North Korean Economy Watch

Herald Tribune
12/5/2006

Japanese police raid pro-North Korea group over alleged accounting violation

Japanese police raided offices of a pro-North Korean association and later arrested an executive over suspected accounting violations on Tuesday, the latest crackdown as Tokyo intensifies pressure on the reclusive communist regime.

Investigators searched the offices of the Hyogo chamber of commerce affiliated with the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, which acts as Pyongyang’s de facto embassy, prefectural (state) police spokesman Naoki Awazu said.

Awazu said no other details were immediately available.

Police suspect a 36-year-old former senior official at the group’s local business office helped North Korea-affiliated companies and offices evade taxes and provided accounting services without a license, Kyodo News agency reported.

Eitetsu Kawa, a North Korean living in Japan, was later arrested on suspicion of accounting law violations.

Japan has been cracking down on the residents’ association amid concerns about North Korea’s nuclear and chemical weapons programs, but it was not immediately known if Tuesday’s raid was linked.

The reclusive regime angered Japan and other nations when it tested ballistic missiles in July and conducted a nuclear test in October.

Pro-Pyongyang Japanese residents have come under increasing scrutiny by authorities as tensions have escalated with North Korea.

Tokyo was also planning to urge local governments to review preferential property taxes for facilities owned by North Korean organizations to check on how the pro-North association uses its buildings and facilities.

On Tuesday, the North’s state-run Korean Central News Agency protested the recent raids, calling them “an infringement upon the dignity of (North Korea) and a vicious political provocation.”

Last week, police raided the association’s Tokyo headquarters and its offices in the northern Japanese city of Niigata on suspicion that a relative of a group official illegally obtained a small amount medical supplies for shipment to the impoverished country.

In August, Japanese police arrested a pro-North resident in Japan for allegedly exporting to the North machinery that can be used to make biological weapons.

In March, Japanese police raided another pro-North Korea local chamber of commerce in connection with Pyongyang’s abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s.

Korea Times
11/26/2006

A North Korean insurance company compensated a South Korean firm for a car crash at the joint inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong, North Korea, for the first time, reports said yesterday.

A bus belonging to the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee, which legally belongs to the Stalinist North, and a vehicle of the Korea Land Corp., a state-run company of South Korea, collided at the complex on July 12, according to reports.

The South Korean company had its car repaired in the south, but asked a North Korean insurance company to cover the bill, which was estimated to be around 1.1 million won ($1,160).

After consulting both companies, the North’s insurance company decided the bus driver was responsible for 80 percent of the incident, paying some 840,000 won, which was actually paid in U.S. dollars, to the South Korean company on Sept. 21.

Some 21 South Korean firms operate factories, using cheap but skilled North Korean labor in the complex, which opened in June 2004. The number of North Koreans at the complex exceeded 10,000 last week, according to the Ministry of Unification.

Yonhap
11/20/2006

China has lifted its freeze on some North Korean accounts in a Macau bank which have allegedly been involved in money laundering and other financial irregularities for Pyongyang, a diplomatic source said Monday.

China ordered its banks to stop engaging in financial dealings with Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in the Chinese territory of Macau, after the U.S. gave its financial institutions similar instructions in September 2005. The sanctions led to the freeze of about US$24 million of the North’s holdings.

Yonhap
11/20/2006 
U.S. does not confirm report of unfrozen N.K. account, reaffirms talks within 6-party context

U.S. officials deferred to Chinese authorities on Monday to confirm whether Beijing has released some of the North Korean accounts frozen for alleged illicit financial activities.

At the same time, they reaffirmed that the U.S. is ready to address the issue at the six-nation nuclear talks when they resume.

Joong Ang Daily
11/17/2006

China has not cut off oil supplies to North Korea, nor will it stop oil and food assistance to its ally as a means of exerting political pressure, Chinese officials were quoted as telling a group of U.S. scholars.

The Americans in the group also said Wednesday that Chinese officials seemed to have a different understanding from the North Koreans about how U.S. financial sanctions would be dealt with at the next round of six-nation talks.

