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Why the Sunshine Policy Made Sense

Thursday, April 1st, 2010

Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online 10-020A: April 1st, 2010
James E. Hoare
4/1/2010

I. Introduction

James E. Hoare was Britain’s Chargé d’Affaires to the DPRK from 2001-2002 and opened the British Embassy in Pyongyang. In this article on the Sunshine policy he writes, “Slowly, the policy was creating a group of people who could see benefits in remaining on good terms with South Korea and who had wider links with the outside world. Engagement has worked in other countries, most noticeably China, and I believe that it was beginning to work in North Korea. There was never going to be a speedy change in attitudes built up over sixty years, but stopping the process after ten was not a wise decision.”

This article was published by 38 North a web site devoted to analysis of North Korea from the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS. 38 North will harness the experience of long-time observers of North Korea and others who have dealt directly with North Koreans. It will also draw on other experts outside the field who might bring fresh, well, informed insights to those of us who follow North Korea.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Article by James E. Hoare

– “Why the Sunshine Policy Made Sense”
By James E. Hoare

At a recent private meeting in London, a former senior United Nations’ official, drawing on experience relating to a wide range of countries, said that transforming a “failing” or “fragile” state was not something that could be done overnight. Those involved needed to think in terms of ten to twenty years rather than weeks or months. Regardless of whether or not one accepts the idea of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) as a failed or even fragile state-and the term is often used in some quarters-the idea that one is in for the long haul in bringing about major modifications in behavior and attitude is certainly a good one to have in mind when dealing with the DRPK. It was such an approach that marked the Republic of Korea’s policy towards the North under former Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.

Since the Lee Myung-bak government took office in the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) in 2008, it is fashionable to dismiss the policies followed by his predecessors as an expensive failure. Sneers about “ATM diplomacy,” innuendo about Kim Dae-jung’s motives, and references to his successor Roh Moo-hyun’s naivety, are the commonplace of South Korean academic and press comment, and are heard much further afield. “Sunshine” or engagement have become terms of mockery. The Lee government has adopted a more aggressive policy towards North Korea. It has not refused assistance outright, but has couched its offers in such a way that rejection is inevitable-the most recent example is the “grand bargain” proposed in 2009 in which the DPRK must first give up its nuclear program to receive security guarantees and aid. This is then played back as evidence that the North is incorrigible and not deserving of assistance.

The Lee government’s approach is based on an incorrect assessment both of the Sunshine Policy and what went before it. “Sunshine” or “engagement” was not something that sprang from Kim Dae-jung’s fertile brain, though he certainly can be credited with refining and developing the idea. The policies pursued by Kim and Roh lay firmly within a tradition that goes back to President Park Chung Hee in the early 1970s and that was followed by all his successors to a greater or lesser degree. However, it was never easy to engage the North and it did not take much to divert earlier presidents from such a policy. Frustrated or annoyed, they eventually gave up the effort.

The difference after 1998 was that South Korea stuck to “sunshine” even when there were difficulties. Neither Kim nor Roh were starry-eyed and neither expected that the North would be changed overnight. Both responded to Pyongyang’s bad behavior with firmness. But they realized that circumstances had changed with the famine and other problems that hit North Korea in the 1990s. They also realized that for engagement to be successful, it was best to avoid rubbing in the fact that the country faced real problems. Even if the explanations offered for the problems often ignored the North Korean regime’s own part in bringing them about, there was nevertheless an acceptance that help was needed. The unprecedented appeal for outside assistance that brought in UN agencies and resident non-governmental organizations in the late 1990s showed that the South would help without preaching. No doubt the expense and complications of German reunification also gave pause for thought. If the two Germanys, which had not fought a savage war and were far richer, could not achieve a smooth reintegration, how could the two Koreas?

So Kim and Roh did not break off engagement as a result of “bad” behavior or outside criticism of “soft policies.” They accepted that it would take a long time to modify Pyongyang’s policies and that there were likely to be few expressions of thanks. Of course there was no instant transformation. But the new approach provided a window for other countries to establish relations with North Korea. In theory, it had long been the South’s policy to allow if not to encourage such relations, but the reality had been different. From 2000 onwards, that changed. Countries that had hitherto held back for fear of offending Seoul now found themselves encouraged to establish relations with Pyongyang.

Those that did so found a North Korea that seemed eager for change, although very careful about how that eagerness was expressed. But there was a readiness to do things that would have seemed improbable only ten years before. While never quite admitting that the policies pursued under Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il might have had defects, those of us working in the North between 2000-2002 found a willingness on the part of officials to admit that they needed assistance and that mistakes had been made. Examples included a vice-mayor who admitted that post-Korean War town planning had many defects that were only then becoming obvious. Officials were willing to admit that the country was in need of a whole range of economic and commercial skills that had hitherto been neglected. Perhaps most telling of all, a country that had responded to the changes in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China in the early 1990s by calling home all its overseas students now was most anxious to send students abroad once again.

Engagement was thus helping to open North Korean eyes to possibilities beyond juche, but unfortunately, even before the 2002 nuclear crisis, there was relatively little follow-up on these expressions of intent. Pyongyang found difficulty in matching students to the requirements of foreign universities and other training institutions. Some countries that established diplomatic relations preferred to concentrate on human rights issues to the exclusion of other matters. Since several of these were members of the European Union (EU), their approach inevitably affected the EU’s broad approach to North Korea. Even among countries that did not give predominance to human rights, goodwill was rarely transformed into sufficient funding to make a real difference.

