North Korean Economy Watch

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Evan Ramstad offers some information on China’s investments in North Korea:

The diplomatic minuet is taking place after China increased trade with North Korea over the past four years. Last year, trade between China and North Korea jumped 41% to $2.79 billion, with most of that coming from increased exports by China.

 On Tuesday, truck traffic between the two countries resumed after a break Monday for a Chinese holiday. Dozens of trucks made the crossing in Dandong, a major city along the North Korean border.

China has been North Korea’s chief political and economic sponsor since the Soviet Union collapsed nearly 20 years ago. For much of that time, it served as donor of last resort, making up the difference when energy, food and donations to North Korea dropped off from other countries. That often amounted to $100 million to $200 million in aid.

China broke from that pattern in 2005 by boosting its exports and widening its trade surplus with North Korea. Outside experts view China’s trade surplus as the chief measure of its economic aid to North Korea because North Korea has no measurable debt instrument and little ability to narrow the trade gap.

Chinese companies, sometimes with help from the Chinese government, are investing heavily in North Korea’s mining industry, construction and light manufacturing such as textiles. Chinese consumer goods line store shelves and market stalls in North Korea.

Many executives of Chinese companies in North Korea say it’s a difficult place to operate. Among the challenges: getting money out of the country. China helped Panda Electronics Group, based in Nanjing, start a computer assembly factory with Taedong River Computer Corp. in North Korea five years ago.

North Korea’s currency, the won, can’t be converted. To move money out of the country, Panda must buy commodities in North Korea and sell them in China for cash, an executive said.

The increased business activity in North Korea reflects China’s desire to treat North Korea more as a “normal country” rather than a socialist brother entitled to unlimited assistance, scholars and analysts in China say. They say China also hopes its companies in North Korea will encourage the North’s government to open its economy as China began to do in the 1980s.

Wang Kai, a manager of Liaoning Fuxin Tianxin Technology and Development Co., says the company decided to build a pipe-making factory in North Korea because the country’s economy has few places to go but up.

“North Korea’s situation and economic status are pretty similar to China’s before the start of the opening up and reform policy,” Mr. Wang said in an interview before the rocket launch.

Others note China’s desire is to prevent North Korea’s collapse, which might pour refugees into China’s northeast.

The increased business is yielding a payoff in political influence for China in Pyongyang that’s become more important since North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il was incapacitated by illness in August. One signal that Mr. Kim was back in control came when he met in late January with a delegation of visiting diplomats from Beijing.

Read the full story here:
Economic interests shape Beijing’s Pyongyang Policy
Wall Street Journal Online
Evan Romstad
4/8/2009

Marcus Noland, co author of The North Korean Famine and Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute of International Economics, wrote a short policy piece in the Asia Pacific Bulletin calling for more effective sanctions on North Korea to deter Pyongyang’s belligerence:

Regrettably, toothless trade restrictions have provided inadequate to deter Pyongyang ex ante, and the world is now faced with dealing with the situation ex post.  Willingness to impose a comprehensive set of sanctions–trade, aid, travel, energy assistance, and finance–might reign in reckless North Kean behavior before another provocation fundamentally destabilizes the situation in Northeast Asia. (Noland, 2009)

The Asia Pacific Bulletin article draws from a thorough empirical study Noland conducted on the (non) impact of UN sanctions on North Korea’s trade. “The (Non-) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea” can be downloaded here.  Here is the abstract:

Before North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006, it was widely believed that such an event would have cataclysmic diplomatic ramifications in Asia. Based on a visual inspection of the data and statistical models, this study finds that, although the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions against the export of heavy arms and luxury goods to North Korea within one week of Pyongyang’s nuclear test, the imposition of these sanctions has had no perceptible effect on North Korea’s trade with the country’s two largest partners, China and South Korea.
policy implications:

1. North Korea appears to have calculated correctly that the direct penalties to its foreign trade for establishing itself as a nuclear power would be modest (or, alternatively, Pyongyang put such a high value on demonstrating the country’s nuclear capability that it outweighed the downside risks, however large). Presumably this experience will condition the reactions of North Korean policymakers in the future—making deterrence with respect to this issue and other sources of conflict more difficult.

2. Despite pre-test diplomatic warnings not to test, the post-test behavior of public and private sector actors in China and South Korea has been accepting of North Korea’s nuclear status. Thus if such warnings are to be heeded in the future, they must embody credible threats of penalty, be much more enthusiastically implemented, and be more broadly targeted.

