Archive for the ‘Special Economic Zones’ Category

More dam construction…

Tuesday, April 22nd, 2008

The Donga Ilbo reports that the DPRK going to supply water to the the Kaesong Industrial Complex by diverting it from a river that flows into South Korea:

North Korea is confirmed to be trapping water behind the walls of the Hwang River Dam in the upper stream of the Imjin River, something which will lead to a water shortage in certain parts of South Korea.  

The multi-purpose dam has a water storage capacity of 300 million to 400 million tons, much more than that of the Hantan River Dam (270 million tons), the Paldang Dam (244 million tons) and the Cheongpyeong Dam (180 million tons).

North Korea is expected to supply water for industry and drinking to the Gaesong Industrial Complex from the Hwang River Dam via the Ryesong River.

North Korea can directly control 420 million to 520 million tons of water with the Hwang River Dam in addition to its fourth “April 5 Dam,” which can store 30 million tons of water in the upper stream of the Imjin River.

The (South) Korea Water Resources Corp. said, “When North Korea suddenly traps or discharges water, South Korea cannot respond to such actions with just the Gunnam Flood Control Dam and the Hantan River Dam.”

Rad the full article here:
N.Korean Dam to Cause Water Shortage in S.Korea
Donga Ilbo
4/22/2008

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KFA wraps up business delegation to DPRK…

Monday, March 10th, 2008

In the words of Alejandro himself:

[The] Korean Friendship Association concluded its first busines [sic] delegation, headed by Mr. Alejandro Cao de Benos, Special Delegate and KFA President, in collaboration with the DPRK Committee for Cultural Relations, Ministry of Trade and the DPRK Chamber of Commerce. The group included companies from Australia, France, Spain and Lebanon in different sectors like ship building, foodstuff production, medicine, IT and infrastructure, etc. The visit was a big success and 75% of the investors signed letter of intentions and contracts. All of the participants agreed that DPR Korea has a huge potential and new market with many interesting opportunities with the lowest taxes and wages but with the most skilled, motivated workforce. The companies fullfiled [sic] all their plans and resolved the questions during the visit and they had meetings with their Korean counterparts as well as with the officials of Trade, Chamber of Commerce, Banking authorities and logistics.

They visited a Foodstuff factory,  Heavy Machinery complex, Ostrich farm as well as the ‘Kaesong Industrial Zone’ in the border with South Korea, were they had a briefing by the Director representative of Hyundai-ASAN.

After that, the investors visited a South Korean cable-making factory and a garment manufacturing plant specialized in high quality sport brands.

From KFA we congratulate the companies that concluded agreements and established Joint Ventures in the DPRK and wish them success in their projects.

From a follow up post on the KFA forum, one of the attendees appears to be Mr. Kevin Liu, head of Asian Division of London-based Exclusive Analysis.

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Germans break ground in Kaesong

Thursday, March 6th, 2008

According to Business Week German auto parts manufacturer, Prettl, became the first non-Korean firm to start building a plant inside a joint inter-Korean factory complex in North Korea–breaking ground Wednesday.  Kim Min-kyung with the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee claims the factory will be open in December and employ 550 North Koreans.

Other facts:

Two Chinese companies also signed contracts last year to run factories in the area but have not started construction, Kim said.

A total of 69 South Korean companies are currently operating in the zone, employing some 23,220 North Korean laborers, according to the management committee.

The full article can be found here:
German firm breaks ground in North Korea
Business Week
3/5/2008

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Stratgeic alliances in North East Asia: Railways, ports, and energy

Tuesday, March 4th, 2008

Writing in today’s Asia Times, Dr. Leonid Petrov analyses the complexity of Russia, Rok, DPRK, and Chinese relations:

Russia and North Korea:

Territorial claims, in one form or another, involve almost all countries adjacent in this region with the exception of Russia and Korea. The Joint Russian Federation-DPRK Commission for the Demarcation of State Borders has recently completed its work by documenting and marking the 17-kilometer frontier. This strip of uninhabited and swampy land in the mouth of the Tumannaya (Tuman-gang) River plays an exceptionally important geopolitical role. It not only provides the two countries with land access to each other, but also prevents Chinese access to the East Sea (Sea of Japan).

China and North Korea: 

Here, some 50km north of the small port that forms the core of North’s Rajin-Seonbong Special Economic Zone, the interests of Russia and China are now at stake. Russia is rapidly repairing the railroad track, and China (in a similarly speedy manner) is constructing a new automobile highway, both leading from their respective borders to the port of Rajin. Russia, investing at least 1.75 billion rubles (US$72 million) into this project, seeks to strongly connect Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian Railroad. China, in turn, hopes to divert the growing cargo traffic to its own territory, offering the efficient network of railroads for delivery of South Korean and Japanese goods to Central Asian and European markets. What position will the government of North Korea take in this clash of ambitions?

