Archive for the ‘Special Economic Zones’ Category
Wednesday, October 15th, 2008
According to Yonhap:
Hyundai Asan Corp., a unit of the South’s Hyundai Group in charge of businesses in North Korea, opened the tour to Kaesong in December last year. Everyday, about 370 people visit the North Korean city, about 70 kilometers north of the frontier separating the two Koreas.
The high number of tourists to Kaesong comes as the two Koreas are still bickering over responsibility in the July death of the South Korean tourist, who was fatally shot dead by a North Korean soldier while touring the North’s scenic mountain resort of Geumgang.
Since then tours to Mt. Geumgang, which began in 1998, have been indefinitely suspended.
In a ceremony to celebrate the 100,000th tourist, Hyundai Asan Chief Executive Officer Cho Kun-shik expressed hope that the two Koreas could amicably resolve the impasse over the shooting death.
According to the Associated Press (via the New Zealand Hearld):
Company officials said most of the tourists have been South Koreans but about 2,600 Americans, Japanese and other foreigners also have taken part in the programme.
Before the [Kumgangsan] shooting incident, about 10,000 people travelled to Kaesong every month, but the number of monthly visitors declined to about 7,450 in August and 5,770 in September, according to Hyundai Asan.
Facts:
1. By May 2008, 40,090 tourists had visited Kaesong, and the daily quota was increased from 300 to 500.
2. Last August, Hyundai announced it was sending $928,560 to North Korea for the Kaesong tours.
3. According to Dr. Lankov, the price to customers is W180,000, W100,000 of which is paid to the DPRK. Additionally, Hyundai pays for all infrastructure improvements. If these numbers are correct, the DPRK has grossed (and probably netted) W10,000,000,000 since the project was launched (appx. US$9,800,000 using an average interbank exchange rate from January through today).
4. Although Hyundai Asan asserts (above) that appx. 370 tourists visit Kaesong per day, the most recent monthly figures (5,770 in September) indicate a mere 192/day. 370 is the number derived by taking the total (100,000) and dividing it by the number of days the project has run (appx. 270 this year)…so the daily average trend by month is now well below the annualized daily average.
Read more here:
N. Korean city draws 100,000 tourists from South despite shooting impasse
Yonhap
10/15/2008
North Korea: Border city draws 100,000 tourists
Associated Press (via the New Zealand Hearld)
10/16/2008
Posted in Economic reform, Joint Ventures, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Tourism | 3 Comments »
Thursday, October 2nd, 2008
North Korea Uncovered: Version 12
Download it here
About this Project: This map covers North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, markets, manufacturing facilities, energy infrastructure, political facilities, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, national parks, shipping, mining, and railway infrastructure. It is continually expanding and undergoing revisions. This is the 12th version.
Additions include: Tongch’ang-dong launch facility overlay (thanks to Mr. Bermudez), Yongbyon overlay with destroyed cooling tower (thanks to Jung Min Noh), “The Barn” (where the Pueblo crew were kept), Kim Chaek Taehung Fishing Enterprise, Hamhung University of education, Haeju Zoo, Pyongyang: Kim il Sung Institute of Politics, Polish Embassy, Munsu Diplomatic Store, Munsu Gas Station, Munsu Friendship Restaurant, Mongolian Embassy, Nigerian Embassy, UN World Food Program Building, CONCERN House, Czech Republic Embassy, Rungnang Cinema, Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, Pyongyang Number 3 Hospital, Electric Machines Facotry, Bonghuajinlyoso, Second National Academy of Sciences, Central Committee Building, Party Administration Building, Central Statistics Bureau, Willow Capital Food House, Thongounjong Pleasure Ground, Onpho spa, Phipa Resort Hotel, Sunoni Chemical Complex (east coast refinery), Ponghwa Chemical complex (west coast refinery), Songbon Port Revolutionary Monument, Hoeryong People’s Library, Pyongyang Monument to the anti Japanese martyrs, tideland reclamation project on Taegye Island. Additionally the electricity grid was expanded and the thermal power plants have been better organized. Additional thanks to Ryan for his pointers.
I hope this map will increase interest in North Korea. There is still plenty more to learn, and I look forward to receiving your contributions to this project.
