Archive for the ‘Fiscal & monetary policy’ Category

Some food, inflation, and trade data

Tuesday, October 2nd, 2012

These are all interesting data points. Do you think they offer reasonable journalistic evidence that the DPRK is practicing inflationary public finance?

First, Yonhap reports on DPRK food imports from China (2012-9-29):

North Korea’s grain imports from China slipped 16.3 percent on year in the first eight months of this year, in an apparent sign that the North may diversify its supply channels of grain, a Seoul researcher said Saturday.

North Korea imported 181,264 tons of rice, flour, corn and other grains from China in the eight-month period, compared with 216,535 tons for the same period last year, said Kwon Tae-jin of the state-run Korea Rural Economic Institute.

The decline in grain imports from China may be attributed to a rise in food aid from China and purchases from non-China markets such as Europe and South America, Kwon said.

“Including imports from non-China markets, North Korea’s total grain imports appeared to rise this year,” Kwon said in a report posted on his Web site, adding Pyongyang may “diversify its import channels.”

At the same time the Daily NK reports that food prices continue to rise (2012-10-2):

Internal sources informed Daily NK over the holiday that on September 29th the price of rice was 6,700 won/kg in Pyongyang, 7,000 won/kg in Onsung, North Hamkyung Province and 6,500 won/kg further west in Hyesan, Yangkang Province.

Not only do these prices far exceed those of Chuseok 2011, they even far exceed those of earlier this year.

The Hyesan source explained that on the day before the Chuseok holiday (Saturday) the atmosphere in the market was thus rather uncomfortable. “It was very slack,” she said. “People couldn’t buy anything easily, so most just seemed to be looking.”

Secondly, Yonhap reports that despite situations like those experienced by Xiyang or in Musan, mineral exports to China are up (2012-10-2):

North Korea’s exports of mineral resources recorded a 33-fold jump over the past decade with China remaining the biggest importer of the North’s iron ore and coal, a report showed Tuesday.

North Korea’s mineral exports stood at a meager US$50 million in 2001, accounting for 7.8 percent of its total exports, according to the report by Seoul’s Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency.

The mineral exports soared to $243 million in 2005 and $1.65 billion in 2011, accounting for 59.4 percent of the North’s total exports last year, the report said.

South Korea has estimated the total values of mineral deposits in North Korea at some $6.3 trillion.

Last year, North Korea exported $1.17 billion worth of anthracite coal and $405 million worth of iron ore, with China importing almost 100 percent of anthracite coal and iron ore, it said.

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North Korea’s legacy of hyperinflation

Sunday, September 30th, 2012

Steve Hanke (Johns Hopkins University) posted some information on the Cato Institute blog about the DPRKs legacy of hyperinflation:

North Korea’s communist economic legacy—in addition to starvation—is hyperinflation. North Korea is one of only 40 countries in the world that have experienced hyperinflation. In our recent Cato Working Paper, Nicholas Krus and I concluded that a North Korean episode of hyperinflation occurred from December 2009 to mid-January 2011, with an estimated peak monthly inflation rate of 496 percent, in March 2010. At this rate, prices were doubling every 14.1 days. Alas, the horrors of hyperinflation will linger, generation after generation. What a legacy.

The blog post links to Hanke’s working paper, “World Hyperinflations”. A PDF table can be seen here.

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Promotion of Foreign Investments into Hwanggumpyong and Other Special Economic Zones

Friday, September 14th, 2012

Institute for Far Eastern Studies

North Korea is exerting efforts in pulling Chinese investments into its special economic zones (SEZs).

On September 7, the 8th Jilin, China-Northeast Asia Investment and Trade Expo was held in Changchun, China as well as the 6th high-level forum for Northeast Asian economic and trade joint venture to promote the joint investment projects of Rason and Hwanggumpyong special economic zones.

At the event, North Korean officials focused on explaining the advantages and favorable conditions for foreign investors, including the joint management committee to be operated by both countries and laws and regulations installed for investment protection.

