Archive for the ‘International trade’ Category

Korea General Corporation for External Construction

Wednesday, March 16th, 2011

UPDATE: Lots of great information in the comments.

ORIGINAL POST: According to Naenara (Link won’t work from South Korea):

The Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO) is a professional enterprise for overseas construction.

GENCO has gained a good reputation from many countries around the world as a credible constructor with a long history of 50 years since its inauguration in January 1961.

It has scores of affiliated building enterprises involving a number of designers, building operators and skilled workers as well as foreign languages and other experts.

GENCO has built lots of dwellings and public establishments in Kuwait, and recently completed the 64-storied Al-Fardan Tower, an ordered project, in a short span of time in Qatar.

GENCO is looking forward to contracts for construction projects such as dwelling houses, public buildings, metros, tunnels, bridges, airports, harbours and stadiums in different countries in diverse forms such as the whole construction work and dispatch of skilled workers.

I had assumed that all overseas constructions projects were under the auspices of the Mansudae Overseas Development Group (MODG), but it appears that there is a rival firm picking up construction contracts.  This would not be surprising since the DPRK often duplicates functions so that the leadership is not reliant on a singe source of information and revenue–plus a little competition between agencies offers the employees an incentive to increase profits which they can remit back to Pyongyang.  It could also be the case that th GENCO and MODG have split the market.  MODG sticks to monuments and GENCO sticks to more traditional construction projects.

Pictured below is a Google Earth image of the Al Fardan Towers in Doha, Qatar (25.320952°, 51.529404°):

I am not sure to what extent GENCO was involved in the project. They claim to have built one of the towers, but I find it hard to believe that they built the whole thing lock, stock, and barrel since it would be impossible to develop the necessary skills in the DPRK. Additionally, there are no comparable buildings in the DPRK.  In all liklihood, GENCO is a company that simply provides construction workers who are low cost and travel from job to job remitting their hard currency earnings back to the DPRK.

Here are some, though not all, previous posts about other construction projects by MODG or GENCO.  Although I have not published it, I have an extensive list of these projects on Google Earth.

If a reader is aware of GENCO’s construction projects in Kuwait, please let me know.

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Kaesong Complex and ROK goods become harder to find in DPRK

Thursday, March 10th, 2011

According to the Daily NK:

This year, the North Korean authorities have been cracking down on the sale and distribution of products, tools and materials coming out of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. As a result, such Korean goods, formerly an expensive but popular choice in Hwanghae and South Pyongan Provinces, are now hard to find in markets.

A source from South Pyongan Province who spoke with The Daily NK in China explained, “Right up until last year, literally anything being made in the Kaesong Complex was available in the market, including clocks, metal, screws, clothes, underwear, toys and parts of electronics. However, the amounts have fallen dramatically since regulations were strengthened.”

The reason behind the regulations is unclear, however; the source suggested it could only be because of deteriorating inter-Korean relations.

Regardless, the source went on, “Nowadays, revealing the fact you sell those Kaesong Complex goods results in high fines and puts you in a bind” Therefore, he went on, “Only bread (Choco Pies), stainless steel or ceramic bowls and underwear are being sold.”

One consequence of the crackdown is that it makes the sale of other South Korean products smuggled in from China equally difficult. Albeit with some provincial differences, clothes and electronics cannot now be displayed on stalls, and must be sold in alley markets in secret.

A source from Shinuiju explained, “Market watch guards go around markets every day inspecting stalls with no notice; their investigation into South Korean products is really severe.” He explained, “If they find goods with Korean writing on, they confiscate them and give them back after two or three days later, after fines have been paid.”

“I hear there was a decree from above reinforcing crackdowns, but won’t this only lead to bribes?” the source pointed out.

Even when readily available, South Korean products are at the top of the price range, so most average families cannot afford them; one Choco Pie, a circular, individually wrapped chocolate cake made famous by the movie “JSA”, is between 180 and 200 won, a set of women’s underwear is 90,000 won, and a set of roughly ten plates, five or six small bowls and some coffee cups is around 250,000 won.

The source reported, “Due to the severe regulations, some traders sell them at home or in secret, hiding the goods behind the curtain.”

Interestingly, one South Korean official with the Kaesong Industrial Complex told the Daily NK that product leakage is not a problem at Kaesong, saying, “There have been almost no cases of complete products leaking out, but it is possible for stock, tools or things provided to workers like Choco Pies. However, the leaks are not enough to affect factory management.