Though I have tremendous respect for Dr. Noland’s work, I am fairly skeptical about the ability of economic santions to change the DPRK’s policies or behavior.  Carrots and sticks are essential tools for any diplomatic negotiation, but China, the DPRK’s strongest political ally and largest trading partner is simply not interested in implementing rigid economic restrictions vis a vis North Korea (for many rational reasons).  Given the uncanny ability of the North Korean elite to remain in power despite severe economic problems, I am afraid that any achievable sanctions regime would only make life more difficult for “ordinary” North Koreans with little possibility of delivering changes at the top.

By Michael Rank

China has exported 5.014 tonnes of beef, worth $77,174, to North Korea via the northern port of Dalian (Chinese source here) and has also agreed to ship 60,000 tonnes of flour (Chinese source here), according to brief reports on Chinese websites.

The export of beef, in 485 containers via the border city of Dongdan in February, was the first of its kind from Dalian, the report said, adding that Dalian is China’s second biggest beef-exporting port after Hong Kong.

The flour will be supplied under an international aid agreement in the period June-August and is being supplied by Jinyuan Flour, a company based in Zhengzhou, capital of the northern province of Henan, and is guaranteed to be of export quality and free of additives, while the beef was supplied by Dalian company Jiansong Xuelong Foods Co Ltd. The report gave no value for the flour.

Another report (Chinese source here) said Chinese-North Korean trade grew by 41.3% last year to $2.793 billion. Chinese exports grew 30.2% to $2.032 billion while North Korean exports to China were up 30.2% at $760.07 million, the report said, quoting Chinese customs statistics.

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
(NK Brief No. 09-3-3-1)
3/3/2009

INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
As February began, North Korea continued to publicly warn that the two Koreas were on a path toward war, stating on February 1 that downward spiraling relations between the two Koreas were brought on by ROK President Lee Myung-bak The (North) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) printed that Lee’s policies toward the North were “the very source of military conflicts and war between the North and the South,” and warned that tensions on the peninsula “may lead to an uncontrollable and unavoidable military conflict and war.”

Poll results released by the Korea Economic Research Institute on February 2 indicated that 68.4 percent of South Koreans support President Lee Myung-bak’s aid-for-denuclearization policy toward the North, and a separate poll by Gallup Korea showed on February 23 that 62 percent of South Koreans blame North Korea for strained inter-Korean relations.

A South Korean official stated on February 4 that 3,000 tones of steel plates that were to be sent to North Korea as part of the energy aid-for-denuclearization deal reached in 2007 would be delayed due to the North’s recent saber-rattling. According to the official, “It is hard to predict when we will send the steel plates. For now, we are not even seriously considering the timing…North Korea should first change its attitude.”

The South Korean government has shot down a project by an ROK journalist organization that would allow the exchange of news with North Korea. It was reported on February 4 that a Unification Ministry Spokesman Kim Ho-nyoun stated, “There are concerns that the exchange of news articles may undermine national security, public order and the interests of the general public.”

On February 16, it was reported the ROK Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee has mandated field commanding officers in all branches of the South Korean military to immediately respond to any North Korean provocation without first seeking permission from superiors. This has further heightened concerns over the possibility of a naval confrontation in the Yellow Sea around the disputed Northern Limit Line.

On February 19, North Korean media warned, “Now that the political and military confrontation between the North and the South has gone into extremes, a physical clash may break out at any moment,” and, “North-South relations have reached such a pass that there is no way to improve them or bring them under control.”

INTER-KOREAN TOURISM
Hyundai Asan, the South Korean company running the Kumgang Mountain tourist resort and the Kaesong City tours in North Korea is on the brink of bankruptcy. A Hyundai representative stated on February 4, “We are reaching a critical situation…unless the tours resume by April, it will be difficult for us to stay afloat.” Hyundai Asan brought in 255.5 trillion Won, or approximately 170.3 million USD, through tour sales in 2007, but in 2008, the company sold only 228.8 billion Won, or 152.5 million USD-worth of tours in 2008. The company employed 1,084 workers when tours were in operation, but has cut back to 479 employees. Of those, approximately 20 percent are receiving only 70 percent of their wages while they work from home. The tours have been on hold since a South Korean tourist was shot and killed at the Kumgang resort last summer.

ROK lawmaker Song Hun-suk stated on February 22, “Since the suspension of the [tourism] program, dozens of South Korean businesses and approximately 1,000 travel agents that offered organized trips to the North have gone to the brink of bankruptcy,” and he reported that approximately 30,000 North and South Koreans were on the verge of unemployment due to the travel ban, with 80 percent of shops and restaurants in South Korea’s Gosung, Gangwon Province, which is near the border, have been forced to close due to the absence of tourists passing through.