Version 12 available: Download it here
Posted in Agriculture, Animation, Architecture, Art, Automobiles, Aviation, Banking, Cell phones, Coal, Communications, Computing/IT, Construction, Copper, Dams/hydro, Education, Electricity, Energy, Environmental protection, Film, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Food, Football (soccer), Foreign direct investment, Forestry, Gambling, Gasoline, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Gold, Golf, Google Earth, Health care, Hoteling, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), International trade, Joint Ventures, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Leisure, Library, Light Industry, Lumber, Manufacturing, Mass games, Military, Mining/Minerals, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Music, Nuclear, Pyongyang Metro, Railways, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Real estate, Religion, Restaurants, Sea shipping, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Sports, Television, Tourism, Transportation, Wind | 1 Comment »
Tuesday, September 30th, 2008
The DPRK’s recent efforts to reconstruct the Yongbyon 5MW nuclear reactor seem to have brought implementation of the “second” Agreed Framework to a halt, though it was already behind schedule. This week the US sent Chris Hill to Pyongyang to try and rescue the process which is hung up on verification protocol. The North claims to have sufficiently declared their nuclear capabilities and believe they should be removed from the US list of state sponsors of terror. The US does not believe this condition has been met and seeks to establish a protocol to verify if the North’s declaration is accurate.
Japan is also set to extend sanctions (due to expire) on the DPRK. According to Bloomberg:
Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party decided to extend sanctions against North Korea for six months after their Oct. 13 expiration date, Jiji Press reported.
LDP lawmakers agreed to extend the sanctions because North Korea took steps to reactivate its nuclear program and made little progress in an investigation into Japanese nationals abducted by North Korean agents, Jiji reported.
Prime Minister Taro Aso’s Cabinet is likely to endorse the extension by Oct. 10., the Japanese wire service said.
The sanctions include a ban on North Korean imports and the entry of North Korean ships into Japanese ports. The extension will be the fourth since sanctions began after North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test, Jiji said.
Just as the DPRKs hopes of restoring/establishing relations with Japan and the US start to dim, however, they have reached out to South Korea, with whom political relations had recently gone sour due to the South’s policy change from unsupervised aid provision under the “sunshine policy” to a quid-pro-quo relationship under a “policy of mutual benefits and common prosperity“. Additionally, the fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist in Kumgangsan led to a deterioration in cooperation between the two governments and suspension of the inter-Korean project (a cash cow for the North).
How much was the Sunshine Policy worth to the North? South Korean GNP lawmaker Jin Yeong, who analzed data submitted by the Unification Ministry and the Export-Import Bank of Korea, claims that the Kim and Roh administrations oversaw the transfer of 8.38 trillion South Korean Won in aid and loans since 1998.
Taking office in February 2003 after the second North Korean nuclear crisis emerged in September 2002, Roh doled out 5.68 trillion won to Pyongyang over his five-year term, double that of his predecessor Kim (2.70 trillion won).
Kim and Roh gave to North Korea 2.4 trillion won for building light-water reactors and in food aid; 2.5 trillion won to pin the price of rice aid to that of the global market; 2.8 trillion won for other aid including fertilizer; and 696 billion won in aid from advocacy groups and provincial governments.
In 2003, South Korean aid to the North reached a high of 1.56 trillion won. Then after North Korean leader Kim Jong Il declared that his country had gone nuclear in 2005, the Roh administration sent 1.48 trillion won to the North.
Jin said, “South Korea gave a loan with rice first in 2000. Payments on the loan are deferred for 10 years. Thus, we are to receive the first repayment installment in 2010. But most of the 2.4 trillion won in loans seem irrecoverable.”
PricewaterhouseCoopers Korea audited the fiscal 2007 accounts of Seoul`s inter-Korean cooperation funds, saying, “Considering the characteristics of the North Korean government, grave uncertainty exists over the possibility of redeeming the loans given to the regime. The ultimate outcome depends heavily on the conditions around the Korean Peninsula.”