In the past, North Korea mainly focused on Rason SEZ but this time around, the spotlight was turned to Hwanggumpyong. Chinese officials went on to explain the details of 14.4 square-kilometer Hwanggumpyong SEZ, where five major industries – textiles, modern agriculture, electronics and communications, culture and industrial and trade services – with industry, culture, and service serving as the three major functions of Hwanggumpyong.

Furthermore, the tariff, tax and other benefits will be provided to various industries. The processing trade industry will be exempt from tariffs, and those companies operating for more than ten years will be granted tax exemptions, while those companies contributing to the infrastructure construction, tourism and hotels will be given priority and other favorable conditions. Last year, North Korea only centered its attention to Rason SEZ, with no mentioning of Hwanggumpyong.

Out of the thirty companies that participated at the North Korean exhibit, were from Rason SEZ. These companies represent the successful cases of Rason, recognized for abundant seafood, processed foods, and textile production.

One company from Rason stated, “repair and expansion project for the road connecting Hunchun with Rason will be completed by the end of this year, which will stabilize power supply that can attract more foreign investment from China.” According to a North Korean businessperson, there are 216 companies currently operating in Rason and over 80 percent are joint venture through foreign capital.

Since January 2010, the city of Rason received the designation as the metropolitan city and has improved the business conditions. Foreign companies inviting their business partners from home to Rason became easier, where visas were processed efficiently, as quickly as a day.

There are plans of more briefing sessions for North Korean SEZs to be held in Beijing, later this month. It is planned to be held from September 26 to 27 with over 30 state managed companies and over 100 representatives participating to explain 50 new investment projects.

The invitation of this event reiterated, the purpose of this briefing session was to attract Chinese investment for North Korean companies, for the contribution of economic development and improvement of people’s lives in North Korea.”

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DPRK affected by rising rice prices, currency depreciation

Friday, August 10th, 2012

Pictured above (Daily NK): The 2012 Won / US$1 exchange rate up to 2012-7-13.

According to data provided by the Daily NK, the won/dollar exchange rate fell (the won appreciated relative to the dollar) nearly 28.4% from 5,100W/US$1 in December 2011 (a high following Kim Jong-il’s death) to approximately 3,650W/US$1 in February 2012. Since February, however, the won has showed a steady depreciation and the exchange rate has risen 48%  to 5,400W/US$1 as of July 13.

So as I sit here eating breakfast I am wondering what caused these swings in the exchange rate?

Firstly, what was behind the dramatic fall in the exchange rate (and food prices) in January and Febraury? A simple answer may be a decrease in uncertainty and risk.  Following Kim Jong-il’s death, the DPRK did not repeat the mistakes made after the passing of Kim Il-sung.  For the most part markets remained open and “regular” activities of the state were highlighted in the domestic media and reported to contacts overseas. It is also possible that Chinese intervention, particularly in the form of food assistance and trade facilitation, could have played a role.

Secondly, does this mean that the increase in the exchange rate and food prices is a result of growing uncertainty? I am not convinced. It is beyond the scope of a blog post to tease this kind of information out, but here are some other things to think about: Economic uncertainty (pending policy changes, inflationary public finance), balance of trade (fall in net exports/rise in net imports, aid), capital flows (investment, aid, remittances), weather (drought/floods), “lean times” leading up to the fall harvest.

Some of these things matter more than others but it is important to keep in mind that the North Korean won is worth about as much today as it was when Kim Jong-il died. Since the won/US$ exchange rate is highly correlated with the price of rice (a fact that can be visually confirmed on the Daily NK web page) this means that food prices are also pretty high at the moment.

UPDATE 1 (2012-8-16): The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) has also posted a few words on this topic:

Rice Prices and Exchange Rate on the Rise
2012-8-16

Since Kim Jong Un’s ascent to power, the rice prices and exchange rates are on the rise. Despite Kim Jong Un’s proclaimed priority in elevating the quality of life for the North Korean people, uncertainty are prevalent in the country as Kim Jong Un has yet to meet the expectations of the people for economic revitalization or reform.