That said, in the British case alone, we were able to fund several sessions of economics training, an English-language training program that put initially two-now four -British teachers into DPRK universities to train English teachers, and intensive English courses for a variety of North Korean officials. In addition, non-governmental bodies such as the BBC and Reuters conducted training programs for media staff in modern methods of news presentation and communication skills. Perhaps if the United States had been more supportive of its ally’s engagement policy these efforts would have made a difference. But as the relatively benign approach towards engagement of the Clinton years gave way to hostility under President George W. Bush after 2000 that too had an impact on how far countries such as Britain would support the sunshine policy.

It was South Korea’s approach to engagement that had the greatest impact. Seoul’s aid and other measures taken under the umbrella of the “sunshine” approach brought North and South into contact across many fields. During the period from 1998-2008, the North became known to South Korean citizens in a totally unprecedented way. The process had begun earlier, especially during the Roh Tae-woo presidency (1988-93), but the trickle of information about the North of those years became a flood. And it was not only information but actual contact with North Korea. For some, this meant tightly controlled tours to the Diamond Mountains (Mount Kumgang) or towards the end of the period, to Kaesong at the western end of the Demilitarized Zone. Limited though these were, they were still a glimpse into what had hitherto been unknown and feared. There were also signs that, as the North got used to the idea of such visits, it might open up a little more; the decision to allow the use of visitors’ own cars in March 2008 was one such indication, but there were several others.

Much more important were the wide range of government and non-governmental contacts. Relatively few North Koreans came South but the traffic in the other direction was enormous. On any given day, there were likely to be several thousand South Korean visitors in the North, dealing with aid, trade, cultural, educational and even religious exchanges-both the Protestant and the Roman Catholic churches in the North had regular South Korean officiating ministers as well as hymnbooks and prayer books produced in the ROK. South Korean journalists were also a not uncommon sight. Most of this activity may have been confined to Pyongyang, by not all of it was. South Koreans were visiting many parts of the country, especially in connection with agricultural assistance and other aid-related projects. Nobody was starry-eyed about these visits. South Korean visitors were watched and controlled. But they were able to learn a lot since they could speak and read Korean. If the projects agreed to at the October 2007 summit between Kim Jong-il and Roh Moo-hyun had been implemented by the incoming Lee Myung-bak government, there would have been a huge increase in these types of contacts.

No doubt engagement was expensive and sometimes the means used to bring it about were shady, but it was producing benefits. The South, and to some extent the rest of the world, now has a far better understanding of how North Korea works then it did before engagement began. Within the North, a large number of people have come to see their southern compatriots in a less hostile light and have some, even if limited, understanding of the economic and social structures of South Korea. Perhaps some of the assistance provided was diverted away from its original purpose, but enough rice and fertilizer bags reached areas far away from Pyongyang and enough people were willing to ask questions about the South to show that the impact of engagement extended beyond a small circle of ruling elite. Slowly, the policy was creating a group of people who could see benefits in remaining on good terms with South Korea and who had wider links with the outside world. Engagement has worked in other countries, most noticeably China, and I believe that it was beginning to work in North Korea. There was never going to be a speedy change in attitudes built up over sixty years, but stopping the process after ten was not a wise decision.

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Hermit economics hobbles Pyongyang

Wednesday, March 31st, 2010

Aidan Foster-Carter writes in the Financial Times about some poor decision-making coming out of Pyongyang:

Great Leader? Pyongyang’s fawning hagiography not only grates, but is singularly unearned. Even by its own dim lights, North Korea’s decision-making is going from bad to worse.

Last year saw two spectacular own goals. Missile and nuclear tests were a weird way to greet a new US president ready to reach out to old foes. The predictable outcome was condemnation by the United Nations Security Council, plus sanctions on arms exports that are biting.

Domestic policy is just as disastrous. December’s currency “reform” beggars belief. Did Kim Jong-il really fail to grasp that redenomination would not cure inflation, but worsen it? Or that brazenly stealing people’s savings – beyond a paltry minimum, citizens only got 10 per cent of their money back – would finally goad his long-suffering subjects into rioting? Forced to retreat, officials even apologised. One scapegoat was sacked – and possibly shot.

By his own admission, Mr Kim does not do economics. In a speech in 1996, when famine was starting to bite, the Dear Leader whined defensively that his late father, Kim Il-sung, had told him “not to get involved in economic work, but just concentrate on the military and the party”.

That awful advice explains much. Incredibly, North Korea was once richer than the South. In today’s world, this is the contest that counts. “It’s the economy, stupid” is no mere slogan, but a law of social science.

Having taken an early lead, Kim senior threw it all away. He built the world’s fourth largest army, crippling an economy that he refused to reform, viewing liberalisation as betrayal. His own personality cult was and is a literally monumental weight of unproductive spending.

Used to milking Moscow and Beijing, in the 1970s North Korea borrowed from western banks – and promptly defaulted. That was not smart; it has had to pay cash up front ever since.

Pyongyang also resorts to less orthodox financing. In 1976 the Nordic nations expelled a dozen North Korean diplomats for trafficking cigarettes and booze. In December a Swedish court jailed two for smuggling cigarettes. More than 100 busts worldwide over 30 years, of everything from ivory and heroin to “supernotes” (fake $100 bills), leave scant doubt that this is policy.

Yet morality aside, it is stupid policy. Pariahs stay poor. North Korea could earn far more by going straight. The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), where South Korean businesses employ Northern workers to make a range of goods, shows that co-operation can work. Yet Pyongyang keeps harassing it, imposing arbitrary border restrictions and demanding absurd wage hikes.