Since President Lee Myung-bak took office this year, exchanges between the two Koreas have been rare. Still, aid to the light-water reactor and the Gaesong industrial complex projects and civilian donations have continued, amounting to a combined 211.3 billion won. (Donga Ilbo)
It appears the Russians are doing their part to bring the North and South together through a project they can all agree on—building a natural gas pipeline from Russia to South Korea via the DPRK:
South Korea plans to import $90 billion of natural gas from Russia via North Korea, with which it shares one of the world’s most heavily fortified borders, to reduce its reliance on more expensive cargoes arriving by sea.
State-run Korea Gas Corp. signed a preliminary agreement with OAO Gazprom, Russia’s largest energy company, to import 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas over 30 years starting in 2015, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy said in a statement. The accord was signed in Moscow during President Lee Myung Bak’s three-day visit that began yesterday.
Gazprom Chief Executive Officer Alexei Miller said after talks today between Lee and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that the exact delivery route hasn’t been determined and that shipments could begin as early as 2015.
“Russia suggested a pipeline via North Korea, which is expected to be more economical than other possible routes,” the minister said in a news briefing. “Russia will contact the North to discuss this.”
“Transporting gas through North Korea could be risky for South Korea,” said Kim Jin Woo, a senior research analyst at Korea Energy Economics Institute. “But the project will ease tensions on the Korean peninsula if Russia successfully persuades North Korea” to accept the plan.
North Korea could earn $100 million a year from the gas- pipeline project, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy said.
“Russia will supply the fuel in the form of LNG or compressed natural gas if negotiations with North Korea do not work out,” according to the ministry’s statement. South Korea and Russia will sign a final agreement in 2010 when a study on the route is completed.
South Korea is turning to Russia, holder of the world’s biggest proven gas reserves, as it faces intensifying competition for energy resources from China and Japan. Asia’s fourth-largest economy depends on gas for 16 percent of its power generation.
Under the agreement, a pipeline to South Korea will be laid via North Korea from gas fields on Sakhalin Island in Russia’s Far East. The pipeline would initially carry 10 billion cubic meters of gas a year, or about 20 percent of South Korea’s annual consumption. The cost of the gas link’s construction is estimated at $3 billion, the ministry said.
Read the full articles here:
South Korea Seeks $90 Billion of Russian Natural Gas
Bloomberg
Shinhye Kang
9/29/2008
Liberal Gov`ts Gave W8.38 Bln to North Korea`
Donga Ilbo
9/30/2008
Posted in Agriculture statistics, Energy, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign aid statistics, International Aid, International trade, Japan, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Natural Gas, Nuclear, RoK Ministry of Unification, Russia, South Korea, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Statistics, USA | 1 Comment »
Monday, September 15th, 2008
The South Korean Ministry of Unification has reports on economic output at the Kaesong Industrial Zone. Below are the highlights from Yonhap:
The total output by South Korean factories operating in North Korea has exceeded US$400 million, Seoul’s Unification Ministry said Monday.
Companies at the Kaesong industrial complex produced goods worth a total of US$410 million between January 2005, when the compound was opened, and July this year. One-fifth of all goods produced were exported, according to the ministry handling inter-Korean affairs.
The output in the first seven months of this year amounted to $140 million, up 51 percent from the same period last year.
As of August, 79 firms operated in the area, employing more than 32,000 North Korean workers, mostly women.
Read the full article here:
Production in inter-Korean business town tops $400 million
Yonhap
9/15/2008
Posted in Economic reform, International trade, Joint Ventures, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, RoK Ministry of Unification, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | Comments Closed
Wednesday, September 3rd, 2008
On this page, I will keep a list of DPRK statutes and summaries:
1. Foreign Investment Law
2. Free Economic and Trade Zone Law
3. Equity Joint Venture Law
4. Contractual Joint Venture Law
5. Foreign Enterprises Law
6. Taxation of Foreign Invested Enterprises
7. Relevant Labor Laws
8. Leasing Land
9. Dispute Resolution
10. Domestic Sales Tax Regulations
11. Manufacturing & Export Operations
12. External Economic Arbitration Law
13. Commercial Joint Venture Law
14. Constitutions (x2)
15. Customs Law
16. Law on Economic Plans
17. Fisheries Law
18. Foreigners in FEZs
19. Intellectual Property
Click “read the rest of this entry” below to see summaries and statute text.