And yet, one defector who used to be a worker in a shoe factory in charge of testing product quality explained that the siphoning off of materials, complete products, tools and other things is common among North Korean workers.

“The way they hide things and bring them out of the factory is really expert. I sometimes put up to 20 pairs of shoes on my body and came out of the factory. If you wear a long, thick winter coat then it is not so remarkable. Sometimes we did it in collusion with the factory manager.”

Read the full story here:
South Korean Products Disappear from Markets
Daily NK
Park Jun Hyeong and Mok Yong Jae
2010-3-10

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ROK firms hurt by inter-Korean trade restrictions

Sunday, March 6th, 2011

According to Yonhap:

Hundreds of South Korean companies doing business with North Korea are teetering on the edge of bankruptcy due to a prolonged cross-border trade ban, the head of the first inter-Korean joint venture said Sunday.

Inter-Korean trade flourished following a summit between the divided countries in 2000, but has been banned by South Korea since last May in response to the sinking of the Cheonan corvette two months prior, which Seoul says a North Korean submarine torpedoed.

According to the South’s unification ministry, about 860 South Korean companies are operating in North Korea.

“South Korean companies, which invested about 200 billion won (US$179 million) in Pyongyang and Nampo, North Korea, are on the brink of bankruptcy because of the suspension of the inter-Korean trade,” Kim Jung-tae, head of Pyongyang Andong Hemp Textiles, said in an interview with Yonhap News Agency.

Pyongyang Andong Hemp Textiles is the first inter-Korean 50-50 joint venture between the South’s Andong Hemp Textiles and the North’s Saebyol General Trading Co., which was established in October 2008.

Kim said the companies posted a combined $150 million in operating loss due to Seoul’s ban on inter-Korean trade.

In June, Kim formed a body consisting of about 200 South Korean businessmen to seek solutions to the prolonged inter-Korean trade suspension. In its opening ceremony, the body called for the government to implement measures to resume inter-Korean trade.

However, the unification ministry holds firm to its position that the trade ban will remain intact until the North takes responsible measures for the sinking of the Cheonan.

Read the full story here:
S. Korean firms reeling from inter-Korean trade ban
Yonhap
3/6/2011

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DPRK-Myanmar shipping

Thursday, March 3rd, 2011

Bertil Linter, who is probably the most prolific author when it comes to illicit DPRK/Myanmar relations, has published an interesting piece in the Asia Times on cargo shipping between the two countries. The whole piece is well worth reading.

The only comment I have on the article is in regards to his economic reasoning for why trade between the two countries makes sense:

All this seems to confirm what diplomatic observers have long suspected: that Myanmar and North Korea, two countries with limited access to bank and other international financial trade facilities, are engaged in barter trade. Myanmar’s ruling generals want more weapons but often don’t have the foreign funds handy to pay for them – or at least they don’t want such transactions to show up in their bank records. North Korea, meanwhile, is starved for food and likewise lacks the finances to pay for imports.

The DPRK does appear to be suffering a shortage of food, but the government does have the funds to pay for food imports–it just prefers to spend those funds in other ways.  Below is a chart of the DPRK’s estimated trade balance from 2000-2008 published by the Congressional Research Service:

As you can see from the bottom line of the table, the DPRK has been running a substantial trade deficit (as a % of its total trade) for nearly the last decade.  This trade deficit must be paid for with hard currency inflows of one kind or another (“aid”, investment, illicit exports). Where these funds are coming from and to whom specifically within the DPRK they are going is a mystery to me, but we do know they are importing (as a group) much more than they are exporting.

Below is the article in the Asia Times:

With the Middle East and North Africa in turmoil, North Korea risks losing some of its oldest and most trusted customers for military hardware. Pyongyang has over the years sold missiles and missile technology to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Syria and Iran, representing an important source of export earnings for the reclusive regime. The growing uncertainty among those trade partners could explain why North Korea is now cementing ties with a client much closer to home: military-run Myanmar.

In April 2007, North Korea and Myanmar resumed diplomatic relations. Those ties were after North Korean agents planted a bomb in the then capital of Yangon in October 1983, killing 18 high-ranking South Korean officials who were on a visit to the country. Only days after the restoration of diplomatic ties, a North Korean freighter, the MV Kang Nam I, docked at Thilawa port, 30 kilometers south of Yangon.

Officials claimed at the time that the ship docked to seek shelter from a storm. However, two local reporters working for a Japanese news agency were turned back and briefly detained when they went to the port to investigate, indicating that there could have been other, more secret reasons for the Kang Nam I’s arrival.