Now it threatens to seize $370m (€275m, £247m) of South Korean assets at Mount Kumgang, a tourist zone idle since a southern tourist was shot dead in 2008 and the north refused a proper investigation. Even before that, Pyongyang’s greed in extorting inflated fees from Hyundai ensured that no other chaebol has ventured north. Contrast how China has gained from Taiwanese investment.

In this catalogue of crassness, the nadir came in 1991 when the dying Soviet Union abruptly pulled the plug on its clients. All suffered, but most adapted. Cuba went for tourism; Vietnam tried cautious reform; Mongolia sold minerals. Only North Korea, bizarrely, did nothing – except watch its old system crumble. Gross domestic product plunged by half, and hunger killed up to a million. Now famine again stalks the land. The state cannot provide, yet still it seeks to suppress markets.

All this is as puzzling as it is terrible. China and Vietnam show how Asian communist states can morph towards capitalism and thrive. Kim Jong-il may fear the fate of the Soviet Union if he follows suit. True, his regime has survived – even if many of its people have not. Yet the path he is on is patently a dead end. Mr Kim’s own ill-health, and a belated bid to install his unknown third son as dauphin, only heighten uncertainty. Militant mendicancy over the nuclear issue – demanding to be paid for every tiny step towards a distant disarmament, then backsliding and trying the same trick again – will no longer wash. North Korea has run out of road; the game is finally up.

What now? A soft landing, with Mr Kim embracing peace abroad and reform at home, remains the best outcome. But if he obdurately resists change, we need a plan B. The US and South Korea have contingency plans for the north’s collapse. So does China, separately. Tacit co-ordination is urgent, lest future chaos be compounded by a clash of rival powers – as in the 1890s. Koreans have a rueful proverb: when whales fight, the shrimp’s back is broken.

But Beijing will not let it come to that. China is quietly moving into North Korea, buying up mines and ports. Some in Seoul cry colonialism, but it was they who created this vacuum by short-sightedly ditching the past decade’s “sunshine” policy of patient outreach. President Lee Myung-bak may have gained the Group of 20 chairmanship, but he has lost North Korea.

Nor will Mr Kim nuzzle docile under China’s wing, though his son might. As ever, North Korea will take others’ money and do its own thing. In early 2010 new fake “super-yuan” of high quality, very hard to detect, started appearing in China. They wouldn’t, would they?

Read the full article here:
Hermit economics hobbles Pyongyang
Financial Times
Aidan Foster-Carter
3/30/2010 

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Posted in Arms shipment, Banking, China, Counterfeiting, Drug smuggling, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, Illicit activities, International Governments, International trade, Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Private property | 6 Comments »

North Korean restaurants in Asia

Monday, March 29th, 2010

According to Slate:

North Korean government-run restaurants have existed for years in the regions of China adjacent to the DPRK’s northern border, but the 21st century has seen an expansion of the business into other parts of Asia. In 2002, the first Southeast Asian branch of Pyongyang opened in the Cambodian tourist hub of Siem Reap, and it became an immediate hit with South Korean tour groups visiting the nearby temples of Angkor. The success of the restaurant, reportedly opened by Ho Dae-sik, the local representative of the DPRK-aligned International Taekwondo Federation, led to the opening of the Phnom Penh branch in 2003. This was followed by more elaborate establishments in Bangkok and the popular Thai beach resort of Pattaya, as well as a small branch in the Laotian capital, Vientiane.

Little is known of how the restaurants operate, but experts say they are closely linked with other overseas operations run by the reclusive regime in Pyongyang. Bertil Lintner, author of Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korean Under the Kim Clan, says that in the early 1990s, North Korea was hit by a severe economic crisis caused by the disruption in trading ties with its former Communist allies. At that time, both the Soviet Union and China began to demand that Pyongyang pay for imports in hard currency rather than barter goods, forcing it to open “capitalist” foreign ventures to make up funding shortfalls. He says the restaurants are part of this chain of trading companies controlled by Bureau 39, the “money making” (and money-laundering) arm of the Korean Workers’ Party.

“The restaurants are used to earn additional money for the government in Pyongyang—at the same time as they were suspected of laundering proceeds from North Korea’s more unsavory commercial activities,” he says. “Restaurants and other cash-intensive enterprises are commonly used as conduits for wads of bills, which banks otherwise would not accept as deposits.”

According to reports from defectors, the eateries are operated through a network of local middlemen who are required to remit a certain amount every year to the coffers in Pyongyang. Kim Myung Ho, a North Korean defector who ran a restaurant in northern China, reported in 2007 that each establishment, affiliated with “trading companies” operated by the government, was forced to make annual fixed payments of between $10,000 and $30,000 back to the North Korean capital. “Every year, the sum total is counted at the business headquarters in Pyongyang, but if there’s even a small default or lack of results, then the threat of evacuation is given,” Kim told reporters from the Daily NK, a North Korean news service run by exiles and human rights activists.

A year ago, the Pyongyang restaurants in Cambodia and Thailand suddenly closed their doors, only to reopen again after a six-month hiatus. Lintner cited an Asian diplomat in Bangkok saying the restaurants, like all “capitalist” enterprises, were hit hard by the global economic crisis, but locals familiar with the establishment in Phnom Penh offered another explanation. One worker at a nearby business said Pyongyang closed after a dispute with a Cambodian customer who tried to take one of its North Korean waitresses out for “drinks” after dinner.

