North Korean Economy Watch

Martyn Williams provides an update on the growing use of mobile phones in the DPRK.  According to his article in PC World:

Koryolink, North Korea’s only 3G cellular operator, saw sales more than double in the first three months of this year as it expanded its network coverage and enjoyed continued demand for its service.

At the end of March the company had 125,661 subscribers, a gain just under 34,000 subscribers over the quarter, according to majority-shareholder Orascom Telecom. The Egyptian company, which invests in cellular operators in developing nations, owns 75 percent of Koryolink.

“Contrary to initial speculations that the mobile service will be only available to the government officials and elite, the fact is that currently mobiles are used by different segments and levels of society,” Orascom said of the customer base.

The network achieved a profit of US$5.8 million in the quarter, before accounting for interest payments, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Orascom did not disclose whether it made a net profit or a loss for the period. The figure is a vast improvement on the US$312,000 EBITDA profit recorded in the first three months of last year.

Quarterly revenues were US$9 million, a jump of 102.5 percent.

Sales were hit by North Korea’s revaluation of its currency.

The move, which saw 100 North Korean won devalued to 1 won, caused social unrest, according to reports from the country. Koryolink said sales activity was “practically at a standstill due to uncertainty factors resulting from the currency revaluation,” and that it closed its sales outlets for about three weeks.

The North Korean network was launched in late 2008 using WCDMA (wideband code division multiple access) technology and is only the second cellular network in the country. The other, Sunnet, uses older GSM technology and suffers from poor call quality and disconnections, according to users in the capital city of Pyongyang.

At launch the Koryolink network covered Pyongyang but has since been expanded to five additional cities and eight highways and railways.

North Korea is one of the world’s most tightly controlled societies. Subscribers to the network are divided by class or type of customer with some unable to place calls to others. Most calls are subject to monitoring by the state’s security services as part of an extensive domestic intelligence gathering program.

Nautilus Institute Policy Forum
Policy Forum Online 10-027A
5/12/2010

Alexander Mansourov

North Korea is not static and inflexible. Indeed, there tends to be a very dynamic picture once you look below the surface. Change is a constant but, as in almost any state or society, it brings about tension. However, there is little or no sign that current tensions, caused by changes in the distribution of power within the leaderships’ core cadre, positioning for succession, or economic reforms are eroding the overall strength of the regime. While such tensions may spill over into society, there have been no signs that they have risen to a level that significantly weakens the regime or have made it feel that drastic action is needed.

Contrary to the popular view, North Korea is not being torn apart by an epic battle between the state and markets. The two have over time established an uneasy but symbiotic relationship. The state still considers the markets as parasites and vice versa, but each has learned to exist with the other. The popular argument that the reopening of markets in the North after their alleged (but unverified) closure is a sign of government capitulation before their power is not persuasive.

Much of the “evidence” we have for the latest uptick in internal tensions following the currency redenomination consists of recycled stories from unproven or unreliable sources relating anecdotes from small slices of the country. These publicly available sources for North Korea are very subjective and come through the lens of defector groups and humanitarian non-governmental organizations that, quite frankly, have their own agendas. Corroborating these reports is often impossible. Separating speculation from rumor and fact is difficult. The best we can do is to strip back some of the speculative veneer and establish hypotheses we can test over time.

What is Really Happening?

In spite of recent speculation in the New York Times and other Western media about North Korea’s growing economic desperation and political instability, Pyongyang is, in fact, on a path of economic stabilization. Last year’s harvest was relatively good-the second in a row-thanks to a raft of developments including favorable weather conditions, no pest infestations, increased fertilizer imports from China, double-cropping, and the refurbishment of the obsolete irrigation system. Thanks to the commissioning of several large-scale hydro-power plants which supply electricity to major urban residential areas and industrial zones, North Korea generated more electricity in 2009 than the year before, although losses in the transmission system remain significant.

According to China’s Xinhua news agency, industrial production in North Korea grew by almost 11 percent last year and 16 percent in the first quarter of 2010, compared to the first quarter of 2009. That positive development was facilitated by two nationwide labor mobilization campaigns-the “150-day campaign” and “100-day campaign” as well as growth in extractive industries, construction, a revival of heavy industries, modernization of the consumer-oriented industries and the expansion of the high-tech sector, especially, information and biotechnology.

Despite a decline in inter-Korean commerce and international sanctions imposed after the North’s missile and nuclear tests in early 2009, foreign trade did not contract in any meaningful way thanks to burgeoning ties with China. Moreover, Beijing seems to be committed to dramatically expanding its direct investments in the development of the North’s infrastructure, manufacturing, and service sectors.