The same ship was put on global radar in June 2009 when it was pursued by the USS John S McCain and then reversed course. It was believed that it was on its way back to Myanmar with more unspecified cargo. Military observers tied the Kang Nam 1 incidents to the arrival of another North Korean ship, MV Bong Hoafan, at a Myanmar port in November 2006 before the resumption of diplomatic relations. Curiously, it was also reported to have been “forced” to seek shelter at a Myanmar port because of “adverse weather conditions”.

An Asia Times Online investigation has found that those were not isolated incidents. Shipping records from Myanmar show that North Korean ships have been docking regularly at Thilawa and Yangon ports for almost a decade. Even the ill-fated Kang Nam 1 had docked in Myanmar long before the 2007 and 2009 incidents. The ship made its first voyage to Myanmar in February 2002, carrying what was declared as “general cargo,” according to the shipping records.

North Korean shipments are almost invariably specified as “general goods” and sometimes “concrete”, but both in and outgoing cargo is usually handled by Myanmar’s Ministry of Heavy Industry 2, which supervises the country’s defense industries, the armed forces’ Directorate of Procurement, and the military’s own holding company, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH).

When the MV Bochon, another North Korean ship, arrived at Thilawa in October 2002, the Myanmar military’s high command sent a document marked “top secret” to the port authorities, requesting them to clear the entire docking area for “security reasons”. They were also advised, according to the shipping records, that some “important cargo” would be offloaded within 36 hours.

When the MV Chong Gen approached Thilawa on April 12, 2010, it asked for permission to fly a Myanmar flag instead of its North Korean one, according to the shipping records. The captain also requested a Myanmar SMC card (smart media card) for a mobile phone, along with coastal charts. These were odd requests for a ship that was officially carrying 2,900 tons of cement and 2,105 tons of “general goods” from the North Korean port of Nampo.

Bizzare barter
Indeed, the requests made by North Korean ships traveling to Myanmar have often been outright bizarre. MV Du Man Gang appears to be one of the most regular North Korean visitors at Thilawa. On one of its many trips to Myanmar, in July 2009 it asked for 150 crates of Myanmar brandy. In March 2010, when another North Korean ship, the MV Kan Baek San, arrived in Myanmar, the North Korean ambassador asked for an unspecified quantity of Myanmar vodka to be sent to the ship, according to the shipping records.

The involvement of North Korean diplomats in these shipments is otherwise more convoluted. In September 2009, the MV Sam Il Po docked at a smaller terminal in Yangon and both the North Korean ambassador Kim Sok Chol and defense attach้ Kim Kwang Chol were present to inspect the cargo along with Lt Col Thein Toe from the Myanmar military. The unspecified cargo was received by UMEH, which in return supplied 1,500 tons of rice which was taken back to North Korea.

That was not the only incident when North Korean freighters returned with Myanmar rice. The MV So Hung arrived in November 2008 with 295 tons of material for the Ministry of Defense and left with 500 tons of rice. When the MV Du Man Gang docked in July 2009 it left with not only brandy but also 8,000 tons of rice. In June 2010, the MV An San arrived with 7,022 tons of what was alleged to be “concrete” and left in July with 7,000 tons of rice.

All this seems to confirm what diplomatic observers have long suspected: that Myanmar and North Korea, two countries with limited access to bank and other international financial trade facilities, are engaged in barter trade. Myanmar’s ruling generals want more weapons but often don’t have the foreign funds handy to pay for them – or at least they don’t want such transactions to show up in their bank records. North Korea, meanwhile, is starved for food and likewise lacks the finances to pay for imports.

When money is involved in North Korea-Myanmar trade, transactions are always done in cash and thus untraceable. Like all other ships, North Korean ones have to pay port fees in Myanmar. The MV Du Man Gang, for instance, asked to pay US$30,994 in cash rather than make a bank transfer. Other ships have made similar requests which has led to speculation about the kind of currency the North Koreans, notorious for counterfeiting US dollars, may be using.

Large quantities of counterfeit US notes have recently shown up in areas around Myanmar. In July and August 2009, a customer tried to change U$10,000 in fake notes at the State Bank of India’s main office in Imphal, Manipur. The fake bills were all of the US$100 denomination and of excellent quality, according to sources. It was the first such incident in Manipur. Although it is not clear whether the bogus notes were printed in North Korea, Imphal is located just over 100 kilometers from Moreh, an Indian town opposite Myanmar’s Tamu where a virtually unregulated border trade is booming.