Russia and South Korea (energy and trade):

In 2007, the volume of the export of “black gold” from Russia to South Korea reached 38.13 million barrels (2.7 times more than in the previous year). The relative proximity of the Russian oil and gas fields is an attractive factor for Korean companies who actively search for alternatives to Middle East oil suppliers. This year South Korea will for the first time start importing natural gas from Russia. The expected volume of delivery during 2008 is 1.5 million tons (or 5.1% of South Korea’s annual demand).

and

Trade relations between Russia and Korea are steadily growing. According to customs statistics, last year Russia recorded the sharpest increase of South Korean imports (56.2% more than in 2006). Due to the inflow of “petro-dollars” the new class of nouveaux riches in Russia began actively buying Korean automobiles, cell phones, television sets and LCD monitors. South Korea exported to Russia goods worth US$8.1 billion (including $3.296 billion of automobiles, $859 million of mobile phone equipment, motor vehicles and spare parts worth $659 million). As for trade with North Korea, in 2006 Russia occupied third place after China and South Korea and absorbed 9% of the total $3.18 billion spent by the North on imports.

More on Russia/South Korea energy talk here. 

The whole article deserves reading here:
Russia lays new tracks in Korean ties
Asia Times
Leonid Petrov
3/5/2008

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DPRK demanding $100 USD residence fee at Kaesong Industrial Complex

Monday, March 3rd, 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies
NK Brief No. 08-3-7-1
3/7/2008
 
North Korea’s latest demand at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is a 100 USD per person registration fee for South Korean workers residing in the complex’s dormitories. The North demanded the fee early in 2007 to cover registration and issuance of registration certificates regarding workers visiting or residing in the complex, and negotiations have been underway the entire year.

An unnamed source close to the South Korean government stated, “At the end of January, the North unilaterally decided on the KIC visiting and residing fees, and when they were not complied with [the North] notified [the South] that they would ban entrance” to the complex, however, “despite this, currently entrance into the complex is freely obtainable.”

The North set a 35 USD fee for registering a short-term stay of up to 90 days, and a 100 USD fee for registering a one-year residency, according to the source. A Unification Ministry official acknowledged, “The fee demanded by the North is not exorbitant, but from the perspective of the businesses in the complex, negotiations on reasonable measures were in progress.”

North Korea is making its demands based on the ‘Kaesong Industrial Zone Entrance, Dwelling and Residence Regulation’ enacted in December 2003. According to this regulation, fees must be paid for issuance and reissuance of registration papers when applying for short term stays up to 90 days, long term visits over 90 days, and residency of one year or more. Currently, there are over 800 South Korean employees who would need to pay fees for visiting or residing at KIC.

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More on the DPRK anti-corruption campaign…

Sunday, February 24th, 2008

Details are starting to emerge on North Korea’s recent anti-corruption drive.   

North Korean authorities have been investigating the chief of a North Korean committee in charge of inter-Korean economic cooperation for months after seizing $20 million from his house, a report said Friday.

Quoting an unidentified Chinese source informed on North Korean affairs, the Dong-A Ilbo newspaper said Pyongyang authorities are intensifying their investigation into Jung Woon-eop and 80 other officials of the committee over where the money came from.

It is possible that this is just a good old fashoned purge.

It is also possible that this campaign is the first stage in a policy shift.

The full article can be found here:
NK Official Suspected of Embezzling Funds From Seoul
Korea Times
Jung Sung-ki
02-22-2008

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Haeju receives South Korean broadcasts

Friday, February 22nd, 2008

How pervasive is the flow of outside information in North Korea?  Typically stories in the media answer this question as though geography is the determinate variable: Cities near the Chinese border are the most influenced by heterodox ideas (since cell phones, clear television signals, and smuggling have been commonplace for years), and cities in the south (along the DMZ) are the most isolated (aside from Kaesong).  North Korea’s internal travel restrictions prevent foreign ideas from spreading.  This view was recently repeated by Andrei Lankov.

“The Kaesong exception” is thought to be correlated to the growth of the the Kaesong Industrial Zone.  The theory goes that the thousands of North Koreans who are employed in Kaesong (who work in South Korean facilities for South Korean managers) pick up bits of outside information at the margin and share it with their friends and family back home.  It is not an unreasonable theory.   

A new story in the Daily NK, however, presents evidence which points to ideological contamination on a nationwide scale (irrespective of geography).  The story claims that the city of Haeju is not only thoroughly exposed to South Korean radio and television – it is a production hub of a pirate video market:

“We can receive the TV broadcast of KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) and SBS (Seoul Broadcasting System) fine in Haeju. Sometimes, we can watch MBC (Moonhwa Broadcasting Corporation) as well. I watched Dae Jo Yong (a popular TV drama from KBS) on TV. However, I wanted to watch it again, so I bought a CD and watched it several more time.” He said, “We can get copies of South Korean TV programs from China. However, a great number of copies are also produced in Haeju.”