There is no question that, for ideological, political, and national security reasons, North Korea’s macroeconomic policy has always been oriented towards the needs of domestic producers. The requirements of large-scale munitions and heavy industries have been the top priority, an orientation that has handicapped the development of domestic consumer-oriented industries. Since the collapse of the government-run, public food distribution system in the 1990s, Pyongyang has largely neglected the interests of individual consumers. It has allowed inflation to eat away at their disposable income, leaving them with only a few possible coping strategies. Those strategies have included pilferage of state assets, official corruption and participation in emerging retail markets where quasi-private merchants have been trading mostly in domestic agricultural produce and Chinese manufactured goods.

As the state-owned economic sector began to recover in the past two years, it had to confront labor shortages, rising production costs, and a powerful competitor-China. Whereas the extractive industries (especially coal and ore mining) benefitted from skyrocketing global raw materials prices as well as proximity and access to the ever-hungry Chinese market, the manufacturing industries hit the “Great Chinese Wall” of cheap consumer goods and industrial products that flooded the country. The competition was killing North Korea’s domestic manufacturers, who had barely begun to recover from two decades of depression.

At the same time, the North’s consumers-always conscious of rampant inflation-dodged mandatory savings requirements and began to increase consumption. They started to develop a clear preference for spending their meager disposable incomes on foreign-made goods in the newly emerging farmers’ and general industrial markets rather than in state-owned stores. Insensitive to the plight of the domestic industries, consumers voted with their purses for better quality, albeit more expensive, imports.

In addition, this development helped drain liquidity from the state banking system. Since the post-July 2002 economic reforms, salaries and money earned by private merchants were rarely deposited in bank accounts and returned to regular state banking channels. Instead, they circulated in emerging markets, were stored in kimchi jars, buried underground, or exchanged for renminbi or euros and taken out of the country by foreign (mostly Chinese) traders. Despite the Central Bank’s proclivity to print more money to increase the supply needed for state investment (which in turn fueled inflation), industrial producers were confronted with increasing difficulty in procuring investment funds from the state banking system, which was running short on previously mandatory individual bank deposits.

Rationale for Current Macroeconomic Stabilization Measures

In formulating the current round of measures, the authorities had to figure out how to cut a political, economic and social Gordian knot. Their options were restricted by an uncertain leadership agenda, ideological confines, political biases, lack of extensive macroeconomic stabilization experience, and scarce resources.

First, they had to reconcile the interests of domestic producers, very well represented by senior managers of state-owned enterprises at all levels of state power, otherwise known as the red directorate, who pressed the government to lower their rising production costs and to protect them from foreign (Chinese) competition. At the same time, consumers, asserting themselves through the nationwide structures of people’s committees and public organizations, sought higher salaries and alternative employment in the non-state sector, with a preference to consume higher quality imports.

Second, they had to reconcile the interests of state bankers-who were urging modernization and re-capitalization of the state banking system in the throes of an unprecedented credit squeeze-with those of the general population worried about inflation, mistrustful of the system, and reluctant to keep their savings in banks.

Third, they needed to find a way to repay the people’s life bond funds “borrowed” from the population in 2003 while also mobilizing additional funds for future capital investment even through confiscatory measures.

Fourth, they probably wanted to restore public confidence in the national currency and must have been motivated by a desire to combat inflationary expectations as well as to signal that inflationary days were over.

Fifth, they probably wanted to curb the growing influence of the new moneyed class demanding fewer restrictions on its businesses and foreign exchange transactions, while placating the regime loyalists, who still believed official propaganda and defended the advantages of the socialist economic system.

Sixth, they wanted to restore the credibility of the state-centered economic management system as demanded by the anti-market neo-conservatives from the party establishment. At the same time, policy-makers wanted to restrain the ever-present bureaucratic class seeking to control, license, and regulate anything and everything, which gave rise to rampant official corruption.

Finally, they wanted to re-assert monetary sovereignty since growing foreign currency substitution was undermining the central bank’s control over the money supply. The loss of monetary sovereignty would have become an insurmountable practical obstacle to building a “strong and powerful state” by 2012, North Korea’s publicly stated objective, and could not be tolerated politically, especially during a leadership transition period.

In an interview with Kyodo News on April 18, 2009, Ri Ki Song, economics professor at the Economic Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences, a North Korean government think tank, pointed out that “redenomination was intended to curb inflation, enhance currency values and create a favorable environment for economic management, and it was also aimed at stabilization and improvement of the people’s livelihood by supplying goods through a systematic national distribution system.”

Outlines of the New “Package Deal”

The currency redenomination began to unfold in late 2009. In November, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) Presidium issued a decree “On Issuing New Currency.” At the same time, the Cabinet of Ministers promulgated two decisions entitled “On Stabilizing People’s Livelihood” and “On Establishing Proper Order in Economic Management System.” These were quickly followed by a series of new regulations issued by the Central Bank, Ministries of Finance and Commerce, Price Regulation Bureau, General Bureau of Customs, and other government agencies.