INTER-KOREAN TRADE
On February 3, the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) launched a new website, “Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Information Center”, at http://interkoreatrade.kita.net. The website is designed to provide information and education on North Korean investment and inter-Korean cooperation

On February 8, South Korea’s Unification Ministry released statistics for 2008 regarding the Kaesong Industrial Complex. According to the ministry, production in the complex was up 36 percent over the previous year, reaching a value of 251.42 million USD. The total value of goods produced in the complex since it began operations in 2005 comes to 524.84 million USD.

The Economic Times ran an article on February 15 titled, “Ever heard of Gaesung? Gear up for its products,” in which it reports that the India-South Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) soon to be signed will mean that India recognizes goods produced in the Kaesong Industrial Complex as South Korean goods.

ROK UNIFICATION MINISTER
On February 12, Korea University Professor of Political Science Hyun In-taek was sworn in as the new South Korean minister of unification. At his inauguration, Hyun stated that he is willing to meet with North Korean counterparts “at any time, at any place” in order to repair inter-Korean relations. Hyun has been criticized as being a hardliner, and an architect of the Lee Myung-bak administration’s “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness” policy. Hyun was a key advisor during Lee’s presidential campaign, at which time Lee introduced the Vision policy, and was also a member of Lee’s presidential transition team, which at one point had advocated the shuttering of the Ministry of Unification.

U.S.-DPRK RELATIONS
A group of high-ranking former U.S. officials now advising the Obama administration on the DPRK visited North Korea during the first week of February. The group included Stephen Bosworth, Jonathan Pollack, Morton Avramowitz, and Leon Sigal. The delegation reported that North Korea does not appear to be rushed, and that they had taken a “wait and see” attitude in Pyongyang. Bosworth stated that “[North Korean officials] understand the Obama administration will need some time to sort itself through the policy review and the expressed patience, there is no sense of alarm or urgency.” He also noted that the officials were willing to move forward with denuclearization talks.

Leon Sigal stated on February 1, just prior to his visit to the North, “the Obama administration should promptly send a high-level emissary, perhaps former President Bill Clinton or former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, to Pyongyang.” Sigal also wrote in an online opinion piece that Obama should “hold a summit meeting with Kim Jong-il in return for North Korea disposing some of its plutonium.”

On February 2, the U.S. State Department announced that it would impose sanctions on three North Korean companies for missile export violations. In accordance with the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act of 1979, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, Executive Order 12851 of June 11, 1993, Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994, the Korea Mining and Development Corporation, the Mokong Trading Corporation, and Sino-Ki are subject to Nonproliferation Measures and Category II missile sanctions.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated on February 13 that the Obama administration would be willing to normalize bilateral relations with North Korea if the North is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate its nuclear weapons program. She stated that the U.S. would have a “great openness” to North Korea, and added, “It’s not only on the diplomatic front,” but that Washington had a “willingness to help the people of North Korea, not just in narrow ways with food and fuel but with energy assistance.” Two days later, North Korea’s head of state Kim Yong Nam reaffirmed that North Korea would “develop relations with countries that are friendly toward us.”

On February 17, Clinton reiterated the U.S. offer of a peace treaty officially ending the Korean War, normalization of relations, and aid, but stated, “The decision as to whether North Korea will cooperate in the six-party talks, end provocative language and actions, is up to them,” and , “If North Korea abides by the obligations it has already entered into and verifiably and completely eliminates its nuclear program, then there will be a reciprocal response,” indicating that North Korea will have to make the next move.

During a trip to South Korea, Clinton stated that North Korea was “badly miscalculating” if it thinks it can “drive a wedge” between Washington an Seoul, and that “North Korea is not going to get a different relationship with the United States while insulting and refusing dialogue with the Republic of Korea.”

U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY TO NORTH KOREA
Following his return from a trip to North Korea at the beginning of the month, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Steven Bosworth was named by Secretary of State Clinton as the Obama administration’s special representative for North Korea. He will remain dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, but will now be responsible for coordinating U.S. policy regarding the DPRK. Special Envoy Sung Kim is responsible for ‘day-to-day’ negotiations with Pyongyang.

UK-DPRK RELATIONS
A British parliamentary delegation arrived in North Korea on February 3, coinciding with a visit to London by a DPRK Workers’ Party of Korea delegation. EU Parliament member Glyn Ford stated that he hoped to reopen dialog that was broken off in 2005 on human rights, and denuclearization, hinting that restarting dialog could lead to the transfer of renewable energy technology to the North.

PRC-DPRK TRADE
It was reported on February 24 that trade between China and North Korea reached 2.78 billion USD in 2008, a 41.2 percent increase over the previous year. DPRK imports were up 46 percent, at over 2.03 billion USD, while its exports to China grew 29.7 percent, to 750 million USD. Mineral resources made up 54.7 percent of North Korea’s exports to China, and machinery and electronics made up the majority of imports.

