Archive for the ‘Black markets’ Category

Recent papers on DPRK topics

Friday, December 17th, 2010

Forgotten People:  The Koreans of the Sakhalin Island in 1945-1991
Download here (PDF)
Andrei Lankov
December 2010

North Korea: Migration Patterns and Prospects
Download here (PDF)
Courtland Robinson, Center for Refugee and Disaster Response, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University
August, 2010

North Korea’s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications
Download here (PDF)
Jonathan Medalia, Congressional Research Service
November 24, 2010

North Korea: US Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation
Download here (PDF)
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Congressional Research Service
Mi Ae-Taylor, Congressional Research Service
November 10, 2010

‘Mostly Propaganda in Nature:’ Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War
Download here (PDF)
Wilson Center NKIDP
Mitchell Lerner

Drug Trafficking from North Korea: Implications for Chinese Policy
Read here at the Brookings Institution web page
Yong-an Zhang, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies
December 3, 2010

Additional DPRK-focused CRS reports can be found here.

The Wilson Center’s previous NKIDP Working Papers found here.

I also have many papers and publications on my DPRK Economic Statistics Page.

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Chinese trade undermining DPRK information blockade

Thursday, December 16th, 2010

According to the Korea Herald:

Although not so explicitly, the communist North Korea appears to be becoming more aware of capitalist cultures and trends, a change the Kim Jong-il regime has feared the most and tried to prevent for decades.

Not only the social upper crust, but the majority of the general public has seen popular South Korean TV series through copies that flow in from China and is aware of the financial gap between the two divided states, North Korean defectors said during a recent forum in Seoul.

According to the defectors ― among hundreds of others who attempt to abandon their impoverished state and escape to the wealthier South each year ― such changes are causing a headache for the North Korean leader trying to secure internal unity before handing over the regime to his youngest son.

“It is difficult to fend off South Korean products and TV shows from entering the country so as long as China remains to be its main trade partner and financial donor,” said Ju Seong-ha, a North Korean defector who graduated from the North’s top Kim Il-sung University.

“The recent phenomena may result in North Koreans choosing South Korea over their own country when the time comes for them to decide.”

North Korea, which is one of the world’s last remaining totalitarian states and also one of the most secretive nations, keeps its people largely isolated from outside news and strictly forbids them from possessing goods that are not distributed by the ruling Workers’ Party.

But the impoverished state’s heavy dependence on Beijing for food and other commodities is inevitably opening up its people to goods and cultures from capitalist nations, particularly South Korea.

China has emerged as the world’s second largest economy after abandoning Stalinist policies and is one of the largest markets for South Korean pop culture, also widely known as “hallyu.”

Most copies of popular South Korean TV series and news that flow into North Korea are produced in China, which is notorious for illegally making cheap, low-quality copies of copyrighted materials.

A 20-something North Korean who escaped to Seoul last year said he had been “shocked” at the sight of South Korea the first time he saw a soap opera starring the country’s top celebrities.

“We had been told South Korea was an underdeveloped country full of beggars,” the defector said, requesting not to be named for safety reasons. “What I saw were beautiful, trendy people living in a glamorous city.”

“I say 90 percent of North Koreans have seen a South Korean TV series at least once,” he said.

Even security and judiciary officials watch popular South Korean soap operas in secret, another unnamed defector told the Dec. 10 forum in Seoul.

“Because the DVD players are sold at a relatively cheap price in North Korea, many households possess them and share CDs among themselves,” the defector said. “Seeing for themselves how well-off and happy people in the South seem, many people build up admiration for the country.”

The apparent popularity of South Korean culture in North Korea coincides with President Lee Myung-bak’s recently made remarks during his trip to Malaysia.

“No one can possibly stop the changes brewing among the general North Korean public,” the South Korean president had said.

Read the full story here:
Changes brewing in ‘not so isolated’ North
The Korea Herald
Shin Hae-in
12/15/2010

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Rice price up 40-fold in last year

Thursday, December 2nd, 2010

According ot the Korea Herald:

The price of rice in North Korea has soared nearly 40-fold in the year after the country’s botched currency reform.

Rice is now traded at around 900 North Korean won per kilogram in Pyongyang’s markets, according to online media outlet Daily NK. This is up 3,990 percent from 22 won late November last year in the newly introduced currency.