(more…)
Posted in Banking, DPRK Policies, Economic reform, Emigration, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), Intellectual Property, International trade, Joint Ventures, Labor conditions/wages, Manufacturing, Price liberalization, Private property, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Statutes | Comments Closed
Wednesday, August 27th, 2008
According to the Choson ilbo:
Following a request from the North in July 2005, the Unification Ministry and the Korea Tourism Organization bought 8,000 tons of asphalt pitch and subsidiary materials with about W4.9 billion from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund to repair Mt. Baekdu runway.
But inspection by the KTO in December 2005 showed construction to be shoddy because an insufficient amount of asphalt had been used. The Unification Ministry and the KTO bought another 8,000 tons of asphalt pitch and other materials with W4.4 billion from the fund in January 2006 and delivered them to the North.
But an inspection in 2007 by the Korea Expressway Corporation found that the paving was no different from that in December 2005, and that 3,497 tons of asphalt pitch had not been used to repair the runway, the BAI said.
The BAI presumes that W2 billion worth of aid materials were diverted illegally for other purposes.
And how did the South Korean’s respond?
The [Board of Audit and Inspection] said agencies including the Unification Ministry “made no preparations to deal with shoddy construction or illegal diversion of the fund.” They took “no action even when a senior North Korean cabinet counselor publicly said in 2006 the North would use a shipment to Nampo Port out of the aid materials to pave the runway of Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang” rather than Mt. Baekdu Airport.
As discussed before (here and here), South Korean development efforts (as conducted via the Ministry of Unification) have been poorly administered. There is little transparency and less accountability for poor decision making and results. Given this institutional environment, we can predict that resources will continue to be frequently diverted.
An alternative, and I believe more effective, economic development strategy which South Korea could adopt towards the DPRK is simply to end MoU structural development programs and allow South Korean businessmen to directly negotiate business opportunities with North Korean counterparts (as the Chinese, European, and others currently undertake). In this way, business persons risk their own capital and they are fully incentivized to make sure their efforts are properly administred. Even if some graft is necessary to get things done, at least it does not come from the South Korean Treasury.
Comments welcome.
Read the full article here:
N.Korea Diverted W2 Billion in Aid: BAI
Choson ilbo
8/26/2008
Posted in Aviation, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Tourism | 2 Comments »
Tuesday, August 26th, 2008
Andrei Lankov writes in the Korea Times that South Korea’s threats to reduce tourism levels to Kaesong, as well as support for the Kaesong Industrial Zone, are misguided. His reasoning is as follows:
North Korea is a very peculiar society, where the elite are almost entirely free from the pressures experienced by those below them. When sanctions are applied to such a regime, they seldom have a direct bearing on the elite and their lifestyle.
Sanctions usually work in an indirect way, by punishing the population which then might either rebel against the government or vote it out of power. Neither rebellion nor elections are possible in North Korea (well, elections are happening there, as everybody knows, with the approval rate of the government candidates standing at a world record high of 100 percent). As a result of sanctions the populace will die without protesting, while the elite will survive and stay in control, even if for a while they will have ride their beloved Mercedes limousines less frequently.
The only way to bring changes to North Korea is to create forces which will be able to challenge the government. This might lead to a revolution, but one cannot completely rule out that the regime will start giving in if sufficiently pressed from within.
In addition to Lankov’s point above, sanctions can perversely benefit those in power who control and profit from black market activity (at higher prices). Additionally, politically sophisticated leaders exploit the consequences of foreign-imposed sanctions to restrict domestic freedoms and political opposition.
Bossuyt (Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions) shows even the most optimistic accounts of sanctions point to only a third having partial success. Others find a mere 2% success rate among authoritarian regimes. So sanctions have a poor track record of inducing positive policy changes, particularly in North Korea.
So why are the Kaesong and Kumgang projects worthwhile? Though not all that economical, Lankov argues that these aid projects create alternate channels for information to permeate the hearts and minds of the isolated North Korean people, and that shattering the North’s monopoly on information is key to promoting change within the DPRK:
…in order to facilitate North Korea’s transformation, more truth about the outside world needs to be imported. The survival of the North Korean regime now critically depends on a few important myths, and each myth is patently false and hence very vulnerable.