DPRK NUCLEAR PROGRAM

(NKeconWatch: Although this is simply a reprint of the IFES report, I have been notified by NTI that this report is inaccurate. According to NTI Communications Director Cathy Gwin:

“I am writing to respond to your post that referred to erroneous reports that the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) is preparing to open an office in Seoul ” in order to help prepare DPRK nuclear scientists for peaceful civilian employment.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has worked in the past to develop ideas on how governments could apply cooperative threat reduction (CTR or “Nunn-Lugar”) approaches as part of a solution to the North Korean nuclear challenge.  However, we have no current program to carry out those activities ourselves, nor do we have a program to retrain North Korean scientists.  In addition, we have no current plans to open an office in South Korea, and we do not have branch offices in Ukraine or Kazakhstan.  We have a main office in Washington, DC and a presence in Moscow.

January 31 was the deadline for North Korea to shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear reactor as part of 6-Party negotiations, but it failed to meet the deadline. Christopher Hill stated on February 3 that the U.S. would “hold on for a few more days,” but that “we’re not happy that the DPRK essentially has missed this very important deadline.”

On February 2, it was reported that the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) would open a new office in Seoul in order to help prepare DPRK nuclear scientists for peaceful civilian employment. The NTI is in the process of building a program to retrain the North’s experts, and “is also considering ways to support not only nuclear scientists at Yongbyon, but also farmers near Yongbyon who provide them with rice,” according to Roy Kim, a professor at Drexel University.

The U.S. government criticized Pakistan’s decision on February 6 to release Abdul Qadeer Khan from house arrest. Khan as been under house arrest for the past 5 years, after admitting to selling nuclear weapons technology to North Korea, as well as Iran and Libya. In 2004, A.Q. Khan took full responsibility for selling the nuclear secrets, stating that the military and government were unaware of his actions. He recanted this confession last year, stating that he had been a scapegoat.

DPRK MISSILE LAUNCH PREPARATIONS
Several countries have reported intelligence pointing to a launch by North Korea of a Taepodong-2 long-range missile. The U.S. State Department warned on February 3 that “a ballistic missile launch by North Korea would be unhelpful and, frankly, provocative,” while the ROK Foreign Ministry noted that a missile launce would “constitute a clear breach of the UN resolution” adopted in 2006. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu stated, “We hope all the parties can recognize that maintaining stability is in the common interest of the people of the Korean Peninsula.” Preparations appear to be underway at its Musudan-ri base, near the DPRK-PRC border. A Taepodong-2 is thought to have a range of 6,700 kilometers (4,150 miles).

Amid reports that it was preparing the missile launch, North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun printed, “The DPRK’s policy of advancing to space for peaceful purposes is a justifiable aim that fits the global trend of the times. There is no power in the world that can stop it,” and, “ As long as developing and using space are aimed at peaceful purposes and such efforts contribute to enhancing human beings’ happiness, no one in the world can find fault with them.” North Korea continues to deny preparations for a long-range missile launch, and insists that it is preparing to launch a satellite

According to a researcher at the South Korean Agency for Defense Development, if North Korea were to launch a satellite, “given the size of the rocket, the satellite will likely be a low-orbit device,” and low-orbit devices usually need to be fired toward either the North or South Pole in order to successfully reach orbit. This would mean North Korea would need to use Chinese, Russian, Japanese or South Korean airspace.

JAPANESE FIRM, DPRK MISSILES
On February 26, Japanese police raided Toko Boeki, a Tokyo trading company with ties to the DPRK residents’ association in Japan. The company is suspected of trying to export magnetic measuring instruments that could be used to manufacture missiles to North Korea via a third country.

DPRK MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
It was reported on February 5 that North Korea’s new 3G cellular network, built by the Egyptian company Orascom Telecom, has been very popular. Orascom Telecom Chairman Naguib Sawiris stated, that in the first two weeks of service, “so far we have about 6,000 applications. The important point is that they are normal citizens, not the privileged or military generals or party higher-ups. For the first time, they have been able to go to a shop and get a mobile phone.”

DPRK SPORTS
North Korea’s soccer squad defeated South Arabia 1-0 as it moved closer to the World Cup finals. The North now has seven points in Group 2, after four games, and is in second place, with only South Korea having more points. North Korea has not been in the World Cup finals since 1966.

KIM JONG IL BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS
Kim Jong Il’s 67th birthday was marked on both sides of the DMZ. In the North, ceremonies were held throughout the country on February 16, and special rations were provided to the people of the country, with extra noodles, rice and other grains given out to mark the day.