The North knocked two zeros off the face value of its old currency on Nov. 30 last year, exchanging 100-won bills for new 1-won notes. Therefore the price of a kilogram of rice, which was 2,200 won in the old currency, was redenominated to 22 won.

Under the currency reform plan, a 100-won note in the new currency should have the exchangeable value of a 10,000-won bill in the old currency. However, due to 4,000 percent inflation, the new 100-won note is now only worth 250 won in the old currency.

The price of rice in North Korea is deemed the benchmark of all prices in commercial trade.

“The apparent purpose of the North Korean currency reform was to reduce the amount of money in the markets to stabilize prices, but it failed to achieve this due to an absolute lack of commodity supplies,” said Cho Myung-chul, a senior fellow at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.

“The fact that rice prices jumped 4,000 percent based on the currency’s exchangeable value shows that the effect of the 100-fold revaluation has mostly disappeared.”

After major markets in the reclusive state were shut down in mid-January this year, rice prices in Pyongyang soared, hitting 1,300 won per kilo in early March. They dropped to the 400-won range in May as markets began to function again, but soared over the 1,000-won mark in August due to an exchange rate hike and damage caused by heavy rains.

When the North redenominated its currency, it placed a cap on the amount of money that could be converted per person, telling people to deposit the rest in state-run banks.

The measure, which was aimed at crippling the growing merchant class and reasserting control over market activities, tightened the distribution of food and stirred anti-regime sentiment.

This Daily NK story asserts that the average salary of a general worker is around 1,500 won a month, and it is not paid regularly.

Read the full story here:
N.K. rice price soars nearly 40-fold in a year
Korea Herald
Kim So-hyun
11/20/2010

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Rimjingang, Imjingang, and the Sunchon Vinalon Complex

Monday, November 8th, 2010

Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Evan Ramstad notes the following information about Rimjingang and Imjingang:

Japanese publisher Jiro Ishimaru has gotten a lot of attention over the past month for his new English-language book of articles from Rimjingang – the magazine about North Korea that’s written by North Koreans.

Over the past six years, he’s worked closely with a few dozen North Koreans to get insiders’ stories published.

Less well known is the North Korean defector in Seoul, Choi Jin-i, who worked closely with him until recently. She published a Korean version of the magazine while he handled Japanese.

They split earlier this year over funding differences. Mr. Ishimaru’s magazine is commercially-funded while Ms. Choi’s is supported by charitable contributions. Ms. Choi’s magazine now has a slightly different name. It’s called Imjingang.

Their writers are mainly North Koreans with the political and financial ability to visit China, where they can communicate freely.

For both Ms. Choi and Mr. Ishimaru, the biggest challenge is getting contributors to verify the information they report.

Mr. Ishimaru’s favorite scoop came last year. It was a video report that showed a 20-year-old textile factory in the North Korean city of Suncheon, long touted as a showplace industrial plant by North Korea’s state media, is actually unused and crumbling.

“The factory might have only run on opening day when the Great Leader (Kim Jong Il’s father Kim Il Sung) was there,” Mr. Ishimaru says. “There had been rumors inside the country that the factory never ran, but nobody outside the nation confirmed that. Our reporter went there and for the first time filmed the factory in ruins.”

Ms. Choi says her favorite article appeared in the magazine’s first issue in 2007. It was an analysis of North Korea’s economic situation by a high-ranking government official. She said she worked for more than a year to persuade the official to give an interview.

The quality of information in that interview surprised North Korea watchers. “Many South Korean scholars said they didn’t know there was an intellectual in North Korea,” Ms. Choi said.

And the surprise for me: The factory in Sunchon mentioned in the story is the Sunchon Vinalon Complex (not to be confused with the 2.8 Vinalon Complex in Hungnam).  I actually used the video mentioned in this story and matched it up with Google Earth Satellite imagery to confirm it was shot in the DPRK.  You can see the blog post and video here.

Read the Wall Street Journal article here:
North Korea by North Koreans; How the Magazines Work
Wall Street Journal
Evan Ramstad
11/8/2010

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DPRK restricts private car use, rattles markets

Monday, November 1st, 2010

Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)
NK Brief No. 10-11-01-1
11/1/2010

The North Korean Ministry of People’s Security (MPS) recently issued an order restricting the use of automobiles and warning that any car or truck used to earn private income would be confiscated by the State. There were a few cases of authorities cracking down on the use of private buses in the mid-2000s, but this is the first time there has been a widespread crackdown on the private use of all vehicles.