When the North Korean propaganda-mongers are talking to the North Korean public, they have to hide how poor their country actually is, and they also have to lie about the great respect Kim and his regime enjoys worldwide, especially in South Korea. An increase in contact with the outside world is the best way to undermine these falsities.
…
The inconvenient truth regarding South Korea’s huge economic advantage will start to surface soon. It will probably take more time before it will dawn on the North Koreans that their Seoul guests are not exactly full of love and respect for the Pyongyang dynasty, either.
There is plenty of journalistic evidence that many North Koreans already know the South is “rich”—although they might not have any idea what that actually means. Still, of all the Hyundai projects in the DPRK, I believe the Kaesong Industrial Zone is probably the most helpful for the South in the long term. None of Hyundai’s other projects do all that much to improve the human capital of the DPRK people, and when things eventually change, it is important for the RoK to have a population of constituents in the DPRK who have some job and management skills and familiarity with the South’s culture to ease the transition.
Comments welcome.
Read the full article here:
Sanctions Harden Lives of Ordinary North Koreans
Korea Times
Andrei Lankov
8/20/2008
Posted in Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, International Aid, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | 1 Comment »
Sunday, August 24th, 2008
Last week, the Choson Ilbo reported on trade, tourism and other exchanges between the two Koreas:
The number of [South Korean] tourists to North Korea plunged more than 60 percent last month following the shooting death of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang resort.
The Unification Ministry says the number dropped to about 21,000, almost a 20 percent decrease from July of last year. The resort was closed after the shooting.
The amount of trade between the Koreas also dropped 1.5 percent from last year.
Although commercial transactions at the jointly-operated Kaesong Industrial Complex in the North increased more than 28 percent year on year, non-commercial transactions, such as aid to the North, plunged more than 80 percent.
Read more here:
Tourism to N. Korea Drops 60% in July
Choson Ilbo
8/18/2008
Posted in International Aid, International trade, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Tourism, Trade Statistics | 1 Comment »
Sunday, August 24th, 2008
Although the article did not offer much new or probing analysis, there were a few data points that I thought it was important to highlight:
Despite its isolation and prisonlike feel, the Kaesong Industrial Park is booming with construction. The park’s operator, a South Korean developer, Hyundai Asan, hopes to expand it into a minicity over the next 12 years, with high-rise apartments and hotels, an artificial lake and three golf courses.
By that time, the company hopes there will be about 2,000 factories here employing 350,000 North Koreans and producing $20 billion worth of goods a year.
That compares with a manufacturing output of only $366 million in the first half of this year, according to South Korea’s unification ministry.
In the six months through June, the flow of goods in and out of the industrial park accounted for 42 percent of the $881 million in trade between the two Koreas, the ministry said.
and
[…] 72 smaller South Korean companies have already built factories here, looking to tap the North’s supply of low-cost, Korean-speaking labor. So far, only one foreign company has come [–German auto parts maker Prettl Group is building a factory. Two Chinese companies will begin operations soon[, b]ut most companies here continue to be smaller South Korean firms, producing low-tech goods, from frying pans to running shoes, largely for domestic consumption.] (NKeconWatch combined two different paragraphs here)
The piecemeal brand of change is seen in the experiences of SJ Tech, a South Korean maker of car and cellphone parts that built a $4 million factory here four years ago. The company’s first North Korean employees had never even seen a keyboard, much less a computer, said Yoo Chang-geun, SJ Tech’s president. SJ Tech has spent so much time teaching them things like machinery operation and management concepts that Mr. Yoo jokingly calls his factory “North Korea’s first business school.”
But the North Koreans were eager learners, sketching keyboards on paper to teach themselves typing. Now, SJ Tech’s 430 North Korean employees have learned enough to run the factory without South Korean supervisors.
In a telling sign, they have also changed their haircuts to look more like their South Korean colleagues.
Andrei Lankov seems optimistic on the project’s political goals, stating “When North and South Koreans can interact on a daily basis, it is a chance for the North Koreans to see with their eyes that their own propaganda doesn’t make sense.”
A few described how the South Korean-run industrial park was improving lives by paying its workers the equivalent of about $60 a month, three times the average salary in the rest of Kaesong. […]
The South Korean government, which spent more than $150 million subsidizing the park, provides low-interest loans and insurance to companies to offset the risks of investing in the unstable and still hostile North.