If true, it would not be the first time. In 2006 and 2007, Daily NK reported several incidents in which waitresses from North Korean restaurants in China’s Shandong and Jilin provinces tried to defect, forcing the closure of the operations. Kim Myung Ho added that two or three DPRK security agents live onsite at each restaurant to “regulate” the workers and that any attempts at flight result in the immediate repatriation of the entire staff.

Read the full story here:
Kingdom Kim’s Culinary Outposts
Slate
Sebastian Strangio
3/27/2010

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Posted in Foreign direct investment, International trade, Restaurants | 1 Comment »

Kumgang investors on the outs

Tuesday, March 23rd, 2010

According to the Donga Ilbo:

Ilyeon Investment Chairman Ahn Gyo-shik is nervous over Pyongyang’s latest moves. “I feel helpless since our company is rattled by external conditions, not our management’s ability,” he said.

The North has threatened to seize real estate owned by South Korean businessmen unless they visit North Korea for a land survey by Thursday. Ahn said he will cross the inter-Korean border with staff from the subcontractors of Hyundai Asan Corp. early Thursday morning.

Since launching a tour to Mount Kumgang in 2003, Ahn has built Kumgang Family Beach Hotel and a sashimi restaurant in the North. He has even served as a chairman of the Corporate Conference for South Korean Companies Doing Business at Mount Kumgang, a gathering of Hyundai Asan’s subcontractors.

In an interview with The Dong-A Ilbo yesterday, Ahn said the head of a conference member company recently died of a heart attack due to severe stress from his business in North Korea.

The suspension of the inter-Korean tours caused the late chairman’s company to teeter on the verge of bankruptcy, causing his death at age 55, Ahn said.

Ilyeon’s prospects are no better. Ahn has invested 14.7 billion won (12.9 million U.S. dollars) in his North Korea venture, including 13.4 billion won (11.8 million dollars) to build the hotel and additional facilities.

His company is six billion won (5.3 million dollars) in the red due to the suspension of the Kumgang tour. Its deficit slightly decreased in early 2007, but the killing of a South Korean tourist at Mount Kumgang in July 2008 by a North Korean soldier dealt another serious blow.

Since the shooting, Ilyeon has slashed the number of hotel staff from 119 (including North Korean workers) to three. Over the same period, Ilyeon’s office in South Korea has also downsized from 15 workers to four.

Ilyeon director Kim Rae-hyeon said, “Most member companies of the conference are almost bankrupt but cannot file for bankruptcy since their assets are in North Korea.”

On the North’s land survey Thursday, Ahn said, “Considering precedents and North Korea’s recent moves, Pyongyang is unlikely to make just empty threats. In the worst-case scenario, the North will confiscate assets held by South Korean companies after compensating South Korean investors with part of their investment.”

Worryingly, a Chinese tourist agency has released a six-day tour of both Kaesong and Mount Kumgang. This could encourage the North to deprive South Korean companies of their right to run businesses in the North.

Yang Mu-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, said, “North Korea could mention Hyundai Asan’s underpayment of 400 million dollars as grounds to freeze assets held by South Korean companies. The North could also freeze the properties of South Korean companies, force them to recall their staff, annul existing contracts, and sign contracts with new companies.”

Other experts, however, say the North is unlikely to confiscate South Korean companies’ assets or deprive them of their exclusive right to do business.

For Thursday’s survey, Hyundai Asan said yesterday that 52 staff from 33 companies such as Hyundai Asan, its subcontractors, Korea Tourism Organization and Emerson Pacific will make the trip. Forty-eight workers from Hyundai Asan and its subcontractors had applied for their visit.

Shim Sang-jin, in charge of Mount Kumgang affairs for Hyundai Asan, will lead the group. The group will board a bus in Seoul and pass through the Customs, Immigration and Quarantine Office in Goseong County, Gangwon Province, around 9:40 a.m. Thursday.

Officials of the tourism organization will head for the North today.

And from the Choson Ilbo:

South Korean officials on Monday duly presented themselves at North Korea’s Mt. Kumgang resort after the North last week threatened to confiscate any real estate held by South Koreans unless they turned up for a survey.   

Three Korea Tourism Organization officials including its Mt. Kumgang branch chief Cha Dong-young went to North Korea through the east coast checkpoint in the afternoon.

Cha claimed the officials “are going to North Korea to conduct our own survey one day before the North’s planned survey” because the KTO has a considerable amount of property in the Mt. Kumgang area. “We’re visiting the North in a cool-headed way. We just hope that tour programs will be normalized as early as possible through dialogue between the two governments,” he added.

North Korea has become increasingly frantic to resume the lucrative tours as hard currency flow dried up amid international sanctions and the fallout from a botched currency reform late last year. Last week’s threat is only the latest in a series of attempts to bully and cajole the South into resuming the tours, which were halted after the fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist in 2008.

The KTO officials and staff from tour operator Hyundai Asan and other South Korean firms will comply with the North’s summons on Thursday. The KTO officials will stay at least until March 31 depending on how long the process takes.

The KTO invested W90 billion (US$1=W1,138) in a cultural hall and a hot spring spa in the tourist area.

“We’ve already handed documents including floor space of facilities and investment amount over to Hyundai Asan for delivery to the North,” Cha said. “We don’t think there’ll be any worst-case scenario, but we’ll find out what the North is up to once we meet North Korean officials.” 

Sixteen staffers of Hyundai Asan and other South Korean firms are to leave Seoul around on Thursday morning and return the same day. 

Yonhap asserts that the DPRK could be laying the groundwork for Chinese operators to take over.  That probably would not be good for Chinese-South Korean relations if they take over seized assets.  Of course if the Chinese bought out the South Koreans then that would be a win-win.