According to a report from the Daily NK, a source from North Hamgyeong Province has revealed that “on an order from the MPS, a crackdown on privately-owned cars, buses, and 1.5-2 ton small trucks began last month,” and, “all traffic police were mobilized and are checking all registrations, car-use permits, and driving licenses.” According to the source, each regional transportation authority is filing comprehensive situation reports, which show that with the exception of cars used by the elite, all illegally-used cars are being confiscated. Even cars used by military-run foreign capital organizations are subject to inspection by police.

In North Korea, the lack of electricity has led, since the mid~2000s, to the sharp drop in the use of trains and a rise in reliance on the so-called ‘service car’ as the primary method of moving people and goods around the country. This crackdown on service cars will be carried out in two phases: Phase 1 will run until the end of the year, then Phase 2 will be carried out until April 2011. The ownership and use of cars by organizations and businesses will also be investigated, while other cars will be inspected one at a time as they travel the roads. If any illegal use is discovered, the car will be impounded.

This kind of measure appears to be one aspect of North Korean authorities’ on-going battle against “anti-socialism.” Cars and other government property being put to private use is problematic, but a crackdown of this size indicates that organizations and government workers are abusing the rules on such a scale that the government can no longer tolerate their corruption. In order for these service cars to exist, authorities must break laws, forge documents, and pay bribes to get a car registered, purchase gas, and handle profits.

However, a crackdown on these cars is expected to have many side-effects. Service cars began replacing trains in 2004, but the people’s reliance on them grew so quickly that they are now the primary means of transportation throughout North Korea.

Ultimately, the North can not avoid significant aftershocks of the measure; without service cars, not only will businesses suffer production problems, those people who make their living through wholesale and retail markets will suffer, and the standard of living for people across the country will take a hit.

Previous posts on this topic cna be found here and here.

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Daily NK: DPRK worried about prostitution/drugs

Monday, November 1st, 2010

According to the Daily NK:

The North Korean authorities consider both prostitution and drugs to be serious problems and are actively seeking ways to combat them, according to an internal document obtained by The Daily NK.

Obtained on the 28th, the document, “Measures against Young Women Earning Money through Prostitution,” produced internally by the People’s Safety Ministry (PSM), reveals that the PSM has instructed local offices to crackdown on prostitution and drug-related crimes more vigorously.

This document was reportedly distributed to provincial committees of the Party and local PSM offices in July this year.

According to the document, “Anti-socialist phenomenon, young women and college students taking part in prostitution included, are appearing,” adding, “Strong measures to overcome this situation must be prepared.”

“At commuting times, women in large groups have been seen taking part in prostitution around bus stops or train stations,” the document states. “Law enforcement officials must not yield to these actions.”

The PSM document also focuses on drug crimes, reporting that, “The circulation and use of illegal drugs is increasing. We must establish measures to overcome drug-related activities.”

The document represents a tacit admission by the PSM that both prostitution and drug use have expanded to the point of becoming social problems in North Korea, a fact which the authorities have never admitted publicly.

As in many other countries, economic difficulties in North Korea tend to lead to an increase in the number of young women entering prostitution, because it represents one of the few ways to make ends meet. Inside North Korea sources say that the March of Tribulation led to a significant increase in prostitute numbers, and last year’s confiscatory currency redenomination is said to have had a similar effect.

As a result, sources say that regardless of the authorities’ will to crack down on prostitution and other illegal activities, it will be impossible because they are now an ingrained part of North Korean society.

Furthermore, even though public trials of persons accused of prostitution-related offences are held regularly in provincial areas, the law is unable to reach the most powerful prostitution rings because they are tacitly protected by paid-off PSM officials.

Read the full story here:
PSM Admits to Seriousness of Social Ills
Daily NK
Shin Joo Hyun
11/1/2010

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$1m won to secure job as Hyesan police officer

Friday, October 29th, 2010

According to Good Friends:

Hyesan City police officers in the Ryanggang Province are still doing well amidst North Korea’s economic chaos which has been further exacerbated by the government’s recent currency reform. Illegal trade in Hyesan, which is close to the national border, is rampant and particularly connected to the sale of drugs as well as rare metals, such as gold, silver, copper, iron, et cetera that are under tight government control. While some smuggling operations are managed by individual venders, most are large-scale enterprises. Bribery has thus become customary since sending and receiving prohibited items requires the aid of police or security officers. As a result, obtaining such positions in Hyesan has become very competitive; in particular, many Ryanggang Province officers have been applying for transfers, with bribes being exchanged in the process.