The Chinese reportedly said they were “surprised” that Pyongyang had told the group it expected those sanctions to be lifted.

Siegfried Hecker, a visiting professor at Stanford University, said he asked Chinese foreign ministry officials if Beijing had cut off heavy fuel oil to North Korea as reported.

“The answer was that China did not cut off heavy fuel oil to North Korea. That’s the direct answer that we received,” he said at a news conference.

Mr. Hecker was part of a four-member delegation that was in Pyongyang Oct. 31-Nov. 4. He is a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, a U.S. nuclear weapons center, and has visited North Korea three times.

The other members of the team were Jack Pritchard, former U.S. point man on North Korea policy and now head of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, D.C.; Robert Carlin, a former North Korea analyst now at the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization; and John Lewis, a Stanford University professor.

There was speculation that Beijing had ended the fuel aid to the North in September, when Pyongyang showed signs of preparing for its first nuclear test. The aid suspension was believed to be China’s way of pressing its ally to forgo the test.

Mr. Hecker said Chinese officials were clear that Beijing did not and would not stop fuel and food donations, arguing that North Korea would only “grow stronger” if pressured.

The team arrived in North Korea on the day the communist regime, after a year’s boycott, agreed to return to the six-nation nuclear talks that also involve South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan.

Pyongyang left the table to protest punitive measures taken by the U.S. Treasury against Macao’s Banco Delta Asia for allegedly laundering money for the North.

North Korean officials told the American visitors that they expected discussions and a conclusion of the sanctions issue at the next six-party talks, according to Mr. Pritchard.

But Chinese officials, when told of Pyongyang’s position, “expressed some surprise,” Mr. Hecker said.

“They indicated, obviously, differences of opinion as to what was agreed on,” he said.

Joong Ang Daily
11/8/2006

Amid continued concern that money spent on the Kaesong inter-Korean industrial complex fuels Pyongyang’s military, the Unification Ministry said yesterday that most of the wages paid by South Korean companies buy daily supplies and food for North Korean workers.

Song Yong-deung, 66, a Korean-Australian who operates a Kaesong-based food and supply company jointly owned by North Korea, told the ministry that his company regularly provides goods to North Korean workers, according to a press release from Goh Gyeong-bin, an official in charge of the complex. Song’s company gets money from North Korean authorities, who in turn accept the wage payments from the South Korean companies operating the complex. The North Korean workers do not directly receive their salaries.

According to data provided by Mr. Song and the ministry, South Korean firms pay an average of $600,000 per month in wages, of which about 45 percent is deducted for fees such as insurance and taxes. In March, after the deductions, a total of $295,000 was paid to the North, of which $219,000 went to Mr. Song’s company to purchase goods, such as rice, for the workers.

Unification Ministry officials said yesterday the bulk of the information provided by Mr. Song matched Seoul’s own assessment on how the money sent to the North is being used. Asked why the ministry has not tried in the past two years since the complex opened to verify how the money sent for wages was being used, Yang Chang-seok, a ministry spokesman, said Seoul has repeatedly asked the North to provide a detailed account of the cash flow, but other than stating the workers bought supplies, little information has been provided.

“Given the nature of the North’s closed society, confirmation itself is problematic,” the spokesman said.

The efforts by Seoul to cast a light on the flow of the money being paid to the North comes at a time when Washington is pushing Seoul to curb inter-Korean projects, citing transparency issues over money sent to the North. Over the weekend, President Roh Moo-hyun vowed to continue with inter-Korean projects in a policy speech addressed to the National Assembly. Currently, there are 15 companies operating at the complex employing 9,632 North Koreans.

The announcement came as U.S. delegation visited Seoul this week to discuss how to implement the United Nations sanctions resolution against the North.

From Businessweek:
Joe McDonald
11/5/2006

In the midst of tensions over North Korea’s nuclear program, a Western company is there searching for oil. Another just bought a bank.

“North Korea is hungry for business,” said Roger Barrett, the British founder of Beijing-based Korea Business Consultants, who recently took 11 Asian and European clients to Pyongyang to play golf and make contacts.