Here is the original story about the assets being seized. 

Here are older posts on Kumgangsan.

Read the full story here:
NK`s Seizure Threat Rattles S. Korean Investors
Donga Ilbo
3/24/2010

S.Korean Officials Respond to N.Korean Summons
Choson Ilbo
3/25/2010

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Posted in Foreign direct investment, Hoteling, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Tourism | Comments Closed

DPRK threatens to seize Hyundai assets at Kumgang

Thursday, March 18th, 2010

According to Yonhap:

North Korea has informed South Korea of its plan to look into all of the real estate owned by South Koreans inside the scenic mountain resort along its east coast, the South’s government confirmed Thursday, as Pyongyang apparently grows impatient with Seoul’s refusal to allow its citizens to travel there.

In a recently faxed message to the South Korean government, the North’s Asia-Pacific Peace Committee, a state agency in charge of cross-border exchanges, said, “South Korean figures who possess real estate in the Mount Kumgang district should come to Mount Kumgang by March 25,” according to the Unification Ministry, which deals with inter-Korean affairs.

The North went on to say, “All assets of those who do not meet the deadline will be confiscated and they won’t be able to visit Mount Kumgang again.”

An inter-Korean tourism program to the mountain, once a cash cow for the impoverished North, has been suspended since the summer of 2008, when a female South Korean tourist was shot dead by a North Korean soldier while traveling there. A luxury hotel, a golf course, and other facilities built by the South Korean conglomerate Hyundai there have since remained idle. A similar joint tour business to the ancient city of Kaesong, just north of the two Koreas’ border, has been also halted.

North Korea, feeling the pinch of U.N. sanctions imposed for its missile and nuclear tests, has called for the South to immediately resume the tours.

In its statement issued March 4, the North Korean committee said, “We would open the door to the tour of the Kaesong area from March and that of Mount Kumgang from April.”

It said it may revoke all accords and contracts on the business unless the South stops blocking the resumption of the joint ventures.

South Korea has urged the North to first fully guarantee the safety of South Korean tourists. Related working-level talks between the two sides last month failed to yield a deal due to differences over details on a security guarantee.

The Unification Ministry expressed regret over the North’s latest threat.

“North Korea’s measure violates agreements between South and North Korean authorities, as well as between their tourism business operators,” the ministry said in a press release. “It also goes against international practice.”

It stressed the North should abide by accords with the South, and all pending issues should be resolved through dialogue.

“As the tours to Mount Kumgang and Kaesong are issues directly related with our people’s safety, there is no change in the government’s existing position that it will resume them only after the matters are settled,” it added.

Meanwhile, the head of the South Korean operator of the tours offered to resign to take responsibility for snowballing losses from the suspended businesses.

Cho Gun-shik, president of Hyundai Asan Corp., expressed his intent to step down in a statement emailed to all staff earlier Thursday, company officials said.

The Choson Ilbo has more:

In the message, North Korea said, “From March 25, North Korean authorities and experts will conduct a survey of all South Korean assets in the presence of South Korean officials concerned,” including Hyundai Asan staffers, who have assets in the area. “All South Koreans with real estate in the Mt. Kumgang area must report to the mountain by March 25,” it added.

According to the ministry, Hyundai Asan signed a lease with the North for a plot of land in Mt. Kumgang until 2052. South Korean firms have invested a total of W359.2 billion (US$1=W1,134), including W226.3 billion from Asan, in a hotel, a hot spring spa, a golf course, and a sushi restaurant there. The South Korean government owns a meeting hall for separated families opened in 2008 that cost more than W60 billion to build.

Nonetheless the threat is likely to fall on deaf ears. A South Korean security official said, “The North apparently wants South Korean firms that are in danger of losing their assets in the North to put pressure on the government, but the government won’t back down.”

A South Korean businessman operating in the Mt. Kumgang region said, “The North is threatening to seize our firms’ real estate there while talking about attracting large amounts of foreign investment. What South Korean or foreign business will make new investments in the North under these circumstances?”

Read the full stories here:
N. Korea threatens to seize S. Korean assets at Mount Kumgang
Yonhap
3/18/2010

N.Korea Ramps Up Threats Over Mt. Kumgang Tours
Choson Ilbo
3/19/2010

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Posted in Asia-Pacific Peace Committee, Finance, Foreign direct investment, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Tourism | 1 Comment »

Hyundai Asan chief offers resignation over Kumgangsan

Thursday, March 18th, 2010

According to Yonhap:

The chief of Hyundai Asan Corp., a South Korean firm that runs tours to North Korea, expressed his intention to step down on Thursday to take responsibility for failing to resume the inter-Korean tour business.

“(I) couldn’t settle them even after running to revive tours (to Mount Kumgang and Kaesong) and normalize business,” Hyundai Asan President Cho Kun-shik said in an e-mail sent to company employees. “I thought taking clear responsibility for results as a president was critical for the firm and the business”.

He intends to resign after a shareholder meeting scheduled for next Wednesday.

Hyundai had been operating tourism projects to the scenic Mount Kumgang on North Korea’s east coast and Kaesong, the ancient capital of the Goryeo Dynasty (A.D. 918-1392).

Cho, a former vice minister with the Ministry of Unification, took the company’s helm in August 2008, a month after tours to the famed mountain resort were suspended following the shooting death of a South Korean woman in the area. Visits to Kaesong were stopped in December of the same year.

He took office vowing to reopen the tour programs, which remain on hold as the two Koreas have yet to reach an agreement over terms for their resumption.