The purpose of these initial steps appears to have been two-fold. First, the North wanted to reinvigorate domestic production of consumer goods. That would be done through import substitution as well as rebuilding the purchasing power and stabilizing the living standards of the mass of budgetary employees. The livelihood of these people-who constitute the overwhelming majority of the workforce, are employed at institutions such as state-owned industries, hospitals and schools and are paid out of the state budget-had been gradually eroded by marketization and high inflation. Second, the reform was designed to encourage savings as well as induce cash flow from proliferating black markets to the state banking system, which had been rapidly losing its handle on money in circulation.

While this move has been portrayed in much of the Western media as a “failure” that has caused significant tensions inside the North, in fact, it is too early to declare these measures either a failure or success. Such redenominations are almost always a source of tension when they are carried out in any country and often need to be adjusted or implemented again before achieving the intended results. North Korean economist Ri Ki Song admitted that “Price adjustments and other related measures were not implemented quickly enough, and there was a situation where [North Korea] could not open the market for several days.” But he took issue with “some Western reports that did not reflect what actually happened.” Ri noted that “In the early days immediately after the currency change, market prices were not fixed, so markets were closed for some days, but now all markets are open, and people are buying daily necessities in the markets.”[1] If inflation is eventually tamed and the currency exchange rate stabilized in the long run-the verdict is still out on both accounts-then these measures may eventually be viewed as a partial success.

As always, there were winners and losers but, once again, the reality appears to be somewhat less clear-cut than has been assumed by the Western media, economists and other analysts. In view of the ongoing preparations for the leadership succession, the redenomination could be viewed as a populist measure aimed at inflicting pain on less than 10 percent of the population through wealth redistribution in order to win support from more than 90 percent of the population who still live on state salaries and have not seen any improvement in their life despite burgeoning market activities. North Korea is still fundamentally a socialist society, and Kim Jong Il’s regime probably won some measure of support from the vast majority of North Koreans for its crackdown on corruption and abuses by rich traders and corrupt government officials who benefitted the most from bustling activity in black markets.

Private merchants may have felt some pain (although likely had stored their wealth in goods, commodities or foreign exchange rather than the old North Korean currency). But the heaviest losses appear to have been suffered by corrupt low and mid-ranking officials from the “power organs” (People’s Security and State Security officers as well as officials from courts and prosecutors’ offices) and government bureaucrats who wielded licensing, auditing, or controlling authority at the county and provincial levels. They had allegedly accumulated substantial savings through bribes and abuse of power and kept their ill-gotten gains in kimchi jars and under the mattresses at home. As a result, these officials could not find a way to get these stacks of old banknotes exchanged for new ones. According to a knowledgeable South Korean source, it is their money that was reported floating in sacks down the Yalu River after redenomination, not the traders’ capital. In short, the currency move may have ended up as more of a strike against corrupt officials and local elites rather than private traders. With markets re-opening and private trade resuming in late January, the latter rebounded fairly quickly, whereas it is likely to take a long time for the corrupt mid-level bureaucrats to recoup their losses through a new round of bribes and extortion.

In Ri Ki Song’s judgment, “an unstable situation occurred temporarily and partially after the currency redenomination,” but, “it did not lead to social chaos at all, and the unstable situation was quickly brought under control.”[2]

Following the currency redenomination, the next government move was to reset the official prices for commodities, such as grains, meats, and fuel, manufactured goods including textiles and daily necessities, and real estate use and utility fees to the pre-2002 level. Salaries of employees in the state sector of the economy were also adjusted, but at a much higher level. Reportedly, those who previously were paid up to 3,000 old won per a month saw an average 8 percent raise in their salaries, whereas those who used to receive a salary of more than 3,000 old won per month saw a decrease on the average of 10 percent per month. Farmers in the cooperative sector were reported to have received a one-time cash payout from 50,000 to 150,000 won in new money. These economic measures initially increased the purchasing power of most consumers in the country, especially those who depended solely on state salaries and wages for their income.

Even according to the Seoul government, the DPRK’s market prices and currency exchange rate appear to be stabilizing after predictable fluctuations from the surprise government-led currency redenomination last year. In its latest report on North Korea submitted to the National Assembly’s foreign affairs committee, the Unification Ministry said that market prices in the country were on a “downward path” following recent measures by the authorities. A kilogram of rice, which cost around 20 DPRK won immediately after the revaluation, soared to 1,000 won in mid-March but dropped to the 500-600 won range in early April, according to the ministry.