A small group of Westerners are taking on the challenge of doing business in the isolated North, hoping to get in on the ground floor as its communist rulers experiment with economic reform.

The obstacles are daunting. A Stalinist dictatorship, bureaucracy and language barriers. Foreign sanctions that block most financial transfers, making it hard to get paid and to get supplies. And now worries that United Nations sanctions imposed after North Korea’s Oct. 9 nuclear test could be expanded to a general clampdown on trade.

But the Westerners talk positively about the North as a business environment, with skilled workers and leaders who they say welcome foreign investment.

“They are very skillful and hardworking,” said Felix Abt, a Swiss businessman who oversees two ventures in Pyongyang, one that makes business and game software for sale in Europe and another that makes antibiotics and painkillers for the domestic market. “It’s sometimes faster to get licenses and necessary approvals here than it is in China or Vietnam.”

Barrett said that even as the U.N. Security Council debated the latest sanctions on the North, he got inquiries from investors interested in its rich mineral resources and low-cost manufacturing work force.

“Investors are rushing into China, but labor costs there are escalating, and companies are looking for an alternative,” Barrett said. North Korea “has absolutely the capabilities to take off like South Korea.”

So far the largest foreign business community in North Korea is from China, its main source of trade and aid.

South Korea accounts for most of the North’s foreign investment, with stakes totaling $620 million in an export-manufacturing zone and a resort for foreigners. China’s investments total just $31 million, according to the Chinese Commerce Ministry.

U.S. regulations allow American companies to trade with North Korea under limited conditions, though tensions between the governments and lack of diplomatic relations raises the risk of doing business. Britain, Germany, Sweden and other Western governments, meanwhile, have official relations with Pyongyang.

North Korea’s foreign trade has risen sharply, though the total was less than $4 billion last year, according to South Korean and Chinese government figures. Trade with the South soared by more than 50 percent in 2005 to just over $1 billion.

Most trade is carried out by North Korean state companies, not private entrepreneurs. And some partners are shying away. Trade with Japan, once the North’s No. 1 trading partner, tumbled from $1.3 billion in 2001 to just $200 million last year amid tensions with Tokyo over North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and ’80s.

The Europeans’ chamber of commerce in Pyongyang had 12 members when it was launched last year. They include delivery company DHL Express, an Italian law firm and a German venture founded in 2003 to provide Internet access to foreign businesses in Pyongyang.

This tentative foothold follows the slow pace of economic reform in North Korea. Only in 2002 did North Korean leader Kim Jong Il allow limited free enterprise to revive a decrepit economy, which teetered in the 1990s following the loss of Soviet aid and then collapsed amid widespread food shortages. Still, foreign observers say officials are reluctant to give up control, despite prodding from Beijing, which wants faster reforms to reduce its ally’s dependence on aid.

Abt, the Swiss businessman, moved to Pyongyang in 2002 after seven years working in Vietnam, another Asian communist economy in the throes of reform.

“I heard that some economic reforms were in the pipeline, and I was quite thrilled to experience the beginning,” said Abt.

Now his Vietnamese wife takes their 14-month-old daughter to play at an international school. After work, he goes out to sing karaoke with North Korean co-workers.

But Abt has felt the bite of efforts to pressure the North.

Foreign banks have been leery since Washington last year sanctioned Macau’s Banco Delta Asia, which the U.S. said helped the North launder money. China told its banks this month to curtail financial transfers to or from the North.

“It’s getting difficult to make bank transfers to suppliers or to get money from customers,” Abt said.

He worries that the factory might have to shut down if U.N. sanctions block imports of required chemicals on the grounds that they also could have military uses.

Barrett said his clients have lost access to $11 million in Banco Delta Asia accounts that were frozen by the U.S. sanctions.

Colin McAskill, a British businessman who has done business with the North since the 1970s, is lobbying Washington to fine-tune its sanctions so the bank’s customers can withdraw money that was made legally.