In South Korea, the Abductees’ Family Union marked the day by flying 100,000 leaflets with North Korean currency and criticisms of the North’s leader. South Korean authorities announced plans to investigate, as it is illegal for South Koreans to possess North Korean bank notes without permission.

DPRK SUCCESSION
More rumors were heard in February concerning who might succeed Kim Jong Il as leader of the North Korean regime. Kim’s youngest son, Kim Jong-un has reportedly registered as a candidate for the March 8 parliamentary elections, which would launch his political career. In addition, an editorial marking Kim Jong Il’s 67th birthday stressed the “inheritance of bloodline of Mount Paektu,” further stoking rumors that one of Kim’s sons may be next in line.

DPRK CENSUS
Results of a preliminary census by the United Nations Population Fund were released in February. According to the data, there were 24.05 million North Koreans as of October last year, with 11.72 million males and 12.33 million females. South Pyongan Province was the most populous, with 4.05 residents. 3.26 million people reside in the North’s capital, Pyongyang. This census, conducted by the United Nations Population Fund, was the first in 15 years to be conducted in North Korea.

According to Asia Pulse Businesswire (Hat tip to Oliver):

Trade between South and North Korea declined 19.6 per cent in January from a year earlier, apparently hit by the slumping South Korean economy and frayed Seoul-Pyongyang relations, the South’s official data showed on Feb. 22.

Inter-Korean trade reached US$113 million in January, down from $140.5 million a year ago, marking the fifth straight monthly fall, the data made available by Unification Ministry in Seoul said.

“The decline in inter-Korean trade appears compounded by several factors like the slowing economic downturn and frozen relations between the two Koreas,” the ministry said in the data.

Inter-Korean relations have chilled since conservative South Korean President Lee Myung-bak took office a year ago, pledging to get tough on North Korea.

The South Korean economy is sharply slumping, due to tumbling exports and sluggish domestic demand. South Korea is widely expected to post negative economic growth this year, the first annual contraction since the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.

Citation:
Inter-Korean trade dips 20 pct in January
Asia Pulse Businesswire
February 26, 2009
(Yonhap)

DPRK trade deficit with China nears USD$1.3 billion
Institutue for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 09-3-5-1
2009-03-05

As North Korean dependence on trade with China continues to grow, the amount of overall trade hit a record high in 2008, however its trade deficit rose along with it. According to recent statistics released by China’s Customs Bureau and the Ministry of Commerce, trade between the DPRK and PRC in 2008 was worth a total of 2.78 billion USD, a 41.2 percent increase over the mere 1.97 billion USD recorded in 2007.

DPRK exports to China were worth 750 million USD, a 29.7 percent rise, while imports from China totaled 2.03 billion USD, up 46 percent, which led to a record 1.28 billion USD trade deficit. Mineral resources accounted for more than half (54.7 percent) of North Korea’s exports to China, while the majority of imports were machinery and electronic goods.

The North’s trade deficit with China has continued to grow for the past five years straight. In 2004, the North’s trade deficit was a mere 210 million USD, but this more than doubled, to 580 million USD, in 2005, rose to 760 million USD in 2006, and then hit 810 million USD in 2007. The reason for the sudden jump in the North’s trade deficit appears to be the globally rising cost of raw materials, and therefore Pyongyang’s trade deficit is expected to continue to rise rapidly in the near future.

This deficit is exacerbated by the North’s isolation from the rest of the international community, leaving it little choice but to continue trading at prices set by the Chinese. With the currently frigid relations between Pyongyang and Seoul, and the deadlock in 6-Party Talks, tensions on the Korean Peninsula make it increasingly difficult for North Korea to trade with other countries, so its dependence on China and Chinese goods is expected to continue to grow. 

And according to the Choson Ilbo:

Trade between North Korea and China totaled US$2.78 billion last year, up 41.2 percent from $1.97 billion in the previous year, according to the statistics released on Monday by the China Customs and China’s Ministry of Commerce. North Korea’s imports topped $2.03 billion, up 46 percent from the previous year, but its exports stood at $750 million, up only 29.7 percent.

As a result, North Korea’s trade deficit with China reached a record high of $1.28 billion, up a whopping 57.7 percent from $810 million in 2007. It has been rising steadily from $210 million in 2004.

Mineral resources accounted for 54.7 percent of the North’s exports to China, while machinery and electronic equipment took up the biggest portion of imports.

The figures are attributable to the drastically increased prices of raw materials and the North’s deepening dependency on China. “North Korea’s dependence on China appears to be rising steadily because foreign countries other than China are reluctant to trade with the North because of strained inter-Korean relations and the stalled six-party talks,” said a North Korea export in Beijing diplomatic circles.