Trade between North Korea and Myanmar is also apparently being done through front companies. In June 2010, the North Korean freighter MV Ryu Gong arrived with 12,838 tons of what was also described as “cement”. While the shipment was handled by the Ministry of Heavy Industry 2, the stated recipient was a little-known company known as Shwe Me, or “black gold” in Myanmar.

Port documents show that the company has nearly a million US dollars in assets but what it actually intended to do with all that cement is unclear. Just as puzzling is the involvement of Singapore-based shipping companies, which handle most of the cargo’s logistics and operate under innocuous sounding names including words like “maritime” and “services”. One of the companies has a distinct Korean name but is actually based in Singapore.

Port records point to a brisk trade between North Korea and Myanmar, all of which is handled by Myanmar’s military rather than civilian-owned private companies. In August last year, then prime minister and now president Thein Sein visited Pyongyang. According to the official Korea Central News Agency, he said that “the government of Myanmar will continue to strive for strengthening and development of the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries.”

With those intentions publicly well-stated, Myanmar may well be on its way in overtaking Egypt, Libya and other traditional military trading partners in the Middle East and North Africa as North Korea’s main market for its military hardware.

Read the full story here:
Fog lifts on Myanmar-North Korea barter
Asia Times
Bertil Linter
3/4/2011

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Increase in DPRK’s mineral resources exports to China expected again for this year

Monday, February 28th, 2011

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
2/24/2011

The trade volume between North Korea and China has steadily increased, reaching its record high of USD 3.4 billion in 2010. Total exports amounted to 1.19 billion USD while imports doubled that figure to USD 2.22 billion. Imports have continued to grow, increasing by 2.4 times over the previous year.

Since the Cheonan incident and the implementation of May 24 sanctions, inter-Korean economic cooperation has come to a halt, naturally resulting in rise in exports to China. In particular, a significant growth in anthracites exports was observed. The monthly anthracites exports that averaged around USD 10 million surpassed USD 70 million mark last August and maintained USD 50 million monthly average between September to November. In addition, cost-per-ton of anthracite in March which was USD 52.2, jumped to USD 82.8 in November, a climb of 60 percent. This boost is attributed to its increased export.

The current supply of electric power consists mostly of hydroelectric power — reaching over 60 percent– but during the winter season most of the hydropower plants are unoperational due to frozen facilities from harsh winter weather. Anthracites were the alternative resource to fill this gap. Sacrificing power production and exporting great amount of anthracites despite severe winter is a strong indication of the poor foreign currency situation in North Korea.

In its New Year’s joint editorial, North Korea placed heavy emphasis on its anthracite export that took up 60 percent of its total exports. In the statement, four vanguard sectors of coal, electricity, metals, and railroads were highlighted as important industries as “rich underground resources that will help with securing funds and resolving raw material problems.” This is the first time in 13 years – that is, since the Arduous March — for coal to be mentioned first in the New Year’s message.

North Korea also began to lift export restraints of mineral resources like coal and silver from the latter half of last year and ordered to increase imports of rice and corns in place of minerals.

The reason food procurement is placed first at the expense of its mineral resources is believed to be associated with the implementation of the succession involving Kim Jong Un, and to keep North Korean people’s dissatisfaction under control and manage the domestic situation.

North had placed restraints on coal, gold, silver, lead, and zinc exports from 2007 through adopting export control of mineral resources.

In addition, North Korea and China will meet in Beijing to sign an agreement on joint development of underground resources. This agreement will include Musan Mine and rare-earth mines that POSCO (The Pohang Iron and Steel Company of South Korea) has shown interest in in the past for development. China’s moves in this sector are suspected as China’s attempt to monopolize the DPRK’s underground resources.

The DPRK’s Joint Venture and Investment Guidance Bureau and China’s Ministry of Commerce were expected to meet on February 15 to discuss agreements related to underground resources development. On the agenda was Musan Mine, abundant in gold and anthracite, and other mines rich in rare-earth elements. Other mines are also known to be specified in the agreement.

China is expected to bring private companies into the underground resources development project after reaching an agreement with the DPRK. According to our source, “both parties will establish a joint venture investment corporation in Hong Kong after signing the agreement.”

Construction of a highway connecting Heilong City of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture to Nampyong and Chongjin of North Korea and railway system linking the cities of Heilong, Nampyong, and Musan are currently underway, expected to be in operation by end of this year. Jilin Province and Ministry of Railways of China began construction of this railway system from October 2010 investing CNY 1.19 billion, which runs a distance of 41.68 km. However, it is expected to extend further onto Chongjin and is considered to become the major transportation hub, integrating economic cooperation between the two countries.