In order to become police or security officer in Hyesan a candidate must offer a bribe of at least one million won in the new currency. This may be a large sum of money; however, it’s only a matter of time before officers recoup their investment by taking in bribes from the smugglers. A smuggling or drug case that may be considered big in other regions can be resolved fairly easily if the right security officials are involved. Last September, a reputed drug trafficker who was arrested on drug related offenses was released within days after being declared innocent of charges. Although an order for intensifying drug regulations had been issued across the country, money clearly had priority.

Such corruption is encouraged by a society-wide permissiveness that doesn’t make a big deal out of anything unless it has to do with ideology issues. Simply speaking, if an incident is not “related to espionage,” then it is not a big deal. Rather, releasing culprits in exchange for money is regarded as a way of surviving during difficult times. Since corruption has become routine, neither officers nor smugglers seems to have a sense that what they are doing is wrong. The same goes for the people at large. For example, although officers are prohibited from possessing and riding personal motorbikes, those who do not own their own are often looked down upon by citizens; they believe that such officers must be slow-witted for not having one being in the position that they are. Along with the jeering is a healthy dose of envy.

If the officers take bribes from smugglers to look the other way, the wives of officers use their husbands’ status to actually join in the fray. They send articles to and receive prohibited items from China; they money they earn from such smuggling activities actually surpass the amount their husbands earn through bribes. Even if the wives are caught, the husbands step in to make the problem go away. The money a husband-wife team earns in this way surpasses the imagination of ordinary people. In Hyesan, there is a saying that only police officers have withstood the currency reform tsunami without breaking a sweat. Others say that “all the laws enacted by the government only serve to fill the bellies of the police officers.”

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Information on the DPRK’s informal transport market

Thursday, October 28th, 2010

According to the Daily NK:

With North Korea’s domestic security forces having been engaged in inspecting and confiscating vehicles being used for private gain since October 18th, the question of whether the so-called “servi-cha” industry will stay the course has become a central issue for many. This is because the presence or absence of the “servi-cha” can make or break the North Korean domestic economy, much like last year’s currency reform.

What is a “servi-cha”?

There are two types of “servi-cha”. The first are vehicles, mainly buses and trucks, owned by state organs and enterprises, which transport people and supplies in exchange for money. Enterprises use the money earned from the service to provide rations for the workers, cover transportation costs or obtain further raw materials for production.

The second type of “servi-cha” is those owned by individuals but registered as being owned by an enterprise; they are used for private gain. Collusion among three parties; the owner of the vehicle, the driver and the enterprise under whose name the vehicle is registered, is necessary in such cases. The owner of the vehicle acquires a car from, predominantly, China or Japan, whereupon cadres of a certain enterprise or local unit register the vehicle under the name of the enterprise or unit. A driver is hired thereafter, who then gets a drivers’ license from the cadre and sets about earn a profit by providing public transportation to residents or moving supplies. A portion of the money earned is given to the cadre, who will usually take a fraction for personal gain and register the remainder as company profit.

In general, two people man a “servi-cha”; the driver and his assistant. Alongside them, the owner of the freight being transported is present, and thereafter empty seats are taken by other passengers. If the car meets an inspection on the way to its destination, there is no problem; on paper, the vehicle is legitimate; it belongs to a unit, and the owner of the freight carries a transportation permit that he/she has received from the car owner. With a bit of alcohol and tobacco on hand to bribe the inspector, even the people occupying the empty seats are free to pass.

A North Korean license plate contains information on the institution the vehicle belongs to. As most people do not have a travel permit, they tend to prefer “servi-cha” that display the license number of a powerful institution. Transportation fees differ according to the type of license plate on the “servi-cha”. “Servi-cha” with plates from powerful groups charge higher fees than those with plates from food factories and agricultural offices, for example.

Vehicles are assigned numbers based on certain rules; license plates that reflect an auspicious date are deemed best; either 216 (February 16th; Kim Jong Il’s birthday) or 727 (July 27th; Victory Day). The license plate of a car given as a gift by Kim Jong Il to someone on the Central Committee might be assigned a number such as 216-11-101.