Read the full article here:
N.Korea’s Reliance on China Trade Deepens
Choson Ilbo
2/24/2009

The South Korean and Indian governments are finalizing a trade concession agreement that will lower Indian import tariffs on some goods produced in the Kaesong Zone. According to India’s Economic Times:

Sounds odd, but some select North Korean goods may soon get special trade concession in India after New Delhi signs a trade pact with South Korea. In fact, the North Korean city of Gaesung will emerge as a major beneficiary as part of the terms and conditions of the India-South Korea comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA), which is likely to be signed soon, sources close to the development told SundayET. The North Korean city is located just 60 km north of Seoul, the capital of South Korea.

Though Indian negotiators initially showed reluctance to such a deal, South Koreans were very keen as many of their companies have invested heavily in the region and set up many factories in that city, using cheap North Korean labourers. Goods produced at Gaesung include low-end engineering products, leather goods, jewellery, chemicals and textiles.

When contacted, commerce secretary GK Pillai confirmed to SundayET that India would extend the same concession to goods produced at Gaesung too. “It’s a matter of 30-40 products which are not very high-end. Those are not cars or steel. Yes, Gaesung is in North Korea, but it’s very much a part of South Korea’s economic co-operation plan. Both the Indian and the Korean (South Korean) governments have agreed to the CEPA, and it should be coming into effect from June or July this year,” he said.

Once the partnership agreement is signed, it will be the first such instance in which India recognises the outward processing concept and gives the same status to goods produced outside the negotiating country with those produced inside. Though Mr Pillai said there was no issue regarding Gaesung, sources close to the development added that India was not very keen on allowing those products.

“India was opposed to the idea as other countries too may demand the same model later. What if a country entering into a trade agreement with India chooses a place in Bangladesh or Pakistan for outward processing,” said a senior government official.

The trade volume between India and North Korea is quite insignificant if it’s compared with that of India-South Korea. During FY08, India’s import from North Korea was worth a mere $161 million, which was 2.6% of that from South Korea. In case of exports, the figures are somewhat better. The total export from India to North Korea was $850 mn in FY08 which was 29% of India’s export to South Korea.

The Bank of Korea, the South’s central bank and most cited source of DPRK economic statistics, estimates North Korea’s gross exports (to all countries except South Korea) in 2006 and 2007 at $950 and $920 (USD in millions) respectively.  They estimate the DPRK’s imports in these years at $2,050 and $2,020 (USD in millions) respectively. 

According to the data in this article, North Korea’s exports to India ($161 million) are a non-trivial 17.5% of its total exports (assuming the 2007 number is approximately current and changes in inflation and exchange rates are trivial).  The DPRK’s imports from India, $850 million in 2008 (according to the article), are a whopping 42% of North Korea’s estimated 2007 total imports.  Either India is now one of the DPRK’s major trading partners, or there was a short-term spike in DPRK-India trading activity, or these numbers are fishy.

Setting this debate aside, a further question arises—how will these transactions be recorded?  Since the DPRK has a trade relationship with India, will goods from Kaesong be flown/shipped from the DPRK to India and counted as North Korean trade, or will goods be shipped from Kaesong to South Korea and then sent to India—to be counted as South Korean trade? 

My suspicion is that the Kaesong goods will be counted as South Korean merchandise trade since this is a South Korea-India trade deal.  If the goods are recorded as South Korean, agreements of this sort will make it much more difficult in the future to determine the DPRK’s trade volume using mirror statistics.  This is because the country of origin records kept by the DPRK’s trading partners will show goods produced in the Kaesong zone as originating in South Korea.  As a result, the DPRK’s merchandise exports could go underestimated.

Read the full story here:
Ever heard of Gaesung? Gear up for its products
The Economic Times
Shantanu Nandan Sharma
2/15/2009

The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) published an interesting paper (with the above title) on legal reform in the DPRK.  Below are some highlights.  Links to the entire paper at the bottom.

As citizens have been left without state provisions for subsistence since the state did not have the material resources to supply the people through its central rationing system, the vast majority of individuals and organizations had to support themselves. Legitimizing commercial and market activity and expanding the scope of private ownership were a part of this effort. One of the most important laws reflecting this transformation is the Damage Compensation Law (sonhae bosang-beop), which is the North Korean version of a general torts law. This law holds an individual or any legal entity liable for its tort when damage is inflicted. Monetary compensation is the rule, while restoration is allowed when possible.