Furthermore, the North Korean government released another broadside of legislation in December and January: the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly revised a number of laws pertinent to economic management ranging from those governing real estate management and commodities consumption to general equipment import, labor accounting, agricultural farms, water supply, sewage, and ship crews. These measures were aimed at bringing the existing regulatory framework in line with the new realities of an emerging market economy, where a growing number of corporate and private interests compete for access to and use of public assets. For example, the Real Estate Management Law is aimed at restructuring existing regulations for the use of public lands, especially for corporate and private purposes, and strengthening the ability of the state to collect real estate taxes and land use fees. It also stipulates the new right to grant “long-term land leases” to foreigners, which is especially important in promoting foreign investment in special economic zones such as Rason and Kaesong.

In January, the North’s Foreign Trade magazine unveiled the contours of the new tariff system established in accordance with the latest revisions in the regulations for the implementation of the DPRK Customs Law and the provisions of the Customs Law. In addition, late last year Kim Jong Il reportedly authorized the restructuring of the foreign trade management system, expanding the prerogatives of general trading companies and upgrading the status of special economic zones, in hopes of boosting domestic production of the export-oriented goods, encouraging import substitution, and attracting foreign investment in the consumer goods sector.

Also in January, the North Korean authorities revealed their intention to seek foreign investment and to reform the state banking system by establishing the second tier of quasi-commercial banks-the State Development Bank, Export-Import Bank, and State Science and Technology Fund-backed partially by the Central Bank and partially by foreign capital.

The stated goals behind this innovation in banking policy are to create favorable financial conditions for the implementation of a 10-year economic infrastructure development plan and five-year science and technology development plan, as well as to facilitate further expansion of foreign trade. The first plan envisions the implementation of six major projects-the development of food production, modernization of railways, construction of roads, expansion of ports, modernization of electric power grid, and development of the energy sector-within the next ten years, to be funded outside the regular state budget channels, primarily relying on Chinese venture capital. The five-year plan stipulates an increase in the state’s investment in science and technology as one of the pillars for a “prosperous, powerful nation,” with a focus on information technology, nano technology and bioengineering.

The notion that all of the measures announced in December 2009 and January 2010 were a hurried response to negative public reaction to problems in the currency revaluation is a little hard to accept. More likely, these were part of a longer-term development strategy of which the currency measures were only one component.

To sum up, North Korea is changing. The latest demonstration of the government’s desire to facilitate change is the new package of economic adjustment measures. Those measures seek to displace imports, restore self-reliance, and consolidate state control over the economic system at the expense of the newly emerging proto-markets in retail trade and the small private merchant class that may create political headaches for the regime down the road.

Subsequently, we may see the establishment of a new-more protectionist and statist-equilibrium in the relationship between domestic producers (industrial factories and plants), importers (trading companies), financiers (state bankers and foreign capital), and consumers (state retail industry and private markets). This might involve the government’s efforts to further control the demand, regulate the supply of imported goods through selective protectionist tariff measures, raise funds for new infrastructure and facility investment, boost the supply of domestically manufactured goods and make them more competitive and affordable.

How this will all work out remains to be seen. Whether the new equilibrium will facilitate economic growth and contribute to increasing production, trade, and consumption, or end up in economic failure causing social chaos and political instability is obviously the core question. Contrary to the rampant, often inaccurate speculation in the Western media, it’s much too soon to tell.

According to the Choson Ilbo:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s youngest son and the heir apparent Kim Jong-un is already said to be busy amassing his own slush fund. Despite North Korea’s dire economic difficulties, Kim Jong-il himself is said to have stashed away between US$200-300 million every year to finance his lavish lifestyle and maintain the party elite’s loyalty to him.

With the money, North Korea would be able to import between 400,000 to 600,000 tons of rice, which would be enough to cover half the country’s food shortage of 1 million tons of rice per year.

Key departments within the Workers Party are pressuring agencies under their control to offer “loyalty funds” for the successor, a source familiar with North Korean affairs said. “A separate company has been established under the leadership of Kim Jong-un to secretly amass foreign currency.”

The source said Kim senior uses his slush fund to finance his expensive tastes, build monuments in his own honor and buy gifts for his loyal aides. Faced with increasing difficulties bolstering his slush funds under international sanctions, the Kim is said to have issued an ultimatum to his top officials in February, saying from now on he would judge their loyalty based on the amount they contribute to the fund.

The North is estimated to have imported more than $100 million worth of high-quality liquor, cars and other luxury goods in 2008. And also on the list are pet dogs, which the Kim family are said to adore. Kim buys dozens of German shepherds, Shih Tzus and other breeds from France and Switzerland every year. He also buys dog food, shampoo and other pet products as well as medical equipment for the dogs and has foreign veterinarians check their health.

Before nation founder Kim Il-sung’s birthday on April 15 this year, Kim imported around 200 high-end cars from China at a cost of some $5 million. A North Korean source said secret funds are also used to finance nuclear missile development and other state projects Kim Jong-il orders personally.