The postponement in relaunching the tours has prompted almost 70 percent of the company’s employees to leave the firm. “I felt regretful for not having reinstated those who had left,” Cho said.

Last week, North Korea accused the Seoul government of effectively blocking South Koreans from visiting its tourist attractions and warned it could revoke all deals covering inter-Korean tours.

But Seoul has demanded an official apology for the shooting death and a pledge that such an incident will not occur in the future, while saying a formal investigation must be carried out to determine why the shooting occurred.

As of February, Hyundai Asan suffered a loss of 257.9 billion won (US$228.1 million) in sales stemming from the travel suspension, according to the company.

Amid growing losses, the firm sold off part of its assets, previously used for the tour program, including 51 tour buses and 41 heavy vehicles.

Mount Kumgang had been a popular tourist spot for South Koreans since it was opened to them in 1998 as a symbol of inter-Korean rapprochement spearheaded by the liberal government of Kim Dae-jung at that time.

Read the full story here:
Hyundai Asan chief offers to resign over suspended inter-Korean tour program
Yonhap
3/18/2010

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Posted in Foreign direct investment, Mt. Kumgang Tourist Special Zone, RoK Ministry of Unification, Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013), Tourism | Comments Closed

DPRK revises law on Rason zone and enacts law on coal to attract foreign investment

Wednesday, March 17th, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-03-17-1
2010-03-17

Following North Korea’s decision to raise the status of the Rajin-Sonbong region to the ‘Rason Special City’, it has revised the ‘Law on the Rajin-Sonbong Trade Zone’, considerably boosting the likelihood that the region will attract the foreign investment necessary to develop the free trade zone, as the revised law further protects investor activities in Rason.

The Rajin-Sonbong region was designated a ‘Free Economic and Trade Zone’ in 1991, but had very little economic impact. Over the years, North Korean authorities have enacted a few measures to try to keep the project alive, but there has been no significant turnaround. With the revision of the law on Rason, North Korean authorities are again focusing their attention on the region, with the goal of ‘opening the door to a strong and prosperous nation’ by 2012. It is also possible that the regime is eyeing the development of the region as a tool to solidify the transfer of power to yet a third Kim.

In December, 2009, after designating the special economic and trade zone, Kim Jong Il traveled to ‘Rason City’ for the first time in 18 years. Jang Song Thaek, director of the administrative bureau of the (North) Korean Workers’ Party, has also visited the area, leading observers to believe that even working-level preparations are being made following the policy decision to highlight the area.

The law on Rason, revised on January 27, is now made up of 5 chapters and 45 articles. 6 of those articles specifically concern promotion of the investment area and trade with overseas Koreans.

The most eye-catching article is no. 8, which addresses economic and trade activities by overseas Koreans. This type of activity was already protected by the existing law, but the revision reiterates that Koreans living outside of the North are allowed to carry out economic activities and trade in an attempt to snare investments from North Koreans living in China and Japan, as well as other diasporas.

In addition, Article 21 addresses the economic dealings of enterprises, groups and organizations outside of the zone, and stipulates that these groups operating within the Rason Special City would be able to engage in business activities with North Korean businesses in other regions. This essentially legalizes the sale of goods produced in the zone throughout the country.

Article 3, addressing investment opportunities, stipulates that investors are allowed to engage in business regarding manufacturing, farming, construction, transportation, communications, science and technology, tourism, distribution, and finance.

By revising the existing law, North Korean authorities have strengthened incentives for investors.

The latest revision also set the basic income tax of enterprises at 14 percent, while stating that enterprises specifically designated by the government would be taxed at a rate of 10 percent.

Furthermore, Article 2 of the revision emphasizes the tourism and investment roles of the special zone, referring to the zone as one for ‘investment, a transport hub, finance, tourism, and public service,” adding ‘investment’ and ‘tourism’ to those activities stipulated in the original law. The Rason Zone Law has been revised five times since its passing in 1993, undergoing change in 1999, 2002, 2005, 2007 and now 2010.

Authorities also revised the law on coal, which now legally regulates the exploration, distribution and use of coal, by the addition of Chapter 6 Article 76 of the ‘Coal Law’. Article 1 lays out the basis of the North’s law on coal, while Article 2 covers exploration, Article 3, ‘mine development,’ Article 4, ‘coal production,’ Article 5, ‘coal distribution and use,’ and Article 6, ‘management structure regarding the coal industry.’ The new law advocates “expansion of cooperation and exchange with other countries and international organizations on the exploration and mining development, as well as production and use.”

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Posted in Foreign direct investment, Law on the Rason Economic and Trade Zone, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong), Special Economic Zones (Established before 2013) | Comments Closed

DPRK should open dialogue for funds

Wednesday, March 17th, 2010

According to the AFP:

North Korea should first open dialogue with the world if it wants foreign investment to revive its troubled economy, a senior World Bank official said Monday.

Jim Adams, World Bank vice president for East Asia and Pacific, said it had yet to be approached by Pyongyang in connection with its reported plan to raise foreign funds by setting up its own development bank.

Adams, in Tokyo to meet Japanese officials and lawmakers, said it was a “key challenge” for the communist state to first map out its own plan to approach the outside world.

“Once those decisions are made, I think there can be an appropriate response,” Adams told a news conference. “But so far I don’t see those decisions having been made.”

There is no doubt that the DPRK needs foreign investment.  The problem is credible commitment to contract terms and the kinds of concessions investors will require.

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DPRK revises Rason investment law

Sunday, March 14th, 2010

According to Yonhap:

North Korea has recently revised a law governing its Rason free trade zone in a bid to speed up its development and attract more foreign investment, including from South Korea, officials in Seoul said Sunday.