Under the socialist system, where the state is responsible for the provision of a citizen’s livelihood, tort law was of little use. Even in the case of death, one’s family would not suffer economically since the state provided sustenance rations. However, with the collapse of the public distribution system, the North Korean authorities could no longer maintain their socialist system. Since an individual now has to rely on his or her own devices, the loss of the employment, for example, directly inflicts a financial burden on the individual or family. Therefore, damage to property or person should be compensated for by the responsible party. Therefore, the new damage compensation law acts as a new mechanism for the protection of private property, and strengthens individual responsibility for negligent acts that inflict damage on others.

and…

Relaxation of law and order, along with the laxity of organizational control due to economic difficulties, changed individual attitudes toward government authorities and organizations in which these individuals were members. Individuals became more independent from the state and its organizations, since both the state and more directly engaged organizations lost important means of control over individuals in society due to the lack of resources and the inability to provide basic necessities to the people.

Under these circumstances, individual victims had no appropriate method to seek compensation for damage through an official dispute resolution process. This has led to an environment in which self-remedy has become the rule, rather than the exception. Although new criminal law punishes those who have used force in asserting their rights, there is no effective means of dispute resolution outside of taking advantage of officials willing to look the other way in exchange for favors, or hiring thugs to more directly resolve disagreements. Citizens can buy justice through bribes, and law enforcement officials are especially helpful in these endeavors when their palms are greased. This is much more economical as well as effective than bringing a case to the relevant official agency, which is generally incapable of resolving problems and instead further exploits the situation.

On courts and lawyers…

For example, the most prominent role of the court in North Korea, where other types of lawsuit are very unusual, was to handle divorce settlements, since divorce through simple agreement of the two parties was not allowed. Ordinary citizens went so far as to perceive settlement of divorce to be the most important role of the court. Criminal cases were also unusual. Political crime is handled through a non-judicial process, while many deviances are resolved through unofficial processes within more local organizations. The role of the court in resolving disputes was negligible, aside from divorce. Since the role of law enforcement agencies is to protect the state and secure the socialist system, the most important qualification for them is not legal expertise, but rather, loyalty and devotion to the North Korean ideology and system.

On the other hand, the Lawyer’s Act of 1993 prescribes the required qualifications of a lawyer. Those who are eligible to work as lawyers are those who are certified legal professionals, those who have working experience of no less than 5 years in legal affairs, or those who have a professional license in a certain area and have passed the bar examination after a short-term course in legal education. This qualification for working as a lawyer signifies that the state wants to equip the judicial system with legal professionals. Although there is no explicit professional qualification for a judge or prosecutor, we may assume that legal professionals have been elected or recruited in practice. This trend is likely to be reinforced as these social changes continue to unfold.

New provisions were also introduced to reinforce the judicial system. For example, interference with a law enforcement official’s performance of duties is now a punishable offence ; Threatening a witness or exacting revenge has been criminalized ; Non-execution of judgment will now be punished. Although the introduction of these provisions was an expression of the government’s effort to bring in a more effective judicial system, it would not be an easy task under the vague status of transformation. The state is very cautious and reluctant to undertake bold or fundamental changes due to concerns about political instability. Therefore, it takes time for various coherent mechanisms to fully support a market system.

You can download the entire paper in PDF format here.

You can read it on the IFES web page here.

The purpose of these types of indexes is to put pressure on world governments to improve their economic policies.  Unfortunately, the DPRK has come in last place for as long as I have been paying attention….

From the 2009 Index of Economic Freedom:

North Korea’s economic freedom score is 2, making its economy the least free in the 2009 Index. North Korea is ranked 41st out of 41 countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

North Korea does not score well in any single area of economic freedom, although it does score some minimal points in investment freedom and property rights. The Communist Party controls and commands almost every aspect of economic activity. Since the early 1990s, North Korea has replaced the doctrine of Marxism’Leninism with the late Kim Il-Sung’s juche (self-reliance) as the official state ideology. Yet the country’s impoverished population is heavily dependent on government subsidies in housing and food rations even though the state-run rationing system has deteriorated significantly in recent years.

North Korea devotes a disproportionately large share of GDP to military spending, further exacerbating the country’s already poor economic situation. Normal foreign trade is minimal, with China and South Korea being the most important trading partners. Trade with India is increasing. No courts are independent of political interference, and private property (particularly land) is strictly regulated by the state. Corruption is rampant but hard to distinguish from regular economic activity in a system in which arbitrary government control is the norm.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is one of the world’s most oppressed and closed societies, and its Communist rulers have repressed basic human rights and nationalized all industry since the country’s founding in 1948. In the 1990s, floods and droughts exacerbated systemic shortcomings and led to severe famine and millions of civilian deaths. North Korea’s economy is mainly supported by international aid and trade with its major trading partners, China and South Korea.