Furthermore, each department of the Party uses its own license plate number in order to distinguish ownership of vehicles. For example, the Party’s Finance and Accounting Department uses the number 02; 11 and 12 is reserved for Party offices; 12 to 14 for administrative units; 15 to 17 for the People’s Safety Agency; 18 to 20 for the National Security Agency; 21 for judicial branches; 22 for a unit under Party Department No. 39, 90 for the Central Party liaison office, and 46 for passenger transport services.

Inspections are stricter for those “servi-cha” with less impressive license plates. Travel permit checks become more thorough, and the inspectors ask more questions about the cargo. Thus, vehicle owners with “weaker” plates tend to have to give more bribes.

Origins of the “Servi-cha”

Public transportation virtually stopped in North Korea during the economic collapse which began in 1995, bringing about shortages of fuel and electricity. The country was incapacitated to the point that the government issued a decree calling on cadres to walk.

The first people to break the logjam were from foreign-currency earning units. They were able to use imported fuel to transport freight for other companies, at a price. Many enterprises quickly spotted the rising demand for freight logistics services, and started earning considerable profits by importing Chinese Dongfeng or Japanese second-hand trucks.

Demand for this was not limited to institutions and enterprises. Vendors also wanted to move their supplies around the country. The importing of Chinese products to the Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Zone beginning in 1997 was followed by a rise in long distance cargo transportation to cities as far as away as Pyongyang, Hyesan, Sinuiju, Kaesong and Haeju.

The Different Types of “Servi-cha”

In general, trucks are a popular choice. This is because they can transport cargo and people at the same time. Buses, which are more readily owned by institutions and enterprises than trucks, are also often utilized for long-distance trips. A regular 45-person bus will often be full to capacity, with the central aisle lined with makeshift seats.

Party and military cadres also use their vehicles as “servi-cha”. It is commonplace for them to order drivers to look out for long-distance travelers as a means of earning extra money when the car is not in use. This also applies to the case of military cadres.

Sometimes, the seats of Japanese second-hand vehicles or Chinese second-hand jeeps are removed in order to take a maximum of eleven passengers.

Earning Money through “Servi-cha”

Use of “servi-cha” has vastly increased the quantity of goods and number of people crossing provinces, with goods smuggled in across the Tumen and Yalu Rivers in the north spotted in locations as far away as South Hwanghae and Kangwon Province, both of which border South Korea. Therefore, it can be said that production and trade between enterprises and vendors owes a great deal to the “servi-cha”.

For example, in 2001 the price of sweet potatoes peaked in the Rajin-Sonbong Zone. Demand for sweet potatoes was high in places north of Hamheung because climate conditions in that northern region are not favorable for cultivating the crop. While sweet potatoes were priced at 7 won per kilogram in South Hwanghae Province, in the Rajin-Songbong Zone the price exceeded 45 won per kilogram.

Vendors from Rajin-Sonbong were therefore able to increase profits 50% by selling Chinese everyday goods in Hwanghae province, and then make seven times more money selling southern sweet potatoes in the north.

It goes without saying that initial expenditure is required to pull this off. The cost of changing tires, of filling up the vehicle with gas, of bribing officials for travel permits and drivers’ permits, all added up to about 70,000 won. However, a round-trip could earn the “servi-cha” crew a net profit of 60,000 to 70,000 won. At the time, it was very good money.

Kim Kyung Hee’s “Servi-cha” Experiment

On her way to Kangkye in Jagang Province, Kim noticed a throng on the street, and approached, concealing her identity. They were people waiting for a “servi-cha”. Leaving her assistant and vehicle behind, Kim quietly stood in line with the other people.

Eventually, a 10-ton “servi-cha” arrived and people began scrambling for seats on the platform normally reserved for cargo. Paying her fare, 50 won, Kim also tried to board, but the driver noted her less than ordinary appearance and gave her the passenger seat.

After a few minutes of travel, a strange voice could be heard;

“Comrade, our time is up.”

The source of the sound was Kim’s watch. It was a message from her assistant, who was following the “servi-cha”. The driver, concerned for any number of reasons, immediately stopped and asked Kim to descend from the cab. In the end, the “servi-cha” left her behind on the road. It has been said that Kim went back to her vehicle and told her assistant that the “servi-cha’s are rather fun”.

Read the full story here:
Servi-Cha: the Lifeblood of the People’s Economy
Daily NK
Im Jeong Jin
10/28/2010

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North Korea’s market restrictions revisited

Wednesday, October 20th, 2010

Reuters published a concise report of the DPRK’s recent restrictions on market activity which is compiled from work by Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard.  Here is the Reuters report:

Reclusive North Korea has imposed a series of measures since 2008 to rein in market activity, foreign trade, and activity across the border.