McAskill is chairman of Hong Kong-based Koryo Asia Ltd., which said in September it was buying a 70 percent controlling stake in Daedong Credit Bank, North Korea’s first foreign-owned financial institution. The bank, which is 30 percent owned by a North Korean bank, serves foreign companies and has accounts at Banco Delta Asia.

North Korea also has turned to Western investors in hopes of developing oil resources and reducing its near-total reliance on China for fuel. It awarded a 20-year exploration concession last year to Aminex plc, a London firm.

Aminex is helping the North Korean government deal with other foreign companies, and in exchange gets to pick where it will drill for oil, its chief executive, Brian Hall, said by phone from London.

Aminex hasn’t felt any effects from the nuclear tumult, Hall said.

“We have good relations and no problems with the agreements but are closely watching the political situation,” he said.

From the Joong Ang Daily:
Bank sees North pain if sanctions take hold
10/24/2006
Choi Hyung-kyu, Ser Myo-ja

The Bank of Korea said yesterday, in a report prepared for a legislator, that international financial sanctions on North Korea could deal a heavy blow to the North’s shaky economy.

In an assessment for Representative Yim Tae-hee of the Grand National Party, the central bank said a 30-percent reduction in foreign currency inflows to North Korea would lower economic activity by three-quarters of a percentage point. A halving of North Korea’s external trade, the paper said, would reduce economic growth by nearly 5.5 percentage points; a 70-percent falloff in trade would drop economic output by 8.25 points.

Estimates of economic activity in centrally planned economies are difficult at best, however, and North Korea’s secrecy makes such estimates even more tenuous.

“When international financial institutions join in the sanctions and cut the influx of the annual $800 million in foreign currency to the North, Pyongyang will face serious trouble,” Mr. Yim said.

He added, without citing sources, that the North earns about $300 million through legitimate activities, such as inter-Korean economic cooperation deals and remittances from North Koreans abroad, adding that counterfeiting and drug trafficking bring in about $500 million more annually.

Christopher Hill, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Asia, arrived in Hong Kong on Saturday to meet, among others, William Ryback, the deputy chief executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.

“The U.S. team asked the Hong Kong authorities to cooperate in its effort to freeze North Korean assets in Hong Kong and Macao,” a Hong Kong source said yesterday. “Hong Kong gave a positive answer.”

Another Hong Kong government source said Mr. Hill also asked the government there to help inspect suspect North Korean ships.

“A North Korean ship under a U.S. intelligence watch is on its way to Hong Kong,” the official said. “Mr. Hill asked the authorities to inspect the boat thoroughly when it enters port here.”

From the Choson Ilbo:
Chinese Banks Restricting Cash Flow to N.Korea
10/17/2006

Major Chinese banks are currently stopping or restricting remittances or payments to North Korea after the North’s announcement of what it claims was a nuclear test, it emerged Monday. Chinese banks in Dandong, where cross-border trade is concentrated, recently started restricting banking transactions with North Korea, an official with the South Korean Embassy in China said. The restrictions, in fact, started in March this year, when the U.S. imposed financial sanctions on Macau’s Banco Delta Asia after designating it Pyongyang’s “primary money laundering concern.”

But not all Chinese banks are doing so, each bank and branch having its own policy. Sources say it does not look as if the Chinese government is ordering them to do so; rather banks have started doing so on their own. Rumor is spreading among traders doing business with North Korea in China that all financial accounts with North Korea including those by North Korean traders in China could be frozen.

North Korean workers in China are leaving the country in droves after North’s claimed nuclear test. A businessman operating a sewing factory in Shenyang, China, said, “Some 100 North Korean workers in my factory returned home three days ago because the Chinese authorities didn’t renew their work permit.” Banks in Dandong and Shenyang, where many businesses trading with North Korea have accounts, are seeing an increasing number of them not receive payments for exports to the North. “Since the U.S. froze North Korea’s accounts in the Macau bank, it takes three or four times longer for us to get paid for imports to the North, and this is hurting us badly,” a businessman trading with the North said. “We can’t do business with the North any longer.”