Business Freedom
0.0
The overall freedom to start, operate, and close a business is extremely restricted by North Korea’s national regulatory environment. The state regulates the economy heavily through central planning. Economic reforms implemented in 2002 allegedly brought some changes at the enterprise and industrial levels, but entrepreneurial activity is virtually impossible.

Trade Freedom
0.0
The government controls all imports and exports, and formal trade is minimal. North Korean trade statistics are limited and compiled from trading partners’ data. Most trade is de facto aid, mainly from North Korea’s two main trading partners, China and South Korea. Non-tariff barriers are significant. Inter-Korean trade remains constrained by North Korea’s unwillingness to implement needed reform. Given the minimal level of trade, a score of zero was assigned.

Fiscal Freedom
0.0
No data on income or corporate tax rates are available because no effective tax system is in place. The government plans and manages almost every part of the economy. Given the absence of published official macroeconomic data, such figures as are available with respect to North Korea’s government expenditures are suspect and outdated.

Government Size
0.0
The government owns virtually all property and sets production levels for most products, and state-owned industries account for nearly all GDP. The state directs all significant economic activity. Large military spending further drains scarce resources.

Monetary Freedom
0.0
Price and wage reforms introduced in July 2002 consisted of reducing government subsidies and telling producers to charge prices that more closely reflect costs. Without matching supply-side measures to boost output, the result has been rampant inflation for many staple goods. Because of the ongoing crisis in agriculture, the government has banned sales of grain at markets and returned to rationing. A score of zero was assigned.

Investment Freedom
10.0
North Korea generally does not welcome foreign investment. A small number of projects may be approved by top levels of government; however, the scale of these investments is also small. Numerous countries employ sanctions against North Korea, and ongoing political and security concerns make investment extremely hazardous. Internal laws do not allow for international dispute arbitration. One attempt to open the economy to foreigners was North Korea’s first special economic zone, located at the remote Rajin-Sonbong site in the Northeast. Wage rates in the special zone are unrealistically high because the state controls the labor supply and insists on taking a share of wages. More recent special zones at Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong are more enticing. Aside from these few economic zones where investment is approved on a case-by-case basis, foreign investment is prohibited.

Financial Freedom
0.0
North Korea is a command-and-control economy with virtually no functioning financial sector. Access to financing is very limited and constrained by the country’s failed economy. The central bank also serves as a commercial bank and had more than 200 local branches in 2007. The government provides most funding for industries and takes a percentage from enterprises. Foreign aid agencies have set up microcredit schemes to lend to farmers and small businesses. A rumored overhaul of the financial system to permit firms to borrow from banks instead of receiving state-directed capital has not materialized. Because of debts dating back to the 1970s, most foreign banks will not enter North Korea.

Property Rights
5.0
Property rights are not guaranteed. Almost all property, including nearly all real property, belongs to the state, and the judiciary is not independent. The government even controls all chattel property (domestically produced goods as well as all imports and exports).

Freedom From Corruption
5.0
After the mid-1990s economic collapse and subsequent famines, North Korea developed an immense informal market, especially in agricultural goods. Informal trading with China in currency and goods is active. There are many indicators of corruption in the government and security forces. Military and government officials reportedly divert food aid from international donors and demand bribes before distributing it.

Labor Freedom
0.0
As the main source of employment, the state determines wages. Since the 2002 economic reforms, factory managers have had limited autonomy to set wages and offer incentives, but highly restrictive government regulations hinder any employment and productivity growth.

Korea Business Consultants has published their January newsletter.

Here is a link to the PDF.

Topics covered:
New Year Joint Editorial
Year of DPRK-China friendship
UNDP to resume DPRK operations
Buddhist Leader to Head DPRK’s ROK Affairs
DPRK Railroad Engineers Study in Russia
Housing Construction Progresses Apace
Orascom Opens Bank in Pyongyang
DPRK Tackles Clothing Shortage
“DPRK Harvest Best in Years”
China to Invest in NK Coal
US$ 3.75 Million in Australian Aid for DPRK
The Principles of the DPRK’s Foreign Trade
ROK Farmers Send Rice to DPRK
New SNG Kaesong Plant Idle
“Inter-Korean Trade Slides Due to Weak ROK Won”
ROK to Build Nursery in Kaesong Complex
DPRK Opens Consulate in Dandong
DPRK, China Foreign Officials Meet
Seoul Forum Highlights DPRK Films
“NK Martial Arts Team Best in World”
PUST Opening Delayed
DPRK TV Takes Note of Park Ji-sung
The Korean War