According to the South Korean officials, a clause allowing “Korean compatriots living outside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)” to engage in economic and trade activities in Rason has been newly included in the legal code.

The Korea Times has some more information:

The North had banned South Korean investors from Rason in a 1999 revision.

Under the latest revision, the reclusive state will lower tax rates and simplify administrative procedures for foreign investors who want to establish branch and agent offices there, the official said.

The revision took effect Jan. 22 when Pyongyang upgraded the status of Rason to a special city, he said.

The official anticipated that South Korean firms would do business in the zone, saying the latest revision is a positive sign of North Korea opening its doors to outside world.

The North designated Rason and nearby Sonbong, located on the country’s northernmost coast close to both China and Russia, as an economic free trade zone in 1991. The zone was renamed Rason later.

But efforts to attract foreign investment and capital have failed. North Korea aimed to attract $7 billion worth of foreign investment into Rason, but actual investment amounted to only $140 million.

There are an estimated 400 foreign businesses operating in North Korea, but most of them are small businesses run by Chinese or North Korean residents of Japan.

The Choson Ilbo adds more:

Article 8 of the revised law makes it possible for “Koreans” living outside North Korea to do business in the special zone, apparently with a view to attracting South Korean investors.

It also removes a clause requiring foreign companies to obtain government approval when they open sales offices or branches in the zone, making it easier to enter the North Korean market.

Instead, approval is with a new agency overseeing the Rajin-Sonbong zone.

But foreign firms and their staff are explicitly under North Korean jurisdiction, including all the draconian laws that apply to North Koreans.

The previous law permitted foreign investors unconditional no-visa entry and stay in North Korea, but under the new rules they are restricted to the zone.

Corporate income tax is reduced from 14 percent to 10 percent “in sectors particularly promoted by the state.” But other terms related to customs, land lease and bank loans remain unchanged.

One former investor is shouting caveat emptor.  According to the Choson Ilbo:

“I blew $500,000 on Rajin-Sonbong 15 years ago,” recalls Roh Jeong-ho, who headed the first South Korean business to set up operations in North Korea’s Rajin-Sonbong Economic Special Zone in 1995.

Roh (46) is scathing about North Korea’s latest attempts to woo investment to the impoverished Stalinist nation. “It’ll be a repeat of the 1990s, which ended in a belly-flop,” he said. “Nothing has changed in North Korea.”

Roh was once touted by the South Korean media as one of the young leaders in his early 30s who were expected to lead the post-unification era when he exported 44 km of barbed-wire fences to Rajin-Sonbong in 1995. North Korea had asked Roh to supply the fences to isolate the area from ordinary North Koreans. In return, the North offered him the use of 33,000 sq. m of land in the free zone for 50 years.

But there was a catch. The problem was a clause in the contract stipulating that the groundwork on facilities to be built within the leased land must be completed within two years. North Korea continued to make unreasonable demands regarding construction when the area was devoid of crucial infrastructure like roads, running water and electricity, and construction had to be delayed.

At first, the North threatened to scrap the barbed-wire order, complaining that the deal was revealed to South Korean media. Roh managed to calm the North Koreans, but then they started making new demands. They even told Roh to supply equipment to guards who were posted along the fence, including tazers and high-voltage current generators.

“North Korean government workers operate under a bizarre, performance-based system,” Roh said. “Their performance is gauged based on how much they are able to extort from South Korean businesses.”

Roh said his North Korean business partners often changed as they were either promoted or demoted based on their performance, requiring negotiations to start from scratch every time. After two years passed without Roh being able to complete groundwork on his allotted land, the right was revoked. He ended up wasting close to US$1 million, including expenses on top of the $500,000 cost of producing the barbed wire.

“If you’re not careful, you could end up losing everything,” he warned. He added that the business prospects are riddled with traps. “We tend to believe that the North Koreans would be accommodating since we are ‘compatriots,’ but that’s a big mistake,” Roh said. “North Korea extends its invitation to South Korean businesses in order to use them as window dressing to attract Chinese and Russian investors.”

Additional information:

1. At least one South Korean company is making the move to Rason.

2. China now has a 10-year lease in Rason.

3. I mapped out the fence built with Mr. Roh’s wire.

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Posted in Economic reform, Foreign direct investment, Rason Economic and Trade Zone (Rajin-Sonbong) | Comments Closed

“Let’s speculate on North Korean debt!”

Thursday, March 11th, 2010

UPDATE 1 (2011-12-21): The Wall Street Journal (Dow Jones Newswire) points out movement on North Korean debt following the death of Kim Jong-il:

Saturday’s death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has given a lift to that country’s only openly traded securities, a batch of bonds that haven’t received a payment in almost three decades.

The defaulted bonds, which were created in 1997 when French bank BNP repackaged a series of non-performing syndicated bank loans that were granted to North Korea in the seventies, have suddenly sparked interest among speculators. The sporadically traded bonds, which trade at a deep discount to their face value, saw a tick up this week and were recently quoted at between 14 and 18 cents on the dollar, compared with 13 to 15 cents, according to London-based sales and brokerage house Exotix.

Those who have bought the bonds are making nothing less than a bet that the transfer of power to Kim’s son Kim Jong Eun will usher in a moment akin to that of the Berlin Wall’s collapse for the tightly controlled communist country.

“Investors are looking at this as an unlimited option trade with enormous potential gains,” said Andrew Chappell, head of European, African and Middle Eastern fixed income trading and sales at brokerage house Exotix in London, who says that inquiries into the bonds have increased in recent days.