As official trade between the North and China shrinks, smuggling between the two countries is thriving, local people say. An ethnic Korean in Dandong said if a North Korean vessel ships 1,000 tons of iron ore to a port here, it officially reports only 100 ton of them and smuggles the rest. Smuggling covers almost everything from iron ore to bronze, TVs, computers, petrochemical products, antiques and maritime products. That is why many feel how determined the Chinese authorities are in cracking down on smuggling will determine the success of sanctions against the North. Locals say they have not heard of any Chinese crackdown on smuggling to and from the North, nor do they expect one.

China clearly stated its opposition against military action in the UN resolution against the North over its claimed nuclear test, calling for “an appropriate level” of sanctions. Beijing says the ultimate goal should be getting the North to return to the six-party talks on its nuclear program, not forcing regime collapse. Some expect China to reduce, rather than stop, its supply of oil to the North.

Meanwhile, China is preparing for an emergency in North Korea. It is setting up barbed-wire fences along the border near the Yalu and Tumen rivers where the military units of the provinces there took charge of guarding the area three years ago. The barbed-wire fences are being extended near Changbai County and the Tumen River. A Chinese official said the fences “were put up after consultations with the North because we needed to draw up a clear border between us and North Korea because of the narrowness of the river or newly built roads.” But some say the main goal is to prevent a mass exodus of North Koreans when the regime falls apart. Experts say another reason China is building up its military strength and carrying out more military exercises near the border with the North is to prepare for regime collapse in the north. The new 60-km long road along the Yalu River is also said to serve strategic military purposes.

From AFP:
10/9/2006

The US already has broad sanctions in place against North Korea, giving it little additional economic and trade leverage to bring to bear following Pyongyang’s defiant nuclear test explosion.

Washington imposed a near total economic embargo on North Korea at the start of the Korean War in June 1950, only beginning to ease the sanctions slightly from 1989 amid efforts to draw the reclusive Stalinist regime into the international community.

A series of measures aimed at encouraging North Korea to not develop nuclear arms culminated in a June 2000 Executive Order legalizing most transactions between US and North Korean nationals.

The order allowed many products to be sold to North Korea, though sanctions affecting trade in military, so-called dual-use and missile-related items remained in place.

But imports from the country remain under tight restrictions, managed by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, and North Korean assets frozen since 1950 remained frozen.

While restrictions on US investments in North Korea and on the travel of US citizens to North Korea were also eased under the 2000 measure, the two countries have no formal diplomatic relations and have never officially ended the Korean War.

Most forms of US economic assistance, other than purely humanitarian aid, remain prohibited and North Korea does not enjoy “Normal Trade Relations” with the United States, so allowable exports are hit by high tariffs.

The State Department acknowledges that “US economic interaction with North Korea remains minimal” and that Washington’s leverage over the reclusive regime is limited.

“There’s not a lot to grab hold of,” commented a senior State Department official about the hunt for ways to impact the North Korean economy bilaterally.

North Korea receives the bulk of its imports over the Chinese and Russian borders and relies on hefty aid from South Korea, giving those three governments far greater potential leverage in economic sanctions.

Washington did find one powerful pressure point last year when the Treasury Department slapped sanctions against a Macau-based bank, Banco Delta Asia, which US officials charged was the main conduit for bringing North Korean counterfeit dollar bills into the international system.

Washington and its allies have long contended North Korea uses counterfeiting, drug trafficking and sales of weapons to prop up its ailing economy.

The US decision to designate the Banco Delta Asia a “primary money-laundering concern” left the bank teetering and could foreshadow similar action targetting other financial transactions by the North.

Many analysts pointed to the banking sanction as possibly the main reason North Korea went ahead with its nuclear test shock at this time.

The North Koreans were “feeling under a great pressure from the United States and the sanctions that were being imposed, particularly the financial sanctions,” said David Albright, a former UN nuclear weapons inspector.

“I think this test is coming from that sense of being backed into a corner,” he said.