In a nod to communist efficiency, the subject interviewed in the Daily NK story even claims that in Haeju it is easier to pick up South Korean television signals than those from North Korea! 

With a “manufacturing” facility in Haeju, black market DVDs or VCDs can be copied and distributed throughout the south east even if security is tighter along the Chinese border.  Additionally, these DVDs/VCDs would be cheaper and more widely distributed because they are produced locally (as opposed to using Chinese labor/capital) and will require fewer middlemen to get them across the border and into the hands of consumers.  If this has been going on for some time, then it is safe to assume that most urban centers from Haeju to Pyongyang have regular access to South Korean media! 

Of course a decline in acceptance of the state ideology means the government must rely on external controls (rather than an individual’s self-control) to maintain the system.  The good news is that external controls can be avoided through technolgy, corruption, or both: 

“In the border areas with China and South Korea such as Hwanghae and Kangwon Province, the North Korean authorities try to prevent people from watching S. Korean TV by soldering and pre-tuning TV sets to Chonsun (North Korea) Central TV. Lately, the authorities also attempt to restrict the usage of remote control by covering the sensor with silver paper.

However, North Korean people circumvent the regulation. Instead of giving away their remote control to the authorities, they purchase an extra and watch the TV as they please after removing the silver paper. After all, the authorities’ efforts to control TV channels turn out to be futile for those who have remote control TV sets.

The full article can be found here:
North Korean People Copy South Korean TV Drama for Trade
Daily NK
Lee Sung Jin
2/22/2008

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The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated..

Sunday, February 17th, 2008

Update:
It seems opposition efforts to spare the South Korean Ministry of Unification were not entirely successful. Yonhap is reporting that even though the ministry will retain its name, much of the rest of it is on the chopping block.

Sources said that if the ministry is retained, its five divisions and one office may be reduced to a single office and three bureaus, with part of its work transferred to the other ministries.

The ministry’s five division headquarters — including unification policy, economic cooperation and cultural exchange — are likely to be reorganized into smaller bureaus, with public relations and information analysis to come under the direct control of the minister.

The office in charge of the Kaesong industrial complex may be turned over to the newly created Ministry of Knowledge-based Economy.

However, the ministry may retain control of inter-Korean dialogue headquarters, the inter-Korean transit office, and a settlement support team for people who have fled North Korea.  (Yonhap)

Although I personally favor an engagement policy with the DPRK, sending the signal that MoU standard practices will no longer be tolerated might actually encourage the DPRK to use donated funds and supplies in an acceptible way.  Remember: carrots AND sticks.  See the game theory here.  However, since the DPRK’s new game seems to play the US, China, Russia, and South Korea off of each other, some are concerned that pushing the DPRK too hard on accoutability and transparency in managing their donations might simply shift North Korea more firmly into China’s corner–which according to Lankov, they already have a strong incentive to do… 

Original Post: 2/8/2008
In the political shake up following the recent South Korean elections, incoming President Lee Myung-bak floated the idea of merging the Ministry of Unification (responsible for the North Korea protfolio) with the South Korean Foreign Ministry.  The story is here.

Today, Reuters is reporting that the Unification Ministry is here to stay.  Afterall, the first rule of bureaucracy is, “Why have one ministry when you can have two at twice the cost!” 

South Korean lawmakers have agreed to spare the ministry responsible for relations with North Korea and reject a call for its closure made by the president-elect, local media reported on Saturday.

The compromise allows the Unification Ministry to stay while lawmakers try to strike a deal to shut other ministries in a plan backed by Lee to streamline government, local media reported lawmakers as saying.

Critics say Lee’s proposal to close the ministry primarily responsible for relations with North Korea could send the wrong signal to Pyongyang, which has long accused Lee’s conservative party of plotting to keep the peninsula divided.

The Unification Ministry has been at the centre of criticism that the outgoing government had been too soft on the impoverished North, pouring aid across the border despite internationally condemned missile and nuclear tests. (Reuters)

The full article can be found here:
South Korea to keep ministry on North: media
Reuters
Rhee So-eui
2/8/2008

New gov’t to downsize Unification Ministry
Yonhap
2/17/2008

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David Kang on North Korean trade potential

Tuesday, February 12th, 2008

Kang: North Korean Trade Potential
Council on Foreign Relations
12/17/2007

Last December, David C. Kang, a professor of government at Dartmouth College and an adjunct professor at Tuck Business School, discussed the North Korean economy for the Council on Foreign Relations. I have excerpted some of his comments below.