Compared to last year, the prices of rice last September that ranged 2,400 to 2,500 KPW per 1 kg, has jumped to 4,500 KPW in December right after the death of Kim Jong Il and exchange rates that averaged 2,800 to 3,000 KPW against one USD soared to 5,000 KPW. Although the prices have stabilized since then, the prices are climbing once again, as the price of rice in February at 3,100 KPW has gone up to 3,600 KPW/kg and exchange rate of 3,700 KPW per dollar jumped to 4,800 KPW in June.

In some places, the price of rice is reported to be above the 5,000 KPW range. According to Daily NK, an internet news outlet, the prices of rice in major cities like Pyongyang, Haesan, and Sinuiju has steadily increased for the last four months.

The price of rice in Pyongyang was 2,600 KPW/kg in April but it has slowly climbed to 3,000 KPW in June 5 to 4,900 KPW in end of June and is 5,300 KPW as of July 13. In Sinuiju and Haesan, the rice prices in April were around 2,600 to 2,700 KPW but soared to 4,300 to 5,000 KPW in July 13.

Exchange rates are also unstable as exchange rate to one US dollar that averaged 3,700 KPW in March soared to 4,200 KPW in April 25, 4,400 KPW in July 14 to 5,400 KPW by July 13.

Seasonal factors are also adding to the price fluctuations. May to August is normally a difficult time for North Korea with frequent famine. Combined with extreme drought conditions in June, accelerating inflation, and people’s rising apprehension about the economy, some rice wholesalers are not withholding the sales of rice.

The rising rice prices and exchange rate is expected to continue for the time being. Flood damages and other natural disasters and the trauma from the failure of last currency revaluation in November 2009 are factors adding to the price escalation.

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Civil Cooperative Bank deposit and saving information

Monday, August 6th, 2012

Previously, I posted information on the Jaeil Credit Bank in the DPRK. Today, with the help of a much-appreciated reader, I offer some hard-currency deposit and saving information from the Pyongyang Civil Cooperative Bank (민사협조은행). The interest rates and time-to-maturity intervals are identical to the Jaeil Credit Bank, however, the marketing material for the Civil Cooperative Bank does a better job of explaining the how interest payments are calculated.

Pictured above is a marketing flyer for the bank taken in Pyongyang. Below is a translation of the flyer:

외화저금안내
Currency savings guide

보통저금 [Usual saving] 1%
정기저금(6개월) [Regular Saving (6 month)] 2.5%
정기저금(1년) [Regular Saving (1 year)] 6%
정기저금(2년) [Regular Saving (2 year)] 7%
정기저금(3년) [Regular Saving (3 year)] 7.5%
정기저금(5년) [Regular Saving (5 year)] 8%
정기저금(10년) [Regular Saving (10 year)] 9%

Civil Cooperative bank provides to its customers the best credit and financial services. It is our general policy to treat your account information as confidential and it will not be shared with the third parties.

Now a regular savings saver can withdraw their interest prior to maturity and the entire principal amount can also be withdrawn before the due date (maturity).

How to Calculate Savings interest
1. Interest of usual savings and regular savings will be calculated until the day before and if withdraw prior to maturity regular savings will also be considered as usual savings.

2. One year is 360 days and one month is calculated as 30 days.

3. If the maturity date of the regular savings passes the entire amount including the interests will be extended under the same condition.

4. If the bank changes the interest rate, the original interest rate will be applied until the date of the change and the new rate will be applied for the principal and extended.

Interest calculation and payment (if withdraw prior to maturity)
1. In case of 6 months savings 0.5% , in case of 2 years savings; until 6 months 0.5%, after that 1%, in case of a 3 years savings; until 6 months 0.5%, till 2 years 1% and in case of 5 years savings; until 6 months 0.5%, till 2 years 1%, till 3 years 1.3% and the rest 1.5%, if 10 years savings; until 6 months 0.5%, till 2 years 1%, 3 years 1.3% , 5 years 1.7% and the rest 2% of interest will be calculated and paid.

