its intention to reinforce bilateral trade relations with China, Yonhap News reported quoting a source Sunday.

“The North Korean consulate-general in Shenyang recently established its branch office in Dandong and dispatched personnel there,” said the source.

“The move signals the North’s intention to increase its product procurement from China through brisker border trade and strengthen its consular affairs amid a growing North Korean population in the Chinese border city.”

Dandong, a city in the Chinese province of Liaoning, is situated right across the Yalu River from Sinuiju in the northwestern part of North Korea. Approximately 70 percent of trade between North Korea and China is conducted through the Dandong-Sinuiju route.

According to the source, the North Korean consulate branch office is the first foreign diplomatic mission to open in Dandong, which has a population of about 650,000.

Bilateral trade and cooperation via Dandong are expected to further grow as China and North Korea are to celebrate the 60th anniversary of their diplomatic relations in 2009 and launch a joint “Year of Friendship.” Two-way trade is estimated to have topped $2 billion last year.

Read the full article here:
N. Korea Opens Mission in Chinese Border City
Korea Times
1/11/2009

Quoting from The Nation:

“North Korea had a little boost this year, due largely to its farm, mine and electricity and gas sectors,” the Hyundai Research Institute (HRI) said in its 2009 report on the communist nation’s economy.

North Korea’s farm production increased by 7.5 per cent, from 4.01 million tonnes in 2007 to 4.31 million tonnes forecast for 2008, according to South Korea’s Rural Development Administration (RDA).

“This year, North Korea’s weather conditions have enabled modest harvest growth,” said Ha Un-Gu, a researcher at RDA.

The delivery of energy aid from the United States, China and Russia was cited by the HRI report as a boost for North Korea’s gas and electricity sectors.

In 2008, North Korean trade with China has grown at a pace strong enough to offset its shrinking trade with Thailand. “So North Korea is forecast to post a record trade volume of 3 billion US dollars in 2008,” the HRI said.

However, North Korea’s 2012 target is becoming elusive, as the country’s trade volume is forecast to slide back from its peak of 3 billion dollars in 2008.

Liquidity problems of key trading partners China and Thailand will make it hard for them to maintain their economic ties with North Korea.

North Korea’s business ties with China were forecast to undergo a particularly steep decline, the HRI said.

North Korea’s trade volume with China increased by 25 per cent to 1.19 billion dollars during the January to June period in 2008, compared to same period in 2007, according to Shin Jeong-Seung, the South Korean ambassador to China.

Download the study (PDF in Korean) here.

Read the full article here:
North Korea’s economy is forecast to resume its slide
The Nation
12/27/2008

Working Paper (Download PDF here)
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Abstract: This study finds that North Korea’s nuclear test and the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions have had no perceptible effect on North Korea’s trade with its two largest partners, China and South Korea. Before North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, it was widely believed that such an event would have cataclysmic diplomatic ramifications. However, beginning with visual inspection of data and ending with time-series models, no evidence is found to support the notion that these events have had any effect on North Korea’s trade with its two principal partners.

In retrospect, North Korea may have calculated quite correctly that the direct penalties for establishing itself as a nuclear power would be modest (or, alternatively, put such a high value on demonstrating its nuclear capability that it outweighed the downside risks, however large). If sanctions are to deter behavior in the future, they will have to be much more enthusiastically implemented.

Keywords: Sanctions, North Korea, Nuclear, United Nations, Trade equations
JEL codes: F51, P2, D74

This subject was covered in the Washington Times this morning.

The Singaporean government is insuring investment in the DPRK…

Quoting from the article:

Singapore firms keen to expand into the largely untapped market of North Korea now have a foot in the door, thanks to two new agreements inked on Tuesday.

The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) said that Singapore signed an Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA) with the country on Tuesday.

Trade and Industry Minister Lim Hng Kiang and his North Korean counterpart, Mr Ri Ryong Nam, signed the IGA during the North Korean Foreign Trade Minister’s official visit to Singapore.

MTI said the IGA will help promote bilateral investment flows by protecting investors and their investments.