His view on the new North-South cargo train service:

It doesn’t have huge economic significance in the overall GDP of North Korea. But it does have major economic significance in the fact that what North Korea had to do in order to let a train go through was an awful lot of adjustment[…]in terms of linking up the railroad, all the ministries had to prepare.  The old [Korean Energy Development Organization] had this problem as well. [W]hen they wanted Americans and South Koreans working in North Korea to build this light-water reactor, [they] had to set up protocols [Post offices, phone calls, where they were going to stay, etc]. It is pretty significant in terms of how much they had to adjust.

He quoted the following figures on North – South trade:

From $200 million in 1998, to now exceeding $1.7 billion in 2007.   South Korea’s total trade volume is $250 billion.

His opinion on the direction of the North Korean economy:

At this point what we’re seeing is very initial steps on the part of North Korea as they try to open up reform and yet maintain control. At the same time, they are being forced into a number of institutional changes and mind-set changes that are the first step forward in this process.

His view of North Korea’s comparative advantage:

Most of the companies that have gone in—the South Korean companies that have gone in—are assembly and light manufactures, such as or textiles and light consumer goods. This is the sort of obvious point of departure. It’s not hugely capital intensive in terms of building factories, and can take advantage of North Korean cheap labor and South Korean technological advantages.

There are a lot of potential mineral resources in North Korea, which would require a whole infrastructure of legal reforms to happen before anyone would take care of them. But at this point the safest bets are the ones that are on the order of assembly and light manufactures in the North and then exporting them out.

His view of South Korea’s long term goals:

If there’s unification, or even better relations, and South Korean companies can use cheap North Korean labor, instead of having to send those factories to China or Vietnam—not only do they speak Korean, they’re culturally similar, and the labor would be cheaper.

[I]f you could reconnect the railroads, from Japan, through Pusan [South Korea], up through North Korea, then out to China and Russia, you would be linking up all these economies in a much more efficient way than they are now. So everybody wants that. But obviously there’s the political problem. And even on the infrastructure side, the North Korean rail system is so old and so decrepit, that basically it would have to be rebuilt from zero. But the potential upsides are massive, in the long run.

His view of China’s engagement:

China has been essentially as deeply involved in economic engagement with North Korea as has South Korea—and by some measures, actually more so. Whereas South Koreans just do this assembling, some Chinese companies are moving in and building full factories in the North. There’s a lot of interest in Chinese-North Korean economic relations on both sides.

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ROK business optomistic about inter-Korean cooperation after nuke resolution

Tuesday, February 12th, 2008

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 08-2-12-1

2/12/2008

South Korean businesses currently involved in inter-Korean economic cooperation are facing many difficulties, both due to and in spite of the system in place, so that at the moment, investment in North Korea does not look much more appealing than in Vietnam or China.

The Korea Chamber of Commerce carried out a survey, titled “Business Perspective on the Direction of South-North Economic Cooperation Policy”, targeting 300 successful businesses (170 companies responded) and 200 companies currently involved in inter-Korean economic cooperation (132 companies responded). According to the results of the survey, 79.4 percent of companies involved in inter-Korean cooperation responded that they are “currently facing systemic and procedural difficulties.”

More specifically, 44.7 percent pointed to the “3-C” (commute, communication, and customs) issues, 22.4 percent pointed to “claim resolution procedures,” 14.3 percent highlighted “difficulties with financial transactions,” 11.8 percent chose the “ban on the import of strategic materials,” and 5 percent indicated that “limited markets” were the main issue.

In addition, 58 percent of responding companies noted issues not related to the system set up for inter-Korean cooperation. 36.6 percent pointed to difficulties resulting from the “lack of understanding of market economics,” 28.7 percent noted a “lack of supervision by managers,” 24.8 percent chose “uncooperative, highly tense attitudes,” and 8.9 percent pointed out “demands for quick production.”

When asked about the relative attractiveness of investment in North Korea if the current situation were maintained, as compared to Vietnam and China, only 27 percent responded, “more attractive”, while 53.7 percent, or twice as many companies, responded that investment was “impossible.”

However, 58 percent responded that, in the event the North’s nuclear issues were resolved, investment in North Korea would be “more attractive than China and Vietnam”, while only 21.7 percent responded that investment in the North would still be “impossible.”

The overall impression of these companies regarding inter-Korean cooperation is that “improvement of inter-Korean relations offers opportunities for new enterprises and is a positive influence on the South Korean economy” (65.3 percent), and 19 percent felt that cooperation would “in the future, serve as a springboard for the relaunch of the South Korean economy.” 15.7 percent of responding companies felt, however, that “there would be no substantial positive influence on the economy.”

Currently, a resolution to the North Korean nuclear issues is the most important factor, but it is imperative that pledges of the incoming ROK administration such as strengthening investment security, preparing claim resolution measures and other issues to placate business interests, and nurturing North Korean exporters, are institutionalized.

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