2. If customers, who already have withdraw the interest prior to maturity from the regular savings, want to withdraw the entire principal of part of it, interest will be calculated as described above with out the withdrawn interest from the principal.

Business hours: Mon-Fri 9.30 am – 5 pm

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Insurance in the DPRK

Thursday, July 12th, 2012

Jakub Rehor and Geoffrey See of Choson Exchange post interesting information on insurance in the DPRK:

According to the Choson Exchange:

In the planned, state-controlled economy of North Korea, familiar concepts (including insurance) acquire a very different meaning. In a market economy, insurance coverage indemnifies individuals or corporations for losses suffered due to natural disasters, accidents, sickness, or death. In North Korea, what is called “insurance” functions as a fundraiser for certain entities in the government.

There are two kinds of insurance products in North Korea, individual and enterprise insurance. Both are compulsory and are administered by KNIC (Korea National Insurance Corporation). Compulsory individual insurance is deducted automatically from salaries, and is used to fund the state-run healthcare system. Individuals cannot file claims under this insurance; all payments go into the healthcare system to cover its costs and to other state-directed uses. This individual insurance program was originally administered by Korea Central Bank, but parts of it were moved to KNIC where it formed a new department.

Individuals do not have the option of buying property or life insurance in DPRK. Only state-owned enterprises can use property insurance. Compulsory enterprise insurance covers property losses from all major perils (there is exclusion for war). There are no separate policies or riders for windstorm, earthquake, flooding, etc. Instead, policies specify coverage by type of property (animal insurance, machinery insurance, etc.)

Pricing is set without regard to individual risks and loss history. Rather, insurance operates on a pooled basis, with the goal of roughly matching premiums with claims and administration costs. There are no reserves and the state absorbs any losses or profits. As a result, KNIC has no incentive to care about profitability or correct pricing (and, presumably, service) for local insurance operations priced in North Korean won.

There is no independent regulatory authority in DPRK overseeing KNIC’s activities. In theory, the Central Bank and Finance Ministry should be involved, but in reality they don’t have the expertise or political backing. The only oversight of KNIC comes from the party which provides mainly political supervision.

Given the pooled nature of the compulsory policies and lack of risk-based pricing, KNIC acts mainly as an administrator, collecting premiums and disbursing payments. In this position it functions as a revenue generator for the government via two channels:

1. It fails to pay market replacement value of losses. Claims are settled at official government prices which do not reflect market reality.

2. It has been alleged that KNIC has been involved in reinsurance fraud. Media reports claim that European reinsurers write policies for KNIC which then submits false claims, or retains a portion of the claim settlement payments rather than passing it on to the insured.

The existing insurance arrangements in DPRK are clearly inadequate for the needs of foreign joint ventures operating in the Special Economic Zones. If North Korea hopes to attract foreign investment, it needs to modernize its insurance system to bring it into line with expectations of outside investors.

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Remittances to the DPRK

Wednesday, July 11th, 2012

Reuters offers a tale of how remittances from defectors in the South are making life easier for their family members who remain in the DPRK (a topic discussed here before). According to Reuters:

Next morning, she wired 15,000 yuan ($2,400) to the broker’s account at a bank in China, near the border. His wife confirmed receipt of the funds, informed her husband, and the defector’s brother got money in North Korea, a state where the average income is estimated at just $1,200 a year.

Brokers typically charge up to 30 percent fees for such transactions, but by and large, they work well.

“I heard it only took 15 minutes for my brother to get the money (after funds were wired),” said the defector, who is officially listed as dead in North Korea. “Two days later, my brother called me back saying ‘Thank you. We will spend your money wisely’.”

Some 70 percent send money home to the country they fled, says the Organization for One Korea, a South Korean support and research institute on North Korean defectors. Annual flows are estimated at $10 million a year as defectors try to help out families in a country where many are malnourished and lack access to basic healthcare.