Musan Iron Mine is known as the largest outdoor iron mine in Asia and Tonghua Iron and Steel Group along with three other Chinese corporations acquired 50-year development rights of Musan Iron Mine. They are bringing in about 120 tons of iron ore each year and more is expected to be brought in once the Heilong-Musan rail link is completed.

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Office 38 reportedly back in business–and other changes

Sunday, February 20th, 2011

UPDATE 4 (2/20/2011): Kim Tong-un (김동은) named Kim Jong-il’s fund manager.  According to Yonhap:

A senior official of North Korea’s ruling party has been named to lead a special party bureau, code-named Office 38, that oversees coffers and raises slush funds for its leader Kim Jong-il and the ruling elites, a source on North Korea said Sunday.

Kim Tong-un, formerly head of Office 39 in the Workers’ Party of Korea, assumed the post in May last year, when North Korea revived Office 38, which was merged with Office 39 in 2009, the source said on condition of anonymity. Office 39 is believed to be another organ that governs a wide network of business operations both legal and illegal.

Both Offices 38 and 39 belong to the Secretariat of the Workers’ Party, which Kim Jong-il chairs, according to a diagram of the North’s power structure released by the Unification Ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs. Last year, the ministry had only included Office 39 in a similar diagram.

In a meeting with reporters last week, a ministry official said Office 38 has been spun off from Office 39 and is now running on its own again. The official, who would speak only on the condition of anonymity citing the sensitive nature of his comments, described “a stream of information” that has come through since mid-2010.

Office 38 mainly oversees transactions involving foreign currency, hotels and trade, the official said, while Office 39, headed by Jon Il-chun, drives revenue by dealing in narcotics, arms, natural resources and others.

The North’s revival of Office 38 is interpreted as an effort to cover the increasing cost of leader Kim Jong-il’s ceding of power to his youngest son, Jong-un.

The story was also reported in Yonhap.

UPDATE 3: Here are links to the Ministry of Unification‘s English language organization charts of the North Korean leadership in which some of the changes mentioned below are listed (though not all): Workers’ Party, State Organs, Parties and Organizations

UPDATE (2/15/2011): According to the Daily NK:

The number of Special Departments under the Secretariat of the Chosun Workers’ Party has been increased from 18 to 20, a move that includes the revival of the No. 38 Department, which previously served as Kim Jong Il’s private bank vault, and the foundation of a film department.

The Ministry of Unification revealed the news yesterday in its 2011 North Korean Power Structure and Index of Figures, Agencies and Organizations. It incorporates North Korean changes from December, 2009 up to the present day, completed after consultation with relevant agencies and experts.

The revival of the No. 38 Department and founding of a film department

The report states, “The No. 38 Department, which was merged with the No. 39 Department in 2009, was spun off again last year. Kang Neung Su, who was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in June of 2010, was introduced as head of the film department at the same time. The exact foundation date of the film department is unknown; however, it appears to be newly established.”

No. 38 and No. 39 Departments are directly controlled by Kim Jong Il and serve as a private vault for his ruling funds. The No. 38 Department manages hotels, foreign currency stores and restaurants etc, while illegal weapons trading through foreign trade companies, the smuggling of gold, illegal trade in drugs and the distribution of counterfeit dollars, so-called supernotes, are handled by the No. 39 Department.

“They combined two offices which had different functions, and it appears that this did not result in the intended efficiency,” a knowledgeable source commented.

Meanwhile, on the establishment of a film department, the source added, “North Korea’s cultural art is a political means by which to carry out Party policy and a policy tool to implant policy in the North Korean citizens.”

Among the reshuffled special departments, the existing ‘Munitions Industry Department’ has been renamed the ‘Machine Industry Department’, and the ‘Administration and Capital Construction Department’ has been scaled back to simply ‘Administration Department’.

Elsewhere, the existing National Resources Development and Guidance Department under the Ministry of Extractive Industries has been promoted to National Resources Development Council and, as reported, the Joint Investment Guidance Department rose to become the Joint Investment Committee, while the National Price Establishment Department became the National Price Establishment Committee. Again, as reported, the ‘People’s Safety Agency’ under the Cabinet became the People’s Safety Ministry under the National Defense Commission, while the Capital Construction Department was downsized to become the General Bureau of Capital Construction.

The Central Court and Central Prosecutors Office were also renamed the Supreme Court and Supreme Prosecutors Office respectively.