Korea Times:
Andrei Lankov
9/25/2006

For a Stalinist country, North Korea was unique in its permissive approach to hard currency transactions. Most Communist states followed the Soviet example and strictly forbade all private trading in currency. There were foreign currency shops in the Soviet Union, but only the lucky holders of foreign passports could go there.

Until the late 1980s, all Soviet citizens returning from overseas were required to submit their currency to the state-run banks within 72 hours of crossing the border. In exchange, they were given special coupons that could be used as money in special shops stuffed with quality goods. They couldn’t be used in “real” currency shops, which targeted foreigners and where the merchandise was even better. By keeping more than just a few one-dollar bills at home, a Soviet citizen committed a crime.

Professional foreign currency speculators existed, but their business was extremely risky.

According to Soviet law, they could face the death penalty for their activities, and some of them were actually shot in otherwise liberal 1960s. Thus, everybody who wanted to buy or sell currency had to be very careful.

But this was not the case in North Korea. From the late 1970s currency shops operated freely in Pyongyang and other major cities, open to any North Korean who had dollars or yen.

No questions were asked by the guards. Unlike their Soviet counterparts, the shops sold not only durables, but also daily necessities and food stuffs. Currency exchange outside the banks was illegal, but it was considered a relatively minor crime.

This approach, unusually permissive for a very repressive and restrictive regime, reflected one North Korean peculiarity.

The presence of some 95,000 ethnic Koreans who were lured into moving to the North from Japan during the 1990s. The government discovered that these people could attract remittances from Japan, so a network of the state-run currency shops emerged to suck the yen into the state’s coffers.

Prices in the shops were roughly twice the international average, with the difference going to the state.

But in the early 1990s another type of dollar-based economy emerged. From 1990 the value of the North Korean won was in steady decline. The public distribution system was falling apart, and many people turned to foreign currency as the major means of protecting their savings from both inflation and the ever present danger of a confiscatory money reform. Thus, in the early 1990s a dollar-based economy emerged.

The exchange rate began to climb. The official rate was 2.2 won per dollar. Like most other Communist states, North Korea grossly overvalued its currency to squeeze more money from foreign visitors. But nobody was trading the won at such grotesquely high rate. By the time the great famine struck the country in the late 1990s, the actual exchange rate was approximately 220 won, a hundred times the official average.

Market traders and emerging entrepreneurs of all kinds ceased to use the North Korean won for any large-scale transactions.

The dollar also became the major medium of saving. Due to the lack of data and peculiarities of the Communist economy, it is difficult to give precise figures, but the annual inflation rate over the last few years has exceeded 100 percent.

The major turning point was reached in 2002, when the government introduced economic reforms. Actually, they were formally known as “special measures.”

The word “reform” had to be avoided in the official parlance since it hinted that something in the North Korean perfect society needed adjustment, and that could not possibly be true.

The new official rate of exchange was 165 won per dollar.

This was already well below the true market rate but still constituted an overnight 7,500 percent depreciation of the national currency. This is probably not a world record, but it’s still an impressive figure.

Simultaneously, the government raised prices in state shops and won-denominated salaries. This was done in an uneven fashion. Some groups gained far more than others, with the military security personnel and academic staff being the most prominent winners.

This meant the release of huge amount of cash, which flooded the economy and sped up inflation. In 2005 the exchange rate soon approached the level of 2200 won to 2300 won per dollar.

It has been discussed whether such hyper-inflation was provoked deliberately, as a result of some calculations, or came about through planners’ mistakes. I am inclined to believe the second option.

North Korean officials are exceptionally naive when it comes to the basics of the market economy. I would not be surprised if we eventually learn that in 2002 they hoped that the prices would stand still once they had been increased to market levels.

All this is often described as the dollarization of North Korean economy. However, in late 2002 the North Koreans declared that they would switch to euros as the major currency unit in their dealings with the outside world. Since then, all North Korean shops exhibit prices in euros, not dollars.

However, this act did not change actual habits much. Transactions are still usually based on the good old greenback.

Those groups who had access to the currency tended to fare much better than others. Some of those groups were once underprivileged, and the great nationwide disaster of the 1990s actually improved their social standing.