It is difficult to estimate the total amount of Kim’s slush fund. Experts can only guess that Kim has stashed huge sums of money in Swiss or Luxembourg bank accounts, as did other dictators like former president of the Philippines Ferdinand Marcos and ex-Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. The international press estimates Kim’s slush fund to be worth around $4 billion.

Kim started amassing his slush fund as soon as he was picked as the next leader of North Korea in 1974 to be able to buy the loyalty of top officials. A special department within North Korea’s Workers’ Party called Room 39 which manages Kim’s slush fund by collecting the loyalty funds, exporting local staples including pine mushrooms and operating stores in hotels. A large portion of the $100 million to $200 million North Korea makes each year from exporting weapons, producing counterfeit dollars, smuggling fake cigarettes and selling drugs are also put into Kim’s slush fund.

A North Korean source said a lot of the cash profits generated by the joint tourism business with South Korea end up inside Kim’s personal slush fund too, judging by the fact that Daesong Bank and Zokwang Trading, which do business with the South, are both controlled by Room 39.

Early this year, Kim appointed his high school friend Jon Il-chun to head Room 39. Jon was made the chief of a state development bank North Korea opened recently to lure foreign investment. A South Korean government official said there are suspicions that Kim is diverting some of the profits of the state development bank into his own slush fund as well.

Read the full story here:
How N.Korea’s Ruling Family Swells Its Private Coffers
Choson Ilbo
4/28/2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-04-20-1
2010-04-20

Ri Ki Song, a professor at the Institute of Economics, a part of North Korea’s Academy of Social Sciences, acknowledged during an interview on April 18 that the North’s currency revaluation of last November had caused some instability to unfold across the country. Professor Ri emphasized during an interview in Pyongyang with Kyoto News, “there was some temporary unrest in some areas . . . but there was absolutely no social upheaval and unstable situations were immediately controlled.”

Professor Ri, in answering questions for the Japanese news agency, was the first North Korean to acknowledge the problems caused by the reform. Regarding foreign media reports of the currency reform, Ri stated that the articles did not reflect the reality of the situation, and that the reforms had not destabilized the North Korean society. These comments were in line with those he made on April 1, when he stated at an APTN press conference, “Many people outside of North Korea have been noisily prattling on about problems emerging during exchange rate fluctuations, but there is no social unrest of the kind they speak of.”

He explained that some instability had occurred because price controls and other measures had not immediately followed the revaluation, and that “markets did not open for a few days [after the currency reform],” acknowledging that preparations for the measures had been insufficient. He also explained that following the currency reform, North Korean authorities had taken steps such as reducing prices on some foods and slashing unproductive expenditures. The government also encouraged women to take up jobs in light industry and in the service sector, and repaired the transport system. In an effort to develop the economy in 2010, the North Korean government boosted the budgets for the light industrial sector by 10.1 percent, and that of agriculture by 9.4 percent.

Professor Ri went on to say that authorities had reduced the price of a kilogram of rice from 40 won to 24 won, had lowered the price of eggs to 8 won, and had cut the prices on cooking oil and soap, as well. He added that this trend will continue for the near future.

The currency revaluation, the first of its kind since 1992, was aimed primarily at increasing the value of the North’s money and harnessing inflation, but despite the reform, the government is still managing foreign exchange rates. While keeping exchange rates under control, Ri stated that authorities could still adjust the value of the won, depending on economic developments as well as other domestic and international conditions.

In both the APTN and Kyoto interviews, Professor Ri called foreign coverage of the North’s economic situation “exceptional,” and insisted that nothing was wrong with the DPRK economy.

The Strategic Studies Institute has published a paper on the DPRK’s illicit activities.  You can download the paper here (PDF). It has been added to my DPRK Economic Statistics page.  Here is the forward:

The authors of this monograph have exposed a key piece of the puzzle which helps to provide a better understanding of North Korea’s surreptitious international behavior. For years, North Korea’s military provocations have been obvious to the world, however, much of its decisionmaking is shrouded in secrecy, particularly that of a wide-range of clandestine activities. This monograph is unique in the way that it sheds light on the illicit activities of the regime, and how those illegal activities are used to support its military programs and the government itself.

From drug trafficking to counterfeiting, from money laundering to cigarette smuggling, North Korea’s Central Committee Bureau 39 is an active participant in the criminal economy of the region with tentacles extending well beyond Asia. The authors discuss how these activities have negative strategic consequences for a number of stakeholders and nations throughout the region while describing how such activities provide critical funding streams for military programs and regime supporters.