The Ministry of Unification report also notes that North Korea added Nampo City to its list of eleven cities and provinces, increasing the total number to twelve.

The newly designated Nampo City includes five former parts of South Pyongan Province; Gangseo, Daean, Oncheon, Yonggang, and Chollima districts. Previously, Nampo was under the direct control of the central government as part of South Pyongan Province proper.

At the same time, North Korea also transferred the existing Kangnam-gun, Joonghwa-gun, Sangwon-gun, and Seungho-district, all formerly southern sections of Pyongyang City, to North Hwanghae Province.

Military Commission placed under the Central Committee of the Party

The relationship of the Central Committee and Central Military Commission, which was formerly said to be in parallel, has been changed, reflecting the idea that the Military Commission is now under the Central Committee of the Party.

The Ministry of Unification commented, “By revising the Party regulations, the Central Military Commission and Central Committee were marked as parallel in 2009 and 2010. However, after confirming the revised Party regulations at the Chosun Workers’ Party Delegates’ Conference on September 28th last year, this relationship was adjusted, and an election is now held for the Central Military Commission via a plenary session of the Central Committee.”

Also, the ‘Bureau of General Staff’ under the National Defense Commission was judged to be below the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, but is now shown to be in a parallel relationship with the Ministry of the People’s Armed Force and ‘General Political Department’.

ORIGINAL POST (2/14/2011): According to Yonhap:

North Korea has revived a special party bureau, codenamed Office 38, that oversees coffers and raises slush funds for its leader Kim Jong-il and the ruling elites, South Korea said Monday in its annual assessment of the power structure in the communist country.

In 2009, the bureau had been merged with Office 39, another organ that governs a wide network of business operations both legal and illegal, according to the Unification Ministry in Seoul.

In a meeting with reporters, however, a ministry official said Office 38 has been spun off from Office 39 and is now running on its own again. The official, who would speak only on the condition of anonymity citing the intelligence nature of his comments, cited “a stream of information” that has come through since mid-2010.

The official would not elaborate on how the information has been obtained, only saying the ministry works closely with “related government bodies” to outline the North’s power structure.

Office 38, whose chief remains unknown, mainly oversees transactions involving foreign currency, hotels and trade, the official said, while Office 39, headed by Jon Il-chun, drives revenue by dealing in narcotics, arms, natural resources and others.

A source privy to North Korea matters said the spin-off suggests that North Korea has been experiencing difficulties in earning foreign currency since merging the two offices.

“Efficiency was probably compromised after the two, which have different functions, were combined,” the source said, declining to be identified citing the speculative nature of the topic. “More importantly, it seems related to the current state of foreign currency stocks. The North is apparently trying to address those difficulties.”

In August last year, the United States blacklisted Office 39 as one of several North Korean entities to newly come under sanctions for involvement in illegal deeds such as currency counterfeiting.

North Korea is also believed to have been hit hard financially after South Korea imposed a series of economic penalties last year on Pyongyang when the sinking of a warship was blamed on it.

Both Offices 38 and 39 belong to the Secretariat of the Workers’ Party, which Kim Jong-il chairs, according to a diagram of the North’s power structure released by the Unification Ministry. Last year, the ministry had only included Office 39 in a similar diagram.

Both offices have often been referred to as Kim Jong-il’s “personal safes” for their role in raising and managing secret funds and procuring luxury goods for the aging leader.

Read the full story here:
North Korea Splits No. 38 and 39 Departments Up Again
Daily NK
Kim So Yeol
2/15/2011

N. Korea revives ‘Office 38’ managing Kim Jong-il’s funds: ministry
Yonhap
Sam Kim
2/14/2011

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Chinese publish DPRK trade data

Thursday, February 17th, 2011

According to Bloomberg:

North Korea’s exports to China jumped 51 percent to $1.2 billion last year, led by iron ore, coal and copper, Chinese government data show. China’s sales to its ally rose 21 percent to $2.3 billion from a year earlier, with supplies of wheat and oil helping ease chronic shortages of fuel and food. Two-way trade fell 4 percent in 2009, when the United Nations tightened sanctions after Kim’s regime carried out a second nuclear test.

The revival in commerce contrasts with U.S. efforts to isolate North Korea after a year in which 50 South Koreans died in attacks that roiled markets. Kim needs China to meet a pledge to put “rice with meat soup” on every table and build a “thriving nation” by 2012, the centennial of his father and the nation’s founder, Kim Il Sung.