According to Chappell’s calculations, investors’ claims extend to the principal and interest accrued from 1984 when the original loans defaulted. That amounts to anywhere between 300% to 600% in unpaid interest.

The premise that’s attracted hedge funds and pension funds is that North Korea can’t exist in isolation forever, and like other former communist countries will find a need to tap the international markets for funds.

That’s why the death of Kim Jong Il has opened a rare opportunity that bets on these bond could pay off. Although there’s no indication of what the structure of the government will look like under Kim Jong Eun, or of the direction it will take, some observers expect the U.S. and other western powers to use this opportunity to bring North Korea into the international fold.

By all accounts, North Korea is in very poor shape financially. A significant segment of the population is said to be dying of starvation. The country’s economy pulls in a meager $29 billion in annual gross domestic product, compared with $1.117 trillion in South Korea, according to IHS Global Insight estimates for 2011. That gaping shortfall in material well-being, the optimists reckon, will eventually drive North Korea to make good with the international community and seek foreign investment. But first it will have to clear its unpaid debts.

In fact, it was a similarly desperate need for funds that initially drove North Korea to borrow a total of 680 million Deutsche Marks and 455 million Swiss francs in syndicated loans from nearly 100 foreign banks in the late 1970s. By 1984, the country had defaulted on these loans and they were left dormant for more than a decade. But in the late 1990s, some of the banks wanted to capitalize on hopes at that time for a reunification between North Korea and South Korea, so they parceled some of the nonperforming loans into two tranches of DEM293 million and CHF217 million.

BNP, now called BNP Paribas, was the manager on the deal. It created a special purpose vehicle called NK Debt Corp., incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, to hold the loans and then sold rights to them to investors.

Over the years, even as North Korea has again distanced itself from the international community and toyed with nuclear ambitions, interest in the zero-coupon no-income bond has waxed and waned among a select few buyers interested in frontier markets or risky bets. As if passing the hot potato, fund managers have been buying and holding these bonds for a few years and then exchanging them for something else, Chappell said.

The holdings are now concentrated among a dozen or so blue-chip pension fund managers and hedge funds, he said, but declined to name them.

Franklin Templeton Emerging Market Debt Opportunities Fund, which is allowed to invest in defaulted debt, confirmed that it holds about $4.25 million in nominal value of the Deutsche mark-denominated bonds. It declined to comment further.

“These investors are not saying the bond has to pay off to make money,” said Tim Slaughter, head of fixed income at Auerbach Grayson, an agency brokerage in New York. “For them, if the price goes up from 14 cents to 16 cents it’s a good return on a $5 million investment. Investors are not necessarily looking for North Korea to reconcile with South Korea.”

But others say this speculative game is simply not worth the risk.

“The price on North Korean debt is too high in the sense there are so many alternatives in frontier debt that are actually paying coupons and redemptions that are trading at attractive levels,” said Morten Bugge, chief investment officer at Global Evolution A/S, a Denmark-based hedge fund that had held these North Korean bonds in the early years.

Read the full story here:
North Korea’s Leadership Transition Draws Brave Debt Buyers
Dow Jones Newswire
Prabha Natarajan and Erin McCarthy
2011-12-22

ORIGINAL POST (2010-3-11): According to Businessweek:

BNP Paribas SA, France’s biggest bank, in 1997 created bonds denominated in Deutsche marks and Swiss francs secured on non-performing loans owed by the Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The notes mature today, and Exotix plans to issue new ones with about a 10-year tenor.

“There are very few investments left in the world like this,” Andrew Chappell, head of London emerging market fixed- income for Exotix, a broker specializing in distressed securities, said in a telephone interview. “The North Korean bonds are very cheap,” they may rise on signs of improved international relations and they are easier to trade than the underlying loans, he said.

President Kim Il Sung drove North Korea to become the first communist nation to default 34 years ago by spending almost a third of gross domestic product on its military. The United Nations toughened sanctions on son Kim Jong Il’s government after it detonated a second nuclear device in May, deepening an economic crisis that forced North Korea to revalue its currency in November by removing two zeros from the face value of the won.
…
“Investors have good reason to hold the notes even by extending them,” said Dong Yong Sueng, a senior fellow in the economic security team at the Samsung Economic Research Institute in Seoul. “They hope that the South Korean government may take over North Korean debts and repay them if the communist state collapses or the regime changes.”

About 320 million marks and 240 million francs ($225 million) of the zero-coupon 1997 bonds are outstanding, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Exotix last quoted them at 12.75 percent of par value as of March 8 from 11.5 percent a month earlier and 33 percent in December 2007.

While prices that low may be attractive to investors willing to take a five- or 10-year bet, “there are just so many better opportunities for investing in high-risk assets,” Richard Segal, director of emerging markets fixed-income at Knight Libertas Ltd., said in a phone interview from London.

“I don’t see much value in the notes even at 10 or 11 percent of par because I see no willingness of North Korea to reschedule the underlying loans and no willingness of South Korea to pay them off short of unification,” he said. That’s “unlikely for a long time.”
…
North Korea is overhauling its legal system in a bid to attract as much as $400 billion in foreign investment over the next decade, almost 20 times current GDP, South Korea’s MBC television reported on March 4.

Read the full story here:
North Korea bonds due today spur exotix bet on political change
Businessweek
Jungmin Hong
2010-3-11

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Posted in Banking, Debt, Finance, Fiscal & monetary policy, Foreign direct investment, France | Comments Closed

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