Under the agreement, investors will be accorded non-discriminatory treatment, compensation in the event of expropriation or nationalisation of their investments, and free transfer of capital and returns from investment – perennial ‘banana peels’ for businesses entering a less-developed and unexplored market.

Separately, the Singapore Business Federation (SBF) also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the North Korean Chamber of Commerce.

According to the SBF, North Korea remains an unexplored market for many Singapore firms but there exists many opportunities for local businesses to tap into such as its high-quality yet affordable workforce and the abundance of natural resources.

Read the full article below:
S’pore, N.Korea ink trade deals
The Straights Times
Francis Chan
12/2/2008

The end of sunshine?
According to Yonhap (here and here), Friday, November 28, was the last day of the Kaesong day tours (210 tourists made the trip) and the last day the “train to nowhere” made its inter-Korean trip.

As for the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ)…According to (Bloomberg), on December 1 the DPRK cut the number of “windows” available each day for South Korean vehicles to enter and leave the KIZ from 19 to 6 (though the Donga Ilbo claims just 3), and limited the number of South Koreans allowed in the complex to 880—about 20% of the 4,200 previously permitted to enter the complex.

According to the  Donga Ilbo, Pyongyang delivered notice at 11:55pm Sunday saying those allowed to stay in Kaesong are 27 staff of the management committee; four from the (South) Korea Land Corp.; 40 from Hyundai Asan Corp.; five at restaurants and living quarters; two at shops and hospitals; and 800 from South Korean companies. Border crossings are also limited to 250 staff members and 150 vehicles each time.

Jeopardizing more than Kaesong
As previously discussed (here and here), South Korea and Russia are interested in building oil and natural gas pipelines which would cross the DPRK. If these projects went through, the DPRK government would benefit from construction and “rental” fees—in effect taking a cut of all the energy resources that cross their borders.  North Korea, is now telling the Russians that the project is not too palatable at the moment.

Still more red than green it seems.

What now?
So while the DPRK chases away investment from the South, they solicit more from Kuwait and Singapore (where Chris Hill is due to stop by):

North Korean Foreign Trade Minister Ri Ryong Nam, now in Singapore, has urged Singapore companies to invest in the isolated country, the Singapore government said Monday.

The North Korean minister “briefed…on economic developments in North Korea and possible investment opportunities for Singapore companies,” in a meeting with Singapore’s former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, now a senior minister in the Cabinet, a government statement said.

Goh said, “Singapore would be glad to explore ways to strengthen bilateral cooperation, including in the areas of trade and investment, once international concerns were assuaged and the environment improved.”

Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo made a trip to North Korea in May, accompanied by a business delegation, in what was the first official visit to North Korea by a Singapore Cabinet minister.

On that trip, Yeo met North Korea’s No. 2 political leader Kim Yong Nam and Ri.

Yeo said at the end of his visit North Korea might be keen to learn from some aspects of the Singapore development model and that Singapore is ready to offer help and ideas. (Kyodo-Japan Economic Newswire)

Chewing gum manufacturers beware!

Last week, North Korean Economy Watch reported Pyongyang’s irrational economic policy threats which could end the flow of millions of South Korean dollars into North Korean coffers.  I use the word “irrational” because government policies are typically designed to increase revenues to the treasury (or to coalition / constituent members), not scare them away.  Today, however, North Korea reaffirmed its commitment to closing the border with South Korea on December 1, though with some qualifications:

1. The North Koreans will end “the train to nowhere” (c) NKeconWatch. This is puzzling because of all the inter-Korean projects, this one is the least “contaminating.” The South Korean government pays the North Korean government to send an empty train across the border each day.  Why jeopardize this easy money?

2. The North Koreans will end the Kaesong day tours.  This will not be good for Hyundai Asan (HA), which is already suffering losses from the idle Kumgangsan resort.  On the plus side for HA, since this project merely bussed people around Kaesong, they will not be leaving much fixed capital on the northern side of the DMZ.  Still, it is strange that the North Koreans would seek to end this program.  Although it is slightly “contaminating” in that hundreds of South Koreans are shuffled through Kaesong every day, the North’s citizens are generally isolated from their wealthy neighbors. Additionally, I estimate that this program has grossed the North Koreans nearly USD$10 million since it was launched nearly a year ago. This is not an insignificant amount of money to the DPRK.