As a result, North Korea is not just a “rogue state,” but practices what is essentially criminal sovereignty whereby it organizes its illegitimate activities behind the shield of non-intervention while using the tools of the state to perpetrate these schemes abroad. The authors argue that this arrangement has important links to succession issues within the regime. They also argue that policy makers who are concerned with the development of future policies and strategies aimed toward North Korea must view those new policies from a different perspective than that used in the past.

This paper draws heavily on information from Kim Kwang-jin who is working at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. Without Mr. Kim’s contributions, much of this activity would remain unknown to us.  You can make a donation to support Mr. Kim’s work here in the US at this web page.

According to KCNA:

Report on Implementation of 2009 Budget and 2010 Budget
 
Pyongyang, April 9 (KCNA) — Deputy Pak Su Gil, vice-premier and minister of Finance, delivered a report on the results of the implementation of the DPRK state budget for last year and its state budget for this year at the 2nd Session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly held on Friday.

According to the report, the state budget for last year was successfully implemented and, as a result, the state budgetary revenue was overfulfilled 1.7 per cent, an increase of 7 per cent over the previous year.

Ministries, national institutions, management bureaus and complexes overfulfilled the national plans for budgetary revenue and all provinces, cities and counties across the country also overfulfilled their plans for local budgetary revenue.

Last year’s plan for state budgetary expenditure was carried out at 99.8 per cent.

An investment from the state budget was focused on the development of metal industry while a huge financial allocation was made for the power and coal industries and the railway transport.

8.6 per cent more funds than the previous year were spent for capital construction and expenditure was increased for agriculture and light industry.

A 7.2 per cent greater financial disbursement than the previous year was made for the field of science and technology, surpassing the level of the latest science and technology in domains of space technology, nuclear technology and CNC technology and putting the key industries of the national economy on a high scientific and technological basis.

A large amount of fund went to the field of cultural construction and 15.8 per cent of the total state budgetary expenditure was spent for national defence.

The reporter said that the scale of revenue and expenditure in the state budget for this year has been set on the principle of improving the people’s standard of living to meet the requirements of the policy of the Workers’ Party of Korea on conducting a great offensive to bring about a decisive turn in the above-said work.

This year’s plan for state budgetary revenue is expected to grow 6.3 per cent over last year. The revenue from the profits of state enterprises, the main source of state budgetary revenue, is expected to go up 7.7 per cent over last year, that from the profits of cooperative organizations 4.2 per cent, that from the fixed asset depreciation 2.5 per cent, that from real estate rent 2 per cent and that from social insurance 1.9 per cent.

This year’s plan for state budgetary expenditure is expected to show an 8.3 per cent increase over last year.

The spending for the light industry is expected to go up 10.1 per cent, that for agriculture 9.4 per cent and that for metal, power and coal industries and railway transport 7.3 per cent as compared with last year.

The expenditure for the machine-building industry is expected to go up and an 8.5 per cent bigger financial allocation will be made for scientific researches and the introduction of new technologies.

A 6.2 per cent bigger financial disbursement than last year is expected to be made to more successfully enforce the popular policies, a proof of the advantages of Korean-style socialism centered on the popular masses.

15.8 per cent of the total state budgetary expenditure for this year is expected to be spent for national defence.

It is expected that a large amount of educational aid fund and stipends will be sent for the children of Koreans in Japan this year, too.

In order to successfully implement this year’s state budget, all domains and units of the national economy should work out enterprising and realistic business strategy and management strategy and tenaciously carry them out by relying on a high degree of mental power of the producer masses and thus fulfill the plans for budgetary revenue without fail, stressed the reporter.

And according to the Choson Ilbo:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il can freely dispose of 20 percent of his country’s budget, a former secretary of North Korean Workers’ Party has said that. Hwang Jang-yop told the Asahi Shimbun, “Only 30 percent of the budget is spent on public services, while 50 percent is earmarked for military spending.” Hwang defected to South Korea in 1997.

Hwang was interviewed by the daily during his visit to Japan on April 4-8. “Kim Jong-il’s dictatorship is 10 times worse than his father’s. People have a painful life,” he said.

Asked if the North is likely to abandon its nuclear weapons program, he said, “There is no such possibility. But the North won’t use the weapons. They’re a means to maintain the regime.”

To the question why Kim’s eldest son Jong-nam was passed over for the succession, he said, “At first, Kim Jong-il thought of choosing his eldest son as his successor. But he seems to have changed his mind as he fell in love with Ko Young-hee, the mother of Jong-un, his third son, after Jong-nam’s mother Song Hye-rim died.”

Commenting on the North’s bizarre abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 80s, he said, “The North needed native Japanese to train agents who would work in Japan.”

Read the full story here:
Kim Jong-il ‘Gets 20% of N.Korea’s Budget for His Own Use’
Choson Ilbo
4/12/2010

Wall Street Journal
Marcus Noland
4/12/2010

North Korea likes to project an image of strength to the world. But back home, there is a serious economic crisis playing out that could have long-term repercussions. Historians may look back and see this as a tipping point.