“Even if North Korea’s front door is firmly locked, there is every reason to think the regime can gain what it needs to survive with impunity as long as the back door is open to China,” said Scott Snyder, an adjunct senior fellow for Korea studies at the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations. China’s trade risks making sanctions “ineffective,” he said.

China sold $325.8 million of crude oil to North Korea last year, up 37 percent from 2009. China’s coal imports jumped 54 percent to $394.4 million, while iron ore purchases doubled to $195 million, according to China’s customs department.

Two-way trade of $3.5 billion was still dwarfed by China’s $207.2 billion commerce with South Korea.

London’s Telegraph added this little nugget to the story:

However analysts added that the North’s two-way trade of $3.5 billion – dwarfed by China’s $207.2 billion commerce with South Korea – would still give the regime little more than life support.

Read the full stories here:
North Korea Exports to China Show Birthday-Boy Kim’s `Back Door’ Reprieve
Bloomberg
Bomi Kim
2/16/2011

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US exports $3.1m to DPRK in 2010

Sunday, February 13th, 2011

According to Voice of America:

US news broadcaster Voice of America has reported that the American government allowed 3.1 million US dollars worth of goods to be exported to North Korea last year.

Out of the 18 export cases 15 of them were humanitarian goods such as food and medical items, while the other three were portable generators.

Currently there are various export restrictions placed on North Korea by the US due to the North’s nuclear programs and its human rights abuses.

But the American government allows certain exports for humanitarian purposes such as blankets, shoes and medicine on a case-by-case basis.

Read the full story here:
US Allowed $3.1 Million Worth of Exports to N. Korea : VOA
Arirang News
2/12/2011

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Chinese investment and trade with the DPRK

Sunday, February 13th, 2011

Writing at his new blog, Marcus Noland argues that KOTRA overstates the percentage of the DPRK’s trade coming from China.

According to Noland, there are several problems with KOTRA data that makes it less than ideal for drawing policy conclusions.  KOTRA counts DPRK-ROK trade as a domestic exchange, not international trade.  Once corrections are made for South Korean trade and a few other tweaks, China’s share of North Korean trade falls from appx 80% to 30%.

In a different but related story, Yonhap reports on research findings by Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at the Nixon Center.  According to the report:

China’s investment in North Korea was less than US$100 million between 2003 and 2009, indicating Beijing’s investment projects in the reclusive country are still relatively small, a U.S. scholar said Thursday.

Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at the Washington-based Nixon Center, said Chinese investment in North Korea totaled $98.3 million over the seven-year period, compared to $1.2 billion in South Korea during the same period.

It was also less than China’s investments in other neighboring states, including $273 million in Thailand, $473 million in Vietnam, $729.8 million in Myanmar and $890.7 million in Mongolia over the same period.

The majority of Chinese investors in North Korea are small and medium enterprises, though some smaller firms enjoy brand recognition, such as Nanjing Panda Electronics Co., China Minmetals Corp. and Wanxiang Group, the scholar said.

The majority of Chinese investors in North Korea are not state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the Chinese central government, but privately owned companies and provincial-, prefecture- and municipal-owned SOEs.

Of the 138 Chinese-North Korean joint ventures established between 1997 and August 2010, 41 percent engage in mining, 38 percent in light industry, 13 percent in services and 8 percent in heavy industry, he said.

Thompson said Chinese investors in North Korea are geographically concentrated in the two northeastern provinces bordering North Korea.

Twenty-eight percent of Chinese companies involved in joint ventures are from Jilin, with 34 percent from Liaoning. The rest are from other regions, including Beijing, Shandong and Shanghai.

Jilin and Liaoning share a 1,400 kilometer border with North Korea and are increasingly focused on foreign trade and on achieving competitive economic advantages through their proximity to North Korea.

“(North Korea’s) joint ventures with China are an important aspect of the bilateral relationship, because in addition to propping up the regime in Pyongyang, they contribute to economic development in China’s northeastern ‘rust belt,'” the scholar said in an emailed note.

China’s northeastern region is seen as the country’s rust belt, covered with obsolete and unprofitable factories.

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Pyongyang’s overseas business agents

Sunday, February 13th, 2011

According to the Asahi Shimbun:

Although they feel responsible for the future of their country, they generally work alone in a foreign land. Their family members are kept “hostage,” and they must resort to secretive tactics to bypass international sanctions to feed their leaders’ voracious appetite for Japanese products.

Yet being a trade agent is a favored occupation among North Koreans.

The job allows individuals to live a fairly free life outside of North Korea and can lead to the accumulation of wealth. That is, if everything goes well.