Incoming funds from South Korea have become so significant that they have been dubbed the “Mount Halla Stream”, named after the tallest mountain in South Korea, said Kang Cheol-hwan, the author of “The Aquariums of Pyongyang,” a survivor’s account of North Korean gulags.

This has helped offset a decline in funds from ethnic Koreans living in Japan that dominated in the mid-1980s and was known as the “Mount Fuji Stream”.

“In the past, pro-Pyongyang people in Japan and some Korean Americans sent money but they grew old and strong sanctions from Japan also took a toll. So the generation providing remittances has changed and it is now the defectors in South Korea who are doing it,” said Kang.

I have also interviewed a few former North Koreans about remittances. They all report it is common and brokers charge about 30%.

Read the full story here:
Insight: A secret plea for money from a mountain in North Korea
Reuters
2012-7-11

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ROK firm pays tax to DPRK

Wednesday, July 11th, 2012

According to Yonhap:

A South Korean company in the inter-Korean industrial zone in North Korea paid about $7,000 in corporate income tax to the North last year, the Unification Ministry said Wednesday.

It was the first time a South Korean company has paid a tax to North Korea since 2004 when the two Koreas opened the complex in the North’s border city of Kaesong to boost cross-border economic cooperation.

South Korean companies in Kaesong are subject to a 10 percent to 14 percent corporate income tax, but their taxes are exempted for five years after first generating profits, and are reduced by 50 percent for the ensuing three years, according to the ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs.

The company and three others also paid about $153,000 in corporate income taxes to the North’s authorities this year for their profits in fiscal year 2011.

The development indicates that some South Korean companies have begun to make money for their operations in the industrial complex that marries South Korean capital and technology with cheap labor from the North.

The complex is now home to more than 120 South Korean small and medium-sized companies, which produce clothes, utensils, watches and other goods.

Last year, the production of the industrial complex reached an all-time high of US$400 million. The complex has produced $1.65 billion worth of goods since 2004.

A ministry official said more South Korean companies are expected to pay corporate income taxes to the North next year. He did not give details on how many South Korean companies make money in Kaesong.

Read the full story here:
S. Korean company in Kaesong paid first corporate tax to N. Korea
Yonhap
2012-7-11

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Some recent publications

Friday, June 29th, 2012

Networks, Trust, and Trade: The Microeconomics of China–North Korea Integration
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
Peterson Institute Working Paper (May 2012)

The Microeconomics of North–South Korean Cross-Border Integration
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
Peterson Institute Working Paper (May 2012)

Gender in Transition
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
Peterson Institute Working Paper (June 2012)

New East German and Soviet Evidence on North Korean Support to South Korean Political Parties and Labor Unions
James Person
Wilson Center, NKIDP

DPRK Perspectives on Korean Reunification after the July 4th Joint Communiqué
Jong-Dae Shin
Wilson Center, NKIDP

Zhou Enlai and China’s Response to the Korean War
Charles Kraus
Wilson Center, NKIDP

China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953-1961
Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia
Wilson Center, NKIDP

Budget Blanks and Blues
Aidan Foster-Carter
38 North

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North Korea aiding Syria to upgrade Scud D capability

Wednesday, June 27th, 2012

According to IHS Janes:

In marked disregard of UN sanctions (Resolutions 1718 from 2006 and 1874 from 2009 both prohibit North Korea from conducting security-related exports), North Korean technicians and engineers stationed in Syria are working with specialists from Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) to develop an arsenal of advanced SSMs. Co-operation between Pyongyang and Damascus also constitutes a Syrian violation of the same two resolutions, which, among other sanctions, include “an arms embargo, which also encompasses a ban on technical training or services”.

Nevertheless, IHS Jane’s has learned that engineers from North Korea’s Tangun Trading Corporation are working with engineers from the SSRC’s Project 99 in a compound located in Jabal Taqsis, near the city of Hama, to advance the Scud D development programme.

Read the full story here:

North Korea aiding Syria to upgrade Scud D capability
IHS Janes
Robin Hughes
2012-6-27

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