The crisis originated in November, when the government sprang upon the public a confiscatory currency reform that wiped out household saving and the working capital of traders and entrepreneurs. The value of the North Korean won predictably plunged as people abandoned it for foreign currencies and even physical goods—anything that could preserve value. The second shoe dropped a month later when the state extended its war on privately held capital, banning the use of foreign currencies.

The government’s intent was to reconstitute orthodox communism. Earlier in August, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s sister, Kim Kyong Hui, telegraphed the move in an essay extolling the superiority of central planning over the decentralized market—even trashing the notion of giving enterprise managers greater autonomy in the context of a socialist economy. The regime’s basic motive—to crush the market and strengthen direct state control—was confirmed by central bank statements immediately after the reform.

But the policy, which was supposed to constitute the political coming out of expected heir Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s third and youngest son, unleashed extraordinary, though sporadic, protests. The government backtracked, allowed markets to reopen and in February issued an unprecedented apology. Park Nam-ki, a 77-year-old technocrat who upon becoming the Party’s economics chief allegedly vowed to end the “capitalist fantasy,” was scapegoated and reportedly executed.

Once broken, the economy may prove difficult to repair. Prices for goods such as rice, corn, and the dollar rose 6,000 percent or more after the reform. And while prices have come down from their peak as the government has relaxed some of its strictures, they are currently still 600 percent or more above their prereform levels—in spite of the money-supply contraction.

The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization reports that the country is more than one million metric tons short of grain. This estimate is likely exaggerated due to faulty methodology, but anecdotal reports of hunger are emerging from returning visitors and refugee networks. It appears the government persuaded farmers in cooperatives to accept cash in lieu of half of their annual in-kind grain allotment—then rendered the bonus worthless via the currency reform. Farmers are now hoarding grain however they can: The United Nations Development Program reports that post-harvest losses amount to 30 percent. The farm economy has been severely disrupted. But unlike the 1990s famine, which was largely an urban phenomenon and killed perhaps a million people, hunger is now reported in the countryside.

The state’s response to these developments has not been reassuring. After Mr. Park was executed, he was replaced by an octogenarian, Yun Gi Jeong, known primarily as a confidante of North Korea’s founder, Kim Il-sung. The political police have been bureaucratically elevated and placed directly under the National Defense Commission, from where Kim Jong-il runs the state. This is not the behavior of a confident or competent government.

The recent missteps are particularly damaging because they are so obviously self-inflicted and nakedly incompatible with the regime’s narrative that ascribes all the nation’s challenges to hostile foreign forces. A survey of 300 North Korean refugees conducted in November 2008 by Stephan Haggard of the University of California San Diego found that respondents were increasingly accessing foreign sources of news and disinclined to accept the government’s explanations, instead holding it responsible for their plight. The currency fiasco will accelerate these trends.

Widespread disillusion, even dissent, does not guarantee mobilization, however. The same survey found that the population remains atomized and mostly fearful of communicating these views, even to friends and family. But the state can justify its hatred of the market in one respect: People participating in market activities are significantly more likely to communicate their dissent to their peers.

There is no reason to expect that this attempt to revive orthodox communism will succeed. But an influx of aid, which would allow the state to keep goods on the shelves and satisfy key constituencies, would make it easier. It is rumored that Kim Jong-il will visit China later this month and that the Chinese will extract a commitment by the North Koreans to rejoin the stalled Six Party Talks over its nuclear program.

If North Korea does agree, economic distress and the opportunity to wheedle more aid out of China and the United States may explain this change of heart. China has effectively taken up the mantle of the previous South Korean government’s “sunshine policy,” and within the US government there are already discussions of another “food for talks” swap to bring the North Koreans back to the table.

North Korea’s retrograde moves are wrecking its economy and propagating discontent among the masses. But the country is bereft of civil society institutions capable of channeling that discontent into constructive political action. Aid and repression may permit the regime to pursue anachronistic communism for some time, but the next leader will inherit an ultimately untenable situation.

According to Yonhap:

North Korea’s market prices and currency exchange rate appear to be stabilizing after severe fluctuations from an abrupt government-led currency reform last year, the Seoul government said Tuesday.

North Korea carried out a currency revaluation last November, a measure it said was to curb inflation. Analysts here linked it to a power transition from North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to his third and youngest son, Jong-un. The currency redenomination is said to have fueled inflation and severe food shortages, causing social unrest in the tightly controlled nation.

In its latest North Korea report submitted to parliament’s foreign affairs committee, the Unification Ministry said that market prices in the country were on a “downward path” following recent measures by the North Korean authorities.