Mr. Yoo of SJ Tech said his North Korean employees’ monthly salaries of $75, in contrast to the $2,000 he pays South Koreans, made investing in North Korea entirely worthwhile, despite any risks.
The article seems to take worker compensation claims at face value, but in reality Kaesong workers do not take home their allotted wages. The DPRK government keeps most of them in taxes and administrative fees. However, other non-monetary benefits make the jobs highly envied among North Korean workers. Rumor has it that North Korean workers pay hefty bribes to get these jobs.
Read the full article here:
Big Dreams for North Korean Industrial Park
New York Times
Martin Fackler
8/20/2008
Posted in Foreign direct investment, Germany, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Labor conditions/wages, Light Industry, Manufacturing, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | Comments Closed
Thursday, August 14th, 2008
The most authoritative map of North Korea on Google Earth
Download it here
This map covers North Korea’s agriculture, aviation, cultural locations, markets, manufacturing facilities, railroad, energy infrastructure, politics, sports venues, military establishments, religious facilities, leisure destinations, and national parks. It is continually expanding and undergoing revisions. This is the eleventh version.
Additions include: Mt. Paegun’s Ryonghung Temple and resort homes, Pyongyang’s Chongryu Restaurant, Swiss Development Agency (former UNDP office), Iranian Embassy, White Tiger Art Studio, KITC Store, Kumgangsan Store, Pyongyang Fried Chicken Restaurant, Kilju’s Pulp Factory (Paper), Kim Chaek Steel Mill, Chongjin Munitions Factory, Poogin Coal Mine, Ryongwun-ri cooperative farm, Thonggun Pavilion (Uiju), Chinju Temple (Yongbyon), Kim il Sung Revolutionary Museum (Pyongsong), Hamhung Zoo, Rajin electrified perimeter fence, Pyongsong market (North Korea’s largest), Sakju Recreation Center, Hoeryong Maternity Hospital, Sariwon Suwon reservoir (alleged site of US massacre), Sinpyong Resting Place, 700 Ridges Pavilion, Academy of Science, Hamhung Museum of the Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Kim Il Sung, South Hamgyong House of Culture, Hamhung Royal Villa, Pork Chop Hill, and Pyongyang’s Olympic torch route. Additional thanks go to Martyn Williams for expanding the electricity grid, particularly in Samjiyon, and various others who have contributed time improving this project since its launch.
Disclaimer: I cannot vouch for the authenticity of many locations since I have not seen or been to them, but great efforts have been made to check for authenticity. These efforts include pouring over books, maps, conducting interviews, and keeping up with other peoples’ discoveries. In many cases, I have posted sources, though not for all. This is a thorough compilation of lots of material, but I will leave it up to the reader to make up their own minds as to what they see. I cannot catch everything and I welcome contributions. Additionally, this file is getting large and may take some time to load.
Posted in Advertising, Agriculture, Architecture, Art, Automobiles, Aviation, Banking, Biotech, Cell phones, Central Broadcasting Station, Coal, Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Communications, Computing/IT, Construction, Dams/hydro, Demographics, Domestic publication, Education, Electricity, Energy, Environmental protection, Film, Finance, Food, Football (soccer), Foreign direct investment, Forestry, Gambling, Gasoline, General markets (FMR: Farmers Market), Golf, Google Earth, Health care, Hoteling, Hwanggumphyong and Wihwado Economic Zones (Sinuiju), Intranet, Joint Ventures, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Kim Il Sung University, Korean Buddhist Association, Labor conditions/wages, Leisure, Library, Light Industry, Lumber, Mansu Art Studio, Manufacturing, Mass games, Maternity Hospital, Military, Mining/Minerals, Ministry of foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, Ministry of Public Health, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Musan Mine, Nuclear, Oil, Phoenix Commerical Ventures, Pyongyang Embroidery Institute, Pyongyang Film Studio, Pyongyang International Information Center of New Techn, Pyongyang International Trade Fair, Pyongyang Metro, Pyongyang University of Medicine, Radio, Railways, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Real estate, Religion, Restaurants, Sea shipping, Sports, Steel, Supreme Peoples Assembly, Tourism, Transportation, Wind | 6 Comments »