3. The ultimate fate of the Kaesong Industrial Zone remains uncertain.  Although the North Koreans have threatened to “selectively expel” up to half of the South Koreans in the facility, some managers remain optimistic:

“(The North) never said it would halt production or expel staff related to the production process. So even in the worst case of operating with only half of the staff, we think there won’t be any problem in production,” said Lee Eun-suk, an official at Shinwon Corp, which has clothing factories at Kaesong. (Reuters, via the Washington Post)

Unless North Korea’s policy makers are terminating the flow of economic rents into the country to curb the power of some particular official or interest group, there are not many instances where these actions could be considered shrewd.  Adding to the confusion, most analysts presume that the majority of the South’s construction and wage fees are distributed to the small cohort of high-ranking North Korean policy makers who ostensibly signed off on the projects in the first place.  So why would they now decide to end their own direct funding?

These policy decisions, moreover, will likely affect the North Koreans in ways they do not yet seem to anticipate, particularly when it comes to attracting private foreign direct investment (which is desperately needed).  Private investors will not be attracted to a business environment where the rules of the game are prone to changing every few months.  Investment entrepreneurs will not risk the appropriation of large scale fixed assets.  International aid and official foreign direct investment will probably go on as usual as these tasks have more to do with political decisions than economic.

So what is going on?  That is the million dollar question, and speculation in this case is not worth all that much.  The Daily NK, however, claims to have interviewed an “official” from Pyongyang who discussed recent developments in the Kaesong Industrial Zone.  His claim is that the North Koreans made the decision to close the Kaesong Zone for internal political reasons:

Q. What is the reason that North Korea is trying to suspend the business in the Kaesong Industrial Complex?

A. In fact, the story about the suspension of the Kaesong Complex has emanated from Pyongyang since this fall, but it had been decided as an instruction of the Party in Pyongyang late last year.

It is hard to say conclusively what is happening in Kaesong, because there are so many complicated things at work. People from the Party in Pyongyang say that the Kaesong Complex and tourism should fall into disuse and the Mt. Geumgang tourism site should be left alone. Whether or not the Kaesong Complex is thrown away is only up to our economy condition and also the General (Kim Jong Il)’s decision.

Q. Do you mean that instructions on the Kaesong Complex have already been decided internally by the Party?

A.Yes, you can say that. This was because at the beginning, they started it on in the precondition of switching workers once a year, but now they know that switching workers every year is impossible.

Additionally, rumors on South Chosun have been constantly circulating among workers and their families, so illusion of the South have now become uncontrollable among the people. The authorities cannot overlook this situation.

From the Party’s view, each worker in Mt. Geumgang and Kaesong is like a poster advertising capitalism. Due to them, our socialist system could be cracked.

As I know, at least 20 affiliates with Kaesong Complex came into questioning for advertising South Chosun and capitalism.

There was a thorough reshuffling in the Party last year. There is nobody who talks about Kaesong or Mt. Geumgang.

Q. Can North Korea ignore the abundant dollars from Kaesong in practice?

A. Frankly speaking, we have relied on it due to money. Even right now, if South Korea treats things like the Mt. Geumgang shooting accident flexibly and starts the tours again, everything is okay. The money we want does not need to come only from South Korea. There are Yuan, Rubles and dollars as well. They are all the same.

Although our economy is so terrible, we will not establish the national vision only targeted on making money. You should bear this point in mind.

Thoughts and opinions apprecaited. 

Read more here:
There Is an Internal Reason for the Bluff on Kaesong
Daily NK
Jung Kwon Ho
11/16/2008

Kaesong Staff to Be Expelled
Daily NK
Kim So Yeol
11/24/2008

Kaesong Tour and Trains are Suspended
Daily NK
Jeong Jae Sung
11/24/2008

North Korea to Halt Cross-Border Rail Service, Tours
Bloomberg
Heejin Koo
11/24/2008

North Korea prepares to shut border with South
Reuters (via Washington Post)
Jonathan Thatcher
11/24/2008

N. Korea Stiffens Diplomatic Stance
New York Times
Choe Sang-hun
11/24/2008