A kilogram of rice, which cost around 20 North Korean won immediately after the revaluation, soared to 1,000 won in mid-March but dropped to the 500-600 won range in early April, the ministry said.

The value of the North Korean won against the U.S. dollar, which nosedived to the 2,000-won range in mid-March from the 30-won range, also rose to the 600-700 won level in early April, according the ministry.

On Kim Jong-il, the ministry said the reclusive leader has made 43 public appearances this year as of Monday, about the same as last year during the same period, and added he is “actively continuing public outings.” Kim is believed to have suffered a stroke in 2008, which spawned speculation of an imminent power transfer.

Read the full sotry here:
N. Korea’s inflation, exchange rate stabilizing after currency reform shock: Seoul
Yonhap
Tony Chang
4/13/2010

According to the Korea Times:

The remains of a U.S. serviceman who went missing in action during the 1950-53 Korean War were recently returned to his family for burial, almost six years after they were excavated in North Korea, the U.S. Department of Defense said Thursday.

The soldier, Army Cpl. Stanley P. Arendt, was buried on March 29 in Palantine, Ill. with full military honors, the Pentagon said in a statement.

In May 2004, a joint U.S.-North Korean team excavated a mass grave near the town of Unsan after receiving a report that an elderly North Korean national had witnessed the death of U.S. soldiers at the site.

The team recovered remains and other personal artifacts that ultimately lead to the identification of seven soldiers.

Arendt was assigned to the 8th Cavalry Regiment in November 1950. According to the Pentagon, “Arendt’s unit was involved in heavy fighting which devolved into hand-to-hand combat around their command post” near Unsan.

Some 400 men were reported missing in action or killed in action during the battle at Unsan, the statement said.

The United States conducted more than 30 excavation missions in the North from 1996 to 2005, finding the remains of what it believed to be some 230 soldiers. It estimates that the remains of some 8,000 of its soldiers are still there.

The joint excavation project between the two countries was halted in 2005 due to tensions over the North’s nuclear ambitions.

On Monday, the North threatened to abandon its efforts to preserve the remains of U.S. soldiers who went missing during the war, unless the United States agrees to restart the project soon. In response, the U.S. State Department hinted the excavations could begin again after the North returns to the six-party talks on its denuclearization.

The project had been a source of hard currency for the North, which has reportedly been struggling with a worsening food situation and reeling from the effects of its disastrous currency revaluation.

Read the full story here:
Remains of US MIA From Korean War Returned
Korea Times
Kim Young-jin
4/9/2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
NK Brief No. 10-04-05-1
4/5/2010

It has recently been verified that following the currency reforms at the end of last year, North Korea passed 11 laws revising and reforming the system of government control over the economy. Among these measures is a law banning the black market sales of grain.

The North’s food administration law, revised last November 3, clearly bans the black market trade and smuggling of grains, and sets the punishment for such activities as the confiscation of the grains in question. In addition, an order was passed down stating that when food supplies are rationed to a labor management office, they are to be distributed in accordance with a worker’s efforts, position, and productivity. On the same day, a new agricultural law was passed that stated if organizations and groups that were granted land for private plots failed to meet state-set harvest quotas, the plots could be confiscated.

In November and December of last year, North Korea also enacted the Real Estate Management Law, Goods Consumption Standard Law, Construction Materials Import Law, Import/Export Country of Origin Law, Waterworks Law, Labor Quantity Law, Farm Law, Sewer System Law, and the Mariner Law. Among these, the Labor Quantity Law sets the number of laborers per hourly production demands, stipulates labor contracts, and determines remuneration in accordance with worker performance. This law is unprecedented in that it allows the responsible organization or business managers or supervisors administrative and even penal authority by giving them power over labor evaluations and payment.

The Farm Law allows each farm to retain some of its harvest, and making it responsible for selling its goods to the state, while on the other hand, forbidding illegal agricultural production. This law, by strengthening state control over agricultural goods, appears to be an effort to restart the Public Distribution System.

The Real Estate Law, a mechanism to collect user fees, stipulates, “Real estate cannot be lent or left to different individuals, groups, organizations or enterprises without the permission of the applicable authority.” Along with this, the law on consumption includes a clause that links consumption of particular goods with those goods’ production in order to prevent waste, as well as a clause designed to reduce or eliminate the use of imported goods.

The law on the import of construction materials gives the government leverage in all aspects of such activity, including planning, processing, transfer, inspection, construction and testing. In addition, if someone from an enterprise or organization imports construction goods without government authorization, changes an import plan, distributes, transports, or wastes construction wares, he or she is subject to administrative punishment.

Ultimately, economic legislation enacted or revised after the currency reform appears to be aimed at strengthening the planned economic system while increasing government control over public revenue and encouraging efforts to recover without outside assistance.