“In the past, the symbol of the wealthy were those Korean nationals who returned from Japan,” a trade agent said. “However, with the suspension of travel by the Man Gyong Bong-92 (cargo-passenger ship that sailed between Japan and North Korea), it has now become the time for trade agents.”

North Korean trade agents in China are under the strict control of Pyongyang.

To be chosen as a trade agent, individuals must have the right background, including not having any family link to the old capitalist class or relatives who are considered anti-state.

They must have also worked for a government institution or major state-run company.

Prospective agents are scouted by trading companies and are only approved by the government after a rigorous background check by state security, Foreign Ministry and other authorities.

Many seeking to become trade agents use their personal connections or even bribes, according to sources.

Trade agents allowed to work in China must leave behind at least one family member in North Korea to deter the agents from defecting.

One trade agent from Pyongyang established a base in a condominium in the central part of a Chinese city. At the start of every day, the agent bows to portraits on the walls of Kim Il Sung, the founder of North Korea, and his son, Kim Jong Il, to pray for successful business.

“We have the burden of the nation on our shoulders. We have to use any means possible to turn a profit,” the agent said.

About 300 North Korean trading companies have been confirmed. They are all affiliated with North Korean government agencies or the military.

Sources said Pyongyang has dispatched nearly 1,000 trade agents to Beijing and 600 or so to Shanghai. Major regional cities are also home to between 100 and 200 North Korean trade agents.

Every night, the trade agents must contact supervisors dispatched by the North Korean government to offices in various cities in China. The agents report on their business activities as well as on their personal movements. Those reports are then transmitted to the headquarters of the trading company that dispatched the agents and to related government agencies.

Every Saturday, the agents must gather at the regional offices for study sessions on the instructions and policies of the Workers’ Party of Korea.

Depending on the experience of each agent and the size of the operation, between $5,000 (412,000 yen) and $60,000 from profits are transferred to North Korea. The trade agent has to use whatever is left over for future business and daily life.

Many agents barely eke out a living, and those who cannot fulfill the government-set quotas are recalled.

The trade agents sell North Korean mining resources, such as coal and iron ore, lumber and seafood. They buy foodstuffs, pharmaceutical drugs, daily necessities and equipment from China.

According to Chinese government statistics, North Korea’s total trade with China in 2009 reached about $2.68 billion, an increase of 5.5 times over 2000. As North Korea becomes more isolated, its trade dependence on China has soared to 73 percent.

The more elite trade agents are dispatched by state-run trading companies to major Chinese cities, such as Beijing, on long-term commercial visas.

Although they are company employees, the North Koreans are unlike the agents working for Japanese trading companies, who may have a large support staff.

The elite North Korean agents often work alone and handle large projects with huge piles of money handed to them by Pyongyang.

After North Korea conducted its first nuclear test, Japan banned exports of luxury items, such as expensive foods, cars and precious metals, from November 2006. After Pyongyang’s second nuclear test in 2009, Japan banned all exports to North Korea.

Despite the sanctions, high-quality Japanese products remain very popular in North Korea. That means the elite trade agents must find ways around the strict sanctions to buy Japanese products and secretly transport them to North Korea.

Generally, the agents make it look like the Japanese products have been purchased by a Chinese entity.

According to sources, the agents often have Japanese products transported to a bonded district in a Chinese port where duties do not have to be paid. Those products are then loaded onto another ship bound for North Korea.

Another method is to have Japanese products pass Chinese customs and traded among a number of Chinese companies before being purchased for shipment to North Korea.

“Japanese companies have become much more cautious because of the total export ban, so it has become harder to obtain Japanese products. Still, there are ways to purchase such products,” said a Chinese worker who trades with North Korea.

Sources said North Korean demand is particularly strong for Japanese-made pharmaceutical drugs, medical equipment, cars and cosmetics.

“Although Chinese products are cheap and readily available, their reputation is not good because the quality is bad,” a Chinese source said. “There is strong demand among the affluent for Japanese-made drugs and foods.”

The North Korean leadership understands the importance of the traders and their roles.

Sources said that when Kim Jong Il visited China last year, he heard about complaints from Chinese companies that they were not receiving payments from North Korean trade agents.

After returning to North Korea, Kim Jong Il is said to have ordered trade officials to settle the unpaid accounts to restore trust in North Korea.

The sources said sudden payments of such unsettled accounts became more frequent from late last year.

Read the full story here:
Trade agents do the dirty work for Pyongyang
Asahi Shimbun
Daisuke Nishimura
2/10/2011

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