A Peterson Institute for International Economics policy brief published this year outlines some of the rules put in place:

2008
January – Women under 40 banned from trading in markets, followed by efforts to redeploy them to workplaces.

April – Wide-ranging Antisocialist Conscience Investigation of Sinuiju, the country’s main land port with China, including the books of trading organizations. Restrictions placed on carrying merchandise on bicycles and carts in Sinuiju.

July – Party, police, and market management office coordinate efforts to limit large sales in the Pyongsung market, an emerging wholesale center for the country in Pyongan province.

October – Nationwide ban on sale of shoes in markets and new restrictions limiting trade in foodstuffs to individually cultivated fruits and vegetables.

November – Major directive announcing the conversion of markets back to the more restrictive farmers’ market format. Markets to be open only on the 1st, 11th, and 21st of each month, and to be limited to retail sales of individually cultivated food; other foodstuffs and manufactures to be sold through the ‘public distribution system’ and state-run stores. Major cities, including Pyongyang, Hamheung, Soochun, Kaesung, and Chungjin, set up model farmers markets.

2009
January – National Security Agency special investigative unit scrutinizes names, number of family members, and livelihoods of households in the National Border Area suspected of involvement in border crossing and trade. Public education campaigns and increased punishment for border crossing.

March – New controls over lodging and movement without passes in National Border Area [and] imposition of strict movement controls in connection with the Supreme Peoples Assembly elections; intensified controls following the elections.

May – Announcement of 150-day campaign accompanied by renewed implementation of market restrictions on women under 40 and restricted items, including products of joint ventures, industrial goods, and American and South Korean products. Punishment of emergent back-alley markets and ‘sell and run’ sales. Public education campaigns against market activities.

June – Closure of Pyongsung market in Pyongan province.

July – Increased control and surveillance over households in National Border Area with defectors.

November – North Korea announces a reform to replace all currency in circulation with new bills and coins.

The Peterson Institute report mentioned in this article can be found here (PDF).

I should also point out that many of these dictates were uniformly unenforceable and many have been rescinded (including the 10-day rule) since the currency reform was implemented.

Read the full story here:
Factbox: How North Korea has tightened controls
Reuters
10/20/2010

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Did the DPRK foil an explosive smuggling attempt?

Tuesday, October 19th, 2010

According to the Daily NK:

Three North Korean Senior Middle School students have been caught trying to carry explosives into North Korea, according to a Radio Free Asia (RFA) report today.

Citing a source from Hyesan, RFA reported, “On the 11th, immediately after Chosun Workers’ Party founding day, 15-year old Songbong Senior Middle School student Kang and two others were caught trying to bring explosives in from China,” adding, “As a result of this, the security authorities have been put on emergency alert and the border totally closed.”

The RFA report explains that the three crossed the border into China with the help of border guards and smuggled back 10kg of explosives in two bags, but were caught at the entrance to a village by a community watch guard unit consisting of workers.

According to another source, “I’ve heard a number of rumors, including that they brought the explosives to destroy the bridge that passes by Wangdeok Station.” However, the source added, “Whether this is true or not I cannot say.”

Wangdeok Station is among a number of stations in North Korea on lines reserved for the exclusive use of Kim Jong Il.

The North Korean authorities are apparently at a loss to explain the case, because the students were just the children of normal workers; they did not have criminal records and were only interested in literature and reading.

Since the event occurred, the Yangkang Province authorities have stepped up security, with provincial committee cadres and students from Hyesan Agriculture University patrolling in the area around Bocheonbo Combat Victory Monument and the local statue of Kim Il Sung. They have also dispatched tens of guards to idolization sites such as Hyesan Revolutionary Museum and Kim Il Sung Revolutionary Activities Institute.

The report also added information on further similar cases: in 1997, a group of people were arrested after smuggling explosives into the country, allegedly in order to blow up the city’s statue of Kim Il Sung, and there has also been an arson case involving Kim Jong Suk Art Theatre and persons with complaints against the Kim Jong Il system.

It should be stated that stories such as these should be regarded with some skepticism since almost all of the facts are unverifiable.

For what it is worth, here is a satellite image of the  Wangdeok Leadership Train Station in Hyesan ( 41.448124°, 128.277445°):

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